A post in another thread prompted me to submit this proposed mechanism for line relief in the Republican legion. Essentially the doubled maniples of Principes come up behind the embattled Hastati. The Hastati begin to fall back through the gaps between the Principes whilst the Principes' posterior maniples, file by file, move up to occupy the gaps between the anterior maniples. The Hastati keep backing through the narrowing gap, always facing the enemy, until the final file closes the gap completely, at which point the last engaged Hastati filter back directly through the files of the Principes.
This would seem to square with the ancient sources and provide a mechanism that enables line relief to take place whilst the legion is engaged with the enemy.
The diagrams below illustrate this mechanism. The brown troops are the enemy, the green the Hastati, and the red the Principes.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/1.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/2.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/3.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/4.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/5.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/6.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/7.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/8.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/9.jpg)
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/mechanism%20line%20relief/10.jpg)
Just remember it should be Roman legion, line relief continued in the Imperial armies as well.
Personally I go with the single file idea. The man of the new unit lets the men of the old unit go past him. Thus no one takes their eyes of the enemy and the whole tired unit is simply replaced in combat by the unit behind it.
Tricky but if you are trained for it not a problem. However both the unit replaced and replacing have to follow the plan.
Oh and it does not need men to go sideways before going back thus following KISS.
My immediate query would be whether the Romans would have conducted any line relief system while actually in contact with the enemy, rather than awaiting a lull in the action. Not only is there much greater risk of it all going pear shaped but the relieving line don't get to use their pila.
My impression is that line relief would have to be conducted, or at least conductible, in the heat of action, otherwise opponents would quickly learn that all you have to do is keep up the pressure and it cannot happen.
The relieving line could use their pila, shooting indirectly - and an overhead volley or two into the mass of the foe would create the kind of disruption that would help the engaged line to make a relatively keen break.
The two times we have line relief alluded to (Livy VIII.8 and Polybius II.33) it is described as 'retro cedentes' (retiring rearwards) and 'epi poda' (retiring backwards) respectively. On the principle that in war one should keep things simple, perhaps the easiest explanation is that when the signal was given each file retired between the files of supporting troops, as Justin T suggests.
For this to be correct, the relieving line would have to be already drawn up for battle (i.e. no gaps between units). Although absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence, I have seen nothing to suggest that the relieving line started the relieving process with gaps unless we extrapolate from Scipio's unusual deployment at Zama.
Any more thoughts on this?
Patrick
I think it would have to be possible whilst in contact with the enemy. Otherwise no point in doing it. If you have to wait for the enemy to oblige then you may never get the chance.
Quote from: Justin Taylor on December 14, 2012, 10:28:02 PM
Just remember it should be Roman legion, line relief continued in the Imperial armies as well.
Personally I go with the single file idea. The man of the new unit lets the men of the old unit go past him. Thus no one takes their eyes of the enemy and the whole tired unit is simply replaced in combat by the unit behind it.
Everything depends on this quote from Livy 8:8,5 "manipuli quindecim distantes inter se
modicum spatium manipulus levis vicenos milites", which Patrick brought up in this thread on the Arkaion Bellum blog: https://groups.google.com/forum/?hl=en&fromgroups=#!topic/arkaion-bellum/8kAvmeoXbcc (https://groups.google.com/forum/?hl=en&fromgroups=#!topic/arkaion-bellum/8kAvmeoXbcc)
Here is the quoted line its context, using the Project Gutenberg translation, with the relevant line in bold:
The Romans formerly used targets; afterwards, when they began to receive pay, they made shields instead of targets; and what before constituted phalanxes similar to the Macedonian, afterwards became a line drawn up in distinct companies.
At length they were divided into several centuries. A century contained sixty soldiers, two centurions, and one standard-bearer.
The spearmen (hastati) formed the first line in fifteen companies, with small intervals between them: a company had twenty light-armed soldiers, the rest wearing shields; those were called light who carried only a spear and short iron javelins. This, which constituted the van in the field of battle, contained the youth in early bloom advancing towards the age of service.
What we are looking at is two kinds of troops in the first line: 20 lightly armed soldiers armed with only a spear and javelins, and 40 more heavily armed troops equipped with shields. The context makes it fairly clear that there were small gaps between the fifteen companies (each company composed of the two troop types), and not between the two classes of troops in a company. A company by the way
is a century.
Then follows the description of the rest of the legion:
'Next followed men of more robust age, in the same number of companies, who were called principes, all wearing shields, and distinguished by the completest armour. This band of thirty companies they called antepilani, because there were fifteen others placed behind them with the standards; of which each company consisted of three divisions, and the first division of each they called a pilus. Each company consisted of three ensigns, and contained one hundred and eighty-six men. The first ensign was at the head of the Triarii, veteran soldiers of tried bravery; the second, at the head of the Rorarii, men whose ability was less by reason of their age and course of service; the third, at the head of the Accensi, a body in whom very little confidence was reposed. For this reason also they were thrown[Pg 514] back to the rear.
So we are talking about another fifteen companies of Principes, who must have been spaced like the Hastati, i.e. with gaps between their companies.
Behind these were the third line, composed of Triarii, Rorarii and Accensi, forming a single company of 186 men, i.e. about 60 men of each type. This later on was compacted down to just the Triarii.
Now for the line relief:
When the army was marshalled according to this arrangement, the spearmen first commenced the fight. If the spearmen were unable to repulse the enemy, they retreated leisurely, and were received by the principes into the intervals of the ranks. The fight then devolved on the principes; the spearmen followed. The Triarii continued kneeling behind the ensigns, their left leg extended forward, holding their shields resting on their shoulders, and their spears fixed in the ground, with the points erect, so that their line bristled as if enclosed by a rampart.
'The intervals between the ranks' refers to the 'small intervals' mentioned earlier. This means that the front line troops didn't just filter through the files of the troops behind them, but between the gaps between one company and the next. 'The spearmen (Hastati) followed' must mean that they became the rear ranks of the Principes who, if they had originally been disposed in companies of 60 men would have logically been in blocks of 10 x 6 = a 10 deep line, becoming only 5 deep when the rear half of each file moved up to fill the gaps between the companies. An 8-man-deep line was the minimum practical depth for infantry in Antiquity. With the Hastati in support the Principes would become a line 10 men deep, quite sufficient for the task.
The same thing happened with the Principes if they did not prevail against the enemy:
If the principes also did not make sufficient impression in the fight, they retreated slowly from the front to the Triarii. Hence, when a difficulty is felt, "Matters have come to the Triarii," became a usual proverb. The Triarii rising up, after receiving the principes and spearmen into the intervals between their ranks, immediately closing their files, shut up as it were the openings; and in one compact body fell upon the enemy, no other hope being now left: that was the most formidable circumstance to the enemy, when having pursued them as vanquished, they beheld a new line suddenly starting up, increased also in strength.
The Triarii would have had rear support from the Rorarii and Accensii, forming, once the gaps were filled, a line 15 men deep, the greater depth necessary to counterbalance the poorer quality of the rear rank troops.
A refinement to my diagrams would be to have the Hastati gradually collapse into a series of half circles that shrink back towards the narrowing gaps between the Principes behind them. That way individual soldiers are not obliged to 'slide sideways' but can slowly retreat straight backwards until clear and safe through the lanes.
QuoteThis means that the front line troops didn't just filter through the files of the troops behind them, but between the gaps between one company and the next.
Nope, it means exactly what it says, moving through the files would be perfectly acceptable.
The velites were not equipped as the rest of the legionaries and would have made poor battle-line troops. I think you will find that the numbers of velites were additional to the numbers of Hastati and that the numbers in maniples of Princepes and Hastati were the same. That the maniples of the Triarii were only half the strength of Hastati and Princepes.
I have always wondered why the weapons of the Triarii were different to the two previous lines, it seems a bit odd to ask people to change the weapons they were used to. I have two ideas; that the spears made a better defensive weapon and that they might need less agility to use (so more suitable for old men).
Quote from: Justin Taylor on December 16, 2012, 10:14:50 AM
QuoteThis means that the front line troops didn't just filter through the files of the troops behind them, but between the gaps between one company and the next.
Nope, it means exactly what it says, moving through the files would be perfectly acceptable.
<snip>
I have always wondered why the weapons of the Triarii were different to the two previous lines, it seems a bit odd to ask people to change the weapons they were used to. I have two ideas; that the spears made a better defensive weapon and that they might need less agility to use (so more suitable for old men).
To get the exact meaning of what the intervals are between you need to look at the Latin. My Latin is dreadful, but if I ask Patrick nicely, he may oblige :)
On the spears of the Triarii, I think you are probably right. The pilum was an offensive weapon and the triarii are a defensive reserve, so perhaps the spear better fitted the tactics expected of them.
*dusts off book cover and clears throat*
The key bit is when, the hastati being unable to overcome the enemy (i.e. things are happening the other way around) the hastati begin, in VIII.8.9:
"... pede presso eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant"
'Pede presso' has the sense of being closely pressed, suggesting this is done in the heat of action. 'Eos' is the pronoun for the hastati and 'retro cedentes' means retreating rearwards or (most probably) backwards. Hence:
"Step by step, retreating backwards ..."
'In intervalla ordinum' is one of those expressions that is very open to translation. 'Principes recipiebant' simply means: 'The principes received them' and the use of the imperfect tense suggests a process that went on for a little while rather than being executed in the blink of an eye.
The principes received the hastati into the 'intervalla ordinum', the intervals between their 'ordines' (literally the intervals of their 'ordines'. Previously in the passage in question Livy has used 'ordo' (plural 'ordines') to mean 'formations'. However the word had multiple uses, and is often understood and translated as 'ranks' ('row, line, series, order, rank') - this to me seems a misconception, as the building blocks of classical armies were not ranks but files. Hence I would understand 'intervalla ordinum' as 'through the gaps between the files'. If 'ordines' should despite my preconceptions actually mean 'ranks', then the hastati are being received into the gaps in the ranks, i.e. the modest lateral spatial allowance between men. The result is the same.
Understood this way, the passage would support the idea of files of hastati passing backwards between files of principes. It would be a fairly tight fit, but not an impossible one, and would allow handover as soon as the fighting rank of hastati dropped back past the first rank of principes, who would probably introduce themselves to an opponent wondering which of his two foes to go for with a solid shield push and a swordthrust to the unmentionables.
That is one understanding.
If on the other hand we interpret 'in intervalla ordinum' as 'through the intervals between the formations', which has the advantage of keeping Livy's usage of 'ordo' consistent, we need to envisage a mechanism by which the first line could insert itself toothpaste-link into these gaps and the second line squeeze from a collection of separate groupings into a single cohesive line while this was happening. This has been the traditional interpretation and focus of the passage, and I think Justin Swanton's ingenious proposal comes as close as one can to devising an approach that meets these seemingly impossible requirements. If there is a better explanation under these parameters I have yet to see it.
That said, were I training a Roman army, I would have the first-line files back between the second-line files for battlefield relief. Much less could go wrong that way.
The triarii have an interesting history. Back in 509 BC they are veterans acting as camp guards. They are still doing this c.437 BC. By 394 BC they are deployed as the third line of the army. By 340 BC their battle procedures are described by Livy in VIII.8.10-12:
"The triarii knelt beneath their banners, with the left leg advanced, having their shields leaning against their shoulders and their spears thrust into the ground and pointing obliquely upwards, as if their battle-line were fortified with a bristling palisade. [11] if the principes, too, were unsuccessful in their fight, they fell back slowly from the battle-line on the triarii. (From this arose the adage, "to have come to the triarii," when things are going badly.) [12] The triarii, rising up after they had received the principes and hastati into the intervals between their companies [in intervalla ordinum, 'formations', 'ranks' or 'files'], would at once draw their companies together [extemplo compressis ordinibus, probably 'files'] and close the lanes, as it were [velut claudebant vias]; then, with no more reserves behind to count on, they would charge the enemy in one compact array [uno continente agmine]."
Livy's use of 'vias' (way, road, passage) and his reference to the triarii closing up ('compressis ordinibus' = 'with files - or formations - close together') and charging the enemy in a single cohesive block makes one wonder if the triarii initially deployed in double depth but on a 6' per man frontage, the reason being that if they deployed on the usual 3' frontage then their obliquely upward-pointing spears could make life very difficult for friends trying to retreat between them (a case of 'friendly-don't-like-it-up-'em syndrome'). It is a lot quicker and easier for a double-depth open formation to become a single-depth closed formation than for a collection of subunits to form a single coherent line the moment friends have finished passing through them. The retention of hoplite-style armament for triarii perhaps reflects the greater effectiveness of a hoplite-style charge compared to a pilum-and-gladius slog as a battle-finisher, and its retention for a time when foes would have run out of missile weapons perhaps suggests that it would not have fared so well against a pilum volley immediately followed by a clash against an intact formed opponent. These are conjectures. Livy does however describe the appearance of the triarii and their immediate onset as "formidolosissimum", which is about as great a degree of panic-inducing dread as Latin will allow.
Patrick
Looking at the Latin of this passage, Livy uses 'ordo' and 'manipulum' interchangeably. I see no implication that 'ordo' is used in the sense of 'files'. For example:
[7] hoc triginta manipulorum agmen antepilanos appellabant, quia sub signis iam alii quindecim ordines locabantur,
[7] this body of thirty maniples they called antepilani, because behind the standards there were again stationed other fifteen companies
To my mind it would rather force the text to translate 'ordo' by 'file'.
Having said that I am very Shakespearean when it comes to Latin (and more so with Greek) ;D
Justin, you are absolutely correct in this instance. :)
However the part that needs explaining is: 'in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant', and here we have to be fussy because, as you correctly point out, the principes and hastati have been described as being in 'manipuli' whereas the triarii, rorarii and accensi are in 'ordines'. Hence if maniples of hastati are filtering between maniples of principes we should be seeing:
'inter intervalla manipulorum principes recipiebant'
(The principes received them between the spaces of their maniples.)
whereas we have:
'in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant'.
(The principes received them into the spaces of their ordines.)
As the principes are not formed in 'ordo' subunits but in 'manipulus' subunits, 'ordo' here must mean something other than a 60-man subunit, and one would expect the usual meaning of 'ranks' or (as I believe may be the case) 'files'.
Patrick
P.S. - I should mention that a 'manipulus' seems to have been 80-strong while an 'ordo' was 60.
[Edit:] P.P.S. - I should also mention that the 60-man formation is a 'vexillum' and three 'vexilla' (one each of triarii, rorarii and accensi) constitute a 186-man (including officers) 'ordo'. Mea culpa, and thanks to Justin Swanton for diplomaticaly pointing this out.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2012, 06:30:11 PM
P.S. - I should mention that a 'manipulus' seems to have been 80-strong while an 'ordo' was 60.
Is that specific to this passage? I thought a maniple was two centuries, a prior and a posterior? Shouldn't it therefore be 160 strong?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2012, 06:30:11 PMHowever the part that needs explaining is: 'in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant', and here we have to be fussy because, as you correctly point out, the principes and hastati have been described as being in 'manipuli' whereas the triarii, rorarii and accensi are in 'ordines'. Hence if maniples of hastati are filtering between maniples of principes we should be seeing:
'inter intervalla manipulorum principes recipiebant'
(The principes received them between the spaces of their maniples.)
whereas we have:
'in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant'.
(The principes received them into the spaces of their ordines.)
As the principes are not formed in 'ordo' subunits but in 'manipulus' subunits, 'ordo' here must mean something other than a 60-man subunit, and one would expect the usual meaning of 'ranks' or (as I believe may be the case) 'files'.
Reading Livy, it is clear - as you have pointed out - that 'ordo' is a generic term meaning a body of men of any size. 'Manipulum' is more precise and means a body of men of a certain size - 62 (or 80) in this case. 'Company' can be used to designate a maniple. Livy's reason for doing this could have been literary, a preference for using different terms to avoid the language becoming too monotone.
In context, 'ordo' here is used to designate the larger Triarii body or, in one instance, the smaller manipular body. The link that Livy makes between '15 companies' and '15 maniples' just makes me think that suddenly using 'company' to indicate a much smaller file unit - without him making it clear that he is doing so - would strain the meaning of the word as used here.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2012, 06:30:11 PM
P.S. - I should mention that a 'manipulus' seems to have been 80-strong while an 'ordo' was 60.
OK, doing the maths:
Triarii, Rorarii, Accensii: 15 x 186 = 2790
Principes, Hastati: 15 x 2 x 62 = 1860
Total:
4650 menTriarii, Rorarii, Accensii: 15 x 186 = 2790
Principes, Hastati: 15 x 2 x 80 = 2400
Total: 4650 men =
5190 menWhich is closer to Livy's total estimate for the size of a legion. Or am I missing something?
One question: would the maniples have been organised as 10 men wide and 8 deep or 8 men wide and 10 deep? I'm thinking the former but just checking.
Quote from: Erpingham on December 16, 2012, 06:38:10 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2012, 06:30:11 PM
P.S. - I should mention that a 'manipulus' seems to have been 80-strong while an 'ordo' was 60.
Is that specific to this passage? I thought a maniple was two centuries, a prior and a posterior? Shouldn't it therefore be 160 strong?
Not yet - as far as I can establish, the 'century' as a legionary subunit does not appear before c.311 BC, the putative date for the change from the 'Livian' legion of Livy VIII.8 with its fifteen maniples per line and four lines (five if accensi are fielded) to the 'Polybian' legion with ten stronger maniples per line (each of two 'centuries') and only three lines.
The Livian maniple was 80 men for the hastati and principes (hastati has 60 heavy and 20 light troops, principes 80 heavy troops). The 60-man triarii/rorarii/accensi maniple was called the 'ordo'.
The Polybian maniple for hastati and principes had 160 men at normal strength and 200 at emergency strength. It was divided into two 'centuries', and at emergency strength a 'century' was exactly 100 men, hence the term. The maniple contained 40 velites with the balance being heavy troops.
Polybian triarii were organised in ten 100-man maniples. These each consisted of 40 velites and 60 triarii proper and, like the hastati and principes maniples, each had two centurions (Polybius VI.24). We can infer that triarii maniples in the Polybian legion were formed into half-strength centuries.
Much confusion has arisen from attempts to read Polybian structures back into the Livian legion. In particular, the century is Polybian. It is not mentioned as part of the Livian legion.
Hope that clarifies the matter.
Patrick
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 16, 2012, 07:06:29 PM
OK, doing the maths:
Triarii, Rorarii, Accensii: 15 x 186 = 2790
Principes, Hastati: 15 x 2 x 62 = 1860
Total: 4650 men
Triarii, Rorarii, Accensii: 15 x 186 = 2790
Principes, Hastati: 15 x 2 x 80 = 2400
Total: 4650 men = 5190 men
Which is closer to Livy's total estimate for the size of a legion. Or am I missing something?
One question: would the maniples have been organised as 10 men wide and 8 deep or 8 men wide and 10 deep? I'm thinking the former but just checking.
Livy gives the size of the 340 BC legion as 5,000 men ("There were usually four legions enlisted, with 5,000 men and 300 horse to each legion." - Livy VIII.8 ).
This would appear to be the emergency strength: elsewhere the legion infantry strength for this period (4th century BC) is given as c.4,000 or 4,200 men, a figure attained by simply not enlisting the
accensi, who seem to have been emergency levies only.
The Livian maniple would have been 10 wide and 8 deep (triarii etc. 10 wide and 6 deep).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 16, 2012, 07:06:29 PM
'Company' can be used to designate a maniple. Livy's reason for doing this could have been literary, a preference for using different terms to avoid the language becoming too monotone.
Ahem - Livy uses 'manipulus' and 'ordo' - and 'vexillum' for a grouping of three 'ordo' formations. He does not use 'company'. Only a translator into English can use 'company' to designate a maniple. ;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2012, 07:09:20 PM
The Livian maniple was 80 men for the hastati and principes (hastati has 60 heavy and 20 light troops, principes 80 heavy troops). The 60-man triarii/rorarii/accensi maniple was called the 'ordo'.
Wouldn't each unit of triarii, accensi and rorarii be called a 'banner' (vexillum), and the total grouping of the three an 'ordo'? Could you remind me of the source for an 80-man maniple? Ta :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2012, 07:09:20 PM
Hope that clarifies the matter.
Patrick
Excellent clarification, thanks. As you know, the evolution of the Republican legion isn't exactly a specialism of mine :). There is a suggestion above that the line relief system remains in use through the republic into the Imperial period. Obviously, the structure of the legion changes greatly. Do we have any evidence how line relief was adapted to these changes?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2012, 07:20:40 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 16, 2012, 07:06:29 PM
'Company' can be used to designate a maniple. Livy's reason for doing this could have been literary, a preference for using different terms to avoid the language becoming too monotone.
Ahem - Livy uses 'manipulus' and 'ordo' - and 'vexillum' for a grouping of three 'ordo' formations. He does not use 'company'. Only a translator into English can use 'company' to designate a maniple. ;)
Let me insert the original latin words into the English translation:
[3] The Romans had formerly used small round shields; then, after they began to serve for pay, they made oblong shields instead of round ones; [4] and what had before been a phalanx, like the Macedonian phalanxes, came afterwards to be a line of battle formed by
maniples [manipulatim = 'in a maniple-like fashion'], with the rearmost troops drawn up in a number of
companies [ordines]. [5] The first line, or hastati, comprised fifteen
maniples [manipuli], stationed a short distance apart; the
maniple [manipulus] had twenty light—armed soldiers, the rest of their number carried oblong shields; moreover those were called "light—armed" who carried only a spear and javelins. [6] this front line in the battle contained the flower of the young men who were growing ripe for service. behind These came a line of the same number of
maniples [manipulorum], made up of men of a more stalwart age; these were called the principes; they carried oblong shields and were the most showily armed of all. [7] this body of thirty
maniples [manipulorum] they called antepilani, because behind the standards there were again stationed other fifteen
companies [ordines], each of which had three
sections [partes], the first section in
every company [actually 'of each'] being known as pilus. [8] The
company [ordo] consisted of three
vexilla [vexillis] or "banners"; a single vexillum had sixty soldiers, two centurions, one vexillarius, or colourbearer; the
company [actually 'They'] numbered a hundred and eighty—six men. The first
banner [vexillum] led the triarii, veteran soldiers of proven valour; the second
banner [just 'the second'] the rorarii, younger and less distinguished men; the third
banner [just 'the third'] the accensi, who were the least dependable, and were, for that reason, assigned to the rear most line.
[9] when an army had been marshalled in this fashion, the hastati were the first of all to engage. if the hastati were unable to defeat the enemy, they retreated slowly and were received into the intervals between the
companies [ordinum] of the principes. The principes then took up the fighting and the hastati followed them. [10] The triarii knelt beneath their banners, with the left leg advanced, having their shields leaning against their shoulders and their spears thrust into the ground and pointing obliquely upwards, as if their battle—line were fortified with a bristling palisade. [11] if the principes, too, were unsuccessful in their fight, they fell back slowly from the battle—line on the triarii. (From this arose the adage, "to have come to the triarii," when things are going badly.) [12] The triarii, rising up after they had received the principes and hastati into the intervals between their
companies [ordinum], would at once draw their
companies [ordinibus] together and close the lanes, as it were; then, with no more reserves behind to count on, they would charge the enemy in one compact array.
One
could say that from [9] onwards Livy uses 'company' to designate a file but it does seem to strain the meaning as he has used it so consistently up to now to designate a much larger body of men. Add to that the mention of intervals between the maniples - which the Triarii companies would have replicated in their own deployment - and the logical conclusion would be that the 'intervals between the companies' of [12] corresponds to gaps between one grouping of vexilla and the next.
Sorry, Justin, you are quite right: three vexilla constitute an ordo, not the other way around!
