Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 26, 2014, 08:19:22 PM
One problem that practically everyone encounters in staging Chaeronea is that practically every rules set in existence gives Macedonian Companions a hard time frontally against hoplites and spear types generally. While this is really a subject for separate discussion, from repeated examples of Macedonian cavalry penetrating lines of opposing spearmen (Granicus, Issus - they also went through some at Gaugamela, but in flank) I conclude that a Macedonian cavalry wedge could go through frontally-facing hoplite infantry like a knife through steak (some steaks are of course tougher than others, and Alex seems to have got temporarily stuck in the opposing hoplites at the Granicus).
If rules sets instead allowed Companions to be superior to hoplites in frontal combat, then on Alexander's flank Chaeronea could run exactly as the sources say it ran, even with him on horseback.
As per the quote and thanks to Patrick for the prompt, any thoughts as to the whys and the wherefores of Macedonian cavalry success (especially frontally) against close order infantry? This is of particular interest to me as I am building up my Macedonian forces in 15mm to the point where I now have 400+ figures painted and based ::)
I shall let someone run through the usual thinking first, and the reasons for it.
Well I will have a stab at the counter argument in that conventional thinking says that cavalry will not charge home against formed close infantry presenting spears. Does this mean that the Macedonian (and I presume Companion) cavalry had an effect, not present in other cavalry charges, that accounts for their success? Or are the accounts somewhat "poetic" in description of the charge delivery even if the outcome is the same? Or is it just a case that the Macedonian cavalry managed to instill panic in their opponents in all of the major engagements described such that their (the receiving infantry) cohesion wavered and or broke before contact?
What Macedonian cavalry success frontally against close order infantry?
At Chaironeia, cavalry aren't mentioned.
At Graneikos, the defeat of the surrounded mercenaries a was achieved jointly by the cavalry and the infantry; but "leading the phalanx against these, and ordering the cavalry to fall upon them from all sides, he soon completely surrounded them and cut them up" - there is no indication that the cavalry broke through frontally.
At Issos, we simply don't know what Persian troops Alexander and the Companions broke through - the controversy about whether the Persian kardakes were hoplites or peltasts is well known. We have one source saying the kardakes were hoplites, another mentioning peltasts, personally I suspect there were some of each - but we don't know that Alexander broke through heavy or close-order infantry.
At Gaugamela there were a few heavy infantry near Darius, and the Companions had to go either through or round them, but we don't know which, and if they went through them then, as Patrick said, it was presumably from the flank.
So I suspect this thread may be a red herring.
Fair and clear points Duncan, which reinforces (for me) my stereo-typical view of cavalry against close order infantry.
Tha Kardakes armament and modus operandi is admitedly a mish-mash of (to me) confusion. However, peltast style Kardakes would presumably fit the bill of being more of an easier route through for the cavalry.
I hate red herrings and especially if its a thread I started! :-[
Let us begin with Chaeronea. The principal source is Plutarch, and what good old Lucius Mnestrius (yes, if you had a name like that you would probably want to be known to posterity as 'Plutarch') says is:
"
He was also present at Chaeroneia and took part in the battle against the Greeks, and he is said to have been the first to break the ranks of the Sacred Band of the Thebans."
In the Greek, this is 'protos ensisei', which means the first to attack, first to drive into or first to damage, shake, jar, rush upon or attack. To me this reads as if he is at the tip of a wedge. Since Macedonian cavalry used wedges and their infantry did not, this implies to me that he was leading cavalry.
The Sacred Band were famous for dying at Chaeronea "with all their wounds in front", so the logic goes thus:
1) Alexander is first into the Theban lines
2) Alexander is therefore at the tip of a wedge
3) Alexander is therefore leading cavalry
4) The Theban Sacred Band is wiped out, taking all their wounds in front
5) Therefore they were overcome frontally by Alexander's cavalry.
This may not be crystal clear or firm to the reader, so in order to validate the idea that Macedonian cavalry could overcome spearmen (and specifically hoplites) frontally, we have to look at their frontal actions against such troop types in other engagements, notably the Granicus and Issus. I leave aside Gaugamela because Alexander seems to have struck that particular contingent in flank, and while turning to face may not have been beyond their capabilities, they are not known to have done so.
The GranicusThe Greek mercenaries, who were predominantly hoplites, were surrounded at the close of the action and refused quarter as 'traitors to Greece'. Then we have the following two accounts of what happened next.
"
The enemy, however, did not resist vigorously, nor for a long time, but fled in a rout, all except the Greek mercenaries. These made a stand at a certain eminence, and asked that Alexander should promise them quarter. [7] But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword (it was not Bucephalas, but another); and most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate."
Plutarch, Life of Alexander, 16.6-7
"Ordering a combined assault by infantry and cavalry [kai toutois ten de phalagga epagagōn kai tous hippeas pantē prospesein keleusas
en mesō di' oligou katakoptei autous] Alexander quickly had them surrounded and butchered to a man."
(Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander, I.16.2)
I have put one particular phrase in bold, because it is for some reason omitted from most translations:
en mesō di' oligou katakoptei autous. It means:
he himself cut his way almost into the middle.
Arrian and Plutarch thus agree on a Macedonian cavalry charge led by Alexander
into the hoplite formation. One can surmise that if he 'charged foremost upon them' he did so frontally, not from a flank (which might anyway have been difficult if they had adopted an all-round defence).
IssusQuote from: Duncan Head on February 26, 2014, 10:32:47 PM
At Issos, we simply don't know what Persian troops Alexander and the Companions broke through - the controversy about whether the Persian kardakes were hoplites or peltasts is well known. We have one source saying the kardakes were hoplites, another mentioning peltasts, personally I suspect there were some of each - but we don't know that Alexander broke through heavy or close-order infantry.
At Issus the Companions frontally charged and broke through picked Persian infantry across a (shallow) river. Actually the question about whether Kardakes were peltasts or hoplites can probably be answered with the word
neither*, but if they were hoplites then Alexander broke clean through them; if they were peltasts they had no business holding a frontage in a role for which heavy/close order infantry would have been required. Whatever type of infantry they were, the Companions went through them frontally like a dose of salts.
*
I have a theory that they were traditional Persian close-order infantry with bow, shield and spear.
In the same battle Alexander also led the Companions into a flank attack on the main body of Greek mercenaries; we can perhaps assume that they did not manage to change facing before he was upon them.
What we observe in these battles (and at Gaugamela where once again Macedonian cavalry ride down Greek hoplites, this time from the flank) is the confidence and effectiveness with which Companions charge into infantry, and in at least some cases specifically hoplite, formations from the front. We never hear of Companions being repulsed by any infantry, hoplite or otherwise. For me, this is enough to suggest that Companions (and perhaps other xyston-armed, wedge-fighting cavalry) were able to defeat spear-armed infantry frontally.
If this was indeed the case, it would give yet another reason for the Macedonian infantry to use the sarissa (pike) rather than the traditional doru (spear). It also raises the interesting possibility that 'sarissaphoroi' among the Macedonian cavalry actually used sarissas in order to outreach opponents with longer spears or even pikes, but that is just conjectural possibility.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 26, 2014, 11:56:49 PM
Arrian and Plutarch thus agree on a Macedonian cavalry charge led by Alexander into the hoplite formation. One can surmise that if he 'charged foremost upon them' he did so frontally, not from a flank (which might anyway have been difficult if they had adopted an all-round defence).
Just on the basis of the information provided, I think this is a bit of a stretch. The initial attempt seems to have failed, then a more deliberate combined approach is used, then finally Alexander smashes the formation. By the point he breaks into the centre, it is probably on its last legs, so less of a test of cavalry skill that a fresh, fully formed unit. Also, if some suggest he may have led an infantry attack on the Sacred Band (which was news to me because I haven't read any recent Alexander stuff) what is to stop him having dismounted here to lead an assault?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 26, 2014, 11:56:49 PM
Let us begin with Chaeronea. The principal source is Plutarch, and what good old Lucius Mnestrius (yes, if you had a name like that you would probably want to be known to posterity as 'Plutarch') says is:
" He was also present at Chaeroneia and took part in the battle against the Greeks, and he is said to have been the first to break the ranks of the Sacred Band of the Thebans."
In the Greek, this is 'protos ensisei', which means the first to attack, first to drive into or first to damage, shake, jar, rush upon or attack. To me this reads as if he is at the tip of a wedge. Since Macedonian cavalry used wedges and their infantry did not, this implies to me that he was leading cavalry.
But surely the same phrase could mean 'he was the first general who's men broke the ranks of the Theban sacred band'.
A general can 'break the enemy ranks' without having to do it in person. He gets the credit even if he merely gives the order because it is assumed that his genius made it happen.
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 26, 2014, 11:56:49 PM
Let us begin with Chaeronea. The principal source is Plutarch ... In the Greek, this is 'protos ensisei', which means the first to attack, first to drive into or first to damage, shake, jar, rush upon or attack. To me this reads as if he is at the tip of a wedge. Since Macedonian cavalry used wedges and their infantry did not, this implies to me that he was leading cavalry.
The same Plutarch, in the life of Pelopidas, says: "It is said, moreover, that the Band was never beaten, until the battle of Chaeroneia; and when, after the battle, Philip was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the
sarisai, with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed...". So the Sacred Band were slain by the sarisai, the weapon of the Macedonian phalanx. That much is reasonably clear.
Hammond, IIRC, combined this and Alexander's charge to suggest that the Thebans were held frontally by the phalanx and Alexander's cavalry charged through a gap into their flank; this is a bit speculative. Again IIRC, the suggestion of a phalanx attack is one of the planks of Buckler's theory that we have no evidence for cavalry involvement at all. That Alexander was the first to break the Theban ranks does not prevent his being on foot: even in a line, someone can break through first. The narrative you get from lookiing at both Plutarch passages is, at best, very ambiguous indeed; but without the preconception that Alexander was leading cavalry, it looks as if he led a phalanx attack.
QuoteThe Granicus...."But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword" ...
I have put one particular phrase in bold, because it is for some reason omitted from most translations: en mesō di' oligou katakoptei autous. It means: he himself cut his way almost into the middle".
Before or after his horse was killed?
LSJ suggests that while
oligou dein or
oligou on its own may mean "almost",
di'oligou is more like "at a short distance" or "for a short time". So something more like "he cut his way a short distance into them"? Combining the two passages suggests that Alexander did indeed charge, whether into the Greek front or into a flank - though "influenced by anger more than by reason", which suggests that he was perceived as acting rashly rather than in pursuance of the standard Macedonian tactical doctrine - but that he only got a little way into the Greek formation before being unhorsed.
QuoteAt Issus the Companions frontally charged and broke through picked Persian infantry
I don't think anyone describes them as "picked".
Quoteacross a (shallow) river. Actually the question about whether Kardakes were peltasts or hoplites can probably be answered with the word neither*, but if they were hoplites then Alexander broke clean through them; if they were peltasts they had no business holding a frontage in a role for which heavy/close order infantry would have been required. Whatever type of infantry they were, the Companions went through them frontally like a dose of salts.
But if they weren't hoplites, they have no real bearing on the question. Even Tissaphernes' lot at Kounaxa could ride through peltasts.
Quote*I have a theory that they were traditional Persian close-order infantry with bow, shield and spear.
I believed something similar once - hence my reconstruction in AMPW, and an article in
Slingshot probably somewhen around 1981 - but no more. I now reconcile Arrian/Ptolemy's "the kardakes are hoplites" with Kallisthenes/Polybios' "peltasts" by way of Curtius' list of units to suggest that both troop-types were present.
QuoteWhat we observe in these battles (and at Gaugamela where once again Macedonian cavalry ride down Greek hoplites, this time from the flank) is the confidence and effectiveness with which Companions charge into infantry, and in at least some cases specifically hoplite, formations from the front. We never hear of Companions being repulsed by any infantry, hoplite or otherwise. For me, this is enough to suggest that Companions (and perhaps other xyston-armed, wedge-fighting cavalry) were able to defeat spear-armed infantry frontally.
At Chaironeia, the decisive blow was clearly a phalanx attack. At Graneikos, the cavalry part of the combined assault seems to have had very limited success. At Issos, which is the best example for Patrick's case, the most we can say is that Alexander's cavalry broke through some infantry of uncertain type. Yes, the Companions were confident and prepared to charge infantry, but there is no unambiguous example of their charging heavy infantry from the front and winning.
The notion of Macedonian companions cracking through formed heavy infantry, especially hoplite infantry, has always intrigued me. Let me grab my popcorn and get comfortable...
Someone pointed out the confusion within the evidence here. The sources we have are not trying to tell us whether Alexander and his companions charged into a hoplite formation frontally despite Oatrick's elaborate chain of supposition. they are generally saying that the Macedonians attacked someone , Alexander was involved and the target was beaten. Even where we can reasonably surmise that the attackers are cavakry we are not told that a frontal charge to contact was made.
Cavalry have a repertoire of ways of. dealing with infantry.
1) They can charge them frntally, crack in and hope that theycan overwhelm the oppsing spear line. That would take a lot of courage and willingness to lose expensive trained men and riders. Goths can't do it, Sarmatians don't do it, Parthian cataphracts do not do this.
2) They can charge towards them, continuing if the infantry flinch and waver enough to indicate they will run, but turning aside if they do not and coming back to try again.
3) They can use associated missile men to create a hole in the infantry line and then break in. Once the line is broken the cavalry are through because they close so quickly.
4) They can ride up to the infantry and hack slash and poke at them until they create a gap in the line. Because the cavalry can hold back units on either flank in reserve they can prevent the infantry coming forward andcan so localise the point of melee. By rotating smsll units into the fray the cavalry can wear down the infantry at the point of contact until a charging unit can break through.
5) They can use their own missiles to concentrate on a sector of line, weaken it and then break through.
The cavalry can use these different techniques according to the situation. At Hastings it is a combination of 3and 4. With their long xyston I would think that 4 was particularly appropriate for the Companions, reverting to 2 when the opponent looked degraded enough.
Being very tired is generally a precursor to losing. When infantry become exhausted they are probably easy meat for a cavalry charge. At the end if a battle keeping cavalry out would difficult for highly stressed men who have already fought for a long time against say other infantry.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 27, 2014, 11:55:39 AM
5) They can use their own missiles to concentrate on a sector of line, weaken it and then break through.
Did the Companions
have their own missiles? I was of the impression the carried only lances/spears and swords.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 27, 2014, 08:24:20 AM
Also, if some suggest he may have led an infantry attack on the Sacred Band (which was news to me because I haven't read any recent Alexander stuff) what is to stop him having dismounted here to lead an assault?
The fact that he had a horse killed under him? Incidentally, I do not see in our sources any mention of a failed initial assault followed by a more deliberate combined arms one.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 27, 2014, 08:35:46 AM
But surely the same phrase could mean 'he was the first general who's men broke the ranks of the Theban sacred band'.
I wondered about that, but the Greek seems to have the sense of immediate combat not abstract achievement.
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 27, 2014, 09:32:34 AM
The same Plutarch, in the life of Pelopidas, says: "It is said, moreover, that the Band was never beaten, until the battle of Chaeroneia; and when, after the battle, Philip was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the sarisai, with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed...". So the Sacred Band were slain by the sarisai, the weapon of the Macedonian phalanx. That much is reasonably clear.
Again, this is what I used to think until I began to wonder if Plutarch specifically means the infantry sarissa. In Plutarch's Alexander (68.4) Alexander slays Abuletes, son of Oxyathres, with a
sarisa (one would expect him to use a xyston), and in 67.2, when the army is having a 'Bacchic march' Plutarch remarks that 'not a shield (pelta) nor helmet (kranos) nor spear (sarisa) was to be seen'. The focus of this comment seems to be upon Alexander and his Companions, although it could be a generalised comment applied to the whole army, but in such a case I would expected 'aspis' rather than 'pelta' as the generic word for shield. He has Alexander bear a xyston at Gaugamela but this is the only mention of the weapon other than when he has Cleitus use one to strike down Rhoesaces at the Granicus (where incidentally Plutarch has Alexander carrying a 'pelta' which seems to tie in with 67.2).
All things considered, I do not think we can draw the conclusion that the Sacred Band were slain by Macedonian infantry, particularly not on the basis of the word 'sarisais', which Plutarch may be using (as apparently in Alexander 67.2) to mean cavalry lances. For Alexander to be leading and fighting in an infantry formation at Chaeronea seems to run counter to what we know of Macedonian practice - if anyone was to fight with the infantry, it seems to have been daddy, not junior -
vide Antigonus and Demetrius at Ipsus.
Quote
QuoteThe Granicus...."But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword" ...
I have put one particular phrase in bold, because it is for some reason omitted from most translations: en mesō di' oligou katakoptei autous. It means: he himself cut his way almost into the middle".
Before or after his horse was killed?
Before.
Quote
LSJ suggests that while oligou dein or oligou on its own may mean "almost", di'oligou is more like "at a short distance" or "for a short time". So something more like "he cut his way a short distance into them"? Combining the two passages suggests that Alexander did indeed charge, whether into the Greek front or into a flank - though "influenced by anger more than by reason", which suggests that he was perceived as acting rashly rather than in pursuance of the standard Macedonian tactical doctrine - but that he only got a little way into the Greek formation before being unhorsed.
This is quite possible, and I may have misunderstood
di'oligou as
oligou dein, so he does not get very far into the middle of the mercenary formation. I doubt however that Alexander would, even if acting rashly, be able to change Macedonian tactical doctrine on the spot: his 'anger' I read as emotive commitment against the 'traitors to Greece', and Plutarch is reproving him for losing men in a fight that was basically unnecessary. I know of no case where his actual tactical judgement was clouded by his emotions, including this one.
There may be a good reason why he would not have got far. The mercenaries were surrounded, and presumably under attack from all sides. This would have pressed them together without fall-back room, and while this would have increased their losses it would also have meant that Alexander's cavalry could not bounce them back, and hence progress would be stopped rather than the momentum continuing.
He does however penetrate a formation of hoplites with Companions in a frontal charge, which is the point that grabbed my interest.
Quote
QuoteAt Issus the Companions frontally charged and broke through picked Persian infantry
I don't think anyone describes them as "picked".
They do seem to have been the best infantry on the Persian side, so I am happy to substitute that wording.
Quote
But if they weren't hoplites, they have no real bearing on the question. Even Tissaphernes' lot at Kounaxa could ride through peltasts.
But they were let through a gap. To develop the point, anyone can ride through a gap. ;) And the choice is not necessarily
either hoplites
or peltasts.
Quote
Quote*I have a theory that they were traditional Persian close-order infantry with bow, shield and spear.
I believed something similar once - hence my reconstruction in AMPW, and an article in Slingshot probably somewhen around 1981 - but no more. I now reconcile Arrian/Ptolemy's "the kardakes are hoplites" with Kallisthenes/Polybios' "peltasts" by way of Curtius' list of units to suggest that both troop-types were present.
Your earlier belief may in fact be correct. Arrian (II.10.3) gives the impression they were archers, which fits neither hoplites nor peltasts but accords with the traditional Persian infantry armament mix.
Quote
At Chaironeia, the decisive blow was clearly a phalanx attack.
For reasons given above, I think not.
Quote
At Graneikos, the cavalry part of the combined assault seems to have had very limited success.
But it nevertheless penetrated a hoplite formation from the front, even if only a little way.
Quote
At Issos, which is the best example for Patrick's case, the most we can say is that Alexander's cavalry broke through some infantry of uncertain type. Yes, the Companions were confident and prepared to charge infantry, but there is no unambiguous example of their charging heavy infantry from the front and winning.
We have however established that they do charge heavy infantry, and do so frontally. There is also no case of their charging heavy infantry and losing. While one may question individual instances and the assumptions behind them (and few if any do this better than Duncan), there is a consistent pattern of Macedonian cavalry charging heavy infantry frontally and clearly not losing. At the Granicus Alexander charges mounted against hoplites and makes his way into the formation without anyone specifically noting that this is unusual or contrary to doctrine. At Issus, he charges Kardakes, whose nature may be debateable but whose permeability to Macedonian cavalry is not. And at Chaeronea the sole argument against his charging the Sacred Band frontally with cavalry rests on a single word which the same writer appears to use in his Life of Alexander to signify a Macedonian cavalry lance.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 27, 2014, 12:07:23 PM
The fact that he had a horse killed under him?
Which would not preclude him leading a subsequent infantry assault.
Quote
Incidentally, I do not see in our sources any mention of a failed initial assault followed by a more deliberate combined arms one.
I am going by the two you provided, as I am entirely inexpert. The Plutarch quote in particular sounds like something that might have lasted some time. While it doesn't stop the whole Macedonian army charging in at one go, it doesn't seem to be the only explanation. And for avoidance of doubt, I'm not saying Alexander didn't lead cavalry assaults in both battles, just that the evidence does not look unchallengeable.
On the wider point, I agree we have good evidence that the Companions were a confident bunch confident to tangle with formed infantry. But the thread title mentions success, and this is harder to be certain of. Did later successor companions have a track record of success against infantry, or do we think this is the "Alexander touch"?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on February 27, 2014, 12:05:45 PM
Quote from: aligern on February 27, 2014, 11:55:39 AM
5) They can use their own missiles to concentrate on a sector of line, weaken it and then break through.
Did the Companions have their own missiles? I was of the impression the carried only lances/spears and swords.
They almost certainly
owned javelins, or at least throwing-spears, as traditional hunting-weapons. However there are few references to them using such weapons in battle. Possibly the only one is in Arrian, Book I, the battle against the Triballians at the Lyginus:
QuoteBut when Alexander had drawn them thus out of the woody glen, he ordered Philotas to take the cavalry which came from upper Macedonia, and to charge their right wing, where they had advanced furthest in their sally. He also commanded Heraclides and Sopolis to lead on the cavalry which came from Bottiaea and Amphipplis against the left wing; while he himself extended the phalanx of infantry and the rest of the horse in front of the phalanx and led them against the enemy's centre. And indeed as long as there was only skirmishing on both sides, the Triballians did not get the worst of it ; but as soon as the phalanx in dense array attacked them with vigour, and the cavalry fell upon them in various quarters, no longer merely striking them with the javelin, but pushing them with their very horses, then at length they turned and fled through the. woody glen to the river.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 27, 2014, 12:07:23 PM
The fact that he had a horse killed under him?
Quote from: Erpingham on February 27, 2014, 02:53:29 PM
Which would not preclude him leading a subsequent infantry assault.
Given the presence of squires with spare horses, junior colleagues who would offer leaders their horse, spear or whatever, the death of a horse need not preclude a general from leading a subsequent cavalry assault
Jim
Quote from: PatrickAgain, this is what I used to think until I began to wonder if Plutarch specifically means the infantry sarissa. In Plutarch's Alexander (68.4) Alexander slays Abuletes, son of Oxyathres, with a sarisa (one would expect him to use a xyston), and in 67.2, when the army is having a 'Bacchic march' Plutarch remarks that 'not a shield (pelta) nor helmet (kranos) nor spear (sarisa) was to be seen'. The focus of this comment seems to be upon Alexander and his Companions, although it could be a generalised comment applied to the whole army, but in such a case I would expected 'aspis' rather than 'pelta' as the generic word for shield. He has Alexander bear a xyston at Gaugamela but this is the only mention of the weapon other than when he has Cleitus use one to strike down Rhoesaces at the Granicus (where incidentally Plutarch has Alexander carrying a 'pelta' which seems to tie in with 67.2).
Alexander's killing of Abuleites is not in battle, so there is no reason to assume he is using a Companion's weapon. Indeed one version of his killing of Kleitos claims he did the deed with a sarisa taken from a guardsman: the same may have happened here. (In fact Tarn suggested that the use of "sarissa" indicates that Plutarch invented the killing of Abuleites, basing the story on the Kleitos incident, as part of his program to show the moral decline of Alexander. But we needn't go that far.) The use of sarisa and pelte in the "bacchanal" suggests that the focus is on the phalanx, since their shield could be called pelte as often as aspis (cf. Polyainos on Philip's route-marches): Companions were not widely associated with shields, and in Arrian I.6 when some of them do use shields, it's aspides, not peltai.
Indeed these days I am with Sekunda (as in "The Sarissa",
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis 2001) in thinking that there is no such thing as a cavalry sarissa.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 27, 2014, 03:27:59 PM
Given the presence of squires with spare horses, junior colleagues who would offer leaders their horse, spear or whatever, the death of a horse need not preclude a general from leading a subsequent cavalry assault
Jim
Agreed. I only point out that Patrick's statement is not as definitive as it appears.
I was probably agreeing with you Anthony.
I've recently done some 'translation work' for a friend. He writes in Italian, translates it into English, and I convert it into proper English for him and then try to discover what he really meant to say.
I've got a lot less definitive about ancient authors and their meanings after this experience.
The English he has been taught and the English I have been taught (and the English I speak) are three different languages :-)
Jim
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 27, 2014, 03:36:29 PM
Alexander's killing of Abuleites is not in battle, so there is no reason to assume he is using a Companion's weapon. Indeed one version of his killing of Kleitos claims he did the deed with a sarisa taken from a guardsman: the same may have happened here. (In fact Tarn suggested that the use of "sarissa" indicates that Plutarch invented the killing of Abuleites, basing the story on the Kleitos incident, as part of his program to show the moral decline of Alexander. But we needn't go that far.) The use of sarisa and pelte in the "bacchanal" suggests that the focus is on the phalanx, since their shield could be called pelte as often as aspis (cf. Polyainos on Philip's route-marches): Companions were not widely associated with shields, and in Arrian I.6 when some of them do use shields, it's aspides, not peltai.
I was looking solely at Plutarch's usage, and this suggests he used 'pelta' as the Macedonian cavalry shield and 'xyston' or 'sarisa' interchangeably as the Macedonian cavalry lance. Bringing in Polyaenus and Arrian's usage does not really clarify Plutarch's, otherwise I would be in agreement.
Do we incidentally know if the guardsmen who would have been present when Cleitus was killed would have been foot or horse Companions, i.e. infantry or cavalry? I believe it was the cavalry who were 'seven days and nights around the king'; if this was so on this occasion, we would have a cavalryman's weapon being termed a 'sarisa'.
For a similar reason, assuming the killing of Abuletes did take place, Alexander would presumably have used either his own weapon or one taken from a nearby Companion, on the basis that it is most likely that he had a retinue of Companion cavalry guarding him, mounted or otherwise.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 27, 2014, 02:53:29 PM
Quote
Incidentally, I do not see in our sources any mention of a failed initial assault followed by a more deliberate combined arms one.
I am going by the two you provided, as I am entirely inexpert. The Plutarch quote in particular sounds like something that might have lasted some time. While it doesn't stop the whole Macedonian army charging in at one go, it doesn't seem to be the only explanation. And for avoidance of doubt, I'm not saying Alexander didn't lead cavalry assaults in both battles, just that the evidence does not look unchallengeable.
Here are the two accounts of the attack on the mercenaries at the Granicus again (was it these you had in mind?); I really see nothing in them to suggest more than one attack from beginning to end.
"
But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword (it was not Bucephalas, but another); and most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate." - Plutarch
Alexander 16.7
"
Ordering a combined assault by infantry and cavalry Alexander quickly had them surrounded and butchered to a man." - Arrian I.16.2
My impression is of fighting that was intense rather than protracted.
Quote
On the wider point, I agree we have good evidence that the Companions were a confident bunch confident to tangle with formed infantry. But the thread title mentions success, and this is harder to be certain of. Did later successor companions have a track record of success against infantry, or do we think this is the "Alexander touch"?
Frankly, I think it is more to do with the fact that the Successor heavy infantry were now almost universally pikemen; not even Alexander would have been able to outreach a pike with a xyston or even a sarissa. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 27, 2014, 09:12:44 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 27, 2014, 03:36:29 PM
Alexander's killing of Abuleites is not in battle, so there is no reason to assume he is using a Companion's weapon. Indeed one version of his killing of Kleitos claims he did the deed with a sarisa taken from a guardsman: the same may have happened here. (In fact Tarn suggested that the use of "sarissa" indicates that Plutarch invented the killing of Abuleites, basing the story on the Kleitos incident, as part of his program to show the moral decline of Alexander. But we needn't go that far.) The use of sarisa and pelte in the "bacchanal" suggests that the focus is on the phalanx, since their shield could be called pelte as often as aspis (cf. Polyainos on Philip's route-marches): Companions were not widely associated with shields, and in Arrian I.6 when some of them do use shields, it's aspides, not peltai.
I was looking solely at Plutarch's usage, and this suggests he used 'pelta' as the Macedonian cavalry shield and 'xyston' or 'sarisa' interchangeably as the Macedonian cavalry lance. Bringing in Polyaenus and Arrian's usage does not really clarify Plutarch's, otherwise I would be in agreement.
Do we incidentally know if the guardsmen who would have been present when Cleitus was killed would have been foot or horse Companions, i.e. infantry or cavalry? I believe it was the cavalry who were 'seven days and nights around the king'; if this was so on this occasion, we would have a cavalryman's weapon being termed a 'sarisa'.
For a similar reason, assuming the killing of Abuletes did take place, Alexander would presumably have used either his own weapon or one taken from a nearby Companion, on the basis that it is most likely that he had a retinue of Companion cavalry guarding him, mounted or otherwise.
Is there any literary evidence for that? I would have assumed that the Hypaspists were more likely to provide the guards than the Companions, if only because they were infantry and better equipped for it
Also you have such people as the Royal Pages and the core bodyguards like Lysimachus who also had roles
Jim
The close bodyguards of the king were the somatophylakes, high-ranking officers who were also (mounted) Companions. In the incident where Cleitus dies, Arrian has Alexander seize a weapon from 'ton somatophylakon', one of his inner circle, not from a hypaspist or even rank-and-file Companion. That said, Arrian complicates the issue by calling it a 'logkhe' ... and Plutarch (Alexander 51.5) has the king seize an 'aikhme' from a 'doruphoros' (generic Greek word for 'bodyguard'). In each case a weapon shorter and lighter than a sarissa or xyston seems to be indicated.
If we consider Arrian to be more careful with his designations, we can conclude that the bodyguard from whom the weapon was taken was a somatophylax. If we can place any confidence in the assertion that the weapon was a sarissa, given that at least two prominent sources differ, then we have a Companion with a sarissa.
The basic point that when Alexander wants a weapon he gets one from a somatophylax does seem a tenable one, though. This would at least give us a somatophylax providing a sarissa when in Plutarch Alexander kills Abuletes.
I have a query on the mechanics of horsemen charging hoplites. Granted that the Companions were equipped with sarissas or the equivalent, that means they were beyond the striking reach of the hoplites, but their horses were not (there is a lot of horse in front of a rider). Hence the hoplites would have had no trouble poking holes in the Companions' horses. A horse is very difficult to kill from the front: the vital organs are out of reach and the brain has plenty of skull in front of it. The horses, however, can be seriously injured and will be rapidly incapacitated. Presuming that each Companion didn't have a row of squires behind him leading fresh horses by the bridle, how Alexander's mounted men counteract this problem?
The only solution I can think of is that the horses wore frontal armour. Does any evidence support this?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 27, 2014, 09:12:44 PM
Here are the two accounts of the attack on the mercenaries at the Granicus again (was it these you had in mind?); I really see nothing in them to suggest more than one attack from beginning to end.
"But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword (it was not Bucephalas, but another); and most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate." - Plutarch Alexander 16.7
"Ordering a combined assault by infantry and cavalry Alexander quickly had them surrounded and butchered to a man." - Arrian I.16.2
My impression is of fighting that was intense rather than protracted.
Well, it seems to me the Plutarch quote has a negotiation , an assembling a combined arms assault and at least one round of assault proper - takes time (at least three moves :) ). I don't think we can assume Alexander lost his horse at the same time that he penetrated to the middle of the formation either - surely Alex unhorsed in the middle of the enemy and having to be pulled out by his guards would be a more prominently heroic episode?
BTW, do why know from other sources why he wasn't riding Bucephalas? Has he changed horses during the action?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 28, 2014, 05:45:53 AM
I have a query on the mechanics of horsemen charging hoplites. Granted that the Companions were equipped with sarissas or the equivalent, that means they were beyond the striking reach of the hoplites, but their horses were not (there is a lot of horse in front of a rider). Hence the hoplites would have had no trouble poking holes in the Companions' horses. A horse is very difficult to kill from the front: the vital organs are out of reach and the brain has plenty of skull in front of it. The horses, however, can be seriously injured and will be rapidly incapacitated. Presuming that each Companion didn't have a row of squires behind him leading fresh horses by the bridle, how Alexander's mounted men counteract this problem?
The only solution I can think of is that the horses wore frontal armour. Does any evidence support this?
Interesting thought: the Alexander Mosaic (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Alexandermosaic.jpg) shows some sort of pattern on the front of Alexander's horse, which could indicate protection. Unfortunately we are missing a lot of detail from around that area.
In late eras, it became customary to set the butt of the spear in the ground and the point at horse's chest level, but I have searched accounts of classical actions for any evidence or even hint of this and found none: hoplites and other spear-armed types do not appear to have had much if anything in the form of an anti-cavalry drill, and in the Plataea campaign we see Theban cavalry riding down Megaran and Philasian hoplites who were caught in the open on their way to join in the infantry action (Herodotus IX.69). It is unlikely they did this by a frontal charge; it just illustrates that as of 479 BC hoplites do not seem to have had a good technique for dealing with cavalry. By 334 BC there still seemed to be no good hoplite technique for dealing with cavalry apart from the obvious one of facing them, which had worked against javelin-amed types since Plataea.
There is naturally the question of how much reach each of the participants can actually use. The xyston-armed cavalryman with his double-handed grip can use perhaps ten feet of a thirteen-foot weapon, of which one can presumably expect eight feet to protrude beyond any significant part of the horse. The hoplite can do his best with his nine-foot spear, but his one-handed grip means he has to hold it at the point of balance, which would give him at most six feet to play with. In theory he could hold it forward, adding the hypotenuse of his arm measurements, but this would be impossible with the traditional overarm grip. An underarm grip would leave him unable to thrust with any force against the rider, whom an infantryman would see as the dangerous element in the horse-man combination.
To my mind (and I know I am conversing with an equestrian) the Companion still has a reach advantage even when the horse is taken into considerations. Is there anything I am missing?
Quote from: Erpingham on February 28, 2014, 07:55:36 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 27, 2014, 09:12:44 PM
Here are the two accounts of the attack on the mercenaries at the Granicus again (was it these you had in mind?); I really see nothing in them to suggest more than one attack from beginning to end.
"But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword (it was not Bucephalas, but another); and most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate." - Plutarch Alexander 16.7
"Ordering a combined assault by infantry and cavalry Alexander quickly had them surrounded and butchered to a man." - Arrian I.16.2
My impression is of fighting that was intense rather than protracted.
Well, it seems to me the Plutarch quote has a negotiation , an assembling a combined arms assault and at least one round of assault proper - takes time (at least three moves :) ). I don't think we can assume Alexander lost his horse at the same time that he penetrated to the middle of the formation either - surely Alex unhorsed in the middle of the enemy and having to be pulled out by his guards would be a more prominently heroic episode?
BTW, do why know from other sources why he wasn't riding Bucephalas? Has he changed horses during the action?
All right, we shall allow that it took three game turns. ;)
Plutarch mentions that the greatest Macedonian mortality occurred in this incident, which would be consistent with Companions fighting furiously around their unhorsed king while the mercenaries crumbled under attack from all sides - the action seems not to have taken long, which suggests that by the time they had hypothetically pulled the king out of the fight (not something Alexander would let them do, in my opinion) it would anyway have been over bar the rounding up of the 2,000 survivors who went to work in the quarries.
Alexander does seem to have kept a change of horses and to have 'spared' Bucephalus undue exertion, e.g. at Gaugamela:
"
As long, then, as he was riding about and marshalling some part of his phalanx, or exhorting or instructing or reviewing his men, he spared Bucephalas, who was now past his prime, and used another horse; but whenever he was going into action, Bucephalas would be led up, and he would mount him and at once begin the attack." - Plutarch, Alexander 32.7
At the Granicus, he would have ridden Bucephalus into the initial fight at the river, then, as the old warhorse was probably blown from his exertions, have changed to another mount for the attack on the beleaguered mercenaries.
With regard to the presence of cavalry at Chaeronea, Diodorus mentions 30,000 infantry and 2,000 horse under the command of King Philip.
I am interested in the origins of Macedonian Companions. At this early stage of his soon to be great if also short career, does the Macedonian horse at Chaeronea merit the label Companions?
In Hanson's book THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR, he does quote Plutarch while describing the aftermath of the battle. King Philip examines the mangled remains of the Scared Band. I don't have the passage immediately at hand, but I believe mention is made of a long spear. The question is, was this a cavalry weapon or an infantry weapon?
In his later book, THE SOUL OF BATTLE, on page 19, Hanson relates that is was the furious cavalry charge of Alexander that destroyed the Sacred Band.
I cannot help but recall Keegan's comments about horses not being very keen on charging "walls" of human beings, especially those armed with long spears!
Just my two cents.
Chris
Quote from: Chris on March 01, 2014, 01:01:41 PM
I am interested in the origins of Macedonian Companions. At this early stage of his soon to be great if also short career, does the Macedonian horse at Chaeronea merit the label Companions?
Yes, the tradition of having Companion cavalry predated both Philip and Alexander. Possibly more to the point would be
when the Macedonian cavalry, who in the Peloponnesian War are noted as being good but not exceptional, were armed with a long spear intended for melee. The reign of Philip II, who reorganised and rearmed his infantry, would seem to be a good time but in the absence of specific archaeological clues or a definite statement in the sources it is hard to say for certain.
Quote
In Hanson's book THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR, he does quote Plutarch while describing the aftermath of the battle. King Philip examines the mangled remains of the Scared Band. I don't have the passage immediately at hand, but I believe mention is made of a long spear. The question is, was this a cavalry weapon or an infantry weapon?
Precisely the question we have been discussing earlier in this thread. :) Macedonian cavalry and infantry both used a long spear-like weapon; the cavalry weapon was
usually termed a xyston, and the infantry weapon a sarissa, but while we can be fairly sure that the infantry did not use the xyston, we are less sure that the cavalry xyston was not on occasion referred to as a sarissa (Plutarch uses 'sarissa' - actually 'sarisa', the Greek spelling - in his account in the
Life of Pelopidas).
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In his later book, THE SOUL OF BATTLE, on page 19, Hanson relates that is was the furious cavalry charge of Alexander that destroyed the Sacred Band.
It looks as if he finally made up his mind on the subject. ;)
Quote
I cannot help but recall Keegan's comments about horses not being very keen on charging "walls" of human beings, especially those armed with long spears!
The business of horses being unwilling to charge ranks of spearmen depends primarily on the training of the men and horses involved.
If we look at the mediaeval period, there are numerous battles (e.g. Falkirk in 1298 and Arbedo in 1422) in which knights and their chargers unhesitatingly plough into massed ranks of enemy spears or similar long pointy weapons; the French Gensdarmes at Pavia in 1525 likewise.
In essence, if a horse is trained to charge home it will charge home. If not, it will not.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on March 01, 2014, 05:51:29 PM
The business of horses being unwilling to charge ranks of spearmen depends primarily on the training of the men and horses involved.
If we look at the mediaeval period, there are numerous battles (e.g. Falkirk in 1298 and Arbedo in 1422) in which knights and their chargers unhesitatingly plough into massed ranks of enemy spears or similar long pointy weapons; the French Gensdarmes at Pavia in 1525 likewise.
In essence, if a horse is trained to charge home it will charge home. If not, it will not.
I have to hold my hand up Patrick and say that I have always been in the "horses wont charge closely packed men with big pointy sticks" camp. Do we have any historical manuals dealing with this kind of situation?
Quote from: Holly on March 01, 2014, 07:38:25 PM
I have to hold my hand up Patrick and say that I have always been in the "horses wont charge closely packed men with big pointy sticks" camp. Do we have any historical manuals dealing with this kind of situation?
Alas my limited knowledge does not extent to any manuals detailing such matters; there are however quite a few instances, mostly in the Middle Ages, where horses (with men on them)
do charge close-packed infantry formations which are bristling with lots of long, pointy sticks - and appear to think it nothing out of the ordinary. The problem often seems to be holding them back, not getting them to do it.
Granted, horses by themselves (without a rider) are extremely unlikely to do this kind of thing. But if a ridden horse has been trained to do so, and nothing untoward has happened to it yet, it really has no reason not to.
Thanks Patrick.
I guess my next question would be if the cavalry are "charging home" into formed infantry, isnt there a danger of being unseated whilst trying to engage with their xystons or is there an assumption that the mass of the horse and rider is being used? Would the xyston be held overhand ready to thrust down rather than "couched" if a full frontal impact against infantry was being employed?
Just trying to visualize it
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on March 01, 2014, 05:51:29 PMPrecisely the question we have been discussing earlier in this thread. :) Macedonian cavalry and infantry both used a long spear-like weapon; the cavalry weapon was usually termed a xyston, and the infantry weapon a sarissa, but while we can be fairly sure that the infantry did not use the xyston, we are less sure that the cavalry xyston was not on occasion referred to as a sarissa (Plutarch uses 'sarissa' - actually 'sarisa', the Greek spelling - in his account in the Life of Pelopidas).
Well,
Patrick is less sure. :)
A tenth century Byzantine manual, from memory Ouranos, describes the use of the menaulion, a thick spear used by squads of men designed to stop cataphract charges. They are needed because the nirmal spears of the infantry are too thin and shatter ot impact with the armoured horses. That implies that until they wrre facing armoured horses the Byzantine spears had been sufficient.
The examples referred to earlier may all have involved the front rank horses at least beng protected and thus able the push into the spear ranks.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on March 01, 2014, 11:29:18 PM
Quote from: Holly on March 01, 2014, 07:38:25 PM
I have to hold my hand up Patrick and say that I have always been in the "horses wont charge closely packed men with big pointy sticks" camp. Do we have any historical manuals dealing with this kind of situation?
Alas my limited knowledge does not extent to any manuals detailing such matters; there are however quite a few instances, mostly in the Middle Ages, where horses (with men on them) do charge close-packed infantry formations which are bristling with lots of long, pointy sticks - and appear to think it nothing out of the ordinary. The problem often seems to be holding them back, not getting them to do it.
Granted, horses by themselves (without a rider) are extremely unlikely to do this kind of thing. But if a ridden horse has been trained to do so, and nothing untoward has happened to it yet, it really has no reason not to.
Another issue may be the horse armour. Not merely that horse armour made it easier for horses to penetrate infantry formations without dying but that a lot had eye protection (or blinkers worn under the armour as part of the bridle) which may have ensured that the horse hadn't a lot of idea about what it was getting into anyway.
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on March 01, 2014, 11:29:18 PM
Quote from: Holly on March 01, 2014, 07:38:25 PM
I have to hold my hand up Patrick and say that I have always been in the "horses wont charge closely packed men with big pointy sticks" camp. Do we have any historical manuals dealing with this kind of situation?
Alas my limited knowledge does not extent to any manuals detailing such matters; there are however quite a few instances, mostly in the Middle Ages, where horses (with men on them) do charge close-packed infantry formations which are bristling with lots of long, pointy sticks - and appear to think it nothing out of the ordinary. The problem often seems to be holding them back, not getting them to do it.
Granted, horses by themselves (without a rider) are extremely unlikely to do this kind of thing. But if a ridden horse has been trained to do so, and nothing untoward has happened to it yet, it really has no reason not to.
I'm with Patrick on this one - trained horses and determined men on them will tangle with lines of shouting men with pointed sticks. It was a poor medieval man-at-arms who, when told to charge close-order infantry, gave the answer "my horse won't do it" and I can't see it going down any better with Macedonian elite cavalry either. Exactly what went on at impact is, of course, an interesting question. I've recently been involved in a discussion about 16th century cavalry where one side insisted they would never charge a pike block frontally, which can be disproved easily enough, but there were follow on discussions about whether the horse was used as a battering ram to break into formation at a gallop. Other than Polish Hussars (who make western men-at-arms appear like wimps in the self-belief stakes), evidence seemed lacking. Contact seems to have been at a more controlled and intended to make gaps which could be exploited.
Quote from: Holly on March 01, 2014, 11:49:38 PM
Thanks Patrick.
I guess my next question would be if the cavalry are "charging home" into formed infantry, isnt there a danger of being unseated whilst trying to engage with their xystons or is there an assumption that the mass of the horse and rider is being used? Would the xyston be held overhand ready to thrust down rather than "couched" if a full frontal impact against infantry was being employed?
Just trying to visualize it
The way I see it is yes, the xyston would be used overhand, double-handed, with most of the weapon pointing out and slightly down ahead of the horse and rider. The net result of the moment of forces at impact would be to hold the rider more firmly in his seat.
The idea for the xyston-using cavalryman would be to put his point into the head or neck of the infantry opponent, which would both do the target serious injury and bowl him over, retaining momentum while rendering the foe instantly hors de combat. A quick-reacting infantry target would get his shield up in time to take the blow, but this would merely smash the shield rim into his helmet or face, stunning him (or worse) and knocking him over just the same. Hence I see a Macedonian cavalry wedge knocking down infantry opponents like skittles as long as they could keep their momentum (men on the inside of the wedge could look out for opportunities to put their points into downed but still-moving opponents). If they were ever brought to a halt things could get sticky, as they would be reduced to thrusts at the opponent without momentum behind them.
Thanks Patrick that is the way I would see it if I had to surmise. All we need to do now is get hold of a couple of hundred re-enactors to test out the theory!
;)
Having read through this strand I keep seeing in my mind that moment at the end of the film version of 'The Two Towers' where the Rohirrim cavalry charge down-slope at the upraised spears of the Uruk-hai and thinking 'How come most aren't being skewered?'.
To go back to original question about rules and cavalry breaking through massed infantry...
It is hard to think that cavalry without heavy armour could be successful against packed infantry wielding anything like a decent set of spears/pikes etc. In Roman engagements such as Pharsalus we see spears being used effectively against cavalry. (Caesar has his troops use their pila to thrust at Pompey's cavalry with success.) During the Macedonian wars Roman infantry units seem to have pushed between the phalanxes so as to attack their flank/rear and I have always imagined that this was Alexander's technique against the Persians. Certainly at Gaugamela, Alexander's tactic of moving to the right to draw the Persian cavalry to the flanks is usually assumed to be part of a larger strategy to open up the Persian lines and enable a more direct attack at Darius. It is also clear from ancient sources that the Persian cavalry was more heavily armoured than the Macedonian (...the Scythians themselves and their horses were much more completely protected with armour for guarding their bodies...1.) so the Macedonian cavalry certainly cannot be equated with the knights of the middle ages. There is surely a great deal of psychology involved as well. I find it incredible that lightly armoured horses could be used to crash through a determined defense armed with good thrusting weapons. I suspect that many men involved in these battles were not only poorly trained but scared witless and unlikely to work as an efficient team when suddenly confronted with a large formation of horses charging towards them thus giving openings for a determined attack to be successful. I am no expert on ancient battle rules (I am trialing several) but it was always an aspect of the Warhammer rules that I thought quite clever, that they built in ideas like fear and terror etc. into the rules for just such a purpose - these are also present in the WAB rules (p51f under heading Psychology) and could be used to tweak the characteristics of units involved for your battles to give outcomes more in line with your interpretation of the historical facts.
Ian
1. I had to check this, the quote is from Arrian, Anabasis 3.13 1 - via Wikipedia but I would be surprised if it were incorrect
Good points, Ian.
One thought about Greek hoplites is that although they were the best infantry of their time by a wide margin, they do not appear to have had any form of 'prepare to receive cavalry' technique akin to the later schiltron or even the later bayonet hedge. Hoplite spears were (at least in artistic representation) used overarm and the technique of grounding the butt to receive cavalry appears to have been unknown or, if known, not practised.
The Macedonian xyston at c.13' was longer than the c.9' hoplite spear (a 12' hoplite weapon would close the gap but would still not let the infantryman outreach the cavalryman). The question of reach has been discussed and short of checking by re-enactment I see no reason why a Macedonian horseman who can reach with the weapon's point of balance up to 3' ahead of his shoulder (on account of the two-handed grip) cannot outreach a hoplite who has to keep his weapon's point of balance within c.1' of his shoulder. Furthermore, the xyston-wielder's preferred target was probably the face or neck, easy enough to reach with the point and immediately effective: having a shiny metal point arriving before one's face tends to attract all of one's attention and inhibit concentration on one's target. In Arrian III.14 Alexander's Companions use this technique at Gaugamela ("the Macedonian horse ... vigorously pressed the assault, fighting hand to hand and thrusting at the Persians' faces with their spears")
Quote
It is also clear from ancient sources that the Persian cavalry was more heavily armoured than the Macedonian (...the Scythians themselves and their horses were much more completely protected with armour for guarding their bodies...1.) so the Macedonian cavalry certainly cannot be equated with the knights of the middle ages.
True. The quote is indeed Arrian III.13 (III.13.4 to be precise), and the Skythian and Bactrian nobles were more heavily armoured than anyone in Alexander's army, but protection is not everything and the 'Macedonian' cavalry in this action consisted of 1) Menidas' mercenary cavalry, 2) Ariston's Paeonians, 3) the 'xenoi' (Greek) cavalry and finally an attack by Aretes' prodromoi - not a single Companion cavalryman among them. The prodromoi attack did, however, put the Persian left to flight. One can draw parallels with Napoleon's cavalry fights against the Mamelukes; the latter were individually better protected and better armed, but collectively inferior in discipline and technique, a difference that became more marked as larger numbers became involved.
Quote
I find it incredible that lightly armoured horses could be used to crash through a determined defense armed with good thrusting weapons.
As mentioned above, technique could explain much. There was no defence more determined than the Sacred Band at Chaeronea, yet Alexander crashed through those and left them dead on the field with all their wounds in front. We have looked at the rather minimal source evidence and attempted to conclude, or failing that to assert, that Alexander led either a cavalry wedge or an infantry formation, my own preference being the former.
One feature of the Macedonian cavalry wedge is that it does have the potential to act like a ripsaw through a defensive line. The point-man might knock down a man in the enemy front rank, and a split-second later those on either side of him will be down, too, before they can reach anyone with their weapons. Each man down in the front rank will be propelled back onto the second rank, who have to either step aside smartly (interfering with their own formation and target acquisition) or stagger back into the rank behind (upsetting two men's target acquisition). Meanwhile the cavalry wedge is still pouring through, knocking down every man ahead of it, for as long as it can maintain momentum - a sort of Hellenistic game of skittles with lance points instead of balls.
Instead of going head-on at individual defending infantrymen, it would make more sense for the wedge to line up between two files of infantry so that the xyston could reach past the horse's head rather than over it, and so that the horse could shoulder aside one infantryman on each side as it passed through. A wedge is composed of files of unequal length, so as each file leader knocks over a target and hence upsets defensive countermeasures he also is lined up to shove through between files, knocking men aside as he does so and making them easier targets for following cavalrymen. Properly done, this kind of wedge penetration turns the target infantry formation into a loose mass of reeling men from which the riders just pick their targets as they ride through.
The problem arises when the momentum is lost and the wedge comes to a halt: once that happens, the front end (and the man at the front in particular) is vulnerable to attack from one or both sides (this seems to have happened to Alexander in the fight against the mercenaries at the Granicus). Hence to remain effective the wedge has to keep moving and to keep moving it has to knock down infantrymen in the way with a minimum of fuss and lost energy.
You may consider this to be surmise and yes, it is. There is no absolute proof, only a number of clues that point in this particular direction. If my understanding of the matter is correct, it would explain why we seem to have accounts of Macedonian cavalry penetrating hoplite formations at Chaeronea and the Granicus (others interpret the source evidence differently to suppose that Alexander was leading infantry, though this itself results in anomalies e.g. if he was fighting on foot how did he get a horse killed under him at the Granicus?). Furthermore, it would suggest that the Macedonian technique differed from both the unsubtle mediaeval charge with couched lance and from the Parthian use of the lance against the Romans (as mentioned in Plutarch's
Life of Crassus and
Life of Anthony). The Macedonian technique envisaged requires precise 'marksmanship' and training together with a degree of mutual cooperation and would be possible for full-time cavalrymen like those of Philip and Alexander, but would be difficult and demanding for part-time Successor soldiery, which might explain the eventual shift away from the xyston and wedge to a more conventional javelin-and-shield based system.
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I suspect that many men involved in these battles were not only poorly trained but scared witless and unlikely to work as an efficient team when suddenly confronted with a large formation of horses charging towards them thus giving openings for a determined attack to be successful.
There you have most Achameneid, especially Late Achaemenid, infantry in a nutshell. ;) Morale is a very important consideration, and in
The Two Towers film the hosts of Mordor do seem to lose both heart and formation as the Rohirrim reach striking range, almost falling over to order. A Macedonian charge would be carried out at something closer to a canter than a gallop (formation did matter) but at Issus they sped up as the Kardakes ahead of them were loosing their first volleys, spoiling their deflection shooting and from Arrian's "... the Persian left collapsed the moment he was on them" (II.10) dropping their morale as they found themselves faced with something outside their previous experience.
Morale would thus be a significant factor where Achaemenid infantry were concerned, but not where the opponents were Greek mercenaries or
(especially) the Sacred Band. There the only explanation (apart from trying to get Alexander to lead infantry) would seem to be technique - which is what started me thinking about this whole business in the first place.
The heart of this seems to be the knocking down/aside of infantry by Companions. Patrick makes a good point in that it is better for the leading Companion rider to aim at a point between hoplite files, rather that directly at a hoplite. In the latter case you have a horse trying to shove back 8 or 16 men pressed together shield-to-back, which sounds like a losing proposition for the horse.
Attacking between files targets the weakness of a hoplite formation - there is no lateral bracing between one hoplite file and the next. A man knocked aside will tend to continue staggering in that direction, especially as the next horse in the wedge knocks him in the same direction. Hence a wedge is designed to knock men sideways, not back. Those men push the files next to them sideways, and so on. There is plenty of room for this sideways movement since the men involved will tend to turn and face the source of the pressure. An average man has far greater breadth than depth, so men turning sideways suddenly leaves them with plenty of space to give way before the advancing wedge - until they fall and are trampled.
Quote
if he was fighting on foot how did he get a horse killed under him at the Granicus?
Didn't we have this conversation before? If you assume that he fought dismounted at this point, it would be after an initial round of combat when his horse was killed. Instead of wasting horses, he continues on foot. Not that I'm saying you are wrong, just that the loss of the horse is not a decisive argument. I'm sure someone would have provided a shield (do we still believe Alexander's cavalry were shieldless - just checking?).
The speculation that one aimed the point of the wedge at a gap between files as a weak point is fascinating. Does it assume though that hoplites had no drills against people breaking in between files e.g. that rank behind the first covered the file gap to the right?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 06, 2014, 07:19:55 PM
The speculation that one aimed the point of the wedge at a gap between files as a weak point is fascinating. Does it assume though that hoplites had no drills against people breaking in between files e.g. that rank behind the first covered the file gap to the right?
The hoplite formation worked by othismos, meaning that files had to form dead straight lines, enabling the men to push each other and hence exert irresistible force against enemy infantry. There was no way of covering the space between the files.
Except that nobody agrees what othismos means, it has been debated endlessly without consensus; and even if it does mean a physical pushing of the man in front, othismos is clearly something that takes place only in certain phases of the battle, which are not "when receiving a cavalry charge" - it doesn't constrain behaviour all the time. So saying that hoplites can't do something because they depend on something else of uncertain meaning which they do at another time is really not a strong argument at all.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 06, 2014, 07:19:55 PM
I'm sure someone would have provided a shield (do we still believe Alexander's cavalry were shieldless - just checking?).
It seems to have varied: Diodorus XVII.20.3 in his description of the Granicus has 'Spithrobates' (probably Spithridates) hurl a javelin with such force that it passes through Alexander's
shield, but Arrian's account of the same battle has no such mention (and Spithridates is mentioned only as being struck down by Black Cleitus when about to strike with a kopis - a heavy blade - at Alexander).
The xyston is generally (among classical authors) considered to be a weapon wielded with two hands but in the Alexander Mosaic it is wielded in one hand and still goes right through a presumably armoured(?) opponent's body (the opponent is one of Darius' personal guard cavalry, some of whom show indications of wearing armour - Duncan is good on the fine details of this).
So were the Companions unshielded? Almost certainly but we cannot be quite certain. Methinks.
Quote
The speculation that one aimed the point of the wedge at a gap between files as a weak point is fascinating. Does it assume though that hoplites had no drills against people breaking in between files e.g. that rank behind the first covered the file gap to the right?
Usually there would be no need because even at 3' per man any gaps would be covered by shields. Whether hoplite formations fighting each other tried to line up against opposing men or against opposing gaps I have no real idea - the accounts of lines 'crashing' together and spears shivering would suggest man-against-man rather than man-against-gap. There seems to be a natural inclination to head for a man rather than for the gap next to a man, and I think the problem simply had not arisen. Macedonian cavalry fighting with the xyston in wedge seems to have been very new and up to Gaugamela there were usually not many people who had faced it before and then survived to have a think about what to do.