I would however be very careful about placing any faith in a translator's use of 'company' for any of the formations involved, and in particular for the word 'ordo'. Also, as previously mentioned, the Latin 'in intervalla ordinum' (genitive case: 'into the spaces of the ordines') is not what one would expect if subunits were retiring between subunits. It does not say or mean 'into the intervals between the ordines' - that is a translator inference, and quite a loose one at that (and would read 'per intervalla inter ordines' or similar if it was intended to mean what the translator thought).
The first and primary meaning of 'ordo' in any Latin dictionary is 'row, line, order, series, succession' - I quote from my Smith's Latin Dictionary. From this we get 'rank' in VIII.8.9 (just between ourselves I think my 'file' is a mistake here: 'rank' actually suffices). I suspect Livy (or the earlier Republicans) used 'ordo' for the grouping of three vexilla because the three vexilla form a 'lineup' in order - a row, line, order, series or succession, so to speak.
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2012, 11:16:06 PM
I would however be very careful about placing any faith in a translator's use of 'company' for any of the formations involved, and in particular for the word 'ordo'. Also, as previously mentioned, the Latin 'in intervalla ordinum' (genitive case: 'into the spaces of the ordines') is not what one would expect if subunits were retiring between subunits. It does not say or mean 'into the intervals between the ordines' - that is a translator inference, and quite a loose one at that (and would read 'per intervalla inter ordines' or similar if it was intended to mean what the translator thought).
The first and primary meaning of 'ordo' in any Latin dictionary is 'row, line, order, series, succession' - I quote from my Smith's Latin Dictionary. From this we get 'rank' in VIII.8.9 (just between ourselves I think my 'file' is a mistake here: 'rank' actually suffices). I suspect Livy (or the earlier Republicans) used 'ordo' for the grouping of three vexilla because the three vexilla form a 'lineup' in order - a row, line, order, series or succession, so to speak.
Patrick
I would suggest that the root meaning of 'ordo' is 'a spinning' or 'a weaving' (from
ordior - to bind/fasten wool together, hence to weave), leading to the primary meaning of 'an arranging', 'an arrangement', 'an order(ing)'. All its derived meanings come from this root meaning, hence row, line, rank (common but not exclusive military meaning) of soldiers and other things, and also troop, band or company.
If the intervals between the 'manipulos' and 'ordines' was a normal part of their formation, then one could understand Livy using the genitive of possession: 'in intervalla ordinum' - 'in the companies' intervals', as opposed to an expression that would imply such gaps were not an integral part of the manipulos or ordines.
Having said that, I admit I'm not a Latinist. The basic question would be whether retiring through files is a better system than retiring through prearranged gaps between ordines/manipulos. We need to get a few hundred re-enactors together and try out the two systems. ???
You can also check out Trooping of the Colour where the bands move though one another.
And what are the enemy doing while all this takes place?
it all seems far too theoretical and complicated to me - and it presupposes that the enemy remain pretty static, remaining compliant, and it relies upon the ability of men to remain at sword thrust length while catching their breath after a bout of combat.
a better alternative seems to be to reject the notion of a single continuous line of battle (your green men), and instead look at charge and withdrawl tactics from each century.
Have you considered that alternative at all?
Quote from: Mark G on December 17, 2012, 09:01:39 AM
And what are the enemy doing while all this takes place?
it all seems far too theoretical and complicated to me - and it presupposes that the enemy remain pretty static, remaining compliant, and it relies upon the ability of men to remain at sword thrust length while catching their breath after a bout of combat.
a better alternative seems to be to reject the notion of a single continuous line of battle (your green men), and instead look at charge and withdrawl tactics from each century.
Have you considered that alternative at all?
My hypothetical reconstruction makes the assumption that the troops are in combat with the enemy all the while, and must spare most of their attention to fighting, with just a little to backing out through relatively wide lanes.
One needs to keep in mind that fighting between infantry was not a continuous and furious hammer-and-tongs affair, Hollywood-style (just try taking a heavy stick, representing a sword, and wacking a tree without pause - see how long you can keep it up for). Sheer physical exhaustion would have obliged it to be a round of cautious sparring, followed by a marginal backing off to get a breather, followed by another round of sparring, and so on. In this manner an engagement could last for hours.
With this system I suggest that it would have been quite possible to do a line relief whilst engaged in combat. The line being relieved and the relieving line maintain their fighting formation and keep a continuous line before the enemy at all times. The retirement manoeuvre is slow and quite simple to execute - the Hastati simply pull out as a group through the narrowing gaps between the principi, who themselves do their more complex file-by-file insertion into the gaps
before having to deal with the enemy.
But like any theory it needs to be tested in real life.
Quote from: Erpingham on December 16, 2012, 07:32:13 PM
... There is a suggestion above that the line relief system remains in use through the republic into the Imperial period. Obviously, the structure of the legion changes greatly. Do we have any evidence how line relief was adapted to these changes?
The main evidence we have is in Caesar's descriptions of his own campaigns and in Vegetius' quoted lineup. Caesar makes at least two references to his 'third line', in Gallic War I.25, the fight against the Helvetii, when he has:
"
the first and second line [prima et secunda acies]
, to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off the field; the third [tertia]
to receive those who were just arriving"
One observes how in this battle the third line, not being needed to relieve the other two, is used as an independent formation to deal with an unexpected development.
and in Civil War III.94, the Battle of Pharsalus, when:
"
Caesar, perceiving the victory so far advanced, to complete it, brought up his third line [tertiam aciem]
, which till then had not been engaged"
This line then replaces the troops engaged in active fighting, but Caesar does not go into details about how it was done.
Vegetius puts the ten cohorts of his legion into two lines, but once again we have no explicit description or usefully allusive phrase illuminating the nitty-gritty of the process. He does however take pains to point out that:
"
The eighth [cohort] is composed of five hundred and fifty-five foot and sixty-six horse, all selected troops, as it occupies the centre of the second line."
The point about this cohort being selected troops is that it is important for a contingent that will be moving into combat (otherwise all that would be required is that the men are of sufficient quality and training to keep their places and cheer). To enter combat they would, in the absence of any mention of moving out to flank the enemy or other such manoeuvre, have to be be relieving the first line.
Ammianus' description of Argentoratum (when Julian thrashed the Alemanni in AD 357) has no discernible references to line relief. Then again, the mid-4th-century AD legion was a shadow of its former establishment, and we know this by indirect references to strengths (e.g. at Amida seven legions and the town garrison had no more than 20,000 men between them) combined with the proliferation of numbers and titles of legions as encountered in Ammianus and detailed in the
Notitia Dignitatum, a sort of guide to Imperial offices and troop dispositions that dates from the late 4th or early 5th century AD.
At the end of that spiel all we can really say is that we do not know the process in sufficient detail to be sure of exactly
how it happened under the Republic or the Empire (though we do seem to be narrowing down the likely possibilities), only that it
did take place up to the time when legions were both shrunken in establishment and multiplied in numbers in the 4th century AD (Constantine usually gets blamed for this).
Patrick
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 17, 2012, 12:14:51 AM
I would suggest that the root meaning of 'ordo' is 'a spinning' or 'a weaving' (from ordior - to bind/fasten wool together, hence to weave), leading to the primary meaning of 'an arranging', 'an arrangement', 'an order(ing)'. All its derived meanings come from this root meaning, hence row, line, rank (common but not exclusive military meaning) of soldiers and other things, and also troop, band or company.
If the intervals between the 'manipulos' and 'ordines' was a normal part of their formation, then one could understand Livy using the genitive of possession: 'in intervalla ordinum' - 'in the companies' intervals', as opposed to an expression that would imply such gaps were not an integral part of the manipulos or ordines.
Having said that, I admit I'm not a Latinist. The basic question would be whether retiring through files is a better system than retiring through prearranged gaps between ordines/manipulos. We need to get a few hundred re-enactors together and try out the two systems. ???
Thinking about it, if a row of 'ordines' with gaps in between had been the norm, I would have expected Livy to use '
in intervalla aciei', into the intervals of the line of battle.
I suppose Livy could have put it several ways. We are looking at what is the most likely interpretation without being able to say definitively 'file' or 'company'. 'in intervalla aciei' - if Livy had already mentioned the intervals in the previous section as being between ordos and manipulos, would it not make sense for him to mention them again as being of those ordos/manipulos?
Quote from: Justin Taylor on December 17, 2012, 08:18:56 AM
You can also check out Trooping of the Colour where the bands move though one another.
That is on the parade ground. It would be a bit different on the battlefield, where the front line's tidy file formation has gone to heck after prolonged fighting, and all it can do is a simple group manoeuvre as a single body. This to my mind would favour retiring through gaps between maniples over retiring through files, the latter of which requires that the retirees have preserved their own file formation and can manoeuvre
as files.
I will repeat, Roman drill as bloodless battles, fight battles as bloody drills.
Thats the whole point, without the training it does not work.
QuoteOne needs to keep in mind that fighting between infantry was not a continuous and furious hammer-and-tongs affair, Hollywood-style (just try taking a heavy stick, representing a sword, and wacking a tree without pause - see how long you can keep it up for). Sheer physical exhaustion would have obliged it to be a round of cautious sparring, followed by a marginal backing off to get a breather, followed by another round of sparring, and so on. In this manner an engagement could last for hours.
One needs to keep in mind that that is the whole point of the Roman line relief system, replacing tired troops with fresh ones and of course they trained both with double weight swords and shields to develop stamina.
Yes I am a fan of real life as well.
we certainly agree on there being pauses in fighting and backing off betwene fighting units during that engagement.
Vegetius again:
"We are informed by the writings of the ancients that, among their other exercises, they had that of the post. They gave their recruits round bucklers woven with willows, twice as heavy as those used on real service, and wooden swords double the weight of the common ones. They exercised them with these at the post both morning and afternoon.
This is an invention of the greatest use, not only to soldiers, but also to gladiators. No man of either profession ever distinguished himself in the circus or field of battle, who was not perfect in this kind of exercise. Every soldier, therefore, fixed a post firmly in the ground, about the height of six feet. Against this, as against a real enemy, the recruit was exercised with the above mentioned arms, as it were with the common shield and sword, sometimes aiming at the head or face, sometimes at the sides, at others endeavouring to strike at the thighs or legs. He was instructed in what manner to advance and retire, and in short how to take every advantage of his adversary; but was thus above all particularly cautioned not to lay himself open to his antagonist while aiming his stroke at him." - Epitomai Rei Militari I.10
This exercise developed both technique and stamina. The latter gave the Romans a significant advantage in protracted battles, e.g. at Vercellae in 101 BC where Catulus' troops easily outfought their gasping Cimbri opponents without even raising a sweat. Regular conditioning makes a big difference even with men who are basically fit: one could view the Roman legionaries as military athletes, in a manner of speaking.
It also means we do not really need to posit frequent and regular pauses in Roman battles: that would have favoured the less fit side and allowed it to recover. I cannot see sensible officers on the fitter side letting that happen. Keep up the pressure, lads: they're weakening!
Patrick
Spartans also probably fitter and tougher than other Greek hoplites, because of the practice.
Not a fan of the pause idea either.
well if you can find chaps fitter than boxers, and get them to fight for an hour uninterupted, I'll buy into a continuous melee model.
but until then, its pauses and breaks offs for me.
No, because in the Roman model you replace them. In the model where you have individuals fighting the tired man drops back to be replaced by the fresh man.
Hoplites, shieldwall I have no idea how that was done but there would always be a way.
No supermen need be involved.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 17, 2012, 03:08:31 PM
Vegetius again:
"We are informed by the writings of the ancients that, among their other exercises, they had that of the post. They gave their recruits round bucklers woven with willows, twice as heavy as those used on real service, and wooden swords double the weight of the common ones. They exercised them with these at the post both morning and afternoon.
This is an invention of the greatest use, not only to soldiers, but also to gladiators. No man of either profession ever distinguished himself in the circus or field of battle, who was not perfect in this kind of exercise. Every soldier, therefore, fixed a post firmly in the ground, about the height of six feet. Against this, as against a real enemy, the recruit was exercised with the above mentioned arms, as it were with the common shield and sword, sometimes aiming at the head or face, sometimes at the sides, at others endeavouring to strike at the thighs or legs. He was instructed in what manner to advance and retire, and in short how to take every advantage of his adversary; but was thus above all particularly cautioned not to lay himself open to his antagonist while aiming his stroke at him." - Epitomai Rei Militari I.10
This exercise developed both technique and stamina. The latter gave the Romans a significant advantage in protracted battles, e.g. at Vercellae in 101 BC where Catulus' troops easily outfought their gasping Cimbri opponents without even raising a sweat. Regular conditioning makes a big difference even with men who are basically fit: one could view the Roman legionaries as military athletes, in a manner of speaking.
It also means we do not really need to posit frequent and regular pauses in Roman battles: that would have favoured the less fit side and allowed it to recover. I cannot see sensible officers on the fitter side letting that happen. Keep up the pressure, lads: they're weakening!
Patrick
True. This would certainly give the Roman the ability to fight for more protracted periods in an infantry melee, but I still suspect there would be certain local lulls in the fighting as opposed to an actual breaking off. Since the Roman infantry were fitter than most of their opponents, they could have used those lulls as a moment to execute line relief (or even done it in the heat of battle). There again, since they could fight for longer than their opponents, the lulls would have been the opportunity for them to push their opponents' morale over the edge, as you describe.
The human body is capable of only fairly short bursts of intense energy, such as sword-fighting. It just seems impossible for me to envisage a Roman soldier swinging away for two hours non-stop against an opponent, in a life-and-death struggle, pumped full of adrenaline.
We tend to think of melee as a kind of olympic sport, a sort of intense and concentrated fencing, whereas much of it would be fought at a pace the modern boxer or fencer would regard as slow motion.
Trained soldiers will use short and economical movements, having had it drummed into them that you only need to lift the shield six inches to stop a hit, and an 18" thrust against an opponent 12" away is as good as a 3' lunge against an opponent 2' 6" away but uses only a quarter of the energy. They will also have gone through extended training sessions involving being kept at the 'posts' all afternoon, developing in the process a rhythmic set of motions like a long-distance runner. Also, being accustomed to double-weight weapons and shields in training, legionaries will find their actual shields and weapons to be featherweights in battle (the Knights of St John used a similar system to train their men, and I suggest getting hold of an account of the Siege of Malta in 1565 to see just how well fully-armoured men could fight for extended periods in hot conditions if they had been trained for it).
The untrained human is indeed only capable of intensive exertions for short periods. The trained human is another matter entirely. He can become exhausted (anyone can), but better training and acclimatisation create situations where, as at Pharsalus, Pompey has exhausted all three of his lines while Caesar had not yet needed to commit his fresh third line. We are not given timing for this battle, but it seems to have been decided in the space of around two hours (my estimate based on available time, distance moved from Caesar's - and to Pompey's - camp, likely timing for Pompey's and Caesar's outflanking manoeuvres and their results and the distance a mounted Pompey managed to cover before nightfall).
Most battles of the period seem to have been decided in the space of an afternoon, with time left over for a pursuit. Assume 2-3 hours of fighting as standard once the action gets going. Each Roman line would be active for perhaps an hour: maybe less if the fighting was particularly intense, maybe more if the opponents were charging in, bouncing off, flowing back, regrouping and trying again. At Argentoratum the fighting seems to have lasted about half an August afternoon, the Romans for the most part holding their ground against waves of Alemanni struggling upslope through a shower of missiles. The Primani legion sustained the strongest Alemanni attack, and exhibit the difference between trained veterans and untrained enthusiasts:
"Taking care to avoid being wounded and covering themselves like gladiators, they plunged their swords into the barbarians' sides, which their wild rage left exposed. The enemy, who were ready to squander their lives for victory, tried repeatedly to find weak spots in the fabric of our line. As they perished one after another and the confidence of the Romans who were striking them down increased, fresh hosts took the place of the slain, till the incessant cries of the dying stupefied them with fear. Then at last they gave way under the stress of the disaster and put all their energy into attempts at flight." - Ammianus XVI.12
Ammianus notes that the Priamani when thus attacked 'renewed the battle with increased spirit', which suggests a) they had already been fighting and b) there was a brief lull while the elite Alemanni formation pushed forward to engage. Thereafter the fighting was continuous until the Germans broke.
We should not assess the Roman soldier's fitness by the limitations of the barbarian enthusiast or the modern desk-bound individual. Rather, we should regard the Roman soldier as a superbly-conditioned athlete, optimised for protracted exertion.
Mark G's comment about boxers reminds me that before the Queensbury Rules came in, boxing matches could go on all afternoon with no breaks. A fight between a pugilist who knew what he was doing and a 'bruiser' who did not would, however, often be over very quickly. Two pugilists or two bruisers would tend to last quite a while.
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 17, 2012, 05:47:26 PM
We should not assess the Roman soldier's fitness by the limitations of the barbarian enthusiast or the modern desk-bound individual. Rather, we should regard the Roman soldier as a superbly-conditioned athlete, optimised for protracted exertion.
Patrick
I think we should be careful not to idealise the noble Roman too much. Filled with clean living, hardened by days at the post, spending his leisure time watching men and animals die horribly in the arena, what could compare ? Most Roman infantrymen spent time doing mindless make work, tried to wangle themselves postings to cushy numbers and got smashed in the vicus given half the chance (oh, and writing letters home saying send more woolly undies). OK, equally extreme counter argument. That continuous combat for hours took place is fair enough but that this combat was all high intensity, life or death struggle? The model of combat of bursts of intensity, with a background level of dodging missiles, shouting abuse and carrying out acts of bravado to become more noticeable (centurions, those steady professionals were prone to this) seems equally, if not more, plausible. If even heavy combat did not feature continuous engagement, then line replacement might be considered easier to carry out without the imminent threat of a sword in your vitals.
Mark's point above, that centuries were relieving each other in combat, does beg the question of how this was co-ordinated enough to do line replacement. I doubt if individual centuries did this of their own initiative but could it have been done by legion?
QuoteThe human body is capable of only fairly short bursts of intense energy, such as sword-fighting. It just seems impossible for me to envisage a Roman soldier swinging away for two hours non-stop against an opponent, in a life-and-death struggle, pumped full of adrenaline.
I seem to remember reading that the expected time in combat was 15 minutes. It might have been in Goldsworthy?
Quote from: Erpingham on December 17, 2012, 06:43:33 PM
Mark's point above, that centuries were relieving each other in combat, does beg the question of how this was co-ordinated enough to do line replacement. I doubt if individual centuries did this of their own initiative but could it have been done by legion?
It would have to be done by army, given that the line to be relieved seems to have backed through the line doing the relieving. Having one legion decide to pull back its first line while its neighbour keeps them engaged is going to give somebody flanking problems. It is also a lot easier to have one trumpet signal for everyone rather than a different one for each legion.
I find it hard to envisage centuries doing their own thing: Mark, is this a WMWW leg-pull? ;)
Protracted meleeing if done with economical, trained movements does make sense, more so if one includes the acclimatisation of rigorous training. There is that anecdote of the dozen Crusader knights who covered a breach in the castle wall for an entire day against an Arab army.
Which all leads I suppose to the conclusion that a line relief was done whilst the front line was locked in combat with the enemy. If there was a lull, the fitter Romans would have used it as an opportunity to press and demoralise their opponents (replacing the lines just then would take time and give the enemy the breather they needed).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 17, 2012, 10:29:59 PM
It would have to be done by army, given that the line to be relieved seems to have backed through the line doing the relieving. Having one legion decide to pull back its first line while its neighbour keeps them engaged is going to give somebody flanking problems. It is also a lot easier to have one trumpet signal for everyone rather than a different one for each legion.
[\quote]
Then we get to the question, how was it co-ordinated. My recollection of earlier debates is there is a shortage of evidence for any kind of line-based sub command. If the general made this decision, on what basis? I would suggest that the legion is the obvious structure through which to co-ordinate. I'd also suggest it took more than one trumpet signal - at least a preparatory order to bring up the second line in advance of the opportunity to do the relief itself.
Quote
I find it hard to envisage centuries doing their own thing: Mark, is this a WMWW leg-pull? ;)
I think Mark is referencing Sabin "The Face of Roman Battle". Certainly, that would be my first port of call for this non-continuous combat model. However, Mark is much more knowledgeable and well-read on this period and may have other more recent sources too
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 18, 2012, 05:36:44 AM
Which all leads I suppose to the conclusion that a line relief was done whilst the front line was locked in combat with the enemy. If there was a lull, the fitter Romans would have used it as an opportunity to press and demoralise their opponents (replacing the lines just then would take time and give the enemy the breather they needed).
If the Romans were that bright eyed and bushy tailed, they wouldn't be calling for line relief. Line relief was actually a tactical withdrawal. Yes, it could lead to a renewed attack but if the first line were expected to do it, they were spent.
I'll repeat my comment of before - don't paint the Romans as supermen. Early legions were not long service professionals, they were citizen levies chosen by lot. Admittedly, some people served year on year and would develop experience and everyone would have at least basic training. But their opposition could quite easily be better and more experienced fighters man-for-man. Their big advantages were tactical (the Roman army had a lot in it's tactical toolkit, including line relief) aided by great articulation. Its low level leadership through the centurionate should not be underestimated - experienced and aggressive fighters.
no leg pull at all, and I am studiously trying to not hijack this thread onto an exposition of an alternative model - plenty of time for that in the second half of 2013, I assure you.
I'm simply trying to get those who favour this to look at some of the difficulties with the single line of combat model which this diagram is based upon.
the thing is, the diagram of all those files pushing past each other looks Greek not Roman to me.
It's all precision and mathematically correct fancy drill.
A Roman way would be to send them off where the rest of the army could see them in action - demonstrating their prowess. This file based approach as much more in tune with the anonymity of the phalanx.
When we look at the use of deeper formations, there are also some lessons we can see from elsewhere in history.
If they guys in the middle and back cannot see what is going on, then at the first sign of something other than a steady forward march, they are quite prone to wavering and running.
routs always start at the back,
and when men can see an opportunity to get out of a fight with honour, they will take it (helping a wounded comrade being case in pont).
So if you have a formation drill which allows the men in middle and back to take a simple sidestep and avoid becoming the front line - by joining the retreating column - that's a positive encouragement to them to pull out of the fight.
The Greeks / Macedonians countered this with file closers to keep them in place.
But the Romans put their best men in the front as leaders for others to follow.
Further, the Romans introduced more anonymity to their uniforms as the Republic progress, but did not change model of combat drill - which encourages further the potential for men to simply sidestep their turn at the front line.
And there are no file closers at the back to keep an eye on who is joining in, nor to stop the pull back becoming over hasty and precipitating a rout of both formations.
Interpenetration has always been associated with mutual routing. Line relief in the horse and musket period was based upon repeated formation changes to enable the formations to pass each other without interpenetrating for that reason (and was considered highly dangerous then too).
And the best way to replace a line was to have it hold its central forward position, have the ends fall in behind that solid centre, and then have the replaceing formation mast PAST it, and then form out, allowing the damanged line to pull back behind their friends as cover.
Ultimately, what is described in the diagram just does not look Roman to me.
Much more Roman would be to keep the men in identifiable groups where each man recognises his comrade well enough to call him out for shirking, and have them take turns at having a go, where everyone can see them, and then pulling back afterwards for the next guys turn.
i.e. the gaps are maintained, and they attack as maniples not as a line.
So for this notion of files pushing past each other to work – look again at the 4th-6th diagrams in particular for the problem area - remembering that they are 'volunteers' not professionals when this drill was developed, I think a fair bit more detail on how the men are kept in place is required to get it onto any sort of stable footing.
(Oh, and perhaps some sort of indication in the sources that there was a fully continuous battle line would not go amiss)
p.s. Those boxing all day matches were not toe to toe from start to finish. They spent, like boxers still do now, a long time hugging each other and leaning off each other, and standing just out of reach getting their breath back. The dullness of this was one of the reasons why Queensbury set up the rules in the first place, to try to make them fight for 3 and rest for 3 and not save things until the end because there was a finite end point coming.
Quote from: Erpingham on December 18, 2012, 08:34:18 AM
I'll repeat my comment of before - don't paint the Romans as supermen. Early legions were not long service professionals, they were citizen levies chosen by lot. Admittedly, some people served year on year and would develop experience and everyone would have at least basic training. But their opposition could quite easily be better and more experienced fighters man-for-man. Their big advantages were tactical (the Roman army had a lot in it's tactical toolkit, including line relief) aided by great articulation. Its low level leadership through the centurionate should not be underestimated - experienced and aggressive fighters.
We can certainly distinguish between the citizen soldiers of the Republic and the professional soldiers of the Empire, but although the Romans may not have
been supermen they certainly
appeared as such to many contemporaries (including Josephus, from whom we get our quote about battles being bloody drills and drill being bloodless battles).
Josephus' observation is one of a smattering of allusions across classical sources that cause me to regard the modern model of
conflictus interruptus with some scepticism. ;)
If we could take modern football and rugby games as an example of human exertion and hopefully in rugby near combat then we would see that
1) Effort is punctuated. Look at an international group of rugby forwards. These are superbly fit men who are paid to train and yet if they get involved in repeated scrums they do get and look exhausted. So the players modulate the intense effort needed to win tactically, with short rests, often by mutual consent.
2) The better team wins at the end. rarely does one team just walk away with the game from the beginning, but by the end the loser is exhausted and just that bit more ragged with their passing and slower in running.
I think that the Romans understand well that most of their opponents replace only by having men from the back of a block step through to replace casualties filtering back. That brings on fresh men, but not a fresh unit. What the Romans do is
a) prepare with pile, this gives a tactical advantage to their first assault.
b) Go in hot and hard. They are deliberately trying to exhaust themselves and the opponent.
c) Repeat until both sides are well tired. During this period they could replace centuries locally, but the line within which that century stands will only be replaced on a legion wide trumpet signal. Of course when tired the Roman centuries and their opponents break off and rest a bit, but the Romans can give more, knowing that they can be replaced.
d) Replace lines by the Hastati falling back through the Principes. The opponent will be too exhausted to follow up.
e) Restart combat with the fresh Principes who cycle through lia throwing and assault with the sword again, but against a fully tired opponent.
The model above allows for replacement on a minor tactical level and grand replacement of a whole line. It plays to what we can see about combative human effort in that the Romans deliberately render the opponent exhausted and then face him with fresh units.
Roy
I would go with slow and steady rather than hot and hard in most cases, and my impression is that the hastati and principes only fought once each (and that until they had given their all) rather than passing the baton back and forth every so often.
They actually do seem to have used a system of relief by individual maniples before they adopted the line-at-a-time relief system at some point between 437 and 394 BC.
Quote from: Mark G on December 18, 2012, 09:04:53 AM
no leg pull at all, and I am studiously trying to not hijack this thread onto an exposition of an alternative model - plenty of time for that in the second half of 2013, I assure you.
I'm simply trying to get those who favour this to look at some of the difficulties with the single line of combat model which this diagram is based upon.
the thing is, the diagram of all those files pushing past each other looks Greek not Roman to me.
It's all precision and mathematically correct fancy drill.
Thanks, Mark. :) Mind you, that bit about precision and mathematical correctness sounds very Roman to me!
Quote from: Mark G on December 18, 2012, 09:04:53 AM
A Roman way would be to send them off where the rest of the army could see them in action - demonstrating their prowess. This file based approach as much more in tune with the anonymity of the phalanx.
When we look at the use of deeper formations, there are also some lessons we can see from elsewhere in history.
If they guys in the middle and back cannot see what is going on, then at the first sign of something other than a steady forward march, they are quite prone to wavering and running.
routs always start at the back,
and when men can see an opportunity to get out of a fight with honour, they will take it (helping a wounded comrade being case in pont).
So if you have a formation drill which allows the men in middle and back to take a simple sidestep and avoid becoming the front line - by joining the retreating column - that's a positive encouragement to them to pull out of the fight.
The Greeks / Macedonians countered this with file closers to keep them in place.
But the Romans put their best men in the front as leaders for others to follow.
They also had optios, who could watch the rear. But having a line of chaps behind with steel in their eyes and hands, plus a code of law which prescribed death for desertion, would have been the main deterrent to early departures.
Quote from: Mark G on December 18, 2012, 09:04:53 AM
Further, the Romans introduced more anonymity to their uniforms as the Republic progress, but did not change model of combat drill - which encourages further the potential for men to simply sidestep their turn at the front line.
And there are no file closers at the back to keep an eye on who is joining in, nor to stop the pull back becoming over hasty and precipitating a rout of both formations.
With a line of combat troops behind, file closers would seem to be an unnecessary luxury.
Quote from: Mark G on December 18, 2012, 09:04:53 AM
Interpenetration has always been associated with mutual routing. Line relief in the horse and musket period was based upon repeated formation changes to enable the formations to pass each other without interpenetrating for that reason (and was considered highly dangerous then too).
And the best way to replace a line was to have it hold its central forward position, have the ends fall in behind that solid centre, and then have the replacing formation march PAST it, and then form out, allowing the damanged line to pull back behind their friends as cover.
Not sure I agree. As Justin Taylor asked: while all this is going on, what is the enemy doing?
Quote from: Mark G on December 18, 2012, 09:04:53 AM
Ultimately, what is described in the diagram just does not look Roman to me.
Probably true. Of course if relief was conducted by files backing through between files, then the diagram is not Roman anyway. ;)
Quote from: Mark G on December 18, 2012, 09:04:53 AM
Much more Roman would be to keep the men in identifiable groups where each man recognises his comrade well enough to call him out for shirking, and have them take turns at having a go, where everyone can see them, and then pulling back afterwards for the next guys turn.
i.e. the gaps are maintained, and they attack as maniples not as a line.
I would have thought that a recipe for piecemeal disaster. Again, while our lot are cheering on Maniple X, what is the enemy doing? Taking advantage of his good fortune and our friendly units' separation to chop up Maniple X from three directions or swallow it whole.
Quote from: Mark G on December 18, 2012, 09:04:53 AM
So for this notion of files pushing past each other to work – look again at the 4th-6th diagrams in particular for the problem area - remembering that they are 'volunteers' not professionals when this drill was developed, I think a fair bit more detail on how the men are kept in place is required to get it onto any sort of stable footing.
(Oh, and perhaps some sort of indication in the sources that there was a fully continuous battle line would not go amiss)
Livy, Cannae: the Carthaginian veterans 'look like a Roman line of battle'. Did he mean they had gaps? ;)
Apart from that we have mainly negative evidence: Polybius comparing legion and phalanx mentions no gaps in the legionary frontage; Vegetius drawing up his legion seems to have cohort next to cohort with no gaps in between; Caesar in his accounts gives the impression of solid lines meeting each other, and only at Zama do we seem to have maniples drawn up with spaces in between, this being a deliberate elephant attenuation measure. In the final phase of Zama, once Scipio has added the principes and triarii to the remaining hastati, the impression is of a single, solid Roman line clashing with a single, solid Carthaginian line.
Keeping the men in place was achieved by discipline and more to the point a penal code that prescribed death for anyone who left his post without permission - including in one case a consul's son when he went out to duel an enemy challenger (and won) without getting permission from the consul.
For the reasons I gave I go with hot and hard. Roman ethos is all about aggression and there is no point in pacing things if you are the fitter team.
Can anyone remind us of the passage where the Romans are too close to a river to manage their normal line replacement technique. It is most instructive but I cannot remember whether it is in Livy or Polybius.
Roy
Polybius II.33. Even better, here it is: :)
Battle with the Insubres.
"The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon skill in this battle; the Tribunes instructing the troops how they were to conduct themselves both collectively and individually. They had learned from former engagements that Gallic tribes were always most formidable at the first onslaught, before their courage was at all damped by a check; and that the swords with which they were furnished, as I have mentioned before, could only give one downward cut with any effect, but that after this the edges got so turned and the blade so bent, that unless they had time to straighten them with their foot against the ground, they could not deliver a second blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave out the spears of the Triarii, who are the last of the three ranks, to the first ranks, or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords only, after their spears were done with, they charged the Celts full in front. When the Celts had rendered their swords useless by the first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans close with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which is their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point. The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because he left the lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to throw themselves into the river. However, the valour of the soldiers secured them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and they returned to Rome with abundance of booty of every kind, and of trophies stripped from the enemy."
QuoteIf we could take modern football and rugby games as an example of human exertion and hopefully in rugby near combat then we would see that
Indeed but imagine not a few men but hundreds possibly thousands and the tired men either; being replaced or dying.
Wonderful Patrick. I think that the point that Polybius makes shows that the Romans expect to fall back during the battle in order to accomplish line relief. Hence I hold no truck with the idea that disengaging from an exhausted enemy leaves the Romans open to some dramatic prejudicial move by their opponents.
Roy
Could I suggest a refinement to the line relief system proposed at the beginning of this thread, as follows (apologies if it makes this a long post). It supposes that the first line of Hastati have been fighting long and hard, are not winning and are in no shape for fancy file-based manoeuvres. They can manage to retire as a body and that is about it. The relief system takes that into account. The positioning of the men should make clear what I'm driving at.
I am working on the assumption that the primary sources tend to favour or at least do not rule out gaps between the Principes' maniples rather than files.
The Hastati are battered and their files are out of kilter.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/1.jpg)
The Principii move up.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/2.jpg)
The Hastati begin to collapse in a series of half circles towards the gaps between the Principii.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/3.jpg)
The half circles gradually shrink as the men retire through the gaps and reform behind the Principii.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/4.jpg)
The posterior files of the Principii start moving up, narrowing the gaps. The Hastati continue to retire through the gaps.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/5.jpg)
This process continues.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/6.jpg)
The gaps are nearly closed. Notice that whilst the Principes files are moving into position, they are covered by the Hastati and do not engage the enemy until they have completed their manoeuvre.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/7.jpg)
The gaps are nearly closed.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/8.jpg)
The last few Hastati retire through the nearly closed gaps, covered by a couple of Hastati at the front end.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/9.jpg)
The last Principes files closes the gaps.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/10.jpg)
The last of the Hastati filter through the Principes' files and the reconstituted Hastati line moves up to support the embattled Principes.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/new%20line%20relief/11.jpg)
I'd love to know how you produced those diagrams - and really hope you dont say powerpoint .
But given the pretty clear statement above that the Romans expected to perform a retrograde movement as part of line relief, I think the weight of evidence is still against this dribbling back of men from the front line and pushing through of men from the second line.
look at the diagram subtitled 'The gaps are nearly closed' and tell me if you were one of the green guys still up front, would you be calmly performing that sort of drill? or would you - already probably exhausted and certainly stressed from fighting - be more likely to just bolt back to the other green guys in the safe zone?
Quote from: Mark G on December 19, 2012, 09:14:15 AM
I'd love to know how you produced those diagrams - and really hope you dont say powerpoint .
Nope. Freehand 10, though I intend to switch over to Illustrator in the near future as it is the new standard vector design programme.
Quote from: Mark G on December 19, 2012, 09:14:15 AMBut given the pretty clear statement above that the Romans expected to perform a retrograde movement as part of line relief, I think the weight of evidence is still against this dribbling back of men from the front line and pushing through of men from the second line.
One could understand the retrograde movement as follows: the Hastati fall back on the Principes who themselves don't move. The Triarii behind them then retreat several yards back to make space for the Hastati as they retire through the Principes' gaps and reform behind them.
Quote from: Mark G on December 19, 2012, 09:14:15 AMlook at the diagram subtitled 'The gaps are nearly closed' and tell me if you were one of the green guys still up front, would you be calmly performing that sort of drill? or would you - already probably exhausted and certainly stressed from fighting - be more likely to just bolt back to the other green guys in the safe zone?
I think it might something in between parade ground precision and the anarchy of panicked flight. The Hastati are battered but intact. They feel they are getting bettered by the enemy but have not reached the point where they feel they are about to be overwhelmed by them. Withdrawal is a bit of a scramble but fairly orderly. The front-line troops, who have not broken, continue to face the enemy, keeping heart as they back slowly towards the gaps and safety. No reason for anyone to have the heebie-jeebies, drop everything and run.
Experienced troops know that if you panic you are probably dead. Safety is in keeping line with your comrades. This is reinforced here where safety lies precisely in doing that.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 19, 2012, 09:36:39 AM
One could understand the retrograde movement as follows: the Hastati fall back on the Principes who themselves don't move. The Triarii behind them then retreat several yards back to make space for the Hastati as they retire through the Principes' gaps and reform behind them.
Why not just line up the triarii further back to start with? IIRC Vegetius has the standards and command between lines 2 & 3 and also rallies the velites there after they have fallen back, so you'd want some space available anyway.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 19, 2012, 09:36:39 AM
Experienced troops know that if you panic you are probably dead.
Indeed, but this drill is supposed to work with a bunch of militia with a few weeks basic, as well as experienced troops.
Quote from: Erpingham on December 19, 2012, 06:43:43 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 19, 2012, 09:36:39 AM
One could understand the retrograde movement as follows: the Hastati fall back on the Principes who themselves don't move. The Triarii behind them then retreat several yards back to make space for the Hastati as they retire through the Principes' gaps and reform behind them.
Why not just line up the triarii further back to start with? IIRC Vegetius has the standards and command between lines 2 & 3 and also rallies the velites there after they have fallen back, so you'd want some space available anyway.
The question then is what were the 'deliberate retrograde movements' mentioned by Polybius? What mechanism of line relief
would require them?
Quote from: Erpingham on December 19, 2012, 06:43:43 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 19, 2012, 09:36:39 AM
Experienced troops know that if you panic you are probably dead.
Indeed, but this drill is supposed to work with a bunch of militia with a few weeks basic, as well as experienced troops.
I suspect the training was a bit more thorough than that, otherwise the troops would be incapable of any kind of manoeuvre in the heat of battle. Mixing experienced troops with greenhorns would also have the effect of stiffening the greenhorns, who would feel confident around the veterans' constancy, besides feeling ashamed of running when the veterans did not (plus the fact they would executed out of hand for doing so).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 19, 2012, 07:17:31 PM
The question then is what were the 'deliberate retrograde movements' mentioned by Polybius? What mechanism of line relief would require them?
Speculating, because I don't know what the Latin says, but if the army had concertina-ed to reduce the gaps between the three lines, the retrograde movement of the front line through the second would be impossible, because there wouldn't be enough space between 2 and 3.
My worry about the attractive diagrams is one of basic philosophy of how warfare works in this period. To me it is vitally important that troops maintain order and cohesion and that the right people are in the right place all the time. Thus a Roman unit cannot just turn around and fight because the men whoa are meant to be at the front will now be at the back. Those who are meant to be a t the frbont of a unit have to be in that posit ion a he n they fight. They right. Marker ha s to Ben the right marker because he knows his role in a drill movement,.
So I don't see the Hastati retiring by filtering through a gap, losing order in the process. Caesar makes a point at the Sambre that his men have lost order and cannot fight effectively. Turning to right or left and then queuing to get through a gap introduces a fundamental disorder and the tr oops will be crushed together, unable to fight and prone to panic.
I would go with the Hastati stepping back, turning on a signal and dropping back through the Principes who advance to intimidate the enemy into holding back as the fall back manoeuvre is conducted. Having dropped back the Hastati turn again and then all the right people are in the right places.
Order is everything when fighting relies upon teamwork.
Roy
I would not categorise the Romans of the Republican period as a 'bunch of militia'. Polybius, although sadly saying little about Roman techniques on the battlefield, indicates that they had good low-level officering (as has been pointed out earlier in this thread ;)) and also describes their system for duties in camp, which shows a level of familiarisation and sophistication well above that of the average feudal 40-day levy.
While it is quite likely that some legions did get only a few weeks training (the mass of recruits in the Cannae campaign being a case in point) these few weeks were probably quite intensive. We might also remember that the average British Territorial Army soldier gets about six weeks' training (equivalent) per year, and this in theory makes him the equivalent of a regular soldier (at least the MoD think so).
Quality of training seems to be at least as important as quantity.
Polybius' 'retrograde movements' (the Greek has epi poda, which specifically means 'retreating backwards') must perforce involve the first line retreating behind the second line into the space between that and the third (so far so good), but as Polybius implies any retirement would have landed the Romans in the soup (or at least the river), we must conclude that the first line continued to retire behind the third - i.e. through the principes and triarii, taking post behind the triarii.
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 19, 2012, 07:42:14 PM
Polybius' 'retrograde movements' (the Greek has epi poda, which specifically means 'retreating backwards') must perforce involve the first line retreating behind the second line into the space between that and the third (so far so good), but as Polybius implies any retirement would have landed the Romans in the soup (or at least the river), we must conclude that the first line continued to retire behind the third - i.e. through the principes and triarii, taking post behind the triarii.
Patrick
Which is different from Livy's legion, where the Hastati stay in support of the Principes (or have I misunderstood Livy's reference?)
Well spotted and perfectly understood. Livy says:
"...tum principum pugna erat; hastati sequabantur." (Literally: 'Then the fight was of the principes; the hastati followed [them].)
It is hard to see how this could mean anything other than the hastati staying behind the principes, presumably as supports (moral and/or actual). In Livy's legion the hastati and principes are also reinforced, apparently piecemeal, by the rorarii during the course of the battle (a relic of the earlier piecemeal commitment system for propping up the line). The Polybian legion lacks rorarii (or, more accurately, the men who might earlier have been rorarii are now incorporated directly into the first two lines).
Quote from: Mark G on December 18, 2012, 09:04:53 AM
I am studiously trying to not hijack this thread onto an exposition of an alternative model - plenty of time for that in the second half of 2013, I assure you.
I forgot to mention: please feel free to propose any alternative model you like. Mine is just a hypothesis after all.
As Threadmaster (or Judge Thredd?) my only provisio is that you supply brightly coloured diagrams ;).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 19, 2012, 08:05:53 PM
Well spotted and perfectly understood. Livy says:
"...tum principum pugna erat; hastati sequabantur." (Literally: 'Then the fight was of the principes; the hastati followed [them].)
It is hard to see how this could mean anything other than the hastati staying behind the principes, presumably as supports (moral and/or actual).
Which is what we would expect (or I would). Seems to me there are two parts to the line relief thing. An exchange of lines 1 & 2 was probably fairly routine. Roy has suggested the hastati would have gone into action expecting to exhaust themselves and be relieved. Even if this wasn't the case, I'd suggest that exchanging the first two lines fits with an expectation of fighting on and winning. If it "came to the triarii" they were in a tough place and the idea was a ordered withdrawal. In the later Republican legion though (e.g. Caesar), without the lines being of different types, does this change?
Quote from: Erpingham on December 20, 2012, 07:56:04 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 19, 2012, 08:05:53 PM
Well spotted and perfectly understood. Livy says:
"...tum principum pugna erat; hastati sequabantur." (Literally: 'Then the fight was of the principes; the hastati followed [them].)
It is hard to see how this could mean anything other than the hastati staying behind the principes, presumably as supports (moral and/or actual).
Which is what we would expect (or I would). Seems to me there are two parts to the line relief thing. An exchange of lines 1 & 2 was probably fairly routine. Roy has suggested the hastati would have gone into action expecting to exhaust themselves and be relieved. Even if this wasn't the case, I'd suggest that exchanging the first two lines fits with an expectation of fighting on and winning. If it "came to the triarii" they were in a tough place and the idea was a ordered withdrawal. In the later Republican legion though (e.g. Caesar), without the lines being of different types, does this change?
Of course. If things went badly the Hastati and Principes would retire through the kneeling (and immobile) Triarii and retreat to the camp. In this case they would have gone straight into the river.
Talk about me missing the obvious :-[.
On that point, are their any actual examples of the Romans WITHDRAWING behind the triarii?
i.e. the Triarii acting as a defensive force to cover a retreat?
I can only think of examples of the Trairii being committed as a mass-de-decision to win the battle now that the enemy has been exhausted.
(Goldsworthy and Sabin offer a compelling counter model for you to look at, they do not have the single formed line of battle, which I think is where all the problems with your attempt start from)
Quote from: Mark G on December 20, 2012, 08:55:44 AM
On that point, are their any actual examples of the Romans WITHDRAWING behind the triarii?
i.e. the Triarii acting as a defensive force to cover a retreat?
I can only think of examples of the Trairii being committed as a mass-de-decision to win the battle now that the enemy has been exhausted.
(Goldsworthy and Sabin offer a compelling counter model for you to look at, they do not have the single formed line of battle, which I think is where all the problems with your attempt start from)
I imagine Livy is clear enough:
[10] The triarii knelt beneath their banners, with the left leg advanced, having their shields leaning against their shoulders and their spears thrust into the ground and pointing obliquely upwards, as if their battle—line were fortified with a bristling palisade. [11] if the principes, too, were unsuccessful in their fight, they fell back slowly from the battle—line on the triarii. (From this arose the adage, "to have come to the triarii," when things are going badly.) [12] The triarii, rising up after they had received the principes and hastati into the intervals between their companies [ordinum], would at once draw their companies [ordinibus] together and close the lanes, as it were; then, with no more reserves behind to count on, they would charge the enemy in one compact array.
Here they represent a safe haven for the exhausted Hastati and Principii, besides being a last-ditch attempt to win a lost battle.
It is difficult to imagine fighting the enemy in anything else than a solid line. A soldier has to have both his sides covered as he is fully occupied fighting the chap in front of him. If he is exposed on one side or the other, as would be the case with a gap-punctuated line, he is dead.
Quote from: Mark G on December 20, 2012, 08:55:44 AM
(Goldsworthy and Sabin offer a compelling counter model for you to look at, they do not have the single formed line of battle, which I think is where all the problems with your attempt start from)
Do you want to give a summary here?
Ahha the vulnerability of the gap punctuated line raises its head. I remember that this has been debated in the past and that the opponet does not rush into the gaps because he must break formation to do so and the gaps are covered off by Velites or Prncipes or hastati as appropriate. It seems attarctive to wargamers to say that the flanks of the fighting units are vulnerable, but actually no enemy is going to lose cohesion in an attempt to exploit them because this breaks his line and exposes his tactical flanks as those advancing into the gaps turn to fight the flanked troops.
Roy
All I would say to this is: if a fractured line was ostensibly so versatile and effective, why then did everyone else before, during and after the Roman period fight with continuous lines*?
(*A mild caveat here: the later Renaissance saw the tercio - an infantry 'moving fortress' that did not form a continuous line with its neighbours - becomes the premier infantry formation on the battlefield. However the tercio was rendered obsolete by Swedish continuous-line infantry, so I think the basic point still stands. We also have French columns during the Napoleonic Wars: these were not as a rule deployed in a continuous line, and although successful against shaken continental troops tended to receive a bloody nose against British infantry - who took advantage of their vulnerable flanks ...)
Patrick
when you say everyone, Patrick, what evidence do you have for this?
Cause the only solid stuff I can find is that Hoplites did when fighting as one city state - but even the bigger hoplite battles broke into smaller sub phalanxes.
The Macedoninan phalanx does seem to have been broken up into separated phalanxes at a tactical level too.
Once you get a decent number of men into the front line, its impossible to move them in a solid continous line.
<p> Do you want to give a summary here? </p>
not really.
A, its a different topic entirely.
B, I have a ton of stuff on it going into Slingshot over 2013, and it would do an injustice to that work to preface it here.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 20, 2012, 11:52:23 AM(*A mild caveat here: the later Renaissance saw the tercio - an infantry 'moving fortress' that did not form a continuous line with its neighbours - becomes the premier infantry formation on the battlefield. However the tercio was rendered obsolete by Swedish continuous-line infantry, so I think the basic point still stands.