It might even be the case that Alexander devised the (putative) tactic of aiming the horse between hoplite opponents rather than at them. He had a sharp tactical mind which was backed by a lot of thought energy and seems to have devised the tactic of aiming for opponents' faces by preference - this is tremendously distracting to the opponent and tends to put them off their stroke, quite possibly contributing to the spectacularly low Macedonian casualty rates.
Justin is as far as I can tell right about files being in straight lines and not overlapping. Wherever one may stand on the idea that Greek hoplites lined up to push against each other (given the source references to shoving they evidently did so in some fashion on at least some occasions) the file was the basic element of manoeuvre and organisation, and as soon as one starts to fudge the file one starts to lose cohesion. Assuming that hoplites remained in ordered files when facing cavalry (I would observe that there seems to be no evidence of specific hoplite anti-cavalry drills, perhaps because most cavalry types did not charge into melee with hoplite formations with the possible exception of a few heavy Persian types) the logical place for a charging horse to go is at the interval between two hoplites where the shields overlap: if it hits an overlapping shield from its right the associated hoplite will tend to revolve out of the way as well as stagger back and/or sideways, while if it shoulders a shield to its left the relevant hoplite will tend to go down, back and/or sideways.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 06, 2014, 08:50:38 PM
Except that nobody agrees what othismos means, it has been debated endlessly without consensus; and even if it does mean a physical pushing of the man in front, othismos is clearly something that takes place only in certain phases of the battle, which are not "when receiving a cavalry charge" - it doesn't constrain behaviour all the time. So saying that hoplites can't do something because they depend on something else of uncertain meaning which they do at another time is really not a strong argument at all.
I take this to mean that arguing that Greek hoplites having a standard drill/procedure does not mean they could not have departed from it when faced by cavalry. Fair enough: the question then becomes what they would have resorted/reverted to, bearing in mind the apparent lack of mention of any anti-cavalry drill (unless someone can find one in the sources, and Cunaxa does not count - that was peltasts getting out of the way of Persian heavy cavalry ;) ). Let us assume for the sake of hypothetical argument that a well-trained hoplite formation (say the Theban Sacred Band at Chaeronea) has or improvises a drill by which every second man takes a pace to the right when faced by cavalry. We still have the interval between men in the front rank at which a horse can be aimed, but we also have men in the even-numbered ranks whose spears are now colliding with the heads of the ranks in front. The horse shoving aside the front-rank men to its left and right will impact directly upon the quincunxed second-rank man and send him staggering down or backwards: his own front-ranker will have inhibited use of the spear. Such a formation would seem to have all the disadvantages of a straight set of files with none of the advantages.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 06, 2014, 07:19:55 PM
Quote
if he was fighting on foot how did he get a horse killed under him at the Granicus?
Didn't we have this conversation before? If you assume that he fought dismounted at this point, it would be after an initial round of combat when his horse was killed. Instead of wasting horses, he continues on foot. Not that I'm saying you are wrong, just that the loss of the horse is not a decisive argument. I'm sure someone would have provided a shield (do we still believe Alexander's cavalry were shieldless - just checking?).
The argument is more what he would have been doing on a horse inside an enemy formation in the first place, specifically how he got there. For him to be mounted he would have to be leading a mounted unit (Macedonians seemed to do things that way); had he been leading a foot unit he would not have been on horseback. Hence even if he fought on foot after being dismounted he would have had to have led a mounted charge at least partly
into the enemy formation in order to get into a situation where his horse could be killed by an opponent sticking a sword in its side, whatever may have happened after that.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 06, 2014, 09:42:48 PM
Hence even if he fought on foot after being dismounted he would have had to have led a mounted charge at least partly into the enemy formation in order to get into a situation where his horse could be killed by an opponent sticking a sword in its side, whatever may have happened after that.
Agreed, though this does weaken this as evidence of a successful cavalry attack.
On lack of hoplite cavalry drills, is the argument that cavalry had never charged hoplites before Chaeronea i.e. Alexander is innovating. Therefore, the hoplites must improvise their defence? I'm afraid I don't share Justin's idea that hoplites in this situation would stick in their files. Duncan has already made the point about
othismos
but , as we are in thought-experiment territory, we could speculate what happens when the file breaker hits the file gap. He has presumably taken down the hoplite to the right with his xyston and pushes into the gap. He is now in touching distance of the second rank - aren't they and ranks behind going to close on him, rather than remain rigidly behind their front man? What he has done is caused chaos, dislocating therows and files in a small area, which can be exploited by the men behind. It is also likely he and his horse are now in bad shape - one reason why I'm with Jim that Alex and his inner guards might have formed the point but the line breaker job was no job for the king.
Remember also it only takes one wounded and/or hamstrung horse to fall or turn at 90 degrees to the line of attack and the attack is in chaos. A horse cannot step over another horse thrashing about on the ground.
What people forget is that if we have not a charge, but a sensible walk, moving forward and stabbing the infantry, the infantry aren't glued to their bases either.
The Macedonians weren't the first people to attack Greek Hoplites from horseback, Mardonius had a body guard of a thousand cavalry at Plataea, the Greeks had been facing Persian armoured cavalry since the Ionian revolt.
If the cavalry hit too tentatively, advancing at a walk, there is nothing to stop the infantry advancing into them. They don't need to stand in their files to brace each other because there is no shock to brace against.
Hoplites were flexible enough to advance against Persian infantry, tearing down shield walls etc (try doing that with hoplons overlapping)
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 06, 2014, 09:42:48 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 06, 2014, 07:19:55 PM
I'm sure someone would have provided a shield (do we still believe Alexander's cavalry were shieldless - just checking?).
It seems to have varied: Diodorus XVII.20.3 in his description of the Granicus has 'Spithrobates' (probably Spithridates) hurl a javelin with such force that it passes through Alexander's shield, but Arrian's account of the same battle has no such mention (and Spithridates is mentioned only as being struck down by Black Cleitus when about to strike with a kopis - a heavy blade - at Alexander).
I had always thought that the "shield" in this case was the sacred shield taken from the Temple of Athene at Troy, and carried in front of Alexander by an attendant (Arrian 1.11.7‑8). That seems the only likely explanation when it is clear that the cavalry did not normally carry shields in mounted combat. (Or else the incident is simply an embroidery by Plutarch, which Patrick's contrast with Arrian might suggest, in which case there may have been no shield at all.) Whatever the explanation, it is an anomaly: the artistic evidence consistently shows Macedonian cavalry fighting without shields (the Mosaic, the Sarcophagus, the Porus Medallion, the Boscoreale statue, and others). And Arrian 1.6.5 is clear that the cavalry took their shields with them specifically when they were going to fight on foot.
QuoteThe xyston is generally (among classical authors) considered to be a weapon wielded with two hands but in the Alexander Mosaic it is wielded in one hand and still goes right through a presumably armoured(?) opponent's body (the opponent is one of Darius' personal guard cavalry, some of whom show indications of wearing armour - Duncan is good on the fine details of this).
Sorry, what "classical authors" generally regard the xyston as wielded with two hands? I can't think of an author who says that; the tacticians seem to equate xystophoroi and kontophoroi, if I remember the terminology correctly, but I don't think that's enough to press details like how many hands you hold the spear with. On the Mosaic, the Sarcophagus (despite themissing weapons, you can tell where they went!), the Porus Medallion, and later works such as the Marissa fresco and as late as Ptolemy on the Raphia Decree, Hellenistic art consistently shows the cavalry spear held in one hand.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 07, 2014, 09:25:37 AM
QuoteThe xyston is generally (among classical authors) considered to be a weapon wielded with two hands but in the Alexander Mosaic it is wielded in one hand and still goes right through a presumably armoured(?) opponent's body (the opponent is one of Darius' personal guard cavalry, some of whom show indications of wearing armour - Duncan is good on the fine details of this).
Sorry, what "classical authors" generally regard the xyston as wielded with two hands? I can't think of an author who says that; the tacticians seem to equate xystophoroi and kontophoroi, if I remember the terminology correctly, but I don't think that's enough to press details like how many hands you hold the spear with. On the Mosaic, the Sarcophagus (despite themissing weapons, you can tell where they went!), the Porus Medallion, and later works such as the Marissa fresco and as late as Ptolemy on the Raphia Decree, Hellenistic art consistently shows the cavalry spear held in one hand.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (XX.11.2) refers to "cavalry spears grasped by the middle with both hands," which seems unsuitable as a description of any Roman cavalry weapon we know, even the cuspis. As in earlier discussions, he seems to mean a pilum, which in his source may have been given as 'xyston', as in Josephus.
However as you mention the artistic evidence seems universally in favour of single-handed use, which puts the two-handed extension of the centre-of-gravity argument backstage: it may actually be a redundant point as on the Alexander Mosaic we see Alexander employing plenty of reach without needing a two-handed grip.
Hence I shall concede that the idea of a two-handed grip on the xyston is probably a misapprehension or at best an optional extra, but nevertheless maintain that the xyston would outreach a standard hoplite doru when used single-handed. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 07, 2014, 12:45:55 PM
Hence I shall concede that the idea of a two-handed grip on the xyston is probably a misapprehension or at best an optional extra, but nevertheless maintain that the xyston would outreach a standard hoplite doru when used single-handed. :)
Maybe so, but how important is this in the scenario you have outlined, where someone smashes through on the file junction? In very short order, a long weapon will become irrelevant as the rider tussles with the first couple of ranks (although hoplites in the later ranks would still be able to use their reach to participate against the intruder).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 07, 2014, 12:45:55 PMDionysius of Halicarnassus (XX.11.2) refers to "cavalry spears grasped by the middle with both hands," which seems unsuitable as a description of any Roman cavalry weapon we know, even the cuspis.
Ah yes, I'd forgotten that one. He's writing late enough that he could - just - be thinking of a Parthian kontos - the long spears of the Iranian cavalry tradition do seem to have been used two-handed.
QuoteAs in earlier discussions, he seems to mean a pilum, which in his source may have been given as 'xyston', as in Josephus.
I still regard this as improbable speculation, of course, and don't think he means "pilum".
Quote from: Erpingham on April 07, 2014, 01:22:25 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 07, 2014, 12:45:55 PM
Hence I shall concede that the idea of a two-handed grip on the xyston is probably a misapprehension or at best an optional extra, but nevertheless maintain that the xyston would outreach a standard hoplite doru when used single-handed. :)
Maybe so, but how important is this in the scenario you have outlined, where someone smashes through on the file junction? In very short order, a long weapon will become irrelevant as the rider tussles with the first couple of ranks (although hoplites in the later ranks would still be able to use their reach to participate against the intruder).
If the Macedonian cavalry wedge and its weaponry operated as I think it did, there would not be a tussle with the first couple of ranks: the point man of the wedge would knock down his target (ahead right) before the latter could respond, his horse would shoulder aside the ahead left man (whose shield would be in the way of any counteraction against horse or rider, and whose face would be in line for a lance-point from the Companion on the point-man's left). Now we consider the next man in each file: from his point of view, the most immediate concern filling his future and field of view is the body of the man in the rank ahead, which is heading towards him helmet-first if propelled by a xyston point or midriff-first if propelled by a horse. Either way he is not going to be in a position to do much other than try to keep his balance, and probably stagger back on the man behind him.
Meanwhile, the wedge point man will have shaken off or dropped his first victim and be looking for the first face in his immediate forward field of view, which will receive a bloody lance point unless the recipient's shield can be interposed in time, in which case momentum and angles will send him backwards, perhaps with his own shield rim between the eyes. As this happens, the men at the edges of the wedge will be putting points into their own targets, spreading the unbalancing and disorder with a ripple effect that steadily eats through the hoplite formation. As long as the cavalry can keep moving and keep putting their lance-tips where they will do most good, they will not have to slow down and can steadily ride through their opponents, keeping ahead of the 'reaction loop' of any rear-rankers trying to get into position to do them harm.
In essence, the Macedonian wedge would have been a continuously moving body whose spearpoints cleared a path for it, in concept not too unlike the Macedonian phalanx. It would not have worked as a charge in-stop-draw swords-hack away system, or at least not very well.
There is really only one counter to this form of attack, or only one that I can see being effective on level ground, and that is to have longer weapons than the attackers. The sarissa of the Macedonian phalanx fulfils this condition, and it is possible that the longer spear of the Iphicratic inventory might also do so, although such Iphicratic spears do not seem to have been used by hoplites in Greece.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 07, 2014, 02:10:31 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 07, 2014, 12:45:55 PMDionysius of Halicarnassus (XX.11.2) refers to "cavalry spears grasped by the middle with both hands," which seems unsuitable as a description of any Roman cavalry weapon we know, even the cuspis.
Ah yes, I'd forgotten that one. He's writing late enough that he could - just - be thinking of a Parthian kontos - the long spears of the Iranian cavalry tradition do seem to have been used two-handed.
QuoteAs in earlier discussions, he seems to mean a pilum, which in his source may have been given as 'xyston', as in Josephus.
I still regard this as improbable speculation, of course, and don't think he means "pilum".
I appreciate the reservations, but wonder exactly how we would rationalise Roman
principes being armed with anything other than a
pilum as their primary weapon. Triarii with the
hasta fit form to function, but principes seem to be equipped similarly to, and have a role almost identical to,
hastati (who despite their name seem to have centred their activities and armoury on the
pilum).
If we develop this point it will probably want its own thread.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 07, 2014, 08:52:33 PM
As long as the cavalry can keep moving and keep putting their lance-tips where they will do most good, they will not have to slow down and can steadily ride through their opponents
You forget one small technical problem, if they're actually killing people and they're going down, the floor is now a mess of writhing bodies, shields and sharp objects. The horses might not panic but they will have to slow down to keep their footing.
If the infantry stand and die, the horses will be slowed. It's if the infantry break that the horses can keep going.
What makes the infantry stand and die is the back rank who are NCOs and ideally lock their shields and keep everybody at it.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 07, 2014, 10:34:18 PM
You forget one small technical problem, if they're actually killing people and they're going down, the floor is now a mess of writhing bodies, shields and sharp objects. The horses might not panic but they will have to slow down to keep their footing.
If the infantry stand and die, the horses will be slowed. It's if the infantry break that the horses can keep going.
What makes the infantry stand and die is the back rank who are NCOs and ideally lock their shields and keep everybody at it.
I think most of the infantry will be knocked back (or down) and the infantry rear ranks will tend to fall back out of the way as friendly bodies hurtle towards them for one reason or another, which partly does the cavalry's work for them. The formation will loosen up and the Companions will keep on driving through. Slowing down for bodies, equipment etc. would be relative rather than absolute, i.e. I envisage the wedge continuing to move at a trot or better as it surges through the infantry formation (rather faster if up against Kardakes at Issus, who did not stand, let alone die in place). The Alexander Mosaic probably captures the nature of such a drive quite well: there are bodies underfoot but the Macedonian cavalry are nevertheless surging forward (though one does wonder how Alex is going to get that Persian off his xyston).
There was one case when the infantry very definitely did stand and die, and that was at the Granicus: being surrounded and presumably in a solid rectangular formation, the hoplites would have had minimal space to 'recoil' individually or collectively, so when Alex and his wedge charged in they would have hit with their usual initial impact but the stricken hoplites would have become jammed in among their crowded comrades and the wedge would have got stuck - which is entirely consistent with Alex's horse being struck through the ribs by a sword (not so easy to do against a briskly moving animal).
The Sacred Band at Chaeronea received their wounds 'all in front', but whether the file closers could have held their files together against repeated shocks by increasing numbers of thousand-pound horses is another matter.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 07, 2014, 11:50:35 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 07, 2014, 10:34:18 PM
You forget one small technical problem, if they're actually killing people and they're going down, the floor is now a mess of writhing bodies, shields and sharp objects. The horses might not panic but they will have to slow down to keep their footing.
If the infantry stand and die, the horses will be slowed. It's if the infantry break that the horses can keep going.
What makes the infantry stand and die is the back rank who are NCOs and ideally lock their shields and keep everybody at it.
I think most of the infantry will be knocked back (or down) and the infantry rear ranks will tend to fall back out of the way as friendly bodies hurtle towards them for one reason or another, which partly does the cavalry's work for them. The formation will loosen up and the Companions will keep on driving through. Slowing down for bodies, equipment etc. would be relative rather than absolute, i.e. I envisage the wedge continuing to move at a trot or better as it surges through the infantry formation (rather faster if up against Kardakes at Issus, who did not stand, let alone die in place). The Alexander Mosaic probably captures the nature of such a drive quite well: there are bodies underfoot but the Macedonian cavalry are nevertheless surging forward (though one does wonder how Alex is going to get that Persian off his xyston).
Hang on, moving at a trot is not compatible with infantry bodies hurtling. I've been struck by half ton livestock moving at a trot or thereabouts. You don't hurtle. You are more likely to be turned and pushed aside. They don't aim AT you, they try to go to one side, hence you're more likely to be spun.
Another thing is that horses and cattle do not charge walls and that is what they see with the shields. There are no gaps, the animal will go for the gap and to make a gap you've got to kill someone.
To kill someone you either exploit a gap caused by a missile weapon (Probably the Persian technique) or you've got to kill him with your spear. Remember unless you can convince your horse to charge a solid obstacle (the wall of shields) you've got to stab one of the infantry and move your horse into his space.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 07, 2014, 11:50:35 PM
There was one case when the infantry very definitely did stand and die, and that was at the Granicus: being surrounded and presumably in a solid rectangular formation, the hoplites would have had minimal space to 'recoil' individually or collectively, so when Alex and his wedge charged in they would have hit with their usual initial impact but the stricken hoplites would have become jammed in among their crowded comrades and the wedge would have got stuck - which is entirely consistent with Alex's horse being struck through the ribs by a sword (not so easy to do against a briskly moving animal).
The Sacred Band at Chaeronea received their wounds 'all in front', but whether the file closers could have held their files together against repeated shocks by increasing numbers of thousand-pound horses is another matter.
Hang on again, you now have briskly moving animals. Before they were only trotting and whilst I've never had to hit a briskly moving animal with a sword, I've had to turn them using a length of blue alkathene and it is perfectly simple to do, from the side they're the size of a barn door, trust me in this, you would struggle to miss.
Also at Granicus, when the Hoplites were killed, did the Cavalry even hit them frontally, or did they wait for light infantry and pikes to break them up a bit?
Jim
don't forget also, the length of the lance is effectively reduced by the length of the horse.
whilst the hoplite can spear the horse's head , the rider has to wait until the horse has pushed far enough past the shield to get his lance into range.
that is assuming the horse can find somewhere to push into, as Jim says.
Quote from: Mark G on April 08, 2014, 07:21:10 AM
don't forget also, the length of the lance is effectively reduced by the length of the horse.
whilst the hoplite can spear the horse's head , the rider has to wait until the horse has pushed far enough past the shield to get his lance into range.
that is assuming the horse can find somewhere to push into, as Jim says.
You don't even need to spear the head, catch the face with the edge of the spearhead and you're going to deter the horse. Indeed a spear point waving about uncertainly near its eyes is going to freak it out (Which is why horse armour included eye protection)
Jim
As I understand it, the advantage of a wedged charge, as oppossed to a linear one, is it concentrates all the "break in" effort in one place. Most of the linear formation being charged is out of the equation (at least to begin with), whereas a small group of cavalry are in contact with their support close at hand. It is still, however, going to be a hard fought thing to go through a close order infantry formation maybe 8 deep. We are in speculative territory about what actually happens but it seems doubtful to me at least that any length advantage of cavalry weaponry will make all the spears of the hoplite formation redundant. It might provide the first hit but less than a second later the rider is among the spear points of the second and third ranks, who he hasn't hit. Likewise, I think it is unlikely that anyone could just trot through poking at targets of opportunity with a twelve foot lance. It is more likely that it would be ditched when it jams into its first victim and the sword would be drawn.
So, I'd speculate that in a successful attack, the wedge leader will push several ranks deep into the phalanx, with half a dozen comrades trampling around widening the gap behind. Momentum will have slowed, horses and men would be wounded but much of the wedge is still behind and not in contact ready to exploit the pushing apart of the ranks, yet preventing any rushing out to envelop. Thereafter, it becomes a battle as to whether the wedge can push apart the formation and break through or whether the cavalry point are brought down or pushed out again. In an unsuccessful attack, the point mans horse runs onto a spear or trips over a falled infantryman and goes down, creating a barrier to exploitation by those behind and the hoplites relock their shields behind the obstacle.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 07, 2014, 08:59:33 PM
QuoteQuoteAs in earlier discussions, he seems to mean a pilum, which in his source may have been given as 'xyston', as in Josephus.
I still regard this as improbable speculation, of course, and don't think he means "pilum".
I appreciate the reservations, but wonder exactly how we would rationalise Roman principes being armed with anything other than a pilum as their primary weapon. Triarii with the hasta fit form to function, but principes seem to be equipped similarly to, and have a role almost identical to, hastati (who despite their name seem to have centred their activities and armoury on the pilum).
If we develop this point it will probably want its own thread.
I can't say that I see a problem. Once, everyone had a thrusting-spear. The thrown pilum is initially introduced for the hastati; it is a success, and so it later spreads to the principes. The idea that the principes should be the same as the hastati is probably anachronistic.
I don't see how we would get a resolution to this, though, so continuing the discussion may not be worth it.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 08, 2014, 08:35:04 AM
As I understand it, the advantage of a wedged charge, as oppossed to a linear one, is it concentrates all the "break in" effort in one place. Most of the linear formation being charged is out of the equation (at least to begin with), whereas a small group of cavalry are in contact with their support close at hand. It is still, however, going to be a hard fought thing to go through a close order infantry formation maybe 8 deep. We are in speculative territory about what actually happens but it seems doubtful to me at least that any length advantage of cavalry weaponry will make all the spears of the hoplite formation redundant. It might provide the first hit but less than a second later the rider is among the spear points of the second and third ranks, who he hasn't hit. Likewise, I think it is unlikely that anyone could just trot through poking at targets of opportunity with a twelve foot lance. It is more likely that it would be ditched when it jams into its first victim and the sword would be drawn.
So, I'd speculate that in a successful attack, the wedge leader will push several ranks deep into the phalanx, with half a dozen comrades trampling around widening the gap behind. Momentum will have slowed, horses and men would be wounded but much of the wedge is still behind and not in contact ready to exploit the pushing apart of the ranks, yet preventing any rushing out to envelop. Thereafter, it becomes a battle as to whether the wedge can push apart the formation and break through or whether the cavalry point are brought down or pushed out again. In an unsuccessful attack, the point mans horse runs onto a spear or trips over a falled infantryman and goes down, creating a barrier to exploitation by those behind and the hoplites relock their shields behind the obstacle.
Just remember that a wedge of horsemen cannot 'push' in the same way a wedge of infantrymen can. Horses react badly to being pushed from behind, it unleashes a whole heap of dominance behaviours and they tend to bite and kick each other.
I suppose you could get the horses so tightly packed that they couldn't do this, but the riders aren't going to be a lot of use either
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on April 08, 2014, 08:35:04 AM
As I understand it, the advantage of a wedged charge, as oppossed to a linear one, is it concentrates all the "break in" effort in one place. Most of the linear formation being charged is out of the equation (at least to begin with), whereas a small group of cavalry are in contact with their support close at hand. It is still, however, going to be a hard fought thing to go through a close order infantry formation maybe 8 deep. We are in speculative territory about what actually happens but it seems doubtful to me at least that any length advantage of cavalry weaponry will make all the spears of the hoplite formation redundant. It might provide the first hit but less than a second later the rider is among the spear points of the second and third ranks, who he hasn't hit. Likewise, I think it is unlikely that anyone could just trot through poking at targets of opportunity with a twelve foot lance. It is more likely that it would be ditched when it jams into its first victim and the sword would be drawn.
I would reiterate that in this era there seems to be no evidence of any hoplite infantry actually having an anti-cavalry drill: the earliest I can think of is Arrian's
ektaxis against the Alans, although Antony's legionaries improvised a testudo-like technique against Parthians (Plutarch, Life of Antony, 45). Hence any idea of massed ranks presenting massed spearpoints, or even presenting spearpoints at horse eye level, should be discarded. The Macedonian Companions were new to a system that was quite unprepared for them, and this lack of previous experience would go a long way to explaining their earlier successes. By the time their hoplite opponents could have expected to develop a counter-technique, Alexander's opponents had run out of hoplites.
If the xyston did penetrate a victim (as opposed to dealing a point-in-and-rip-out wound or a stroke that became self-extracting as the opponent fell) then it might well break, but the spiked butt would serve for at least one more stroke, by which time one might well be through the enemy formation. As far as I can establish from the accounts of Alexander's battles, Companions resorted to sword-work only in cavalry battles (the record is not sufficiently complete to be certain on this point, but it is the impression one receives).
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So, I'd speculate that in a successful attack, the wedge leader will push several ranks deep into the phalanx, with half a dozen comrades trampling around widening the gap behind. Momentum will have slowed, horses and men would be wounded but much of the wedge is still behind and not in contact ready to exploit the pushing apart of the ranks, yet preventing any rushing out to envelop. Thereafter, it becomes a battle as to whether the wedge can push apart the formation and break through or whether the cavalry point are brought down or pushed out again. In an unsuccessful attack, the point mans horse runs onto a spear or trips over a fallen infantryman and goes down, creating a barrier to exploitation by those behind and the hoplites relock their shields behind the obstacle.
This seems not unreasonable, although I would not see the point man's horse running onto a spear. Hoplites habitually used their spears overarm and do not seem to have grounded the butt except as part of kneeling/standing and waiting to move, e.g. the Spartans at Plataea. Curiously enough, the one time when Alexander's Companions were held up and got into a shoving match was on the riverbank at the Granicus - against Persian cavalry.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 08, 2014, 07:07:21 AM
Hang on, moving at a trot is not compatible with infantry bodies hurtling.
I did say 'at a trot
or better', indicating that a trot would be the minimum rather than the average speed.
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I've been struck by half ton livestock moving at a trot or thereabouts. You don't hurtle. You are more likely to be turned and pushed aside. They don't aim AT you, they try to go to one side, hence you're more likely to be spun.
Yes, this is roughly what I would anticipate at such a speed (and I do appreciate first-hand experience in the matter ;) ), although I would see the initial impact of the cavalry wedge and much if not all of the follow-through as moving somewhat faster.
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Another thing is that horses and cattle do not charge walls and that is what they see with the shields. There are no gaps, the animal will go for the gap and to make a gap you've got to kill someone.
To kill someone you either exploit a gap caused by a missile weapon (Probably the Persian technique) or you've got to kill him with your spear. Remember unless you can convince your horse to charge a solid obstacle (the wall of shields) you've got to stab one of the infantry and move your horse into his space.
The 'wild card' here is training: both the training of the cavalry (including their mounts) and the training of the infantry they are up against. A wall of shields is not 'solid' so much as continuous. One can conjecture about what shields-on-poles arrangements the Macedonians may have set up for training purposes, but I do not see training a warhorse to push between shields (aim for the bit where they join or overlap) as being particularly challenging. Besides, the point man will have removed the owner of one of those shields with his lance by the time the horse gets there and the said owner will be (involuntarily) doing his bit to open up the rank behind.
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Hang on again, you now have briskly moving animals. Before they were only trotting* and whilst I've never had to hit a briskly moving animal with a sword, I've had to turn them using a length of blue alkathene and it is perfectly simple to do, from the side they're the size of a barn door, trust me in this, you would struggle to miss.
*Not quite; 'at a trot
or better'.
The pertinent question would seem to be: how easy is it to do this while the next animal's rider is putting a lance point into your neck or face? This is why I think that as long as the cavalry kept moving they would be inside the 'reaction loop' of both individual infantrymen and the infantry formation as a whole.
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Also at Granicus, when the Hoplites were killed, did the Cavalry even hit them frontally, or did they wait for light infantry and pikes to break them up a bit?
Nobody tells us explicitly, but the impression one gets is of a simultaneous attack from all sides. It would of course make sense to use archery to prepare the sector to be hit by the wedge, and we do note that at the Granicus the Macedonian cross-river cavalry attack is accompanied (though not prepared) by Agrianes and archers, while at Issus the archers are deployed so that they seem able to 'shoot in' the Companions. That said, the Companions did not wait at Issus because of the 'incoming mail' being sent by the Persians, but at Chaeronea or when dealing with the mercenaries at the Granicus I would expect Alexander to have taken advantage of a preliminary shower of arrows from the archers - just enough to cause an upset rather than a barrage to make a path of dead bodies - a brief 'hurricane bombardment'. So yes, the clues suggest that the defenders were probably 'prepped' by a bit of archery in each case when the Companions triumphed over hoplites, or Patrick thinks they did. ;)
Just to point out that with livestock a 'visually' solid wall is a solid wall. There are technical vision problems with equine binocular vision (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equine_vision#Visual_field ) because of eye placement and head shape, but you see it in cattle as well. Moving cattle and horses out of a field onto a lane, they'll not see the gateway because in a narrow (ten foot wide) lane, the hedge of the opposite side of the lane 'blocks' the gate.
What you're forgetting with a hoplite formation is that if the infantry are loose enough for there to be viable gaps a horse can see so the infantry can be knocked down and brushed aside, the infantry in the second rank can attack the point of the wedge from the side and may even move forward to tackle the horsemen. One man with a shield can screen the man behind him disemboweling the lead horse
If the infantry are too tightly packed to do this sort of thing, there are no gaps and nobody is getting knocked down so the wedge doesn't happen.
As for "no evidence of any hoplite infantry actually having an anti-cavalry drill" we don't have much evidence for them having formal drills of any sort except in the later period.
But they'd been fighting Thessalians and Persians for a couple of centuries prior to the Macedonians getting involved so it wasn't as if you're discussing Aztecs seeing horses for the first time.
It's difficult to assume that Macedonian cavalry came as a shock to the Greeks or were doing anything they hadn't seen before, both Scythians and Thessalians used a wedge
Jim
Couple of points from Patrick.
"Horse eye level" - there doesn't seem to me a lot of difference between the height of a spear held overarm and the eye level of a horse. Horse would be a bit higher but nothing that would create difficulty. Also, stabbing at the throat maybe more worthwhile - horses have tough heads.
Second, grounding spears. This is a bit static - hoplites surely would have actively stabbed at the cavalrymen and horses. They may not have had cavalry drills but that is how they fought infantry, so why would they just stand there against infantry? If I'm allowed a parallel, medieval spearmen did ground their spears to receive cavalry but also actively stabbed, so I would be surprised if hoplites would stand there waiting for something to run onto their spear.
Roman cavalry horses were 14 hands (or thereabouts), so that is about 4'8" at the withers
Looking at http://www.allenandpage.com/uploaded/image/Feed-Chart.jpg you get a feel for the weight, and http://www.equine-world.co.uk/about_horses/horse-images/measure-horse.jpg you can see that the eyes are about four to six inches higher than the height in hands. The eyes of a 14 hand horse will be about 5ft above the ground.
Jim
Assuming Vitruvian proportion, a 5ft 6in hoplite and the spear held level on the shoulder, I reckon the point would be about 4ft 9 inches above ground. It is often shown with arm extended higher than this, thrusting down, but this may be a more infantry combat stance (to get over the shield of the man facing in a hoplite clash).
Just to check,
We have no other examples of companions breaking frontally into formed infantry.
So why abandon a battle winning tactic?
Quote from: Mark G on April 08, 2014, 03:43:29 PM
Just to check,
We have no other examples of companions breaking frontally into formed infantry.
So why abandon a battle winning tactic?
The short answer would seem to be that after the end of the Achaemenid Empire, the kind of formed infantry that Companions found themselves up against were mostly armed with sarissas. The 21' sarissa would conclusively outreach a 13' xyston no matter what the cavalryman did.
The other consideration is that Macedonian cavalry usually had a more pressing preoccupation on the field: enemy cavalry. At Issus Darius put all his cavalry in one sector, leaving the Companions free to plough through his Kardakes. At the Granicus, Alexander used a small number of contingents to restrain and dispatch the Persian left, reserving his Companions for a strike through to Darius. From the lineup Darius used as described in Arrian, and looking at the scene depicted by the Alexander Mosaic, Alex would have driven through the hoplite contingent on Darius' left to engage his (mounted) kingsmen - the scene that appears to be depicted on the Mosaic. One may note hoplite bodies on the ground (scattered rather than clumped) and the fact that the Companions still have their lances.
This would have been the last occasion in which Companions needed to charge through hoplites (as far as I can recall). Thereafter the foes faced by Alexander either fielded a substantial mounted contingent (Scythians and Indians) which the Macedonian horse concentrated upon. or the opposition did not attempt battle, but endured a siege. Following Alexander's death, the predominant infantry type was the sarissa-armed phalanx, and attacking that head-on was not really an option for any cavalry type.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 08, 2014, 01:05:40 PM
Couple of points from Patrick.
"Horse eye level" - there doesn't seem to me a lot of difference between the height of a spear held overarm and the eye level of a horse. Horse would be a bit higher but nothing that would create difficulty. Also, stabbing at the throat maybe more worthwhile - horses have tough heads.
Second, grounding spears. This is a bit static - hoplites surely would have actively stabbed at the cavalrymen and horses. They may not have had cavalry drills but that is how they fought infantry, so why would they just stand there against infantry? If I'm allowed a parallel, medieval spearmen did ground their spears to receive cavalry but also actively stabbed, so I would be surprised if hoplites would stand there waiting for something to run onto their spear.
Jim did mention that horses lack effective binocular vision: if they can miss a gate, not seeing a spearpoint should be easy. From the hoplite's point of view, trying to stab the throat or even the chest would indeed seem more productive, and in my understanding of the Macedonian technique the length of the xyston and the advance deployment of the point would be intended to get the hoplite to look to his own defences before he could think about making mischief with his spear.
So yes, I agree that a hoplite would naturally incline to an 'active defence', attempting to insert his steel rather than hoping the target would do it for him. Against standard javelin-armed cavalry he should be able to do this, which may explain why they did not usually close to melee against hoplites (there is one case in Xenophoon's
Hellenica where the Persians did, having caught the hoplites foraging and run a couple of scythed chariots through them first just to make sure, but frontal charging into melee against hoplites was very much the exception not the rule). The length of the xyston, combined with Alexander's preference for using the opponent's face as target, would tend to pre-empt any 'active defence' by the hoplite.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 08, 2014, 11:44:19 AM
What you're forgetting with a hoplite formation is that if the infantry are loose enough for there to be viable gaps a horse can see so the infantry can be knocked down and brushed aside, the infantry in the second rank can attack the point of the wedge from the side and may even move forward to tackle the horsemen. One man with a shield can screen the man behind him disemboweling the lead horse
If the infantry are too tightly packed to do this sort of thing, there are no gaps and nobody is getting knocked down so the wedge doesn't happen.
The overriding consideration here is that the wedge is not moving in a Xeno's Paradox fashion allowing countermoves by the infantry: it is a developing threat whose aspect is changing all the time, and if hoplites start moving they just lose whatever cohesion they do have and become easier targets for the faster-moving and faster-acting cavalrymen. There is simply no time for the hoplites to react as the wedge plunges into and through their formation.
Gaps are not necessary to knock down hoplites: reach is. If the formation is too packed and unyielding, yes, the wedge will come to a stop (as seems to have happened when Alexander charged the mercenaries at the Granicus). At the normal interval of 3' frontage per man, it will not be sufficiently dense to prevent progress.
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As for "no evidence of any hoplite infantry actually having an anti-cavalry drill" we don't have much evidence for them having formal drills of any sort except in the later period.
Precisely. As far as I can tell, nobody worked out an effective procedure for them against Macedonian cavalry. Against other cavalry they seem to have relied upon the reach of their weapons (judging very loosely by Plataea once the Spartans got into action). This would have worked well against javelin-armed types but not against the xyston-armed Macedonians.
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But they'd been fighting Thessalians and Persians for a couple of centuries prior to the Macedonians getting involved so it wasn't as if you're discussing Aztecs seeing horses for the first time.
It's difficult to assume that Macedonian cavalry came as a shock to the Greeks or were doing anything they hadn't seen before, both Scythians and Thessalians used a wedge.
Precisely - a wedge with javelins. The Macedonians used a wedge with the xyston, giving them an appreciable - even decisive - edge in reach and impact, and making the new tactic of frontally charging hoplites possible. Having a few archers in support did not hurt, either.
Actually a javelin has a lot longer reach, and can create the gap before you need to enter it. If the lead rider gets his spear stuck in the shield of a hoplite the entire wedge grinds to a halt out of embarassment :-)
Jim
Are you arguing that the wedge was only used against hoplites?
Personally I'd suggest the cavalry wedge was used because it was more easily manoeuvred than a line.
When fighting other mounted troops it might be that the wedge naturally flattened out, or it might be that the wedge worked better against cavalry than infantry
Jim
This is an oft worked through debate in which we alll imagine the situation as cavalry charge infantry.
usually we end up quoting examples from Napoleonic warfare where a horse dies on the square to create a gap or puzzling over how Bayard's fully armoured knights can pass completely through a Swiss pike phalanx several times. Part of the problem is that there is no one right answer as to what happens when cavalry charge infantry. The weakness of a debate based upon our imaginative reconstructions is that , even for much better documented periods, there is not much evidence. Where there are incidents we lack basics such as the detail of terrain, the training and drills of the participants, particularly the horses, even the actual useage of the weapons concerned. I see we now even have uncertainty as to whether hoplites would clump up or open to use their weapons against cavalry.
Hoplites had experience of a dangerous charging enemy. the scythed chariot. They seem to deal with these pretty well so I assume that they had drills. Persian Cavalry were still dangerous, art shows them fighting with hoplites. That all suggests to me that hoplites in good order resisted cavalry and that melee took place at the front edge of the hoplite formation.
If Alex and his wedge can break in then it becomes crucial how deep the hoplites are. If four deep they are ruined, if eight maybe they hold and if sixteen then Alex is in trouble....if the hoplites have good enough morale not
With the case of the horse charging the square, a dead horse can travel thirty yards and ignores infantry lines.
Basically a horse moving at speed, struck by a musket ball, keeps moving under its own momentum until finally it collapses. This gives it a massive advantage when charging squares compared to living horses who shy away.
With regard to Bayard, he was obviously just awfully difficult to kill. When you think about it you can see the problem facing the Swiss. Do you drop the pike and stab him with a dagger, or leave your mates behind to prod at him with a pike at a distance?
On the other hand Bayard doesn't seem to have done a lot of damage. King Francis would boast that "thirty brave charges" were hurled by the French gendarmerie against the stubborn Swiss but the Swiss were still there, and finally left when the Venetians arrived. So having gendarmes ride into or through your formation doesn't seem to have been a major issue. Perhaps they weren't doing a lot of damage either?
Jim
I think we've actually done well to avoid bringing in out of period examples (though I've been itching to do so :) ). We can , for example, say with certainty that medieval cavalry fought formed infantry and have some idea of what went down. We seem to be seriously deficient in examples of Macedonian cavalry doing so - at best Patrick has turned up two, which exist in such insufficient detail that we can't be sure they refer to cavalry attack on formed hoplites at all. Patrick's thesis seems to be that for a brief period, cavalry had an advantage because they carried a longer spear and had effective wedge tactics. The critical element would seem to be spear length - if the hoplite becomes a phalangite, cavalry attacks no longer happen.
To save us going to out of period, are there other examples within a few hundred years of cavalry tackling formed infantry. For example, did Hellenistic cavalry never attack infantry or was it only phalangites they stayed clear of? Did anybody attack Romans, Iberians, Galatians? If so, do we have any details that would help us here?
We have quite a few accounts of Romans versus Parthians and Sassanids. After discussions on DBMM list because of DBMM rule changes I even wrote an article in Slingshot :-)
(Sassanids versus the Romans)
Jim
Typical - my post and Jim's crossed in the post and mine now looks sort of sarcastic, which it wasn't meant to be.
Trying to bring a general point out of the Bayard stuff, the key if you look at this and medieval examples isn't isolated break ins, but the infantry managing to maintain the cohesion to isolate and destroy (or in Bayard's case, expel) the intruder. I think this would have been key in the case of the hoplites too.
Matt Bennett did some work on routing , years back and we talked through examples when he was looking for examples. The conclusion was that the expectations of both sides were key. Hence surprise or rather a plan not working was key. If the infantry expected to stand then breaking them was much harder than if they expected to fail. So medieval armies strengthened their infantry in several ways... I think this is in his article in 'Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World '. given that most Med infantry will have thought knights pretty terrifying they sought refuge in dense formations with bad terrain to the front, or pits and their own knights dismounted to boost morale and common risk. What they are trying to do is boost the expectation that the foot can hold the knights off. Similarly the Swiss were not of the sort to panic when Bayard broke in and just let the horses push through them. Between Hoplites and Companion cavalry there was not a huge social or martial gradient and, as was said earlier hoplites had been facing Thessalian and Persian cavalry and scythed chariots for many years so one rather thinks they had drills and expectations that they could deal with such a charge and survive. I also take the point that the Companions could push in and move through with few casualties on either side because its actually quite hard for either side to reach anyone in such conditions.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 09, 2014, 09:24:48 AM
I also take the point that the Companions could push in and move through with few casualties on either side because its actually quite hard for either side to reach anyone in such conditions.
Roy
A good point. Given modern health and safety considerations, it's amazing how few people died in ancient battles
Jim
Well, day off so time to read the whole thread...
I don' want to get too involved as I'll have to disappear off soon, but I'd like to suggest a few points..
#1 Greek cavalry didn't fight in wedges to 'break through', it was to give them control and manoeuvrability.
#2 Hoplite, is used for any close order infantry (including Galatians etc). Though in this case mercenary long spear/big shield late classical Greek infantry are probably what Alex faced.
#3 Alex's companions would be outreached by long spear infantry We can take the xyston as a 12ft counterbalanced spear held, one handed, roughly in the middle so reaching 8ft from the ride'rs shoulder. The dura as a 10ft counterbalanced spear held, one handed, roughly in the middle so reaching 7ft from the infantryman's shoulder. As the horse is over 3ft in front of the rider, the infantryman gets to strike first.
#4 There has been an enormous amount of work on cavalry charges and the consensus is that it's a giant game of 'chicken'. If the infantry flinch and waiver, the cavalry charge home and break them. If the infantry stand firm, the charge peters out and bounces off. This is explicitly detailed in later Chinese and Persian texts; implicit in Arrian and Xenothon; and ties in with Napoleonic examples of the odd horse, often dead, breaking squares etc...
Just thoughts....
Tom..
This discussion is going nicely without me, so I shall confine myself to a couple of points.
Quote from: Mark G on April 09, 2014, 07:01:27 AM
Are you arguing that the wedge was only used against hoplites?
No, just that when cavalry have the xyston and hoplites the doru a wedge could be successful against hoplites.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 09, 2014, 08:52:19 AM
To save us going to out of period, are there other examples within a few hundred years of cavalry tackling formed infantry. For example, did Hellenistic cavalry never attack infantry or was it only phalangites they stayed clear of? Did anybody attack Romans, Iberians, Galatians? If so, do we have any details that would help us here?
Not many, unfortunately. Hellenistic powers tended to fight mainly each other, and where cavalry (xyston-armed or not) came up against phalanxes, it invariably went for a flank (Sellasia 222 BC, Raphia 217 BC). When Pyrrhus fought the Romans (280-279 BC), his cavalry at Heraclea was tied up with the Roman cavalry until his elephants went in and sorted out that particular problem, after which our narrative passes over the bit between that and the end of the battle, so we do not know if his cavalry knocked any wedges through legionary lines. At Asculum the actions of the cavalry are not detailed. Once the Seleucids begin treating the Parthians as public enemy number one, their cavalry are remodelled as cataphracts and wedges seem to go out of the window (Macedonians in Macedon continue with them but seem to revert to javelin and shield, everyone in Greece who was anyone having meanwhile adopted the pike for their infantry).
All we can say with confidence is that the hoplite rapidly went out of fashion in the Successor period, to be replaced initially by the enigmatic thureophoroi and then by pikemen. Whether the main reasons were social, tactical or doctrinal is an open question, but the change was made. We might hypothesise from this that the weakness of hoplites against Companions had been appreciated, but one might equally hypothesise that the weakness of hoplites against phalangites had been appreciated (despite hoplites showing quite well at Issus). The intermediate troop type - thureophoroi - would not seem to have any great advantage over hoplites against either Companions or phalangites unless it had a longer spear than the hoplite, perhaps an Iphicratic (150% length) model.
Carthaginian cavalry can be seen in action at Bagradas, 255 BC, where they envelop the Roman rear and then shoot down Roman infantry with their javelins. In Cannae, 216 BC, the similarly javelin-armed Spanish and Gallic cavalry in Carthaginian service charge the rear of Roman formations, presumably making contact against troops who are facing the wrong way or who cannot face the right way quickly enough.
Macedonians did fight Gauls, but these battles are covered by our sources only in a tell-them-when-it-is-over-then-tell-them-who-won kind of way. The one exception is the 'elephant victory' over the Gauls in Babylonia narrated by Lucan, which was won by ... elephants.
The Parthians did leave us a victory over Crassus, and while their army was not Hellenistic it did have lance-armed cavalry who happily put their lances through two Romans at a time, or so Plutarch tells us in his Life of Crassus. Mark Antony's men did better with an overlapping shield arrangement (Plutarch, Life of Antony 45) but the Parthians were still happy about closing frontally to melee formed Roman infantry, and Parthians did not employ a wedge (or of they did our sources omit it).
Quote from: tadamson on April 09, 2014, 12:21:49 PM
#3 Alex's companions would be outreached by long spear infantry We can take the xyston as a 12ft counterbalanced spear held, one handed, roughly in the middle so reaching 8ft from the ride'rs shoulder. The dora as a 10ft counterbalanced spear held, one handed, roughly in the middle so reaching 7ft from the infantryman's shoulder. As the horse is over 3ft in front of the rider, the infantryman gets to strike first.
Looking at the Alexander Mosaic (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Alexandermosaic.jpg), we can see the butt spike and the point of Alexander's xyston, and on my computer screen at the highest magnification the lance is 5 1/2" long and is held at the 1 3/8" mark. This is about a quarter of the way along. Hence the Companion gets to strike first. :)
I suspect the xyston may have been counterweighted rather than counterbalanced.
Quote from: tadamson on April 09, 2014, 12:21:49 PM
#1 Greek cavalry didn't fight in wedges to 'break through', it was to give them control and manoeuvrability.
This isn't true, if I recall correctly. The manuals - or at least Arrian - mention both manouevrability and breaking through as advantages of wedge.
Patrick's right about the grip-point of the xyston; and the hoplite's doru is more like eight feet than ten, judgung from most illustrations.
I think a bit more work on what the hoplites looked like at this time would be valuable.
When i was reading on the a couple of years ago, it became clear that the composition and equipment of all Greek armies changed dramatically during the penrloponesian war.
Yet we still view any Greek army as basically a pre marathon era mass of old style hoplites plus a few lights.
I think some more work on what the Greeks looked like, and how their army was composed is now needed for charonea
The basic armament of the hoplites - the spear and shield - didn't change significantly, unless you think they were in fact "Iphikrateians". And the presence of traditional hoplite Argive shields in the Mosaic, and also on the Sarcophagus, suggests that the mercenaries in Persian service weren't.
there may be more to it than that though Duncan.
body armour - and the consequent change in doctrine of manoeuvre and speed over solidity.
the total army composition changing from mostly hoplites to mostly peltasts as some authors suggested (or at least a change from a single troop type plus attendants army to a more balanced composition force - something which the Macedonians themselves clearly represent).
iphicrates himself, not so much, but can we rule out changes to the length of the spear so easily when the Macedonians may have adopted a change in length from the Thebans?
How certain are we of exactly that Alexander was facing full citizen hoplites?
Quote from: Mark G on April 09, 2014, 04:18:11 PMHow certain are we of exactly that Alexander was facing full citizen hoplites?
If you're talking Chaironeia, the image of Philip examining the bodies of the dead Theban citizen Sacred Band who had gone down before the Macedonian sarisai makes it pretty certain.
The http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Alexandermosaic.jpg (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Alexandermosaic.jpg) mosaic isn't particularly good evidence for xyston legth. It was reconstructed from a very fragmented state and the butt spike (if it is that) is in a 'best guess' position (the smooth plaster isn't just filling gaps).
Though as we believe its based on a 3rd c BCE painting it may be the best evidence we have. And this isn't the place to rehash the 'look how long the Persian lances are' discussion. :-)
Tom..
While length of the xyston seems to be key to Patrick's reconstruction, I'm not sure whether that is too detailed. If cavalry pre-xyston were armed with javelins, isn't the likely major change the fact you now have a big spear that you thrust with rather than a little one you throw, regardless of exact length and reach?
Quote from: tadamson on April 09, 2014, 04:39:44 PM
The http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Alexandermosaic.jpg (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Alexandermosaic.jpg) mosaic isn't particularly good evidence for xyston legth. It was reconstructed from a very fragmented state and the butt spike (if it is that) is in a 'best guess' position (the smooth plaster isn't just filling gaps).
But there's plenty of other representational evidence that bears out both the length of the weapon and the way in which it was held - the Kinch tomb and the Raphia decree, for a start.
And as for the buttspike in the Mosaic, I'm not so sure: this isn't from an academic article, it's Paul McDonnell-Staff on RAT, but I think he's right on this one: "Anyone who views the mosaic will have observed the 'bare' patches, and most assume this was damage during the eruption, or during its recovery. It is neither. The mosaic is displayed exactly as found, complete with several repairs, and the mortar producing the 'bare' patches, which are in fact wear in ancient times from people standing and admiring it." In other words, the buttspike is probably where it was found, not "restored".
It was moved to Naples in the mid 19th C, and restored as best they could...
Quote from: Erpingham on April 09, 2014, 04:58:44 PM
While length of the xyston seems to be key to Patrick's reconstruction, I'm not sure whether that is too detailed. If cavalry pre-xyston were armed with javelins, isn't the likely major change the fact you now have a big spear that you thrust with rather than a little one you throw, regardless of exact length and reach?
I would think that the major change is that for the first time since cavalry became the premier mounted arm in Hellas some very well-trained cavalry now have a weapon capable of outreaching their best infantry opponents and a combat formation that is effective at slicing through infantry and cavalry alike. As a side-mention, it is interesting to note that in certain Mycenaean frescoes chariot warriors and infantry both carry long spears, making one wonder if a similar development had occurred during the chariot era, at least in Greece, where the bow never really seems to have become established as a chariot weapon.
Jim made the point that a javelin has a longer 'reach' than any lance, but the javelin, once it leaves the hand, is unguided and can be blocked, deflected or dodged. The lance point is guided right up to the moment of impact, and has rather more impact; even a small advantage in reach gives the cavalryman a very large advantage.
Curiously, Roman cavalry of the 5th-4th century BC seems to have used the
cuspis, a melee weapon wielded like a lance, and Livy has instances of Roman cavalry making frontal attacks on enemy formations - a tradition we see intermittently revived in the 3rd century BC, albeit usually with less success, even though the Roman cavalry by this time has adopted the javelin.
We have alexander facing the sacred band - only 300 men, i recall. How many of them had retained the same level of quality as their forebears at leuctra 40 years earlier?
Doesnt Polyaenus have something about the athenians being pulled forward by a feigned retreat by Philip?
That indicates a less than well drilled Athenian contingent for a start.
And isnt it diodorus who describes alexander as being with companions, but where does he mention them being horsed?
While its plutarch who says alexander broke the line, but who also says the thebans fell before sarissa and were face to face with the macedonian phalanx.
Wasnt alexander at the front of the hypaspists at Issus when they broke through initially, before remounting to chase darius from the field
- again reinforcing the suggestion that at Chaeronea he had an infantry command - which is only logical given its placement jammed against a river.
Quote from: Mark G on April 10, 2014, 04:46:12 PM
We have alexander facing the sacred band - only 300 men, i recall. How many of them had retained the same level of quality as their forebears at leuctra 40 years earlier?
Judging by the fact that they all fell 'with their wounds in front', one could say all of them.
Quote
Doesnt Polyaenus have something about the athenians being pulled forward by a feigned retreat by Philip?
That indicates a less than well drilled Athenian contingent for a start.
Not disagreeing there: the Athenians were still a home-grown hoplite army not up to the standard of the Spartans or the Sacred Band.
Quote
And isnt it diodorus who describes alexander as being with companions, but where does he mention them being horsed?
Diodorus writes (XVI.86.1-4)
"
The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valour and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required. 2 On the other side, dividing the line according to nationality, the Athenians assigned one wing to the Boeotians and kept command of the other themselves. Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both.
3 Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. 4 Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory."
The word translated 'companions' here is not 'hetairoi' (Companions) but 'parastaton', either those close to/next to Alexander or perhaps those commanding other formations (1,000 cavalry, the number one would expect on each wing, would form five 200-man wedges). While horses are not explicitly mentioned (nor is being on foot) one may note that both Alexander and Philip are leading from ahead - Alexander is the first through the ruptured enemy front and Philip is 'well in front' when advancing. Although the terminology is not necessarily conclusive, it is suggestive of a wedge, and hence of cavalry. One may also remember that Macedonian monarchs we see on the battlefield are almost invariably leading cavalry: Antigonus at Ipsus is the exception, having apparently put his whole cavalry contingent under his son Demetrius.
Quote
While its plutarch who says alexander broke the line, but who also says the thebans fell before sarissa and were face to face with the macedonian phalanx.
Plutarch mentions the sarissa but not the phalanx - the latter is a translator's interpolation. The existence, or rumoured existence, of a cavalry type termed 'sarissaphoroi' indicates that Plutarch need not have been using 'sarissa' to indicate an infantry weapon. Indeed, one might hypothesise (albeit without much weight) that the sarissa may originally have been developed for Macedonian cavalry and was subsequently adopted by Macedonian infantry as the cavalry adopted the lighter xyston.
Quote
Wasnt alexander at the front of the hypaspists at Issus when they broke through initially, before remounting to chase darius from the field
- again reinforcing the suggestion that at Chaeronea he had an infantry command - which is only logical given its placement jammed against a river.
Not in any of our sources: Arrian by implication puts him at the head of the Companions: he and they could not 'ride at a gallop' into action if on foot. Diodorus XVI.33.2 is even more definite: "He himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops."
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 10, 2014, 08:30:54 PM
Diodorus writes (XVI.86.1-4)
"The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valour and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required. 2 On the other side, dividing the line according to nationality, the Athenians assigned one wing to the Boeotians and kept command of the other themselves. Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both.
3 Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. 4 Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory."
The word translated 'companions' here is not 'hetairoi' (Companions) but 'parastaton', either those close to/next to Alexander or perhaps those commanding other formations (1,000 cavalry, the number one would expect on each wing, would form five 200-man wedges). While horses are not explicitly mentioned (nor is being on foot) one may note that both Alexander and Philip are leading from ahead - Alexander is the first through the ruptured enemy front and Philip is 'well in front' when advancing. Although the terminology is not necessarily conclusive, it is suggestive of a wedge, and hence of cavalry. One may also remember that Macedonian monarchs we see on the battlefield are almost invariably leading cavalry: Antigonus at Ipsus is the exception, having apparently put his whole cavalry contingent under his son Demetrius.
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Nothing there to say cavalry, and nothing to say wedge really.
Indeed Generals advance and force the enemy to fall back without drawing a sword. Alexander "ably seconded by his men" wins by his charisma or his cunning, he doesn't actually have to hit people with a sharpened steel bar.
Jim
Diodorus doesn't seem to say Alexander faced the Sacred band. Is this detail in another source?
Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas; it's quoted either earlier in this thead or in the Crazy for Chaeronea one.
The time the fight takes is interesting too, if you take the view that Philip did pull back, the Athenians followed up, and Philip was able to flank them, it adds some considerable time to the battle, which again reinforces doubt upon a hard charging companion attack breaking through on the other flank; and instead suggests a longer infantry battle
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 10, 2014, 10:30:05 PM
Indeed Generals advance and force the enemy to fall back without drawing a sword. Alexander "ably seconded by his men" wins by his charisma or his cunning, he doesn't actually have to hit people with a sharpened steel bar.
That would certainly be news to the Sacred Band, who presumably died with just their autograph books in front. ;)
Quote from: Mark G on April 11, 2014, 09:26:12 AM
The time the fight takes is interesting too, if you take the view that Philip did pull back, the Athenians followed up, and Philip was able to flank them, it adds some considerable time to the battle, which again reinforces doubt upon a hard charging companion attack breaking through on the other flank; and instead suggests a longer infantry battle
But only if one takes that view. Is it actually based on a source statement? Plutarch tells us only that Alexander was first to break into, or break through [enseisai], the Sacred Band (Life of Alexander, 9), and that Demosthenes' sole contribution to Chaeronea was to abandon his unit and run away disgracefully (Life of Demosthenes, 20), plus the bit in his Life of Pelopidas about the Sacred Band dying with all their wounds in front. In any event, Philip could still pull back (say off a slope and onto the level) and then hit the Athenians frontally, assuming such a pull back did happen.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 11, 2014, 11:45:18 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 10, 2014, 10:30:05 PM
Indeed Generals advance and force the enemy to fall back without drawing a sword. Alexander "ably seconded by his men" wins by his charisma or his cunning, he doesn't actually have to hit people with a sharpened steel bar.