The Swedes - and perhaps even more so, the Dutch battalions before them - were not continuous lines, but formed in chequerboard formations very similar to the popular conception of the Romans. (See http://tinyurl.com/cucsk4p (http://tinyurl.com/cucsk4p), for example.)
While that example may be irrelevant because of firearms, the Tang writings of Li Jing recommend two lines of
dui (fifty-man "centuries") in a loose chequerboard - http://tinyurl.com/bqqe2kw (http://tinyurl.com/bqqe2kw).
Your examples are pertinent despite them being based on firearms. Late XVIth and early XVIIth century battles often became hand to hand affairs with the shooting having been used to weaken the opponent. At the Dunes the Cromwellian soldiers chargev in with pike and with musket swinging!!
Roy
to add some colour to this.
I have friends who do sword fighting (not fencing, but the meaty stuff that means that they have to call the Police before they go to training because they are carrying proper weapons).
they all tell me that this is the best sword fight on film.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gHCvV8uUr9U
its 6 minutes long, and both guys are knackered half way through.
Whimpy actors and over weight renactors not withstanding, it makes the point that men will pull back mid way through a fight time and again and still be fighting.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 20, 2012, 09:08:12 AM
It is difficult to imagine fighting the enemy in anything else than a solid line. A soldier has to have both his sides covered as he is fully occupied fighting the chap in front of him. If he is exposed on one side or the other, as would be the case with a gap-punctuated line, he is dead.
I think this has been picked up pretty well by Mark but the general point of who flanks who is that anyone who rushes into a gap left by design between two units is in greater danger because the gap-leaver is prepared to have the enemy to the flank, rather than it being an impetuous decision.
On the non-continuous line, on Ancmed Steven James pointed out that Vegetius mentions a Roman formation called the saw (
serra ?), which Steven envisages as two lines with gaps offset so the rear rank is behind the gaps in the first. Such a formation could exchange lines simply by the front rank reversing through the gaps, leaving the second line to become the "teeth". Just another one to throw into the mix :)
Quote from: Mark G on December 20, 2012, 12:40:27 PM
when you say everyone, Patrick, what evidence do you have for this?
Biblical cultures, judging by battle descriptions and available reliefs, used solid lines which could part to emit and perhaps admit mounted forces. This process is detailed as being used by Gauls in Lucian's 'Zeuxis and Antiochus', aka 'Elephant Victory'. In classical battles the one case of serious gapping (First Mantinea) in classical sources (Thucydides) has the 'gapped' part of the line overwhelmed by its cohesive opponents. I have yet to see a description of a phalanx (hoplite or Macedonian style) advancing by choice in anything but a continuous line except when Xenophon details his men into separate 100-man units for mountain fighting. Greek and Roman accounts of fighting barbarians do not seem to mention gaps between their own subunits or those of the enemy (if anyone has any that do, please mention them).
Saxon battles tended to be fought in 'shieldwall', which is not really a formation permitting any gaps. Mediaeval actions seem to involve solid masses of men. Swiss did indeed have gaps between their
keil, but the
keil themselves were big solid blocks of pikemen and/or halberdiers. Tercios were similar: big units which deployed with intervals between them. One reason for the intervals was, as Duncan hints, that firearms were now part of the repertoire: the tercio had all-round shooting capability. It also packed a massive close-ranked punch in melee. Where it fell down was when it was matched against the nimbler Swedish formations, which emphasised a more linear and connected approach. Duncan rightly points out the Swedes had a staggered line of battle, though it is noteworthy that in the English Civil War, when tercios were no longer the Swedish system's opponents, it was back to complete lines.
18th century military theorists looking for ways to rise above the linear (continuous line) firefight went back to thinking about large, deep and semi-independent pike-armed formations. These never saw the light of day but had a cultural successor in the French column - which foundered against any effective linear defence, so that in the 19th century everyone in Christian Europe except the Russians went back to the linear firefight (the Russians caught up later, after the Crimean War).
The overall verdict of history seems to be that it is better to stay together in a cohesive formation. Some armies could operate with intervals because their units could give each other effective mutual support against the type of opponents they were fighting, but these seem to have been a few big units rather than a lot of small ones. Swiss in particular used skirmishers and momentum to avoid giving their opponents easy access to their flanks - and were good at all-round defence if the opponent did get there.
Li Jing's Chinese infantry drilled in a loose chequerboard formation, but deployed for battle "in two lines or echelons of equal strength," without specifying whether these were solid or chequerboard type lines.
However, as Anthony mentions, sometimes a specially-created gap can suck in opponents as part of a cunning plan, a sort of Cannae in miniature. I seem to remember seeing somewhere a description of a Byzantine manoeuvre of this nature involving a whole
meros: the unit would deploy as a three-sided box with the open side (facing the enemy) covered by a thin screen of troops. When the enemy attacked the screen would fall back, dragging the enemy into the trap. Whether this trick was actually used in battle I know not, but the idea was there.
Patrick
P.S. - The swordfight is much as one would expect from unshielded barbarians with no stamina and an excess of enthusiasm. Trained Romans would have polished off either of those two quite quickly by taking the first flurry of blows on the shield and then delivering a good stab, which would have been no more exhausting than presenting arms. Bring on the next Celt! :)
Back on trarii,
teh key points is
"they would charge the enemy in one compact array"
i.e., the trarii are an attacking weapon - a mass de descision.
Yet we have all taken that very same description to mean that they are a defensive formation for the army to withdraw behind.
Its not, yes the exhausted H and P recover beind it - but not defensively, rather , they recover and rejoin the attack which the T lead.
Hence my point - they wre to attack with, once they H and P had worn down the enemy (Rome frequently got lucky in that the H and P would win on their own, but thats a side effect from the plan).
This episode with the Livian legion (340 BC) is the last known example of their doing so, and the triarii's success was the result of a ruse. We also lack any instances of the triarii seeing off the enemy during the Polybian period (c.311(?) to c.107 BC).
I think it is not so much that triarii are envisaged as the decisive weapon that will sweep the enemy off the field as that a spear-armed unit needed some impetus behind it to be effective, hence the get-together-and-charge. In the Polybian legion the battles seem to have been won or lost by the hastati and principes (or won by the opponent's cavalry) without the triarii affecting the issue. This seems to have been design rather than luck. It is perhaps worth noting that in the Polybian legion the heavy infantry of the triarii are cut down to 600 from the 900 in the Livian legion. One would expect their number to be increased rather than reduced if they were in fact the arm of decision rather than a vestigial and no longer seriously used part of the army.
Slightly on topic are these videos of Viking swordfighting technique. Using both sword and shield together should be quite tiring after a while.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFiIDl_mt2c
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dkhpqAGdZPc
Yep I see line relief as a plan, not a confused event. In fact as a confused event it is a failure.
Quote from: Mark G on December 21, 2012, 09:17:51 AM
Back on trarii,
i.e., the trarii are an attacking weapon - a mass de descision.
Yet we have all taken that very same description to mean that they are a defensive formation for the army to withdraw behind.
Maybe it's the translation but I find it difficult to read the triarii's intervention as part of a well oiled attack plan. Why did "It came down to the triarii" mean a desperate situation? Why the implication that the enemy believe the enemy is lost and are shocked to discover formed troops still to be overcome? Or are you suggesting the retreat of the first two lines is a ruse, to bring the enemy in pursuit mode within striking distance of the "
masse de decision"?
I had a look at the Viking swordfighting technique videos and was not impressed. The two guys concerned are moving far too fast and too fluidly for my view of Vikings. They take up too much space and hit with little power. My view of Vikings/Anglo Saxons etc. is that the main task is protection with the shield. Many men have little head or shoulder protection, their safety is dependent upon keeping the shield high and being protected by the men either side. The blows will be delivers with a major vertical swing aiming to batter down she shield and hit the head. To that end the sword and long axe are very heavy, too heavy for a fencing style and too long for stabbing ala Romain. The best depiction that I have seen of this style is the duel in the 13th Warrior. In the Dark Ages it is about giving and receiving mighty blows and your rating as a man sort of depends upon how you do it.
For Romans its all about winning. There is no false heroism, dealing death is a practical matter. Efficiency is what counts and I suppose the manliness of getting in close.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on December 21, 2012, 07:25:03 PM
In the Dark Ages it is about giving and receiving mighty blows and your rating as a man sort of depends upon how you do it.
"And Matty struck the very first blow, and hurt Lord Arnold sore,
Lord Arnold struck the very next blow, and Matty struck no more "
The trouble I have with Viking (and A/S ) battle descriptions, and for that matter later Medieval ones, is the detailed descriptions tend to be one on one fights, often in a formal setting like a duel or a tournament. This very individualistic style doesn't reflect line-of-battle fighting, any more than Gladiatorial combat reflects legionary drill. However, it is really a different thread.
Quote
For Romans its all about winning. There is no false heroism, dealing death is a practical matter. Efficiency is what counts and I suppose the manliness of getting in close.
Roy
Do we know this from our sources, or is it speculation? Isn't there evidence of "conspicuous gallantry" both among centurions and also velites (some of whom wear wolfskins so as their heroics will be more noticeable)?
I think that we know it from our sources and I recall from Lendon's soldiers and ghosts!
I suspect that soldiers need motivation to take the risks of fighting and part of that motivation is to live up to your society's particular martial ethos. Why do the British celebrate Balaclava rather than the Alma or Isandlhwana rather than Gingindlovu or Ulundi. It is a matter of particular culture and what sticks in my mind is a Roman general executing his son because he disobeyed orders and fought a duel. I cannot imagine a Celt doing that,, the son would be being heroically praied and given the best portion of the roast animal.
I know there are doubts about how far one can use the Tain as evidence for the fighting style and ethos of the Celts on the continent, but it is a story of great blows with magic weapons and the application of heroic risk taking force. Roman accounts are much more prosaic and about pushing and stabbing (Marius v the Cimbri/Teutones) and caesar than about heroic moments.
Roy
my point on triarii is that we get too hung up on bon motts about 'down to the triarii'. as though it was evidence of an organisational intention.
It looks far more like the 'RAF - Rare As Fairies' to me, than it does as evidence of a tactical doctrine.
We should be looking at the conception when the system was first developed, and then trace its development / evolution forward through time.
What I see, is that the original fighting men were essentially all triarii - long spear, big shield, fairly typical.
Experiences like the Samnites up in the hills, the first celtic incursions, and I suspect also the increase in manpower which came from the beginnings of Rome's growth all triggered a need for a change in style.
So the three line deployment was devised.
But the Hastatti were initially just a heavier form of skirmisher than the velites, and with a heavier javelin and a better shield (buts still not much armour, and so fleeter of foot). sort of like under 21s to the velites school boy leagues. Potential not yet realised.
then the principes and the triarii fight 'properly' with long spears and big shields - the first fighting line of principes, and the second fighting line of veteran Triarii.
It soon proved that actually this heavy javelin followed up with a stabbing sword worked quite well, so the H and P were made more uniform, to maximise that.
But the fully equipped fighting men were still the triarii with full armour, spear and shield - the actual experienced veterans, remember, not a bunch of pensionable home guard types.
And further on, it was found that in fact there were hardly any times when the Triarii were being called upon so well did this pilum/sword combination work, and eventually even the triarii were similarly equipped as well.
remembering that most of the battles which we have good records for involving the Republican Romans seem to be over before the Triarii are called upon.
So the 'down to the triarii line fits in with the young men self agrandising, and as much in self bosting about who does all the work, as in gentle mocking of the older men or in defining a really tough fight)
If 'down to the trairii'was indicative of the need to retreat behind a defensive reserve, then the battle would be considered lost when the Principes were beaten.
But if DTTT was idicative of an unexpectedly hard battle requiring the use of the veterans, then the triarii were the weapon used to win the big battles.
So a hard battle would then be one which did require the triarii - but that is not to indicate that the triarii were a last resort, but rather that this opponent happened to be harder than others, - we actually had to use the veterans.
and hence, Triarii were the wqepon to win the big battles, the sort of thing you use to force a decision which is still in doubt - a fighting reserve.
Virtually every wargamer i have met has a conception of the Triarii being a defensive last resort, their usage indicating that the battle is almost lost.
Rather, I think it makes much more sense to view them as the expected battle winning weapon which time and usage gradually turned into something hardly required - unless it was a particularly tough day.
the difference is quite significant, I think.
Quote from: Mark G on December 28, 2012, 09:06:01 AM
Virtually every wargamer i have met has a conception of the Triarii being a defensive last resort, their usage indicating that the battle is almost lost.
Rather, I think it makes much more sense to view them as the expected battle winning weapon which time and usage gradually turned into something hardly required - unless it was a particularly tough day.
the difference is quite significant, I think.
The reason why almost all wargamers have this conception is the almost universal modern view (well, as universal as it can be when classical history is no longer studied) is that "Down to the Triarrii" means you are in the last chance saloon. This is the interpretation I was taught at school, for example. This is not to say it is correct but if you take your idea and translate it accordingly "it came down to the
masse de decision" doesn't seem to have the right level of desperation. I do agree though that things rarely got so bad that the triarii were needed in any form. It would be interesting to see a breakdown of the relative use of the three lines - I suspect that a minority of actions were fought by the first line alone, the majority by the first two and probably the smallest number involved all three.
Originally the triarii were not part of the line of battle at all: they were camp guards. This would lend a new level of desperation to ad triarios ('down to the triarii'). At some point between 437 and 394 BC they became the third line, and this seems to have coincided with the change from a piecemeal relief system by sending small numbers of maniples up to weak points in the first line to a formal system of whole line relief.
The manipular system (sans triarii) appears to date from pre-500 BC (much earlier than expected), as Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to a portent just prior to the final battle of the 505-503 BC Sabine War in which the Romans' hussois (a Greek word specifically used for pila) gleamed with fire during the night. He adds a description of the weapon, and it is a pilum - no doubt. So while the battle between Tarquin and the Roman Republic fought in 509 BC has all the elements of a hoplite battle (each side's right wing was victorious but the battle as a whole was indecisive) it would seem that the Roman Republic quickly abandoned the hoplite model, moving to a scutum-and-pilum-based soldier who fought in maniples and deployed in two battlelines (later known as the hastati and principes). This may have come about because of the hit-and-run nature of the Sabine War, or because a substantial slice of the Tullian first class, who provided the hoplite-type infantry, sided with Tarquin rather than with the Republic (or were wiped out by Lars Porsenna), or both. Or there may have been other reasons. In any event, pila-and-scutum equipped infantry seem to have formed most if not all of the effective fighting force from 503 to 437 BC.
Hence the Republic's battles, at least down to 437 BC, were fought without triarii on the field. From 394 BC one sees them lined up behind the principes, albeit not taking an active role unless all else fails, and from c.311(?) BC (after 314 BC but some time before 280 BC) they are reduced in establishment and from c.107 BC they start being abolished entirely.
One may also note that when the 'Livian' legion (300 skirmishers, 900 hastati heavy foot, 1,200 principes heavy foot, 900 triarii heavy foot) changed to the 'Polybian', the number of hastati (1,200 heavy foot) marginally increased while the number of skirmishers shot up from 300 leves to 1,200 velites. This leads me to conclude that hastati could not have been skirmishers, otherwise the 'Polybian' legion would not have needed 900 additional skirmishers to do the job for them.
Mark's idea of the triarii as 'la Garde' is an interesting one, but to me the logic of rating them as an arm of decision when to our knowledge they only ever decided one battle - and that by using a ruse - is somewhat questionable.
Patrick
when do you date the principes changing from spear to pilum, Patrick?
I am a bit dubious about the chronology which you present above Patrick.
the chronology I recognise is that it was not until the Samnite wars that the manipular legion was formed.
i.e. nearer to 300 b.c not 400 b.c.
while their may well be a linguistic history which includes 'triarii' before then, it was meaningless in the context upon which we understand Triarii now.
I also see little real evidence for pila-and-scutum operations forming 'most of if not all of the effective fighting force from 503 to 437 B.C.'
all the physical evidence and illustrations which we have seem to show something much closer to a long spear armed fighting man in that period as the main fighting man.
I don't see any evidence at all of the Sabine war instituting the pila-sword combination into Rome as the main combination, nor of Lars Porsena ending the Hoplite class and only leaving Pila armed Romans left.
Happy to see some real evidence of this, as it would make an early Roman army much more interesitng to prepare as a project, but I just don't see it for now other than passing references to individual pieces of equipment without any tactical or artistic context to put them into.
Additionally, I doubt the introduction of a third line of triarii as early as 400 b.c. In fact I doubt a meaningful first and second line of fighting men in this period - and rather see a fighting line and a skirmish line.
So if you are defining Triarii in 400 b.c. as the camp guards, well, they had to hang around somewhere I suppose, but this period was still the early period where there was one fighting line, there were skirmishers in front of it, and there was a camp behind it, but the development of hastatii and principes is not related to this.
the chronology which I recognise is much closer to Polybius.
Taking the Samnite wars as an approximate date - and cause - this is when we get the introduction of a multiple line triplex system.
And with that chronology, we have a reasonable amount of evidence and understanding of the Triarii as evolving from the first class, the main fighting men, who fought with large shield and long spear.
The principes started out as essentially the same fighting men, but younger/less well armoured - equipped with armour, large shield and long spear - arguably from the second class (although I think that may stretch the accuracy of the 5 classes as modelled in Livy a bit too far) - and with a specific role to perform in front of the main fighting veterans.
Hastatii, with their lack of armour comparable to the T and P are thus a heavier layer of missile capability after the velites - not skirmishers per-se, since they are expected to fight, but equally, not expected to do the bulk of the fighting, rather they are given serious javelins to properly soften the enemy up before the P begin the battle proper.
Experience soon shows that pila and sword is more effective than spear alone (and hence also the change in relative numbers you reference, which is part of the refinement of the Polybian system in the mid republic, not part of the change from Camillan to Polybian in the early republic), but this, for me, meets the basic definition.
Even if you take on Livy's notions of the Camillan reforms, which I am less than convinced by as it seems like another stretch to make his notions of the servian classes seem consitent (the numbers are quite unbelievable), you still have hastatii with spears but no armour - and therefore fitting into the main line of battle, rather than forming a separate line of battle in front on their own.
And if you accept Livy's notions of cammillus, then you must also accept that his rorarii and accesnii are the camp guards - which takes us back to the definition of triarii as camp guards and therefore behind the main fighting line i.e. irrelevant for all but the biggest defeats.
the dating of ad triarios is also probably relevant here - and I am pretty sure I remember it being well into the polybian period that this was first recorded - but if it was indeed very early, then it would be correct as an indicator that things were despirate, since it was down to the camp guards. But equally, it would be an anachronism to apply ad triatios to the Triarii of the Plyian legion if that were the case, since the name may be the smae but everything else about them has changed.
Do we even have an example of a camillan arrayed battle which indicates a sucession of fighting lines?
At least we agree that defining 'really early' Romans as hoplites is problematic - but it doesnt follow that they therefore did not have large shields and long spears. The basic fighting man for hundreds of years was one with a large shield and a long spear, only some of them were hoplites.
Let us start with the original Roman army as per Livy I.43 and Dionysius IV.16-18.
The first class are unambiguously hoplite-equipped and have 80 'centuries', a politico-administrative unit rather than a military organisation. The second and third classes are similarly equipped (and between themselves amount to 80 'centuries') but have a scutum rather than a clipeus and less armour. The fourth class are either unarmoured third-class equivalents (Dionysius) or spear-and-javelin armed (Livy). The fifth class have slings (Livy) or javelins and slings (Dionysius) and are clearly missile troops, almost certainly skirmishers.
This is to all intents and purposes the army which fights the Roman Republic's first battle in 509 BC (against Tarquin, who wants his throne back). Tarquin fields what one presumes is a similar army. Each side wins on the right, loses on the left. Eventually the winner is decided by the fact that the Republicans lost one man less. It is basically a hoplite battle fought by a hoplite army with many of the poorer troops fighting as rear-rankers rather than as skirmishers.
The Lars Porsena turns up, chases the Romans back into their city (and according to Tacitus actually occupies it) but declines to reinstate Tarquin. Inference: the Republic lost a battle. They may also have had a rethink about their army. Lars P then goes off and gets himself killed, leaving the Republic free by default. Next comes the war with the Sabines (505-503 BC).
This war was an affair of outposts and ambushes, not set-piece battles, until the final engagement (which the Romans won). Dionysius includes this intriguing snippet about a portent on the night before the final battle:
"It was as follows: From the javelins [hussos] at were fixed in the ground beside their tents (these javelins [hussos] are Roman weapons which they hurl and having pointed iron heads, not less than three feet in length, projecting straight forward from one end, and with the iron they are as long as spears of moderate length) — from these javelins [hussos] flames issued forth round the tips of the heads and the glare extended through the whole camp like that of torches and lasted a great part of the night." - Dionysius V.46.2
'Hussos' is the customary Greek specialist word for the Roman pilum, as in Polybius VI.23.8. The description given by Dionysius is unmistakably that of a pilum.
So what are the Romans doing with pila in 503 BC? The obvious answer is: using them for battle. Pila and hoplite formations do not mix. Inference: the Romans had given up hoplite formations.
Now for triarii. Back to the Republic's first battle in 509 BC.
" ... those of the Tyrrhenians who were posted on the enemy's right wing and commanded by Titus and Sextus, the sons of King Tarquinius, put the left wing of the Romans to flight, and advancing close to their camp, did not fail to attempt to take it by storm; but after receiving many wounds, since those inside stood their ground, they desisted. These guards were the triarii, as they are called; they are veteran troops, experienced in many wars, and are always the last employed in the most critical fighting, when every other hope is lost." - Dionysius V.15.4
Triarii are also camp guards in Dionysius VIII.86.
"But when, after attacking the hill and surrounding the camp, they [the Volsci] endeavoured to pull down the palisades, first the Roman horse, obliged, from the nature of the ground, to fight on foot, sallied out against them, and, behind the horse, those they call the triarii, with their ranks closed. These are the oldest soldiers, to whom they commit the guarding of the camp when they go out to give battle, and they fall back of necessity upon these as their last hope when there has been a general slaughter of the younger men and they lack other reinforcements."
They are still at it in 480 BC:
"apart from the triarii and a few younger troops, the rest of the crowd then in the camp consisted of merchants, servants and artificers" - Dionysius IX.12.1
"These met with but slight resistance, and whilst they were wasting time by thinking more about plundering than about fighting, the Roman triarii, who had been unable to withstand the first assault, despatched messengers to the consul to tell him the position of affairs, and then, retiring in close order to the head-quarters tent, renewed the fighting without waiting for orders." - Livy II.47.5
and in 437 BC:
"Fabius Vibulanus first manned the rampart with a cordon of defenders; and then, when the attention of the enemy was fixed on the wall, sallied out of the Porta Principalis, on the right, with his triarii, and fell suddenly upon them." - Livy IV.19.8
The first time we see triarii in the field is 394 BC:
"triarii Romani muniebant, alius exercitus proelio intentus stabat" (The Roman triarii dug defences, the rest of the army stood ready for battle.) - Livy V.26.6/7
They are doing the same in 350 BC:
"The Romans without a pause in their work, triarii erant qui muniebant (the triarii were digging defences), began the action with their troops of the first and second lines, who had been standing alert and armed in front of the working party." - Livy VII.23.7
The legion of 350 BC would be substantially the same legion as that of 340 BC, the latter being described in Livy VIII.8, with which we should all now be familiar. The legion of 394 BC does what the legion of 350 BC does, but not the legion of 437 BC.
As to tactical procedures ...
The battle against the Hernici in 486 BC illustrates the system of piecemeal reinforcement that appears to have prevailed between the short-lived hoplite system (obit pre-503 BC) and the recognisable 'Livian' legion of Livy VIII.8 (394-314 BC).
"Then there was a glorious struggle as both armies fought stubbornly; and for a long time they stood firm, neither side yielding to the other the ground where they were posted. At length the Romans' line began to be in distress, this being the first occasion in a long time that they had been forced to engage in war. 3 Aquilius, observing this, ordered that the troops which were still fresh and were being reserved for this very purpose should come up to reinforce the parts of the line that were in distress and that the men who were wounded and exhausted should retire to the rear. The Hernicans, learning that their troops were being shifted, imagined that the Romans were beginning flight; and encouraging one another and closing their ranks, they fell upon those parts of the enemy's army that were in motion, and the fresh troops of the Romans received their onset. Thus once more, as both sides fought stubbornly, there was a strenuous battle all over again; for the ranks of the Hernicans were also continually reinforced with fresh troops sent up by their generals to the parts of the line that were in distress." (Dionysius VIII.65.2-3)
Triarii are not involved. As we have seen, they were guarding the camp as of 486 BC. The two lines would appear to be the forerunners of what would later become the hastati and principes, and the apparent interchangeability of maniples of both lines suggests they were identically armed.
As can be seen, there is plenty in our sources to not just support but practically dictate a very early adoption of a pilum-and-scutum armed maniple-based early legion. Thanks to Dionysius, we can put the likely beginning date as somewhere between 505 and 503 BC. Thanks to Livy, we can put the date when this early legion (the 'proto-manipular legion', as we might call it) changed to the three-line formation with triarii on the field as between 437 and 394 BC.
Anyway, we can read all about it in Slingshot 287, and Rodger Williams can take a bow. :)
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 29, 2012, 12:25:34 PMSo what are the Romans doing with pila in 503 BC? The obvious answer is: using them for battle. Pila and hoplite formations do not mix. Inference: the Romans had given up hoplite formations.
Of course, if you follow Hans van Wees' view of hoplites, there is no reason why pila
should be incompatible with 6th-century hoplite formations....
But overall, I despair of the early Romans. Every statement in one ancient source is contradicted in another. For example, Patrick shows Dionysios describing pila being used as early as the 6th century; yet the
Ineditum Vaticanum specifically says that the pilum was adopted during the Samnite wars. It's hard to see how they can both be right. And similar contradictions are everywhere.
I increasingly find myself believing nothing about early Roman history at all.
Can I just pop into this debate to say 'Certosa Situla'. That looks to me very like a mixed formation being portrayed. Would not some of the contradictions fall away if the Romans had started with an Italian system of mixed spears and javelins in different units.
I might also suggest that Romans and Etruscans were never hoplites, that is a construction that we force upon them because the kit looks like hoplites kit and is adopted from Greek models. However, kit does not always determine tactics so it might not be correct or useful to call Italians hoplites with all the baggage that brings along in our concept of how warriors perform.
Alternately, Duncan is making a lot of sense by warning that Greek hoplites originally had a pair of spears, one or throwing and one or retaining in hand and that this might be he model that is transmitted to Italy via the Greek colonies and it most certainly accords with the timescale of the founding of those colonies.
Good heavens, if the Romans adopt two throwing spears fom the Greeks then what does that do for the conceptual tyranny of a Western Mediterranean way of war?.
Roy
Quote from: Duncan Head on December 29, 2012, 05:53:39 PM
But overall, I despair of the early Romans. Every statement in one ancient source is contradicted in another. For example, Patrick shows Dionysios describing pila being used as early as the 6th century; yet the Ineditum Vaticanum specifically says that the pilum was adopted during the Samnite wars. It's hard to see how they can both be right. And similar contradictions are everywhere.
I increasingly find myself believing nothing about early Roman history at all.
I know what you mean, Duncan - there seems to be a rule that if you have exactly two sources on a subject they will contradict each other. Adding more sources gives a prepondrance of opinion which may or may not be a reportage of original fact. Still, with the
Ineditum Vaticanum vs Dionysius we can make a value judgement on the following basis:
Dionysius is working from other historians, or at least sources used by other historians. He is somewhat eclectic and not especially discriminatory, but seems to be reasonably thorough in his gleanings. The
Ineditum quotes a single instance of ambassador-to-ambassador palaver in which effect was probably intended to be more important than history. Battle descriptions of 5th century BC Roman engagements in Livy and Dionysius do fit a manipular system but do not fit a hoplite system. Ergo, I assume the
Ineditum excerpt involves simplification or mis-remembering on the part of the Roman ambassador, as the weight of course-of-battle narratives seems to be against it.
Roy - a mixed formation along Certosa Situla lines is tempting, but unlikely for Romans in the 5th century BC on the basis that one line being propped up with individual maniples from another line (as opposed to outright line relief) works best if both are similarly armed and equipped. Matching the Situla to something resembling the original army of Servius Tullius, however, is very tempting.
I have some sympathy for the idea that Etruscans and Romans were never hoplites, but the battle between Tarquin and the new Republic in 509 BC looks suspiciously like a hoplite battle in its course and outcome. While one might achieve a similar effect by different means, I prefer the simpler explanation - or at least deduction.
If some cultures in Italy adopted the Greek system as it was in the 8th-7th century BC, one might well expect them to follow the trend of losing the second spear at some point. Servius Tullius however seems to have dispensed with it - or the Romans had done without it - before the Greeks themselves (Spartans excepted), while Etruscans under Lars Porsenna were still at least partly endowed with missiles while Horatius Cocles was defending his bridge. (None of this is particularly supportive of a 'WMWW' hypothesis, and battle descriptions of the period seem even less so. ;) Rather, it suggests some common cross-cultural patterns but with an emphasis on different local techniques.)
I am no expert on this period so what I say here is interested comment rather than anything weighty.
It strikes me that labelling the Etruscans as a unity is a little dangerous because of precisely the point that you make Patrick, they are separate cities and thus might have different traditions of warfare and different weaponry . However, it is hard not to say Etruscan hoplite or Etruscan chariots.
I doubt that the Italian Greeks would just follow mainland Greece because their enemies are different. The big threat in Italy is Italians and generally Italians chuck stuff.
As to the Certosa Situla it really fits in for me because it shows different classes of warrior and that is very Roman. Why have the Romans evolve from a spear phalanx to a mixed weapon system when the mixed weapon system has such a long Italian pedigree in the area of Rome's original rulers, Etruscans? Much simpler to have always had different classes and weapon sets.
Roy
Just a point of clarification. Patrick, you keep using the WMWW shorthand. Now, I know far more about this theory than I want to, but not everyone will. So, if we are to continue refering to it, we must have a (very) brief description. As Western Mediterrenean Way of War is a theory of Paul Macdonald-Staff, who is not a member, he isn't here to make that definition but in brief it is the theory that all heavy infantry troops in the Western Mediterranean in the years 500-0BC (or thereabouts) fought with a long shield, two heavy throwing (or dual pupose throwing/thrusting ) spears and a sword as secondary weapon unless we are told differently (e.g. triarii with their long spears). Paul would see the fact that throwing weapons are the primary armament leading to the idea that missile exchanges were an important part of combat. There is much more to it than this but that is enough I think for those not scarred by the WMWW debate to get the gist.
On the situla question, is it due to Connolly that we see it as representing classes of troops with different armaments? Can it not represent a "barbarian" army, with men equipped according to personal preference?
Quote from: Erpingham on December 30, 2012, 01:22:36 PMOn the situla question, is it due to Connolly that we see it as representing classes of troops with different armaments? Can it not represent a "barbarian" army, with men equipped according to personal preference?
I think the fact that they are in
groups each armed in a particular style, rather than a mix of single figures, argues against "personal preference".
Though I'm not sure that any of the other Venetian situla art shows anything similar, so could it be some sort of bizarre artistic one-off?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 30, 2012, 12:23:38 PM
Roy - a mixed formation along Certosa Situla lines is tempting, but unlikely for Romans in the 5th century BC on the basis that one line being propped up with individual maniples from another line (as opposed to outright line relief) works best if both are similarly armed and equipped. Matching the Situla to something resembling the original army of Servius Tullius, however, is very tempting.
If you believe in the "original army of Servius Tullius", of course. Though you have to lose the property-qualifications in anachronistic currency, and many scholars don't believe in the "classes I-V" but only in a single
classis-infra classem distinction. I'm not sure if there is anything else completely out of the question.
QuoteIf some cultures in Italy adopted the Greek system as it was in the 8th-7th century BC, one might well expect them to follow the trend of losing the second spear at some point. Servius Tullius however seems to have dispensed with it - or the Romans had done without it - before the Greeks themselves (Spartans excepted), while Etruscans under Lars Porsenna were still at least partly endowed with missiles while Horatius Cocles was defending his bridge.
Italian "hoplite" with two spears at http://www.antika.it/007812_popoli-italici-veneti.html (http://www.antika.it/007812_popoli-italici-veneti.html).
If you recall Alexander Zhmodikov's interpretation of Livy, the "Servian" first class hoplites still
do have throwing spears (as would the other heavy infantry, as Livy only lists changes in their defensive gear from class to class):
Quote from: Alexander Zhmodikov, "Roman Republican heavy infantrymen in battle (IV-II centuries BC)" in Historia 49.1 (2000)Livy himself tells us that the Romans used the phalanx-like formation and were armed with bronze shields (clipei), but in his account of the Servian constitution he provides the Roman 'hoplite' with missiles in addition to a spear and a sword ('arma his imperata galea clipeum ocreae lorica, omnia ex aere; haec ut tegimenta corporis essent; tela in hostem hastaque et gladius' ('he ordered them to have helmets, shields, greaves, and cuirasses, all of bronze; [and] missiles against the enemy, and also a spear, and a sword') ), so certainly it was not a phalanx of the classical Greek type.
It involves reading
tela as "missiles" - probably the commonest meaning of the word - rather than generically as "weapons".
If the Roman infantry were never armed
solely with thrusting-spears, does this make their evolution easier to explain? We could certainly visualise some carrying early versions of the pilum alongside a thrusting-spear before the army standardised on a pair of pila in the 4th or 3rd century.
I think I am right in saying that early pila are not like the weighted long shanked things that are found on Roman imperial sites but might be just a spearhead that as an extra six inces to a foot of extra steel haft that adds weight to the point and helps it pass through a shield? That would make it much more of a heavy javelin and would make the weapon set much more like that found in some Anglo Saxon graves where there is a spear that looks right for throwing and one that looks better adapted for thrusting.
Roy
Quote from: Duncan Head on December 30, 2012, 03:23:33 PM
I think the fact that they are in groups each armed in a particular style, rather than a mix of single figures, argues against "personal preference".
Good point - I should have looked more closely. However, I'm not entirely sure this is evidence of a class-based army. One could suggest it represents an alliance of men in different conventional equipment of their tribe/grouping. Perhaps the men with the Scutum and hoplite shield are different from the guys with the long oval shields (thureoi)? The idea that you have a couple of different groups of etruscans and their northern allies might be a suggestion?
I think a couple of other situlae are possibly relevant. One is the Arnoaldi situla, it shows infantry with logg squared shields an cavalry with a round shield with no boss ans a rim. That shows, I suggest, two types of shield in the same army?
There is also the Benvenuti situla that shows infantry with round shields, rimmed but no boss, with two spears.
I wouldn't like to say what all the above means, but it sort of fits in a context in which groups have different kit that perhaps indicates varied function within an army.
Of course, a great way to develop tactics that involved using different weapon styles might ell be to have allies that work together and then are perhaps incorporated into the same orce as say the Etruscans come to dominate Venetic tribes?
Roy
Quote from: aligern on December 30, 2012, 05:10:18 PM
I think a couple of other situlae are possibly relevant. One is the Arnoaldi situla, it shows infantry with logg squared shields an cavalry with a round shield with no boss ans a rim. That shows, I suggest, two types of shield in the same army?
The Arnoaldi also has a foot figure in crested helmet, aspis-style shield and two spears - a hoplite or dismounted cavalryman? He's two in front of the cavalryman.
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:PSM_V55_D039_Arnoaldi_situla_from_bologna.png
Much as discussing the Etruscans is fascinating, are we in danger of getting off topic?
Quote from: Duncan Head on December 30, 2012, 03:45:44 PM
If you believe in the "original army of Servius Tullius", of course. Though you have to lose the property-qualifications in anachronistic currency, and many scholars don't believe in the "classes I-V" but only in a single classis-infra classem distinction. I'm not sure if there is anything else completely out of the question.
...
If you recall Alexander Zhmodikov's interpretation of Livy, the "Servian" first class hoplites still do have throwing spears (as would the other heavy infantry, as Livy only lists changes in their defensive gear from class to class):
Quote from: Alexander Zhmodikov, "Roman Republican heavy infantrymen in battle (IV-II centuries BC)" in Historia 49.1 (2000)Livy himself tells us that the Romans used the phalanx-like formation and were armed with bronze shields (clipei), but in his account of the Servian constitution he provides the Roman 'hoplite' with missiles in addition to a spear and a sword ('arma his imperata galea clipeum ocreae lorica, omnia ex aere; haec ut tegimenta corporis essent; tela in hostem hastaque et gladius' ('he ordered them to have helmets, shields, greaves, and cuirasses, all of bronze; [and] missiles against the enemy, and also a spear, and a sword') ), so certainly it was not a phalanx of the classical Greek type.
It involves reading tela as "missiles" - probably the commonest meaning of the word - rather than generically as "weapons".
If the Roman infantry were never armed solely with thrusting-spears, does this make their evolution easier to explain? We could certainly visualise some carrying early versions of the pilum alongside a thrusting-spear before the army standardised on a pair of pila in the 4th or 3rd century.
Rodger and I deliberately ducked the question of how Etruscans were armed and organised simply because there is so little to go on and what there is is rather open to interpretation. However the question of the Servian army is another matter: both Livy and Dionysius quote it, but they have interesting detail differences which suggest each used sources of different origin. I am familiar with the argument that the 'Servian centuriate' could not have existed in that period for various assumed social reasons, but believe that to be a misconception based
au fond on misinterpeting the Fabii 'private war' against Veii as 'evidence' of a chaotic and unstructured society
selon Christopher Smith
et. al..
Property qualifications
per se would not be a problem: I am not convinced the currency is anachronistic, though it may well be stated in later equivalents (e.g. I seriously doubt the 6th century Romans were using actual drachmae). Currency existed in civilised societies long before coinage, so even if the early Romans had to use lumps of bronze of a given weight to express a value they could still express the value.
Zhmodikov's interpretation of
tela in hostem may have merit, but Dionysius has no such weaponry so I took Livy to mean 'as weapons [tela] for use against the enemy', which leaves 'hastaque et gladius' in possession of an apparent redundancy (...que et, 'and ... and'). Were it not for Dionysius I would happily take 'tela' to mean 'missiles'. However the only battle we have recorded for this force (509 BC) goes like a hoplite battle, missiles or no and Zhmodikov or no.
Two-weapon possibilities are hinted at when Livy refers to hastati and principes discharging hastae
and pila at attacking Gauls, so we may be justified in assuming a pilum+hasta armament for hastati and principes for at least part of the period. Good thought, Duncan. :)
And now - where were we with respect to line relief?
Patrick
Excuse my ignorance here, but why is the 509 BC battle so very definitely a hoplites battle?
Roy
Patrick, did either you or Rodge reference Cornell (The beginnings of ROme), as I understand that he makes a case against the 5 classes as per Livy - mostly on the grounds that they require the majority of fighting men to come from the smallest propertied class in Rome, which is difficult to believe.
If your case is that the 5 classses demonstrate a continum of Roman fighting in sucessive lines from the get-go, you will have to speak to that a little I think.
Secondly, you argument rests on Livy and Dionysius - or at least, that portion of it which you relate here does.
Both of these guys were writing in the empire.
that is a long time past the events, neither of them had access to anything new to base their conclusions from that I am aware of, and Polybius never touched on the detail which they offer.
The broad thrust of the criticism of Livy is that he is writing to support a view of the empire as it currently is.
Polybius only seemed to feel on safe ground defining the three line republican legion dating from around the Samnite wars.
Livy, writing over a hundred years later, delves further back to narate a servian legion which has the elites providing the bulk of the fighting men, and then also relates a Camillan legion which happens to have 5 lines - supporting the notion of their being 5 classes and a continum from one to the other.
Further, Livy has the two weakest classes sitting out the back as Rorarii and Accessni - that is, the plebs in the back watching the Patricians doing all the work, which fits with his definition of the trairii as camp guards and camp site diggers.
As I say, I doubt Livy on both of these points - the numbers of available propertied men to make the servian 5 classes work seems dubious to me.
And the Accensii and Rorarii seem like an equally dubious codification written in support of the 5 classes - a sort of Pilkdown Man linking something unknowable to the demonstrability of the three line manipular legion we have from Polybius.
Additionally, the unambiguously hoplite equipped is in fact quite ambiguous - not every long spear and large shield is a hoplite - there is a specific tactical doctrine and societal orgnaisation which is also required, and which there is little evidence for that which I am aware of (not that I am bothered weither way on that point).
And as I say, the use of the word triarii to define camp guards has no meaningful conneciton to the Triarii of the Republican legion, which were clearly long spear and large shield armed fighting men, not camp guards, diggers and hangers on.
the only link is a derivation from the word for third - camp guards as third rank is completley different from third line of fighting men (with camp guards back in camp). One lot are little more than coolies, the other lot are actual fighting men in a three line system.
As Duncan notes, the existance of the 5 classes is doubted by many scholars, and I think it also casts a deal of doubt onto the Camillan 5 lines too.
So I am much more compfortable working with a single fighting line, preceeded by a large skirmish line (and with camp guards well behind) until the Samnite wars.
On your point of there being a case for Romans using Pila and Scutrum and swords from 500 b.c, if that were true, why did the original principes come equipped with long spear and not Pila, and why did the original Hastatii come with little armour?
Its an interesting thesis, but for me not at all a slam dunk, I am afraid.
Roy, the battle in 509 BC saw each side's right defeat the other side's left while the action as a whole was indecisive. I have not seen this in a non-hoplite infantry battle, which makes this particular fight look very hoplite-ish.
Mark, I put more trust in the basic consistency of Livy and Dionysius than in the inconsistencies of modern scholarship. Tim Cornell, with all due respect (he is usually quite sensible), seems to me to be seriously underestimating the manpower available to a 7th-6th century Italian city-state, especially at the top. Like most scholars , he seems to miss the basic point that Servius Tullius deliberately shifted the burden of military service squarely onto those who could afford it and away from those who could not.
Servius Tullius' five classes are not five lines; they are five property classes. The actual battle lineup is not given, except that the most heavily armoured stood at the front and the least heavily armoured (fourth class) at the back. The fifth class are hard to see as anything except skirmishers. Whether this army drew up in one line or more than one (exclusive of skirmishers) is not stated, but the battle in 509 BC runs as if one line only were used (no reference to reserves, reinforcing trouble spots, etc. contrary to 5th century practice).
Polybius began his history with the First Punic War, so did not write about the rise of early Rome. He begins with 264 BC, by which time the 'Polybian' legion seems already to have been established.
We can doubt Livy as much as we like, but the fact remains that he and Dionysius between them present a coherent and credible development of the Roman legion which it would be unwise to ignore. Rather than dismissing them I would suggest trying to understand them.
Tell you a secret: when Rodger first mooted the idea that the Romans used a form of manipular legion long before 340 BC, I was not keen at all. The best way to prove him wrong, thought I, was to go back and look at the original sources and let them speak for themselves. That is when I got something of a surprise. It was a bit disconcerting to find evidence of manipularity reaching back not just into the 5th century but as far back as 503 BC. It was also somewhat humbling and an excellent illustration of the folly of taking for granted that a conventionally accepted scheme must be correct.
The skirmish lines in both the Tullian ('Servian') army and the 340 BC legion in Livy VIII.8 are noteworthy for their smallness. From the Livian to the Polybian legion we see a fourfold expansion of the skirmisher arm (300 leves to 1200 velites). No model involving a large skirmish line ahead of a single battle line for an early Roman army is sustainable from our sources (which is presumably why authorities advocating such a system are so keen to dispense with the original sources).
Mark, have you a reference for 'original principes' being 'equipped with long spear and not Pila', or 'original Hastatii' having 'little armour'? I think I know whence you derive these, but would rather check to be sure we are both working from the same script.
Anthony - I am not detailing 'WMWW' here as we shall have ample explanation - and refutation - coming up in forthcoming Slingshots. Mark G and Roy, take a bow. :)
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 31, 2012, 11:40:45 AM
Anthony - I am not detailing 'WMWW' here as we shall have ample explanation - and refutation - coming up in forthcoming Slingshots. Mark G and Roy, take a bow. :)
Patrick
We all look forward to it but for now a brief explanation of the four dread letters was necessary for the uninitiated. While I'm not looking forward to revisiting all of the arguments, there was certainly plenty to interest fans of warfare in the time of the Roman Republic, as I'm sure Roy and Mark will bring out.
looks like we both have some interesting stuff to get into with the next slingshot then.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 31, 2012, 11:40:45 AM
Roy, the battle in 509 BC saw each side's right defeat the other side's left while the action as a whole was indecisive. I have not seen this in a non-hoplite infantry battle, which makes this particular fight look very hoplite-ish.
Patrick, would you accept Sentinum as an example of One wing being defeated whilst the other is held.... and not a hoplite in sight?
If the Romans tend to a two legion, two consul command structure then varying outcomes by wing make sense.
Even if this is unified command and sounds like a Greek hoplite 5th century BC battle it only becomes proof if the thought is already there in our heads. I accept , f course, that the thought that I start with is that Italian systems are probably not clones of Greek ones.
Roy
I would not, Roy, because Sentinum a) was not a case of each side's right defeating the other's left (although the Roman left was hard pressed) and b) the overall battle was not indecisive, but a clear Roman victory.
In any event, in 509 BC the Republican Romans were facing a similar army (Tarquin's) not a coalition of two opponents with different fighting styles (*whistles as he looks back at WMWW*). Even if two consuls were fighting independent battles I do not think Tarquin was.
Actually you should have quoted First Philippi (42 BC) - that was a clear case of each-side's-right-defeats-opponent's-left in a legionary battle. Even better, it was indecisive. The one quibble I would have is that neither army was using Servius Tullius' system. ;)
Anthony - yes, a brief explanation was fine and I am glad you did so.
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 29, 2012, 12:25:34 PMThe battle against the Hernici in 486 BC illustrates the system of piecemeal reinforcement that appears to have prevailed between the short-lived hoplite system (obit pre-503 BC) and the recognisable 'Livian' legion of Livy VIII.8 (394-314 BC).
"Then there was a glorious struggle as both armies fought stubbornly; and for a long time they stood firm, neither side yielding to the other the ground where they were posted. At length the Romans' line began to be in distress, this being the first occasion in a long time that they had been forced to engage in war. 3 Aquilius, observing this, ordered that the troops which were still fresh and were being reserved for this very purpose should come up to reinforce the parts of the line that were in distress and that the men who were wounded and exhausted should retire to the rear. The Hernicans, learning that their troops were being shifted, imagined that the Romans were beginning flight; and encouraging one another and closing their ranks, they fell upon those parts of the enemy's army that were in motion, and the fresh troops of the Romans received their onset. Thus once more, as both sides fought stubbornly, there was a strenuous battle all over again; for the ranks of the Hernicans were also continually reinforced with fresh troops sent up by their generals to the parts of the line that were in distress." (Dionysius VIII.65.2-3)
I'd be curious to know how this piecemeal reinforcement could take place without sections of the line getting its flanks exposed, i.e. a 30-metre-wide portion of the line pulls back, leaving a hole which the enemy will fill before the relief troops can; or the 30-metre-wide portion filters back through the relieving troops files, also leaving a gap which can be exploited.
The only mechanism which I see working is that the relieving troops
advance into the file gaps of the front line troops, who then retire back through the relieving troops' own files and out of danger. This manoeuvre would present a continuous front to the enemy at all times.