That would certainly be news to the Sacred Band, who presumably died with just their autograph books in front. ;)
He's a general, (and a sixteen or seventeen year old one at that). He has plenty of highly paid and burly individuals to do the killing for him.
Jim
I doubt he would be any more combat-shy at Chaeronea than he was at the Granicus, where he led the main attack and was very definitely in the thick of the action, with one of his burly chaps saving his life, or at least ensuring it was not at risk, when the Persian satraps crowded around him.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 11, 2014, 09:20:05 PM
I doubt he would be any more combat-shy at Chaeronea than he was at the Granicus, where he led the main attack and was very definitely in the thick of the action, with one of his burly chaps saving his life, or at least ensuring it was not at risk, when the Persian satraps crowded around him.
At Granicus he was 22 and King, at Chaeronea he was 18, barely of an age to called up and he'd do what his father bluidy well told him :-)
I don't think you can extrapolate back to Chaeronea from Granicus, too many things had changed.
Jim
Bear in mind that he commanded his first campaign - very successfully - at 16. :)
"While Philip was making an expedition against Byzantium, Alexander, though only sixteen years of age, was left behind as regent in Macedonia and keeper of the royal seal, and during this time he subdued the rebellious Maedi, and after taking their city, drove out the Barbarians, settled there a mixed population, and named the city Alexandropolis." - Plutarch, Life of Alexander, 9.1
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 12, 2014, 11:18:46 AM
Bear in mind that he commanded his first campaign - very successfully - at 16. :)
"While Philip was making an expedition against Byzantium, Alexander, though only sixteen years of age, was left behind as regent in Macedonia and keeper of the royal seal, and during this time he subdued the rebellious Maedi, and after taking their city, drove out the Barbarians, settled there a mixed population, and named the city Alexandropolis." - Plutarch, Life of Alexander, 9.1
There is a great deal of difference between winning battles, conducting successful campaigns and personally hacking your way through eight ranks of burly hoplites. At eighteen he isn't going to have the weight.
On horseback it's not quite such a disadvantage, but you've still not got the reach of an adult and your blows aren't as heavy.
What we have to remember is that a general can lead his men to glory without even drawing his sword.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 12, 2014, 05:32:36 PM
What we have to remember is that a general can lead his men to glory without even drawing his sword.
A Roman general, yes: not a Hellenistic monarch. Being up front not just with the lads but actually ahead of them was part of the art of Macedonian kingship, at least under Philip and Alexander. Besides, it gives the somatophylakes something to do (and occasionally boast about afterwards). Alexander was anyway first into danger throughout what we now of his life and would not have abided being anywhere but up front at Chaeronea.
Hence I think that any attempt to evict Alexander from the point of a putative wedge at Chaeronea on the basis of generalisations about the military art is going to be stillborn. ;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 12, 2014, 07:45:09 PM
Hence I think that any attempt to evict Alexander from the point of a putative wedge at Chaeronea on the basis of generalisations about the military art is going to be stillborn. ;)
I suspect we do not know enough about the organisation of the close royal guard to say for certain but the front of a cavalry wedge is very exposed - there is a difference between heroic and suicidal. Alexander may cross the point in later life (after he becomes convinced he is divine?) but as early as Chaeronea? That is of course if there is anything to the fact that the Theban Sacred band were ridden down by a cavalry wedge at all.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 12, 2014, 07:45:09 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 12, 2014, 05:32:36 PM
What we have to remember is that a general can lead his men to glory without even drawing his sword.
A Roman general, yes: not a Hellenistic monarch. Being up front not just with the lads but actually ahead of them was part of the art of Macedonian kingship, at least under Philip and Alexander. Besides, it gives the somatophylakes something to do (and occasionally boast about afterwards). Alexander was anyway first into danger throughout what we now of his life and would not have abided being anywhere but up front at Chaeronea.
Hence I think that any attempt to evict Alexander from the point of a putative wedge at Chaeronea on the basis of generalisations about the military art is going to be stillborn. ;)
Well at Chaeronea he wasn't a monarch, he was just some kid who needed nursemaiding lest he get himself killed
At Chaeronea he'd have done what he was told and liked it.
Evicted him from the point of a wedge for which there is no evidence that it existed, or whether it was infantry or cavalry or even had him in it?
Jim
Apologies all if already stated elsewhere but are any of our sources from eyewitness accounts of the battle?
Plutarch was 46 -120AD, Arrian was 86 to 160AD, Curtis who's the one people have least faith in, was actually the second nearest in time as he is thought to have written between 41 and 79AD. The most contemporary was Diodorus Siculus who wrote between 60 and 30 BC. He was only three hundred years adrift, so was as contemporary as you or I am to the Jacobite rebellion of 1715.
Obviously they all had their sources, but these never survived and we struggle to subject them to proper analysis
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on April 12, 2014, 08:39:01 PM
I suspect we do not know enough about the organisation of the close royal guard to say for certain but the front of a cavalry wedge is very exposed - there is a difference between heroic and suicidal. Alexander may cross the point in later life (after he becomes convinced he is divine?) but as early as Chaeronea? That is of course if there is anything to the fact that the Theban Sacred band were ridden down by a cavalry wedge at all.
Alex showed an interesting combination of cold calculation and apparent bravado throughout his life, with the bravado being more apparent when he was younger. At the Granicus he is definitely playing a heroic role, striking down Mithridates and leading the subsequent attack on the cornered Greek mercenaries. He would if anything have been even keener at Chaeronea, intent on showing what he was made of (in a non-anatomical way).
Paradoxically, the tip of the wedge is one of the safest places to be. Missiles tend to fly past and land behind you, while melee opponents are distracted by the shiny-tipped long xystons flanking you on either side. Unless you are up against opponents whose weapons outreach you, problems only arise if the wedge is forced to halt or slow to a speed where opponents can adjust in time to prepare a shrewd stroke against you and/or your mount; it is noteworthy that the only times Alexander or his mount get hit in battle are when the wedge has come to a halt: on the bank of the Granicus, in amid the mercenaries at the same battle and when duelling with Darius' bodyguard (or in at least one account Darius) at Issus.
If still in doubt, consider how many kings died at the tip of a wedge they were leading. The number is not high.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 12, 2014, 08:46:15 PM
Well at Chaeronea he wasn't a monarch, he was just some kid who needed nursemaiding lest he get himself killed
Sorry, but this seriously misrepresents what we know of both Alexander and Macedonian culture. The 'kid' has already commanded one campaign - with complete success - two years earlier. He would indeed have done what he was told - by his father - at Chaeronea, but it seems that his father told him to command the left of the army, not to hang back out of the action.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2014, 08:57:35 AM
Plutarch was 46 -120AD, Arrian was 86 to 160AD, Curtis who's the one people have least faith in, was actually the second nearest in time as he is thought to have written between 41 and 79AD. The most contemporary was Diodorus Siculus who wrote between 60 and 30 BC. He was only three hundred years adrift, so was as contemporary as you or I am to the Jacobite rebellion of 1715.
Obviously they all had their sources, but these never survived and we struggle to subject them to proper analysis.
Jim is right about this, although Arrian has an advantage over our other sources in that he had access to - and used - the contemporary accounts of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, which he relies upon heavily - time-wise this is like our using Argyll's records when writing an account of the 1715 rising. Diodorus and Curtius lacked access to Ptolemy's and Aristobulus' accounts and Plutarch might have had access to one or both but his emphasis on the life and character of his subjects results in a rather abbreviated treatment of their battles and campaigns. Arrian is thus judged our best source and is usually taken as authoritative when discrepancies occur, though his account is not exhaustive and the other sources add various details - including our only accounts of Alexander's battle (Chaeronea) and campaign (against the Maedi) prior to becoming king.
Thanks Jim and I am trying not to state the obvious as you have summed up the sources to the debate nicely for me! I guess the angle I am coming from is that Alexander's role in the battle could have been beefed up at any point in the intervening 300-500 years.
We have a 22 year old King fighting and winning (some would say lucky in one or two instances) from 336BC onwards. Is it possible that Alxexander wished to have huge amounts of Kudos attached to the pivotal battle of Chaeronea in 334BC by having his involvement "enhanced"?
Very slightly off topic but fascinating all the same.......
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 13, 2014, 10:23:39 AM
Paradoxically, the tip of the wedge is one of the safest places to be. Missiles tend to fly past and land behind you, while melee opponents are distracted by the shiny-tipped long xystons flanking you on either side. Unless you are up against opponents whose weapons outreach you, problems only arise if the wedge is forced to halt or slow to a speed where opponents can adjust in time to prepare a shrewd stroke against you and/or your mount; it is noteworthy that the only times Alexander or his mount get hit in battle are when the wedge has come to a halt: on the bank of the Granicus, in amid the mercenaries at the same battle and when duelling with Darius' bodyguard (or in at least one account Darius) at Issus.
If still in doubt, consider how many kings died at the tip of a wedge they were leading. The number is not high.
We could look at the percentages. How many kings do we know (as opposed to speculate) led wedge attacks on formed infantry and how many times? How many died or were wounded? How does this compare to those who led other types of attack (e.g. infantry, linear cavalry formations)? I presume we are just using Classical/Hellenistic period?
I think part of the problem here (other than the lack of clarity of the evidence) is we carry two different images of cavalry wedges contacting infantry - yours is clean, precise, knife through butter; mine more of a controlled collision, cleaver into bone. I admit mine is based on medieval warfare, where penetrating a solid infantry formation was easy compared with getting out of it intact, let alone cutting through.
All we actually know is that Alexander was in titular command of part of the army. It is probable that in the pre-battle discussion the role of his force had been mapped out
What we have from Plutarch is that Alexander broke the Sacred band
He also says the Sacred band met the Macedonian infantry face to face.
So there is no evidence of cavalry at all, save that Dio Sic mentions Alexander and his Companions, who need not have been mounted.
So there is no evidence of a wedge.
I cannot see why anyone would have an 18 year old stuck in the front rank of a pike phalanx as anything other than an indirect assassination attempt.
By definition the men he will be fighting will be veterans in the enemy front rank, their best equipped, strongest and most skillful men.
Three hundred years later 'historians' have got three centuries of Hellenistic baggage to cope with.
(I use the '' around historians because, for example, Plutarch was a teller of improving moral tales as much as he was a historian)
Jim
Came across this while googling : Philip II of Macedonia: Greater Than Alexander
Richard A. Gabriel http://www.amazon.co.uk/Philip-II-Macedonia-Greater-Alexander/dp/1597975192
On pp 78-82, he spells out Macedonian cavalry tactics, specifically the use of the wedge against hoplites. His conclusions are almost identical to Patrick's except he has a shorter xyston and doesn't give it much significance - it's more about the horse. If anything, he has a lower opinion of hoplites abilities. He doesn't seem to have any more evidence than we have been discussing, though, except he claims that Arrian says Philip II adopted the Thracian cavalry wedge to combat infantry. Perhaps someone could turn that up and see whether "infantry" means hoplites?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2014, 01:22:06 PM
All we actually know is that Alexander was in titular command of part of the army. It is probable that in the pre-battle discussion the role of his force had been mapped out
I cannot see why anyone would have an 18 year old stuck in the front rank of a pike phalanx as anything other than an indirect assassination attempt.
By definition the men he will be fighting will be veterans in the enemy front rank, their best equipped, strongest and most skillful men.
Three hundred years later 'historians' have got three centuries of Hellenistic baggage to cope with.
(I use the '' around historians because, for example, Plutarch was a teller of improving moral tales as much as he was a historian)
Jim
I'm with you Jim. It "feels" unlikely that a young untried Alexander would be in the front rank (be it infantry or cavalry). I would imagine that Philip gave instructions to keep Alexander in the mix but not right at the front. A blooding but not a death sentence for his progeny and enough burly guardsmen to keep him out of serious trouble
Quote from: Holly on April 13, 2014, 05:36:03 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2014, 01:22:06 PM
All we actually know is that Alexander was in titular command of part of the army. It is probable that in the pre-battle discussion the role of his force had been mapped out
I cannot see why anyone would have an 18 year old stuck in the front rank of a pike phalanx as anything other than an indirect assassination attempt.
By definition the men he will be fighting will be veterans in the enemy front rank, their best equipped, strongest and most skillful men.
Three hundred years later 'historians' have got three centuries of Hellenistic baggage to cope with.
(I use the '' around historians because, for example, Plutarch was a teller of improving moral tales as much as he was a historian)
Jim
I'm with you Jim. It "feels" unlikely that a young untried Alexander would be in the front rank (be it infantry or cavalry). I would imagine that Philip gave instructions to keep Alexander in the mix but not right at the front. A blooding but not a death sentence for his progeny and enough burly guardsmen to keep him out of serious trouble
If he was like the other 18 year olds I've met, listening to his story afterwards, you'd have thought he'd won it single handed anyway, showing a lot of sad old men the way it should be done :-)
Jim
How many wounds did Philip have? Looking at Alexander's behaviour in later life it is far more likely that his father told him to lead from the front and take the risks . Yes, he would have good men around him, but he would not kept away fro risk. Philip would know that it took a hero to lead Macedonians and that meant being where the action was.
I wonder if people impose too modern a view. They would have Alex, like Prince Harry, not allowed in too risky a spot. I bet Harry would have preferred to be out where the shooting was hot.
Roy
Maybe Alexander's actions later in life were because he was "restrained" on the instruction of Philip (hypothetically) at Chaeronea so as to prove himself to those around him. Could the relationship between Philip and Alexander, strained as they were because of his mother, be a family interplay on who knows best?
One thing that doesnt change in history is the friction between sons and fathers as the former "comes of age" and the latter tries to keep the status quo
Quote from: aligern on April 13, 2014, 05:51:45 PM
I wonder if people impose too modern a view. They would have Alex, like Prince Harry, not allowed in too risky a spot. I bet Harry would have preferred to be out where the shooting was hot.
Roy
I think you are going too modern here. In the Middle Ages, when monarchs really did see frontline action, there was some debate as to whether a monarch had a duty to protect himself for the common good or whether he should, as a true knight, lead from the front. A similar debate could surely be considered for the advisors of a Macedonian king? We can speculate what being "at the front" meant - certainly exposing himself to danger, certainly personally involved in killing. Probably with his personal guards close about him (isn't part of the tragedy of Cleitus that he had saved Alex's life in a melee?). Charging into a formed phalanx eight feet ahead of everyone else? Unproven.
Looking at Philip's wounds, the eye was damaged at a seige when he was checking the artillery, there is an article http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8654972 The wounds of Philip which is available to everyone with an account
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2014, 01:22:06 PM
He also says the Sacred band met the Macedonian infantry face to face.
Actually he says no such thing, in fact: he says (in his Life of Pelopidas, 18) that the Sacred Band fell to Macedonian sarissas.
keisthai tous triakosious, enantious apēntēkotas tais sarisais hapantas en tois hoplois kai met' allēlōn anamemigmenous(the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the sarissas, with their armour, and mingled one with another)
Macedonian infantry is not mentioned. The Perseus translator, however, took it upon himself to add 'of the phalanx' after 'sarissas', presumably to order matters in his own mind.
Quote from: Holly on April 13, 2014, 06:00:03 PM
Maybe Alexander's actions later in life were because he was "restrained" on the instruction of Philip (hypothetically) at Chaeronea so as to prove himself to those around him. Could the relationship between Philip and Alexander, strained as they were because of his mother, be a family interplay on who knows best?
It does not seem to have been strained at the time of Chaeronea, nor does Alexander have a history of being 'restrained' by his father. One may remember that at the age of ten he was allowed to approach and interact with a dangerous and untameable horse. We should beware of assuming that Macedonian heirs were 'cosseted' - everything we have indicates they were encouraged to behave like men and take risks like men.
At Ipsus, Antigonus had his son and heir on the field. Where was this son and heir? At the head of the cavalry.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2014, 06:21:22 PM
In the Middle Ages, when monarchs really did see frontline action, there was some debate as to whether a monarch had a duty to protect himself for the common good or whether he should, as a true knight, lead from the front. A similar debate could surely be considered for the advisors of a Macedonian king?
If so, none of our sources mention it, which would be a most surprising omission if it were in fact an omission. A Macedonian king (and his Hellenistic successors) invariably led from the front for the common good - with one exception. Perseus at Pydna (168 BC) is believed to have ducked out of leading (just once) on the pretext that he had to sacrifice at a temple or that he had been kicked by a horse - and he was forever after execrated as a coward.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 13, 2014, 07:41:49 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2014, 01:22:06 PM
He also says the Sacred band met the Macedonian infantry face to face.
Actually he says no such thing, in fact: he says (in his Life of Pelopidas, 18) that the Sacred Band fell to Macedonian sarissas.
keisthai tous triakosious, enantious apēntēkotas tais sarisais hapantas en tois hoplois kai met' allēlōn anamemigmenous
(the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the sarissas, with their armour, and mingled one with another)
Macedonian infantry is not mentioned. The Perseus translator, however, took it upon himself to add 'of the phalanx' after 'sarissas', presumably to order matters in his own mind.
Which is why I am a spectator in this discussion. My experience is that one cannot trust translations since even the good translators try to second-guess the author's mind in more obscure passages.
A translator needs three things: a good grasp of the original language, a good grasp of English, and a first-rate academic understanding of the historical context (which does not necessarily mean an erudite knowledge of fashionable academic theories) ;).
I note that whilst Macedonian infantry are not mentioned, neither are the cavalry, and given we have no evidence whatsoever of Macedonian cavalry charging frontally successfully into Greek Hoplites (Surely the Lamian war would have turned up one example if it was so obviously successful) I'm happy to accept it was just an infantry battle.
With Antigonus you are in the post Alexander world. Not only that but Demetrius was 35 at the time of the battle of Ipsus, so can hardly be evidence of the utility of ephebes in combat
As for Perseus, again, he was the king, Alexander was a boy obeying orders. Disobeying orders was not encouraged
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 13, 2014, 07:41:49 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2014, 01:22:06 PM
He also says the Sacred band met the Macedonian infantry face to face.
Actually he says no such thing, in fact: he says (in his Life of Pelopidas, 18) that the Sacred Band fell to Macedonian sarissas.
keisthai tous triakosious, enantious apēntēkotas tais sarisais hapantas en tois hoplois kai met' allēlōn anamemigmenous
(the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the sarissas, with their armour, and mingled one with another)
Macedonian infantry is not mentioned. The Perseus translator, however, took it upon himself to add 'of the phalanx' after 'sarissas', presumably to order matters in his own mind.
Going back a few pages, when Patrick said:
QuoteIn Plutarch's Alexander (68.4) Alexander slays Abuletes, son of Oxyathres, with a sarisa (one would expect him to use a xyston), and in 67.2, when the army is having a 'Bacchic march' Plutarch remarks that 'not a shield (pelta) nor helmet (kranos) nor spear (sarisa) was to be seen'. The focus of this comment seems to be upon Alexander and his Companions, although it could be a generalised comment applied to the whole army, but in such a case I would expected 'aspis' rather than 'pelta' as the generic word for shield.
and
Quote
I was looking solely at Plutarch's usage, and this suggests he used 'pelta' as the Macedonian cavalry shield and 'xyston' or 'sarisa' interchangeably as the Macedonian cavalry lance.
- I forgot to mention the obvious response, namely, that Plutarch's
Aemilius Paullus 19 makes it clear that Plutarch's vocabulary for Macedonian
infantry equipment was precisely
sarisa and
pelte. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that
Alex. 67.2 focusses on the Companions, especially since these are not normally associated with any shield, but rather on the Macedonian infantry.
Therefore, despite everything Patrick has put forward, it still seems to me that there is no passage where Plutarch can be show to use
sarissa for a cavalry spear; that, therefore, the
sarissai that slew the Sacred Band were indeed those of the Macedonian infantry, even though Plutarch doesn't explicitly say so; and, therefore, that whether Alexander fought on foot, found a gap in the line with his cavalry as Hammond postulated, or pranced about looking pretty while sycophants wrote fictions, he did not on this occasion lead cavalry into a frontal charge against hoplites.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 13, 2014, 07:41:49 PM
It does not seem to have been strained at the time of Chaeronea, nor does Alexander have a history of being 'restrained' by his father. One may remember that at the age of ten he was allowed to approach and interact with a dangerous and untameable horse. We should beware of assuming that Macedonian heirs were 'cosseted' - everything we have indicates they were encouraged to behave like men and take risks like men.
True but the incident at Philip's wedding and subsequent exile of Alexander must have festered. Suppose Philip wanted to slight Alexander by cossetting him at Chaeronea in direct opposition to the "norm" as you have suggested.....?
2 years later Philip lies dead and there is a whiff of smoke where Alexander is concerned
Patricide and filicide occur with depressing regularity
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 13, 2014, 07:41:49 PM
If so, none of our sources mention it, which would be a most surprising omission if it were in fact an omission.
Given that our sources leave out or leave uncertain so much about Chaeronea, I don't think that argument holds. Personally, I think it highly unlikely that Philip's counselors would be utterly indifferent to matters of succession. In any case, the intention was to show a parallel from pre-modern times, as against Roy's House of Windsor example. I don't think it is a major factor in discussing cavalry tactics.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 13, 2014, 08:23:48 PM
Going back a few pages, when Patrick said:
QuoteIn Plutarch's Alexander (68.4) Alexander slays Abuletes, son of Oxyathres, with a sarisa (one would expect him to use a xyston), and in 67.2, when the army is having a 'Bacchic march' Plutarch remarks that 'not a shield (pelta) nor helmet (kranos) nor spear (sarisa) was to be seen'. The focus of this comment seems to be upon Alexander and his Companions, although it could be a generalised comment applied to the whole army, but in such a case I would expected 'aspis' rather than 'pelta' as the generic word for shield.
and
Quote
I was looking solely at Plutarch's usage, and this suggests he used 'pelta' as the Macedonian cavalry shield and 'xyston' or 'sarisa' interchangeably as the Macedonian cavalry lance.
- I forgot to mention the obvious response, namely, that Plutarch's Aemilius Paullus 19 makes it clear that Plutarch's vocabulary for Macedonian infantry equipment was precisely sarisa and pelte. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that Alex. 67.2 focusses on the Companions, especially since these are not normally associated with any shield, but rather on the Macedonian infantry.
Unfortunately that argument does not hold, because in Plutarch's Alexander 16.4 Alexander at the Granicus is described as:
"...
conspicuous by his buckler [pelte]
and by his helmet's crest ..."
Hence here we have Plutarch using 'pelta' unequivocally as a Macedonian
cavalry shield, and doing so in the life of Alexander, not in a period removed from it by almost two centuries. If anything, this turns the argument around the other way.
The only other use of 'pelta' by Plutarch in his Life of Alexander is in the previously-mentioned episode in chapter 67, when Alexander and "the rest of his friends and commanders" are having their Dionysiac procession in covered waggons and "
Not a shield [ou pelten]
was to be seen, not a helmet [ou kranos],
not a spear [ou sarisan] ..."
It is not wholly clear whether this description refers only to Alexander and his close Companions or includes the rest of the army, in which "
along the whole march with cups and drinking-horns and flagons the soldiers kept dipping wine from huge casks and mixing-bowls and pledging one another," (if Plutarch is referring to the whole army then one could argue that he is subsuming everything under infantry equipment, though one could equally argue that he uses these terms - pelta and sarissa - for both infantry
and cavalry equipment) but the argument that Plutarch uses 'pelta' to designate a phalangite shield is definitely negated by his use of it in Alexander 16.4.
Unless someone would like to suggest that Alexander went into action on foot at the head of infantry in his attack across the Granicus ... ;)
Quote from: Holly on April 13, 2014, 10:13:58 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 13, 2014, 07:41:49 PM
It does not seem to have been strained at the time of Chaeronea, nor does Alexander have a history of being 'restrained' by his father. One may remember that at the age of ten he was allowed to approach and interact with a dangerous and untameable horse. We should beware of assuming that Macedonian heirs were 'cosseted' - everything we have indicates they were encouraged to behave like men and take risks like men.
Suppose Philip wanted to slight Alexander by cossetting him at Chaeronea in direct opposition to the "norm" as you have suggested.....?
If so, then Plutarch's biography of Alexander would have read somewhat differently, along the lines of: "A further grudge he bore against his father was not being allowed to distinguish himself at Chaeronea."
Quote from: Erpingham on April 14, 2014, 09:21:00 AM
Personally, I think it highly unlikely that Philip's counselors would be utterly indifferent to matters of succession. In any case, the intention was to show a parallel from pre-modern times, as against Roy's House of Windsor example. I don't think it is a major factor in discussing cavalry tactics.
Fair enough, from that angle. Concerning Macedonian matters of succession, my impression is that counsellors' chief preoccupation was to emerge on the winning side in the succession struggle that often followed the demise of a king. We may note that Alexander swiftly secured his position by dealing with at least one cousin, so I do not see any argument for preserving the heir apparent because he is the heir apparent (there were always a number of those), rather that in the highly competitive world of Macedonian monarchy the lad should have the chance to win his spurs, so to speak.
On Philip letting Alexander fight in the front I would cite 'let the boy win his spurs'
There are all sorts of relationships between fathers and sons so I don't buy the anthropological arguments. It is more important that the attitude of the Macedonian king is to lead from the front at key times. If Alexander does not do this how is he going to dominate the Macedonian aristocracy?
Despite all the discussion on whether Alexander is leading a pike phalanx, his guards dismounted or his horsed companions I don't think we have excluded any of the options?
It does strike me, that determined horsemen can always melee with and put pressure on foot, especially foot without pikes. Hence whether it is likely or not, a mounted attack is feasible.
Roy
Of course, sensible horsemen will charge in and out repeatedly, as they are basically buggered on their left once the horse is motionless and the infantry have recovered from the impact
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2014, 11:42:37 AMUnfortunately that argument does not hold, because in Plutarch's Alexander 16.4 Alexander at the Granicus is described as:
"... conspicuous by his buckler [pelte] and by his helmet's crest ..."
Hence here we have Plutarch using 'pelta' unequivocally as a Macedonian cavalry shield, and doing so in the life of Alexander, not in a period removed from it by almost two centuries. If anything, this turns the argument around the other way.
Except that, as we discussed elsewhere, this incident may be complete fiction. I am quite happy that Plutarch may use
pelte for an
imaginary shield.
QuoteThe only other use of 'pelta' by Plutarch in his Life of Alexander is in the previously-mentioned episode in chapter 67
I am not convinced you can draw meaningful conclusions from a sample size of two.
Quote from: aligern on April 14, 2014, 01:12:21 PM
On Philip letting Alexander fight in the front I would cite 'let the boy win his spurs'
By standing at the front of an infantry formation, with experienced knights around him. Edward III had a good relationship with his son, so we can rule out the assisted suicide explanation :)
Quote
It does strike me, that determined horsemen can always melee with and put pressure on foot, especially foot without pikes. Hence whether it is likely or not, a mounted attack is feasible.
Roy
A mounted attack is certainly feasible but would it be one perfect charge in wedge formation led by Alexander? Or would it be more like Mark's idea of a lot of in and out fighting, trying to create an exploitable gap? As we can't actually answer unequivocally that there was a cavalry attack at all, it seems that the rest must be our best informed speculation (as often is the case).
For clarity, in strongly on the "not mounted in the first place " camp .
Especially as there were only 300 Theban sacred band (300 / 8 deep = sod all) , it makes sense that the space itself was very small and constricted. Ideal for an elite infantry force, pointless for a mounted one.
Quote from: Mark G on April 14, 2014, 03:20:41 PMEspecially as there were only 300 Theban sacred band (300 / 8 deep = sod all)
We cannot rule out that they might have been the front rank of a wider formation. This (according to Plutarch's
Pelopidas) was how Gorgidas had originally used them, and although Pelopidas favoured concentrating them in one body we can't be sure of how they fought after Pelopidas and Epaminondas.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 14, 2014, 01:28:24 PM
I am not convinced you can draw meaningful conclusions from a sample size of two.
Perhaps not, but these are the only samples in Plutarch's
Life of Alexander, so this is 100% of the sample size and it seems (at least in my understanding) that both point in the same direction.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 14, 2014, 01:48:11 PM
A mounted attack is certainly feasible but would it be one perfect charge in wedge formation led by Alexander? Or would it be more like Mark's idea of a lot of in and out fighting, trying to create an exploitable gap? As we can't actually answer unequivocally that there was a cavalry attack at all, it seems that the rest must be our best informed speculation (as often is the case).
We do know that the typical tactic of Macedonian xyston-armed wedges was to go in and push through, judging by accounts of the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela (and, as far as we can judge, the Jaxartes). There was one battle in which the Macedonian cavalry did make repeated charges, pulling back for another go each time, and this was the Hydaspes. We can conclude that they could do this but mostly chose not to. At the Hydaspes their opponents were able to fall back on elephants, which might account for the different tactics there.
There would be no advantage to adopting this mode of attack against hoplites: one would simply sacrifice the disorganisation created by the initial impact, allow strikes at the retiring horsemen and then have to do it all again. If going for an in-and-out style of attacking against hoplites, the best weapon to use would be the javelin.
We might not be able to say
unequivocally that there was a cavalry attack on the Sacred Band at Chaeronea (there are comparatively few things we can say
unequivocally about most events in classical history), but every clue and indicator we have seems to point that way: Alexander's Companions' performance at the Granicus and Issus, his leaving hoplite bodies along his path of attack in the Alexander Mosaic, the Chaeronea description of Alexander as being the first into (or first through) the Theban formation and Philip similarly 'ahead of' his troops. All of these are indicative, and while we can attempt pick holes in each individual instance in isolation, when we put them together the result looks consistent.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2014, 08:50:17 PM
We might not be able to say unequivocally that there was a cavalry attack on the Sacred Band at Chaeronea (there are comparatively few things we can say unequivocally about most events in classical history), but every clue and indicator we have seems to point that way:
1) Alexander's Companions' performance at the Granicus and Issus,
2) his leaving hoplite bodies along his path of attack in the Alexander Mosaic,
3) the Chaeronea description of Alexander as being the first into (or first through) the Theban formation and Philip similarly 'ahead of' his troops.
All of these are indicative, and while we can attempt pick holes in each individual instance in isolation, when we put them together the result looks consistent.
I took the liberty of splitting your points and numbering them.
1) At Granicus and Issus we have no evidence of the Companions charging hoplites frontally. At Granicus it was cavalry (against the surrounded and doomed Greek hoplites at the end the sources strike me as not supporting a cavalry charge into the front of them.)
2) This one I wouldn't like to say either way. A group of hoplon carrying guards might well have been ridden down, they could have been men who got caught when their unit fell back or whatever.
3) We know (I assume) that Philip was not on horseback. Comparison with Philip might just mean that Alexander was somewhere in the Macedonian phalanx that fought the Thebans
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2014, 10:25:23 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2014, 08:50:17 PM
We might not be able to say unequivocally that there was a cavalry attack on the Sacred Band at Chaeronea (there are comparatively few things we can say unequivocally about most events in classical history), but every clue and indicator we have seems to point that way:
1) Alexander's Companions' performance at the Granicus and Issus,
2) his leaving hoplite bodies along his path of attack in the Alexander Mosaic,
3) the Chaeronea description of Alexander as being the first into (or first through) the Theban formation and Philip similarly 'ahead of' his troops.
All of these are indicative, and while we can attempt pick holes in each individual instance in isolation, when we put them together the result looks consistent.
I took the liberty of splitting your points and numbering them.
1) At Granicus and Issus we have no evidence of the Companions charging hoplites frontally. At Granicus it was cavalry (against the surrounded and doomed Greek hoplites at the end the sources strike me as not supporting a cavalry charge into the front of them.)
2) This one I wouldn't like to say either way. A group of hoplon carrying guards might well have been ridden down, they could have been men who got caught when their unit fell back or whatever.
3) We know (I assume) that Philip was not on horseback. Comparison with Philip might just mean that Alexander was somewhere in the Macedonian phalanx that fought the Thebans
Jim
I would (not unexpectedly ;) ) take issue with each of these.
1) At the Granicus Alexander did charge the enemy hoplites and had a horse killed under him. Since the hoplites were under a 'combined attack by infantry and cavalry" (Arrian) we can deduce they were surrounded, hence facing in all directions, hence any attack on them would perforce be frontal. At Issus he was admittedly charging Kardakes; I added that to show the continuity of tradition of Macedonian cavalry charging directly into opposing infantry.
2) If the Companions did not kill/maim those hoplites in the Alexander Mosaic, who did? They have Companions to the left of them (from the viewer's angle) and Persians to the right of them. I doubt that the Persians would themselves have killed hoplites who were in Alexander's way, and the hoplites would not have killed themselves or each other, which would seem to leave just the Companions as the instruments of death and serious injury.
3) We definitely do not 'know' that Philip was not on horseback at Chaeronea: it has just been assumed in the absence of a clear statement either way that me 'must have' been on foot despite the description of him being 'in front of' his soldiers. Such a description fits better with a wedge, and we
do know that Macedonian Companions fought in wedge whereas we have no accounts of Macedonian infantry fighting in wedge.
Putting these clues together with the consistent pattern of Macedonian monarchs (and heirs) leading mounted from the front, it seems reasonable to extrapolate this behaviour back to Chaeronea, especially given its consistency with the few clues we have.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2014, 10:17:20 AM
2) If the Companions did not kill/maim those hoplites in the Alexander Mosaic, who did? They have Companions to the left of them (from the viewer's angle) and Persians to the right of them. I doubt that the Persians would themselves have killed hoplites who were in Alexander's way, and the hoplites would not have killed themselves or each other, which would seem to leave just the Companions as the instruments of death and serious injury.
The painting/mosaic is of course a moment in time - we cannot be sure how the artist perceived the run up to the scene. Nor can we be certain that it accurately reflects that moment in time - it is an art work not an action photo. So arguing that the presence of apparent dead hoplites in the composition means that Alexander has just carved through a phalanx of formed hoplites leading a wedge formation, in the process losing his helmet, might be a stretch of the evidence?
Duncan's suggestion of the Theban Sacred Band fronting a wider formation of say 800 men makes a lot of sense. If they are in an 8 deep formation then all dying with wounds to the front is just a bit less likely than if they are the front two or three ranks of a formation.
The sacred band was only ever 300 men strong.
Hence my disbelief that anyone would be stupid enough to squeeze cavalry opposite the space they occupied.
Even at an unheard of 4 deep formation (which would have been commented on), they are not a hundred men wide standing shoulder to shoulder.
Cavalry cannot operate in such a cramped space.
Ahh, but if the saced band are the front two ranks of a formation then they are 150 men wide and cavalry can operate.
R
And if the moon were made of green cheese...
Meantime, these guys form an elite unit for the best part of a century, and die as a unit on this field.
You take my point, i think.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2014, 10:42:14 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2014, 10:17:20 AM
2) If the Companions did not kill/maim those hoplites in the Alexander Mosaic, who did? They have Companions to the left of them (from the viewer's angle) and Persians to the right of them. I doubt that the Persians would themselves have killed hoplites who were in Alexander's way, and the hoplites would not have killed themselves or each other, which would seem to leave just the Companions as the instruments of death and serious injury.
The painting/mosaic is of course a moment in time - we cannot be sure how the artist perceived the run up to the scene. Nor can we be certain that it accurately reflects that moment in time - it is an art work not an action photo. So arguing that the presence of apparent dead hoplites in the composition means that Alexander has just carved through a phalanx of formed hoplites leading a wedge formation, in the process losing his helmet, might be a stretch of the evidence?
It could be considered a stretch, but suggesting that the hoplites are an invention casts unwarranted aspersions on the accuracy of Philoxenus of Eretria, the 4th century BC artist who painted the picture on which the Alexander Mosaic is academically assumed to be based. We know of this painting through Pliny, who dates it to when Cassander was king, which puts it between 317 and 297 BC - when living witnesses to an event in 331 BC would still have been available.
Greek (and Hellenistic) art emphasised realism to a degree which would frighten modern film-makers, so we need not imagine that the participants in the composition was invented.
Returning to the question of how much we can extract from this pictorial information, we need to look at Darius' OB at Gaugamela, in which Arrian (III.11) states that the Greek hoplites were drawn up "
in two sections, one on each side of Darius and his Persian guard." Therefore, in order to get to Darius from the flank exposed by the departure of the Persian left, Alexander would perforce have had to plough through the left-hand contingent of hoplites. Given this, and the dead/dying hoplites in the picture, we can safely conclude that their presence is factual and that the Companions dealt with them. (I should note that it was Duncan Head whose eye for detail pointed out these hoplites in an Ancmed discussion on Iphicrates' reforms.)
The one matter not certain is whether the hoplites at Gaugamela managed to change facing sufficiently rapidly for Alexander to attack them head-on. Given that they would have been well trained and disciplined, it is likely they would have managed this. Whether they did or not, Alexander and his Companions still got through them and attacked Darius' bodyguard.
Quote from: Mark G on April 15, 2014, 12:24:26 PM
The sacred band was only ever 300 men strong.
Hence my disbelief that anyone would be stupid enough to squeeze cavalry opposite the space they occupied.
Even at an unheard of 4 deep formation (which would have been commented on), they are not a hundred men wide standing shoulder to shoulder.
Cavalry cannot operate in such a cramped space.
Mark, I suggest that before making any such statements it might be beneficial to work out the width of a Macedonian cavalry
ile in wedge.
Quote from: Mark G on April 15, 2014, 05:11:28 PM
Meantime, these guys form an elite unit for the best part of a century, and die as a unit on this field.
You take my point, i think.
Assuming the intent is not to portray them as nonagenarians, the obvious point is that for once they had run into a superior opponent.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2014, 08:50:17 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 14, 2014, 01:28:24 PM
I am not convinced you can draw meaningful conclusions from a sample size of two.
Perhaps not, but these are the only samples in Plutarch's Life of Alexander, so this is 100% of the sample size and it seems (at least in my understanding) that both point in the same direction.
But if you reckon I can't use Plutarch's
Aemilius Paullus to elucidate his
Alexander, then I don't see why you can use the
Alexander to elucidate the use of "sarissa" in the
Pelopidas - which is where we started. ;)
Quote from: Mark G on April 15, 2014, 05:11:28 PM
And if the moon were made of green cheese...
Meantime, these guys form an elite unit for the best part of a century, and die as a unit on this field.
You take my point, i think.
Personally, I have no idea what your point is.
The Sacred Band fought as the front rank of the phalanx until c.375. They are then known to have fought as a single body for about fifteen years, till Mantineia. How they deployed after that is unknown.
Even if they did fight as a single body at Chaironeia, this proves nothing about whether cavalry could have attacked them, since any frontal cavalry attack (which of course I don't believe in, but for the sake of argument...) could have been directed at the whole frontage of the Theban phalanx. That the Sacred Band were pointed out the next day laying dead together need only indicate that they were the only part of the line that died in place to the last man.
If they'd been the front ranks of a larger formation I would have thought that it might be expected that the bodies of men not of that larger formation would be mixed in with them.
I can understand there being no Macedonian bodies, they could well have been cleared away first.
I suppose that it may well be that the bodies of the Sacred Band had been put separately, the looting and recovering of bodies of friends (on the Macedonian side) may well have started by the time Philip arrived there.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2014, 09:53:55 PM
If they'd been the front ranks of a larger formation I would have thought that it might be expected that the bodies of men not of that larger formation would be mixed in with them.
Don't quite understand that - men "of that larger formation" but not of the Band, I could understand, but "men not of that larger formation" - why? In any case:
Quote...and when, after the battle, Philip was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the sarisai, with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed...
- while this suggests that the 300 were all in the same place, I think it may be too much to read into it that no other bodies were with them.
I was assuming from memory that it had specifically mentioned Philip had seen it next day, in which case looting would have been done and bodies even sorted a bit. But re-reading it, Philip might well have happened past an hour or so after the fighting had finished.
Mind you, one thing that niggles, how could he tell they were the bodies of the sacred band?
1) They wore some form of identification, a common shield design or something.
2) Someone who'd fought them was still there and said something along the lines of "And that heap is the Sacred band"
3) The incident was invented to add a touch of pathos and cast an interesting light on Philip's character.
I guess all are perfectly possible, perhaps equally possible
Jim
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 15, 2014, 09:20:21 PM
But if you reckon I can't use Plutarch's Aemilius Paullus to elucidate his Alexander, then I don't see why you can use the Alexander to elucidate the use of "sarissa" in the Pelopidas - which is where we started. ;)
Period, m'lud, period. Pelopidas and Alexander belong to the same century, one generation apart. Plutarch's sources for these individuals would most probably date from that time and have its usage. Aemilius Palus is a century and a half later, by which time meanings had changed - peltast (the eponymous troop category for the pelta) for a start. ;)
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 15, 2014, 09:41:03 PM
Even if they did fight as a single body at Chaironeia, this proves nothing about whether cavalry could have attacked them, since any frontal cavalry attack (which of course I don't believe in, but for the sake of argument...) could have been directed at the whole frontage of the Theban phalanx. That the Sacred Band were pointed out the next day laying dead together need only indicate that they were the only part of the line that died in place to the last man.
Indeed, the Sacred Band would not have been deployed in isolation, but as part of the Theban battle line. It is entirely in keeping with Alexander's nature that he would go for the best and strongest of the enemy troops.
The Sacred Band were traditionally exactly 300 strong. If we assume for the sake of argument that they deployed in a single body, this body would most probably be 30 wide by 10 deep or 50 wide by 6 deep. A Macedonian cavalry
ile of c.200 men (190 or 210) is 19 or 20 horses wide: allowing 4.5' per horse (rather than the Polybian 6' which allows for about-turns) this is 28.5 yards or 29 yards. The frontage of Alexander's
ile with this spacing would have matched the frontage of a 10-deep Sacred Band quite nicely. If we insist on 6' per horse then we have a 40-yard width, allowing the bulk of the
ile to front the Sacred Band (or the whole of the
ile with room to spare if the Sacred Band deployed 6 deep).
One question about Chaeronea is whether the Thebans would have attempted to fight in their usual very deep formation - I think the consensus is that they would not, because a) the death of Epaminondas seems also to have been the end of his tactical approach and b) deploying the main phalanx 50 deep would leave them seriously outflanked by the Macedonians. If they did mass 50 shields deep it puts an entirely new complexion on the battle, but given their position on the right (Epaminondas used to put his deep formation on the left) and the need to front the Macedonian force it seems much more likely that they went for a more standard 8 deep or 10 deep deployment.
Given the assumption that the Thebans would have deployed 8-10 deep, the Sacred Band would have a 30-yard frontage and hence only Alexander's
ile could attack it. The other four
ilai on his wing would thus hit the main Theban infantry line or, if the Sacred Band was on the extremity of the Theban line, two would hit that line and two the Theban cavalry.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2014, 10:44:55 PM
Mind you, one thing that niggles, how could he tell they were the bodies of the sacred band?
Greek cities had heralds, whose duties included arranging truces after battles to allow for recovery of the dead, and heralds knew their own citizens. Hence identification would not depend upon Alex saying: "Daddy, look what I did!" but upon the Theban herald pointing out who was whom.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2014, 10:23:07 AMPeriod, m'lud, period. Pelopidas and Alexander belong to the same century, one generation apart. Plutarch's sources for these individuals would most probably date from that time and have its usage. Aemilius Palus is a century and a half later, by which time meanings had changed - peltast (the eponymous troop category for the pelta) for a start. ;)
Yet you rejected my earlier use of Polyainos, who uses pelte for the Macedonian shield of Philip II's reign - suggesting (using the same argument of "presumed contemporary sources" as for Plutarch) precisely that usage had
not changed. Consistency, m'lud, consistency.
The argument that pelte in Plutarch's
Alexander means a cavalry shield, hence the association of pelte and sarisa may indicate cavalry, hence the sarisai in Plutarch's
Pelopidas may be cavalry weapons, relies on a very selective use of evidence, I fear.
It may be a bit less selective than that, my learned friend.
Plutarch in Alexander 67 seems to use pelta and sarissa as generalised words for the equipment of the Macedonian army as a whole. This is of course set in Alexander's reign and hence may validate Polyaenus' use of pelta as a Macedonian infantry shield without excluding its usage for a Macedonian cavalry shield, as per Plutarch in Alexander 16.
Regarding sarissas in Pelopidas, we may remember the enigmatic Macedonian sarissaphoroi, who were cavalry but whose name suggests use of the eponymous weapon. I can conjecture (on no real evidence) that Philip originally rearmed his cavalry with sarissas, and then experience suggested a lighter weapon would be better, resulting in progressive re-equipment so that by the time Alexander went campaigning only a few Macedonian cavalry (the oldest and least retrainable?) still used the sarissa. If Plutarch was drawing on a period source for his Pelopidas then he may have transcribed the term without further reflection - his weapon vocabulary throughout his works seems to vary in precision and accuracy, perhaps reflecting his original source material. This is why I feel he needs to be treated with some care as he lacks a military background and seems to have had a rather eclectic collection of sources.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2014, 07:38:38 PM
It may be a bit less selective than that, my learned friend.
Plutarch in Alexander 67 seems to use pelta and sarissa as generalised words for the equipment of the Macedonian army as a whole. This is of course set in Alexander's reign and hence may validate Polyaenus' use of pelta as a Macedonian infantry shield without excluding its usage for a Macedonian cavalry shield, as per Plutarch in Alexander 16.
A passage to which I can give very little weight, as it seems to be describing either a fictional shield in an apocryphal incident - since Macedonian cavalry did not generally carry shields in mounted combat - or at best an antique of unknown type and age purloined from a temple. So I don't see it as proven, or indeed likely, that Plutarch used pelte to mean a "Macedonian cavalry shield" (probably a non-existent class at this period).
QuoteRegarding sarissas in Pelopidas, we may remember the enigmatic Macedonian sarissaphoroi, who were cavalry but whose name suggests use of the eponymous weapon.
We're never actually told that the sarissophoroi cavalry carried a sarissa. Their "official" name seems to have been prodromoi, and the alternative designation is a bit of a mystery.
QuoteI can conjecture (on no real evidence)...
Indeed. Let's just stop there.
This gets increasingly tenuous. There is no
clear, unambiguous example of any cavalry, certainly not of any Companion cavalry, using a weapon called sarissa in Alexander's reign - even you might agree with that formulation.
Therefore, it is vastly more probable that the sarisai in
Pelopidas were infantry weapons, in which case the Thebans were frontally engaged by the phalanx, in which case there is no evidence for a charge by cavalry into the front of hoplites at Chaironeia.
If I may go back a bit to the mechanics of Companions breaking frontally through hoplites.
The one difficulty both sides of the debate have alluded to is the front man of a cavalry actually killing between 6 and 10 hoplites he faces. It's his lance. The Alexander Mosaic shows the problem. Stick a lance into a man whilst your horse is moving forwards and the lance stays in him. It is physically impossible to pull it out and stick it into the next man. Hence after the first strike you have lost your main weapon; you are perhaps able to bowl men over but you can no longer dispatch them. But the Sacred Band were all killed with their wounds in front, thus the presumption is that they were killed by Companions which implies Alexander was either able to use his lance 6-10 times (how?) or he used 6-10 lances.
The only solution I can think of is that the men to the rear of the cavalry wedge passed their lances up to the men in front, who used them to take out the next hoplite, and the next, and so on until the wedge broke through the line.
The technique used by the 'medium' cavalry of the late imperial period was to rest the spear on the shoulder, jab it into the throat or head of one's opponent, and then swivel the shaft upwards and jerk the spearpoint out as one passed, but I suspect the Macedonian lances were a little too long for that trick.
Lance relay on stationary horses against elite formed infantry?
Can we move this to the fantasy boards yet?
It does stretch beyond belief (passing lances). If the cavalry break in they have to keep going, using the horse to make a path and relying on their momentum to prevent the infantry wounding them. We should remember, of course that it is quite hard to deliver a serious blow when you are being pushed back by a man on a horse as keeping your footing is the main consideration.
If the cavalry do not push on then they must turn back because they are in severe trouble if becalmed amongst infantry who will pull them off the horse.
Justin should remember from his reading of Maurice that cavalry do not exercise pressure uPon each other so it is the pressure of those horses that are against the infantry that counts.
I'd see it as more a maytter of an interaction between the cavalry and the infantry whereby the cavalry are constantly looking for the infantry to quail or for a casualty to cause a disruption in their line. Botherwise they bicker and the cavalry turn away and go back to reform and try again. Its not impossible that hoplites could be surprised and broken by aggressive lancers, but it would be extremely difficult for that to occur with the infantry having wounds to the front because that implies that the cavalry kill their way through resisting infantry and that is very unlikely.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 17, 2014, 07:51:55 AM
Its not impossible that hoplites could be surprised and broken by aggressive lancers, but it would be extremely difficult for that to occur with the infantry having wounds to the front because that implies that the cavalry kill their way through resisting infantry and that is very unlikely.
Roy
I think we've already had some of this discussion. Patrick does appear to be the only one who can conceive of a cavalry attack where the wedge leader selects and kills targets with the xyston, rather than drops it when it sticks in an unlucky victim (probably the first if he is using the momentum of the horse to carry him through) and draws his sword. I had not occurred to me though that this plays into the "all wounds to the front" argument. Certainly, in a cavalry attack like this, we would expect a mixture of wounds - lance, sword, trample. But is Plutarch being poetic here?
I'm wondering if there isn't the possibility of some kind of file relief in a wedge: front ranker sticks an infantryman with his wedge and stops. Rider behind him flows around and becomes the new front ranker, attacking the next infantry target and being replaced in his turn. A priori it's possible.
FYI here is an image of a 200-man Macedonian ile charging 300 Sacred Band deployed 6 deep. Have I got the wedge right?
It
looks as if the cavalry could break through.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/wedge.jpg)
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2014, 08:43:16 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2014, 07:38:38 PM
This is of course set in Alexander's reign and hence may validate Polyaenus' use of pelta as a Macedonian infantry shield without excluding its usage for a Macedonian cavalry shield, as per Plutarch in Alexander 16.
A passage to which I can give very little weight, as it seems to be describing either a fictional shield in an apocryphal incident - since Macedonian cavalry did not generally carry shields in mounted combat - or at best an antique of unknown type and age purloined from a temple. So I don't see it as proven, or indeed likely, that Plutarch used pelte to mean a "Macedonian cavalry shield" (probably a non-existent class at this period).
Now who is being selective? ;) The point is that whether or not Alexander carried a shield into combat at the Granicus, Plutarch uses
pelte to designate this particular (real or hypothetical) Macedonian cavalry shield being used on horseback
and he never, not once, in the whole of his life of Alexander uses it specifically for a Macedonian infantry shield.
Quote
We're never actually told that the sarissophoroi cavalry carried a sarissa. Their "official" name seems to have been prodromoi, and the alternative designation is a bit of a mystery.
Which the prior use of the sarissa would explain. ;)
Quote
This gets increasingly tenuous. There is no clear, unambiguous example of any cavalry, certainly not of any Companion cavalry, using a weapon called sarissa in Alexander's reign - even you might agree with that formulation.
But this does not preclude the 'tenuous' possibility of Macedonian cavalry using it in Philip's reign.
Quote
Therefore, it is vastly more probable that the sarisai in Pelopidas were infantry weapons, in which case the Thebans were frontally engaged by the phalanx, in which case there is no evidence for a charge by cavalry into the front of hoplites at Chaironeia.
The probability seems to rest on the idea that without an unambiguous statement in its favour, a weapons system could not have existed. If we look at (for example) accounts of Gallic cavalry in action in Caesar's
Gallic War, we find no statement that Gallic cavalry used swords. Is this reason to deny that they did so? Naturally, absence of specific mention of a weapon is not proof that it
was used (this we work out from other clues), but it need not be taken as proof that the weapon was
not used.
I think that to make progress on this point we should examine the hypothesis that Alexander (and perforce Philip on the other wing) led sarissa-armed infantry (basically phalangites or, presumably - if we can settle the armament question - hypaspists) against their opponents' hoplites.
I leave anyone to outline the arguments in favour of this option.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2014, 10:06:09 AM
Quote from: aligern on April 17, 2014, 07:51:55 AM
Its not impossible that hoplites could be surprised and broken by aggressive lancers, but it would be extremely difficult for that to occur with the infantry having wounds to the front because that implies that the cavalry kill their way through resisting infantry and that is very unlikely.
Roy
I think we've already had some of this discussion. Patrick does appear to be the only one who can conceive of a cavalry attack where the wedge leader selects and kills targets with the xyston, rather than drops it when it sticks in an unlucky victim (probably the first if he is using the momentum of the horse to carry him through) and draws his sword. I had not occurred to me though that this plays into the "all wounds to the front" argument. Certainly, in a cavalry attack like this, we would expect a mixture of wounds - lance, sword, trample. But is Plutarch being poetic here?
If one looks for references to the xyston breaking in use during Alexander's lifetime one finds just one - at the Granicus, when fighting against cavalry (Arrian, Anabasis I.15.6). Two weapons have broken - Alexander's and that of Aretis. A third Companion, Demaratus, hands Alexander a fresh weapon, which Alexander uses to take the Persian leader Mithridates out of the fight by striking him in the face. Alexander then fells Rhoesaces with a thrust into his chest through his armour.
We may note in passing that in I.15.7 Alexander strikes down Mithridates with a doru (
dorati) and in I.16.8 he slays Rhoesaces with a xyston (
xusto) - and this is the same weapon that Demaratus handed to him as a
doru. Arrian notes that the
xystois kraneinois (cornel-wood xystons) gave the Macedonians an advantage over their Persian opponents, who were armed with the palta, a small throwing-spear (Xenophon uses an identical designation for this weapon). If one wished to press a semantic point, one could note that in Arrian I.6 the Macedonian infantry are armed with
dorasi (spears) while in I.4 they use sarissas, and conclude that
doru is an equivalent term for sarissa and hence the xyston can be termed a sarissa, but such narrow semantic arguments do not add to understanding.
Having noted how the terminology of Arrian varies, we may now return to the matter of broken lances.
In the Alexander Mosaic, broken lances (xyston) are conspicuous by their absence. Alexander has just skewered a Persian cavalryman, but this is his first, and the weapon does not seem to be breaking. There are some dead and demising hoplites in the scene, and as indicated earlier the Companions seem to have been the only possible causes of their demise (dead bodies do not usually retire back behind friendly lines). The inference is that the Companions used a drill or technique that allowed them to deal with infantry without breaking their weapons.
What could this have been?
As mentioned earlier in the thread, Alexander's penchant for aiming at the opponent's face might give us an important clue. The face and neck of a hoplite opponent would be an excellent target for a Companion, and would have the advantage of knocking the target down whether or not he got his shield in the way. Once down, subsequent members of the wedge would have a target on the ground with opportunities for a downward thrust. The first hoplite to go down would knock into the second, and meanwhile the wedge would be pouring in, adding casualty after casualty like a saw-blade ripping into wood. The point-man of the wedge could recover quickly enough to hit the third hoplite in the file, the xyston point still being at the right height and in the correct direction, and most of the hoplites would simply not know what had hit them.
The beauty of using the face as target is that few if any xyston shafts need be broken.
There seems to have been an optimum height above ground for using the xyston point: Alexander on the Alexander Mosaic shows it as being level with the waist of a cavalryman (perhaps a cavalryman on a Nisaean steed or similarly largish breed). This height would equate to the face of a hoplite or the chest of a cavalryman mounted on a pony or small breed of horse. If this conclusion is correct, then the optimum 'striking height' of the xyston may have been an element in the design of the weapon as it is too useful to be merely coincidental.
One aspect of this system of attack is that it could not work against hoplites in
othismos configuration, i.e. with shield-to-back rather than at the usual 3' per man front to rear spacing. Since othismos seems to have occurred part-way into an infantry fight rather than as a shove at the outset, this is not a problem for the suggested Macedonian cavalry attack routine.
What might be a problem is dealing with all those downed hoplites: it is assumed that the following personnel in the wedge will have their xystons pointing downward and be ready to jab at anyone on the ground and still moving or trying to get up. Since most downed opponents are likely to be stunned from the xyston impact and subsequent fall, procedure was probably to thrust a hole in anyone not showing a lot of blood just to be on the safe side.
The Companion wedge would thus rely on reach, impact and momentum, moving on to targets that had not recovered from the initial surprise of seeing the lead infantryman go down without being able to affect his attacker. Cavalrymen using this technique would have to be well trained and practised in order to ensure accurate strikes against face-sized targets - the best and most accurate would thus be used as file leaders with any who were less precise being assigned to rearward positions within the wedge for 'strafing ground targets'.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2014, 10:06:09 AM
But is Plutarch being poetic here?
I would suggest holding him innocent until proven guilty of poeticism. :)
Lots of points there, Patrick. I think the lance breaking issue is a bit of a red herring, though. The real issues are the weapon getting stuck in the target and its difficulty of handling inside a dense infantry formation, which may be waving all manner of weaponry about with which it could tangle. To keep momentum (which we all agree is important in this speculative reconstruction), I'd suggest dropping the lance and drawing a secondary weapon. I think cavalry of the period carried a decent sword - a kopis / machaira? - which suggests he was well prepared for such an eventuality.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2014, 11:46:00 AMThe probability seems to rest on the idea that without an unambiguous statement in its favour, a weapons system could not have existed.