I would add that this would have been the original method of line relief which, due to the disruption of the front line troops' file formations, would have presented some difficulties in execution, hence explaining the Hernicians' renewed attack. They knew all about piecemeal line relief since they did it themselves, and so they knew that that portion of the army was vulnerable whilst the relief operation was underway (rather than imagining the Romans were beginning to flee as the account states - which could (!) be a mistake by the original writer). This would explain the Romans switching to a more effective method of general line relief proposed at the beginning of this thread.
Just a theory to back a theory... ;D
Ooooh Justin, does this mean that you also believe that the Romans always carried out relief and that it developed over time to more effective methods?
S there wouldn't really be a 'hoplite period' because the Etruscans and the Romans (after all the Romans are a form of Etruscan) all use Italianate systems which , in their case had some of the troops as spearmen a la Certosa Situla and others with javelins from the beginning?
And that Greek kit models are adopted by the better off whereas the poorer men keep Italian kit such as the cardiophylax?? But that the kit is being used in an Italian , non Greek , way?
Roy
Justin,
Start with slingshot 176 through back order.
It has Sabins first paper covering the mechanics of manipular line relief reproduced there.
Goldsworthy in Complete Roman army is also worth getting as well.
both go into more detail in other places, but thats a good place to start.
Key concepts to get your head around.
1. both sides retained gaps between the various brigades in the front line, and no one had a compeltely unified single front line. (Patrick is just missing the point to refute this because he cannot find an example in the original sources, it makes manoever impossible otherwise)
2. Those brigades would make charges, but then mutually separate by onsent as the front lines became exhausted.
once you get that in your head, and think about what it means to be too tired to keep fighting, it becomes a lot easier to understand.
Quote from: aligern on January 01, 2013, 09:16:34 AM
Ooooh Justin, does this mean that you also believe that the Romans always carried out relief and that it developed over time to more effective methods?
S there wouldn't really be a 'hoplite period' because the Etruscans and the Romans (after all the Romans are a form of Etruscan) all use Italianate systems which , in their case had some of the troops as spearmen a la Certosa Situla and others with javelins from the beginning?
And that Greek kit models are adopted by the better off whereas the poorer men keep Italian kit such as the cardiophylax?? But that the kit is being used in an Italian , non Greek , way?
Roy
I think it a given that there was an earlier, non-relief hoplite system of fighting used by the Romans, who progressively switched to line relief later on. As for the weapons systems, I'm just the pupil here. The discussion is very interesting - feel free to go off topic whenever you want.
Actually, Mark, those would seem to be key concepts to avoid.
1. Gaps between formations tend to be lethal to those formations, as demonstrated at Delium (424 BC) and First Mantinea (418 BC).
Delium http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=209.msg753#msg753 (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=209.msg753#msg753) - observe what happens to the Thespians.
First Mantinea http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=255.msg1058;topicseen#msg1058 (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=255.msg1058;topicseen#msg1058) - see what happened to the Sciritae and Brasideans.
2. If you cannot relieve lines without a hiatus in the fighting then you do not have a line relief system, only a line exchange one, which anyone with two lines and a trace of discipline could do.
The uniqueness of the Roman system indicates there was rather more to it than that.
Quote from: Mark G on January 01, 2013, 09:47:57 AM
Justin,
Start with slingshot 176 through back order.
It has Sabins first paper covering the mechanics of manipular line relief reproduced there.
Goldsworthy in Complete Roman army is also worth getting as well.
both go into more detail in other places, but thats a good place to start.
Key concepts to get your head around.
1. both sides retained gaps between the various brigades in the front line, and no one had a compeltely unified single front line. (Patrick is just missing the point to refute this because he cannot find an example in the original sources, it makes manoever impossible otherwise)
2. Those brigades would make charges, but then mutually separate by onsent as the front lines became exhausted.
once you get that in your head, and think about what it means to be too tired to keep fighting, it becomes a lot easier to understand.
Ta. I will try to get hold of the sources you recommend.
I have a problem with gaps in the front line. it obliges each man on the corners to fight two to his front and side, which means certain death. I just can't see troops adopting that kind of formation willingly. "Right chaps, let's draw straws for the corner boys!"
The point of this thread is that line relief
is possible with the troops engaged in fighting forming a continuous line, and in a way that fits in with the sources. One is not obliged to have the forward line broken up by regular intervals, at least not once it has closed with the enemy.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 01, 2013, 10:59:54 AM
2. If you cannot relieve lines without a hiatus in the fighting then you do not have a line relief system, only a line exchange one, which anyone with two lines and a trace of discipline could do.
An interesting shift. There are clearly many who think that the Roman system was simply one of line exchange and what we are searching for is the way this was done without descent into chaos.
BTW, who are the other armies recorded as operating a planned system of line exchange?
Quote from: Erpingham on January 01, 2013, 11:13:24 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 01, 2013, 10:59:54 AM
2. If you cannot relieve lines without a hiatus in the fighting then you do not have a line relief system, only a line exchange one, which anyone with two lines and a trace of discipline could do.
An interesting shift. There are clearly many who think that the Roman system was simply one of line exchange and what we are searching for is the way this was done without descent into chaos.
BTW, who are the other armies recorded as operating a planned system of line exchange?
Most armies of the period began action with their skirmishers and then withdrew these through the heavy troops, a 'line exchange' system which involved at least a trace of discipline, not to mention signalling, and was perforce 'planned'.
My point is really that line exchange
per se is nothing special. Practically everyone did it to get their skirmishers out of the way. Conversely, line
relief enables a fresh line to take over from a tired one
in combat. If one waited for a lull in the battle to do line substitution then a) one might as well just leave the leading line in place on the basis that it would refresh at the same rate as an enemy who would presumably be using the lull to do the same and b) one is never going to be able to get the line out of trouble when it really needs replacing. Hence, apart from pulling skirmishers back through heavy infantry mere line
exchange is pointless - to get troops clear of trouble you need line
relief, i.e. the ability to get a weakening line out and replaced by a fresh one while it is in combat.
If the Romans really needed to wait for a lull and could only then exchange lines, I would expect to see many more cases of the hastati being overwhelmed before they could be relieved. There should also be at least some hint in the sources of waiting for a lull in order to perform line substitution.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 01, 2013, 02:24:23 PM
If the Romans really needed to wait for a lull and could only then exchange lines, I would expect to see many more cases of the hastati being overwhelmed before they could be relieved. There should also be at least some hint in the sources of waiting for a lull in order to perform line substitution.
I think we have got to a fundamental difference in the way we think of these things. To start with your final comment, if we had sufficient information on how the Roman's did it, we wouldn't be having the discussion. We don't have sufficient source info as far as I can tell (based not on my own knowledge but the combined knowledge of those who actually know something about Roman warfare and have shared that) to know when the Roman's did perform line relief. Personally, I think it fits in lulls in the action which my vision of ancient combat suggests existed. During those lulls, both armies will be seeking to reorganise, rest, withdraw their casualties, maybe bring new men forward. The Roman army's ability to make the change and put whole new fresh units into the line and do it quickly would enable them to catch the enemy on the back foot - a huge tactical advantage.
And, to tackle the earlier point about skirmish lines, it is a fair one but surely the Roman situation was of a different order - they are not just pulling back a load of loosely order infantry who could probably infilitrate back through the formation gaps (be they between files or between units) but making a wholesale change of close-formation infantry units and having those fresh units ready to renew combat in short order.
Quite so; the Romans are not just pulling back a skirmish line, they are substituting a fresh line of battle for an engaged one, or at least one that has been engaged. This is what makes their system unique.
Interestingly, Livy does not view the change as conferring a huge tactical advantage by catching weary enemies on the wrong foot, but rather writes as if it were a pedestrian change of shift in the middle of a day's work:
"When the army was marshalled according to this arrangement, the hastati first commenced the fight. If the hastati were unable to repulse [profligare = overcome] the enemy, they retreated leisurely [pede presso], and were received by the principes into the intervals of the ranks [in intervalla ordinum]. The fight then devolved on the principes; the hastati followed." - Livy VIII.8.9-10
"If the principes also did not make sufficient impression in the fight, they retreated slowly [sensim] from the front to the Triarii." - idem, 11
In each case he gives the impression that the fighting line retreats while still engaged. They retreat 'leisurely' or 'slowly' which is consistent with an engaged line fighting to its front but not with the smart rapidity necessary to catch an unengaged enemy in mid-breather. They are received through the ranks of a stationary rear line, whereas a quick exchange is best accomplished by moving the rear line rapidly forwards through the first line. In short, they do the opposite of what one would expect of a line swap during a pause in the fighting.
Patrick
Patrick, against the idea of the 'retreat fighting' as you describe it is the logic that says that soldiers can only fight with intensity for at most 20 minutes. If that is enough to exhaust both sides, but fighting is continuous, then the battle will be over very quickly because each line will only have a 20 minute 'life'.
It does seem much more likely that there are assaults and retirements by the first line until it is exhausted. At that point it retires from the equally degraded enemy , but instead of halting, and recuperating as it has before , the line retires upon a signal and goes back through the gaps in the line of the Principes which has closed up to create gaps and now opens up to fight.
I find the above description fits the ancient sources and the logic of human energy and endurance.
Justin, I am surprised that an initial Roman fighting style as a hoplites phalanx is a 'given'. I would have thought that the logic that the fighting style of early Italians appears to be to use javelins or to have spears and long shields says that whatever the Roman start point is, it is unlikely to be hoplite.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 01, 2013, 08:00:00 PM
Patrick, against the idea of the 'retreat fighting' as you describe it is the logic that says that soldiers can only fight with intensity for at most 20 minutes. If that is enough to exhaust both sides, but fighting is continuous, then the battle will be over very quickly because each line will only have a 20 minute 'life'.
It does seem much more likely that there are assaults and retirements by the first line until it is exhausted. At that point it retires from the equally degraded enemy , but instead of halting, and recuperating as it has before , the line retires upon a signal and goes back through the gaps in the line of the Principes which has closed up to create gaps and now opens up to fight.
I find the above description fits the ancient sources and the logic of human energy and endurance.
I've always wondered about the 'retirements' of an exhausted line. Look at it like this: the front rank of an eight-rank-deep line is the one that does the actual fighting, and they are the chaps who get tired. The seven ranks behind them are just standing there, perhaps pushing forward a bit as well. After 20 minutes they are still fresh. So the only troops with any incentive to pull back are the 1/8 up front. Will the other 7/8 respect their fatigue and step back a few paces? Or will they rather tell the 1/8 to keep at 'em? The front rankers have no choice but to maintain a kind of desultory sparring with their equally exhausted opponents, both sides panting whilst looking at each other over their shields from two feet away.
I can imagine troops of an exhausted front rank preferring rather to slip back between the files and let the second rank take over who, when exhausted, gives way for the third rank, and so on. By the time you get back to the first rank again it is fresh and ready to recommence the cycle of fighting.
In either scenario there is no imperative for the lines to pull apart. Fighting is continuous. Recoiling, which did happen frequently, must have resulted from a tug-o-war in reverse. One side pushing harder than the other and forcing the other to stagger back. Literally a shoving match. At no time can I see a desire by an embattled front rank soldier to give way before the enemy being accommodated by the ranks behind him. Keeping him in position was the purpose of the rear ranks in the first place.
Quote from: aligern on January 01, 2013, 08:00:00 PMJustin, I am surprised that an initial Roman fighting style as a hoplites phalanx is a 'given'. I would have thought that the logic that the fighting style of early Italians appears to be to use javelins or to have spears and long shields says that whatever the Roman start point is, it is unlikely to be hoplite.
Roy
I'm not the expert. Keep talking!
have a look at Oliver Stone's Alexander movie again - there are aerial shots there of the phalanx - each taxeis or syntagma ( I didn't count the CGI men) is descrete from the others. (OK, you can stop watching now, its just the aerial of the macedonians we need)
there is still a recongnisable battle line, but each unit has a gap to its neighbours to allow it to funtion and move. the alignments are not absolute, and the skirmishers run through these gaps to get to the front.
The Roman system takes this a step further and rather than having the depth within each unit as individual causalty replacement and 'depth', it has organised unit sized gaps to allow the new unit to move entirely forward.
there are your skirmish channels in a macedonian battle - one of the supposed single battle line armies.
Think of the descriptions we have of something huge for a hoplite battle, like Platea - not on single holplite line there either.
all this insistence on a single entirely continuous line of battle, and on men pushing past each other while maintaining rank and file spacing, it just doesnt make sense and is clearly an extremely dangerous and disorganising thing to do. Once you get your head around there being units and spaces between the units - after than it just becomes a question of how organised and how large the gaps are.
the next step is accepting that men will not and cannot fight hand to hand for any long period of time - like boxers with their 3 minutes. they mutually accept stepping back to a safe distance to recover themselves before the next charge.
well, your units do the same thing. and their 'flanks' are not threatened because there is no time to organise an 'exploitation' response to the enemy charge except by maybe one oor two individuals - who have to expose themselves greatly unless their comrades support them - which takes organisation.
given the risks, most men dont even think about it.
it took a legate to organise the triarii at Cynocephalae.
the hoplite wings enveloping - not exactly a swift and immediate tactic, now is it, it still requires time and distance and organisation and planning, and it is often only just beginning before the entire battle is over as the rear starts running somewhere in the middle of the field.
Interesting point Justin... about only the front rank fighting. Extend that a bit further, if only the front rank engage in combat and that until they are exhausted then being in the front rank must be suicidal because eventually one of the opposing pair is disabled and then a fresh chap appears opposite and finishes off the exhausted victor. Fairly obviously there must be a system of rotating fighters within groups or you have a very short hoplite type battle. As the weight of opinion seems to be that Romans have generally long battles then they most likely deal with this by rotating fighters within say the Hastati until everyone has had a go. Given the relatively wide Roman spacing compared to the Greek.this looks feasible.
Far far e it for me to question an accepted wargaming convention, but perhaps when base widths were decided upon Romans should have been on twice the frontage that Greeks were on. Perhaps those old 20mm (22.5mm really) should have had Greeks on 12.5 mm bases and Romans on 20mm. Then Wargamers would stop extrapolating back from the neatly based little men that we stand over in godlike manner. Because we see the little chaps as solid blocks and thus fail to appreciate that there are gaps between 'units' in real life.
That might alleviate Patrick's problem with the poor fellows on the end of units that then have a gap. . I too found it hard to conceive that , if the front line is not continuous, the opponent would not just advance and flank the units concerned. That's because my little DBM bases of troops can break frontage and swing to the flank in front of an enemy with impunity, but in real life they likely won't break their own line or take the risk. In fact I'd hope my ancestors if they were in such a position would say to themselves, 'Hey this is great, there is no one opposite me I can stand here and look good without a whole lot of risk of being hit.... hope the guys to the side of us beat the chaps to their front!!'
Roy
Quote from: Mark G on January 02, 2013, 08:00:17 AM
have a look at Oliver Stone's Alexander movie again - there are aerial shots there of the phalanx - each taxeis or syntagma ( I didn't count the CGI men) is discrete from the others. (OK, you can stop watching now, its just the aerial of the macedonians we need)
there is still a recognisable battle line, but each unit has a gap to its neighbours to allow it to funtion and move. the alignments are not absolute, and the skirmishers run through these gaps to get to the front.
What Oliver Stone does and what Philip and Alexander did are not necessarily the same thing.
But look at Spartacus (with Laurence Olivier as Crassus) towards the end of the film where they are getting set for the final battle. This is the film-maker trying to make sense of a gapped doctrine combined with quincunx deployment, the two sacred cows of Republican Roman military history. It looks impressive but they cannot get it to work as a combat system - they end up blending the first row of cohorts into a single four-deep line, which then advances on the slave army (to be repelled by the Hollywood flaming loofahs).
Quote from: Mark G on January 02, 2013, 08:00:17 AM
The Roman system takes this a step further and rather than having the depth within each unit as individual causalty replacement and 'depth', it has organised unit sized gaps to allow the new unit to move entirely forward.
And we saw in Spartacus that even a film-maker gives up on these 'gaps' - keeping alignment with 'gapped' units is a real challenge, whereas keeping alignment with a line is easy enough so that even film extras can do it.
However the 'new unit' does not move forward - Livy us quite clear (as is Polybius in II.33 in the battle against the Insubres) that it is the leading line which moves backwards.
Quote from: Mark G on January 02, 2013, 08:00:17 AM
there are your skirmish channels in a macedonian battle - one of the supposed single battle line armies.
Let us not confuse Oliver Stone with Philip II. ;)
Quote from: Mark G on January 02, 2013, 08:00:17 AM
Think of the descriptions we have of something huge for a hoplite battle, like Platea - not on single hoplite line there either.
all this insistence on a single entirely continuous line of battle, and on men pushing past each other while maintaining rank and file spacing, it just doesnt make sense and is clearly an extremely dangerous and disorganising thing to do. Once you get your head around there being units and spaces between the units - after than it just becomes a question of how organised and how large the gaps are.
Delium 424 BC:
"
The extreme wing of neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield. [3] The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand" - Thucydides IV.96.2-3
Note the absence of gaps, and what happens to the Thespians when gaps appear on each side of them.
First Mantinea 418 BC:
"
On the present occasion the Mantineans reached with their wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans still farther beyond the Athenians, as their army was the largest. [3] Agis afraid of his left being surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans outflanked it too far, ordered the Sciritae and Brasideans to move out from their place in the ranks and make the line even with the Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristocles to fill up the gap thus formed, by throwing themselves into it with two companies taken from the right wing; thinking that his right would still be strong enough and to spare, and that the line fronting the Mantineans would gain in solidity.
72. However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset, and at short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta, as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed before the Sciritae （whom Agis on seeing that the two companies did not move over ordered to return to their place） had time to fill up the breach in question. [2] Now it was, however, that the Lacedaemonians, utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as superior in point of courage. [3] As soon as they came to close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and bursting in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed breach in their line cut up and surrounded the Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there." - Thucydides V.71-72
We see the same thing happening to the Sciritae and Brasideans as happened to the Thespians at Delium: gaps = death, or at least rapid defeat.
Quote from: Mark G on January 02, 2013, 08:00:17 AM
the next step is accepting that men will not and cannot fight hand to hand for any long period of time - like boxers with their 3 minutes. they mutually accept stepping back to a safe distance to recover themselves before the next charge.
well, your units do the same thing. and their 'flanks' are not threatened because there is no time to organise an 'exploitation' response to the enemy charge except by maybe one oor two individuals - who have to expose themselves greatly unless their comrades support them - which takes organisation.
Is there any source evidence for this? There is plenty for Romans being trained for extended combat and staying in a fight for extended periods (Plutarch, Josephus, Caesar).
Quote from: Mark G on January 02, 2013, 08:00:17 AM
the hoplite wings enveloping - not exactly a swift and immediate tactic, now is it, it still requires time and distance and organisation and planning, and it is often only just beginning before the entire battle is over as the rear starts running somewhere in the middle of the field.
But see what happened at Delium and First Mantinea above. The 'gapped' units there went under swiftly and with style.
Patrick
Very neat Patrick. Mark invites you to look at a picture of Thespians gapped and you counter with the historic Thespians surrounded.
Might I suggest that there is a big difference between gaps that have another enemy unit facing you further down in the gap and a completely open flank as the Thespians presented. In the latter case an opponent can lap around to your rear because there is no friendly unit covering you to which the enemy would expose his flanks and rear whilst lapping around. I don't think Mark would expect a flank cleft just in the air to be self sustaining.
Roy
I suspect that Mark's idea of a second line of gapped units covering the gaps between the first lines might have one difficulty. Let me illustrate with some diagrams:
Should the brown troops in front of the gaps try to flank the orange troops they will be charged in flank themselves by the orange troops covering the gaps. So far so good.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/broken%20lines/1.gif)
I feel though that the brown troops would not sit still. Nothing stops them charging the orange troops opposite them. In the heat of battle that would be almost inevitable.
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/broken%20lines/2.gif)
The side edges of the advanced brown units must now turn to face the orange troops on their flanks, who must in turn face the brown units now on their own flanks. This exposes troops on both sides to corner killing and ruptures their rank-by-rank line relief. Disorder and confusion mount on both sides increasing the likelihood of a rout. A classic lose-lose situation. Would the generals on either side be happy with that?
(https://dl.dropbox.com/u/85630106/broken%20lines/3.gif)
I thought I had been pretty clear about this, troops don't just break their line and go forward. Reading the descriptions of Celts and Germans for example they clearly form lines with overlapped shields.
My concept (and there are others) of Ancient combat is that 'order' is hugely important, groups stick together because that is how you are protected and supported. So in my conceptualisation the opponent has huge inhibitions about running into the gaps. Your men who turn to the side are in disorder, they cannot give effective support to the front and their unit will lose. The brown army has effectively surrounded itself and will die.
Yu have to remember that there is a lot of fear and insecurity around and that to counter that fear you stay together, formed and under command. The benefits of initiative are far outweighed by the risks. Real people lack the courage of the little lead heroes. Once you start taking individual initiative it all falls apart.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 02, 2013, 11:23:32 AM
We see the same thing happening to the Sciritae and Brasideans as happened to the Thespians at Delium: gaps = death, or at least rapid defeat.
At the risk of repeating myself, there is a difference between a unit in whose formation unplanned gaps appear and one that trains to fight with gaps. Actually, I'm not sure that the line in contact had gaps (certainly not all the time) but I don't think what happens when gaps happen/or are forced on a phalanx is actually conclusive about what the Romans did.
Quote
Is there any source evidence for this? There is plenty for Romans being trained for extended combat and staying in a fight for extended periods (Plutarch, Josephus, Caesar).
Patrick
Again, part of the problem is a fundamental difference in understanding of what "staying in a fight for extended periods" means in the sources. In the view of some here (and in secondary literature) a unit can be in a fight while shouting abuse, hurling missiles, spear fencing, sending out the odd idiot to moon at the enemy etc. as well as when hammering away with the shield and jabbing with the sword at breath-smelling range. The unit is out of the fight when it collectively ceases to think it's next move will be engaging the enemy in some way, either because of fatigue or fear or disorder or its leaders say "You've done enough lads - somebody else's turn"
Quote from: aligern on January 02, 2013, 01:48:28 PM
I thought I had been pretty clear about this, troops don't just break their line and go forward. Reading the descriptions of Celts and Germans for example they clearly form lines with overlapped shields.
Yes, for the initial lineup before the actual battle begins.
Quote from: aligern on January 02, 2013, 01:48:28 PMMy concept (and there are others) of Ancient combat is that 'order' is hugely important, groups stick together because that is how you are protected and supported. So in my conceptualisation the opponent has huge inhibitions about running into the gaps. Your men who turn to the side are in disorder, they cannot give effective support to the front and their unit will lose. The brown army has effectively surrounded itself and will die.
In my scenario the orange army is just as surrounded as the brown and actually has as much chance of routing as the browns do.
Quote from: aligern on January 02, 2013, 01:48:28 PMYu have to remember that there is a lot of fear and insecurity around and that to counter that fear you stay together, formed and under command. The benefits of initiative are far outweighed by the risks. Real people lack the courage of the little lead heroes. Once you start taking individual initiative it all falls apart.
Somehow I can't visualise these considerations holding blood-maddened Gauls or Germans back from pouring into the gaps. Once they had charged in there was no stopping them. Only the failure to sweep away their opponents might induce them to panic and break.
"blood-maddened Gauls or Germans" ?
I'd suggest that's more a literary stereotype (from a "civilised" perspective of course) than a reality. Members of tribal societies, even those with a strong warrior/heroic ethos, are not stupid. One example from Ian Knight's recent (and highly readable) book on Isandhlwana is telling - at the end of the battle a lone cornered redcoat held off a band of Zulus (presumably "blood-maddened" by the pursuit) with his fixed bayonet; instead of rushing him with their much shorter spears they sensibly called over a man with a rifle, who duly shot him.