Nope - merely that if there is no evidence for it, it
probably doesn't exist - and it's not safe to assume that it does.
QuoteIn the Alexander Mosaic, broken lances (xyston) are conspicuous by their absence.
The Companion behind Alexander, the one in the white helmet, carries a spear shorter than Alex's - you can see his spearhead level with Alexander's horse's nose. It
may be a broken xyston (in which case the visible "spearhead" may be that originally at the butt). The cavalryman ahead of him, the white helmet-plume set against the dead tree, seems to be using a sword. Perhaps he's broken his xyston?
Neither of these is definite, but I don't know where in the mosaic you would
expect to see evidence of broken lances: we don't actually see much of the ground that the cavalry have charged over, which would presumably be where broken bits would lie.
You might hope to see bits of spear sticking out of infantry who'd been killed by the cavalry ;-)
Frankly I don't suppose it was the sort of thing an artist would bother putting in. I'm not sure I've ever noticed detritus on the 'floor' in any ancient painting etc
Jim
The mosaic is precisely the one that does have detritus on the floor, though....
It would be even worse if it used renaissance perspective, just ask ucello!
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 17, 2014, 10:47:03 AM
FYI here is an image of a 200-man Macedonian ile charging 300 Sacred Band deployed 6 deep. Have I got the wedge right?
I think the wedge should be a basic triangle, though that is an interesting interpretation.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2014, 12:01:43 PM
Lots of points there, Patrick. I think the lance breaking issue is a bit of a red herring, though. The real issues are the weapon getting stuck in the target and its difficulty of handling inside a dense infantry formation, which may be waving all manner of weaponry about with which it could tangle. To keep momentum (which we all agree is important in this speculative reconstruction), I'd suggest dropping the lance and drawing a secondary weapon. I think cavalry of the period carried a decent sword - a kopis / machaira? - which suggests he was well prepared for such an eventuality.
The xyston itself also had a useful butt-spike, so that one could carry on using it if it did get broken. At the Granicus, when Alexander was fighting on the riverbank, he had broken his xyston and called for another one - but his next man was also using a broken one. Another of his Companions, presumably a non-front ranker, passed him a fresh weapon, with which he was immediately able to move out and attack the Persian leader Mithridates. It is likely the fighting on the riverbank had slowed the wedge, but it is interesting that 'resupply' from a man behind (or behind and to one side) was possible in mid-fight.
You are right about swords being carried and used: Plutarch even tells us that the sword was Alexander's favourite weapon and he had a specially light, strong one as a present from the King of Citium.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 17, 2014, 01:15:48 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2014, 11:46:00 AMThe probability seems to rest on the idea that without an unambiguous statement in its favour, a weapons system could not have existed.
Nope - merely that if there is no evidence for it, it probably doesn't exist - and it's not safe to assume that it does.
Which leaves the matter (or the usual perennial problem) of exactly what constitutes evidence, which to an extent turns on what the little grey cells make of it.
Quote
QuoteIn the Alexander Mosaic, broken lances (xyston) are conspicuous by their absence.
The Companion behind Alexander, the one in the white helmet, carries a spear shorter than Alex's - you can see his spearhead level with Alexander's horse's nose. It may be a broken xyston (in which case the visible "spearhead" may be that originally at the butt). The cavalryman ahead of him, the white helmet-plume set against the dead tree, seems to be using a sword. Perhaps he's broken his xyston?
Neither of these is definite, but I don't know where in the mosaic you would expect to see evidence of broken lances: we don't actually see much of the ground that the cavalry have charged over, which would presumably be where broken bits would lie.
Good observations; this suggests that whatever Alex's men have just charged through, leaving a scattering of hoplite bodies in the scenery, it took out a few lances. It also suggests that whatever they have just charged through did not slow or detain them for long enough to let men in non-leading positions to pass replacement xystons forward.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2014, 07:41:32 PM
Good observations; this suggests that whatever Alex's men have just charged through, leaving a scattering of hoplite bodies in the scenery, it took out a few lances. It also suggests that whatever they have just charged through did not slow or detain them for long enough to let men in non-leading positions to pass replacement xystons forward.
I think at this point it behoves us to remember that it is a work of art, not evidence produced for a coroners court
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2014, 07:41:32 PM
Good observations; this suggests that whatever Alex's men have just charged through, leaving a scattering of hoplite bodies in the scenery, it took out a few lances. It also suggests that whatever they have just charged through did not slow or detain them for long enough to let men in non-leading positions to pass replacement xystons forward.
Actually, our evidence of passing weapons forward is someone passes one to the king. He probably would have given up any other piece of kit or his horse too. But if a fellow trooper had asked? And again, this is a work of art, not an illustration in an Osprey campaign book, so the fact that Alexander has a fully intact xyston could be to do with the iconography and composition, rather than an attempt to depict an actual moment.
I would say again that Hellenic and Hellenistic artists did try hard to get their details right, as far as we can judge - interpretative art was not really their thing, depiction was. Had Alex been fighting with a broken xyston at this juncture he would have been portrayed as doing so (and it might have looked more heroic, as might his smiting down a Persian with a sword, but he is not so portrayed so we can conclude he had an intact one).
The idea of art as the inspiration of the artist and history being an optional extra is a comparatively recent phenomenon (apparently Christianity had a lot to do with it - or one can blame the Renaissance and argue over the details in da Vinci's paintings ;) ).
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2014, 11:29:25 AM
Actually, our evidence of passing weapons forward is someone passes one to the king. He probably would have given up any other piece of kit or his horse too. But if a fellow trooper had asked?
He would probably have got one. Unfortunately we do not know the details of how a wedge formation was organised, but one can conjecture on the basis of logic that the best men would be at the leading edges, and that they would be the ones who would have priority for intact lances - in the mediaeval era each man's lance was his own, and a friend or liege lord might get it but nobody else, whereas in a regular unit one has the option of ordering priorities, especially as the weapons are usually issued by the throne or the state.
Granted we have just the one example: it raises the possibility - even likelihood - that front men could get their lances replaced, though as you indicate it does not render it certain. I think it a reasonable procedure to have, the question being whether the Macedonians would agree.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 18, 2014, 12:43:02 PM
I would say again that Hellenic and Hellenistic artists did try hard to get their details right, as far as we can judge - interpretative art was not really their thing, depiction was. Had Alex been fighting with a broken xyston at this juncture he would have been portrayed as doing so
I think we need to agree to disagree on Hellenistic art. I claim no great knowledge but what I do know seems to suggest idealisation of the human form was standard, for example. Portraiture of Alexander was very stylized, IIRC. We are, I think, very short of extant examples of Hellensistic painting, certainly on the scale of the Alexander mosaic. So it is OK to suggest that the artist had in front of him a description of this exact event in detail (an account now lost to us - art historians seem to debate which battle this is, let alone be able to point to an exact description of the incident depicted) but it is speculation. Personally, I see a very fine composition rather than a detailed history lesson. Unless we think Alexander did fight bareheaded, there is one concession to style in his image, so why not more?
Fiddling around a bit, I think there might just be a way of doing 'line relief' in a cavalry wedge whilst it is pushing its way through an infantry line.
Here is a wedge about to charge into infantry. There are no horsemen behind the leading rider, and the distance between one file and the next is 6' - a little more for the central corridor.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/cavalry%20wedge%20relief/1.jpg)
Heading for the gap between two files, the leadsman takes out the infantryman to his right whilst the two horsemen nearest him take out the infantryman on either side.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/cavalry%20wedge%20relief/2.jpg)
The leadsman advances between the files, pushing aside or bowling over the next two infantrymen, who are taken out by fresh horsemen whilst the two previous ones retire through the central corridor. Each cavalryman is presumed to use his lance only once.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/cavalry%20wedge%20relief/3.jpg)
The process continues, fresh horsemen advancing to clear the way for the leadsman whilst horsemen of other files widen the breach.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/cavalry%20wedge%20relief/4.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/cavalry%20wedge%20relief/5.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/cavalry%20wedge%20relief/6.jpg)
Finally the infantry line is breached. Notice that this will work provided there are enough horsemen in the central files to take up the slack. Which means a lozenge formation would probably work better.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/cavalry%20wedge%20relief/7.jpg)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2014, 12:59:06 PM
I think we need to agree to disagree on Hellenistic art. I claim no great knowledge but what I do know seems to suggest idealisation of the human form was standard, for example. Portraiture of Alexander was very stylized, IIRC. We are, I think, very short of extant examples of Hellenistic painting, certainly on the scale of the Alexander mosaic. So it is OK to suggest that the artist had in front of him a description of this exact event in detail (an account now lost to us - art historians seem to debate which battle this is, let alone be able to point to an exact description of the incident depicted) but it is speculation. Personally, I see a very fine composition rather than a detailed history lesson. Unless we think Alexander did fight bareheaded, there is one concession to style in his image, so why not more?
Well, we can agree to disagree but the Alexander Mosaic has the dead tree that was a feature of Gaugamela, a shadow of the chariot wheel on the chariot body that enables us to determine the approximate orientation of the battlefield and representations of weaponry, costume and armour that show much attention to detail. I do not think the artist would bother inventing details that were well known to living witnesses, most of whom were influential people.
Where I would agree is that the picture extracts the maximum drama from a known setting - the artist has done his best to set the elements for best visual impact within the constraints of what actually happened - so a fine composition, yes, but of a detailed historical event. I remember an Ancmed discussion in which Duncan, who had observed the picture more closely than myself, pointed out numerous details that demonstrated that, for example, the Greek hoplite casualties in the picture were equipped in standard and not Iphicratic hoplite fashion. These details, moreover, are consistent, and consistency suggests care.
None of our sources mention Alexander losing his helmet in the battle, though this does not necessarily mean that it was not lost. Exactly how he would have managed to lose it might be a puzzle.
I'd suggest the following problems
1) You are walking excited horses backwards whilst all around them equally excited horses are going forwards. Either that or you're turning them in a very tight turning circle which means they present their unshielded and unprotected flank to the infantry.
2) You are assuming that each horseman can virtually automatically take out an infantryman. If the kill rate is that reliable, why bother with the wedge.
3) If you look at your diagram the second horseman on the left hand edge of the wedge always has a live infantryman with nothing to do save strike sideways and 'safely' disembowel the horse
4) As far as I remember all our drill manuals etc talk about everybody being in files, none talk about the leader NOT being in a file (although it is of course possible that if it was obvious that is what happened, they might not bother mentioning it. Ancient authors were beggars for that :-( )
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 18, 2014, 08:50:01 PM
I'd suggest the following problems
1) You are walking excited horses backwards whilst all around them equally excited horses are going forwards. Either that or you're turning them in a very tight turning circle which means they present their unshielded and unprotected flank to the infantry.
2) You are assuming that each horseman can virtually automatically take out an infantryman. If the kill rate is that reliable, why bother with the wedge.
3) If you look at your diagram the second horseman on the left hand edge of the wedge always has a live infantryman with nothing to do save strike sideways and 'safely' disembowel the horse
4) As far as I remember all our drill manuals etc talk about everybody being in files, none talk about the leader NOT being in a file (although it is of course possible that if it was obvious that is what happened, they might not bother mentioning it. Ancient authors were beggars for that :-( )
Jim
Let's see if I can answer them.
1. The retiring horses turn in a tight circle. Six feet is enough. The nearby infantry have either been knocked off their feet or are too preoccupied by horsemen directly in front of them to interfere.
2. The wedge enables the horsemen to focus on a narrow part of the line. Otherwise it's one file of horsemen per 2 files of infantry and they will not get through. Not every black circle is necessarily a kill - they could be a wounded or a knocked down and concussed infantryman, in any case
hors de combat for the present.
3. The horsemen are in constant movement all the time. It is only if they stopped that they would become a vulnerable target for infantry.
4. I needed a clear central corridor to enable 2 files to retire simultaneously. Hypothetically it works and doesn't leave a file behind the leadsman with nothing to do.
My personal (but not excessive) experience of horses is that you turn them tight they are effectively standing still. The other problem is the risk of a traffic jam as two horsemen try and turn at the same time and then the third and fourth turn as the first two as still getting out of each other's way
What you're describing does sound like a caracole with spears rather than pistols, but I cannot think of any ancient author describing anything like it.
Jim
Do we have evidence for such a complex evolution in contact with the enemy in any cavalry manual? It seems extremely complicated even to do on a drill square. A simpler form would flatten the wedge on impact, leaving essentially a semicircle of cavalry in contact with the enemy. If successful, the cavalry have intruded a few men into the infantry formation and there is a solid mass behind the point of impact to continue to exploit into the gap. Meanwhile, the outer angles of the wedge form a protective "shoulder" to the penetration, to prevent ranks on either side of the penetration from interfering from the flanks. The leaders thrash around making space and carving a wider and deeper wound in the infantry formation, with men from the later ranks behind the centre filling the gap.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 18, 2014, 08:45:38 PM
None of our sources mention Alexander losing his helmet in the battle, though this does not necessarily mean that it was not lost. Exactly how he would have managed to lose it might be a puzzle.
As I said, lets leave it there, as we have different views of the precision with which we can read the scene. As an aside though, Alexander is usually shown as blond or with light red hair, based on literary descriptions. If, as the consensus seems to be, that the original painting was done a few years after Alexander's death this must be one of the earliest coloured images of Alexander to survive. He has black hair.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2014, 09:43:29 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 18, 2014, 08:45:38 PM
None of our sources mention Alexander losing his helmet in the battle, though this does not necessarily mean that it was not lost. Exactly how he would have managed to lose it might be a puzzle.
As I said, lets leave it there, as we have different views of the precision with which we can read the scene. As an aside though, Alexander is usually shown as blond or with light red hair, based on literary descriptions. If, as the consensus seems to be, that the original painting was done a few years after Alexander's death this must be one of the earliest coloured images of Alexander to survive. He has black hair.
Are you sure? It looks light brown to me. Have another look (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Alexandermosaic.jpg), now that we are letting the matter rest. (Click on the pic to magnify.)
On the subject of the wedge evolutions in combat, my own feeling is that it would work best as an integral moving whole, though the idea that sub-evolutions might occur within it is an interesting one.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2014, 11:32:26 AM
Are you sure? It looks light brown to me. Have another look (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Alexandermosaic.jpg), now that we are letting the matter rest. (Click on the pic to magnify.)
My mistake, it is certainly brown, though it looks similar in tone to the Persians around him, so quite dark. Still doesn't match the descriptions. Is there any relevant colour on the Alexander sarcophagus (since you've written an article on it?).
Thinking about it, the idea of line relief in a wedge is unworkable for the simple reason that there is no time. A horse walks at about 3-4 mph. It trots at about 8-10 mph, canters at about 10-17 mph and gallops at about 30 mph. Presuming that a trot is the slowest pace a wedge will move at when contacting enemy, that means the leading horseman will be through a 10-deep infantry line in 3
seconds (work on 12 km/h. That's 12 000 m/h = 3.33 m/second. A ten-rank infantry line is about 10m deep). No time for any fancy manoeuvring at all.
Which leads to another suggestion. This assumes the wedge consists of files 6' apart, and faces an infantry line with files 3' apart. Each file of the wedge heads for the spot between 2 infantry files. Each file leader does not sink his lance in the first infantryman, but uses it to make the infantry flinch, raising shields, ducking, whatever, which momentarily stops them reacting effectively, only using his lance to hit the last rank or, in the case of Alexander, go for a juicier target beyond.
As the cavalry advance between the infantry files, they knock the men left and right into narrow corridors, unbalancing them and making them targets for the following horsemen who take them out. By the time the wedge emerges from the infantry line, half or more of the infantry have been killed or incapacitated and the remainder are in total disarray.
In the images below each cavalryman is assumed to target a footman once with his lance. This doesn't take into account the damage he could subsequently do with his sword. The entire sequence happens in about 6 seconds.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/1.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/2.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/3.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/4.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/5.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/6.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/7.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/8.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/9.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/10.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/11.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/12.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20wedge%20charge/13.jpg)
One minor problem is that we have virtually no evidence for hoplites being ridden down by cavalry.
I'm not talking about cases where this is presumed to have happened, I'm talking about cases where a historical author mentions that horsemen broke through hoplites from the front.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 01:32:31 PM
Thinking about it, the idea of line relief in a wedge is unworkable for the simple reason that there is no time. A horse walks at about 3-4 mph. It trots at about 8-10 mph, canters at about 10-17 mph and gallops at about 30 mph. Presuming that a trot is the slowest pace a wedge will move at when contacting enemy, that means the leading horseman will be through a 10-deep infantry line in 3 seconds (work on 12 km/h. That's 12 000 m/h = 3.33 m/second. A ten-rank infantry line is about 10m deep). No time for any fancy manoeuvring at all.
A good point about the potential speed this could happen at. However, it does assume the infantry do nothing but dive out of the way. Even if they wanted to run, they would be hard pressed to get out of the way. Even if the horseman went for the gap between files, the horse is wider than the gap, so collisions seem inevitable, even if no-one was trying to stop the horse. However, unless this unit is completely worthless (and even the great advocate of hoplite busting Companions Patrick doesn't think this) these hoplites will be actively trying to stop the attack. So, against a determined enemy, I still think you end up with a partial penetration of the formation at best, with the rest of the wedge flattening against the line. It is then up to the frontmen both to create space for the ranks behind to enter into the "wound" in the infantry formation, to widen it and ultimately split the formation apart.
The hypothesis is made on the assumption that the infantry files are 3' apart with a 3' gap between each infantryman of a file. The horse are 6' apart, so each front ranker horseman targets the space between every other file. This is important as the infantry will naturally dodge or be pushed into the space between files not being targeted by the horsemen (if they are not knocked down altogether). Once in that space they are disoriented, compacted together and unable to react, and can be easily dispatched by the following horsemen.
Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it. Bearing in mind the leading horseman will be through in seconds - about 2 seconds for a line 6 deep and 4 seconds for a line 12 deep - the Sacred Band would have had no time at all to react.
In devising the Macedonian phalanx, Philip made sure nobody tried the same trick on him. ;)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 04:24:04 PM
Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it. Bearing in mind the leading horseman will be through in seconds - about 2 seconds for a line 6 deep and 4 seconds for a line 12 deep - the Sacred Band would have had no time at all to react.
I'm afraid this just has to be wrong
Or there is no way infantry would ever have stood against cavalry.
Given that infantry did stand against cavalry I think we can assume that it wasn't perhaps that easy
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 04:24:04 PM
In devising the Macedonian phalanx, Philip made sure nobody tried the same trick on him. ;)
If I were Philip and my cavalry could destroy elite hoplites in less than 5 seconds, I wouldn't have bothered devising a phalanx :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2014, 04:54:10 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 04:24:04 PM
Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it. Bearing in mind the leading horseman will be through in seconds - about 2 seconds for a line 6 deep and 4 seconds for a line 12 deep - the Sacred Band would have had no time at all to react.
I'm afraid this just has to be wrong
Or there is no way infantry would ever have stood against cavalry.
Given that infantry did stand against cavalry I think we can assume that it wasn't perhaps that easy
Jim
This is Macedonian cavalry, well-trained and armed with long lances, against infantry whose spears were shorter and - more importantly - who had no training to counter the wedge.
It took a while for the world to figure out how to counter massed tank assaults. Compare France 1940 to Kursk 1943. ;D
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2014, 04:57:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 04:24:04 PM
In devising the Macedonian phalanx, Philip made sure nobody tried the same trick on him. ;)
If I were Philip and my cavalry could destroy elite hoplites in less than 5 seconds, I wouldn't have bothered devising a phalanx :)
A wedge can effectively hit only a narrow frontage. You can't take out an entire army with it. Strictly-speaking, I should have given the wedge in my diagrams more rear ranks. I'm guessing too it wasn't a perfect triangle. The back two corners would have been chopped short so as not to leave a lone horseman having to punch his way without support through the enemy ranks.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 05:00:13 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2014, 04:54:10 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 04:24:04 PM
Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it. Bearing in mind the leading horseman will be through in seconds - about 2 seconds for a line 6 deep and 4 seconds for a line 12 deep - the Sacred Band would have had no time at all to react.
I'm afraid this just has to be wrong
Or there is no way infantry would ever have stood against cavalry.
Given that infantry did stand against cavalry I think we can assume that it wasn't perhaps that easy
Jim
This is Macedonian cavalry, well-trained and armed with long lances, against infantry whose spears were shorter and - more importantly - who had no training to counter the wedge.
It took a while for the world to figure out how to counter massed tank assaults. Compare France 1940 to Kursk 1943. ;D
All sorts of people had been using cavalry wedges, it was mentioned earlier in this thread. Also in your description you don't need a lance.
You said "Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it."
A dead horse moving at speed can travel 30 yards, (this they discovered in the Napoleonic period) so all you need do is get your horse into a gallop and even if a front rank spear kills it, it'll still travel down the gaps between the files bowling the infantry over.
This would have happened for the Assyrians, the Medes, the Persians and everybody else. It didn't therefore I would suggest your mechanism is wrong
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 05:05:05 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2014, 04:57:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 04:24:04 PM
In devising the Macedonian phalanx, Philip made sure nobody tried the same trick on him. ;)
If I were Philip and my cavalry could destroy elite hoplites in less than 5 seconds, I wouldn't have bothered devising a phalanx :)
A wedge can effectively hit only a narrow frontage. You can't take out an entire army with it. Strictly-speaking, I should have given the wedge in my diagrams more rear ranks. I'm guessing too it wasn't a perfect triangle. The back two corners would have been chopped short so as not to leave a lone horseman having to punch his way without support through the enemy ranks.
Hoplite armies didn't have reserves, this is well known. Why the hell did Philip bother with a phalanx. All he had to do was launch his companions anywhere at the enemy line (because the Theban sacred band would be the toughest bit, anywhere else would actually have been better.)
The lead wedge would have poured through the Hoplite line, other units would have poured through the gap and spread out behind hitting the Greeks from the rear whilst the Phalangites just applauded, threw bouquets and looked menacing enough so that the Hoplites dare not turn their backs on them to deal with the Companions now rampaging about their rear echelon. (not that they could deal with them because any hoplite unit that did face off the companions would just be ridden through automatically, )
So the real question is why the hell did Philip bother rearming his infantry. He could have saved the money on them, kept them as javelin throwing irregulars and the money saved could have gone into more infantry busting cavalry units
Jim
QuoteAll sorts of people had been using cavalry wedges, it was mentioned earlier in this thread. Also in your description you don't need a lance.
You said "Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it."
A dead horse moving at speed can travel 30 yards, (this they discovered in the Napoleonic period) so all you need do is get your horse into a gallop and even if a front rank spear kills it, it'll still travel down the gaps between the files bowling the infantry over.
This would have happened for the Assyrians, the Medes, the Persians and everybody else. It didn't therefore I would suggest your mechanism is wrong
You need a lance to cow the infantry into a protective defensive posture, enabling you to push through them without becoming a pincushion.
If cavalry are not trained to execute this surgical file-slicing with precision, then horses would barge frontally into footmen and be stopped by them. Stop one horse and all the remaining horses of the file stop as well. Stop enough front horses and the wedge disintegrates, the stopped horsemen themselves becoming targets for the infantry around them.
Why didn't Assyrians, Medes, Persians,
et al try this? Perhaps simply because no-one thought of it. (they didn't think of hoplite infantry either). Why didn't cavalry armies after Macedonia try it? Because the Macedonian phalanx was an effective countermeasure, making the tactic obsolete, and by the time one got to Rome it had been forgotten.
My understanding of the history of tactics and formation is that good ideas often get forgotten. How long did it take Mediaeval Europe to figure out that pike was the right way to oppose heavy cavalry?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2014, 05:17:41 PM
Hoplite armies didn't have reserves, this is well known. Why the hell did Philip bother with a phalanx. All he had to do was launch his companions anywhere at the enemy line (because the Theban sacred band would be the toughest bit, anywhere else would actually have been better.)
The lead wedge would have poured through the Hoplite line, other units would have poured through the gap and spread out behind hitting the Greeks from the rear whilst the Phalangites just applauded, threw bouquets and looked menacing enough so that the Hoplites dare not turn their backs on them to deal with the Companions now rampaging about their rear echelon. (not that they could deal with them because any hoplite unit that did face off the companions would just be ridden through automatically, )
So the real question is why the hell did Philip bother rearming his infantry. He could have saved the money on them, kept them as javelin throwing irregulars and the money saved could have gone into more infantry busting cavalry units
Jim
The principal reason is that the Companions have lost most of their lances in the first pass, and are not able either to intimidate or take out infantry a second time round. Even if the horsemen punch a hole through the centre of the line, there is still need of good infantry to follow up - not only to exploit the hole but to successfully engage the portions of the line that are still intact. Javelin-throwing irregulars just don't cut it.
Other reasons: the skill needed for this wedge tactic to work was considerable. It would require superlative horsemanship combined with an excellent handling of a long lance. It was not something everyone could do. I also suspect (thinking on the fly) that surprise was an important element of success. Once the Greek commander realised his infantry were being frontally assaulted by cavalry, he would order them to close up (18" between each man of a file), making them too compact to be pushed aside by the horses. There would then be real danger of the wedge grinding to a halt, which is what seems to have happened at the Granicus.
But you've pointed out the weakness in your own argument
1) From your explanation it's the horse not the spear that's the important bit, from the various discussions on this thread the infantry spear might well have hit the horse before the horseman's spear hit the infantryman. Remember I think it was Duncan who commented that there is no evidence for Companions using Sarissa
2) It had been forgotten by the Roman period? And there's those Parthians with all those cataphracts armed with kontos and dripping with armour, and it never occured to them that they could just ride down the gaps between the files and scatter Roman infantry instead of sitting watching the horsearchers shoot for hours on end. It's a pity all these Parthian monarchs who called themselves 'Philhellene' didn't actually read any Greek histories because then they'd have known.
Jim
Not quite sure how I have? ???
1. Both horse and spear are important. Without the spear the hoplites will be able and willing to have a go at jabbing the horseman. With the spear aimed at them they are more likely to duck or raise their shields. With the horse one can push between hoplites and penetrate right through their formation.
2. My impression of cataphracts dripping with armour is that they had been originally conceived to deal with phalangites, i.e. they formed up in close order and frontally rammed an infantry line, ignoring pikes and jabbing the footmen with their kontos. Nothing that required subtlety or training which was not the Parthians' strong point. They were not in the league of Macedonia's professionalism, if I'm not mistaken.
If the Greek histories described exactly how a wedge worked would we be having this discussion?
Exactly, the Greeks described the wedge but none of them ever noticed it was any use in riding down infantry, even those writing after Alexander
Strange that
Jim
Because - after Alexander - it wasn't? ;)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2014, 07:12:32 PM
Because - after Alexander - it wasn't? ;)
Why not, the Successors were leading the same men, there were still Hoplites or even easier meat Thureophoroi, and Pyrrhus lead his men against legionaries, they should have been a doddle to ride down, most of them didn't have long spears
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2014, 07:06:54 PM
Exactly, the Greeks described the wedge but none of them ever noticed it was any use in riding down infantry, even those writing after Alexander
Clarification: The Greek
historians don't mention Macedonian cavalry using wedges, not even when describing the campaigns of Philip and Alexander. Not that they describe any other formation, either.
The Greek
tacticians describe the wedge, saying that the Macedonians used it, and saying that it was the best formation for breaking through an enemy formation - not distinguishing enemy infantry from cavalry:
Quote from: AsklepiodotosIt is said that the Scythians and Thracians invented the wedge formation, and that later the Macedonians used it, since they considered it more practical than the square formation; for the front of the wedge formation is narrow, as in the rhomboid, and only one‑half as wide, and this made it easiest for them to break through, as well as brought the leaders in front of the rest, while wheeling was thus easier than in the square formation...
Don't read too much into some very patchy evidence.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 19, 2014, 10:39:15 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2014, 07:06:54 PM
Exactly, the Greeks described the wedge but none of them ever noticed it was any use in riding down infantry, even those writing after Alexander
Clarification: The Greek historians don't mention Macedonian cavalry using wedges, not even when describing the campaigns of Philip and Alexander. Not that they describe any other formation, either.
The Greek tacticians describe the wedge, saying that the Macedonians used it, and saying that it was the best formation for breaking through an enemy formation - not distinguishing enemy infantry from cavalry:
Quote from: AsklepiodotosIt is said that the Scythians and Thracians invented the wedge formation, and that later the Macedonians used it, since they considered it more practical than the square formation; for the front of the wedge formation is narrow, as in the rhomboid, and only one‑half as wide, and this made it easiest for them to break through, as well as brought the leaders in front of the rest, while wheeling was thus easier than in the square formation...
Don't read too much into some very patchy evidence.
In an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry. I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up. He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?). Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here. Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting th wedge as an anti-infantry formation?
Presuming that a cavalry formation could penetrate hoplite infantry in the manner I suggested earlier, it becomes clear why the cavalry formation had to be a wedge and not a line. There are two reasons.
The first is aim. For it to work, the cavalry files had to target the space between every other infantry file, as smashing head-on into infantry would in all likelihood stop the horses. Hence it was crucial for each file leader to hit exactly the right spot. This meant one file leader had to be ahead of the others, directing them. He would hit the infantry first. This gave the leaders of the two cavalry files next to him their cue and the time to nudge their horses into the space two infantry files along, which in turn gave the next file leaders the chance to nudge their horses towards the next correct file spaces, and so on. If the cavalry had attacked in a line there would be no lead to follow; the cavalry would hit the infantry at a random point with potentially disastrous results.
The second reason is space. For the wedge tactic to work as described, the leading horsemen must be able to shunt aside infantry on either side of the space between the infantry files, widening it so a file of horse could pass through easily. If a line of horses hits the file spaces at the same time, the infantry in adjacent files are pushed toward each other, colliding and possibly obstructing the creation of the passageway for the horses. However in the case of a wedge, a file leader is always able to push infantry away on one side easily, as the next cavalry file on that side is still behind him. Corridors are cleared and the cavalry can push through without trouble.
Thus endeth the hypothesis. Now let me get my shield up... ;D
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2014, 08:16:53 AM
In an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry. I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up. He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?). Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here. Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting the wedge as an anti-infantry formation?
I shall have to give the Greek a good going through at some point. Exact details are not obvious (with my level of Greek) from a casual scan through. Interesting that the subject has come up before.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2014, 07:06:54 PM
Exactly, the Greeks described the wedge but none of them ever noticed it was any use in riding down infantry, even those writing after Alexander
Strange that
Jim
A bit more precision would be helpful. The generic wedge was useful for manoeuvre, but until the Macedonians added long weapons it does not seem to have been used for penetrating hoplite formations. Greek historians had few chances to notice the effects of Macedonian cavalry on hoplites before Macedonian supremacy became a fact of life - they seem not to have given much attention to the Sacred War, and Greek (other than Phocians) did not face Macedonians in open battle until Chaeronea in 338 BC. After Chaeronea we have the Spartan campaign in 331 BC and that is usually mentioned in passing without any details.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2014, 05:17:41 PM
Hoplite armies didn't have reserves, this is well known. Why the hell did Philip bother with a phalanx. All he had to do was launch his companions anywhere at the enemy line (because the Theban sacred band would be the toughest bit, anywhere else would actually have been better.)
The lead wedge would have poured through the Hoplite line, other units would have poured through the gap and spread out behind hitting the Greeks from the rear whilst the Phalangites just applauded, threw bouquets and looked menacing enough so that the Hoplites dare not turn their backs on them to deal with the Companions now rampaging about their rear echelon. (not that they could deal with them because any hoplite unit that did face off the companions would just be ridden through automatically, )
So the real question is why the hell did Philip bother rearming his infantry. He could have saved the money on them, kept them as javelin throwing irregulars and the money saved could have gone into more infantry busting cavalry units
Macedonian infantry were unremarkable until rearmed, and more to the point not recorded as being able to stand up to hoplites. After rearming they were well capable of dealing with hoplites. Since they constituted a small percentage of the army - 2,000 of 32, 000 at Chaeronea or about 6% - the other 94% of the army needed to hold their own against the rather large part of the opposing army that could not be burst through at the outset.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2014, 08:16:53 AMIn an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry. I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up. He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?). Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here. Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting the wedge as an anti-infantry formation?
Briefly - no, he doesn't. Arrian says that Philip taught the Macedonians to use this formation (
taxis). He also says that the wedge is the best formation to use for breaking through an enemy
taxis. He doesn't say that is why Philip adopted wedge, nor does he specify that it was used for breaking through
infantry formations.
Thanks Duncan. From your earlier remarks I suspected as much. I suspect from the text that Gabriel has taken Markle at his word, perhaps unable to check the Greek for himself (he appears to be a general military historical writer rather than a classicist).
So that leaves us, in the known facts, that Philip II is thought to have introduced the wedge to macedonian cavalry. Because it isn't mentioned by historians, we don't know if it was used exclusively and we have no detailed record of how it operated. We have no unambiguous evidence that formed hoplites were broken frontally by Macedonian cavalry. We do know that on one occassion, cavalry were involved in the breaking of hoplites in a combined arms action.
The hypothesis presented is that Macedonian cavalry, through rearmament, new tactics (the wedge) and a high level of individual weapon skill, developed into a force capable of destroying even elite hoplites. In particular, a theory based on aiming the wedge at the gap between two hoplite files meant that cavalry could with minimal difficulty ride through a hoplite formation, picking off hoplites with their spears. This tactic was a surprise to hoplites, who had no time to create a counter. The new tactics were only used during the life of Alexander, as hoplites were replaced by pike-armed phalangites. The discontinuity meant that the new tactics were not readopted when infantry stopped being pikemen.
The counter argument is that there is no good evidence that Macedonian cavalry ever bested formed hoplites frontally and, if they did, that they used a wedge to do so. The inter-file theory takes little or no account of any counter measures hoplites might use (even if surprised) or that they are armed, that the gap between files is less than a horse width so there would be some "friction" even if no hoplite moved or used a weapon, that riding through a formation at a trot picking of targets at will would be very difficult even in a field of dummies and that the lack of evidence of this tactic in the histories, or attempts to duplicate it, are very surprising if it really could break elite close order infantry in a matter of seconds.
Is that a reasonable summary of the argument so far?
Seems to sum things up OK for me Anthony
When you think about we have the Sacred War where Philip had plenty of chances to ride down hoplites. Historians might not have mentioned it, but one suspects the contemporary hoplite commanders would have noticed it and pondered on it.
We have on incident at the Battle of Chaeronea where it is possible that Alexander was part of a cavalry unit that might possibly have defeated hoplites frontally.
We then have the war against Sparta in 331BC, followed by the Lamian war where cavalry fail to ride down hoplites frontally. Indeed in the Lamian war Macedonian cavalry struggle to cope with Thessalians
Finally we have the period up to the 270s BC when we think similar cavalry tactics were used, Pyrrhus used the same cavalry tactics against the Romans who weren't even all armed with long spears without any notable accounts of his cavalry defeating infantry frontally. Indeed some seem to thing that it was Pyrrhus returning from Italy who brought the idea of shielded heavy cavalry to the Hellenistic mainstream
Jim
Good summing up, Anthony.
The two objections to the mechanism of a wedge passing between infantry files are:
a) the friction would have stopped the horses,
b) the hoplites would have killed or incapacitated the Companions.
There is no evidence confirming a). What we really need is some mounted reenactors to attack in wedge a formation of (disposable) Russian peasants and see what happens. Visualising it, I suspect that the hoplites would instinctively try to get out of the way of the riders. Since each mounted file is 6 feet apart and the horses are not heading directly towards the footmen, that suggests the infantry would jump for the gaps between the horses. Bearing in mind they have no drill for what to do in this situation.
For b) ones needs to keep in mind that only the first two rows of a hoplite phalanx have their spears at the ready. Faced with advancing horse and riders whose lances had a greater reach, the hoplites' reaction would by-and-large be one of self-preservation: move out of the way of the horses, raise shields to guard against the lancepoints. To think about all that and about getting a spear into a horseman is rather asking a lot of the hoplite.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2014, 10:48:44 AM
Visualising it, I suspect that the hoplites would instinctively try to get out of the way of the riders. Since each mounted file is 6 feet apart and the horses are not heading directly towards the footmen, that suggests the infantry would jump for the gaps between the horses. Bearing in mind they have no drill for what to do in this situation.
I think you underestimate these phalanxes. Their whole essense is collective action. So, I think they would have tried to brace against impact. The front rankers might go down, but they'd either bring down the horse or slow it for others to attack it. You really didn't get to stand in the front rank of the Sacred Band if you thought of your own safety rather than that of your comrades. You also didn't have a victim mentality - even if Plutarch piles on the pathos after you are dead. To paraphrase Patton, you don't win wars by dying for your country but by making some other dumb b*****d die for his.
Only way of confirming/refuting it is for reenactors to try it out (unless someone has some really sophisticated simulation software?).
Being trained professionals is only an advantage if your training takes into account what you are up against. The Spartans, for all their professionalism, had no answer to the Theban column and no time to devise any - they broke and ran.
Bracing would have helped the Sacred Band hoplites only if they were in close order - each man of a file pushing against the man in front. A hoplite with three feet between himself and chap behind is going to be pushed aside or knocked down by a horse, no matter what he does. I really can't see how a horse can have trouble pushing two men aside in this fashion. It's only two at a time, no problem for 1000 pounds of trained horseflesh.
Of course all this doesn't prove the Companions used a wedge to go frontally through hoplites, but it does make it at least plausible.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2014, 10:48:44 AM
Good summing up, Anthony.
The two objections to the mechanism of a wedge passing between infantry files are:
a) the friction would have stopped the horses,
b) the hoplites would have killed or incapacitated the Companions.
There is no evidence confirming a). What we really need is some mounted reenactors to attack in wedge a formation of (disposable) Russian peasants and see what happens. Visualising it, I suspect that the hoplites would instinctively try to get out of the way of the riders. Since each mounted file is 6 feet apart and the horses are not heading directly towards the footmen, that suggests the infantry would jump for the gaps between the horses. Bearing in mind they have no drill for what to do in this situation.
For b) ones needs to keep in mind that only the first two rows of a hoplite phalanx have their spears at the ready. Faced with advancing horse and riders whose lances had a greater reach, the hoplites' reaction would by-and-large be one of self-preservation: move out of the way of the horses, raise shields to guard against the lancepoints. To think about all that and about getting a spear into a horseman is rather asking a lot of the hoplite.
And hereby lies a problem
It's going to be a long project.
Firstly you don't just have to train the re-enactors, you have to train the horses. My guess is that you're probably talking about ten years for the horsemen, spending a large number of hours each week, every week on horseback. For the horses, you're probably going to have to start with unbroken horses to get them used to the different style of riding and bits.
By the time the ten years are up the re-enactors are probably up to training their own horses.
Then to get the re-enactment right you have to make sure that the re-enactors know that their horse could well die (but that they'll be paid compensation at the end of the financial year if the money holds out and we win) and that if the horse is injured then they'll have to survive on foot within spear range of a lot of vengeful infantry.
In training, just to drive this home, you could have a few practices where they were armed with poles and the 'infantry' had riot shields and baseball bats. This should remind them that it's a potentially dangerous occupation.
As for the infantry, why Russian peasants? I'd expect the phalanx to be made up of small businessmen, prosperous farmers, poets, playwrights, philosophers, pretty well all of whom are fit enough to plough an acre a day under the Greek sun.
But even with Russian Peasants and no common language I bet I could produce good hoplites in a lot shorter time, and for a far lower cost than it cost you to produce the companions.
As for instinctively running away. Why? That just guarantees that you die. One thing that all hoplites knew was that the side that ran, died. That's why they kept fighting for so long, because it was turning your back to run that was the dangerous thing to do. If the enemy behind you didn't kill you, the file closer on your own side probably would to deter others.
And that's why the file closers were chosen with care, tough veterans, the second most experienced man in the file, who knew that as long as the others kept facing forward, he was going to live.
That was one reason for Spartan success, they had a reputation for not pursuing, which meant it was safe to run away from them.
Run away from cavalry and you're dead. This isn't a new Macedonian invention, it's something the Greeks knew anyway, from the Persian wars and their own cavalry forces.
Friction doesn't stop horses. The one guy who's so bluidy minded he smashes a horse on the nose with his shield stops horses, or rips open it's thigh with his butt spike as it goes past. It's not an exercise riding through dummies, the smell of blood and screams are going to terrify the horse, especially the screams of other horses.
Jim
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2014, 09:18:29 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2014, 08:16:53 AMIn an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry. I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up. He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?). Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here. Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting the wedge as an anti-infantry formation?
Briefly - no, he doesn't. Arrian says that Philip taught the Macedonians to use this formation (taxis). He also says that the wedge is the best formation to use for breaking through an enemy taxis. He doesn't say that is why Philip adopted wedge, nor does he specify that it was used for breaking through infantry formations.
Having had a look, yes, Duncan has it correct - although for that matter Arrian does not specify that it was used against cavalry or not used against infantry. I think Gabriel or Markle may have inferred that since the only serious cavalry formations Philip is likely to have faced would be Thessalian wedges, and a wedge is not going to be that great at cutting through a wedge, the intended use would have been against hoplite infantry, which a wedge could cut through if the cavalrymen had appropriate weapons. Psiloi and Thracian peltastic types (which the Macedonian infantry seem to have resembled prior to re-equipment with the sarissa) were probably defeatable by standard javelin-armed heavy cavalry.
If one asks why Philip would have wanted his cavalry to cut through hoplites, the answer may lie in the context of the Sacred War, when Onomarchus of Elatea and his Phocian mercenary army were carrying all before them. Onomarchus handed Philip two successive defeats and Philip enlisted the help of the Thessalians for his next campaign, in which he won the Battle of the Crocus Field against 500 Phocian cavalry and 20,000 Phocian infantry. Diodorus ascribes the victory to the Thessalian cavalry:
"A severe battle took place and since the Thessalian cavalry were superior in numbers and valour, Philip won." - Diodorus XVI.35.5
Although the first duty of the Thessalians would have been to deal with their Phocian counterparts, just removing 500 horse from the battlefield does not win the battle (vide Bagradas): something more is required, namely the defeat of the enemy infantry. Is Diodorus hinting at this? In any event, it seems that Philip started thinking about wedge-configured cavalry at about this point. His infantry, which was using 'javelins' when he first fought Onomarchus, may have been re-equipped with the sarissa at around the same time that Philip overhauled his cavalry.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 21, 2014, 11:11:24 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2014, 10:48:44 AM
Visualising it, I suspect that the hoplites would instinctively try to get out of the way of the riders. Since each mounted file is 6 feet apart and the horses are not heading directly towards the footmen, that suggests the infantry would jump for the gaps between the horses. Bearing in mind they have no drill for what to do in this situation.
I think you underestimate these phalanxes. Their whole essence is collective action. So, I think they would have tried to brace against impact. The front rankers might go down, but they'd either bring down the horse or slow it for others to attack it. You really didn't get to stand in the front rank of the Sacred Band if you thought of your own safety rather than that of your comrades. You also didn't have a victim mentality - even if Plutarch piles on the pathos after you are dead. To paraphrase Patton, you don't win wars by dying for your country but by making some other dumb b*****d die for his.
I rather doubt that a hoplite phalanx meeting Macedonian cavalry for the first time would have tried to brace against impact, simply because they would not have expected an impact. This in itself would in part account for the success of the Macedonian cavalry at Chaeronea. One point that Justin made is the speed with which the whole attack would take effect - there would have been no possibility of thinking through, let alone working out, a
collective response.
Had hoplite phalanxes been given the kind of training that later (much later) generations received on the subject of how to deal with cavalry then yes, they could probably have stopped a Macedonian wedge by kneeling, bracing weapons, etc. The essential point is that
they never had such training and that is why the Macedonian cavalry wedge was so effective.
One can see the same pattern with elephants: against troops not trained in dealing with them, they were terrifyingly effective. Against troops who were trained to deal with them, they were usually not very useful. The same pattern repeats with tanks in the 20th century.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2014, 09:18:29 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2014, 08:16:53 AMIn an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry. I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up. He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?). Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here. Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting the wedge as an anti-infantry formation?
Briefly - no, he doesn't. Arrian says that Philip taught the Macedonians to use this formation (taxis). He also says that the wedge is the best formation to use for breaking through an enemy taxis. He doesn't say that is why Philip adopted wedge, nor does he specify that it was used for breaking through infantry formations.
This makes me wonder why a wedge couldn't be larger than a taxis (about 200-odd men). Looking at my reconstruction of how a wedge worked (last time, promise!) it is clear there would be a definite limit on the width hence the size of a wedge. The mechanism requires that the file leader of the frontmost cavalry column heads for the gap between two infantry files, and that the two adjacent file leaders orientate themselves on him, slightly adjusting their direction to head for the gaps two infantry files across, allowing the next pair of file leaders to orient themselves, and so on.
The problem is that the cavalry wedge does not start out with its files exactly double the width of the infantry files it is attacking. It's approximate, which means that although the central cavalry files will have little adjusting to do, the outermost files will have to do a good deal more swerving in order to line up with their target gaps. There comes a limit as to how much a file can swerve in mid-trot and that limit determines the width of the wedge.
Presuming that Alexander's wedge targeted the substantial part of the Sacred Band, the wedge would have a maximum possible width of about 50 yards, presuming the Band deployed 6 deep ( 300 / 6 = 50 men wide = 50 yards wide), or about 25 files, 12 on each side of the central file. But it may well have been less than this.
We also tend to assume that a wedge continues to taper and expand until there is only one man at each rear corner. It could have expanded each rank up to (say) 10 or 12 wide and then just kept this width for the balance of the formation, being in effect a short column with a sharp tip. This would make it similar to a Thessalian rhombus with the aft end squared off.
That is what is envisaged in 15th-century German manuals - basically a column tipped by a wedge. But it 's not what the Hellenistic manuals describe - though they do only speak of pretty small wedges, so that isn't a completely foolproof argument when we look at the sort of wedge(s) formed by a 2-300 man squadron.
This is why I am somewhat hesitant about adopting the 'tipped column' suggestion: a) there seems to be no direct (and not a lot of indirect) evidence for it as part of the Hellenistic repertoire and b) the Thessalian rhombus seems not to have worried that the men at the corners were over-exposed, so should the Macedonian wedge be troubled on that point?
In theory, the men at the leading edge of the wedge can each give their opponents a sarissa in the kisser to take the hoplite out of the fight. The men behind them deal with any opponents still on their feet. Those at the left and right corners of the wedge do not have anyone behind them, so when their turn comes to barrel through the enemy formation they do so solo. If each corner man had a half-file behind him he would be rather less exposed and much better supported. It is one of those logic-from-thin-air observations and should be considered on its merits - but only if it has any. :)
It may not be necessary for the outermost files to have more than one cavalryman each. Since horses do not physically push against each other, the frontmost horse of each file must make its way between the infantry files on its own, with the following riders getting the job of sending the infantrymen to their ancestors. Hence a lone cavalryman should be able to push though an infantry formation and possibly take out a footman whilst doing so, without needing any mounted colleagues behind him.
Whether wedge or line I should imagine it would not be an easy task for a horseman, lance in hand, to pick out and eliminate a hoplite in a close shield formation. Didn't Xenophon describe, in the return journey of the Ten thousand, an incident when hoplites formed up, moved as one, and unintentionally intimidated and caused panic among allied horse? Horses being intelligent animals may be a little hesitant to impale themselves on pointed sticks or have hooves cut by sharp swords. I suppose it all depends on the training and leadership of the opposing forces.
Robert Gargan
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2014, 08:37:41 PMHence a lone cavalryman should be able to push though an infantry formation and possibly take out a footman whilst doing so, without needing any mounted colleagues behind him.
So they don't really need a wedge at all?
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 23, 2014, 10:39:43 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2014, 08:37:41 PMHence a lone cavalryman should be able to push though an infantry formation and possibly take out a footman whilst doing so, without needing any mounted colleagues behind him.
So they don't really need a wedge at all?
If they're doing this as a formation then, yes, (hypothetically of course) they would. A Companion going it alone into a mass of hoplites is buying an express ticket to the Elysium Fields since the hoplites are unlikely to feel intimidated and will be able to concentrate on bringing him down. Faced with an approaching mass of horsemen, each hoplite is more likely to concentrate on the horseman in front of him, and do so with defensive outlook, especially if such an attack is not expected. This very much increases the security of each rider.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 23, 2014, 10:39:43 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2014, 08:37:41 PMHence a lone cavalryman should be able to push though an infantry formation and possibly take out a footman whilst doing so, without needing any mounted colleagues behind him.
So they don't really need a wedge at all?
Exactly which is what I pointed out from the suggested model (I think on about the 19th)
That from the model they're offering, the wedge becomes unnecessary because if it works it will work in linear formation
Jim
Presuming that the Companions penetrate the hoplites by each cavalry file making for the gap between every other infantry file, then a wedge is a useful formation for enabling the frontmost cavalry file leader to steer the wedge and its files towards and into the right infantry files, something which is impossible to do with a linear formation. Whether the files on the edge consisted of one or more horsemen is rather irrelevant to the basic efficacy of the wedge.
Quote from: RobertGargan on April 23, 2014, 10:37:59 PM
Whether wedge or line I should imagine it would not be an easy task for a horseman, lance in hand, to pick out and eliminate a hoplite in a close shield formation. Didn't Xenophon describe, in the return journey of the Ten thousand, an incident when hoplites formed up, moved as one, and unintentionally intimidated and caused panic among allied horse? Horses being intelligent animals may be a little hesitant to impale themselves on pointed sticks or have hooves cut by sharp swords. I suppose it all depends on the training and leadership of the opposing forces.
Robert Gargan
Given that the xyston had a reach advantage over the typical hoplite
doru (spear), the question of willingness or unwillingness of horses to impale themselves probably never arose. Had Philip of Macedon retained a weapon of javelinic nature, then equine impalement would have been a consideration, but the length of the xyston seems to have been intended to make the question academic.
Definitely agree that training and leadership are vital considerations - the Companions seem to have been among the most highly-trained cavalry in existence, and could be trained in an attack routine against hoplite formations, whereas hoplites would be trained to fight enemy hoplites, perhaps chase lighter infantry, but dealing with cavalry would not be high on their usually limited training agenda, particularly how to deal with a type of cavalry not encountered before.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2014, 10:53:00 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 23, 2014, 10:39:43 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2014, 08:37:41 PMHence a lone cavalryman should be able to push though an infantry formation and possibly take out a footman whilst doing so, without needing any mounted colleagues behind him.
So they don't really need a wedge at all?
If they're doing this as a formation then, yes, (hypothetically of course) they would. A Companion going it alone into a mass of hoplites is buying an express ticket to the Elysium Fields since the hoplites are unlikely to feel intimidated and will be able to concentrate on bringing him down. Faced with an approaching mass of horsemen, each hoplite is more likely to concentrate on the horseman in front of him, and do so with defensive outlook, especially if such an attack is not expected. This very much increases the security of each rider.
The value of the wedge would seem to be the disorientation it induces among the individuals in the target formation. The angular nature of the wedge means that instead of a constant frontage being in action, more and more men are going to be hit by attackers piling in, making it hard for individual opponents to keep 'target orientation' and 'situational awareness' in the face of a constantly changing and developing situation.
One man might make it into an infantry formation, but because every infantryman can concentrate on him and get their awareness pattern focussed on him and what he is doing he will soon be brought down. With 200 companions funnelling in behind him, there are a couple of hundred additional distractions plus the fact that the wedge itself is ripping into more and more of the defenders' line, so for the defender aligning one's orientational framework in the every-changing situation becomes impossible
unless one already has a counter-technique worked out in advance. This, hoplites conspicuously lacked.
One often overlooked aspect of troop performance is orientation, the ability to comprehend the immediate situation and do something effective about it. In air fighting, it is always those with 'situational awareness' who kill those without it, and I suspect the same is true on the battlefield.
Surely, the advantage of a wedge is concentration of force? The attacker is concentrated against a small portion of the enemy line, yet deployed in such a way as to prevent easy overlap (both flanks being echeloned back). The idea that hoplites could be rendered helpless by cavalry approaching in a novel formation still seems a mighty stretch to me.
It would not be the approach, but rather the sudden ploughing through the formation that would cause the shock, and in particular the way the expanding contact 'rippled' rather than being a plain, straightforward smash.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2014, 11:05:27 AM
It would not be the approach, but rather the sudden ploughing through the formation that would cause the shock, and in particular the way the expanding contact 'rippled' rather than being a plain, straightforward smash.
Hang on
When this started out we weren't charging at speed, we had time for them to kill individual hoplites with well placed spear thrusts.
Now we don't even need the spear, we've no time to use it because we've got sudden ploughing and shock
Jim
Isn't it key that the cavalry can be made to get into contact with a mass of shiny bronze foot-men?
Perhaps the wedge offers an advantage there because in a line all the front rank horses need to be brave enough too plough in, whereas in a wedge you can put the 10 most aggressive horses in the front group??
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 24, 2014, 05:48:59 PM
Isn't it key that the cavalry can be made to get into contact with a mass of shiny bronze foot-men?
Perhaps the wedge offers an advantage there because in a line all the front rank horses need to be brave enough too plough in, whereas in a wedge you can put the 10 most aggressive horses in the front group??
Roy
But as far as we know there was no attempt to categorise horses by aggression. Xenophon discusses them, we've got documentation from horse inspections. The point of the wedge was defined by the rank of the riders, and the order they appeared in the formation would depend on the order of their files.
I've never come across any way to measure how keen a horse is to smash down people, in fact those that are more likely to do it are those who just charge forward in hysterical panic more scared of the horses on either side of them than the obstacle in front.
An aggressive horse would be more likely to lash out at a neighbouring horse that was encroaching on its personal space.
I can see the advantage of the wedge for movement and turning, and against relatively loose formations such as other mounted troops a wedge led aggressively might be useful, but I'm afraid I've seen no evidence of it being any particular use against infantry.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2014, 11:47:52 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2014, 11:05:27 AM
It would not be the approach, but rather the sudden ploughing through the formation that would cause the shock, and in particular the way the expanding contact 'rippled' rather than being a plain, straightforward smash.
Hang on
When this started out we weren't charging at speed, we had time for them to kill individual hoplites with well placed spear thrusts.
Now we don't even need the spear, we've no time to use it because we've got sudden ploughing and shock
Jim
Sorry, I was unclear: my comment above was regarding the difficulty of orientation for the defenders, not the effects of armament, which would definitely be present and used. The point is that time would seem to move slower for the attackers (the Companions), who know exactly what they are doing, but too fast for the defending hoplites to orient themselves with regard to exactly what is going on - at least until they had seen it done a few times, and how many of them had that opportunity?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2014, 06:42:48 PM
But as far as we know there was no attempt to categorise horses by aggression. Xenophon discusses them, we've got documentation from horse inspections. The point of the wedge was defined by the rank of the riders, and the order they appeared in the formation would depend on the order of their files.
I've never come across any way to measure how keen a horse is to smash down people, in fact those that are more likely to do it are those who just charge forward in hysterical panic more scared of the horses on either side of them than the obstacle in front.
An aggressive horse would be more likely to lash out at a neighbouring horse that was encroaching on its personal space.
Horses could be trained to do some quite remarkable things, some of which we see in mediaeval and renaissance accounts. Untrained horses were not used by cavalrymen for the reasons Jim mentions, but selected and trained warhorses would not give such trouble.
Xenophon has this to say about mounts (Cavalry Commander I.5-7):
"
While the ranks are filling up, you must see that the horses get enough food to stand hard work, since horses unfit for their work can neither overtake nor escape. You must see that they are docile, because disobedient animals assist the enemy more than their own side. [4] And horses that kick when mounted must be got rid of, for such brutes often do more mischief than the enemy. You must also look after their feet, so that they can be ridden on rough ground, for you know that wherever galloping is painful to them, they are useless. [5]
Having made sure that the horses are in good condition, the next business is to train the men. First they must learn to mount from the spring [i.e. vault]
, since many before now have owed their lives to that. Secondly, they must practise riding over all sorts of ground, since any kind of country may become the area of war. [6] As soon as they have acquired a firm seat, your next task is to take steps that as many as possible shall be able to throw the javelin when mounted and shall become efficient in all the details of horsemanship.
After that both horses and men must be armed [hoplisteon = must be armoured]
, so that, while they are themselves thoroughly protected against wounds, they may have the means of inflicting the greatest loss on the enemy. [7] Then you must contrive to make the men obedient: otherwise neither good horses nor a firm seat nor fine armour are of any use."
In essence, look out for those likely to cause problems and get rid of them, then train the rest and their riders. I do not know if the Macedonians selected horses for aggression (or 'spirit') but they had a weapons system the Athenians did not - the xyston - and their selection criteria may have been slightly different, although the principle of getting rid of potential problem cases would have been retained.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2014, 08:43:12 PM
Sorry, I was unclear: my comment above was regarding the difficulty of orientation for the defenders, not the effects of armament, which would definitely be present and used. The point is that time would seem to move slower for the attackers (the Companions), who know exactly what they are doing, but too fast for the defending hoplites to orient themselves with regard to exactly what is going on - at least until they had seen it done a few times, and how many of them had that opportunity?
Hang on again ;)
I realise it isn't your point, but someone commented that the wedge would work only if it went down the files, bowling infantry aside. If it hits at anything other than 90 degrees to the front (or to the flank, I suppose you might get the same effect with ranks) it is less effective (at least according to the models that we've had proposed.
So in reality then a wedge would telegraph it's point of contact before the cavalry even hit.
Jim
I'll be writing an article on this for Slingshot, so correct me now before I embarrass myself in print... but invariably in set piece Macedonian battles the Companion cavalry charged into a gap that was created in the enemy infantry line by the echeloned attack of the phalanx. The cavalry either hit the enemy infantry in the flank, or penetrated the gap and exploited the enemy tactical rear echelons. I don't recall ever hearing about a frontal attack against infantry. The closest to that was Alexander's foolhardy charge across the Granicus against formed Persian heavy/extra heavy cavalry waiting for him atop the opposite embankment and that very nearly got him killed.
I'm inclined to agree with Dave Beatty. The Macedonian army was dangerous because of the balance in arms - horse and foot. Pinned by phalangites the enemy was held in play while the lance armed Macedonian horse could take out opposing cavalry and light infantry head on: why risk irreplaceable horse in a frontal attack on spear armed foot? What little evidence we have portrays Alexander as a master of battle always using the varied parts of the army for the right action on the right terrain. I have to admit I find it difficult to deploy a wargames army to great effect!
Robert Gargan
Dave/Robert,
That Macedonian companions could break hoplites frontally using a wedge formation is a speculative theory proposed by Patrick and Justin. There is no indisputable evidence that companions clashed frontally with hoplites let alone broke them but there is ambiguity, which allows a theory to be proposed. If you go back a couple of pages, I summarised the two sides to this debate before we hurled ourselves back into it.
In terms of attacking infantry at all, I think Patrick has mentioned a fight with Persian Kardakes, but as these weren't hoplites this has not been revisited.
Indeed as far as I can tell the only battle where there appears to be any suggestion that the Companions charged hoplites frontally is the Battle of Chaeronea
Dave's analysis seems to sum up the situation.
We have Chaeronea where Alexander 'led' the force which defeated the Theban Sacred Band. From the evidence we have the Sacred Band is as likely to have died with infantry pike wounds in their chests as Alexander is to have led a cavalry charge at them.
We have the fight with the Kardakes which has been somewhat overlooked, mainly because that would probably open a whole new can of worms because then we'd have to agree with what the Kardakes were :-\
One interesting comment is that if the destroying hoplites with a cavalry charge is true, nobody thought fit to ever mention it. Alexander is the only person in his day who seems to have managed in, but with the true Humility of the Englishman he's to diffident to mention it and his biographers all ignore this unique achievement. :-[
Jim
Quote from: Dave Beatty on April 24, 2014, 11:50:22 PM
I'll be writing an article on this for Slingshot, so correct me now before I embarrass myself in print... but invariably in set piece Macedonian battles the Companion cavalry charged into a gap that was created in the enemy infantry line by the echeloned attack of the phalanx. The cavalry either hit the enemy infantry in the flank, or penetrated the gap and exploited the enemy tactical rear echelons. I don't recall ever hearing about a frontal attack against infantry. The closest to that was Alexander's foolhardy charge across the Granicus against formed Persian heavy/extra heavy cavalry waiting for him atop the opposite embankment and that very nearly got him killed.
We have two cases where Macedonian cavalry seems to have charged frontally into a hoplite formation - once with complete, and once with limited, success.
1) Chaeronea: the sparse details are detailed earlier in this (rather long) thread, but in essence, by working from hints that Alexander was 'first to break through the enemy line' (of Theban hoplites, in this case specifically the Sacred Band) and noting that at the other end of the field Philip led 'ahead' of his troops one can conclude that a pointed formation (i.e. wedge) was involved. Attempts to recast this as post-victory propagandistic waffle do not convince me, because we know that Alexander did habitually charge at the head of a cavalry wedge.
2) The Granicus: once Alexander has the Greek mercenaries cornered (they ask for clemency and he says no), we learn that he ordered a combined infantry and cavalry attack on them and had a horse killed under him by someone putting a sword through its ribs. Putting two and two together, Alex led a wedge into an attack on the hoplite formation, and because the hoplites were surrounded and hence facing outward in every direction this attack was perforce frontal. It also seems to have got stuck, probably because the targets were too closely packed to be knocked aside as would be possible with a normal hoplite formation, which gave someone the chance to put a short sword into the side of Alex's horse.
Quote from: RobertGargan on April 25, 2014, 12:44:01 AM
I have to admit I find it difficult to deploy a wargames army to great effect!
Robert Gargan
This is actually what started this discussion: the fact that trying to refight Chaeronea tends to have Alex's cavalry wing up against the right hand part of the Theban line, Sacred Band included, and under existing wargame rules the result is usually an ignominious Macedonian loss in this sector. If however the Companions are allowed to defeat hoplites frontally, the result is much more like the impression we get from the snippets in our sources.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2014, 08:42:40 AM
One interesting comment is that if the destroying hoplites with a cavalry charge is true, nobody thought fit to ever mention it. Alexander is the only person in his day who seems to have managed in, but with the true Humility of the Englishman he's to diffident to mention it and his biographers all ignore this unique achievement. :-[
Remember we are missing a fair number of period sources, including the History by Callisthenes (which may admittedly only have begin with Alexander's arrival in Asia in 334 BC); we may also note that Curtius' early chapters (1 and 2) are lost and that even Arrian only begins with Alexander's kingship, omitting his early life - perhaps because this still leaves him with a lot to cover - hence our source for main Chaeronea becomes Diodorus XVI.86.
"
The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valour and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required. [2] On the other side, dividing the line according to nationality, the Athenians assigned one wing to the Boeotians and kept command of the other themselves. Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both. [3]
Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. [4] As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory." - from Perseus (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0084%3Abook%3D16%3Achapter%3D86).
Note that he 'ruptures' (errexe) the enemy front, which one would expect from a wedge but not from a line. Observe also how he forces his way through, as if the first person to do so, and that Philip also 'advanced well in front'. Such positioning is consistent with leading a cavalry wedge.
Quote from: Dave Beatty on April 24, 2014, 11:50:22 PM
I'll be writing an article on this for Slingshot, so correct me now before I embarrass myself in print... but invariably in set piece Macedonian battles the Companion cavalry charged into a gap that was created in the enemy infantry line by the echeloned attack of the phalanx.
Dave - in a word, no. I am following Arrian's acounts here as they are the sharpest and clearest even if not always the most detailed. At the Granicus Alexander sent in his right-wing cavalry, catching the Persian leadership together before they could disperse to command their contingents, and once he had reduced their number a bit the pressure of his cavalry and phalanx (which was beginning to cross) plus their leaderless state and a mistimed move down from the hill by the Persians' Greek mercenaries combined to panic and collapse the Persian centre, whereupon the more or less leaderless wings followed suit, leaving the mercenaries high and dry. With the Persian cavalry out of the picture, Alex crushed the mercenaries with a combined cavalry and infantry attack.
At Issus, Alex and his Companions went through the Kardakes like a knife through butter and then engaged in a short but intense duel with Darius' bodyguard. That concluded, Alex noticed his phalanx was in trouble and hit the Greek mercenaries responsible in the flank of their formation. Whether the unengaged ones turned to face him prior to impact is an open question.
At Gaugamela, Alex teased the Persian left out of position and chased it off the field before leading his Companions against the left flank of the Persian centre. This brought him into direct conflict with the left-hand contingent of Greek hoplites (there was one contingent on either side of Darius' bodyguard). Whether or not they turned to face him (would you?) he and the Companions went through them easily enough to engage in the traditional fight against Darius' bodyguard while Darius again narrowly escaped. The Alexander Mosaic seems to depict this action, and we may note a couple of downed hoplites as part of the detail.
Hence, one way or another, every major battle Alexander fought between arrival in Asia and entry into Babylon - Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela - saw Companions charging hoplites. One of these charges - at the Granicus - had to be frontal. The others were into the flank of a hoplite formation, though the hoplites could have turned to face (I would be surprised if they had not at least tried).
I might as well note that as of a few years ago I was firmly of the belief that cavalry could not effectively charge spear-armed infantry: a legacy of WRG rules. Looking at the primary sources changed my mind.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2014, 12:00:35 PM
One of these charges - at the Granicus - had to be frontal. The others were into the flank of a hoplite formation, though the hoplites could have turned to face (I would be surprised if they had not at least tried).
A confident restate of your case, Patrick :) However, I'm not sure I would say that being part of combined assault on a group of surrounded hoplites is exactly the same as a frontal assault, unsupported. While I would agree that the obvious thing would be to form an alround defence, do we know what the standard hoplite drill for this was? A circle or a hollow square seem possibilities? How much does this affect the support given by the files?
On charging to face when charged in the flank, it would be the obvious thing to do. However, as the hoplite phalanx was very directional, just turning the flanking files isn't going to be the same as the fully formed front. Instead of facing a line of well-armed and experienced file leaders, you primarily have the ordinary hoplites to contend with, for example. And would the rank support be as effective when the ranks become files?
Quote from: Dave Beatty on April 24, 2014, 11:50:22 PM
I'll be writing an article on this for Slingshot
I don't envy you the task of summarising this rather lengthy discussion. You may also want to check the Chaironeia thread of which this is a sort of offshoot (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1195 (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1195)), for example because:
Quote from: PatrickAlexander was 'first to break through the enemy line' (of Theban hoplites, in this case specifically the Sacred Band) and noting that at the other end of the field Philip led 'ahead' of his troops one can conclude that a pointed formation (i.e. wedge) was involved.
...it's in that thread that I noticed that "errexe", the verb used for the "breaking through" action which Patrick suggests implies a wedge, is actually used by other authors to describe hoplite combat, that is breakthroughs by infantry who are not in wedge.
Indeed, pats basis for a wedge equally rests upon the belief that all infantry combat not involving a wedge must result in an equal line of othismos pushing but never piercing.
so you have to accept othismos, accept lines never pierce lines, accept kardakes equal hoplites, accept alexander was on horseback at all times, etc etc.
Its a big ask just to result in a singular event.
Collecting together the primary sources on the subject, this is what we have:
| Asklepiodotos
It is said that the Scythians and Thracians invented the wedge formation, and that later the Macedonians used it, since they considered it more practical than the square formation; for the front of the wedge formation is narrow, as in the rhomboid, and only one half as wide, and this made it easiest for them to break through, as well as brought the leaders in front of the rest, while wheeling was thus easier than in the square formation...
Diodorus
The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valour and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required. On the other side, dividing the line according to nationality, the Athenians assigned one wing to the Boeotians and kept command of the other themselves. Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both.
Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory. - XVI.86.1-4
Plutarch
The enemy, however, did not resist vigorously, nor for a long time, but fled in a rout, all except the Greek mercenaries. These made a stand at a certain eminence, and asked that Alexander should promise them quarter. But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword (it was not Bucephalas, but another); and most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate. - Life of Alexander, 16.6-7
Arrian
Ordering a combined assault by infantry and cavalry Alexander quickly had them surrounded and butchered to a man. - Anabasis of Alexander, I.16.2 |
And that's it. What is obvious from this is that
nothing in the texts conclusively and beyond doubt affirms that Alexander (and Philip) used horses when attacking formed hoplites or went in on foot. I'm not talking about what is more likely, just what is clearly stated or not clearly stated.
What emerges then is that if horses breaking through a hoplite phalanx is a reasonable possibility, the horse hypothesis has weight just as the infantry hypothesis does. One cannot discard it as unlikely or unproven. It's not as if one has to choose between on horse and on foot. Better to look at both and try to deduce which is more probable.
All this to say that I was also thinking of doing an article on the subject, but will keep it for later down the line - unless our esteemed editor thinks that two articles with differing conclusions on the subject is a good idea? If not then fine. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2014, 12:00:35 PM
"The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valour and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required. [2] On the other side, dividing the line according to nationality, the Athenians assigned one wing to the Boeotians and kept command of the other themselves. Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both. [3]
Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. [4] As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory." - from Perseus (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0084%3Abook%3D16%3Achapter%3D86).
Note that he 'ruptures' (errexe) the enemy front, which one would expect from a wedge but not from a line. Observe also how he forces his way through, as if the first person to do so, and that Philip also 'advanced well in front'. Such positioning is consistent with leading a cavalry wedge.
Save that it never once mentions cavalry, or horses, or mounted troops of any sort. After all Philip is not assumed to be charging at the head of a cavalry wedge yet we know he did fight on horseback.
Also Generals, linguistically, can lead their men to victory without every drawing and sword, even Spartan kings had bodyguards in front as well as alongside and behind them.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2014, 05:49:22 PM
Save that it never once mentions cavalry, or horses, or mounted troops of any sort.
Then again, it does not mention infantry of any sort. What conclusion are we to draw from this notable omission? ;)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2014, 12:56:39 PM
A confident restate of your case, Patrick :) However, I'm not sure I would say that being part of combined assault on a group of surrounded hoplites is exactly the same as a frontal assault, unsupported.
True, it is not exactly the same, the essential difference being that the boxed-in target formation lacked room for stricken individuals to drop, tumble or be pushed out of formation - which to me indicates why Alex got stuck and lost his horse: he just could not maintain momentum into the increasingly packed mass the way he could through a unidirectional formation which had room to collapse back onto. This incident is the only mention we have of a horse being killed under him, even though he was wounded at Issus and almost wounded in the early stages of the Granicus.
Quote
While I would agree that the obvious thing would be to form an all-round defence, do we know what the standard hoplite drill for this was? A circle or a hollow square seem possibilities? How much does this affect the support given by the files?
As far as I can determine, there was no standard drill. The Spartans may have been an exception: they trained for just about every eventuality they could think of, but being surrounded was such a rare event - I recall only three cases in the remainder of the hoplite era: Thermopylae (480 BC), the Thespians at Delium (424 BC) and the Athenians at Syracuse (413 BC). There may be more but it was sufficiently rare not to drill for.
At the Granicus, the likely formation would be a rectangle, perhaps initially an 8 deep hollow rectangle with not much room in the middle; conceivably a solid rectangle as this would be more in keeping with a last-ditch stand-and-die deployment. The latter is my preferred guess.
Quote
On charging to face when charged in the flank, it would be the obvious thing to do. However, as the hoplite phalanx was very directional, just turning the flanking files isn't going to be the same as the fully formed front. Instead of facing a line of well-armed and experienced file leaders, you primarily have the ordinary hoplites to contend with, for example. And would the rank support be as effective when the ranks become files?
Very likely not. It makes little difference in many wargaming rules, but in life a face-to-flank (as against redeploy-to-flank) would be an emergency measure for hoplites, with the files in an unaccustomed relationship so that any support would be of a very improvised nature. While the fact of facing men with spears would be the same, the formation would be hard put to exert effective counterpressure. It should nevertheless still be enough to cause javelin-armed cavalry to keep their distance.
Quote from: Mark G on April 25, 2014, 05:11:51 PM
Indeed, pats basis for a wedge equally rests upon the belief that all infantry combat not involving a wedge must result in an equal line of othismos pushing but never piercing.
I always say, beware of generalisations. However in this case the general outline of infantry combat - and specifically hoplite vs hoplite or hoplite vs phalanx combat - involving linear relationships seems appropriate. There were quite a few cases when hoplites broke hoplites (a hunt through Thucydides will reveal many of these; Xenophon's Hellenica has most of the others), and something of a question mark as to whether a phalanx ever broke hoplites in frontal combat, but one looks long and hard for a case of the leader of a hoplite or phalanx formation being
first through the enemy line.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2014, 05:49:22 PM
Also Generals, linguistically, can lead their men to victory without ever drawing a sword, even Spartan kings had bodyguards in front as well as alongside and behind them.
Macedonian generals eschewed linguistic leadership in favour of the real thing, as pointed out previously.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2014, 07:35:03 PM
Then again, it does not mention infantry of any sort. What conclusion are we to draw from this notable omission?
I'm not the one building a theory on the basis of the omission. If the source mentioned either individual fighting with their mounted troops, that's fine. But we're extrapolating back from Alexander, king, and man of military age to Alexander, crown prince and perhaps not yet a full adult
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2014, 07:35:03 PM
Macedonian generals eschewed linguistic leadership in favour of the real thing, as pointed out previously.
Macedonian
Kings did, or rather one King before Alexander (I don't think we know much about the battlefield performance of those before Philip and not a lot about him) and those we know after him. Whether, for example, Antipather found the need to ostentatiously mix it in the front rank we don't know.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2014, 08:07:48 PM
... we're extrapolating back from Alexander, king, and man of military age to Alexander, crown prince and perhaps not yet a full adult
Alexander was precocious in many ways, and had conducted his first campaign two years
prior to Chaeronea. I think extrapolating back to age 18 (Chaeronea) from age 22 (Granicus) is not too great a leap.
Quote
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2014, 07:35:03 PM
Macedonian generals eschewed linguistic leadership in favour of the real thing, as pointed out previously.
Macedonian Kings did, or rather one King before Alexander (I don't think we know much about the battlefield performance of those before Philip and not a lot about him) and those we know after him. Whether, for example, Antipater found the need to ostentatiously mix it in the front rank we don't know.
Again, judging by what people thought of Perseus at Pydna for not leading from the front, I doubt that Antipater would have been respected by his troops had he not done so. Obviously we have no source stating explicitly that all Macedonians who commanded led from the tip of a wedge (apart from Antigonus at Ipsus who unusually fielded himself with his phalanx), but looking at all the indicators from such Macedonian kings as we have information for does suggest a tradition of leading from the front, on horseback, and I would expect to see this at Chaeronea.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2014, 12:05:06 PM
Obviously we have no source stating explicitly that all Macedonians who commanded led from the tip of a wedge (apart from Antigonus at Ipsus who unusually fielded himself with his phalanx), but looking at all the indicators from such Macedonian kings as we have information for does suggest a tradition of leading from the front, on horseback, and I would expect to see this at Chaeronea.
As our evidence of Chaeronea is incomplete, one could equally well interpret that Alexander and Philip lead from the front of the phalanx and Antigonus is following an established tradition.
Part of the difficulty we are having in this debate is that Patrick and Justin are running not with a dispute whether Alex was on a horse at Chaeronea but a full-blooded leap to Alex had introduced a new phalanx-smashing tactic which took the Sacred band so much surprised that they stood like rabbits in the headlights, allowing themselves to be speared to death.
If we break this down, I would say that the fact that Alex fought on horseback at Chaeronea is possible from the evidence. This means it is possible that the Companions did break the Sacred Band, especially if we allow the idea that the words xyston and sarissa could be interchangeable. Even if not, the possiblity of a combined arms attack on the Sacred band by phalangites and Companions must be acknowledged, simply because it is one way of reconcilling conflicting acccounts. But the idea that Alexander is leading an infantry phalanx from the front is also possible from the evidence.
That the Macedonian cavalry attacked infantry in wedge must be speculative - our evidence could point to the idea that wedge was a good anti-cavalry tactic and no more. The methodology suggested for the wedge attack on hoplites, that a cavalry attack in wedge would reduce trained hoplites to passive fatalism and particularly that the horsemen could ride through a hostile hoplite phalanx at a trot, virtually unhindered, is a huge leap of imagination that I personally find implausible.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2014, 12:34:58 PM
Part of the difficulty we are having in this debate is that Patrick and Justin are running not with a dispute whether Alex was on a horse at Chaeronea but a full-blooded leap to Alex had introduced a new phalanx-smashing tactic which took the Sacred Band so much by surprise that they stood like rabbits in the headlights, allowing themselves to be speared to death.
If Alex is on a horse and leading from the front, the former being our surmise and the latter stated by our sources (Plutarch and Diodorus), then he would need to be at the head of an effective fighting formation or he would be a target and in all probability a casualty. Since the Sacred Band died to a man without any of our scant sources suggesting that they gave anywhere near as good as they got, I infer they faced an opponent with significantly superior technique and casualty-inficting ability.
The question is: what was this technique, and how did it work?
Quote
If we break this down, I would say that the fact that Alex fought on horseback at Chaeronea is possible from the evidence. This means it is possible that the Companions did break the Sacred Band, especially if we allow the idea that the words xyston and sarissa could be interchangeable. Even if not, the possiblity of a combined arms attack on the Sacred band by phalangites and Companions must be acknowledged, simply because it is one way of reconcilling conflicting acccounts. But the idea that Alexander is leading an infantry phalanx from the front is also possible from the evidence.
In order to attempt the leading-a-phalanx hypothesis it is necessary to dismiss our sources' united assertion that Alexander was 'first' or 'foremost' as a literary dislocation. While not a barrier to the phalanx hypothesis it is noticeable that this requirement already puts more strain on our sources than the cavalry wedge hypothesis.
Quote
That the Macedonian cavalry attacked infantry in wedge must be speculative - our evidence could point to the idea that wedge was a good anti-cavalry tactic and no more.
Except that if (leaving out Chaeronea) we look at the number of occasions on the battlefield when Macedonian Companions attacked significant contingents of enemy infantry and cavalry, we get:
GranicusCavalry: yes Infantry: yes (Greek mercenaries)
IssusCavalry: no* Infantry: yes (Kardakes and Greek mercenaries)
GaugamelaCavalry: no* Infantry: yes (Greek mercenaries)
*In these battles, the only cavalry the Companions fought during the course of the battle was Darius' own bodyguard - unless one counts the sharp action with the Indian and Persian cavalry contingent when Alexander was returning from his pursuit to help Parmenio.
We are left with the perhaps surprising conclusion that the majority of fighting on the battlefield by Companions seems to have been done against
infantry, and most of that was against Greek hoplites. Companions are generally mentioned in our sources as fighting in wedge, whether against infantry or cavalry (albeit not every instance is specific, should we wish to go into details); they do not appear to have had one formation for use against cavalry and another against infantry. Polyaenus (quoted earlier) stated that Philip adopted the wedge because it was good at cutting through enemy formations (taxeis) without specifying either infantry or cavalry, and so probably meaning both.
Quote
The methodology suggested for the wedge attack on hoplites, that a cavalry attack in wedge would reduce trained hoplites to passive fatalism and particularly that the horsemen could ride through a hostile hoplite phalanx at a trot, virtually unhindered, is a huge leap of imagination that I personally find implausible.
Not so much imagination as deduction. If Alex was on horseback leading a formation at Chaeronea, that formation has to be cavalry. If he was at the head of it then the formation has to be a cavalry wedge. That much is deduction. How the cavalry wedge would run down and/or run through a hoplite formation is imaginative/speculative, but does seem to accord with the slender evidence we possess about Chaeronea and the fight against the mercenaries at the Granicus.
To round out the picture, I would point out that Alexander usually (always in the cases our sources - notably Arrian - describe) supports the Companions with archers and Agrianians. This suggests that missiles were used to prepare the target - a combined arms attack - before the Companions went in; Issus may have been an exception because the target (the Kardakes) seems to have had more missile capability than Alexander's supporting missilemen, so he just charged straight away - and it worked.
Since the alternative idea of Philip and Alexander leading infantry formations at Chaeronea has again been advanced, I again invite anyone to explain how this might work and how it might tie in with our source statements: as an alternative hypothesis it deserves close examination.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2014, 05:48:50 PM
In order to attempt the leading-a-phalanx hypothesis it is necessary to dismiss our sources' united assertion that Alexander was 'first' or 'foremost' as a literary dislocation. While not a barrier to the phalanx hypothesis it is noticeable that this requirement already puts more strain on our sources than the cavalry wedge hypothesis.
Quote
But at least we have support for the phalanx in the wounds the Thebans suffered. We also know that 'leading' a force, and being foremost doesn't necessarily mean standing at the front, especially when you're reading a historian who wrote three hundred years later and was seeing Alexander through the lens of 300 years of legend.
It is notable that Alexander is less prominent in the eyes of Demosthenes who was a contemporary and hadn't lapped up several centuries of Alexander worship
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2014, 06:06:23 PM
But at least we have support for the phalanx in the wounds the Thebans suffered.
I am not sure that they do: Plutarch's mention of 'sarissa' wounds need not mean they were inflicted by Macedonian infantry: I have looked at usage earlier in this thread and the term is far from conclusive.
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We also know that 'leading' a force, and being foremost doesn't necessarily mean standing at the front, especially when you're reading a historian who wrote three hundred years later and was seeing Alexander through the lens of 300 years of legend.
Diodorus does not describe Alexander as 'leading' but as 'first'; Plutarch likewise. In any event, as previously mentioned, leadership for Macedonians was not an abstract concept but a concrete station at the tip of a wedge, and historians who write 300 years after the event use sources younger then themselves. We have been through these hoops a few times already.
Quote
It is notable that Alexander is less prominent in the eyes of Demosthenes who was a contemporary and hadn't lapped up several centuries of Alexander worship
This being the Athenian orator Demosthenes, lifelong hater and bitter enemy of Philip, Alexander and all things Macedonian? ;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2014, 08:08:04 PMI am not sure that they do: Plutarch's mention of 'sarissa' wounds need not mean they were inflicted by Macedonian infantry: I have looked at usage earlier in this thread and the term is far from conclusive.
I suspect you may be the only one who thinks so.
1) The use of the term Sarissa is perhaps inconclusive, perhaps not, but at least we're arguing on the basis of a positive statement, we're not postulating the use of something in that melee that wasn't mentioned at all, like cavalry
2) We might have been through the hoops, but they still fail to convince, A youth who was not of military age is postulated to have been at the head of a postulated wedge formed from postulated cavalry.
3) Demosthenes does have the advantage of having been at the battle. He also studied the Macedonians and any bias he had was known, he wasn't from a generation which vaguely genuflected to Alexander as a god.
The bottom line seems to be, can one prove that a cavalry wedge armed with long lances is physically incapable of penetrating a hoplite phalanx armed with much shorter spears? I suspect that opposition to the idea comes from its strangeness rather than any inherent absurdity. A priori the thing could work. So far I haven't been given any compelling reason why it couldn't.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2014, 09:31:27 PM
The bottom line seems to be, can one prove that a cavalry wedge armed with long lances is physically incapable of penetrating a hoplite phalanx armed with much shorter spears? I suspect that opposition to the idea comes from its strangeness rather than any inherent absurdity. A priori the thing could work. So far I haven't been given any compelling reason why it couldn't.
It might well work in theory, but I see no evidence that it ever happened in practice. We have a period with this sort of cavalry facing infantry with shorter weapons which lasted from some point in Philips reign to Pyrrhus in Italy.
We then had even more heavily armoured cavalry using even longer lances at infantry who had even shorter spears, and they waiting until the infantry formation had been disrupted by missile fire from horsearchers or whatever.
I have no reasons why it shouldn't work, I'd just comment that it appears that in reality either it didn't work or nobody wanted to be the poor sap on the point of the wedge and try it
Jim
Arrian in his Anabasis of Alexander describes, infers, the great commander is wary of charging the dense, compact formation of Mallian spearmen, and without his own infantry present decides to ride round them. The text is interesting because it states Alexander specifically avoided close fighting with his lance armed cavalry.
It may be that the hoplites broken at the Granikos were experiencing low morale with the flight of their allies, unlike the Malli spearman, who rushed to take on Alexander who only had cavalry and light forces in the initial confrontation.
The hoplite dory spear was up to 9 feet in length - any longer and it would probably be difficult to use. The Macedonian xyston lance would have been difficult to use at 12 feet, given the centre of gravity would restrict forward projection. It would have been ideal for use against enemy cavalry, and routed forces, as I suspect the Persians were quick to discover.
Not sure what happened at Chaironeia, it is a pity we do not have more detailed information.
Robert Gargan
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2014, 08:21:23 PM
1) The use of the term Sarissa is perhaps inconclusive, perhaps not, but at least we're arguing on the basis of a positive statement, we're not postulating the use of something in that melee that wasn't mentioned at all, like cavalry
Or infantry. :)
We might remember that Arrian (I.16) specifically mentions a particular cavalry troop type:
sarissophorous hippeas, sarissa-bearing/using cavalry. These seem later to be referred to as
prodromoi, 'before-runners' or scouts*, but the very existence of the designation
sarissophorous hippeas is sufficient to refute any contention that the 'sarissa wounds' taken by the Sacred Band in Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas 'must have' come from phalangites.
*Aretes is mentioned as the commander of the
sarissophoroi at the Granicus and the
prodromoi at Gaugamela.
Quote
2) We might have been through the hoops, but they still fail to convince, A youth who was not of military age is postulated to have been at the head of a postulated wedge formed from postulated cavalry.
Yet this 'youth not of military age' (what was 'military age'? - remember that in the first winter of his campaign he released all the men who had recently married so they could go home and enjoy themselves until spring) fought his first campaign two years prior to Chaeronea.
Quote
3) Demosthenes does have the advantage of having been at the battle. He also studied the Macedonians and any bias he had was known, he wasn't from a generation which vaguely genuflected to Alexander as a god.
And the disadvantage that he combined the objectivity of a fanatic with the judgement of a politician.
Quote from: RobertGargan on April 26, 2014, 11:16:20 PM
Arrian in his Anabasis of Alexander describes, infers, the great commander is wary of charging the dense, compact formation of Mallian spearmen, and without his own infantry present decides to ride round them. The text is interesting because it states Alexander specifically avoided close fighting with his lance armed cavalry.
This is presumably Arrian VI.6.3-4, where I suspect rereading the account would clarify matters.
In VI.6.3 he surprises one town, having arrived by a difficult route, causes havoc and shuts the survivors up within their walls.
"
He took them completely by surprise, and most of them, unarmed as they were, offered no resistance and were killed. Some shut themselves up in the town, whereupon Alexander, whose infantry had not yet arrived upon the scene, blocked them up in there by throwing a cordon of mounted troops round the walls."
He cordons the town with cavalry because his infantry has not yet arrived. In essence, he is not assaulting the
town with just cavalry; he awaits his infantry for the purpose.
In VI.6.4, as soon as he is joined by his infantry, he sends Perdiccas with two cavalry hippachies on to another town:
"...
at which large numbers of the Indians had concentrated, and ordered him not to attack until he himself should arrive, but to keep his eyes open to prevent anyone from slipping out of the town and informing the other natives that he was already on the way."
The mission was essentially to keep the target isolated. Meanwhile, Alexander took the town he had surrounded, and Perdiccas
"...
reached his objective. He found the town deserted, and learning that it was not long since the inhabitants had fled, he rode with all speed in pursuit of them, his light infantry following at the best speed they could make. Some of the fugitives managed to escape into the marches; the rest were overtaken and killed."
There was no question of Macedonian cavalry being shy of attacking formed infantry: Perdiccas had been sent on a watch-and-interdict mission which he adjusted to a pursuit-and-slay mission as soon as he realised that the Indians had run rather than face his cavalry.
Quote
It may be that the hoplites broken at the Granikos were experiencing low morale with the flight of their allies, unlike the Malli spearman, who rushed to take on Alexander who only had cavalry and light forces in the initial confrontation.
As we have seen, these particular Mallian spearmen were only to keen to rush in the opposite direction - they never even saw Alexander.
Quote
The hoplite dory spear was up to 9 feet in length - any longer and it would probably be difficult to use. The Macedonian xyston lance would have been difficult to use at 12 feet, given the centre of gravity would restrict forward projection. It would have been ideal for use against enemy cavalry, and routed forces, as I suspect the Persians were quick to discover.
The centre of gravity was probably well back, judging by the grip a quarter of the way along the length shown in the Alexander Mosaic. Hellenistic designers had a habit of counterweighting things, and I suspect the xyston was one of these.
Quote
Not sure what happened at Chaironeia, it is a pity we do not have more detailed information.
Agreed - it would make this discussion unnecessary, for a start. Sadly all we have are clues which we can attempt to patch together.
1) Arrian wrote 500 years later so might have been inexact in his terms, but still, it appears that the only cavalry he thought had sarissa were scouts and did not charge frontally into Hoplites.
But still I think I'll be guided by Duncan's comments in this
2) The ephebes were aged about 17 or 18, and were not full men
3) So from now on we must disregard all history written by an ancient writer who took part in politics. Well there's goodbye to Xenophon (who somehow neglected to mention things because he was somewhat pro-Agesilaus), Polybius (who's opinions of the Aetolians were hardly without bias) and of course Caesar.
Of course Demosthenes was a politician, so was Thucydides. Of course he was biased. Most historians are, even if their bias consists of the charming belief that they rise above their own inate bias :-[
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2014, 09:31:27 PM
The bottom line seems to be, can one prove that a cavalry wedge armed with long lances is physically incapable of penetrating a hoplite phalanx armed with much shorter spears? I suspect that opposition to the idea comes from its strangeness rather than any inherent absurdity. A priori the thing could work. So far I haven't been given any compelling reason why it couldn't.
I'm not sure it is for the those who are unconvinced by a radical new theory to disprove it. It is for the proponent to make a convincing case. My opposition to the wedge idea comes from its inherent improbability. Would we expect a formed phalanx, either elite or professional, to be helpless in the face of cavalry? Inexperienced maybe, helpless no. Could horsemen, no matter how skilled, perform the feat of riding through the enemy formation at a trot picking off individual hoplites? Why are the two disputed examples given the only ones in history - one would expect such a miraculous anti-infantry tactic to at least be tried again? Why does the model of infantry combat against formed infantry (easy- breezy charge through) seem so at odds with our knowledge of other periods? Sorry, Justin, but there are many compelling reasons to doubt this theory.
And yet Leuctra shows what happens to "a formed phalanx, either elite or professional" when it is up against a tactic designed to overcome it and which it has never encountered before. Military history is full of this. Why should it be improbable for cavalry to take advantage of a phalanx's natural weakness - its file gaps - if the phalanx has no counter tactic?
A counter tactic would have been easy enough to devise: close up ranks, use lances/pikes, ground spears, etc. Even kneeling with large elongated shields set on the ground - as practised by late Roman infantry - provides an adequate block against horses. The point is that the hoplites did none of this because they were not used to being charged by cavalry. This was the first time horsemen had been used in such a shock role, and for ever afterwards it would be known that they were capable of it. Countermeasures would be devised that would render the tactic obsolete. The surprise is gone.
Penetrating a hoplite phalanx as described earlier would require a high degree of precision which supposes a level of training not present in many cavalry armies. You can't imagine barbarian horsemen or Mediaeval knights pulling it off.
So no-one was trained for it, armed for it, or had thought of it before, and it would be relatively straightforward for infantry to counter it afterwards. How many times was the Theban column used?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2014, 11:44:43 AM
A counter tactic would have been easy enough to devise: close up ranks, use lances/pikes, ground spears, etc. Even kneeling with large elongated shields set on the ground - as practised by late Roman infantry - provides an adequate block against horses. The point is that the hoplites did none of this because they were not used to being charged by cavalry.
As you say, counter tactics are easy to suggest. What evidence have we that they were not used? We have no certain evidence that Companion cavalry could defeat hoplites frontally, let alone the tactics that were used if it did happen. Granted, the ground spears tactics do seem to be absent from the hoplite playbook, but closing up was standard. As to Companions being the best trained cavalry in our period, I leave that to those with a mastery of the sources.
I've annoyed myself by not being able to find the reference quickly, but at one point Caesar writes something to the effect that formed and determined infantry are perfectly safe against cavalry. Obviously later in time, with legionaries rather than hoplites or phalangites, and the cavalry would certainly not be using sarissa, but perhaps of some bearing.
Patrick
I should have identified the passage. It is V1.8.6-7:
...But when the Indians saw he had cavalry only, they turned about and made a vigorous resistance, in number about fifty thousand. Alexander, seeing their infantry formation solid, and with his own infantry not yet on the field, kept circling round and making charges, but without coming to close quarters with the Indians...
The arrival of the Macedonian heavy infantry was enough to bring about the flight of the Mallians. My point is that the Macedonian cavalry alone were not the battle winners but it was Alexander's uncanny ability to organise the combined arms of foot and horse in mutual support on the battlefield.
Robert Gargan
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2014, 08:28:43 AMWe might remember that Arrian (I.16) specifically mentions a particular cavalry troop type: sarissophorous hippeas, sarissa-bearing/using cavalry. These seem later to be referred to as prodromoi, 'before-runners' or scouts*, but the very existence of the designation sarissophorous hippeas is sufficient to refute any contention that the 'sarissa wounds' taken by the Sacred Band in Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas 'must have' come from phalangites.
The very existence of the term sarissophoroi to identify one unit of cavalry actually implies that other Macedonian cavalry - notably, the Companions - did
not carry the sarissa. There'd be no point in distinguishing them as "sarissophoroi" if everyone else had the sarissa, it would be like calling them "The Helmet-Wearers".
So unless we think that Alexander led not the Companions but the prodromoi at Chaironeia, the term "sarissophoroi hippeis" is actually quite a telling argument against his leading a wedge of sarissa-armed cavalry.
Gaebel has quite a good discussion of Chaeronea and, more generally, Alexander's use of cavalry. The book is here: http://www.kavehfarrokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Gaebel_202_Cavalry_Operations_in_the_Ancient_Greek_World.pdf
For Chaeronea see pages 154-156; for Alexander see the chapter beginning p.159.
Interesting, Aaron. Looking at the passage on Chaeronea:
| A more fundamental question about Chaeronea is whether Alexander was commanding cavalry or infantry. In spite of the absence of clear evidence from the ancient sources, the majority of modern historians is convinced that Alexander was leading cavalry during the battle, apparently basing their judgment on his later use of the mounted arm in Asia. A satisfactory argument against cavalry, however, is provided by P. A. Rahe, who points out that "the inability of ordinary Greek cavalry to charge through the phalanx had nothing to do with any deficiency in equipment and tactics. The problem lay with the horse. A horseman can charge into a mob, but only if those in his path give way before him. If those in the crowd link arms and stand their ground, the horse will shy," |
Not really conclusive. Horses throughout history have been trained to charge groups of men who did not voluntarily give way but were shoved aside or bowled over (and I can't recall any instances of infantry linking arms as a cavalry counterploy ;))
| and goes on to day that "the effect of shock cavalry is psychological and not physical." |
Cataphracts and knights notwithstanding?
| Buckler, apparently independently, reached the same conclusion, emphasizing the fact that no ancient source mentions cavalry at the battle. |
This point has been covered already in the thread.
| Perhaps most telling is Plutarch's statement that the Sacred Band faced Macedonian sarissas, a weapon that the ancient sources never associate with the Macedonian regular cavalry. |
The existence of sarissophoroi proves at least that some Macedonian horsemen were equipped with such weapons. Patrick has argued that the Companions in their early phase were likewise equipped, switching to a somewhat shorter and more easily manageable lance later on whilst this body of cavalry retained the original weapon.
| These arguments should be sufficient to cast serious doubt on the claim that cavalry broke into the Sacred Band at Chaeronea. Indeed, precisely because this elite Theban unit of heavy infantry fought and died where it was posted in the battle line, it is more likely to have faced infantry rather than cavalry. The sarissa-bearing Macedonian phalanx would have presented a dense array of spearpoints that was essentially impenetrable, and when individuals fell wounded, others moved up from behind. The much looser formation of cavalry would have made it easier for the steadfast Thebans to parry lance thrusts as well as to injure horses but more difficult for that cavalry to inflict intense slaughter in a confined space. |
Unless they were penetrated by a wedge as described earlier.
| When cavalry kill large numbers of infantry, it is usually done against men in flight. In 326, even against Mallian infantry in India, Alexander was unwilling to bring his cavalry to close quarters until his own foot had arrived, at the sight of which the Mallians turned and fled. |
To reproduce Robert's post:
QuoteI should have identified the passage. It is V1.8.6-7:
...But when the Indians saw he had cavalry only, they turned about and made a vigorous resistance, in number about fifty thousand. Alexander, seeing their infantry formation solid, and with his own infantry not yet on the field, kept circling round and making charges, but without coming to close quarters with the Indians...
The arrival of the Macedonian heavy infantry was enough to bring about the flight of the Mallians. My point is that the Macedonian cavalry alone were not the battle winners but it was Alexander's uncanny ability to organise the combined arms of foot and horse in mutual support on the battlefield.
One needs to note that Alexander faced
fifty thousand Indians. With all the will in the world he could not hope to defeat such a force with cavalry alone, no matter how effective the wedge was (bearing in mind a wedge charge was good for one pass, perhaps two at the most). He needed to pin them in place, keep them on the defensive with cavalry activity, until his infantry arrived enabling him to finish them off.
Actually it is an interesting exercise to come up with clear examples (Say prior to 1550) of
1) Decent quality infantry who were not weakened or disordered by being caught moving or out of formation
2) Who had not first been weakened by missile fire
3) who were then ridden down and destroyed where they stood by mounted troops
Even the Swiss who were ridden through by Knights survived any number of charges which passed through them and finally withdrew.
They weren't bowled over or massacred where they stood.
Be interesting to see who comes up with how many
Jim
Aren't hoplites supposed to lock shields? So where exactly are these gaps which horses are looking at?
This is a bit of an unfair question. Cavalry and infantry both tired to maximise their chances of success in this sort of fight by using supporting troops, advantageous terrain, surprise etc. So there aren't many head-on, both sides fully prepared, no sneaky tricks examples. Here are some medieval examples.
Battle of the Standard : Scots cavalry rode through part of English line to attack baggage. Other than it wasn't the main mass of English, not clear who was attacked.
Battle of Valmont (1st day) : French cavalry rode through English line to attack baggage. Seems on this occassion they rode through main force but this was spread only one or two men deep.
Battle of Verneuil : Italian cavalry in French pay rode through part of English army to attack baggage (is there a pattern here?). Not certain who was attacked - could have been archers, could have been part of main body.
Delbruck has three examples of Swiss formations being defeated by cavalry, in 1271, 1289 and 1322. It is not clear in the examples whether the Swiss were in good order, though surprise was involved in 1289. On all three occassions, a knight rode into the formation and disrupted it but died in the process. The Swiss clearly didn't feel they were supposed to stand still to let the horseman trot through :)
Quote from: RobertGargan on April 27, 2014, 02:00:02 PM
Patrick
I should have identified the passage. It is V1.8.6-7:
...But when the Indians saw he had cavalry only, they turned about and made a vigorous resistance, in number about fifty thousand. Alexander, seeing their infantry formation solid, and with his own infantry not yet on the field, kept circling round and making charges, but without coming to close quarters with the Indians...
My apologies, let us look at the passage you intended. To put it in context, we should also look at the immediately preceding activities. The Penguin translation gives:
"
Alexander at once advanced with all his available cavalry to the point on the Hydraotes where the Mallians had massed, and gave orders for the infantry to follow. Reaching the river and observing the enemy in position on the further bank, though he still had only the cavalry with him, he plunged, without even waiting to reform after his march, into the ford. When he was half-way over, the enemy withdrew from the river bank rapidly but in good order."
Whatever the ability of Macedonian cavalry to punch through formed enemy infantry may have been, the Indians were convinced it would be good enough to make their position untenable.
Now we move on to the section you quote:
"
Alexander followed them up, and as soon as they realised that he had only mounted troops with no infantry in support, they checked theior withdrawal, turned and offered a vigorous resistance. Their force was some 50,000 strong. Alexander's infantry had not yet joined him; accordingly, as the Indians were massed in close formation [puknen]
, he held off for the time being, keeping his cavalry manoeuvring and making an occasional probe [prosbolas = attack, assault or approach]
; presently however, the Agrianes arrived on the scene together with the archers and some picked units of light infantry [psilon ... epilektous]
which were serving under his personal command, while at the same time the heavy infantry was already visible at no great distance. Faced by these simultaneous threats the Indians broke ..."
Interesting is Arrian's information that the Indians were in close formation [
puknos = closed up], and that this seems to have been the factor that decided Alexander to wait for his infantry. A closer than usual formation would prevent the Macedonian cavalry from making an effective penetration, and may well have been the reason why Alexander, who so confidently led his cavalry against the enemy line at the ford, did not attempt to do more than the occasional
prosbolas when it had formed up in the open.
Quote
The arrival of the Macedonian heavy infantry was enough to bring about the flight of the Mallians. My point is that the Macedonian cavalry alone were not the battle winners but it was Alexander's uncanny ability to organise the combined arms of foot and horse in mutual support on the battlefield.
I am in full agreement with this conclusion; the discussion in this thread is not so much whether Macedonian cavalry could go it alone against heavy infantry (although there is an element of that) but rather whether they could go it at all, even with support. Naturally, any instances of heavy infantry shying away from a frontal attack by Macedonian cavalry, such as at the ford crossing above, are indicative.
Quote from: Mark G on April 27, 2014, 07:08:33 PM
Aren't hoplites supposed to lock shields? So where exactly are these gaps which horses are looking at?
Hoplites could not 'lock' shields. Perhaps you are thinking of a Roman testudo? The gaps are between the men: as Jim pointed out earlier, if a horse hits a shield it will most likely spin the owner round, not be stopped by him.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 27, 2014, 03:42:53 PM
The very existence of the term sarissophoroi to identify one unit of cavalry actually implies that other Macedonian cavalry - notably, the Companions - did not carry the sarissa. There'd be no point in distinguishing them as "sarissophoroi" if everyone else had the sarissa, it would be like calling them "The Helmet-Wearers".
So unless we think that Alexander led not the Companions but the prodromoi at Chaironeia, the term "sarissophoroi hippeis" is actually quite a telling argument against his leading a wedge of sarissa-armed cavalry.
It is generally - and probably correctly - assumed that the Macedonian cavalry first adopted long shafted weapons under Philip II. When one considers adopting a new weapons system the first step is usually to evaluate it: the Romans under Hadrian seem to have fielded an
ala contariorum for this purpose. Lacking definite source information on this point, we can hypothesise that Philip initially formed a unit of '
sarissophoroi hippeis' to evaluate the use of the sarissa by his cavalry. His
hetairoi would have remained
hetairoi whether or not they used the sarissa, the xyston or some form of javelin.
The idea that Alexander may have led the
sarissophoroi at Chaeronea is one worth considering: he would not have led the
ile basilike as that would have been his father's right, privilege and expected station, and the
sarissophoroi may have been the next thing to an elite formation Macedon possessed. This would allow the Sacred Band to fall to Macedonian sarissas without the bulk of Macedonian cavalry needing to be armed with this weapon.
Judging by the fact that Alexander's Companions in Asia seem to have used the xyston, we might conclude that the cavalry sarissa experiment was one which was soon improved upon, the xyston being lighter, handier and less exhausting to use from horseback. The role of the
sarissophoroi as
prodromoi is interesting: I did a bit of checking, and they seem to have had a vanguard role rather than a proper scouting role (note how they lead in at the Granicus and launch the decisive charge against the Persian left at Gaugamela), making me wonder if
prodromoi signifies 'vanguard' rather than 'scouts'.
Putting Alexander at the head of the
sarissophoroi at Chaeronea would make many things fit together rather nicely; thank you for the idea.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2014, 08:25:47 PMHoplites could not 'lock' shields. Perhaps you are thinking of a Roman testudo?
http://periklisdeligiannis.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/40.jpg (http://periklisdeligiannis.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/40.jpg)
And this article (http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDMQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fxa.yimg.com%2Fkq%2Fgroups%2F15944922%2F1940190184%2Fname%2FJAH&ei=a15dU6XsNsXmOfzuAQ&usg=AFQjCNFhRMhImL63VcyW5trzYZLH4YXj2g), especially figure 2.
Whether they
did overlap shields is another question, of course. But it looks very much as if they
could.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2014, 08:25:47 PM
Hoplites could not 'lock' shields. Perhaps you are thinking of a Roman testudo? The gaps are between the men: as Jim pointed out earlier, if a horse hits a shield it will most likely spin the owner round, not be stopped by him.
Yes, but Jim also pointed out that a line of shields looks like a wall and horses and other livestock don't like charging walls if there is any other option (like going sideways and hitting the horse next to them to encourage it to get out of their way)
Jim
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 27, 2014, 08:50:03 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2014, 08:25:47 PMHoplites could not 'lock' shields. Perhaps you are thinking of a Roman testudo?
http://periklisdeligiannis.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/40.jpg (http://periklisdeligiannis.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/40.jpg)
And this article (http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDMQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fxa.yimg.com%2Fkq%2Fgroups%2F15944922%2F1940190184%2Fname%2FJAH&ei=a15dU6XsNsXmOfzuAQ&usg=AFQjCNFhRMhImL63VcyW5trzYZLH4YXj2g), especially figure 2.
Whether they did overlap shields is another question, of course. But it looks very much as if they could.
With a title like "GREEK HOPLITES IN AN ANCIENT CHINESE SIEGE"
how could I not download it!
Jim
As an exercise, it might be an idea to look at the cavalry wedge hypothesis in a little more detail. I've redrawn the figures with everything to scale. The hoplite shields are 3' across, the hoplites stand 3' apart with a little overlap on the shields. Their spears are 7' in length. The Macedonian horse are 7' long (a little smaller than a contemporary horse which is 8' long). The Companion lances are 13' long, which is in the range for a sarissa and xyston.
Putting it all together, a few things stand out:
1. the front rank hoplite will have the cavalry lance in his face before his spear can reach even the horse. In other words, he is completely at the mercy of the horseman.
2. The only immediate threat to the Companion is the hoplite he is targeting. The adjacent hoplites are too far across to target him - they will be looking at the horsemen further back.
3. The horse will hit the hoplite shields on their sides, pushing them left and right, which will swivel the hoplite (if he is not knocked down), enabling the horse to shove him aside and clear a passageway. It doesn't matter if the shields overlap.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20cav%20wedge/1.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20cav%20wedge/2.jpg)
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/new%20cav%20wedge/3.jpg)
Small problem
A trot is 8mph
In one hour the horse will cover 42240 feet
The gap between the infantry spear and the horse's nose looks to be one foot, the horse will cover that in about a hundredth of a second.
There isn't even time for the impetus of the spear to overcome the hoplite's inertia before the horse gets cut up
But actually you miss the real point
The horse is not going to go there anyway because it's a solid bronze wall with spikes
Jim
Fine graphics, as always Justin. I suspect, though, that real life was rather messier. A quick glance at the initial diagram suggests that, if the file leader moves his head but holds his spear, the xyston will pass over by it. At the contact speed, loss of aim might make the spear miss the horse, it might not. If it doesn't, the file leader's horse has had its throat ripped out. Even if our lead man misses, his second ranker is likely to hit the horse or maybe than man within a second or so - the cavalry leader won't have recovered his weapon by then and has probably dropped it and is going for his sword. The horse will probably plough on into the ranks - maybe out of the back of this thin formation, before dropping. If he is lucky, the rider will get of the horse and avoid any men behind the phalanx. He has to hope he can get back to his own lines. If the hoplites draw up any deeper than four deep (and many believe they did), he really is in trouble. The next rank will have similar threats and the danger of tripping over fallen horse and men. Rank three will ease off and try for a controlled impact, making the most of the mess the men in front made. It may work, in which case the name of the dead hero who led them in will be remembered. If it doesn't, it won't. let's hope he is no-one important :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2014, 05:49:22 PM
and that Philip also 'advanced well in front'. Such positioning is consistent with leading a cavalry wedge.
And don't forget that Philip was lame (don't ask me to quote a primary source, I am in the middle of taking final exams right now)... so it would be a bit tough for him to outrun his men on foot. Not to mention that Philip means "friend of horses" if my Greek serves me correctly ;)
Patrick, thanks for the primary source reminder, it has been 30 years since I did that and was relying upon my memory so I will make sure I dig out my Loeb translations when I write that article this summer. I do recall there being quite some discrepancies in the primary sources especially for Granicus and I believe that it was Peter Green who first postulated that Alex failed in a frontal attack against the Persian extra heavy cav atop the bank of the river and then forded unopposed some distance downstream for a more conventional set-piece (see Green's
Alexander of Macedon p.175).
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 27, 2014, 08:50:03 PM
Whether they did overlap shields is another question, of course. But it looks very much as if they could.
Indeed, though 'overlap' is not quite the same as 'lock': one could not drive a chariot over a hoplite formation however they arranged their shields, whereas this procedure seems to have been a classic test for a testudo; but let us assume they did overlap, as seems eminently likely. As each Companion comes up, he uses his xyston (or perhaps sarissa if a sarissaphorus) to knock down the hoplite ahead to his right, leaving only the one ahead to his left for his horse to brush shoulders with. The horses could be trained to go for the apparent solid line, knowing it would break up as they arrived.
Christopher Matthews' paper is amusing, arguing that Late Republican Romans could not have formed an effective shieldwall. Plutarch's
Life of Antony and
Life of Crassus are noticeably not covered in his discussion, and
Life of Antony 45.2 does seem germane to any consideration of the Chinese description:
"
However, as the Romans were descending some steep hills, the Parthians attacked them and shot at them as they slowly moved along. Then the shield-bearers wheeled about, enclosing the lighter armed troops within their ranks, while they themselves dropped on one knee and held their shields out before them. The second rank held their shields out over the heads of the first, and the next rank likewise. The resulting appearance is very like that of a roof, affords a striking spectacle, and is the most effective of protections against arrows, which glide off from it."
Back to Macedonian cavalry.
Justin, that is a very nice diagram. May we hope to see it as part of a Slingshot article?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2014, 10:17:35 PM
A quick glance at the initial diagram suggests that, if the file leader moves his head but holds his spear, the xyston will pass over by it.
But how far could or would the hoplite, whose perception is anyway rather limited and movement constrained by the helmet he is wearing, move his head? Suit up and try it. ;) I think a far more likely reaction would be to keep his head centred but to bring up his shield.
Quote
At the contact speed, loss of aim might make the spear miss the horse, it might not. If it doesn't, the file leader's horse has had its throat ripped out. Even if our lead man misses, his second ranker is likely to hit the horse or maybe than man within a second or so - the cavalry leader won't have recovered his weapon by then and has probably dropped it and is going for his sword.
I suspect this may seriously under-estimate the ability of a Companion to put his man down - and may also over-estimate the ability of hoplites to create a tactical approach in the space of about half a second when they realise these fools on horseback
are actually going to charge to contact. These counter-tactical arguments all seem to assume that the hoplites are well prepared and fully drilled to receive Companion cavalry, which seems not to have been the case historically.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2014, 10:17:35 PM
Fine graphics, as always Justin. I suspect, though, that real life was rather messier. A quick glance at the initial diagram suggests that, if the file leader moves his head but holds his spear, the xyston will pass over by it.
This presumes he has the time to move his head or that moving his head will save him from a lancepoint.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2014, 10:17:35 PMAt the contact speed, loss of aim might make the spear miss the horse, it might not. If it doesn't, the file leader's horse has had its throat ripped out.
It is highly unlikely the hoplite will be aiming for the horse, and even if he was, it is unlikely, given the speed of the whole process, that he will be able to seriously injure it. He doesn't have time to deliberately aim for a vulnerable part of the horse's anatomy. Think about it: a wedge of horse are coming at you at a trot or even a canter. What is your reaction? Get your shield up in the way of that sarissa or calmly poke the horse just as your cranium gets pierced?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2014, 10:17:35 PMEven if our lead man misses, his second ranker is likely to hit the horse or maybe than man within a second or so
If the leading horseman drives the frontmost hoplite into the man behind him with the force of his sarissa, the second hoplite will be knocked off balance and completely disorientated and unable to target the horseman. He has neither the time nor a clear line to the horseman. That quote about Alexander needing a lance and his two neighbours having
broken lances is interesting - it implies that they hit their targets with considerable force, which would certainly send them spinning.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2014, 10:17:35 PM- the cavalry leader won't have recovered his weapon by then and has probably dropped it and is going for his sword. The horse will probably plough on into the ranks - maybe out of the back of this thin formation, before dropping.
The leader is through the hoplite formation in about two seconds, maybe three. No time or need to draw his sword. The horse has not received any serious injuries.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2014, 10:17:35 PMIf he is lucky, the rider will get of the horse and avoid any men behind the phalanx. He has to hope he can get back to his own lines. If the hoplites draw up any deeper than four deep (and many believe they did), he really is in trouble.
Why? 2 seconds to get through a line 6 deep, 4 seconds for a line 12 deep (I did the diagram just 4 deep to show how penetration would work).
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2014, 10:17:35 PMThe next rank will have similar threats and the danger of tripping over fallen horse and men. Rank three will ease off and try for a controlled impact, making the most of the mess the men in front made. It may work, in which case the name of the dead hero who led them in will be remembered. If it doesn't, it won't. let's hope he is no-one important :)
He gets home to boast about it and have the bards write it up.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 27, 2014, 08:50:03 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2014, 08:25:47 PMHoplites could not 'lock' shields. Perhaps you are thinking of a Roman testudo?
http://periklisdeligiannis.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/40.jpg (http://periklisdeligiannis.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/40.jpg)
And this article (http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDMQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fxa.yimg.com%2Fkq%2Fgroups%2F15944922%2F1940190184%2Fname%2FJAH&ei=a15dU6XsNsXmOfzuAQ&usg=AFQjCNFhRMhImL63VcyW5trzYZLH4YXj2g), especially figure 2.
Whether they did overlap shields is another question, of course. But it looks very much as if they could.