And of course there are plenty of instances of blood-maddened Romans too....
Regards
Mick
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 02, 2013, 06:51:23 PM
Somehow I can't visualise these considerations holding blood-maddened Gauls or Germans back from pouring into the gaps. Once they had charged in there was no stopping them. Only the failure to sweep away their opponents might induce them to panic and break.
I'm sure Roy will say something on this (and probably Jim if he's watching) but this does assume a literal reading of the topoi of how barbarians fought. Were they really like "blood-maddened" wild animals, or did they get tired like everyone else? (note Patrick's point that Romans trained for extended combat, so they could go on when the big, tall etc. etc. barbarians had worn themselves out with their animal like frenzy). I'm much more willing to have a concept of a massed barbarian army which was not made up of big fanatics but was mainly of bog standard freemen who were mainly there to follow - how well those men got stuck in would depend on circumstances. Worn out, with most of their leaders and heroes down, how quickly will these guys think "Line change - must attack now!", actually get over the inertia of who actually starts them moving and whether others will follow and deliver a cohesive attack?
Justin, please go to the Ancient and Mediaeval Battles section here and look at Vosges and Bibracte and Mons Graupius. They are all examples where Germans, Gauls and Britons tand in relatively good order with overlapped shields and await the Romans. Jim Webster wrote an article in Slingshot , this year, I think, reinforcing the point that these 'barbarians' are really quite disciplined and controlled and not subject to wild out of control charges. All those rule-sets that feature uncontrollable hairies launching themselves at Romans or Macedonians have it romantic but wrong.
I might say it is pretty much the same for knights. Where once we saw 'uncontrolled advance' and 'impetuous charge' we are now more likely to understand poor command and control and local commanders acting to drive off a threat that they cannot otherwise sustain, but that is NOT a blood lust maddened charge.
Roy
Quote from: Mick Hession on January 02, 2013, 07:38:51 PM
"blood-maddened Gauls or Germans" ?
I'd suggest that's more a literary stereotype (from a "civilised" perspective of course) than a reality. Members of tribal societies, even those with a strong warrior/heroic ethos, are not stupid. One example from Ian Knight's recent (and highly readable) book on Isandhlwana is telling - at the end of the battle a lone cornered redcoat held off a band of Zulus (presumably "blood-maddened" by the pursuit) with his fixed bayonet; instead of rushing him with their much shorter spears they sensibly called over a man with a rifle, who duly shot him.
And of course there are plenty of instances of blood-maddened Romans too....
Regards
Mick
True, but one needs to read the account of the Zulu assault at Rorke's Drift, where the Zulus attacked an improvised fortified position from 4.30 pm until 2.00 am the following morning, clambering over the bodies of their fallen to get at the British. The mopping up of individual British soldiers in the aftermath of Isandlwana was done when the heat of the battle was over, and could be accomplished economically. When the battle was at its height losses were not a primary consideration for the Zulu. One could fit Gauls into this category of fighter.
Speaking of the blood-maddened Gaul, wasn't it his Galatian relatives who, alone in the ancient world, were able to defeat a phalanx frontally by getting their front ranks to run straight into the sarissas, enabling the rear ranks to step over them and, um, incapacitate the hapless phalangites?
Quote from: aligern on January 02, 2013, 08:05:37 PM
Justin, please go to the Ancient and Mediaeval Battles section here and look at Vosges and Bibracte and Mons Graupius. They are all examples where Germans, Gauls and Britons tand in relatively good order with overlapped shields and await the Romans. Jim Webster wrote an article in Slingshot , this year, I think, reinforcing the point that these 'barbarians' are really quite disciplined and controlled and not subject to wild out of control charges. All those rule-sets that feature uncontrollable hairies launching themselves at Romans or Macedonians have it romantic but wrong.
I might say it is pretty much the same for knights. Where once we saw 'uncontrolled advance' and 'impetuous charge' we are now more likely to understand poor command and control and local commanders acting to drive off a threat that they cannot otherwise sustain, but that is NOT a blood lust maddened charge.
Roy
Thanks for pointing me to these threads, Roy. Reading through them I agree that the Gauls and Gaul-like tribes could adopt defensive formations on the battlefield and could come on in a fairly disciplined fashion. I'm just thinking that when they
did attack it was all-out. I still suspect they would pour through gaps in the Roman lines (if gaps there were) in order to get at the Romans. The moment of contact between the two lines was time of maximum aggressivity, not a time to be cautious and hold back.
Did the Galatians defeat a phalanx frontally? It would be great if someone could find the description and then post it in the battles section. When we meet Galatians acting against Romans they stay on the tops of hills and are shot down by light troops.
Gauls do defeat a Macedonian army, I am expecting Jim to be the expert on this, but I thought that it was a fairly scratch force that they fought and that it was outnumbered and outflanked.
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 02, 2013, 08:11:58 PMSpeaking of the blood-maddened Gaul, wasn't it his Galatian relatives who, alone in the ancient world, were able to defeat a phalanx frontally by getting their front ranks to run straight into the sarissas, enabling the rear ranks to step over them and, um, incapacitate the hapless phalangites?
No.
That sounds like complete fiction to me. There are no surviving narratives of Galatian victories over the Macedonians that give any tactical detail.
We do have Pausanias' account of the Galatian fight against old-style hoplites at Thermopylai, which does play up the barbarian stereotype a bit:
QuoteThe Gauls were worse armed than the Greeks, having no other defensive armour than their national shields, while they were still more inferior in war experience. On they marched against their enemies with the unreasoning fury and passion of brutes. Slashed with axe or sword they kept their desperation while they still breathed; pierced by arrow or javelin, they did not abate of their passion so long as life remained. Some drew out from their wounds the spears, by which they had been hit, and threw them at the Greeks or used them in close fighting. Meanwhile the Athenians on the triremes, with difficulty and with danger, nevertheless coasted along through the mud that extends far out to sea, brought their ships as close to the barbarians as possible, and raked them with arrows and every other kind of missile. The Celts were in unspeakable distress, and as in the confined space they inflicted few losses but suffered twice or four times as many, their captains gave the signal to retire to their camp. Retreating in confusion and without any order, many were crushed beneath the feet of their friends, and many others fell into the swamp and disappeared under the mud. Their loss in the retreat was no less than the loss that occurred while the battle raged.
I think that's the closest you'll get, though.
The descriptions of the later battles in Pausanias talk of the Gauls being surrounded and destroyed by javelins. That would fit rather well with them adopting a static formation , held by the Greek heavy infantry in front and galled by missiles to the lank. Best I can do with their earlier victory is that the Macedonian commander Ptolemy Keraunos was knocked off his elephant, captured and killed.
The topos (conventional set of epithets) for Gauls is that they are wild and disorganised, they flash fierce looks , have courage but no endurance, have huge bodies and no armour and are drunken, cruel, superstitious and perfidious. Oh and they are in impossibly high numbers. This is to be directly contrasted with the virtues of the civilised Greeks and Romans who are disciplined, stoical, deploy all arms on the battlefield in combination, make rational plans and are outnumbered.
When an Ancient Historian has to describe an action for which he has a fairly bare description he raises the rhetoric by describing the Barbarians as having all the appropriate attributes. This is easy for an audience , to whom the work is being declaimed, to relate to. It is no different from our newspapers who depict the Germans as arrogant, the Italians as corrupt and cowardly, the Greeks as chaotic .
Roy
Quote from: Erpingham on January 02, 2013, 06:03:34 PM
At the risk of repeating myself, there is a difference between a unit in whose formation unplanned gaps appear and one that trains to fight with gaps. Actually, I'm not sure that the line in contact had gaps (certainly not all the time) but I don't think what happens when gaps happen/or are forced on a phalanx is actually conclusive about what the Romans did.
But which armies in the classical period used gaps? The only references to gaps I have been able to find in the sources are to unplanned ones, unless one counts Scipio's unique deployment at Zama (even then he filled the gaps with velites). And why would Roman legionaries survive in a situation where Greek hoplites did not?
Quote from: Erpingham on January 02, 2013, 06:03:34 PM
Again, part of the problem is a fundamental difference in understanding of what "staying in a fight for extended periods" means in the sources. In the view of some here (and in secondary literature) a unit can be in a fight while shouting abuse, hurling missiles, spear fencing, sending out the odd idiot to moon at the enemy etc. as well as when hammering away with the shield and jabbing with the sword at breath-smelling range. The unit is out of the fight when it collectively ceases to think it's next move will be engaging the enemy in some way, either because of fatigue or fear or disorder or its leaders say "You've done enough lads - somebody else's turn"
This kind of fighting seems to have been the province of skirmishers, not formed heavy troops.
Gallic ferocity and Gallic-Roman interaction might with benefit form a new topic.
Patrick
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 02, 2013, 10:49:48 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 02, 2013, 08:11:58 PMSpeaking of the blood-maddened Gaul, wasn't it his Galatian relatives who, alone in the ancient world, were able to defeat a phalanx frontally by getting their front ranks to run straight into the sarissas, enabling the rear ranks to step over them and, um, incapacitate the hapless phalangites?
No.
That sounds like complete fiction to me. There are no surviving narratives of Galatian victories over the Macedonians that give any tactical detail.
Interesting. I had read somewhere (but cannot remember the source) that Gaulish mercenaries in the period c400-200 BC were amongst the most feared warriors of that era, capable of defeating a phalanx (not necessarily a Macedonian one). Any truth in that, or is it just more Roman hyperbole?
This might be worth a separate thread, as Patrick suggests.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 02, 2013, 08:11:58 PM
True, but one needs to read the account of the Zulu assault at Rorke's Drift, where the Zulus attacked an improvised fortified position from 4.30 pm until 2.00 am the following morning, clambering over the bodies of their fallen to get at the British. The mopping up of individual British soldiers in the aftermath of Isandlwana was done when the heat of the battle was over, and could be accomplished economically. When the battle was at its height losses were not a primary consideration for the Zulu. One could fit Gauls into this category of fighter.
While we need to be careful in comparing Zulus to ancient troop types, their endurance in the Isandlhwana and Rorke's Drift action is remarkable The regiments in action at Rorke's Drift had been on the move for the whole day before they started to fight, with very little food. To suggest that they constantly attacked over such a wide period isn't true though. They attacked and withdrew, manoeuvering against different parts off the post, and attacks became less frequent and less determined as time wore on (they were tired, hungry and had taken a lot of casualties). The battles of the first part of the Zulu war were a shock to the Zulu army - they weren't used to the level of casualties and, in a society where heroism and heroic leadership were expected, casualties among officers and the natural leaders left many units the shadow of their former selves. We may wish to take that back as a reflection on our Gauls too - even in a heroic society, not all warriors are equally brave.
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 02, 2013, 10:49:48 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 02, 2013, 08:11:58 PMSpeaking of the blood-maddened Gaul, wasn't it his Galatian relatives who, alone in the ancient world, were able to defeat a phalanx frontally by getting their front ranks to run straight into the sarissas, enabling the rear ranks to step over them and, um, incapacitate the hapless phalangites?
No.
That sounds like complete fiction to me. There are no surviving narratives of Galatian victories over the Macedonians that give any tactical detail.
Actually it is complete conjecture, and the conjecture is mine. Apologies to Justin if he gained the impression it was source-based or source-backed.
The reason for the conjecture was my premise that a Gaul impaled on a sarissa would act similarly to a boar impaled by a spear (and for that matter Mordred at Camlann, if the account of his last duel is based on anything historical), running up the shaft to strike at the owner. Even if he did not make it (the other 4-9 sarissa points he would be facing would probably stop him) it would give the sarissa wielder a problem, because having a dead Gaul half-way up your pike is not going to do much for your ability to hold it up against the next attacker.
Given Ptolemy Keraunos' demonstrated level of generalship and prudence, we need not confine ourselves to attributing his defeat to a single cause, though it is interesting to speculate on some of the mechanics of this first interaction between Gauls (Galatians) and Macedonians.
Patrick
Perhaps it is significant that the British at Roeke's drift fired off some 20,000 rounds and yet only 400 Zulu died (that's an estimate of course. Apparently a lot of Zulu casualties were from bayonet wounds as they tried to get over the mealie bag and biscuit tin fortifications and were disadvantaged against the firmly planted men of the 24th.
Surely, if the Zulu had been so keen on being in the face of the British they would have suffered many more casualties as there is really no place for long range shooting, the Zulu are generally in cover until a distance that varies from 30 yards to ten.
Even if I misremember the rounds shot it was still an awfully high number. It argues that a lot of the time the Zulu were keeping their heads down and the British were shooting to keep them from moving.
Had the Zulu been indifferent to their own lives they could easily have swamped the post and probably lost about 1000 men doing it, simply by assaulting everywhere and disregarding casualties. Instead they probed at different points at different times, accumulating casualties, but then rotating in new units.
I think the problem here is that the language of the description of battles is ill suited to factual analysis because it concentrates on the moments of action rather than on the systematic accounting of each phase and sub action. So charges and shouting and heroic actions predominate. Also, only certain men give accounts. The Zulu, apparently told David Rattray a lot about Isandlhwana but little about Rorke's drift because it was a shameful, illegal action against Cetewayo's orders.
In WW2 in Normandy the books that have been published major on the accounts of literate individuals and heroes and personal action. It gives the impression that all German guns are 88mm, all tanks Tigers. Airpower is overestimated because it has dramatic effect. A more scientific analysis suggests that artillery did most of the work, but then it wouldn't be much of a story to say that a German company re occupies a village, ten batteries of artillery hit it and then there are effectively no survivors. Similarly the casualties in tanks that ,light first time' and are death traps for the crews are very dramatic and feed the need for a war is hell narrative, but I now hear that they were relatively rare (though horrid and dramatic) . Similarly the costs of the bomber offensive in the allies best young men and costly machines probably vastly outweighed the benefits, but for years that story could not have been told.
One of the best scientific analyses of a battle is Mark Adkin's Charge of the Light Brigade. I was surprised to learn that charging across the front of the Russian guns was surprisingly low risk given that the target was well spaced out and the guns have a low rate of fire and you need to be a bloody good gunner to hit a target that is not standing still. Charging guns frontally is, of course, not advisable, but even there the gunners have to get the grape fire timed just right and, if you know what you are doing, the first line of cavalry gets massacred, but the gunners cannot reload before the second line is on them, sabres flashing.
So with the ancient accounts we have to import as much science as we can and that means using comparanda and reason as well as looking for what is key truth and what is simply rhetoric in the accounts. When the Gauls are described with all the to poi and flourishes I'd not believe it unless the source specifically says that the Gauls charged en masse and wildly.
Look Justin at Vercellae where the Gauls come on in a huge block, perhaps square and chant as they go. That's a Gallic (or German) attack, but it is in ranks and in order.
And yes, a Gallic attacks thread with some sourced quotes would be useful.
Roy
One thing came to mind on the subject of wearier lines of infantry giving way before a more robust foe: if a front rank soldier steps back, the soldier behind him, in order not to have his bossed shield poke into the front chap's back, will naturally step back too, as will the fellow behind him, and so on. Only in some armies were the rear ranks meant to press against the front ranks and create an othismus.
This being the case, one can envisage a line of outfought infantry backing up quite a distance before a superior foe, as happened historically. No need for a push-o-war.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 05, 2013, 06:13:08 PM
Only in some armies were the rear ranks meant to press against the front ranks and create an othismus.
There are other interpretations of othismos too - the degree to which deliberate pushing went on in any ancient formation is another theme we could pick up sometime in the future :)
Quote
This being the case, one can envisage a line of outfought infantry backing up quite a distance before a superior foe, as happened historically. No need for a push-o-war.
When is a pushback not a pushback? When it's a retrograde movement :) I would see this with fitting in with a concept of different intensities of combat. The line falling back can rally and go in again or, if the time is right, exchange with the support line. The degree to which the enemy followed up would be telling - if they press hard enough you'd have difficulty making the exchange. If they are tired but overenthusiastic, you've just drawn them in to a mincing machine. If they don't follow at all, you have a choice of breaking contact or attacking with your fresh troops.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 05, 2013, 07:58:06 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 05, 2013, 06:13:08 PM
Only in some armies were the rear ranks meant to press against the front ranks and create an othismus.
There are other interpretations of othismos too - the degree to which deliberate pushing went on in any ancient formation is another theme we could pick up sometime in the future :)
I'm all ears (or all eyes in this case).
Quote
This being the case, one can envisage a line of outfought infantry backing up quite a distance before a superior foe, as happened historically. No need for a push-o-war.
When is a pushback not a pushback? When it's a retrograde movement :) I would see this with fitting in with a concept of different intensities of combat. The line falling back can rally and go in again or, if the time is right, exchange with the support line. The degree to which the enemy followed up would be telling - if they press hard enough you'd have difficulty making the exchange. If they are tired but overenthusiastic, you've just drawn them in to a mincing machine. If they don't follow at all, you have a choice of breaking contact or attacking with your fresh troops.
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There is a certain hypothetical system proposed at the beginning of this thread that makes it possible to do line relief even when under pressure from the enemy. The idea is that you need to do a line relief in precisely that situation - when the enemy is pressing your front ranks and threatening to break them. If the front ranks are holding their own then no need for the relief operation.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 06, 2013, 06:03:53 PM
I'm all ears (or all eyes in this case).
Well, as I understand it (and I've only really come across it peripherally), there are at least three schools of thought
1. Rugby scrum - a mass push by the two opposing phalanxes
2. Individual push - any pushing is in the context of a series of individual combats/pushes
3. There was no physical
othismos - it was metaphorical/a literary device or psychological (I suppose that could be two different schools of othismos denial :) )
It really needs a thread of its own and some serious Classical Greek enthusiasts to do the arguments justice - as I say, I've seen enough in passing to know a debate rages but can't tell you the current front runner.
can I plede that we leave othismos until 2015.
Quote from: Mark G on January 07, 2013, 02:26:40 PM
can I plede that we leave othismos until 2015.
I thought we'd got 2015 down for "The range and armour piercing capabilities of the Longbow", for the Agincourt 600th anniversary? May have to be 2016 :)
Can't we do it now-ish? At least a bit? Pretty please?
I defy anyone to fight well whilst someone else is pushing them in the back.
Its likely not such a problem if the man at the front is crouched inside his shield pushing too. I agree that wielding a spear might be a problem, but then that may have occupied the first phase and when that declines through fatigue and spear breakage, the best the back ranks can do is push because they do have energy.
Which Theban says 'Give me one more push'?
Think of the description by Ammianus of Roman troops at Argentoratum pushing with their knees. That sounds like direct power transmitted via the shield??
Roy
The men 'pushing with their knees' at Argentoratum are Alemanni, and probably Alemanni cavalry, as the description occurs during the narrative of the cavalry action.
The use of the knee to brace the shield was a defensive measure, as described in Cornelius Nepos' Life of Chabrias, I.2
Chabrias the Athenian was also numbered among the most eminent generals, and performed many acts worthy or record. But of these the most famous is his manoeuvre in the battle which he fought near Thebes, when he had gone to the relief of the Boeotians; for in that engagement, when the great general Agesilaus felt sure of victory, and the mercenary troops had been put to flight by him, Chabrias forbade the rest of his phalanx to quit their ground, and instructed them to receive the attack of the enemy with the knee placed firmly against the shield, and the spear stretched out. Agesilaus, observing this new plan, did not dare to advance, and called off his men, as they were rushing forward, with sound of trumpet. This device was so extolled by fame throughout Greece, that Chabrias chose to have the statue, which was erected to him at the public charge by the Athenians in the forum, made in that posture.
One may note this was a 'new plan' (novum), an improvisation, not a recognised manoeuvre, and was above all defensive in nature.
Conversely, in Ammianus' account of Argentoratum the 'knee pressure' comes in XVI.12.37, before the infantry close to combat in XVI.12.42, the interim period being occupied in a missile exchange (XVI.12.36) and the cavalry action (XVI.12.37-41). I would read this as the Alemanni 'spurring' on their cavalry without having spurs, urging their mounts on by knee pressure to force back their Roman cavalry counterparts (and perhaps hold their attention and position while the Alemanni light infantry went about their business of horse-belly-slitting).
On the subject of Cimbri and Teutones, these seem to have been Germans rather than Gauls, and the use of a chain to keep the front rank level suggests a deliberate rather than impetuous advance. Gallic impetuosity seems to have been containable until the leaders wished it unleashed, missile-maddened individuals at Telamon and Olympia notwithstanding. I am still looking for an explicit description of a Gallic charge outside Caesar - our sources seem uninterested in the actual mechanics of closure.
Aha, at last we come to the definition of what is a Gaul.
The Cimbri and Teutones have been characcterised as Gallic culture tribes abandoning Germany as the future Germans of Tacitus move into the country.
A sub tribe that is travelling with them moves in with the Helvetii and is not distinguished as Germans by Caesar, though for him being German might just mean Trans Rhenane.
Artefacts such as the Gundestrup cauldron that are found in the Cimbric area might well argue for a developed Celtic culture.
The names of the leaders of the Cimbri and Teutones are Celtic.
The animal headed headdresses and description of their tactics happily fits with Celtic
The abandonment of Celtic sites in Germany such as the Heuneberg argues for a southward migration of the Celts away from German pressure.
None of the above is absolute proof, but on balance I'd see the C and T as more Celtic than German if the distinction is meaningful.. and I think it might be meaningful.
Roy
This is the section from Ammianus: So, when the call to battle had been regularly given on both sides by the notes of the trumpeters, they began the fight with might and main; for a time missiles were hurled, and then the Germans, running forward with more haste than discretion, and wielding their weapons in their right hands, flew upon our cavalry squadrons; and as they gnashed their teeth hideously and raged beyond their usual manner, their flowing hair made a terrible sight, and a kind of madness shone from their eyes. Against them our soldiers resolutely protected their heads with the barriers of their shields, and with sword thrusts or by hurling darts threatened them with death and greatly terrified them. 37 And when in the very crisis of the battle the cavalry formed massed squadrons valiantly and the infantry stoutly protected their flanks by making a front of p285their bucklers joined fast together, clouds of thick dust arose. Then there were various manoeuvres, as our men now stood fast and now gave ground, and some of the most skilful warriors among the savages by the pressure of their knees tried to force their enemy back; but with extreme determination they came to hand-to‑hand fighting, shield-boss pushed against shield, and the sky re-echoed with the loud cries of the victors or of the falling. And although our left wing, marching in close formation had driven back by main force the onrushing hordes of Germans and was advancing with shouts into the midst of the savages, our cavalry, which held the right wing, unexpectedly broke ranks and fled; but while the foremost of these fugitives hindered the hindmost, finding themselves sheltered in the bosom of the legions, they halted, and renewed the battle. 38 Now that had happened for the reason that while the order of their lines was being re-established, the cavalry in coat-of‑mail, seeing their leader slightly wounded and one of their companions slipping over the neck of his horse, which had collapsed under the weight of his armour, scattered in whatever direction they could; the cavalry would have caused complete confusion by trampling the infantry underfoot, had not the latter, who were packed close together and intertwined one with the other, held their ground without stirring. So, when Caesar had seen from a distance that the cavalry were looking for nothing except safety in flight, he spurred on his horse and held them back like a kind of barrier. 39 On recognising him by the purple ensign of a dragon, fitted to the top of a very long lance and spreading p287out like the slough of a serpent, the tribune of one of the squadrons stopped, and pale and struck with fear rode back to renew the battle. 40 Whereupon Caesar, as is the custom to do in times of panic, rebuked them mildly and said: "Whither are we fleeing, my most valiant men? Do you know not that flight never leads to safety, but shows the folly of a useless effort? Let us return to our companions, to be at least sharers in their coming glory, if it is without consideration that we are abandoning them as they fight for their country." 41 By his tactful way of saying this he recalled them all to perform their duty as soldiers, following (though with some difference) the example of Sulla of old. For when he had led out his forces against Mithradates' general Archelaus and was being exhausted by the heat of battle and deserted by all his men, he rushed to the front rank, caught up a standard, flung it towards the enemy, and cried: "Go your way, you who were chosen to be companions of my dangers, and to those who ask you where I, your general, was left, answer truthfully: 'Fighting along in Boeotia, and shedding his blood for all of us.' "
Seems to me that its shield-boss against shield boss and that the Germans are indeed PUSHING with their knees.