Interesting article, Duncan. It seems the 'fishscale' formation would correspond to hoplites in close formation - 18" between each file rather than 3'. What is the evidence that hoplites deployed in such a formation and when did they do so?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2014, 10:47:07 AM
I suspect this may seriously under-estimate the ability of a Companion to put his man down - and may also over-estimate the ability of hoplites to create a tactical approach in the space of about half a second when they realise these fools on horseback are actually going to charge to contact. These counter-tactical arguments all seem to assume that the hoplites are well prepared and fully drilled to receive Companion cavalry, which seems not to have been the case historically.
Whereas I think you are placing the Companions on a pedestal and ignoring the skills of the hoplites :) I have proposed no specific training to face a cavalry wedge, just tried to extrapolate what trained and experienced hoplites might do in these circumstances based on how they fought. You, however, have proposed a detailed drill, practiced to the point of precision, based on no evidence, contemporary or otherwise. We both naturally feel our guesses are more plausible or realistic :)
Justin, I think we approach the problem with irreconcilable pre-conceptions. I think experienced and elite hoplites will have similar levels of military skills to Companion cavalry, for example. The holding of nerve is down to the man, rather than whether he is cavalry or infantry. A companion is as likely to miss his thrust as a hoplite if they both keep their nerve. As to hitting the horse, would a skilled warrior aim at the large unamoured target or the smaller armoured one, partly hidden behind the unarmoured target and three feet further away? It would fit with known later practice (e.g. Roman, Byzantine, Medieval) too. As to the time sequence, we probably both underestimate what happens in a very short period of time. But time applies to both equally, so, if a hoplite can't move his head, his aim can't be thrown off either. While you are confident that hoplites will spin out of the way to allow an unimpeded trot through, I think the horse will be speared before/if that happens. Short of detailed modelling software, we probably can't answer that definitively.
Could the lead man penetrate through the formation? Given the closing speed and a bit of luck, possibly. It is only four ranks deep, so even in the likely scenario that he is on a dying or falling horse, he may make it. Very little chance if it were deeper. The second rank men might be through, but are more likely to be blocked by falling bodies and the confusion of ranks. After that, it becomes too confused to call, as the subsequent ranks will try to modify their trajectory to avoid collisions but get their strike in and the hoplites will try to retain or regain their order.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2014, 10:47:07 AM
The horses could be trained to go for the apparent solid line, knowing it would break up as they arrived.
Pity nobody seems to have achieved this.
This harks back to the question I had before, I'll paraphrase it as "who has examples of people riding horseman through formed up heavy infantry from the front"
So far we've had knights who either clipped the end of a line (or some sources have rode around the line) at the Battle of the Standard, and two deep infantry ridden through
Given this Macedonian excellence, the Normans must have been total poltroons and appalling bad horsemen, unable to train their horses to ride down Anglo Saxon infantry who didn't even have spears
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2014, 12:37:29 PM
Justin, I think we approach the problem with irreconcilable pre-conceptions.
For me it's more a question of floating a hypothesis that is on the face of it plausible without being able to verify it by experimentation. We simply don't know how hoplites would react in such a situation, but everything suggests at least that the horses - if they can be trained to it and are not seriously wounded - can push their way through the phalanx via the file spaces.
As regards the two ifs, I can't see why a horse cannot be trained to push through a line of men who give way before it. Get some Macedonian footmen to form up. The horse is led between them and they part to let it through. Do it several times to get the horse used to the idea. Then mount and ride the horse through the footmen who, again, part company to let it through. After the horse is used to that, let the footmen part company more slowly, obliging the horse to push against them a little, then a little more, and so on. The horse is given the idea that a line of men is not a barrier, and can be penetrated with a little effort. Surely that is not an impossible achievement?
As regards serious wounding the horse there are several assumptions being made: a) the hoplite will be sufficiently unfazed by the approaching cavalry to think of targeting anything at all (unlikely); b) he will target the horse rather than the rider (unlikely); c) despite the speed of the horse and the fact that its head is in the way he will succeed in gravely injuring its neck (unlikely).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2014, 02:45:14 PM
As regards serious wounding the horse there are several assumptions being made: a) the hoplite will be sufficiently unfazed by the approaching cavalry to think of targeting anything at all (unlikely); b) he will target the horse rather than the rider (unlikely); despite the speed of the horse and the fact that its head is in the way he will succeed in gravely injuring its neck (unlikely).
Hence my comment on a priori assumptions. My answers would be
a) Though fazed, as an elite hoplite, his training is to stand his ground and deal aggressively with his man His training will prevail over his fear.
b) Almost certain. What do you call a cavalryman who has lost his horse? An infantryman. Unless you want to steal his horse, kill it.
c) This horse is a big target and a hit of some sort is almost inevitable. There will be an element of luck about where the hit will be but a spear in the chest, throat, mouth or in the eye would cause a serious wound. A seriously wounded horse will be hard to control and even a great horseman would be at risk of losing his seat, even if the wound to the horse isn't mortal.
As I said, we envisage the scenario, the capabilities of the protagonists and even equine psychology differently.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2014, 02:45:14 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2014, 12:37:29 PM
Justin, I think we approach the problem with irreconcilable pre-conceptions.
For me it's more a question of floating a hypothesis that is on the face of it plausible without being able to verify it by experimentation. We simply don't know how hoplites would react in such a situation, but everything suggests at least that the horses - if they can be trained to it and are not seriously wounded - can push their way through the phalanx via the file spaces.
As regards the two ifs, I can't see why a horse cannot be trained to push through a line of men who give way before it. Get some Macedonian footmen to form up. The horse is led between them and they part to let it through. Do it several times to get the horse used to the idea. Then mount and ride the horse through the footmen who, again, part company to let it through. After the horse is used to that, let the footmen part company more slowly, obliging the horse to push against them a little, then a little more, and so on. The horse is given the idea that a line of men is not a barrier, and can be penetrated with a little effort. Surely that is not an impossible achievement?
The problem is we have no evidence that after three thousand or more years of domestication that anybody has actually done this successfully
It may be they were all to unimaginative to think of it, or it might just be that they were expert horsemen who knew what could and couldn't be done.
So perhaps the professionals who knew these things decided it was an impossible achievement.
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2014, 12:00:27 PM
Whereas I think you are placing the Companions on a pedestal and ignoring the skills of the hoplites :) I have proposed no specific training to face a cavalry wedge, just tried to extrapolate what trained and experienced hoplites might do in these circumstances based on how they fought. You, however, have proposed a detailed drill, practiced to the point of precision, based on no evidence, contemporary or otherwise. We both naturally feel our guesses are more plausible or realistic :)
We can look at hoplites trying to deal with cavalry in earlier contexts: the two examples which stand out are Plataea in 479 BC (Herodotus IX.49, and IX.69) and Delium in 424 BC (Thucydides IV.96). We can also examine an incident in Xenophon's
Hellenica where Agesilaus' Spartans encounter Persian cavalry, and the result is not quite what one would expect (Hellenica IV.1.17-19). The results are not encouraging for considering what trained and experienced hoplites might do in these circumstances. An thou be interested, I shall detail these incidents.
Conversely, it is not easy to find any instance in which hoplites show to advantage against cavalry. I doubt that they would have significantly increased in capability when faced with Companions, given their general lacklustre performance against mere javelin-armed cavalry. ;)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2014, 01:18:45 PM
This harks back to the question I had before, I'll paraphrase it as "who has examples of people riding horseman through formed up heavy infantry from the front"
"
Alexander, at the head of his own troops on the right wing, rode at a gallop into the stream. Rapidity was now all in all: a swift attack would shake the enemy, and the sooner they came to grips the less damage would be done by the Persian archers. Alexander's judgement was not at fault: the Persian left collapsed the very moment he was on them - a brilliant local success for the picked troops under his personal command." - Arrian II.10
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2014, 10:47:07 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 27, 2014, 08:50:03 PM
Whether they did overlap shields is another question, of course. But it looks very much as if they could.
Indeed, though 'overlap' is not quite the same as 'lock':
In which case I have no clear idea what you mean by "lock". Though that is probably not really relevant here.
Quoteone could not drive a chariot over a hoplite formation however they arranged their shields, whereas this procedure seems to have been a classic test for a testudo;
Apparently one can roll Thracian wagons over it, though.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2014, 11:32:05 AMInteresting article, Duncan. It seems the 'fishscale' formation would correspond to hoplites in close formation - 18" between each file rather than 3'. What is the evidence that hoplites deployed in such a formation and when did they do so?
Read Christopher Matthew's edition of Ailian - I may have mentioned the point in my Slingshot review. He argues that the close one-cubit formation in the tacticians must reflect hoplite drill, because you can't overlap Macedonian shields, but you can overlap Argive aspides. I don't think I believe it, but that's the kind of thinking that informs his "Chinese siege" article.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2014, 11:12:51 AMIt is highly unlikely the hoplite will be aiming for the horse, and even if he was, it is unlikely, given the speed of the whole process, that he will be able to seriously injure it. He doesn't have time to deliberately aim for a vulnerable part of the horse's anatomy. Think about it: a wedge of horse are coming at you at a trot or even a canter. What is your reaction? Get your shield up in the way of that sarissa or calmly poke the horse just as your cranium gets pierced?
Crouch to receive cavalry, I think (http://flavianomega.tripod.com/spartan/spartanvscavalry.jpg)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2014, 07:52:23 PM
We can look at hoplites trying to deal with cavalry in earlier contexts: the two examples which stand out are Plataea in 479 BC (Herodotus IX.49, and IX.69) and Delium in 424 BC (Thucydides IV.96). We can also examine an incident in Xenophon's Hellenica where Agesilaus' Spartans encounter Persian cavalry, and the result is not quite what one would expect (Hellenica IV.1.17-19). The results are not encouraging for considering what trained and experienced hoplites might do in
In these quarters the Spartan king passed the winter, collecting supplies for the army either on the spot or by a system of forage. On one of these occasions the troops, who had grown reckless and scornful of the enemy through long immunity from attack, whilst engaged in collecting supplies were scattered over the flat country, when Pharnabazus fell upon them with two scythe-chariots and about four hundred horse. Seeing him thus advancing, the Hellenes ran together, mustering possibly seven hundred men. The Persian did not hesitate, but placing his chariots in front, supported by himself and the cavalry, he gave the command to charge. The scythe-chariots charged and scattered the compact mass, and speedily the cavalry had laid low in the dust about a hundred men, while the rest retreated hastily, under cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites, who were fortunately near.
Several accounts I've read point out that these were probably foraging 'light troops' as the survivors recovered 'under cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites.'
The obvious question is how could Agesilaus and his hoplites provide cover as Hoplites only apparently learned to cope with cavalry after Alexander?
Jim
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 28, 2014, 08:43:48 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2014, 11:12:51 AMIt is highly unlikely the hoplite will be aiming for the horse, and even if he was, it is unlikely, given the speed of the whole process, that he will be able to seriously injure it. He doesn't have time to deliberately aim for a vulnerable part of the horse's anatomy. Think about it: a wedge of horse are coming at you at a trot or even a canter. What is your reaction? Get your shield up in the way of that sarissa or calmly poke the horse just as your cranium gets pierced?
Crouch to receive cavalry, I think (http://flavianomega.tripod.com/spartan/spartanvscavalry.jpg)
That would work against javelin-armed cavalry who get a little too close. I note this extract from the accompanying article:
| The Battle of Plataea in 479BC was the last of the Persian invaders, a strong hold that needed to be taken. Many have questioned what actually went on at Plataea during the night when every Greek contingent moved. The Greek units were prompted to move because of Persian cavalry attacks, the Megarians nearly had there whole force annihilated but were reinforced by Athenian hoplites and archers who saved them and hit Masistius (Persian Cavalry leader) which brought him to the ground and subsequently his death. Greek cavalry was almost none existent so hoplites always feared a cavalry unit could quickly flank them and attack there exposed lines. As the picture to the right shows, Persian cavalry was not refined enough to take on a prepared hoplite who had a far longer spear unlike the cavalry man who had an exhaustible weapon in the form of a javelin and no stirrups to hang on to the horse, meaning charges were impossible. |
And indeed it would work against lancer cavalry as well. Blocking the lance with your shield while aiming your own spear at the horse would be quite natural.
Incidentally there are two representations of hoplites confronting cavalry at http://www.sikyon.com/athens/ahist_eg02.html (http://www.sikyon.com/athens/ahist_eg02.html), one Persian seal and one Greek vase. Both use a similar underarm thrust.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 28, 2014, 10:16:08 PM
And indeed it would work against lancer cavalry as well. Blocking the lance with your shield while aiming your own spear at the horse would be quite natural.
Incidentally there are two representations of hoplites confronting cavalry at http://www.sikyon.com/athens/ahist_eg02.html (http://www.sikyon.com/athens/ahist_eg02.html), one Persian seal and one Greek vase. Both use a similar underarm thrust.
The hoplite in these three cases seems to be holding his shield away from his body, i.e. partially opening his shield guard in order to give his spear free play. If I'm not mistaken this not his regular disposition in a phalanx, where he keeps his shield close in front of his body and uses his spear overarm. I suspect that holding a 3' wide shield against the body prevents easy use of a spear underarm, but this needs verification.
If the hoplite is being charged by cavalry whose lances outreach his spear, it would be natural for him to close his shield guard and raise the shield to protect his face. Presuming that his spear - held overarm - is pointed at a vulnerable spot on the horse, what does the Companion do? Simple - he targets the shield. In my reconstruction diagram the cavalry lance will reach the hoplite whilst the latter's spearpoint is still a foot or more away from the front of the horse's head, i.e. several feet from the horse's neck. The lance will hit the shield, knocking the hoplite backwards and sending his spear all over the place. The broken lances mentioned earlier imply that the Companion could hit his target with considerable force, enough to break a thick shaft.
The hoplite, rammed against the man behind him, would likewise send him spinning. With the two front ranks neutralised the Companion is safe - the other ranks don't even have their spears at the ready and will have no time to do so.
For a javelin-armed cavalryman the situation is very different. The only way he can reach the hoplite is by ramming him with his horse, and the hoplite is precisely ready for that.
These aren't wooden dolls.
The Hoplon isn't a flat plank shield, it's curved and if your companion (who somehow has magicked an unwilling horse into charging a wall) doesn't hit it absolutely square (or even if he does and the hoplite slightly shifts his arm) then the spear will skid across the surface and in the 100th of a second he has before his horse comes in range of the spear, there's damn all he can do about it.
Jim
QuoteIn which case I have no clear idea what you mean by "lock".
nor I,
overlapping shields to me are locked. dismissing that for pedantic reasons misses the point, which is - they do not present any gaps, which has been the basis of much of the 'yes they can' argument lately.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 28, 2014, 08:32:30 PM
In which case I have no clear idea what you mean by "lock". Though that is probably not really relevant here.
True; it was our Mr Grindlay's usage. ;)
Quote
Quoteone could not drive a chariot over a hoplite formation however they arranged their shields, whereas this procedure seems to have been a classic test for a testudo;
Apparently one can roll Thracian wagons over it, though.
An observation which is both accurate and misleading:
" ...
any sections ... which were caught in the narrow pass were to form in the closest possible order, such men as were able lying prone on the ground with shields locked together [sugkleisai es akribes tas aspidas = put their shields together precisely]
above their bodies, so as to give the heavy wagons, as they careered down the hill, a chance to bounce over them without doing any harm ... the carts passed harmlessly over the shields [huper tōn aspidōn epikulistheisai oliga eblapsan = over the shields they rolled with only slight effect]." - Arrian I.1.9-10
This impromptu self-protection system worked because the phalangites were
lying down.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2014, 09:18:59 PM
Several accounts I've read point out that these were probably foraging 'light troops' as the survivors recovered 'under cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites.'
Xenophon simply says 'stratiotes' (soldiers).
Quote
The obvious question is how could Agesilaus and his hoplites provide cover as Hoplites only apparently learned to cope with cavalry after Alexander?
My basic point was that even before Philip, Alexander and long thrusting cavalry armament hoplites had problems coping with cavalry. This does not mean they were totally vulnerable in all circumstances, rather that they were surprisingly vulnerable in certain circumstances.
Hoplites seem never to have learned to really cope with cavalry (one notes how as a troop type they faded out after Alexander, though not necessarily for this reason), but javelin-armed cavalry had problems in frontal close fighting against hoplites which is why Philip of Macedon introduced the sarissa and xyston. Duncan's pics of hoplites receiving javelin cavalry are interesting as they show two things: 1) how the long hoplite spear confers a reach advantage and 2) how natural a target the head is for a horseman.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 28, 2014, 10:16:08 PM
And indeed it would work against lancer cavalry as well. Blocking the lance with your shield while aiming your own spear at the horse would be quite natural.
The pictures Duncan references are interesting.
Observe the Spartan (http://flavianomega.tripod.com/spartan/spartanvscavalry.jpg) receiving cavalry. Rather than impale the horse, he is definitely aiming at the rider. His spear seems to be held well behind the point of balance, which would do nothing for the point's controllability (unless that butt spike is a lot heavier than it looks). Up against a xyston-armed cavalryman he would currently be on the ground nursing a faceful of lance-point or lying dazed by a whack from the rim of his interposed shield.
Now consider the 'Persian rider (http://www.sikyon.com/athens/images/persian_rider.jpg)'. Note how the face is a natural target for the horseman and once again the infantryman's spear point is aimed at the rider, not the horse. Instead of aiming 'quite naturally' for the horse he puts his life on the line trying to hit the rider.
Finally we have the vase image (http://www.sikyon.com/athens/images/vase01a.jpg). Once again the infantryman's spear seems to be going past the horse in the general direction of the rider - details are not easy to make out at this size, but the horse does not seem to have been discommoded. The rider is, intriguingly, holding a weapon with a butt-spike which looks longer than the usual Persian palta (short throwing-spear), and both he and his mount are remarkably small, so that his eye level is only just above that of the infantryman.
Put together, these three pictures suggest that individual infantrymen who may or may not have been in formation used their spear held underarm to try and deal with the rider, but not the horse.
If this is representative of what the Sacred Band may have done at Chaeronea, or other hoplites elsewhere, then I may have to revise my thinking that Greek hoplites lacked any form of anti-cavalry drill, and instead point out that the anti-cavalry posture shown would have been ineffective against xyston- or sarissa-armed Macedonians on account of the Macedonians' greater reach combined with superior training. The hoplites would end up just as dead: having a drill that does not work is almost worse than having no drill at all.
My respects to Duncan for finding those pictures. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2014, 10:30:25 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2014, 09:18:59 PM
Several accounts I've read point out that these were probably foraging 'light troops' as the survivors recovered 'under cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites.'
Xenophon simply says 'stratiotes' (soldiers).
Quote
The obvious question is how could Agesilaus and his hoplites provide cover as Hoplites only apparently learned to cope with cavalry after Alexander?
My basic point was that even before Philip, Alexander and long thrusting cavalry armament hoplites had problems coping with cavalry. This does not mean they were totally vulnerable in all circumstances, rather that they were surprisingly vulnerable in certain circumstances.
Hoplites seem never to have learned to really cope with cavalry (one notes how as a troop type they faded out after Alexander, though not necessarily for this reason), but javelin-armed cavalry had problems in frontal close fighting against hoplites which is why Philip of Macedon introduced the sarissa and xyston. Duncan's pics of hoplites receiving javelin cavalry are interesting as they show two things: 1) how the long hoplite spear confers a reach advantage and 2) how natural a target the head is for a horseman.
They may indeed be called soldiers, but hoplites are mentioned separately. It the first group were hoplites then surely the others would be 'the other hoplites' or somesuch. Certainly you cannot assume the troops broken by the chariots were hoplites. Also it's hardly a good example of the ability of cavalry to charge infantry when they have to follow scythed chariots in
As for the surprising vulnerability, examples of cavalry on their own breaking hoplites would be nice. So far the only one we have is Chaeronea where there is no evidence that it was cavalry that did the damage
As for being a troop type that faded out, they seem to have outlived the shieldless companion style cavalryman.
As for Philip of Macedon introducing the xyston so his cavalry could fight hoplites, given that the only example of cavalry fighting hoplites on their own is the one that you are using Philip issuing the xyston to support, we have a circular argument here.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2014, 06:48:59 AMThe hoplite in these three cases seems to be holding his shield away from his body, i.e. partially opening his shield guard in order to give his spear free play. If I'm not mistaken this not his regular disposition in a phalanx, where he keeps his shield close in front of his body and uses his spear overarm. I suspect that holding a 3' wide shield against the body prevents easy use of a spear underarm, but this needs verification.
Shall I just say that this is a somewhat controversial question, and leave it at that? :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2014, 10:30:25 AMObserve the Spartan (http://flavianomega.tripod.com/spartan/spartanvscavalry.jpg) receiving cavalry. Rather than impale the horse, he is definitely aiming at the rider.
Or else he was aimning at the horse, but the animal has got past the point.
QuoteHis spear seems to be held well behind the point of balance, which would do nothing for the point's controllability (unless that butt spike is a lot heavier than it looks).
Hard to see the butt spike. But I suspect that the spear was always held at the point of balance, which depending on the weight of the spike and any taper in the shaft might be well back of the mid-point. We needn't suspect the artist of perfect geometry, especially if the intention was to show the spearpoint threatening the rider.
QuoteUp against a xyston-armed cavalryman he would currently be on the ground nursing a faceful of lance-point or lying dazed by a whack from the rim of his interposed shield.
Up against a xyston-armed cavalryman the point of the xyston would not hit the angled shield squarely, and so would probably skid off the polished bronze facing.
QuoteNow consider the 'Persian rider (http://www.sikyon.com/athens/images/persian_rider.jpg)'. Note how the face is a natural target for the horseman and once again the infantryman's spear point is aimed at the rider, not the horse. Instead of aiming 'quite naturally' for the horse he puts his life on the line trying to hit the rider.
Bear in mind that this representation, unlike the others, is Persian and hence "on the side of" the horseman, and may, again unlike the others, be intended to show an unsuccessful hoplite.
QuoteFinally we have the vase image (http://www.sikyon.com/athens/images/vase01a.jpg). Once again the infantryman's spear seems to be going past the horse in the general direction of the rider - details are not easy to make out at this size, but the horse does not seem to have been discommoded.
The hoplite's spear seem to me to be going into the horsde's neck, but I agree that it is almost impossible to be sure.
QuoteThe rider is, intriguingly, holding a weapon with a butt-spike which looks longer than the usual Persian palta (short throwing-spear), and both he and his mount are remarkably small, so that his eye level is only just above that of the infantryman.
I suspect she (for I believe her to be an Amazon) is carrying the sort of spear "like a vine-pole" that Xenophon so disapproves of: a thrusting-weapon with butt-spike, but somewhat shorter and much flimsier than the xyston.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2014, 10:30:25 AM
If this is representative of what the Sacred Band may have done at Chaeronea, or other hoplites elsewhere, then I may have to revise my thinking that Greek hoplites lacked any form of anti-cavalry drill, and instead point out that the anti-cavalry posture shown would have been ineffective against xyston- or sarissa-armed Macedonians on account of the Macedonians' greater reach combined with superior training. The hoplites would end up just as dead: having a drill that does not work is almost worse than having no drill at all.
If what these hoplites are doing represents an accurate example of what hoplites in formation would do, then I withdraw my assertion that the obvious thing to aim at is the horse. However, as Alexander lost his horse fighting hoplites, not everyone was paying attention on the drill field :) It does, I think, nail the idea that hoplites will be so surprised being attacked by cavalry that they will stand still and allow themselves to be killed.
if we look at the images, we have a single figure represented. It is, I believe, a common classical convention to show individual duelling more than group combat. So what other formation members are doing is unclear. The stooping thrust would make it hard to overlap shields. However, we don't know how many ranks they would be in (four to eight? - Arrian fighting the Alans and the Byzantine manuals suggest the higher end of this range, but medieval infantry might fight cavalry in as few as two or three ranks).
If they are following later (republican Roman and later) practice, the first few ranks crouch and later ranks support by fighting over them - in the Roman case perhaps by throwing pila , Byzantines throwing or thrusting their longer weapons. This would be different again to Justin's suggestion that only the first two ranks used weapons.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2014, 07:40:44 AM
These aren't wooden dolls.
The Hoplon isn't a flat plank shield, it's curved and if your companion (who somehow has magicked an unwilling horse into charging a wall) doesn't hit it absolutely square (or even if he does and the hoplite slightly shifts his arm) then the spear will skid across the surface and in the 100th of a second he has before his horse comes in range of the spear, there's damn all he can do about it.
Jim
The hoplite shield was substantially made of wood, about 2cm thick in the centre thinning out to about 1cm thick at the edge, and covered (sometimes) with a thin layer of beaten bronze on its outer face. A lancepoint hitting it at speed would in all likelihood penetrate the bronze and wedge itself into the wood (or punch right through) rather than 'skid across the surface'.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 29, 2014, 01:40:57 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2014, 10:30:25 AMObserve the Spartan (http://flavianomega.tripod.com/spartan/spartanvscavalry.jpg) receiving cavalry. Rather than impale the horse, he is definitely aiming at the rider.
Or else he was aiming at the horse, but the animal has got past the point.
If he was, this suggests that the horse would not be quite so easy a target as has been suggested. Granted we may need to allow for artistic approximations and imperfections, but I would have thought that if any of our sample hoplites were trying to put spearpoints in horses then at least one of the artists should show what happens when such an attempt is successful.
Out of interest, what would happen if the attempt were successful? Would we have
equus mortuus travelling 30 yards with a hoplite attached? Or what would happen to the momentum of the now-defunct animal? This may have been a consideration in the apparent tendency of hoplites to go for the rider.
Quote
Up against a xyston-armed cavalryman the point of the xyston would not hit the angled shield squarely, and so would probably skid off the polished bronze facing.
Not so sure about this, given that a steel point with a good deal of force and plenty of inertia would be pushing the shield rim against an occupied helmet: I think the force would transmit from point to shield rim and shield rim to shield user, and as the latter went down
then the point would slide out of the indentation. Not sure how much a xyston weighed but 10 lbs seems a possible estimate (the Wikipedia sarissa (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Sarissa) entry puts a 15' sarissa at 12 lbs and an 18' sarissa at 14.5 lbs) and this would not be deflected as easily as, say, an arrow - it would be more like a ten-pound object hitting at speed with a fair bit of force behind it.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2014, 12:06:33 PM
They may indeed be called soldiers, but hoplites are mentioned separately. It the first group were hoplites then surely the others would be 'the other hoplites' or somesuch. Certainly you cannot assume the troops broken by the chariots were hoplites. Also it's hardly a good example of the ability of cavalry to charge infantry when they have to follow scythed chariots in
A fair observation. I shall give you that one.
Quote
As for the surprising vulnerability, examples of cavalry on their own breaking hoplites would be nice. So far the only one we have is Chaeronea where there is no evidence that it was cavalry that did the damage
Not true: check out Herodotus IX.69 Thucydides IV.96. If they are not handy, ask me to quote.
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As for being a troop type that faded out, they seem to have outlived the shieldless companion style cavalryman.
Actually they seem to have died out rather quickly and been replaced by shielded cavalry on the Italian model.
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As for Philip of Macedon introducing the xyston so his cavalry could fight hoplites, given that the only example of cavalry fighting hoplites on their own is the one that you are using Philip issuing the xyston to support, we have a circular argument here.
Please
read my earlier posts. :) Macedonian cavalry definitely fought hoplites at the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, and from all the indications seems to have fought them at Chaeronea.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2014, 08:12:46 PMQuote
Up against a xyston-armed cavalryman the point of the xyston would not hit the angled shield squarely, and so would probably skid off the polished bronze facing.
Not so sure about this, given that a steel point with a good deal of force and plenty of inertia would be pushing the shield rim against an occupied helmet: I think the force would transmit from point to shield rim and shield rim to shield user, and as the latter went down then the point would slide out of the indentation.
Sorry, when did you establish that the hoplite would rest his shield against his head if he raised it? None of the illustrations are so doing.
QuotePlease read my earlier posts. :) Macedonian cavalry definitely fought hoplites at the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, and from all the indications seems to have fought them at Chaeronea.
Please
read Jim's post. He said "the only example of cavalry fighting hoplites
on their own". That rules out the combined assault at Granicus.
Cavalry definitely did fight hoplites at the Granicus, though not alone; fought somebody at Issos, but we don't know how the somebodies were equipped; may have fought hoplites at Gaugamela, but no source says so; and Chaironeia is still not an area of general agreement.
So basically, Jim's right.
Incidentally, what do we make of the Bursa relief on p.22 of Sekunda's Osprey Army of Alexander? Cavalry in Boiotian helmets with what looks like Persian saddle-cloths attacking infantry with hoplite shields: Sekunda suggests it "must date to the reign of Alexander or shortly thereafter". The hoplite shield is not raised as prominently as in other artworks.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2014, 07:47:48 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2014, 07:40:44 AM
These aren't wooden dolls.
The Hoplon isn't a flat plank shield, it's curved and if your companion (who somehow has magicked an unwilling horse into charging a wall) doesn't hit it absolutely square (or even if he does and the hoplite slightly shifts his arm) then the spear will skid across the surface and in the 100th of a second he has before his horse comes in range of the spear, there's damn all he can do about it.
Jim
The hoplite shield was substantially made of wood, about 2cm thick in the centre thinning out to about 1cm thick at the edge, and covered (sometimes) with a thin layer of beaten bronze on its outer face. A lancepoint hitting it at speed would in all likelihood penetrate the bronze and wedge itself into the wood (or punch right through) rather than 'skid across the surface'.
which in the 100th of a second between your spear hitting his shield and his spear hitting your horse in the face, is not a problem. You've got a panicking blinded horse and he's got a turned round a bit.
But actually you're spared this because your horse is too smart to go here anyway
Jim
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 29, 2014, 09:26:35 PM
So basically, Jim's right.
The law of averages indicates that in an infinite universe this must happen occasionally but I don't try to make a habit of it ;-)
Jim
My overall impression is that we have all pushed our lines of argumentation about as far as they can go. What we really need now are some mounted and hoplite reenactors weary of this vale of tears to confirm who is right.
(or perhaps Patrick and I could hop on horses whilst everyone else grabs an aspis? ;))
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 29, 2014, 09:26:35 PM
Sorry, when did you establish that the hoplite would rest his shield against his head if he raised it? None of the illustrations are so doing.
Again accurately observed, but misleading. If the hoplite interposes his shield between his head and an oncoming xyston point, much as he might do against a flying javelin, he will rapidly discover the difference as the impact force behind the xyston smashes his shield rim against his face or forehead. This is basic mechanics: we are dealing with a
moving cavalryman ...
Quote
QuotePlease read my earlier posts. :) Macedonian cavalry definitely fought hoplites at the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, and from all the indications seems to have fought them at Chaeronea.
Please read Jim's post. He said "the only example of cavalry fighting hoplites on their own". That rules out the combined assault at Granicus.
Strictly speaking, the only example I have found of cavalry fighting hoplites 'on their own' (assuming we take this to mean just cavalry on one side and just hoplites on the other with nobody else in sight) is in Herodotus IX.69. As the point of this thread is to evaluate whether Macedonian cavalry could have defeated hoplites in a frontal attack, noting that it was customary for Companions to work in close association with missile troops, all we can establish from instances of cavalry fighting hoplites 'on their own' is that in Herodotus IX.69 the hoplites definitely came off worse.
"
However, when the Megarians and Philasians had come near the enemy, the Theban horsemen (whose captain was Asopodorus son of Timander) caught sight of them approaching in haste and disorder, and rode at them; in this attack they trampled six hundred of them, and pursued and drove the rest to Cithaeron." -
op cit.
We note that the hoplites were 'approaching in haste and disorder', but were they so hopelessly disarrayed that they could not have formed up in the presence of cavalry? For what it it worth, this incident fulfils the stated but barren objective of a case in which hoplites alone are defeated by cavalry alone.
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Cavalry definitely did fight hoplites at the Granicus, though not alone; fought somebody at Issos, but we don't know how the somebodies were equipped; may have fought hoplites at Gaugamela, but no source says so; and Chaironeia is still not an area of general agreement.
They fought hoplites at Issus when Alex turned from his pursuit of Darius to help his phalanx; they had to fight hoplites at Gaugamela because in order to get at Darius from the flank of his left centre they had to penetrate the hoplites on the left of his bodyguard. The fact that they also went through the Kardakes at Issus like a knife through butter does not change the fact that even if we leave aside Chaeronea the Companions fought against hoplites in open battle more often than against any other single troop type during Alexander's military career as far as Babylon. At the Granicus, they fought 'standard' Persian cavalry - and hoplites. At Issus, they fought Kardakes, Darius' bodyguard - and hoplites. At Gaugamela, they fought hoplites and Darius' bodyguard.
What we can say is that in each battle Alexander led Companions into the attack against hoplites with perfect equanimity and successful results. The Granicus is the only case where we can be certain the attack was fully frontal, as at Issus and Gaugamela his position gave him a flank to attack, and hoplites facing to flank would lack their customary file reassurance and support. Also at Issus the hoplites were definitely engaged to their front by the phalanx and at Gaugamela they may have been. Since the evidence on the subject of Companions and hoplites is perforce circumstantial, we have to see which way the circumstantial evidence points, and I have seen nothing about it that would point away from Alexander leading a wedge of sarissa- or xyston-equipped cavalry through the Sacred Band at Chaeronea.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2014, 10:27:29 PM
My overall impression is that we have all pushed our lines of argumentation about as far as they can go.
Probably true, but we have left unexplored the alternative hypothesis of Alexander leading infantry against the Sacred Band at Chaeronea, which I feel does need to be evaluated against the hints from our sources. In essence, we have two candidates for Alexander's attack on the Sacred Band: lance-armed cavalry in wedge or pike-armed infantry in line. So which is it, and why?
I suggest that anyone who wishes to maintain that Alexander led infantry against the sacred Band at Chaeronea explain how this would accord with the circumstantial information in our sources.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 30, 2014, 09:32:04 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 29, 2014, 09:26:35 PM
Sorry, when did you establish that the hoplite would rest his shield against his head if he raised it? None of the illustrations are so doing.
Again accurately observed, but misleading. If the hoplite interposes his shield between his head and an oncoming xyston point, much as he might do against a flying javelin, he will rapidly discover the difference as the impact force behind the xyston smashes his shield rim against his face or forehead. This is basic mechanics: we are dealing with a moving cavalryman ...
Or the xyston breaks, or the point glances off the curved surface of the shield, or the shock forces the shield-arm down and to the side, or the horse shies away from the impact at the last minute... driving the shield against the head is one of several possible outcomes, and I'm not sure it's the most likely.
QuoteProbably true, but we have left unexplored the alternative hypothesis of Alexander leading infantry against the Sacred Band at Chaeronea, which I feel does need to be evaluated against the hints from our sources. In essence, we have two candidates for Alexander's attack on the Sacred Band: lance-armed cavalry in wedge or pike-armed infantry in line. So which is it, and why?
I suggest that anyone who wishes to maintain that Alexander led infantry against the sacred Band at Chaeronea explain how this would accord with the circumstantial information in our sources.
Actually I think we have at lest three scenarios to be considered:
1. Alexander leads sarissa-armed cavalry against the front of the Sacred Band
2. Alexander leads sarissa-armed infantry against the front of the Sacred Band
3. Sarissa-armed infantry engage the front of the Sacred Band while Alexander's charge is elsewhere - the Hammond scenario of the "charge into a gap" into the Theban flank which is probably still the most widely-retailed reconstruction
My own view is, still, that the sarisai mentioned at Chaironeia are overwhelmingly more likely to be infantry than cavalry weapons, and therefore either 2 or 3 fits the evidence far better than 1. I'm finding Patrick's arguments and Justin's reconstructions very interesting as an exploration of how Macedonian cavalry might have intended to tackle hoplites - the tactics they would have used in the charge at Granicus that got Alexander's horse killed under him, for instance - but much less convincing as an account of what might have happened at Chaironeia.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 30, 2014, 09:59:35 AM
Or the xyston breaks, or the point glances off the curved surface of the shield, or the shock forces the shield-arm down and to the side, or the horse shies away from the impact at the last minute... driving the shield against the head is one of several possible outcomes, and I'm not sure it's the most likely.
Whilst we're on the subject.... :D
1. The hoplite raises his shield to protect his head a second or two before the Companion charges home.
2. The Companion has time to adjust his aim. He targets the approximate centre of shield which is now roughly level with the base of the hoplite's neck.
3. The speed and force of the lance thrust do not leave the lancepoint the opportunity of sliding off the shield. It penetrates it to a greater or lesser degree (pretty much as the cataphract's kontos later did).
4. Either the lancepoint passes right through the shield, knocking the infantryman back, or it doesn't, slamming the shield against the infantryman and knocking him back. Both ways, he finds himself flat on his back.
5. The hoplite's spear, which was poised to strike the horse, goes wildly off aim as the hoplite tumbles. In other words, the cavalry lance sufficiently outreaches the hoplite spear to deny it any chance of getting near the horse. Add another foot to the lances in my diagrams, or chop the hoplite spears by a foot, or both.
6. As he is bowled backwards, the hoplite knocks over the man behind him. That takes out the two ranks whose spears were at the ready, leaving the Companion relatively safe as he passes through the rest of the phalanx.
Justin, you're doing it again. Time in this case is linear - it doesn't move at different pace for different people at different times. The hoplite moving his shield to deflect the xyston is happening at the same time as the cavalryman is reacting and trying to move his spear. The collision of the hoplite spear with the horse happens a fraction of a second afterwards, then the second hoplite's spear hits the horse, then the cavalryman hits the first hoplite (who may by this point be falling backwards into the second hoplite). All this happens in less than a second.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 30, 2014, 02:53:30 PM
Justin, you're doing it again. Time in this case is linear - it doesn't move at different pace for different people at different times.
Funnily enough, both in my experience and in that of several people's war memoirs, it does. I do not try to explain it, just to note that it actually does happen.
Quote
The hoplite moving his shield to deflect the xyston is happening at the same time as the cavalryman is reacting and trying to move his spear. The collision of the hoplite spear with the horse happens a fraction of a second afterwards, then the second hoplite's spear hits the horse, then the cavalryman hits the first hoplite (who may by this point be falling backwards into the second hoplite). All this happens in less than a second.
I think we do need to be careful about assuming that a Greek hoplite would aim for the horse - see the artistic examples Duncan produced. It is tempting to read later anti-cavalry tactics into the hoplite's repertoire, but perhaps not appropriate.
What may also be relevant is that the Companion would be trained for this situation whereas a trained hoplite would be using an anti-cavalry drill based on traditional javelin-armed cavalry, at least at Chaeronea.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 30, 2014, 09:59:35 AM
Actually I think we have at lest three scenarios to be considered:
1. Alexander leads sarissa-armed cavalry against the front of the Sacred Band
2. Alexander leads sarissa-armed infantry against the front of the Sacred Band
3. Sarissa-armed infantry engage the front of the Sacred Band while Alexander's charge is elsewhere - the Hammond scenario of the "charge into a gap" into the Theban flank which is probably still the most widely-retailed reconstruction
Fair enough. We may as well begin by summarising the meagre source evidence.
Exhibit 1: Plutarch's Alexander.
He was also present at Chaeroneia and took part in the battle against the Greeks, and he is said to have been the first to break the ranks of the Sacred Band of the Thebans. - Plutarch, Alexander 9.2
(
en de Khairōneia tēs pros tous ' Hellēnas makhēs parōn meteskhe, kai legetai prōtos enseisai tō hierō lokhō tōn Thēbaiōn)
Exhibit 2: Plutarch's Pelopidas.
It is said, moreover, that the band was never beaten, until the battle of Chaeroneia; and when, after the battle, Philip was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the long spears [tr. adds: of his phalanx]
, with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed, and on learning that this was the band of lovers and beloved, burst into tears and said: 'Perish miserably they who think that these men did or suffered aught disgraceful.' - Plutarch, Pelopidas 18.5
(
legetai de diameinai mekhri tēs en Khairōneia makhēs aēttēton: hōs de meta tēn makhēn ephorōn tous nekrous ho Philippos estē kata touto to khōrion en hō sunetugkhane keisthai tous triakosious, enantious apēntēkotas tais sarisais hapantas en tois hoplois kai met' allēlōn anamemigmenous, thaumasanta kai puthomenon hōs ho tōn erastōn kai tōn erōmenōn houtos eiē lokhos, dakrusai kai eipein 'apolointo kakōs hoi toutous ti poiein ē paskhein aiskhron huponoountes.')
Exhibit 3: Diodorus' History
Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both.
[3] Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. [4] As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory. - Diodorus XVI.86.2-4
(
genomenēs de makhēs karteras epi polun khronon kai pollōn piptontōn par' amphoterois mekhri men tinos ho agōn amphidoxoumenas eikhe tas elpidas tēs nikēs.
3 meta de tauta tou Alexandrou philotimoumenou tō patri tēn idian andragathian endeixasthai kai philotimias huperbolēn ouk apoleipontos, homoiōs de kai pollōn autō sunagōnizomenōn andrōn agathōn prōtos to sunekhes tēs tōn polemiōn taxeōs errēxe kai pollous katabalōn kateponei tous kath' hauton tetagmenous. 4 to d' auto kai tōn parastatōn autō poiēsantōn to sunekhes aiei tēs taxeōs parerrēgnuto. pollōn de sōreuomenōn nekrōn hoi peri ton Alexandron prōtoi biasamenoi tous kath' hautous etrepsanto. meta de tauta kai ho basileus autos prokinduneuōn kai tēs nikēs tēn epigraphēn oud' autō parakhōrōn Alexandrō to men prōton exeōse tē bia tous antitetagmenous, epeita de kai pheugein sunanagkasas aitios egeneto tēs nikēs.)
Diodorus' "hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides" appears regularly in his accounts of battles: one is not sure how far to take it seriously, as he uses it in instances (e.g. when Alexander fights Darius' bodyguard at Issus) when Arrian gives the impression of an action over quite swiftly. If it is a material observation as opposed to a rhetorical flourish, then it may be noteworthy the Alexander's and Philip's contributions do not take place until
after this "hotly contested for a long time" phase, suggesting that whatever they were leading from the front may not have been in action at the outset of the battle.
We may note that while the translator is quite definite about "rupturing the solid front of the enemy line." Diodorus' Greek says: "to sunekhes tēs tōn polemiōn taxeōs errēxe," which strictly means rupturing the
continuous or
conjoined enemy line. I think the translator has the correct sense: if so, then Alexander was attacking the front of the Theban formation, not its side.
There is more to consider, perhaps in a later post. Effective analysis should also consider what we know of Macedonian tactics and techniques from other engagements, some of which we might validly read back into the battle at Chaeronea (and some perhaps not?), and an assessment of both armies' composition and likely deployment, which would have the advantage of indicating whether either side could noticeably outflank the other and also which army had a preponderance in cavalry and so might have some free to act against enemy infantry.
Then we might be able to compare source statements with reconstructions involving Alexander leading an infantry attack, a cavalry attack and a frontal infantry attack with a cavalry flank attack.
I suspect however that if we are going to do this we should do so in a different thread, as the aim of this one was to evaluate whether Macedonian cavalry could operate with success against close order infantry, and it seems to the main proponents in this thread that we have gone about as far as we can on this particular subject.
Quote from: PatrickWe may as well begin by summarising the meagre source evidence.
Oh, let's not. We've done all this before.
I am just reminded (while reading the new Arrian translation) that the Macedonian cavalry are described as fighting with javelins against the Thracians in 335 (I.2.6). I think that the first description of any sort of long cavalry lance is at the Graneikos the next year. Clearly, then, lances were first issued in the winter of 335-4 in preparation for the invasion of Asia, so Alexander cannot have led lance-armed cavalry during his father's reign.
:) , I think, although I am not sure that this theory can be disproved.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 30, 2014, 08:31:36 PM
I am just reminded (while reading the new Arrian translation) that the Macedonian cavalry are described as fighting with javelins against the Thracians in 335 (I.2.6). I think that the first description of any sort of long cavalry lance is at the Graneikos the next year. Clearly, then, lances were first issued in the winter of 335-4 in preparation for the invasion of Asia, so Alexander cannot have led lance-armed cavalry during his father's reign.
:) , I think, although I am not sure that this theory can be disproved.
I am. :) The Greek for Arrian I.2.6 reads:
"
tēn de phalagga tōn pezōn kai tēn allēn hippon pro tēs phalaggos parateinas kata mesous epēge. kai este men akrobolismos par' hekaterōn ēn, hoi Triballoi ou meion eikhon: hōs de hē te phalagx puknē eneballen es autous errōmenōs kai hoi hippeis ouk akontismō eti, all' autois tois hippois ōthountes allē kai allē prosepipton, tote dē etrapēsan dia tou napous eis ton potamon."
The Penguin translator rendered the bold section as:
"
and the cavalry, instead of shooting at them, had actually begun to ride them down in a fierce assault all over the field," which suggests the Thracians expected cavalry to shoot at them but were surprised when it rode them down in melee instead.
Ousontes (from
otheo), translated here as 'rode down', seems (in the Perseus lexicon entry (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=w%29qou%3Dntes&la=greek&can=w%29qou%3Dntes0&prior=i%28/ppois&d=Perseus:text:2008.01.0530:book=1:chapter=2:section=6&i=1#lexicon)) to have the sense of pushing or thrusting, which - if this was Arrian's actual intended meaning - would seem to be good evidence for the Macedonian cavalry being lance-armed at this juncture.
What do you make of this?
Here's an alternative reading.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 30, 2014, 06:15:23 PM
Exhibit 1: Plutarch's Alexander.
He was also present at Chaeroneia and took part in the battle against the Greeks, and he is said to have been the first to break the ranks of the Sacred Band of the Thebans. - Plutarch, Alexander 9.2
(en de Khairōneia tēs pros tous ' Hellēnas makhēs parōn meteskhe, kai legetai prōtos enseisai tō hierō lokhō tōn Thēbaiōn)
Alexander was the first man in all of history to break the famed Sacred Band, which shows that he was something special.
Quote
Exhibit 2: Plutarch's Pelopidas.
It is said, moreover, that the band was never beaten, until the battle of Chaeroneia; and when, after the battle, Philip was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the long spears [tr. adds: of his phalanx], with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed, and on learning that this was the band of lovers and beloved, burst into tears and said: 'Perish miserably they who think that these men did or suffered aught disgraceful.' - Plutarch, Pelopidas 18.5
(legetai de diameinai mekhri tēs en Khairōneia makhēs aēttēton: hōs de meta tēn makhēn ephorōn tous nekrous ho Philippos estē kata touto to khōrion en hō sunetugkhane keisthai tous triakosious, enantious apēntēkotas tais sarisais hapantas en tois hoplois kai met' allēlōn anamemigmenous, thaumasanta kai puthomenon hōs ho tōn erastōn kai tōn erōmenōn houtos eiē lokhos, dakrusai kai eipein 'apolointo kakōs hoi toutous ti poiein ē paskhein aiskhron huponoountes.')
The Sacred Band had never before been beaten, but at Chaeroneia they died where they had stood, facing the long spears of the Macedonians. This moved Philip to observe that while certain people might have thought that a unit comprised of 150 pairs of lovers was a naff concept anyone who was actually there could see that they were men of great bravery.
Quote
Exhibit 3: Diodorus' History
Once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both.
[3] Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. [4] As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory. - Diodorus XVI.86.2-4
(genomenēs de makhēs karteras epi polun khronon kai pollōn piptontōn par' amphoterois mekhri men tinos ho agōn amphidoxoumenas eikhe tas elpidas tēs nikēs.
3 meta de tauta tou Alexandrou philotimoumenou tō patri tēn idian andragathian endeixasthai kai philotimias huperbolēn ouk apoleipontos, homoiōs de kai pollōn autō sunagōnizomenōn andrōn agathōn prōtos to sunekhes tēs tōn polemiōn taxeōs errēxe kai pollous katabalōn kateponei tous kath' hauton tetagmenous. 4 to d' auto kai tōn parastatōn autō poiēsantōn to sunekhes aiei tēs taxeōs parerrēgnuto. pollōn de sōreuomenōn nekrōn hoi peri ton Alexandron prōtoi biasamenoi tous kath' hautous etrepsanto. meta de tauta kai ho basileus autos prokinduneuōn kai tēs nikēs tēn epigraphēn oud' autō parakhōrōn Alexandrō to men prōton exeōse tē bia tous antitetagmenous, epeita de kai pheugein sunanagkasas aitios egeneto tēs nikēs.)
Alexander was precocious and eager for glory, and at Chaeroneia his men broke through the enemy line, forcing them to flee. He himself took part in the fighting, as did his companions. Philip however would have no one claim the victory from him, and was the one who finally put the enemy to flight.
Alternative conclusion: these sections emphasise both Alexander's early ability and his desire for glory. As an example, at Chaeroneia his command was successful in defeating the enemy that opposed him. This section of the enemy line included the famed Theban Sacred Band, who did not flee with the rest of the wing but were cut down where they stood. As they had never before been defeated, this is a striking indication of Alexander's leadership ability and foreshadows his later success.
Attempts to get much greater detail out of these accounts risks selective reading of figurative or formulaic language as factual description to support one's own case. Diodorus mentions the enemy fleeing after Alexander's breakthrough, yet others tell us that the Sacred Band did not flee, so right away we have a conflict between which parts to take figuratively - or as a general account - and which to take literally. Once we start making these kinds of interpretative choices our arguments must inevitably become subject to bias.
Combine this with a lack of unambiguous evidence for cavalry being capable of / trained to charge formed and disciplined heavy infantry frontally and we're not left with much on which to base a positive argument!
IMHO, of course.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 30, 2014, 02:53:30 PM
Justin, you're doing it again.
I'm somehow reminded of Yzma in The Emperor's New Groove when Kuzco catches her sitting on his throne ruling the empire behind his back:
"Doing what?"
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/yzma.jpg)
(Sorry, couldn't resist!)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 30, 2014, 02:53:30 PMTime in this case is linear - it doesn't move at different pace for different people at different times. The hoplite moving his shield to deflect the xyston is happening at the same time as the cavalryman is reacting and trying to move his spear. The collision of the hoplite spear with the horse happens a fraction of a second afterwards, then the second hoplite's spear hits the horse, then the cavalryman hits the first hoplite (who may by this point be falling backwards into the second hoplite). All this happens in less than a second.
To rerun it, the hoplite lifts his shield a second or two
before impact. The Companion, whose lance is already aimed at the hoplite's head, needs only to lower it slightly to target the centre of the shield. The effect of impact is immediate: the hoplite is bowled over backwards at the speed of the advancing horse. As the hoplite's body moves, his spear aim goes wild. If his spearpoint by some chance contacts the horse it will have no force behind it as the hoplite is either dead, unconscious or has his arms behind him to brace for the fall. At worst the horse might be slightly injured.
The second hoplite is knocked off balance by the first well before his spear is in striking range of the horse.
Ignoring decades of fighting Persians, that is.
I asked very early on about changes to Greek armies, yet we still seem to only acknowledge a single centuries old model of one type of Greek soldier.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 30, 2014, 11:30:19 PMWhat do you make of this?
I think it misses "eti". This is a particle that usually has an implication of time, so "kai hoi hippeis ouk akontismō eti" means something like "and the cavalry were
no longer shooting javelins at them". There was an initial missile phase, akrobolismos, before the pushing, which "eti" implies that the cavalry wwre taking their part in.
And I think otheo is used in too wide a range of contexts to draw any very firm conclusion about what it implies this time.
And I think you are giving "disproved" a looser meaning than I would.
Here are the uses of ἔτι taken from the Liddell and Scott lexicon (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0058%3Aentry%3De)%2Fti) on Perseus. If used in the sense of time with a negative it means 'no longer'. But used in the sense of degree it can mean 'not...furthermore'.
I.of Time,1.of the Present, yet, as yet, still, Lat. adhuc, Il., attic; cf. οὐκέτι.
2.of the Past, mostly with imperf., ἀήθεσσον γὰρ ἔτι they were yet unaccustomed, Il.; προορωμένοις ἔτι Thuc.
3.of the Future, yet, further, ἄλγε᾽ ἔδωκεν, ἠδ᾽ ἔτι δώσει Il.:—also hereafter, Aesch., Soph.
[4. with a neg., no longer, "οὐδὲ . . ἔ. παρέμειναν" D.H.5.46; v. οὐκέτι, μηκέτι.] - got this from a different source.
II.of Degree, yet, still, besides, further, moreover, Lat. praeterea, insuper, Hom., etc.; ἔτι δέ and besides, nay more, Thuc.
2.often to strengthen a comp., ἔτι μᾶλλον yet more, Il.; μᾶλλον ἔτι Od.; ἔτι πλέον Hdt., etc.
3.with the posit., ἔτι ἄνω yet higher up, Xen.
Am I correct in surmising there is a possible ambiguity in this passage? The context appears to suggest that the missile skirmishing was done by archers and slingers only, with the cavalry devoted exclusively to charging:
| And those who were surprised drew themselves up in battle array in a woody glen along the bank of the river. Alexander drew out his phalanx into a deep column, and led it on in person. He also ordered the archers and slingers to run forward and discharge arrows and stones at the barbarians, hoping to provoke them by this to come out of the woody glen into the ground unencumbered with trees. When they were within reach of the missiles, and were struck by them, they rushed out against the archers, who were undefended by shields, with the purpose of fighting them hand-to-hand. But when Alexander had drawn them thus out of the woody glen, he ordered Philotas to take the cavalry which came from upper Macedonia, and to charge their right wing, where they had advanced furthest in their sally. He also commanded Heraclides and Sopolis to lead on the cavalry which came from Bottiaea and Amphipolis against the left wing; while he himself extended the phalanx of infantry and the rest of the horse in front of the phalanx and led them against the enemy's centre.
And indeed as long as there was only skirmishing on both sides, the Triballians did not get the worst of it; but as soon as the phalanx in dense array attacked them with vigour, and the cavalry fell upon them in various quarters, not striking them with the javelin moreover, but pushing them with their very horses, then at length they turned and fled through the woody glen to the river. |
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2014, 06:57:43 AM
I'm somehow reminded of Yzma in The Emperor's New Groove when Kuzco catches her sitting on his throne ruling the empire behind his back:
"Doing what?"
Nice one Justin. Whenever my three (now grown up) daughters meet up, one will invariably at some point say "Hey, I'm a Llama again" and they will all collapse in hysterics, so I have fond memories attached to the film :)
Without going into it in depth, I think we have a different idea of the dynamism of the hoplite defence and the degree of initiative the cavalryman retains when he has begun his ramming action. Again, this reflects a view as to whether we are talking of a manouever of precision or brute force. But, as Patrick has said, perhaps time to leave it as a point of difference and move on. I think there is some quite interesting stuff coming out about cavalry/infantry co-operation coming out, for example.
Quote from: Prufrock on May 01, 2014, 01:36:09 AM
Attempts to get much greater detail out of these accounts risks selective reading of figurative or formulaic language as factual description to support one's own case.
I think this has been one of the problems in the discussion. Too much can be built on a word or phrase, perhaps missing the literary impact that the author was after. The Plutarch comment is a good example - his main purpose is to tell us about the courage of the Sacred Band and Philip's sensibilities (he reacts like a civilized Greek, not some kind of barbarian), not to enter a discussion into Macedonian armament or a CSI-type analysis of wounds.
QuoteThe context appears to suggest that the missile skirmishing was done by archers and slingers only, with the cavalry devoted exclusively to charging:
Not to me. The shooting by the archers and slingers is only mentioned before tha Triballians are out of the wooded glen; the whole second paragraph, "And indeed as long as there was only skirmishing on both sides, the Triballians did not get the worst of it; but as soon as the phalanx in dense array attacked them with vigour, and the cavalry fell upon them in various quarters, not striking them with the javelin moreover, but pushing them with their very horses, then at length they turned and fled through the woody glen to the river" is after that, and the archers etc seem to be ignored, so the "skirmishing"/distant combat/akrobolismos is associated only with the Triballians, the phalanx, and/or the cavalry.
But look at the sequence of events. Alexander orders his archers and slingers to harass the Triballians and draw them out of the wood. When they take the bait and come out he orders his upper Macedonian cavalry to charge the right wing, the cavalry under the command of Heraclides and Sopolis to move against the left wing and the remainder of the cavalry along with the phalanx to attack the centre.
Arrian then sums up the situation: the Triballians had managed fine when enduring missile fire, but they fold when the phalanx along with the cavalry who charge to contact hit them. Nothing here suggests an intermediary cavalry shooting phase between the shooting by the archers and slingers and the final closing in for the kill by the cavalry and phalanx.
Justin has essentially said everything I would have said in this situation.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 01, 2014, 09:15:46 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 30, 2014, 11:30:19 PMWhat do you make of this?
I think it misses "eti". This is a particle that usually has an implication of time, so "kai hoi hippeis ouk akontismō eti" means something like "and the cavalry were no longer shooting javelins at them". There was an initial missile phase, akrobolismos, before the pushing, which "eti" implies that the cavalry were taking their part in.
I would read it rather as "and the cavalry
eti (still) not shooting at them, but
ōthountes allē (thrusting here and there) and
allē prosepipton (here and there riding them down).
Quote
And I think otheo is used in too wide a range of contexts to draw any very firm conclusion about what it implies this time.
One might say the same about
eti - but doing so does not particularly help us.
Otheo in all of its contexts has the sense of thrusting or pushing with force, which allows us to conclude that the Macedonian cavalry were engaging in melee when the expectation - at least among the Triballi - was that they would engage with missiles. One may readily surmise from this that the Macedonian cavalry were using weapons intended for close combat, as they did at the Granicus the following year.
The original point here was that the new translation stated or implied that Macedonian cavalry in this case used javelins, which we have demonstrated is not supported by Arrian's Greek, which rather emphasises their non-use of javelins when they might be expected to do so and the substitution of a close-combat attack system instead. We may differ over interpretation of individual words, but the context is of preliminary skirmishing in which the Triballi hold their own followed by close action against Macedonian infantry and cavalry in which they do not, and in which the Macedonian cavalry gives the impression of acting contrary to expectation.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 01, 2014, 10:54:10 AM
I think this has been one of the problems in the discussion. Too much can be built on a word or phrase, perhaps missing the literary impact that the author was after.
Agreed: we do need to consider the context and how the whole picture fits together.
No, I see nothing "contrary to expectation" in the passage at all. Justin's assessment of the sequence of events is misleading. Alexander sends the archers and slingers to lure the Triballians out of the woods. When they succeed, he sends the Upper cavalry (etc) to attack - rather than "charge" - the right wing. There is then a period of distant fighting - it makes no sense for this passage, placed between the advance of the phalanx and cavalry and their closing to handstrokes, to refer back to the archers' activity three sentences earlier. That is the sequence that Arrian describes. and that's why ouk eti has an implication of time, "no longer shooting javelins", because it's set in opposition to the preceding period of time when the distant fighting was taking place.
I don't see that the Macedonian cavalry pushing their horses into the Triballians, after their period of throwing javelins at them, suggests they had lances: it certainly does not prove it. Cavalry seem to have often been prepared to close with peltasts and other non-hoplite infantry - these are Thracians, remember, not hoplites - when conditions were right. So there is no "substitution of a close-combat attack system instead"; rather, the cavalry are behaving exactly the same as we would expect Greek or even Persian cavalry, armed with javelins or the usual mixture of javelins and spears, to behave against peltasts. It's also - odd? - that if Arrian wants to describe a new tactical style involving lances, the only weapon he mentions is the javelins that Patrick and Justin reckon weren't being used.
I should add that the smiley in the original post was genuine, I do not really think that the cavalry lance was introduced in 335/4 - though it does seem possible that the Upper Macedonian cavalry hadn't yet adopted it in 335, they may have been the last to do so. But it is interesting that while various ancient sources credit Philip with introducing the sarisa to the infantry, but not with any change in cavalry weaponry.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 01, 2014, 09:29:14 PM
I don't see that the Macedonian cavalry pushing their horses into the Triballians, after their period of throwing javelins at them, suggests they had lances: it certainly does not prove it. Cavalry seem to have often been prepared to close with peltasts and other non-hoplite infantry - these are Thracians, remember, not hoplites - when conditions were right. So there is no "substitution of a close-combat attack system instead"; rather, the cavalry are behaving exactly the same as we would expect Greek or even Persian cavalry, armed with javelins or the usual mixture of javelins and spears, to behave against peltasts. It's also - odd? - that if Arrian wants to describe a new tactical style involving lances, the only weapon he mentions is the javelins that Patrick and Justin reckon weren't being used.
To be honest, it makes sense that the Macedonian cavalry had javelins since Arrian mentions them. If they had only lances he would either have stated the fact or not mentioned their weaponry at all.
Granted that, the question then is whether
all the cavalry were javelin-armed, and
only javelin-armed. If the answers are yes and yes then clearly cavalry was not the battle winner at Chaeronea. But nothing precludes the idea that some of the cavalry had javelins and some not, or that (some) cavalrymen had javelins and lances. Arrian mentions the javelins in a specific context - they were not/no longer being used - without implying they were the only armament of the horsemen.
What is of interest is the use made of the cavalry: two bodies attack either flank of the Triballians whilst a third body, placed in front of the phalanx, attacks the centre. It is possible to see here an allusion to one kind of cavalry used in a frontal shock role, in contrast to more lightly-armed cavalry employed in flanking actions?
One thing I find curious: why put cavalry in front of the phalanx?
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 01, 2014, 09:29:14 PM
No, I see nothing "contrary to expectation" in the passage at all. Justin's assessment of the sequence of events is misleading. Alexander sends the archers and slingers to lure the Triballians out of the woods. When they succeed, he sends the Upper cavalry (etc) to attack - rather than "charge" - the right wing. There is then a period of distant fighting - it makes no sense for this passage, placed between the advance of the phalanx and cavalry and their closing to handstrokes, to refer back to the archers' activity three sentences earlier. That is the sequence that Arrian describes. and that's why ouk eti has an implication of time, "no longer shooting javelins", because it's set in opposition to the preceding period of time when the distant fighting was taking place.
I think this reads an unintended sequencing into Arrian's narrative. The way I read it is:
Description of dispositions (I.2.4-6): Alexander arrays his troops, sending the missilemen to skirmish and draw out the Triballians. This succeeding, he orders the Upper Macedonian cavalry to
emballein (throw or dash against), not
akontizein, the Triballian right and
at the same time instructed the Amphipolitan and Bottiaean cavalry to advance against the enemy left while he himself led the main body of infantry and the rest of his cavalry
parateinas, which seems to mean beside rather than preceding, against the enemy centre.
Description of outcome (I.2.7): As soon as skirmishing is replaced by close combat, the Triballians are overcome by the weight and force of the Macedonian infantry and the 'not shooting but thrusting and riding down' (
ouk akontismō eti, all' autois tois hippois ōthountes allē kai allē prosepipton) of the Macedonian cavalry.
Quote
I don't see that the Macedonian cavalry pushing their horses into the Triballians, after their period of throwing javelins at them, suggests they had lances: it certainly does not prove it.
Couple of thoughts here: 1) They have not thrown javelins. 2) They are employing aggressive close combat which is consistent with using lances. 'Proof' would only be certain with explicit mention of lances, but unless they carried both weapon types like Byzantine trapezitoi, it does seem to be a case of one or the other and hence if they are not using javelins then realistically they would be using lances.
Quote
Cavalry seem to have often been prepared to close with peltasts and other non-hoplite infantry - these are Thracians, remember, not hoplites - when conditions were right. So there is no "substitution of a close-combat attack system instead"; rather, the cavalry are behaving exactly the same as we would expect Greek or even Persian cavalry, armed with javelins or the usual mixture of javelins and spears, to behave against peltasts. It's also - odd? - that if Arrian wants to describe a new tactical style involving lances, the only weapon he mentions is the javelins that Patrick and Justin reckon weren't being used.
Apart from the fact that Arrian does not mention the use of javelins (the reverse, if anything), there is a point here: it was not only Macedonian cavalry which was prepared to get its weapons dirty in close combat if conditions were right, especially against opponents less formidable than hoplites. However Arrian's phrasing -
ouk akontismō eti (yet without shooting) - indicates that something expected was replaced by
outhontes and
prosepipton - pushing/thrusting and falling upon (attacking as opposed to collapsing!), the implication being that this was an apparent novelty, otherwise why mention it in this way at all?
Quote
I should add that the smiley in the original post was genuine, I do not really think that the cavalry lance was introduced in 335/4 - though it does seem possible that the Upper Macedonian cavalry hadn't yet adopted it in 335, they may have been the last to do so. But it is interesting that while various ancient sources credit Philip with introducing the sarisa to the infantry, but not with any change in cavalry weaponry.
Interesting in this regard is that Arrian refers to Alexander's infantry - phalanx and hypaspist alike - as using the
doru practically throughout his narrative of these anti-Thracian and Illyrian campaigns. I do not seriously believe that Alexander un-equipped his infantry's sarissas only to re-equip them for the campaign in Asia. :)
If our sources fail to credit Philip with introducing new weaponry to his cavalry, we are left with three options: 1) he did, but they failed to mention it; 2) they already used the sarissa or xyston so he changed nothing; 3) he did not, and Alexander made the change. How would we evaluate which of these options reflected reality?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2014, 06:59:00 AM
What is of interest is the use made of the cavalry: two bodies attack either flank of the Triballians whilst a third body, placed in front of the phalanx, attacks the centre. It is possible to see here an allusion to one kind of cavalry used in a frontal shock role, in contrast to more lightly-armed cavalry employed in flanking actions?
I think the cavalry with the centre should be beside (parateinas) rather than in front of the phalanx, but this does suggest a shock role.
Whether the flanking cavalry were, as Duncan suggests, late rearmers, and hence had a different tactical role in this battle, is another question: I see no indication in Arrian's Greek that any of them used javelins, in fact quite the opposite. Moving on a bit, in Arrian I.6.3 we have an interesting passage that when I first saw it, with 'phalagga' and 'embolon' in the same sentence, tempted me to jump to the conclusion that here was evidence of a phalanx in wedge and the mystery of Chaeronea was solved. Not so - it was the army's left, specifically the 200 cavalry who had made their way unnoticed round to the Taulantian flank, which was being ordered into wedge while the Taulantians' attention was focussed on the very obvious infantry display before them. Lack of javelin use by Macedonian cavalry is also apparent in this action, although we are not told which parts of Macedonia they came from: a general homogenity seems to be assumed at this point, which being apparently less than a fortnight after the action in I.2.6 would not have left much time or opportunity for any Macedonian cavalry to re-equip and re-train. These are all indicators rather than clear source assertions, but the indicators seem consistent with a general lack of Macedonian mounted javelinage.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2014, 12:23:01 PM
Lack of javelin use by Macedonian cavalry is also apparent in this action, although we are not told which parts of Macedonia they came from: a general homogenity seems to be assumed at this point, which being apparently less than a fortnight after the action in I.2.6 would not have left much time or opportunity for any Macedonian cavalry to re-equip and re-train. These are all indicators rather than clear source assertions, but the indicators seem consistent with a general lack of Macedonian mounted javelinage.
Question though. Here are the definitions of akontizein from Perseus: LSJ (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=akontizein&la=greek#Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=a)konti/zw-contents), Middle Liddell (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=akontizein&la=greek#Perseus:text:1999.04.0058:entry=a)konti/zw-contents), Slater (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=akontizein&la=greek#Perseus:text:1999.04.0072:entry=a)konti/zw-contents) and Autenreith (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=akontizein&la=greek#Perseus:text:1999.04.0073:entry=a)konti/zw-contents). They all indicate throwing a javelin as the primary meaning.
Quite so, though when one has 'ouk ...' preceding a word it generally means "not ..." - is there a further bout of akontizein I have somehow missed?
I mean, the fact that Arrian mentions javelin-throwing would tend to indicate that at least some of the Macedonian cavalry had javelins but didn't use them. Either that or he is saying that something unusual is happening - instead of throwing javelins in the traditional manner, the cavalry are charging into contact with the peltasts using another weapon. The difficulty with the latter interpretation is that a) they would already have done that at Chaeronea, hence it wasn't such a novel tactic, b) he doesn't mention them using lances, and c) Greek javelin-armed cavalry charging to contact with peltasts was not something unheard of.
I still think the context of the passage rules out an intermediary skirmishing phase by the cavalry between the shooting by the archers and slingers and the move to contact by the phalanx and cavalry. The phrase 'And indeed as long as there was only skirmishing on both sides, the Triballians did not get the worst of it' follows immediately after Alexander has given the order for the cavalry and phalanx to close in, hence it must refer to the shooting earlier in the battle. That being the case, the cavalry don't use javelins at all but just charge in. Did some or all of the cavalry charge in with lances? There just isn't enough in the text to prove it either way. One has to put this passage in the larger context of how Macedonian cavalry were fighting elsewhere.
Which leads to the question: what are the sources for javelin-armed cavalry charging formed peltasts?
I suspect one would be the bit from Xenophon Patrick mentioned earlier with Persian cavalry following scythed chariots into Greek infantry.
Unfortunately it's a bit vague
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2014, 09:05:16 AM
I mean, the fact that Arrian mentions javelin-throwing would tend to indicate that at least some of the Macedonian cavalry had javelins but didn't use them. Either that or he is saying that something unusual is happening - instead of throwing javelins in the traditional manner, the cavalry are charging into contact with the peltasts using another weapon. The difficulty with the latter interpretation is that a) they would already have done that at Chaeronea, hence it wasn't such a novel tactic, b) he doesn't mention them using lances, and c) Greek javelin-armed cavalry charging to contact with peltasts was not something unheard of.
It would be novel to the Taulantians, whose accounts of Chaeronea would have been delivered in general terms by an excited trader rather than as a precise explanation from a military liaison officer.
Quote
Which leads to the question: what are the sources for javelin-armed cavalry charging formed peltasts?
In addition to the Hellenica instance Jim mentions, there is the battle of Cunaxa, where Xenophon (Anabasis, I.10.7-8) describes Tissaphernes' charge against Episthenes' peltasts, although these had a cunning plan which nonplussed the Persians:
"
For Tissaphernes had not taken to flight in the first encounter, but had charged along the river through the Greek peltasts; he did not kill anyone in his passage, but the Greeks, after opening a gap for his men, proceeded to deal blows and throw javelins upon them as they went through. The commander of the Greek peltasts was Episthenes of Amphipolis, and it was said that he proved himself a sagacious man. [8] At any rate, after Tissaphernes had thus come off with the worst of it, he did not wheel round again, but went on to the camp of the Greeks..."
It looks as if Tissaphernes' cavalry, the only troops on that wing who did not run from the Greeks, may have charged in a column. Their appearance is described thus:
"
There were horsemen in white cuirasses [leukothorakes]
on the left wing of the enemy, under the command, it was reported, of Tissaphernes ..." - Anabasis I.8.9
Formation not described, weaponry not described; but as the javelin (palta for Persians) was more or less universal cavalry armament at the time it is a fairly safe bet that these were carried.
It should however be noted that Persian cavalry tended to be more heavily armoured than their Greek counterparts, Xenophon recommending the adoption of certain items of Persian cavalry armour (the Athenians do not seem to have taken much notice).
There is one classic case of Greek cavalry not charging peltasts; this was when Iphicrates mauled a Spartan
mora near Corinth - but the reason given was lack of Spartan initiative rather than that the peltasts were too tough a nut.
Quote
Greek javelin-armed cavalry charging to contact with peltasts was not something unheard of.
True, and even Greek javelin-armed cavalry charging hoplites on occasion. The interest of Arrian I.2.6 seems to lie in the way the charging therein was performed - without the use of javelins.
Not withstanding what Arrian did or not say about Alexander's Companions, the problem I have with a, matter of course, successful frontal attack on hoplites is that, later, heavier knights did not repeat the tactic. Norman knights failed to break Harold's Huscarls at Hastings until archers, feint attacks and various stratagems took their toll.
Robert Gargan
Quote from: RobertGargan on May 03, 2014, 11:12:07 PM
Not withstanding what Arrian did or not say about Alexander's Companions, the problem I have with a, matter of course, successful frontal attack on hoplites is that, later, heavier knights did not repeat the tactic.
Robert Gargan
It is probably more accurate to say medieval cavalry did attack formed spearmen frontally but, if there was nothing to disrupt the enemy formation (terrain, unpreparedness, archery, tricksiness) they didn't have much success. A few successful occassions are mentioned earlier.
Quote from: RobertGargan on May 03, 2014, 11:12:07 PM
Not withstanding what Arrian did or not say about Alexander's Companions, the problem I have with a, matter of course, successful frontal attack on hoplites is that, later, heavier knights did not repeat the tactic. Norman knights failed to break Harold's Huscarls at Hastings until archers, feint attacks and various stratagems took their toll.
Robert Gargan
The theoretical technique proposed for penetrating a hoplite phalanx with heavy cavalry requires precise manoeuvring which presupposes a high degree of unit training, something mediaeval knights are not noted for. The best you could expect from them was to form a line and charge home; no question of each cavalry file targeting the gap between every other infantry file. That meant that the knights would plough into the infantry rather slice through them. They obviously would not be able to kill all the infantry in the first impact, so success depended on them panicking the footmen into routing, after which they could pursue and cut them down at their leisure.
If they did not succeed in getting the line to rout, then they would have to pull back fast before the footmen could dispatch the exposed knights, reform, and charge again. Some knights would inevitably get killed in the process and the mounted commander would eventually have to weigh up who was winning the battle of attrition.
Though Justin and I don't agree on whether any suggested unsupported Macedonian cavalry success against hoplites existed, he is right that the amount of formation training that the Macedonians got was much more than that of most medieval men-at-arms. I don't think we have evidence of formation training until Charles the Bold's army. Medieval cavalry were often a conglomeration of smaller components who probably knew one another and may have served together but that was it. So tactics were on the basic side, based on stringing the component bits in a line. Wedges were rare - only the Germans seem to have used them and then they were pointed columns, not the glorious geometry of Justin's graphics.
Agreed - mediaeval parallels are misleading as a yardstick of what could and would be done in classical times. Hastings is an especially unsatisfactory comparison for several reasons, not least because the Bayeux Tapestry shows some Norman cavalry still using their spears overarm, presumably for hurling. Furthermore, the Norman cavalry spear itself does not seem to have been a particularly lengthy implement and does not compare with the Macedonian xyston.
Interestingly enough, mediaeval knights seem for some time (specifically AD c.1100-1300) to have assumed as a matter of course that if they charged varlets on foot the latter would not be able to withstand them: English, Flemish and Swiss tended to be exceptions to the general pattern. This seems to be one reason why Courtrai (AD 1302) caused a shock throughout knightly circles, particularly in France itself: an army of mere burghers on foot had seen off the chivalry of France.
Though in pretty well all the cases where medieval infantry defeat knights they have rough ground or obstacles in front of them.
Do we have examples of knights just riding down infantry earlier?/
Roy
Just thinking about the Companions at Chaeronea
Just how well 'drilled' were they. They were wealthy men who were supported by landed estates (and perhaps some sort of salary when actually serving) and often had civic roles that they needed to keep up.
They weren't a regular cavalry regiment as we would understand one.
So their horsemanship and skill on horseback would be good but the amount of time they actually spent in mounted drill could be very limited.
Once on campaign with Alexander then they'd be 'with the colours' most of the time and doubtless drill improved but I suspect Philip (or Macedonian) couldn't have afforded to keep all the companion cavalry (as opposed to an inner bodyguard) under arms all the time.
On the other hand I'm sure I've read somewhere that William the Bastard used the time waiting for the winds to change to drill his men before the invasion of England (if only to stop them getting bored) so the level of drill between his men and Philip's might not have been all that great.
Jim
Quote from: aligern on May 04, 2014, 12:02:38 PM
Though in pretty well all the cases where medieval infantry defeat knights they have rough ground or obstacles in front of them.
Do we have examples of knights just riding down infantry earlier?/
Roy
battle of Lewes 1264? Navas de Tolosa 1212? Maybe Fordham 1173 (this may have been an ambush). Most of the ride downs seem to have been against disordered or otherwise disrupted troops. Battles in Italy, where knights and infantry clashed often, seem to have quite a few cases where infantry held their own. Teutonic Knights don't seem to have done brilliantly against Russian shieldwalls.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2014, 12:10:03 PM
On the other hand I'm sure I've read somewhere that William the Bastard used the time waiting for the winds to change to drill his men before the invasion of England (if only to stop them getting bored) so the level of drill between his men and Philip's might not have been all that great.
Jim
I think we need to separate drilled from skilled, or even practised. Norman knights probably did practice, conroi v. conroi. Whether anything bigger formed up is another question. Based on 12th century tournament evidence, we might expect in a well-established force that a conroi might fall in in a particular order and they may have a game plan but precision drill, or even the ability to operate with other conrois in their own battle less less so.
Justin has proposed the Macedonians used high precision drills. We know Macedonian cavalry could form wedges, which must have taken a bit of planning and practice, but Justin's drills take it to another level. Presumably the preparation and training period is attested in the pre-Chaeronea run-up, even if the specific details are not covered?
I'm not sure we have anything more on cavalry drills than Xenophon to be honest.
We know there were mounted exercises of sorts, but much was centered on improving the individual skills of the individual soldier, not on unit drill.
When you read your Livy or Polybius you begin to realise that we're talking about people who felt that the calibre of the individual, their personal 'quality' which was to an extent based on their breeding and background, was considered far more important that how much time they'd spent riding in lines. Think of them as gentleman amateurs who probably practiced a bit when they had time.
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2014, 11:53:20 AM
Agreed - mediaeval parallels are misleading as a yardstick of what could and would be done in classical times. Hastings is an especially unsatisfactory comparison for several reasons, not least because the Bayeux Tapestry shows some Norman cavalry still using their spears overarm, presumably for hurling. Furthermore, the Norman cavalry spear itself does not seem to have been a particularly lengthy implement and does not compare with the Macedonian xyston.
Wasn't overarm a particular way of using a spear? the cavalryman would point the spear at his target's head or throat. On contact the spearpoint would wedge into the target - the cavalryman would then swivel the shaft upwards as he passed and yank the spearpoint out. That kind of trauma would normally be enough to kill the infantryman and leave the horseman with the spear ready to insert into his next victim.
The technique would fine for taking out loose order infantry, especially if they were running, but not so much for oot massed in a shieldwall - they had spears whose reach matched his.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 04, 2014, 12:29:16 PM
Justin has proposed the Macedonians used high precision drills. We know Macedonian cavalry could form wedges, which must have taken a bit of planning and practice, but Justin's drills take it to another level. Presumably the preparation and training period is attested in the pre-Chaeronea run-up, even if the specific details are not covered?
Strictly-speaking the drill required was not that complicated. The Companions had to form a wedge made up of columns, fairly easy as it is natural for horses to follow each other. The leading man of each file had to be able to direct his horse at the correct point in the infantry line. Moving at a trot or perhaps canter it is quite doable for an experienced rider. Then each rider simply had to target a hoplite: either his head or the approximate centre of his shield if it has been raised. Again not overly difficult.
The big difference between Companions and mediaeval knights is the file system. If I'm not mistaken knights by and large just formed up any old how into a line, then charged. You couldn't get more out of that than a crude frontal smash designed to panic an infantry line into rout. Same thing as cataphracts, which would explain why knights gradually turned into cataphracts as time wore on.
You might care to read this Justin:-))
http://web.archive.org/web/20110805101324/http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/bennett1.htm
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2014, 02:18:50 PM
The big difference between Companions and mediaeval knights is the file system. If I'm not mistaken knights by and large just formed up any old how into a line, then charged. You couldn't get more out of that than a crude frontal smash designed to panic an infantry line into rout.
It isn't an unreasonable generalisation. However, you could same similar things about post medieval cavalry too. Granted they had a structure which placed men and officers in set places, but all they used was "a crude frontal smash" as you put it. Modern reconstructors of the medieval cavalry charge, like Matt Bennett or JF Verbruggen, note the technical similarity between what we know of how medieval men-at-arms charged and how it was done in the 18th to 20th centuries. The key trick was to arrive
en masse and not as individuals.
I think I would doubt the ability of medieval cavalry to be able to use the precision described in Justin's wedge tactic. It revolves getting file leaders spaced precisely to be able to hit a sweet spot less than the width of a horse in a hostile formation, with their men inch perfect behind them. I think the level of precision could be achieved with some practice - I've seen similar stuff done in musical rides in tattoos, though with the files wider apart - but I'm still not sure anything that complex would be tried in the face of the enemy. One of the reasons why 18th-20th century cavalry formed in shallow lines was there was less chance of fouling each other (admittedly, more of an issue if you were taking missile casualties than charging something which had a reach of about six feet).
Quote from: aligern on May 04, 2014, 02:39:01 PM
You might care to read this Justin:-))
http://web.archive.org/web/20110805101324/http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/bennett1.htm
Roy
Interesting, especially this part:
| If you have succeeded in overthrowing the enemy's line, your own will be in disorder. The melee which ensues, soon, however, turns into a pursuit, and this affords the opportunity of destroying those who have turned; for the charge and the melee do not last long enough to inflict or sustain heavy loss in men or horses ... The pursuit must be kept up with vigour ... This is not the time to stay the slaughter, but watch over the safety of the pursuers with your cavalry reserves till the flying enemy is entirely dispersed.... Then rally. |
A charge which either immediately routed the enemy, or if not, followed by a short melee, which finished the job. Hence cavalry among enemy infantry
could melee at least for a short period of time.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2014, 03:59:02 PM
A charge which either immediately routed the enemy, or if not, followed by a short melee, which finished the job. Hence cavalry among enemy infantry could melee at least for a short period of time.
I think there is a caveat here about whether Nolan is talking about a cavalry melee rather than an infantry one - IIRC, Nolan is one of the cavalry manuals available on line, if anyone wants to look. However, if we look at medieval examples (which I suppose we are allowed to, if we are looking at Victorian ones), the fight seems to be in four stages.
1. The commitment to fight. The infantry need to stand their ground. The cavalry need to move to contact. Infantry probably bottled it more than the cavalry - but cavalry could ride round the target shouting abuse/looking for an opening e.g. Arques 1303, Laupen 1339
2. Whether the infantry formation is penetrated - men-at-arms may approach with insufficient vigour to break into the infantry. Bannockburn is a good example but there are others - Lunalonge 1349, the early stages of Nogent-sur-Seine 1359. This seems to be what is happening for most of hastings too. Cavalry may rally back and try again in these circumstances.
3. Cavalry penetrate the infantry, issue in doubt - this is when it gets really nasty. Examples include Courtrai, where several of the French leaders die among the Flemish ranks, their horses brought down; Chataeu-Guyon at Grandson 1473 (who, like Robert of Artois at Courtrai, is killed in touching distance of the enemy standards) and Bayard at Marignano 1515 (whose horse bolts out of the enemy lines, so he survives). It wasn't easy on the receiving end either. The Black prince was knocked off his feet at Crecy, as was William of Julich, one of the Flemish commanders at Courtrai.
4. The fnal act - either the cavalry succeed in breaking up the infantry and they retreat or rout, or the cavalry break off. The infantry can pursue but probably shouldn't (see Hastings and the less well known Montenaken 1465).
Can we parallel these stages in more ancient periods, or was medieval warfare really different (in which case we can probably give up on Victorian examples)
[Edit - pressed send before writing last sentence]
An interesting and useful analysis of the mediaeval charge process. Looking at the Macedonian Companions, we really only see them in action under Alexander, and they are being handled by a master, committed at the right moment and in the right way. There are however some observations one can make.
- There is no individual impetuosity, or at least none recorded. Everyone seems to know his place and keep it.
- One gets the impression of much mutual support: Alexander, fighting at the Granicus with a broken xyston, calls for a new one - and (on the second try) gets one. At Gaugamela, he and his squadron have the fight of their lives against an unusually good contingent of Indians and Persians, but prevail with the loss of about 60 Companions, Coenus, Menidas and Hephaestion being wounded - however Alexander, who would have been at the tip of the wedge, is unhurt.
- There are never any comments in any of our sources about the Companions showing any deficiencies in training: no mishaps, no accidents, no lack of skill in anything. I think they had a level of training perhaps unprecedented in the classical world, probably funded (insofar as this was necessary) by the Chalcidian gold mines Philip picked up part-way through his career.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 04, 2014, 04:53:12 PM
Can we parallel these stages in more ancient periods, or was medieval warfare really different (in which case we can probably give up on Victorian examples)
We probably can if we are looking at cavalry in general: if examining Companions in particular the one clearly if briefly described conflict is at Issus when Alexander's Companions ride through the Persian Kardakes almost as if the latter were not there.
Arrian's description:
"...
once within range of missiles, Alexander, at the head of his own troops on the right wing, rode at a gallop into the stream. Rapidity was now all in all: a swift attack would shake the enemy, and the sooner they came to grips the less damage would be done by the Persian archers. Alexander's judgement was not at fault: the Persian left collapsed the very moment he was on them - a brilliant local success for the troops under his command." - Arrian II.10.3-4
Here the infantry drop out of the equation at step 1, the mutual commitment evaluation phase. However this is not the end of the battle: after almost catching Darius Alexander has to break off to rescue his phalanx from Darius' hard-fighting Greek mercenaries:
"
Alexander's victorious right wing, seeing the Persians opposite them already in flight, now swung left towards the centre, hard-pressed as it was by Darius' Greeks; they forced them back from the river and then, outflanking the broken enemy left, delivered a flank attack on the mercenaries and were soon cuttting them to pieces." - ibid.II.11.2
The Greek
parerrōgos indicates a bursting through the side of the mercenary formations, rather than the translator's 'outflanking the broken enemy left', which includes a 'left' not in the Greek.
In each case the Companions seem to make mincemeat of the opposition without trouble. The fight against the mercenaries at the Granicus seems to have been similarly one-sided in outcome but here the Companions encountered difficulties, judging by the fact that Alexander had a horse killed under him - quite a rarity. This sequence is reconstructed from clues in our sources rather than from an explicit narrative, but for the sake of comparison:
1. Commitment to fight: the Macedonians are determined to crush their opponents, who themselves know they must stand or die (or in the event stand
and die). Neither side flinches.
2. Whether the infantry is penetrated: Alexander according to Diodorus penetrates a little way into the mercenaries and then has his horse killed under him. So yes, but not much; perhaps because with the infantry being attacked from all sides the formation was pushed in from all sides and became too dense to penetrate further. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the Indian (Mallian) example Robert brought to our notice the Macedonian cavalry were perfectly happy about attacking Indian infantry
until the later closed up tightly, perhaps indicating that a lesson in this regard had been learned at the Granicus.
3. Issue in doubt: Alexander's horse was felled with a sword in the side. As we have seen from the artistic examples Duncan showed, Greek hoplites seem to have preferred to attack the rider, so stabbing the horse may have been a
faute-de-mieux for a hoplite who could not reach the rider for reasons of shortness of weapon and/or being constrained by crushed-together comrades. Meanwhile the Macedonians - horse and foot - were pressing in from all sides, so the outcome was really just a matter of time.
4. The final act: the mercenaries were slaughtered by the converging Macedonian attacks before they could do really significant damage. Our sources do however comment that the lion's share of Macedonian losses were taken in this part of the action, so it does look as if a Macedonian wedge got stuck in an inconvenient place at an inconvenient time.
One may note that the problem - a wedge caught because its target was being compressed - and the solution - the wedge rescued because its opponents were squeezed and cut down from all sides - came from the same causes and hence was self-curing after the initial embarrassment.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 04, 2014, 02:49:38 PM
I think I would doubt the ability of medieval cavalry to be able to use the precision described in Justin's wedge tactic.
I would doubt any cavalry having that level of precision. Imagine trying to get your files absolutely lined up, making sure your wedge approaches at right angles and isn't diverted by some quirk of the ground.
A tactic that depended on that level of precision would probably be useless on the battlefield.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2014, 07:55:16 PM
I would doubt any cavalry having that level of precision. Imagine trying to get your files absolutely lined up, making sure your wedge approaches at right angles and isn't diverted by some quirk of the ground.
Getting the files lined up would not be a problem, as every man would know his place and his neighbours. Approaching at right angles is another way of saying approaching head on, and the only man who has to line up precisely is the man leading the wedge, because once he is in position everyone else is lined up on him.
We also have to consider the degree of 'good enough' that would be effective. If the alignment were, say, 3-5 degrees out, would it invalidate the system? I think not. At Issus, Alexander's cavalry crossed the Pinarus at the gallop and still cut through the opposition with total effectiveness. They also sliced through the Greek mercenaries from the flank, and do not seem to have needed a precise 90-degree alignment.
I suspect that to an extent they would have been able to plough their own furrow, having much the same effect if they attacked at a slight angle as if they went precisely between the files. The reason is that in addition to the 3' per man frontal spacing an opposing infantry formation would also have 3' per man front-to-rear spacing (and for that matter a slightly over 4' per man diagonal spacing). All that would really be needed would be to knock the skittles over in a slightly different direction.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2014, 11:05:00 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2014, 07:55:16 PM
I would doubt any cavalry having that level of precision. Imagine trying to get your files absolutely lined up, making sure your wedge approaches at right angles and isn't diverted by some quirk of the ground.
Getting the files lined up would not be a problem, as every man would know his place and his neighbours. Approaching at right angles is another way of saying approaching head on, and the only man who has to line up precisely is the man leading the wedge, because once he is in position everyone else is lined up on him.
We also have to consider the degree of 'good enough' that would be effective. If the alignment were, say, 3-5 degrees out, would it invalidate the system? I think not. At Issus, Alexander's cavalry crossed the Pinarus at the gallop and still cut through the opposition with total effectiveness. They also sliced through the Greek mercenaries from the flank, and do not seem to have needed a precise 90-degree alignment.
If the horses are trained to push through file gaps, all the rider has to do is get the horse to the file gap approximately head-on so it doesn't have to swerve too much and then let it do the rest whilst he gets busy with his lance.
Don't forget the different saddle and the effect of stirrups.
Medieval knights are not comparable to companions when it comes to charging home with a lance
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2014, 11:05:00 PM
We also have to consider the degree of 'good enough' that would be effective. If the alignment were, say, 3-5 degrees out, would it invalidate the system? I think not. At Issus, Alexander's cavalry crossed the Pinarus at the gallop and still cut through the opposition with total effectiveness. They also sliced through the Greek mercenaries from the flank, and do not seem to have needed a precise 90-degree alignment.
I suspect that to an extent they would have been able to plough their own furrow, having much the same effect if they attacked at a slight angle as if they went precisely between the files. The reason is that in addition to the 3' per man frontal spacing an opposing infantry formation would also have 3' per man front-to-rear spacing (and for that matter a slightly over 4' per man diagonal spacing). All that would really be needed would be to knock the skittles over in a slightly different direction.
This seems something of a revision Justin. Previously, the horsemen had to hit the precise point mid-file where the shields touched. Only that way could they spin the enemy out of the way, rather than collide. Are you now conceding collisions may have been inevitable? Your point about the Issus might lead you to pause. Alexander in this case can't have made a precision manouever, yet was still successful. If precision wasn't the key factor, what was? A cavalryman like Nolan would have probably given an answer on the lines of
elan, to which we could add leadership, weapon skills and horsemanship. Our medieval man-at-arms would recognise these too.
And, once again, hoplites aren't wooden skittles. They are armed with spears and shields and are capable of movement, which allows them both to counter attack and brace themselves.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 05, 2014, 06:38:58 AM
If the horses are trained to push through file gaps,
If
We have no evidence that anyone in the ancient world ever achieved this. Have we any evidence that it was achieved even in Napoleonic or later cavalry?
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2014, 09:39:37 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2014, 11:05:00 PM
We also have to consider the degree of 'good enough' that would be effective. If the alignment were, say, 3-5 degrees out, would it invalidate the system? I think not. At Issus, Alexander's cavalry crossed the Pinarus at the gallop and still cut through the opposition with total effectiveness. They also sliced through the Greek mercenaries from the flank, and do not seem to have needed a precise 90-degree alignment.
I suspect that to an extent they would have been able to plough their own furrow, having much the same effect if they attacked at a slight angle as if they went precisely between the files. The reason is that in addition to the 3' per man frontal spacing an opposing infantry formation would also have 3' per man front-to-rear spacing (and for that matter a slightly over 4' per man diagonal spacing). All that would really be needed would be to knock the skittles over in a slightly different direction.
This seems something of a revision Justin. Previously, the horsemen had to hit the precise point mid-file where the shields touched. Only that way could they spin the enemy out of the way, rather than collide. Are you now conceding collisions may have been inevitable? Your point about the Issus might lead you to pause. Alexander in this case can't have made a precision manouever, yet was still successful. If precision wasn't the key factor, what was? A cavalryman like Nolan would have probably given an answer on the lines of elan, to which we could add leadership, weapon skills and horsemanship. Our medieval man-at-arms would recognise these too.
And, once again, hoplites aren't wooden skittles. They are armed with spears and shields and are capable of movement, which allows them both to counter attack and brace themselves.
The point is that a horse is not a go-kart. Approach an infantry line at a few degrees on either side of a right angle - making sure it still hits the point between two shields - and the animal gets the idea it is supposed to pass down the lane between files, which it proceeds to do without needing further direction from the rider, who can focus on more important things like sending the infantry to their ancestors.
Hoplites are not wooden skittles but they are ordinary men who, with or without armament, can be easily shoved to one side by a horse. Bracing won't help.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 10:49:30 AMWe have no evidence that anyone in the ancient world ever achieved this. Have we any evidence that it was achieved even in Napoleonic or later cavalry?
Jim
Sure, if we had evidence we wouldn't be having this discussion. It's a hypothetical exercise, examining if a wedge
could operate in this way as opposed to if it
did. Until someone digs up a scroll of
An Introduction to Cavalry Tactics by Philip we are never going to know for certain if it was done. Napoleonic cavalry of course were differently armed and dealing with very different opponents.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2014, 09:39:37 AM
This seems something of a revision Justin. Previously, the horsemen had to hit the precise point mid-file where the shields touched. Only that way could they spin the enemy out of the way, rather than collide. Are you now conceding collisions may have been inevitable? Your point about the Issus might lead you to pause. Alexander in this case can't have made a precision manouever, yet was still successful. If precision wasn't the key factor, what was? A cavalryman like Nolan would have probably given an answer on the lines of elan, to which we could add leadership, weapon skills and horsemanship. Our medieval man-at-arms would recognise these too.
And, once again, hoplites aren't wooden skittles. They are armed with spears and shields and are capable of movement, which allows them both to counter attack and brace themselves.
Not so much a revision as pointing out that there is more leeway in driving a wedge through a phalanx than a needle through a penny. It is really beside the point whether the system was first explained with everything at utterly precise angles; if it had not been, the diagram would have been a series of blurs which, although perhaps more closely resembling real life in many ways, would not have been so clear and understandable.
We can of course attempt to get out protractors and vector diagrams and guesstimate the maximum angle of offcentredness that would still allow a wedge to cleave through its target without complications: on an individual basis this tends to be self-adjusting because the target tends to look (and face) directly towards a horseman coming in at him, so he sets up a roughly 90 degree impact even if the attacker is coming in at an angle. Even better, because spacing between men in the hoplite phalanx is about the same all the way round, the geometry of domino effects will work at almost any angle provided the targets are facing the cavalry.
We may also remember that such anti-cavalry drill as is depicted in period representations (or at least those we have seen) was designed for use against cavalry with shorter weapons and would thus work
against the hoplites when facing xyston-armed opponents.
I think Justin's point is that the Macedonian cavalry may well have
trained with extreme precision. In action, they would have required less precision than their training demanded. This would give them an 'adaptation reserve', an over-capacity in skill, that would tend to cancel out the mini-friction elements of the battlefield and would mean they performed to the expected standard every time (except once, against the mercenaries at the Granicus, because of the unforeseen results of formation compression, or so I surmise).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 05, 2014, 12:15:25 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 10:49:30 AMWe have no evidence that anyone in the ancient world ever achieved this. Have we any evidence that it was achieved even in Napoleonic or later cavalry?
Jim
Sure, if we had evidence we wouldn't be having this discussion. It's a hypothetical exercise, examining if a wedge could operate in this way as opposed to if it did. Until someone digs up a scroll of An Introduction to Cavalry Tactics by Philip we are never going to know for certain if it was done. Napoleonic cavalry of course were differently armed and dealing with very different opponents.
But it's a meaningless hypothetical exercise because it flies in the face of all we know that can be done with horses. It has as much validity as arguing that men can run a mile in full plate armour across a muddy field in not much more than five minutes. It's hypothetically possible but don't attempt to use the hypothesis to look at Agincourt.
As for arguing that it wasn't done, defending a theory based on there being no contrary evidence is not popular in scientific circles.
Let us simply look at the facts, if cavalry cheerfully knocked infantry out of the way like so many skittles why on earth did they bother with wedges, because in a line each horse is the point of a wedge of one, followed by another line of wedges. In a wedge, the succeeding horses add no weight, all a wedge does is delay the skittle effect.
Similarly if this 'just ride down the files' is so obviously successful why the hell did countless generations of perfectly competent horsemen who'd spent their lives in the saddle wait about whilst horsearchers (or other javelinmen) desperately tried to create a few gaps to charge in. Were they all just incomparably thick or was Philip the man who suddenly woke up in the middle of the night and woke whichever wife he was with at the time with the shout of "Of course, we've being doing it wrong all these centuries."
Jim
PS and edited to add that then you have to explain away why half way through Alexander's reign it was declared unsporting and was never done again
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2014, 12:51:02 PM
We can of course attempt to get out protractors and vector diagrams and guesstimate the maximum angle of offcentredness that would still allow a wedge to cleave through its target without complications: on an individual basis this tends to be self-adjusting because the target tends to look (and face) directly towards a horseman coming in at him, so he sets up a roughly 90 degree impact even if the attacker is coming in at an angle. Even better, because spacing between men in the hoplite phalanx is about the same all the way round, the geometry of domino effects will work at almost any angle provided the targets are facing the cavalry.
I'm not the one arguing about geometry - I'm the cleaver rather than scalpel one. Like Jim, I'm very sceptical of combat techniques which rely on the battlefield for a precision even well-trained troops would struggle with on the drill field. As hinted at in my previous post, I think elan and leadership were the key things in the success of Alexander's Companions, along with a mental shift to seeing themselves as shock cavalry, not glorified skirmishers. Yes, the xyston plays an important role but isn't the key. But I'm unconvinced the discovery of a magic tactic before which all men were powerless but which was forgotten after Alexander's reign plays a part.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 01:17:38 PM
But it's a meaningless hypothetical exercise because it flies in the face of all we know that can be done with horses. It has as much validity as arguing that men can run a mile in full plate armour across a muddy field in not much more than five minutes. It's hypothetically possible but don't attempt to use the hypothesis to look at Agincourt.
We're not asking if a horse can do the manifestly impossible, and the hypothesis is well within the range of what a horse can be trained to do.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 01:17:38 PMAs for arguing that it wasn't done, defending a theory based on there being no contrary evidence is not popular in scientific circles.
But proposing a theory to explain textual evidence that affirms cavalry did attack heavy infantry in a wedge formation is useful. If one can show that a cavalry wedge taking out a hoplite phalanx is possible, then one has a reason for accepting the passages in their obvious and most natural sense.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 01:17:38 PMLet us simply look at the facts, if cavalry cheerfully knocked infantry out of the way like so many skittles why on earth did they bother with wedges, because in a line each horse is the point of a wedge of one, followed by another line of wedges. In a wedge, the succeeding horses add no weight, all a wedge does is delay the skittle effect.
I covered this point earlier. A wedge can do something a line cannot: aim at a precise point. The leading rider of the frontmost file heads for the gap between two shields; the leading riders of the files further back aim for the correct gap points further along the infantry line.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 01:17:38 PMSimilarly if this 'just ride down the files' is so obviously successful why the hell did countless generations of perfectly competent horsemen who'd spent their lives in the saddle wait about whilst horsearchers (or other javelinmen) desperately tried to create a few gaps to charge in. Were they all just incomparably thick or was Philip the man who suddenly woke up in the middle of the night and woke whichever wife he was with at the time with the shout of "Of course, we've being doing it wrong all these centuries."
The real question is why didn't someone before Philip come up with the idea that if you give your infantry longer spears than their opponents your men can form a human hedgehog and turn anyone in front of them into a pincushion? The Macedonian phalangite made all forms of infantryman before him obsolete, but he was invented only after - what - 3000 years of organised warfare?
The truth is that good ideas can take a very long time to think up. Everyone knows that hot air rises, but it had to wait for the Montgolfier brothers before something as simple as a hot air balloon was invented. My own impression is that with the arrival of Rome all the creative thinking re military armament and tactics was exhausted. Everything afterwards until the invention of gunpowder was variations on a theme. During the era of Philip though a lot of innovation was going on.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 01:17:38 PMPS and edited to add that then you have to explain away why half way through Alexander's reign it was declared unsporting and was never done again
Against the Macedonian phalanx this tactic was ineffective and once everyone had adopted the phalanx it became obsolete.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 05, 2014, 05:30:15 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 01:17:38 PM
But it's a meaningless hypothetical exercise because it flies in the face of all we know that can be done with horses. It has as much validity as arguing that men can run a mile in full plate armour across a muddy field in not much more than five minutes. It's hypothetically possible but don't attempt to use the hypothesis to look at Agincourt.
We're not asking if a horse can do the manifestly impossible, and the hypothesis is well within the range of what a horse can be trained to do.
Sorry but have you any evidence groups of thousands of horses being trained to charge unbroken close order infantry frontally?
When you look at those later knights who charged into unbroken Swiss pike blocks the one thing you notice is that they had full armour
This includes eye protection, (and probably the equivilent of blinkers worn under that if only to protect the eye from the armour) so the horse had less idea about what was going on than the rider.
To base a hypothesis on something which is not known to be possible and has never been shown to be possible is a waste of time.
Rather than worrying about geometry how about showing some evidence that the core of your hypothesis is at all possible
Note you are not "proposing a theory to explain textual evidence that affirms cavalry did attack heavy infantry in a wedge formation"
There is no textual evidence to show that Macedonian cavalry did this against Hoplites at Chaeronea, there is no textual evidence to show that Macedonian cavalry were even present at Chaeronea.
For the whole wedge thing, it's main advantage seems to be ease of maneuvering on the battlefield.
Then you stop to think about it, a line is merely a long string of one horse wedges.
In a line each one has enough space within the space given him to swerve a foot to either side to hit the gap and run down the files if this is actually possible, we have to get over the wargamers assumption that stuff is glued to the base.
With your wedge you actually build this ability for the following files to have this flexibility, otherwise if the lead horse gets it wrong the entire wedge stops, embarrassed and glares at the poor sap at the point who misjudged it and brought them all to a juddering halt
The reason it didn't happen before Philip is because competent horsemen knew what could and couldn't be done.
The reason Philip didn't do it is because he'd had a lifetime amongst horses and knew what they would and wouldn't do.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 05, 2014, 05:30:15 PM
But proposing a theory to explain textual evidence that affirms cavalry did attack heavy infantry in a wedge formation is useful. If one can show that a cavalry wedge taking out a hoplite phalanx is possible, then one has a reason for accepting the passages in their obvious and most natural sense.
Did we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry attacked heavy infantry in wedge formation? The wedge evidence I've seen so far is from tactical manuals that says the Macedonian cavalry used it, mainly for manoeuver advantage but also for penetration of enemy formations (type unspecified). Patrick has a rather literal interpretation of some passages about Chaeronea as referring to a wedge but this is speculation. There don't seem to have been any other references to wedges and infantry, just inference, so part of a case rather evidence.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2014, 06:53:43 PM
Did we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry attacked heavy infantry in wedge formation? The wedge evidence I've seen so far is from tactical manuals that says the Macedonian cavalry used it, mainly for manoeuver advantage but also for penetration of enemy formations (type unspecified). Patrick has a rather literal interpretation of some passages about Chaeronea as referring to a wedge but this is speculation. There don't seem to have been any other references to wedges and infantry, just inference, so part of a case rather evidence.
This may be the wrong kind of question: do we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry of this period attacked heavy infantry in line formation? For that matter, do we have a specific reference to Roman soldiers throwing pila point-first? Macedonian cavalry are on occasion specified as entering wedge (embolos), e.g. Arrian I.6.6, and it seems reasonable to surmise that this was their standard attack formation. Our sources' sources most probably took it for granted and so did not make a point of specifying the fact.
One thing we can do is narrow possible options down to a limited range of likely choices. In the case of Chaeronea, Alexander either led an infantry assault or a cavalry assault to break through the Theban Sacred Band. Putting him with an infantry assault requires (at least in my judgement) uncomfortably straining our sources and our knowledge of Macedonian tactics and customs whereas putting him at the head of a cavalry assault does not (it does strain our beliefs about cavalry-infantry relationships but these are mostly founded on different cultures). Furthermore, extrapolating back from the fact that in every major battle against a Persian army (Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela) Alexander charged hoplites at the head of his cavalry, one can see him doing the same at Chaeronea. Same army, same tactical system, same type of opponent.
The one speculative part of the arrangement is how it would have worked. Objecting to aspects of this is all well and good provided it is rationally done and it may be that the proposed model was not the way things actually worked. It nevertheless seems good enough to me pending a better suggestion, given the hoplite tactics portrayed in art and the novelty of cavalry whose weapons outreached those of the hoplites, plus taking account of the quality of Macedonian cavalry.
While on the subject of asking the wrong kind of question:
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 06:44:46 PM
Sorry but have you any evidence [of] groups of thousands of horses being trained to charge unbroken close order infantry frontally?
Well, one could go on about a stampede, natural herd instinct and so on, but the stipulation is unrealistic. Macedonian cavalry would have trained in their basic fighting units, the c.200-man
ilai. 200 men and 200 horses (trained fighting men and warhorses) would have much training and long experience of operating together as a unit. They would also be accustomed to have the other
ilai charging at their side, and they could be expected to have a very high degree of individual and collective horsemanship.
On the matter of horses,
listen very carefully for I shall say this only once. ;)
Horses do what they are trained to do. In the late mediaeval era some were even trained to jump ranks of enemy soldiers (I am sure Anthony can give us details and caveats regarding this practice). What an untrained horse does in the 21st century or did in any previous century is not really relevant. What trained horses can or could do is. (Cue debate on stunt animals ...)
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There is no textual evidence to show that Macedonian cavalry did this against Hoplites at Chaeronea, there is no textual evidence to show that Macedonian cavalry were even present at Chaeronea.
There is of course no textual evidence to show that they did not. However on the subject of Macedonian cavalry being present, might I put in a word from that Sicilian fellow Diodorus?
"
So Philip failed to get the support of the Boeotians, but nevertheless decided to fight both of the allies together. He waited for the last of his laggard confederates to arrive, and then marched into Boeotia. His forces came to more than thirty thousand infantry and no less than two thousand cavalry." - Diodorus XVI.85.5
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The reason it didn't happen before Philip is because competent horsemen knew what could and couldn't be done.
The reason Philip didn't do it is because he'd had a lifetime amongst horses and knew what they would and wouldn't do.
I could be cruel and put Jim to specific proof that 'it' a) could not be done and b) did not occur. After all, if I am asked to substantiate a hypothesis it is only fair that my fellow SoA member be asked to substantiate an assertion. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2014, 07:46:30 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2014, 06:53:43 PM
Did we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry attacked heavy infantry in wedge formation? The wedge evidence I've seen so far is from tactical manuals that says the Macedonian cavalry used it, mainly for manoeuver advantage but also for penetration of enemy formations (type unspecified). Patrick has a rather literal interpretation of some passages about Chaeronea as referring to a wedge but this is speculation. There don't seem to have been any other references to wedges and infantry, just inference, so part of a case rather evidence.
This may be the wrong kind of question: do we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry of this period attacked heavy infantry in line formation? For that matter, do we have a specific reference to Roman soldiers throwing pila point-first? Macedonian cavalry are on occasion specified as entering wedge (embolos), e.g. Arrian I.6.6, and it seems reasonable to surmise that this was their standard attack formation. Our sources' sources most probably took it for granted and so did not make a point of specifying the fact.
One thing we can do is narrow possible options down to a limited range of likely choices. In the case of Chaeronea, Alexander either led an infantry assault or a cavalry assault to break through the Theban Sacred Band. Putting him with an infantry assault requires (at least in my judgement) uncomfortably straining our sources and our knowledge of Macedonian tactics and customs
What evidence to we have of Macedonian tactics prior to 334BC that Macedonian Kings/Crown Princes could not lead infantry?
But yes, putting an ephebe in the front rank of any combat strains everything we know of Hellenic warfare and we've no real reason to assume the Macedonians were any different
To your comment "I could be cruel and put Jim to specific proof that 'it' a) could not be done and b) did not occur. After all, if I am asked to substantiate a hypothesis it is only fair that my fellow SoA member be asked to substantiate an assertion." I merely answer the following
I have spent a lot of time over the last few decades reading military history. I have not come across any examples of it happening therefore I assert that it probably didn't
Of course if you produce one example where it did happen,,,,
Jim
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2014, 07:46:30 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2014, 06:53:43 PM
Did we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry attacked heavy infantry in wedge formation? The wedge evidence I've seen so far is from tactical manuals that says the Macedonian cavalry used it, mainly for manoeuver advantage but also for penetration of enemy formations (type unspecified). Patrick has a rather literal interpretation of some passages about Chaeronea as referring to a wedge but this is speculation. There don't seem to have been any other references to wedges and infantry, just inference, so part of a case rather evidence.
This may be the wrong kind of question: do we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry of this period attacked heavy infantry in line formation? For that matter, do we have a specific reference to Roman soldiers throwing pila point-first? Macedonian cavalry are on occasion specified as entering wedge (embolos), e.g. Arrian I.6.6, and it seems reasonable to surmise that this was their standard attack formation. Our sources' sources most probably took it for granted and so did not make a point of specifying the fact.
Forgive me, but I do think it is the right question. If absence of specific evidence is positive evidence that something happened, then we are doing it wrong. We are speculating for much of this (as Justin himself keeps reminding us) - it is about plausibility. And it has been said before, we have different conceptions of the weight we should place on things when judging what is plausible.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2014, 08:27:53 PM
Forgive me, but I do think it is the right question. If absence of specific evidence is positive evidence that something happened, then we are doing it wrong. We are speculating for much of this (as Justin himself keeps reminding us) - it is about plausibility. And it has been said before, we have different conceptions of the weight we should place on things when judging what is plausible.
The question seems to distil down to whether the more reasonable of a pair of alternative explanations should be discarded because there seems to be no explicit quote either in its favour or against it. Were there an explicit quote either way this thread would not have been started: in order to get anywhere with the topic we have to sift and assemble clues and extrapolate trends. Having done this, the Alexander-led-a-cavalry-wedge-in-a-frontal-attack explanation seems to me to be way ahead of the alternatives, and the objections to it, when not limited to unvarnished opinion, have so far tended to bring up evidence which favours this having been the case. Discarding it for lack of explicit support when it seems well favoured with implicit support seems to me as myopic as it would be to accept it uncritically for lack of explicit opposition.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2014, 07:59:09 PM
But yes, putting an ephebe in the front rank of any combat strains everything we know of Hellenic warfare and we've no real reason to assume the Macedonians were any different
We have every reason to assume that Macedonians
were different. Their culture was different (they did not have the
polis as their major social and administrative unit), their language seems to have been different*, their political system was different (monarchy), their army was different (relying on cavalry with infantry as afterthoughts). Once they got going we no longer had Hellenic warfare, but Hellenistic warfare - a rather different approach.
*There is a long-running dispute over this, with opposite parties citing on the one hand Plutarch's Alexander 51.4:
"
But one of his body-guards, Aristophanes, conveyed it away before he could lay hands on it, and the rest surrounded him and begged him to desist, whereupon he sprang to his feet and called out in Macedonian speech a summons to his corps of guards (and this was a sign of great disturbance), and ordered the trumpeter to sound, and smote him with his fist because he hesitated and was unwilling to do so."
and on the other the use of Greek by Macedonian kings in their decrees.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2014, 11:56:53 PM
The question seems to distil down to whether the more reasonable of a pair of alternative explanations should be discarded because there seems to be no explicit quote either in its favour or against it.
I'm suggesting that it should be discarded not because there is no explicit quote, but that there is no explicit quote which allows us to state that something happened that never happened before and that appears never to have happened again in the history of mounted warfare. The 'reasonable' explanation demands that Philip discovered a technique that he used only once, that Alexander might have used once with less success and that was never used again, and was never rediscovered by tens if not hundreds of thousands of cavalry commanders in the approximately 1800 years that followed. Even through they had the same problem to deal with.
This secondary issue is explained away by saying that the Companions were uniquely professional, even through the ones who fought under Philip would not have spent as long under arms as those who fought on Alexander's campaigns or those who fought under some of the Successors and certainly didn't train and drill to anything like the extent of the men of a Roman Cavalry Ala.
And as for the fact that 'Horses do what they are trained to do', fine. Let us have an example that shows them charging into elite, ordered spear armed units from the front and riding them down.
A hypothesis which does not advance with regular underpinnings of evidence drawn from fact is void.
As for Macedonians being different, yes, fair enough, but the descriptions of the battles come from Greek authors, and when they say a General led his men to victory, Generals can do this without drawing a sword.
Given the point that
1) there was no mention of any cavalry fighting or charging infantry
2) Alexander was 17 and even Spartan kings fought with a front rank of bodyguard
I think it follows the literary evidence, with less need to spin a hypothesis which demands things to happen that never happened before and were never to happen again, that the Theban Sacred Band where defeated by Phalangites. It might be that the Phalanx was composed of an elite bodyguard given to Alexander for the day,perhaps the foot companions had been split between Philip and Alexander.
Alexander could well have been in their ranks, he might have been near the front, but probably not too near the front because there were far better fighters available and things hadn't got that desperate that the muscle, power and experience of a seventeen year old were necessary
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2014, 07:44:33 AM
I'm suggesting that it should be discarded not because there is no explicit quote, but that there is no explicit quote which allows us to state that something happened that never happened before and that appears never to have happened again in the history of mounted warfare. The 'reasonable' explanation demands that Philip discovered a technique that he used only once, that Alexander might have used once with less success and that was never used again, and was never rediscovered by tens if not hundreds of thousands of cavalry commanders in the approximately 1800 years that followed. Even through they had the same problem to deal with.
But here is the nub of the matter: they did not have the same problem to deal with. The hoplite had effectively vanished from warfare, never to return. Throughout the Hellenistic era, the infantry who mattered were pikemen, whose reach prevented cavalry from making effective frontal attacks.
Can anyone remember why WRG rules decided that super-heavy cataphracts (read 'cataphracts') were effective frontally against pikes? Was this based on some form of reasoning or just taken as given for reasons unknown?
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This secondary issue is explained away by saying that the Companions were uniquely professional, even through the ones who fought under Philip would not have spent as long under arms as those who fought on Alexander's campaigns or those who fought under some of the Successors and certainly didn't train and drill to anything like the extent of the men of a Roman Cavalry Ala.
Philip reigned from 359 to 336 BC; Alexander from 336 to 323. Philip's cavalrymen had the potential for longer experience (he would have developed his cavalry following his success at the Crocus Field in 353/2 BC, giving his men up to 14 years' experience prior to Chaeronea; Alexander's reign lasted 13 years). We should perhaps remember that the majority of Successor cavalry were cleruchs whose efforts were diverted by their landholdings, whereas Philip's cavalry, being essentially noble, could pass this boring stuff on to lesser mortals and enjoy themselves on horseback rather more.
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And as for the fact that 'Horses do what they are trained to do', fine. Let us have an example that shows them charging into elite, ordered spear armed units from the front and riding them down.
Chaeronea. Out of interest, how many elite, ordered spear-armed units where there? Apart from the Sacred Band, presumably only Spartans qualify, which means it is a pity we do not have a detailed account of the 'battle of mice' fought near Megalopolis by Antipater against Agis (III) in 331 BC. (Curiously enough, Diodorus records Agis as being slain by javelins after being carried wounded from the battle.) Unless one can count Darius' mercenary Greeks as 'elite' and 'ordered' it also means this is a rather loaded and narrow request. ;)
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As for Macedonians being different, yes, fair enough, but the descriptions of the battles come from Greek authors, and when they say a General led his men to victory, Generals can do this without drawing a sword.
But Macedonian generals did so at the head of their troops. Greek authors would not transfer 21st century attitudes into Macedonian culture. Whence comes this idea that Macedonian heirs were cosseted?
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I think it follows the literary evidence, with less need to spin a hypothesis which demands things to happen that never happened before and were never to happen again, that the Theban Sacred Band where defeated by Phalangites. It might be that the Phalanx was composed of an elite bodyguard given to Alexander for the day,perhaps the foot companions had been split between Philip and Alexander.
Using the standards set as a hurdle for the cavalry wedge attack proposal:
1) there was no mention of any infantry fighting or charging infantry
2) Alexander was 17 and even Spartan kings fought with a front rank of bodyguard
so he could not have been 'first' through the Theban line and this idea thus contradicts our sources, i.e. there is literary evidence against it.
Furthermore, the Alex-was-in-a-phalanx hypothesis hangs on one word - sarissas - used in connection with the demise of the Sacred Band. We note that the word does not appear in Greek prior to the rise of Macedon (if it does I could not find it), which suggests it is not a Greek word. If it is a Macedonian word, it may be the Macedonian equivalent of the Greek
doru, the generalised spear word, and hence able to refer to both cavalry's and infantry's long pointy sticks. The existence of a Macedonian contingent named 'sarissophoroi' in any event allows us to suggest that Alexander could have led this unit against the Sacred Band, so either way there are no literary problems with the cavalry wedge.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2014, 11:09:21 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2014, 07:44:33 AM
I'm suggesting that it should be discarded not because there is no explicit quote, but that there is no explicit quote which allows us to state that something happened that never happened before and that appears never to have happened again in the history of mounted warfare. The 'reasonable' explanation demands that Philip discovered a technique that he used only once, that Alexander might have used once with less success and that was never used again, and was never rediscovered by tens if not hundreds of thousands of cavalry commanders in the approximately 1800 years that followed. Even through they had the same problem to deal with.
But here is the nub of the matter: they did not have the same problem to deal with. The hoplite had effectively vanished from warfare, never to return. Throughout the Hellenistic era, the infantry who mattered were pikemen, whose reach prevented cavalry from making effective frontal attacks.
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And were then replaced by Legionaries who were from the cavalry's point of view inferior hoplites with no pike to prevent cavalry just riding down the files.
But the cavalry had forgotten how to do this and never remembered again
Your second point
"Philip reigned from 359 to 336 BC; Alexander from 336 to 323. Philip's cavalrymen had the potential for longer experience (he would have developed his cavalry following his success at the Crocus Field in 353/2 BC, giving his men up to 14 years' experience prior to Chaeronea; Alexander's reign lasted 13 years). We should perhaps remember that the majority of Successor cavalry were cleruchs whose efforts were diverted by their landholdings, whereas Philip's cavalry, being essentially noble, could pass this boring stuff on to lesser mortals and enjoy themselves on horseback rather more."
Actually a lot of Philips men were Cleruchs, he is recorded as handing out land to support men. And since when did being a noble mean you had time to do more drill? If that was so the best drilled cavalry of all time would have been in Medieval France
Chaeronea? We have no evidence that cavalry was even involved in the fighting!
The Alexander as phalangite hypothesis hangs on three facts
1) We KNOW that phalangites were involved in the fighting
2) We have NO evidence that cavalry were involved fighting the sacred band or that Philip or Alexander fought on horseback that day
3) There is a reference, made by a greek at least three hundred years afterwards, that the wounds were made by Sarissas. As the only sarissophoroi we appear to know of were (and I think Duncan said this) light cavalry scouts, then according to you Alexander charged not at the head of the companions but at the head of a bunch of light cavalry.
If light cavalry could take down elite hoplites you can see why they rapidly disappeared from the army and the nobility who made up the companions ensured that the histories were very vaguely written :-)
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2014, 11:09:21 AM
so he could not have been 'first' through the Theban line and this idea thus contradicts our sources, i.e. there is literary evidence against it.
As for Alexander being 'First' through the Theban line, I wouldn't put too much (or any) weight on this.
Legends accumulated around Alexander very quickly. Remember that Onesicritus who was apparently with the army, recorded the tale of Thalestris and Alexander. When it was told in the presence of Lycimachus the latter is said to have laughed and commented that he must have been off duty that night.
To try and re-write the history of cavalry warfare based on a throw away line about Alexander being first through a line is nonsense. Remember that at the very least it was written by somebody looking back on Alexander the God, so of course he'd be first through the line.
Jim
QuoteAnd were then replaced by Legionaries who were from the cavalry's point of view inferior hoplites with no pike to prevent cavalry just riding down the files.
But the cavalry had forgotten how to do this and never remembered again
Not quite. There are references to earlier Republican Roman cavalry charging
through their own infantry to attack the enemy. Sure, the infantrymen would have moved so as not to be shoved (too much) by the horses, the the point is it proves the file system made it pretty easy for horses to pass through infantry - at speed.
And it is possible that the cavalry had not forgotten how to do it, but neither had the infantry forgotten how it was done, and had devised an anti-file-slice tactic accordingly. The Romans for example: all they would need to do is rotate their oval shields 90 degrees and overlap them so that the top and bottom end of each shield rests on a different man. That should,
a priori, stop a horse. Just an idea.
Quote3) There is a reference, made by a greek at least three hundred years afterwards, that the wounds were made by Sarissas. As the only sarissophoroi we appear to know of were (and I think Duncan said this) light cavalry scouts, then according to you Alexander charged not at the head of the companions but at the head of a bunch of light cavalry.
I don't know about anyone else, but somehow I cannot equate carting a 13' sarissa around the place with the idea of light scouting. Light cavalry scouts are, well,
light, n'est-ce pas? ;) What was the sarissa for?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2014, 12:44:42 PM
QuoteAnd were then replaced by Legionaries who were from the cavalry's point of view inferior hoplites with no pike to prevent cavalry just riding down the files.
But the cavalry had forgotten how to do this and never remembered again
Not quite. There are references to earlier Republican Roman cavalry charging through their own infantry to attack the enemy. Sure, the infantrymen would have moved so as not to be shoved (too much) by the horses, the the point is it proves the file system made it pretty easy for horses to pass through infantry - at speed.
The Spartans file system allowed young hoplites to charge out of the ranks to attack light troops, so obviously by this reckoning it would have allowed Theban or Athenian hoplites to charge into their ranks, because the file system made it pretty easy for infantry to pass through infantry, also at speed. ;D
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2014, 12:44:42 PM
Quote3) There is a reference, made by a greek at least three hundred years afterwards, that the wounds were made by Sarissas. As the only sarissophoroi we appear to know of were (and I think Duncan said this) light cavalry scouts, then according to you Alexander charged not at the head of the companions but at the head of a bunch of light cavalry.
I don't know about anyone else, but somehow I cannot equate carting a 13' sarissa around the place with the idea of light scouting. Light cavalry scouts are, well, light, n'est-ce pas? ;) What was the sarissa for?
This one you can take up with Duncan and all the others who have agreed with this
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2014, 01:14:27 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2014, 12:44:42 PM
QuoteAnd were then replaced by Legionaries who were from the cavalry's point of view inferior hoplites with no pike to prevent cavalry just riding down the files.
But the cavalry had forgotten how to do this and never remembered again
Not quite. There are references to earlier Republican Roman cavalry charging through their own infantry to attack the enemy. Sure, the infantrymen would have moved so as not to be shoved (too much) by the horses, the the point is it proves the file system made it pretty easy for horses to pass through infantry - at speed.
The Spartans file system allowed young hoplites to charge out of the ranks to attack light troops, so obviously by this reckoning it would have allowed Theban or Athenian hoplites to charge into their ranks, because the file system made it pretty easy for infantry to pass through infantry, also at speed. ;D
Jim
Mmmm....try holding a 3' wide shield in front of you and then using it to barge your way between two files of burly Spartan hoplites whose own shields touch or even overlap. If you are The Rock you might just do it...
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2014, 12:44:42 PM
Not quite. There are references to earlier Republican Roman cavalry charging through their own infantry to attack the enemy. Sure, the infantrymen would have moved so as not to be shoved (too much) by the horses, the the point is it proves the file system made it pretty easy for horses to pass through infantry - at speed.
We have accounts of scythed chariots and elephants moving through lanes in hostile troops. The key is that these were opened to let the chariot/elephant through - they didn't permanently exist. It is possible that Republican Roman infantry could also open lanes to let cavalry through. There is also, to me, a significant difference between moving through a group of people trying to stay out of your way and a group trying to block your way and kill you.
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And it is possible that the cavalry had not forgotten how to do it, but neither had the infantry forgotten how it was done, and had devised an anti-file-slice tactic accordingly. The Romans for example: all they would need to do is rotate their oval shields 90 degrees and overlap them so that the top and bottom end of each shield rests on a different man. That should, a priori, stop a horse. Just an idea.
Given we have no evidence for it, we must assume it was a highly successful tactic until a counter measure was dreamed up, then forgotten about :)
I do think the argument is getting rather cyclic though. Perhaps a fresh angle, like why did Macedonian scouting light cavalry have very long spears as Justin asks, is what is needed - perhaps as part of a Alexanders cavalry - what sorts were there and what did they all contribute to his success thread?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2014, 03:05:26 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2014, 01:14:27 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2014, 12:44:42 PM
QuoteAnd were then replaced by Legionaries who were from the cavalry's point of view inferior hoplites with no pike to prevent cavalry just riding down the files.
But the cavalry had forgotten how to do this and never remembered again
Not quite. There are references to earlier Republican Roman cavalry charging through their own infantry to attack the enemy. Sure, the infantrymen would have moved so as not to be shoved (too much) by the horses, the the point is it proves the file system made it pretty easy for horses to pass through infantry - at speed.
The Spartans file system allowed young hoplites to charge out of the ranks to attack light troops, so obviously by this reckoning it would have allowed Theban or Athenian hoplites to charge into their ranks, because the file system made it pretty easy for infantry to pass through infantry, also at speed. ;D
Jim
Mmmm....try holding a 3' wide shield in front of you and then using it to barge your way between two files of burly Spartan hoplites whose own shields touch or even overlap. If you are The Rock you might just do it...
I merely used your own example to show how silly it was, what is possible, moving from the back of a friendly unit to the front of a friendly unit, may not be possible if done from the front of a hostile unit trying to move to the back of a hostile unit
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on May 06, 2014, 03:32:32 PM
I do think the argument is getting rather cyclic though. Perhaps a fresh angle, like why did Macedonian scouting light cavalry have very long spears as Justin asks, is what is needed - perhaps as part of a Alexanders cavalry - what sorts were there and what did they all contribute to his success thread?
Good idea. To help it along, I posit that any mounted unit armed with sarissas is meant to charge opponents, which automatically classifies it as shock, heavy cavalry.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2014, 06:24:01 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 06, 2014, 03:32:32 PM
I do think the argument is getting rather cyclic though. Perhaps a fresh angle, like why did Macedonian scouting light cavalry have very long spears as Justin asks, is what is needed - perhaps as part of a Alexanders cavalry - what sorts were there and what did they all contribute to his success thread?
Good idea. To help it along, I posit that any mounted unit armed with sarissas is meant to charge opponents, which automatically classifies it as shock, heavy cavalry.
Fair point. No reason why scouting should just be done by specialist light cavalry. Medieval armies used their knights and men-at-arms for this and they were certainly shock cavalry.
The idea that sarissaphoroi were, or became, scouts seems to rest on their later designation as prodromoi, which literally suggests 'runners before', plus some examples of actual scouting. In Arrian III.7.7 the prodromoi report a sighting of enemy cavalry, and in III.8.1 Alexander takes the ile basilike, one ile of Companions and his Paeonians prodromon to deal with them. Prodromon here may mean 'at speed' or simply 'in advance', or even both, as the main body of the army are told to follow at their own pace.
If the prodromoi were given a scouting role it may well have dated from Alexander's reign: when Alexander was operating in Thrace and Illyria just after his accession there are no references to scouts but a few to him 'receiving messages', making me wonder if the sarissophoroi (who are not mentioned, sources being similarly quiet about prodromoi) were as yet not rearmed with xystons or were away with Parmenio, or both. They are present at the Granicus, commanded by Aretes and termed 'sarissophoroi' there, but following the Granicus there are no references to sarissophoroi and when Aretes is next mentioned he is commanding prodromoi.
However the prodromoi were also effective shock troops: at Gaugamela, the Persian left, around 20,000 strong, is broken by "the powerful assault of Aretes and his men" (Arrian III.14.3). As sarissophoroi, they led the assault across the Granicus together with the Paeonians (another useful shock contingent) plus supporting infantry (archers and Agrianes) and the Macedonian cavalry squadron of the day.
Curiously enough, Arrian renames the sarissophoroi in mid-battle: in I.14.1 they are sarissophorous hippeas but once they cross the river in I.14.6 they are prodromous hippeas. For the rest of Arrian's history they are prodromoi, still commanded by Aretes.
The sarissophoroi/prodromoi and the Paeonians both exhibited this dual-use capability: not only did they seem to do vanguard work and scouting, they also did much shock work at the sharp end on the battlefield. One wonders if the prodromoi would use lances when scouting; they would certainly find them helpful in battle.
For interest, here is a diagram (to be incorporated in an article on the subject) of a complete cavalry
ile - 256 horsemen - charging in wedge an infantry formation of 300 men, 50 files wide and 6 ranks deep. Presuming it was the sarissophoroi who left their sarissas in the Sacred Band, the diagram shows that one ile attacking the Sacred Band was a feasible proposition. The wedge is only a little wider than the 300-man phalanx. It is exactly 16 ranks deep from the tip of the wedge to the rear baseline, which itself is 31 horses wide. Add a few men to the Sacred Band and/or shave a few men from the ile and the correspondence will be exact (not that it needs to be of course).
A wedge in motion must have been an impressive sight.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/full%20cavalry%20wedge.png)
not sure if this has been covered elsewhere in the thread but I was under the impression that a wedge is more likely to become a rhombus in actuality?
For Thessalians, yes, Dave. Less sure it would apply to others.
My one observation on Justin's diagram is that a wedge might work best if the men in the respective ranks overlapped rather than being strictly follow-my-leader. Hence the ranks increase in a succession 1,2,3,4,5 etc. rather than 1,3,5,7 etc. This seems to be the traditional understanding of a wedge formation, although it would be unwise to discard alternatives without good reason.
This more traditional arrangement would give an ile of 210 men (or 190 on a bad day?) with a base width of 20 horses rather than 31. If this is correct, then Alex could have attacked the Sacred Band four files off dead centre and had enough room for another ile to join the fun four files in from the join where the Sacred Band prolonged the Theban hoplite line or four files from its outer flank, which would presumably have linked with the Theban cavalry.
Alternatively, if the Macedonian cavalry had attacked in a 'wedge of wedges', with Alex's wedge spearheading and two other ilai positioned so their wedge tips were adjacent to the rear corners of his own ile, he could have ridden through the centre of the Sacred Band and the two following wedges would have cleaned up anything he missed (the two remaining ilai I would ascribe to his wing would either have been dealing with Theban cavalry or following up in support). An arrangement of this nature may account for the Sacred Band suffering 100% casualties - and it would make sense for a leading wedge to have supports to create an expanded rupture of the enemy line rather than to punch an isolated hole and then look a bit foolish on its own in the enemy rear.
I think this imaginative reconstruction fails the test of the Sacred Band falling in heaps with their wounds to the front. If cavalry charged through as posited then they would have bowled over the Banders who would have been crushed and bowled aside by the horses's chests. Cavalry destroy infantry when the infantry run and are speared from behind, generally not when they stand in their ranks.
Roy
We are back again to what Plutarch intended his words to convey. Philip hasn't received a CSI report that says all the enemy have received penetrating wounds to the front from sarissa thrusts. Plutarch is saying that the Sacred Band didn't break but fell where they fought - unlike some of their allies. I'm not sure he intends us to interpret the type of combat, infantry or cavalry. In fact, the most likely circumstance which would create a stand where everyone dies in a heap, all facing the front, is if they had formed an allround defence and fought to the last. This would not fit with a reconstruction where Alexander overruns the Sacred Band in the first minutes, causing mass demoralisation, but rather that they were surrounded and killed later.
I'm about halfway through an article on the subject. The text of Diodorus is interesting, in that he gives details that seem to be authentic as opposed to being made up:
| Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight. |
This seems a different kind of fight to that led by Philip on the right flank:
| Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for the victory. |
Notice that the infantry line on the Greek right flank is 'ruptured' several times, 'gaps' are opened, but the line is not immediately broken. It is only a little later that Alexander (or the troops led by Alexander) 'forced his way through the line' causing the Greeks to rout.
I'm reminded of the deployment of the Macedonians at Issus, as given by Diodorus:
| He roused his soldiers with appropriate words for a decisive effort and marshalled the battalions of foot and the squadrons of horse appropriately to the location. He set the cavalry along the front of the whole army, and ordered the infantry phalanx to remain in reserve behind it.
He himself advanced at the head of the right wing to the encounter, having with him the best of the mounted troops. |
The battlefield at Issus was narrow, as was the battlefield at Chaeronea. Hypothesizing that the Macedonian cavalry deployed
in front of the infantry at Chaeronea, the text of Diodorus then makes sense. Commanding several wedges of ilia, Alexander was the first to slice though the hoplite line, his sarissophoroi passing between the files of the hoplites and killing many as they did so. The following ilia did the same, and the Greek phalanx was punctured but not yet destroyed. Its final demolition came from the following Macedonian phalanx, which overran the decimated Greek line, causing it to rout.
To be honest the battle on the Macedonian right flank reads more like an infantry struggle. Philip 'forced back the troops stationed before him and then ... compelling them to flee'. Philip, like Alexander, leads the attack 'also in person', which precludes the notion that Alexander did not actually lead his own attack, but just took credit for it. Was Philip mounted? Most probably yes if Alexander was. Did he lead a cavalry wedge through the Greek infantry? The text does not say, but I can't imagine how he could lead an attack in person any other way.
What is curious about Diodorus's account is that the battle rages for some time in the balance before Alexander and Philip make their decisive attacks. This implies an infantry engagement before the Macedonian cavalry was committed. This is confirmed by Polyaenus:
| Engaging the Athenians at Chaeroneia, Philippus made a sham retreat: and Stratocles, the Athenian general, ordered his men to push forwards, crying out, "We will pursue them to the heart of Macedonia." Philippus observed, "The Athenians know not how to conquer:" and ordered his phalanx to keep close and firm, and to retreat slowly, covering themselves with their shields from the attacks of the enemy. As soon as he had by the manoeuvre drawn them from their advantageous ground, and gained an eminence, he halted; and encouraging his troops to a vigorous assault, he attacked the Athenians and won a brilliant victory. - Strategems 4.2.2 |
Perhaps the best way to understand this is a drawn-out infantry engagement on the Macedonian right flank since the 'advantageous ground' of the Athenians precluded an effective cavalry charge. It is only once the Athenians have been drawn onto level ground that Philip, leading the cavalry, could attack them. This of course implies that his cavalry were on the flank of his phalanx and kept step with it as it retreated. Once it was on the high ground - or more importantly, once the Athenians were on the flat - then Philip was able to give them the wedge treatment which the phalanx, or fresh troops stationed behind the cavalry, could exploit. A hypothesis. :)
Quote from: Erpingham on June 01, 2014, 02:49:30 PM
We are back again to what Plutarch intended his words to convey. Philip hasn't received a CSI report that says all the enemy have received penetrating wounds to the front from sarissa thrusts. Plutarch is saying that the Sacred Band didn't break but fell where they fought - unlike some of their allies. I'm not sure he intends us to interpret the type of combat, infantry or cavalry. In fact, the most likely circumstance which would create a stand where everyone dies in a heap, all facing the front, is if they had formed an allround defence and fought to the last. This would not fit with a reconstruction where Alexander overruns the Sacred Band in the first minutes, causing mass demoralisation, but rather that they were surrounded and killed later.
Good to have you back, Mr Clipsom. :)
One might wonder about the geometry of:
Quote
In fact, the most likely circumstance which would create a stand where everyone dies in a heap, all facing the front, is if they had formed an all round defence and fought to the last.
The intent is evidently that an all-round defence requires any casualties to take their wounds in front. Might I suggest that an overwhelmingly effective frontal cavalry attack would have the same effect, with the important (from our point of view) advantage that the defenders - who being the Sacred Band would indeed not have routed but would have died where they stood - could receive their sarissa-inflicted badges of honour while all facing the same direction?
Alas that we still have no mention in the sources that this was a cavalry attack, nor have we any cavalry armed with Sarissa other than the light scouts
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on June 01, 2014, 10:52:51 PM
Alas that we still have no mention in the sources that this was a cavalry attack, nor have we any cavalry armed with Sarissa other than the light scouts
Jim
The point though is that a cavalry unit armed with sarissas by definition has a shock role in battle, even if it does scout the rest of the time.
As jim says though, what cavalry, what sarissas?
Just to respond to Justin's note on sarissa armed cavalry having, by definition a shock role. Later steppe cavalry often carry long spears in a light role. I tend to think that this may well be to deal with other light cavalry. that might well result in contact, but it is not necessarily a shock role, more a matter of having the final word in driving off opposing lights.
Roy
Patrick answered this point earlier in the thread:
QuoteThe idea that sarissaphoroi were, or became, scouts seems to rest on their later designation as prodromoi, which literally suggests 'runners before', plus some examples of actual scouting. In Arrian III.7.7 the prodromoi report a sighting of enemy cavalry, and in III.8.1 Alexander takes the ile basilike, one ile of Companions and his Paeonians prodromon to deal with them. Prodromon here may mean 'at speed' or simply 'in advance', or even both, as the main body of the army are told to follow at their own pace.
If the prodromoi were given a scouting role it may well have dated from Alexander's reign: when Alexander was operating in Thrace and Illyria just after his accession there are no references to scouts but a few to him 'receiving messages', making me wonder if the sarissophoroi (who are not mentioned, sources being similarly quiet about prodromoi) were as yet not rearmed with xystons or were away with Parmenio, or both. They are present at the Granicus, commanded by Aretes and termed 'sarissophoroi' there, but following the Granicus there are no references to sarissophoroi and when Aretes is next mentioned he is commanding prodromoi.
However the prodromoi were also effective shock troops: at Gaugamela, the Persian left, around 20,000 strong, is broken by "the powerful assault of Aretes and his men" (Arrian III.14.3). As sarissophoroi, they led the assault across the Granicus together with the Paeonians (another useful shock contingent) plus supporting infantry (archers and Agrianes) and the Macedonian cavalry squadron of the day.
Curiously enough, Arrian renames the sarissophoroi in mid-battle: in I.14.1 they are sarissophorous hippeas but once they cross the river in I.14.6 they are prodromous hippeas. For the rest of Arrian's history they are prodromoi, still commanded by Aretes.
The sarissophoroi/prodromoi and the Paeonians both exhibited this dual-use capability: not only did they seem to do vanguard work and scouting, they also did much shock work at the sharp end on the battlefield. One wonders if the prodromoi would use lances when scouting; they would certainly find them helpful in battle.
Make sarissaphoroi the cavalry unit led by Alexander against the Thebans and the text of Diodorus becomes coherent - probing attacks by cavalry that pierce the Greek phalanx without blowing it away, followed by a
coup de grace by the Macedonian phalangites that dispatches the Greek right flank.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on June 02, 2014, 06:53:07 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on June 01, 2014, 10:52:51 PM
Alas that we still have no mention in the sources that this was a cavalry attack, nor have we any cavalry armed with Sarissa other than the light scouts
Jim
The point though is that a cavalry unit armed with sarissas by definition has a shock role in battle, even if it does scout the rest of the time.
Not necessarily. It's role may be to be held by for the pursuit where they are far more efficient at butchering fleeing infantry. To ask unarmoured men to ride into the front of formed up infantry units is not going to end well
Jim
The point though is that this is exactly what they did at the Granicus and at Gaugamela: heavy infantry in the former case, heavy armoured cavalry in the latter. Hardly the work of pure and simple scouts.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on June 02, 2014, 09:10:54 AM
The point though is that this is exactly what they did at the Granicus and at Gaugamela: heavy infantry in the former case, heavy armoured cavalry in the latter. Hardly the work of pure and simple scouts.
Remember we're not always entirely sure who the prodromoi were or how they fitted in
https://web.duke.edu/classics/grbs/FTexts/48/Rzepka.pdf
Also they seem to have been just absorbed in the the Companions because Macedonians were needed more than light cavalry scouts, but looking above, they might always have been part of the companions.
But there again, why on earth call a small group of cavalry sarissaphoroi if all Macedonian cavalry carried sarissa? Remember the Greeks were very enthusiastic on naming troops from weapon or (particularly) shield type, the latter not much use for cavalry.
So Troops were described as peltasts because they carried a certain type of shield, not because the adopted a certain sort of behaviour on the battlefield.
So sarissaphoroi would be called sarissaphoroi because they carried sarissa. It had to be a distinguishing feature or ALL macedonian cavalry would have been described as sarissaphoroi
- It may be that they were never light cavalry as we would think of them but were always men chosen for scouting and as such they might have been as well armoured as anyone else,
- Or it may have been that we've got over-focussed on a purely wargames mechanic. Whilst we assume light horse need missile weapons to skirmish with, our ancestors knew better. Bedoiun could skirmish with light lances, and Northern Horse were known as 'prickers' because they did skirmish with light lances. Just because we, at least three generations removed from proper horsed cavalry, don't know how it works doesn't mean it didn't. So the sarissaphoroi light horse may well have skirmished heavy cavalry out of the battle just as adequately as Numidians might. Similarly they might have been able to 'skirmish' heavy infantry out of the battle. You don't have to kill units to eliminate them.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on June 02, 2014, 10:12:30 AM
So sarissaphoroi would be called sarissaphoroi because they carried sarissa. It had to be a distinguishing feature or ALL macedonian cavalry would have been described as sarissaphoroi
- It may be that they were never light cavalry as we would think of them but were always men chosen for scouting and as such they might have been as well armoured as anyone else,
- Or it may have been that we've got over-focussed on a purely wargames mechanic. Whilst we assume light horse need missile weapons to skirmish with, our ancestors knew better. Bedoiun could skirmish with light lances, and Northern Horse were known as 'prickers' because they did skirmish with light lances. Just because we, at least three generations removed from proper horsed cavalry, don't know how it works doesn't mean it didn't. So the sarissaphoroi light horse may well have skirmished heavy cavalry out of the battle just as adequately as Numidians might. Similarly they might have been able to 'skirmish' heavy infantry out of the battle. You don't have to kill units to eliminate them.
Jim
The
sarissophoroi/prodromoi are described in our sources as undertaking definite shock action as opposed to 'pricking' (e.g. "the powerful assault of Aretes and his men" at Gaugamela in Arrian III.14). Given this, I suspect the first option may be the one which corresponds with history.
The designation 'sarissophoroi' would seem to be connected with the weapon, but were they so named in Arrian because they were the
only Macdonian cavalry
ever to carry it or because they were the
last to
remain equipped with it?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on June 02, 2014, 11:12:51 AM
The sarissophoroi/prodromoi are described in our sources as undertaking definite shock action as opposed to 'pricking' (e.g. "the powerful assault of Aretes and his men" at Gaugamela in Arrian III.14). Given this, I suspect the first option may be the one which corresponds with history.
The designation 'sarissophoroi' would seem to be connected with the weapon, but were they so named in Arrian because they were the only Macdonian cavalry ever to carry it or because they were the last to remain equipped with it?
Well have we any evidence that any other Macedonian cavalry were ever equipped with it?
Jim
Given the effort Justin put into this mammoth, the article should be good.
But i do hope you stick to internal source consistency.
If one source says Alex was cavalry and another says the cav had sarissa and a third says thebans had sarissa wounds, it does not follow that this proves Alex charged on horseback with sarissa armed cavalry and broke thebans frontally. Especially not if the first source has no thebans, the second has Alex on foot and the third has no cavalry.
And for my money, id say Philip, inventor of pike tactics, places young son in with his guard on foot to learn his trade. The terrain and army descriptions are far too pro infantry to suggest anyone would chose to put mon-expendable cavalry in the front line
Quote from: Mark G on June 02, 2014, 04:27:26 PM
Given the effort Justin put into this mammoth, the article should be good.
But i do hope you stick to internal source consistency.
I'll do my best. :)
Quote from: Mark G on June 02, 2014, 04:27:26 PMIf one source says Alex was cavalry and another says the cav had sarissa and a third says thebans had sarissa wounds, it does not follow that this proves Alex charged on horseback with sarissa armed cavalry and broke thebans frontally. Especially not if the first source has no thebans, the second has Alex on foot and the third has no cavalry.
My approach is to try and reconcile the different sources as far as is reasonably possible, on the assumption that the authors were just as intelligent and wary of old wives' tales as we are - unless they were using them for propaganda purposes, like our own stereotyped caricatures of WW2 Germans or Japanese. And one can spot propaganda.
Quote from: Mark G on June 02, 2014, 04:27:26 PMAnd for my money, id say Philip, inventor of pike tactics, places young son in with his guard on foot to learn his trade. The terrain and army descriptions are far too pro infantry to suggest anyone would chose to put mon-expendable cavalry in the front line
Yet this is exactly what Alexander did at Issus, if Diodorus is to be believed. Issus should have been an infantry battle - the battlefield was
narrower than Chaeronea, and the armies larger, and yet it was decided by cavalry.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on June 02, 2014, 04:39:53 PM
Yet this is exactly what Alexander did at Issus, if Diodorus is to be believed. Issus should have been an infantry battle - the battlefield was narrower than Chaeronea, and the armies larger, and yet it was decided by cavalry.
But at Issus the decent hoplite infantry was faced off by Sarissa pikemen, Alexander didn't attempt to ride it down with cavalry.
The cavalry charged the barbarian infantry
Looking at some people's interpretation of Chaeronea, Alexander was an utter idiot at Issus.
All he had to do was to find a place where the hoplites were standing on a reasonable gently sloping bit of river bank, and one Ile of companions would have punched a hole through them, (after all, advanced calculations and modelling have showed that a forty yard gap of easy terrain is all that was needed) the second and third ile would have widened the gap and the Sarissa armed pike men would have followed up their aristocratic betters and rolled up the rest of the hoplite line with virtually no casualties.
Abandoning mere pikemen to face off hoplites led to heavy and totally unwarranted casualties when the cavalry could have done it so easily.
Jim
Arrian sheds some light on the question:
| For Darius was no longer leading the foreigners against him, as he had arranged them at first, but he remained in his position, upon the bank of the river, which was in many parts steep and precipitous ; and in certain places, where it seemed more easy to ascend, he extended a stockade along it. By this it was at once evident to Alexander's men that Darius had become cowed in spirit.
But when the armies at length met in conflict, Alexander rode about in every direction to exhort his troops to show their valour; mentioning with befitting epithets the names, not only of the generals, but also those of the captains of cavalry and infantry, and of the Grecian mercenaries as many as were more distinguished either by rank or merit. From all sides arose a shout not to delay but to attack the enemy.
At first he still led them on in close array with measured step, although he had the forces of Darius already in full view, lest by a more hasty march any part of the phalanx should fluctuate from the line and get separated from the rest. But when they came within range of darts, Alexander himself and those around him being posted on the right wing, advanced first into the river with a run, in order to alarm the Persians by the rapidity of their onset, and by coming sooner to close conflict to receive little damage from the archers.
And it turned out just as Alexander had conjectured ; for as soon as the battle became a hand-to-hand one, the part of the Persian army stationed on the left wing was put to rout ; and here Alexander and his men won a brilliant victory.
But the Grecian mercenaries serving under Darius attacked the Macedonians at the point where they saw their phalanx especially disordered. For the Macedonian phalanx had been broken and disjoined towards the right wing; because Alexander had charged into the river with eagerness, and engaging in a hand-to-hand conflict was already driving back the Persians posted there ; but the Macedonians in the centre did not execute their task with equal speed; and finding many parts of the bank steep and precipitous, they were unable to preserve the front of the phalanx in the same line. - Arrian 2. 10 |
In other words, Alexander chose the part of the river that had the gentlest banks so he could attack the enemy at speed. This part happened to be where the kardakes were posted, so Alexander went through them. The Macedonian phalanx had the toughest job, attacking the mercenary Greeks up the steepest banks of the river. What can you do? The boss gets the best seat.
Actually when you read it, the Greeks attacked the Macedonians. It seems that a gap opened up because in at least one area the phalanx was slowed by the terrain and at other points the phalanx must not have been bothered by terrain. This allowed the phalanx to become 'disjointed' and the Hoplites could attack there.
So whilst "many parts steep and precipitous" and "certain places, where it seemed more easy to ascend, he extended a stockade along it" 'many' and 'certain' almost certainly leaves areas which were neither, perhaps because the hoplite commander was intelligent enough to leave himself avenues to mount a counter attack.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on June 02, 2014, 06:16:26 PM
Actually when you read it, the Greeks attacked the Macedonians.
Erm ... 'counter-attacked at the gap' I would accept.
Quote
So whilst "many parts steep and precipitous" and "certain places, where it seemed more easy to ascend, he extended a stockade along it" 'many' and 'certain' almost certainly leaves areas which were neither, perhaps because the hoplite commander was intelligent enough to leave himself avenues to mount a counter attack.
The Greek of Arrian II.10 has the sense that such places as were easy of access were palisaded. Gaps are not mentioned.
esti de hopou kai kharaka parateinas autais hina euephodōtera ephaineto(And all those places which were easy of access had a palisade stretched across them.)
The mercenaries had presumably strengthened their positions on their own initiative, whereas the kardakes seem to have felt that their arrows and the presence of the river would be sufficient defence. That the mercenaries were not confident about encountering Macedonians without an advantage in terrain or defences is indicative of respective expectations.
You're over extrapolating again
The account doesn't mention that the entire front had defences or was covered by terrain.
The account does mention that parts of the front were open so hoplites could counter attack.
The first translation that you posted said
"In certain places, where it seemed more easy to ascend, he extended a stockade along it"
So which is it?
What ever happens has to allow for the counter-attack that we know happened.
Also why should we presume the mercenaries did anything?
We are told specifically
"For Darius was no longer leading the foreigners against him, as he had arranged them at first, but he remained in his position, upon the bank of the river, which was in many parts steep and precipitous ; and in certain places, where it seemed more easy to ascend, he extended a stockade along it."
Now this is all we know. Postulating that the mercenaries did more defences (Why, since when were Greek mercenary hoplites known for erecting fixed defences for field battles?) is taking us beyond the sources.
Indeed the way the Greeks counter attacked seems to indicate that whilst Darius was cowed, his Greeks were more confident
Jim
You also forget who commanded at these two battles.
Charonea Alex was just a boy who did what he was told.
Issus, he was the king and had victories of his own to prove it
Quote from: Jim Webster on June 02, 2014, 11:00:21 PM
You're over extrapolating again
The account doesn't mention that the entire front had defences or was covered by terrain.
The account does mention that parts of the front were open so hoplites could counter attack.
Sadly it does not: it merely says that the parts easy of access were
all (esti) fenced off by a palisade. This is why I checked the Greek.
Quote
The first translation that you posted said
"In certain places, where it seemed more easy to ascend, he extended a stockade along it"
So which is it?
Nope, Justin posted that one. :)
Quote
What ever happens has to allow for the counter-attack that we know happened.
This was not a planned 'counter-attack' but an opportunistic exploitation of a rupture in the Macedonian line as the hypaspists and right-hand phalanx pressed on after the collapsing kardakes and the remainder of the phalanx got stuck in against the mercenaries. Arrian also notes that "in a number of places the steep banks of the stream prevented them [the phalanx] from maintaining a regular and unbroken front, and the result was that Darius' Greek mercenaries attacked precisely at the point in the line where the gap was widest." The Macedonians seem to have been pressing back the mercenaries despite the palisades, but those with tricky bits of river bank to deal with were being held up and the rapid advance of those facing the kardakes had created a significant gap which seems to be the one the mercenaries attacked into. In theory the line of Greek allies following Alexander's phalanx should have handled this, but one gets the impression they were slow off the mark in this case - they may have dealt better with the smaller gaps.
Quote
Also why should we presume the mercenaries did anything?
We are told specifically
"For Darius was no longer leading the foreigners against him, as he had arranged them at first, but he remained in his position, upon the bank of the river, which was in many parts steep and precipitous ; and in certain places, where it seemed more easy to ascend, he extended a stockade along it."
Now this is all we know. Postulating that the mercenaries did more defences (Why, since when were Greek mercenary hoplites known for erecting fixed defences for field battles?) is taking us beyond the sources.
There seems to be some confusion here. What we are told is that the Greek mercenaries were drawn up along the river bank; where it was difficult of access it was not palisaded; where it was easy of access it was. This is what Arrian's account tells us - no more, no less. Darius ordered (ephaineto) the erection of the palisades (kharaka). I do not see where the idea that the mercenaries did 'more' defences arises - certainly not from any posts in this thread.
"For Darius was no longer leading the foreigners against him" seems to be a dictionary-over-sense translation of
ouketi antepēge Dareios (literally: 'not now advanced against him Darius'); the Penguin translation renders the sense better as: "Darius made no move to attack, but kept his men in their initial dispositions along the river bank".
Quote from: Mark G on June 03, 2014, 07:14:21 AM
Charonea Alex was just a boy who did what he was told.
I am going to have to ask for some source evidence for that assertion. It is incredible that Alexander, who had conducted his first campaign at sixteen, would be 'just a boy who did what he was told' two years later.
Thanks for the clarification of the Greek Patrick, obviously the palisades were easy enough for the Greeks to take down when they mounted their own counter attack.
With regard to the comment "I am going to have to ask for some source evidence for that assertion. It is incredible that Alexander, who had conducted his first campaign at sixteen, would be 'just a boy who did what he was told' two years later."
He was an ephebe, He wasn't a man, indeed in Greek and Roman culture you became a full adult later in life than we accept as normal now. (Indeed in Roman culture it could be argued that a man didn't become a full adult as we could accept it until his father died.)
Now I'm not sure the details of the Macedonian equivilent of the ephebate (if that is the correct word) but I see no evidence that Macedonians advanced to adult hood earlier than their neighbours with whom they shared so much common culture. Indeed the Macedonian Kings claimed to be Hellenes.
Jim
Slightly off-subject but still sort of on it, what is the primary source evidence for the dead tree of the Alexander mosaic being at Gaugamela as opposed to at Issus?
Secondly, why were the Persian spears so long?
Ta in advance.
Quote from: Jim Webster on June 03, 2014, 11:41:56 AM
Thanks for the clarification of the Greek Patrick, obviously the palisades were easy enough for the Greeks to take down when they mounted their own counter attack.
Although we are not told that they did so ... this is perhaps an extrapolation? ;)
Quote
With regard to the comment "I am going to have to ask for some source evidence for that assertion. It is incredible that Alexander, who had conducted his first campaign at sixteen, would be 'just a boy who did what he was told' two years later."
He was an ephebe, He wasn't a man, indeed in Greek and Roman culture you became a full adult later in life than we accept as normal now. (Indeed in Roman culture it could be argued that a man didn't become a full adult as we could accept it until his father died.)
Now I'm not sure the details of the Macedonian equivalent of the ephebate (if that is the correct word) but I see no evidence that Macedonians advanced to adult hood earlier than their neighbours with whom they shared so much common culture. Indeed the Macedonian Kings claimed to be Hellenes.
Macedonians do seem to have done things differently. Macedon was a monarchy, and we might note (perhaps if I say it often enough) that Alexander conducted his first campaign at the age of sixteen (Plutarch, Alexander 9.1).
"
While Philip was making an expedition against Byzantium, Alexander, though only sixteen years of age, was left behind as regent in Macedonia and keeper of the royal seal, and during this time he subdued the rebellious Maedi, and after taking their city, drove out the Barbarians, settled there a mixed population, and named the city Alexandropolis."
Also noteworthy is that Alexander, not his tutor or one of Philip's officers, was given the keeping of the royal seal, and hence the exercise of royal authority - at the age of sixteen. While the Macedonian royal line was indeed of Greek descent - Thucydides II.9 tells how the Temenids of Argos made themselves rulers of the locality - and they drove out some of the tribes in the area, the population they ruled was apparently not Greek. Hence when dealing with Macedon we should not assume that Greek customs are necessarily applicable.
Anyone else who states that Alexander was an 'ephebe' or 'boy' at Chaeronea will be asked to write out the above quote from Plutarch 100 times . :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on June 03, 2014, 07:59:03 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on June 03, 2014, 11:41:56 AM
Thanks for the clarification of the Greek Patrick, obviously the palisades were easy enough for the Greeks to take down when they mounted their own counter attack.
Although we are not told that they did so ... this is perhaps an extrapolation? ;)
Quote
"But the Grecian mercenaries serving under Darius attacked the Macedonians at the point where they saw their phalanx especially disordered. "
If the interpretation is that what wasn't too steep to attack up was guarded with pallisades, and if the translation is correct, we are told they attacked. Obviously they might have poured down the steep slopes in total disarray, or they might have vaulted the pallisades, or there might have been gaps left to allow for counter attacks which isn't without precedent.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on June 03, 2014, 07:59:03 PM
With regard to the comment "I am going to have to ask for some source evidence for that assertion. It is incredible that Alexander, who had conducted his first campaign at sixteen, would be 'just a boy who did what he was told' two years later."
He was an ephebe, He wasn't a man, indeed in Greek and Roman culture you became a full adult later in life than we accept as normal now. (Indeed in Roman culture it could be argued that a man didn't become a full adult as we could accept it until his father died.)
Now I'm not sure the details of the Macedonian equivalent of the ephebate (if that is the correct word) but I see no evidence that Macedonians advanced to adult hood earlier than their neighbours with whom they shared so much common culture. Indeed the Macedonian Kings claimed to be Hellenes.
Macedonians do seem to have done things differently. Macedon was a monarchy, and we might note (perhaps if I say it often enough) that Alexander conducted his first campaign at the age of sixteen (Plutarch, Alexander 9.1).
"While Philip was making an expedition against Byzantium, Alexander, though only sixteen years of age, was left behind as regent in Macedonia and keeper of the royal seal, and during this time he subdued the rebellious Maedi, and after taking their city, drove out the Barbarians, settled there a mixed population, and named the city Alexandropolis."
Also noteworthy is that Alexander, not his tutor or one of Philip's officers, was given the keeping of the royal seal, and hence the exercise of royal authority - at the age of sixteen. While the Macedonian royal line was indeed of Greek descent - Thucydides II.9 tells how the Temenids of Argos made themselves rulers of the locality - and they drove out some of the tribes in the area, the population they ruled was apparently not Greek. Hence when dealing with Macedon we should not assume that Greek customs are necessarily applicable.
Anyone else who states that Alexander was an 'ephebe' or 'boy' at Chaeronea will be asked to write out the above quote from Plutarch 100 times . :)
Yes, Plutarch, writing about 500 years later mentions that Alexander was keeper of the royal seal because it doesn't mention he had veteran officers, clerks and suchlike.
After all, we assume that there were military commanders in charge of the units that we assume were under him, so I see no reason why there shouldn't be the usual clerks and financial officers who continued running things.
A regent can be given the keeping of the seal without having to sleep with it under his pillow just as a general can overthrow the enemy without having to break their line in person
Jim
As regent, not while under immediate royal command.
Come on patrick, dad says jump, boy jumps.
I am very worried by this rubbishing of Plutarch. Whilst I am all for source criticism we have to be very careful about discounting sources who were themselves working from sources that were closer to the time. If Alexander was acting as regent then he was not merely a shadow doing what the men around the throne said. Philip would have left sensible courtiers to give advice, but you are either regent or you are not and Alex would have the final say. The macedonians were quite open in their advice to kings so those left with Alex would be open and honest, but I bet he made the decisions.
Ancient and medieval history walks a line between on the one hand close analysis of the meaning of individual words and, on the other acceptance of anything written a long time ago as literal truth. Clearly both a very dangerous views. Once we decide to deride a source we need good reason, otherwise the whole of Plutarch is gone and much more besides. If Plutarch is contradicted by other, closer sources then fine to disbelieve, if the tenor of the times from closer to the action is against him then we might disbelieve, but just citing the 500 years gap. is a bit too aggressive an interpretation.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on June 04, 2014, 08:14:08 AM
I am very worried by this rubbishing of Plutarch. Whilst I am all for source criticism we have to be very careful about discounting sources who were themselves working from sources that were closer to the time. If Alexander was acting as regent then he was not merely a shadow doing what the men around the throne said. Philip would have left sensible courtiers to give advice, but you are either regent or you are not and Alex would have the final say. The Macedonians were quite open in their advice to kings so those left with Alex would be open and honest, but I bet he made the decisions.
Ancient and medieval history walks a line between on the one hand close analysis of the meaning of individual words and, on the other acceptance of anything written a long time ago as literal truth. Clearly both are very dangerous views. Once we decide to deride a source we need good reason, otherwise the whole of Plutarch is gone and much more besides. If Plutarch is contradicted by other, closer sources then fine to disbelieve, if the tenor of the times from closer to the action is against him then we might disbelieve, but just citing the 500 years gap. is a bit too aggressive an interpretation.
Roy
Agreed. If we adopt temporal distance as an index of reliability of judgement this must reflect on those of us who attempt to dismiss source material at an interval of 1,800 years ...
Quote
A regent can be given the keeping of the seal without having to sleep with it under his pillow just as a general can overthrow the enemy without having to break their line in person
But in Macedon he who held the seal governed the country, wherever he put it at night.
Quote
As regent, not while under immediate royal command.
Come on patrick, dad says jump, boy jumps.
Actually not:
"
And since Philip saw that his son's nature was unyielding and that he resisted compulsion, but was easily led by reasoning into the path of duty, he himself tried to persuade rather than to command him." - Plutarch, Alexander 7.1
It seems the point of these attempts to represent Alexander as being still effectively a child who must be coddled at Chaeronea is a last-ditch attempt to detach him from taking a leading role at the tip of a cavalry wedge. Such attempts to portray Alexander as anything but Alexander do not convince.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on June 04, 2014, 10:15:29 AM
It seems the point of these attempts to represent Alexander as being still effectively a child who must be coddled at Chaeronea is a last-ditch attempt to detach him from taking a leading role at the tip of a cavalry wedge. Such attempts to portray Alexander as anything but Alexander do not convince.
Let's keep a sense of proportion here. I agree with Roy that the Regent will have had executive power, although his father would have been sensible enough to have left senior advisors and an experienced bureaucracy (of what ever form that took). This means that a similar arrangement could have been in place in military affairs - leadership of troops, assisted by experienced officers and plenty of bodyguards (I don't buy the idea that Philip would have left Alexander deliberately vulnerable). But is a leap beyond our evidence to be certain that Alexander fought with the cavalry, let alone how they were drawn up. So suggesting that interpretations that do other than place Alexander at the tip of a hoplite-smashing wedge are "last-ditch" perhaps misrepresents the balance of the evidence.
Given that people like Parmenion and Antipater were perfectly capable of telling Alexander he was wrong when he was an adult and could override them, I cannot imagine them being cowed by a sixteen year old
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on June 04, 2014, 10:15:29 AM
It seems the point of these attempts to represent Alexander as being still effectively a child who must be coddled at Chaeronea is a last-ditch attempt to detach him from taking a leading role at the tip of a cavalry wedge. Such attempts to portray Alexander as anything but Alexander do not convince.
As opposed to last ditch attempts to prove that there was a cavalry wedge present at all?
Jim
Well i am saying that when the king commands, everyone obeys.
And that king had good reason to want his left wing to be on foot.
Quote from: Mark G on June 04, 2014, 01:24:34 PM
Well i am saying that when the king commands, everyone obeys.
And that king had good reason to want his left wing to be on foot.
Yep, it makes far more sense to take on heavy infantry with other heavy infantry rather than try the novel and never before attempted technique of riding them down with heavy cavalry :-)
Jim
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85630106/merrygoround.gif)
Just had to! ;)
It sums up entirely what we've got.
There is no evidence for Alexander leading cavalry in this battle.
But we have a hypothesis which suggests that contrary to all previously held beliefs that Alexander led cavalry to defeat elite heavy infantry with a frontal charge.
Using a technique that had never been used before and was immediately forgotten after his reign
But there's no evidence he led cavalry in the battle in the first place. Except of course that the fact that subsequently he led cavalry proves that he did at this time and that on the strength of this, an infantry weapon with which light cavalry were briefly issued with had to become the weapon for heavy cavalry as well (even through there is no contemporary evidence for it)
Jim
Could I suggest the parties, rather than produce further tit-for-tat, draw back and look at the framing of the question(s) we are trying to answer?
We seem to have become confused about whether we are trying to interpret the Battle of Chaeronea or whether we are looking at Macedonian cavalry tactics against infantry in the time of Alexander.
If we take the wider question, we can look at some battles where Macedonian cavalry did fight infantry. We can look at their level of success and the factors behind that in our sources. We can postulate certain tactics were used. We can then say that we think those tactics were first tested at Chaeronea. If we start from Chaeronea, we just have insufficient clear information, capable of plausible interpretation in totally opposite ways, so we will get nowhere (roundabouts indeed).
Entirely agree. Comparing every engagement involving Macedonian cavalry will help weigh up which is the most likely scenario for Chaeronea. Of course our big difficulty is that we have data, a theory to explain the data, but no way of verifying or refuting the theory by experimentation, unless someone can come up with a really sophisticated computer simulation or a lot of re-enactors who have decided they are tired of life.
Not really,
comparing every engagement involving Macedonian cavalry is pretty much identical to comparing ever battle involving king alexander on horseback and then declaring the same must apply to prince alexander at charonea.
More fruitful.
Describe all reported battles involving king Philip.
Examine those for evidence of cavalry usage.
Then see how that fits to charonea.
And then write a good paper on how Alex took an infantry focussed army designed to beat hoplites frontally, and turned it into a proper combined arms force which conquered Asia.
Quote from: Erpingham on June 04, 2014, 03:01:11 PM
We seem to have become confused about whether we are trying to interpret the Battle of Chaeronea or whether we are looking at Macedonian cavalry tactics against infantry in the time of Alexander.
If we take the wider question, we can look at some battles where Macedonian cavalry did fight infantry. We can look at their level of success and the factors behind that in our sources. We can postulate certain tactics were used. We can then say that we think those tactics were first tested at Chaeronea. If we start from Chaeronea, we just have insufficient clear information, capable of plausible interpretation in totally opposite ways, so we will get nowhere (roundabouts indeed).
Indeed. We have already examined the Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela and a couple of actions in India, together with Alexander's campaign against the Taulantians. These actions provided good reason to conclude that Macedonian cavalry could take on hoplite infantry with success - indeed they did so in every major battle against the Persians, with complete success at Issus and Gaugamela and partial success at the Granicus (they appear to have got stuck, the most likely reason being the compression of the target from all-round attacks). We have noted that, presumably learning from the lesson of the Granicus, Alexander was perfectly happy to use his cavalry to attack heavy infantry in India unless it had closed up into a dense formation.
Chaeronea was fought in 338 BC; Philip died in 336 BC. Prior to the Granicus, Alexander's campaign against the Taulantians and others in 335 BC displays similar tactics - forming wedge and charging to contact against opposing infantry - as were used in his campaigns against the Persian Empire. The Granicus was fought in 334 BC. None of our sources mention Philip altering the cavalry between 338 and 336 BC or Alexander altering it between 336 and 335 BC (or for that matter 334 BC) so it seems logical to conclude that any changes in equipment and tactical combat techniques between 338 and 334 BC would have been relatively minor.
Since the techniques from our known period involve leading cavalry wedges from the front, it makes sense to conclude that this method would have been employed at Chaeronea a few years earlier under the same military system. Comparing this assumption against our scarce source details for the battle shows remarkable consistency, much more than one sees for any offered alternative.
Quote from: Mark G on June 04, 2014, 04:59:28 PM
Describe all reported battles involving king Philip.
Examine those for evidence of cavalry usage.
Then see how that fits to charonea.
Please go ahead, Mark. I shall be interested to see how far you get and what you can find out about Macedonian cavalry usage pre-Chaeronea. :)
At Chaeronea the Greek allies only had generals such as Stratocles and Chares, a less than well disciplined Athenian hoplite force, up against generals of the order of Philip and Alexander, and the unified, balanced field army of Macedonia. The result was not unexpected.
In the Lamian War, under better leadership, the Greek allies were joined by the formidable Thessalian cavalry and were much more successful against Macedonian cavalry and phalangites. The hoplite enjoyed good flank support, leadership and high morale - part of a well organised and more effective combined arms field army and more than able to hold its own.
I suspect the fractured nature of Philip and Alexander's Greek enemies was a significant feature in the Greek defeat at Chaeronea rather than a frontal attack by Macedonian lancers - although - I accept, no one but Alexander knew how to lead soldiers.
Robert Gargan
Quote from: RobertGargan on June 04, 2014, 10:58:31 PM
I suspect the fractured nature of Philip and Alexander's Greek enemies was a significant feature in the Greek defeat at Chaeronea rather than a frontal attack by Macedonian lancers - although - I accept, no one but Alexander knew how to lead soldiers.
Robert Gargan
A good observation, though it does not have to be either/or; it can be both/and. Fractured Greek leadership and frontal attacks by Macedonian cavalry do not have to be mutually exclusive.
While we have this thread open, it may be worth looking further into Macedonian cavalry technique. Alexander (who provides our material because his battles were written about in some detail) always seems to provide missile support for a Macedonian cavalry attack.
At the Granicus,
"
Command of the right had already been given to Philotas, Parmenio's son, with the Companion cavalry, the archers, and the Agriane javelinmen ..." - Arrian I.14.1
At Issus,
"
At the same time ... he threw forward his Prodromoi under Protomachus together with the Paeonians under Ariston and the archers under Antiochus." - Arrian II.9.2
At Gaugamela,
"
One half of the Agrianes, commanded by Attalus and in touch with the Royal Squadron (ile basilike) on the right wing were, together with the Macedonian archers under Brison, were thown forward ... the position in advance of the Royal Squadron and other units of the Companions was occupied by the other half of the Agriane contingent and archers, supported by Balacrus' javelinmen (akontistai) ..." - Arrian III.12.2-3
This consistent grouping of missilemen with cavalry suggests that preparatory and covering shooting were a standard recourse of Macedonian cavalry technique, even if not always called upon (at Issus Alexander seems to have dispensed with any shooting and just charged as fast as possible, a variation of technique that becomes understandable if he was facing archers). In considering the effects and effectiveness of Macedonian cavalry we should perhaps consider the part played by their supporting shooters.
Interesting. I can only think that missile fire would stop infantry from moving, obliging them to put their shields up. This would make the cavalry charge more of a surprise for them, whilst their immobility helped the cavalry pinpoint their targets, the infantry file spaces.