Roy
The 'pushing with the knees' is 'obnixi genibus', whereas Nepos in his Life of Chabrias has 'obnixo genu scuto', unambiguously 'with the knee bracing the shield'. Ammianus conspicuously has 'genibus', the plural, and a complete absence of any shield.
Further, the structure of the narrative points to the 'knees' occurring during the cavalry engagement. The passage seems to have been partly mistranslated.
And when in the very crisis of the battle the cavalry formed massed squadrons valiantly and the infantry stoutly protected their flanks [actually 'et muniret latera sua firmius pedes' = and [the cavalry] guarded their [own] flanks as firmly as infantry; 'firmius' is a comparative, 'as firm as'] by making a front of their bucklers joined fast together [frontem artissimus conserens parmis], clouds of thick dust arose. Then there were various manœuvres [discursus = movements rather than manoeuvres], as our men now stood fast and now gave ground, and some of the most skilful warriors among the savages by the pressure of their knees tried to force their enemy back; but with extreme determination they came to hand-to-hand fighting [dexterae dexteris miscebantur = they interspersed, right side to right side], shield-boss pushed against shield, and the sky re-echoed with the loud cries of the victors or of the falling.
Roman cavalry and infantry both used bossed shields, but legionaries did not use the parma. Ammianus seems to be saying here that the Roman cavalry:
1) Joined their squadrons into a single line
2) Thus secured the flanks of each squadron as firmly as infantry
3) Put their shields up facing the enemy
4) Movements then occurred, some Romans giving ground and some barbarians using knee pressure to gain it
5) Finally interpenetration occurred so that each side's cavalrymen faced unshielded foes on their right and shielded on their left.
This makes a coherent and credible sequence of events that has suffered at the hands of translators and given rise to misunderstandings.
It also suggests that the Roman clibanarii in mid-4th century Gaul used standard cavalry weapons and shield rather than lances, but that is a different discussion.
Must say I cannot see how cavalry push with their knees. The actions of cavalry and infantry are interspersed in the narrative hence I believe that the boss to boss action and knee pushing is inafantry action.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 08, 2013, 08:43:46 PM
Must say I cannot see how cavalry push with their knees.
Roy
Ask the horse. ;)
The infantry action begins with XVI.12.42:
Then the Alamanni, having beaten and scattered our cavalry, charged upon the front line of the infantry, supposing that their courage to resist was now lost and that they would therefore drive them back.The infantry action went thus, with nobody using their knees except to drop to:
But as soon as they came to close quarters, the contest continued a long time on equal terms. For the Cornuti and the Bracchiati, toughened by long experience in fighting, at once intimidated them by their gestures, and raised their mighty battle-cry. This shout in the very heat of combat rises from a low murmur and gradually grows louder, like waves dashing against the cliffs. Then a cloud of hissing javelins flew hither and thither, the dust arose with steady motion on both sides and hid the view, so that weapon struck blindly on weapon and body against body. But the savages, thrown into disorder by their violence and anger, flamed up like fire, and hacked with repeated strokes of their swords at the close-jointed array of shields, which protected our men like a tortoise-formation. On learning this, the Batavians, with the "Kings" [Reges] (a formidable band) came at the double quick to aid their comrades and (if fate would assist) to rescue them, girt about as they were, from the instant of dire need; and as their trumpets pealed savagely, they fought with all their powers. But the Alamanni, who enter eagerly into wars, made all the greater effort, as if to destroy utterly everything in their way by a kind of fit of rage. Yet darts and javelins did not cease to fly, with showers of iron-tipped arrows, although at close quarters also blade clashed on blade and breastplates were cleft with the sword; the wounded too, before all their blood was shed, rose up to some more conspicuous deed of daring. For in a way the combatants were evenly matched; the Alamanni were stronger and taller, our soldiers disciplined by long practice; they were savage and uncontrollable, our men quiet and wary, these relying on their courage, while the Germans presumed upon their huge size. Yet frequently the Roman, driven from his post by the weight of armed men, rose up again; and the savage, with his legs giving way from fatigue, would drop on his bended left knee and even thus attack his foe, a proof of extreme resolution.Observe the different character of the fighting: missiles continue to fly during the melee, movements are minimal and fatigue or overbearing puts down opponents.
Somethings don't change though - the barbarians are all tall, strong and in a rage, while the Romans fight in a disciplined way. I'm sure the warrior falling on one knee with exhaustion but continuing to fight is an artistic image that carries back to classical Greek art too. Ammianus knew his classics (and his audience).
Eureka!
The Roman, driven from his post by the weight of armed men rose up again. Of course, one single Roman is not going to be driven back or this contest of overlapped shields w,oils disintegrate. This must be a literary description of Romans retiring exhausted to rest and then coming back to the fray again.
Roy
Sloppy translation, I am afraid. 'Pulsus loco Romanus' means 'A Roman, knocked down
in his place' not driven from it, which would be 'ex pulsus loco Romanus' or 'pulsus ex loco Romanus'.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 09, 2013, 09:29:36 AM
Somethings don't change though - the barbarians are all tall, strong and in a rage, while the Romans fight in a disciplined way. I'm sure the warrior falling on one knee with exhaustion but continuing to fight is an artistic image that carries back to classical Greek art too. Ammianus knew his classics (and his audience).
There are simple reasons for this: Romans were disciplined, Alemanni were not. Alemanni were tall, Romans were not. And one wonders whence came the original inspiration for classical art, if not in actual occurrences. That said, Ammianus does like his heroic atmosphere, though I doubt that it affects the accuracy of his narrative.
One point we may note is that line relief does not seem to be part of the process any longer. The crux of the action occurs when the German kings, with their select followers, plough through their own side's faltering ranks to charge the Roman centre.
And so there suddenly leaped forth a fiery band of nobles, among whom even the kings fought, and with the common warriors following they fell upon our lines before the rest; and opening up a path for themselves [et iter sibi aperiendo = and needing to open a way for themselves]
they got as far as [pervenit = reached, arrived at]
the legion of the Primani, stationed in the centre in a strong formation called praetorian camp [quae confirmatio castra praetoria dicitatur = which was said to be as secure as a praetorian camp]
; there our soldiers, closely packed and in fully-manned lines [densior et ordinibus frequens = impenetrable and in steady formation]
stood their ground fast and firm, like towers, and renewed the battle with greater vigour; and being intent upon avoiding wounds, they protected themselves like murmillos, and with drawn swords pierced the enemy's sides, left bare by their frenzied rage. But the enemy strove to lavish their lives for victory and kept trying to break the fabric of our line. But as they fell in uninterrupted succession, and the Romans now laid them low with greater confidence, fresh savages took the places of the slain; but when they heard the frequent groans of the dying, they were overcome with panic and lost their courage. Worn out at last by so many calamities, and now being eager for flight alone, over various paths they made haste with all speed to get away, just as sailors and passengers hurry to be cast up on land out of the midst of the billows of a raging sea, no matter where the wind has carried them; and anyone there present will admit that it was a means of escape more prayed for than expected. Moreover, the gracious will of an appeased deity was on our side, and our soldiers slashed the backs of the fugitives; when sometimes their swords were bent, and no weapons were at hand for dealing blows, they seized their javelins [tela = weapons]
from the savages themselves and sank them into their vitals; and not one of those who dealt these wounds could with their blood glut his rage or satiate his right hand by continual slaughter, or take pity on a suppliant and leave him. - Ammianus XVI.12.49-52
Ammianus further describes the Alemanni being followed up down-slope to the river, where they suffered even heavier losses. Noteworthy is the bending of Roman swords with prolonged use (18th century bayonets tended to do the same) and the fighting technique of the Primani - the stab to the opponent's unguarded side and the weaponry bending with use could both come from a description of Barrel's and Munro's regiments at Culloden. It was not only Gauls who found their metallurgy sometimes wanting on the battlefield.
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 09, 2013, 06:21:00 PM
There are simple reasons for this: Romans were disciplined, Alemanni were not. Alemanni were tall, Romans were not. And one wonders whence came the original inspiration for classical art, if not in actual occurrences. That said, Ammianus does like his heroic atmosphere, though I doubt that it affects the accuracy of his narrative.
Patrick
I would caution taking every detail as literally true. Ammianus is a good observer, but it seems to me he applies his not inconsiderable talents to conjur up a classical battlepiece. The height differential may have been considerable in the days of the Republic but it was less so in the late Empire - the Roman army is not all lads from the urban slums anymore. No doubt men did go down on one knee but was it often? And did the Romans still use short stabbing swords at this stage?
So, on the main manoeuvers, I'd take A pretty seriously. Even on some of the tactics - the cavalry closing up like infantry, for example, or the infantry clearly in very close order (I'm tempted to suggest
foulkon except we'd need another debate to unpack the term :) ). But the striving heroic combat stuff looks like a literary polish. And before I'm accused of being over literary, I would point to John Keegan's analysis of battlepieces in modern military history and how they evoke feel as much as they deliver facts (Face of Battle, Ch.1).
Methought that Philip Rance had providedbthenlast word on the Foulkon?
https://web.duke.edu/classics/grbs/FTexts/44/Rance2.pdf
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 09, 2013, 09:29:54 PM
Methought that Philip Rance had providedbthenlast word on the Foulkon?
Roy
I recall it as being pretty comprehensive but I can't remember if he thought the order Ammianus was describing was a Foulkon. If I get a chance, I'll relook at it and find out, unless someone knows the answer?
Moving off at a slight tangent (and just in passing mentioning Napier's history of the Peninsular War as a source that combines heroic action with usable accuracy), the apparent lack of line relief (but possible unit relief when the Batavi and Reges move to get the Cornuti and Bracchiati out of a jam) at Argentoratum may match up with the legion reorganisation that happened around the early 4th century AD.
The traditional legion was about 5,000-6,000 strong and fought in three lines (Caesar), or two plus 'triarii' (Vegetius). Each line in a three-line legion would contain 1,600-2,000 men. It would appear that during the legion reorganisation the number of legions roughly tripled, while individual legion strength went down to maybe 1,200-1,500 men (authorised strength may have been a bit higher).
Hypothesis: instead of a 5/6,000-man three-line legion using line relief the new system deployed a single-line 1,600-2,000-man (at full strength; usually less when fielded) legion without line relief, but which may have exchanged fresh reserve formations for tired/endangered front line units, basically taking the Roman system back full circle to its earliest days except that now small legions formed the basic 'unit of relief' rather than maniples. The new small legion occupied the same frontage as the old large legion, but was all 'up front', six ranks deep. A second line, probably of auxilia, would stand ready to go to the assistance of any legion in trouble, perhaps at the ratio of one auxilium giving cover for one legion.
This is still somewhat hypothetical, and in need of further evidence one way or the other, but is aired here because it seems to fit and looks like a possible tail-end development of the original subject.
Patrick
Interesting thoughts. I'd be interested in views as to whether there was a deliberate division of legions into three in the early fourth century, as opposed to a period when legionary detachments had left the empire covered in bits of legion and this was regularised. What's the last reference we have prior to 4th century of whole line relief, as opposed to smaller units swapping with one another? This may help judge whether line relief went out with the old legions.
For most of the period we have to rely on inference, e.g. Diocletian's Joviani and Herculiani are given as c.6,000 strong AD c.300 (Vegetius I.16: "We formerly had two legions in lllyricum, consisting of six thousand men each"); Ammianus at the siege of Amida (AD 359) has "seven legions, a heterogenous crowd of strangers and citizens of both sexes and a few other troops, amounting in all to 20,000 souls," suggesting the legions were of no great size, and at Argentoratum (AD 357) Julian has 13,000 troops, some of whom are cavalry, while five infantry formations (Cornuti, Bracchiati, Batavi, Reges, Primani) from the right and centre are named. Formations on the left and possibly some in the centre and reserve are not named, so perhaps ten or more infantry formations may have been fielded, and certainly more than five. Allowing for some being 500-man auxilia, there is still not much manpower left over for the legions.
The Notitia Dignitatum of AD 395 or later has a profusion of units, the west alone having 12 'palatini' and 32 'comitatenses' legions, whereas traditionally (before the reorganisation) the Empire had maintained around 14 legions in the west: 3 legions in Britain, 4-5 in Gaul, 1 in Spain and 1 (praetorians) in Italy, plus 2-5 in Illyria. Jumping from 14 to 44 implies three times as many legions, and given Ammianus' figures above, also suggests the new legions were at about 1/3 strength. The west also has 65 auxilia palatini. There are also 17 'pseudocomitatenses' whose role and status is unclear, but they are listed where we might expect auxilia comitatenses, a category conspicuous by its absence.
Over time, legions had sent vexillations (detachments) to various other theatres to meet emergencies, and some of these vexillations seem not to have returned to the parent legions. It is quite likely that they were regularised as new legions (and it is possible but by no means certain that the 'seniores' and 'iuniores' might represent an original legion and its vexillated 'offspring', though as the 'senior' and 'iunior' legion are occasionally listed together in the Notitia and some auxilia bear these designations this is not an infallible supposition). However this would leave imbalanced legions (some at c.4,000 men; others at c.2,000) so it looks as if a deliberate decision was taken to divide up all legions, not just those with alienated vexillations. Elite legions such as the Joviani and Herculiani as far as I know stayed together rather than emitting vexillations, which would also suggest a deliberate readjustment.
Whether this coincided with the end of line relief is harder to judge owing to the paucity of battle accounts mentioning such details, though the idea of looking for the last known mention of line relief is a good one. My impression (which may be incorrect) is that the last explicit reference is in Caesar's description of Pharsalus (48 BC). Tacitus describes the battles at Bedriacum in AD 69 in some detail, but is more concerned about which legion did what than about tactical procedures. Historians between Tacitus and Ammianus are not noted for attention to military detail, which is why we surmise much from Trajan's column and argue over who created the first Roman heavy cavalry rather than having a source which tells us what we need to know. From memory (and I shall have to track this down) Marcus Aurelius committed multiple lines against invading Alemanni, and Decius against the Goths and Scythians at Abritus (AD 251), but this will mean a trawl through Dio, Zonaras et. al. when I get the time.
Ergo, the idea that line relief went out with the new smaller legion remains hypothetical, though Vegetius (writing in the 4th century AD) uses a basic six deep deployment and refers to multiple lines as a feature of the 'ancient legion'. This may be as close as we get. There is however one perhaps useful pointer.
Traditionally, a legion (5,000-man) deployed on a front of about 200 yards, as far as we can establish. This would be commensurate with three lines each containing c.1,600 men deployed 200 wide and 8 deep. Vegetius uses what appears to be a standard army frontage of 1,656 men and a six deep deployment, which may be just a clever way of fitting nearly 10,000 men into a quick-and-dirty deployment or it may indicate that the army was usually expected to deploy six deep. If so, then a 1,200-man 'new legion' could deploy on a 200 yard frontage six men deep, hence covering the same frontage as a traditional (5-6,000-man legion). A 1,600-man 'new legion' could deploy eight deep on the same frontage.
More importantly, a six deep deployment leaves no realistic possibility of line relief (although there remains a theoretical possibility of rank relief) so there may have been a recognition or belief that against the opponents currently faced by the Empire three lines constituted overkill and one line - perhaps backed by a reserve line, as seems to have been the case at Argentoratum - sufficed for ordinary battlefield needs. Rather than have a traditional legion deploy on a frontage three times the usual width, the new system seems to have three new legions, each on the frontage of an old legion. This new deployment system (if it was indeed such) would go some way to explaining why Julian with 13,000 men at Argentoratum was able to match the frontage of 35,000 Alemanni.
Alas, my knowledge of the fighting techniques of the Imperial legion is thin (lack of similar level of exposure to debate than on the Republicans :) ) but it seems to me that the appearance of auxilia in self contained small units and the fact that most of these units could form line of battle will have complicated the formation model. Take, for example, Mons Graupius where the auxilia are deployed in front of the legions - could line relief work in those circumstances? Or would you get something more on the lines Ammianus aludes to of individual units being relieved/reinforced?
Going briefly back to Ammianus, Rance (whose view of Ammianus' literary flourishes is probably influentual in my own view looking back) does not say definitively that the Romans adopt a foulkon (or fulcum, as the original Latin would have it) because their is no explicit evidence of Late Western Roman use, though the term must have been introduced between the late 3rd and early 5th century. He is clear that the formation described is a lineal descendent of Roman formations, in its anti-cavalry form dating back to the late Republic. For those who haven't read it for a while, the paper is well worth another look.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 11, 2013, 08:23:27 AM
Alas, my knowledge of the fighting techniques of the Imperial legion is thin (lack of similar level of exposure to debate than on the Republicans :) ) but it seems to me that the appearance of auxilia in self contained small units and the fact that most of these units could form line of battle will have complicated the formation model. Take, for example, Mons Graupius where the auxilia are deployed in front of the legions - could line relief work in those circumstances? Or would you get something more on the lines Ammianus aludes to of individual units being relieved/reinforced?
Join the club - knowledge of the precise functioning of early, middle and late Imperial legions is sketchy to say the least, largely because our sources for the period tend not to have a Polybian descriptive approach or even a Livian assemblage of clues. However I believe it would be fair to say that you make a good point in that committing auxilia to the main line of battle requires a different approach to relief than the usual three-line legion system. Mons Graupius (AD 83 or 84) was an engagement where, as Mick Hession has pointed out, once the British (Caledonian) chariotry was out of the way the infantry of the Caledones were really no problem for their trained Roman opponents, even though the latter were 'merely' auxilia. Hence one suspects the question of line relief did not arise.
The German invasions of the 2nd century AD that gave Marcus Aurelius such a hard time may have been a different matter, the Marcomannii in particular being a tough nut to crack. When the crisis of the 3rd century AD broke, the Empire seems to have begun increasing its cavalry establishment, perhaps a sign that the infantry could no longer entirely cope. By the 4th century, heavy - even armoured - cavalry had become a major component of Roman armies, and in the 5th century it seems to have become the mainstay of the Empire's remaining forces, although a larger infantry component still existed. In the 6th century, especially during Belisarius' campaigns of reconquest, infantry is definitely the subordinate arm, at some times almost superfluous in battle, though still essential in sieges and useful in engagements such as Taginae (where Narses dismounts his cavalry and supports it with infantry, especially archers). We may be able to surmise from this that the Romans were finding their infantry system had weaknesses, and these weaknesses may have had to do with the inability to provide effective relief for auxilia, or it may simply be that their opponents were now using more cavalry (the increasing Sarmatian presence being a case in point) and the Romans were having to raise more and heavier cavalry to counter them. Somewhere along the line, however, there would have been a need to relieve auxilia in mid-fight, German tribes tending to have more fighting ability and staying-power than Caledonians. Hence one could posit that with increasing proportions of auxilia in the battle line a reduction of the legions to single-line formations would have allowed a more or less uniform unit relief system instead of having to operate two different systems side-by-side.
Whatever the roots of the change, by the mid-4th century AD the Romans seem to have had a system that worked really well against Germans when not let down by bad leadership, and could even work effectively against Sassanid/Sasanian Persians (Parthians and Persians were a problem for the earlier system), though this took good leadership to achieve.
'Foulkon' seems to derive from the Greek 'phylax' or 'phulax' (depending on how one transcribes the upsilon), meaning a guard. 'Phylakein' or 'phulakein' were guard forces of any sort, e.g. to cover foragers, so the 'foulkon' seems by extension of meaning to have been a formation or configuration whereby infantry could, so to speak, guard themselves. Ammianus refers to Roman infantry at Argentoratum being protected by a 'nexam scutorum compagem', a close-joined array of shields, 'in modum testudinis', i.e. in the fashion of a tortoise. He seems to be describing either a testudo or, more likely, a shield wall arrangement. Whether this equates to a Byzantine or even Rancian 'foulkon' I leave others to judge. Functionally I see no reason why the concept should not fit: doctrinally and from a detail standpoint it may be a more open question.
Patrick
I would place the dominance of cavalry in Roman armies as a change that occurs in the 580s when fighting the Avars and not earlier. Even then a large Roman army operating against the Persians or Arabs might well have a majority of infantry. The reason for the use of all cavalry armies in the Strategikon of Maurice is really because the infantry cannot keep up and pin the Avars. At one point in Maurice's campaigns a general is referred to as having ' the infantry army'.
Belisarian armies are cavalry armies by default and are not typical. The army at Dara, at Callinicum, at Taginae, atvCasilinum, is an army that is largely infantry, but with a substantial cavalry component. I would go so far as to say that the cavalry has danced to being a decisive arm, but still uses an infantry base. At Taginae and at Casilinum infantry and dismounted cavalry are used to blunt the opposing attack and then cavalry surround and pursue. If anything that is a sophisticated all arms strategy rather than a cavalry dominant one.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 11, 2013, 10:33:57 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 11, 2013, 08:23:27 AM
'Foulkon' seems to derive from the Greek 'phylax' or 'phulax' (depending on how one transcribes the upsilon), meaning a guard. 'Phylakein' or 'phulakein' were guard forces of any sort, e.g. to cover foragers, so the 'foulkon' seems by extension of meaning to have been a formation or configuration whereby infantry could, so to speak, guard themselves. Ammianus refers to Roman infantry at Argentoratum being protected by a 'nexam scutorum compagem', a close-joined array of shields, 'in modum testudinis', i.e. in the fashion of a tortoise. He seems to be describing either a testudo or, more likely, a shield wall arrangement. Whether this equates to a Byzantine or even Rancian 'foulkon' I leave others to judge. Functionally I see no reason why the concept should not fit: doctrinally and from a detail standpoint it may be a more open question.
Patrick
Rance has a couple of different derivations of foulkon .For detailed discussion see the paper, but both would involve the term coming into Greek from Latin. As I said, a whole other topic of debate :) More interestingly, there is the question of whether in modum testudinis means not "in the fashion of a tortoise" but "in the fashion of (a military formation called) a tortoise". Rance would go for the latter, and would view this , as you suggest, as a type of interlocked shieldwall i.e. a formation in which soldiers held their shields interlocked as they would in a testudo. Which is also what troops in a foulkon do too, so this maybe the same or an ancestral version.
Well stated, Roy.
I would agree the 580s as the time when Byzantine infantry starts to become an optional extra on the battlefield rather than an integral part of the army. From the 3rd century AD cavalry was increasing in status and importance, and my understanding of the beginning of cavalry dominance would date to such actions as the Milvian Bridge, where the cavalry engagement seems to have been expected to decide the battle - and did. We can agree on cavalry becoming the arm of decision somewhere along the line.
Anthony, Ammianus' usage ('in modo testudine') could be read either way (tortoise or testudo), though a full testudo involves shields all round and on top, and is really an assault formation for sieges rather than a battlefield formation (albeit Crassus' men appear to have used it at Carrhae once they realised the Parthians were not going to run out of arrows). This may be why Ammianus has them 'in modo testudine' (in the fashion of an overlapping scaly thing) rather than simply 'in testudo' (or rather 'in testudine'). The governing criterion for their formation is that they need to be able to use their personal weapons. There is of course a certain attraction in the idea that rear ranks are holding up shields as a 'roof', given that friendly (and possibly enemy) missiles are coming over for much of the battle.
I have made a video which shows clearly how relief system worked. I studied a lot of sources.
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LzTgdz7vmPY
That is one of the interpretations.
Your Greeks are obligingly passive throughout, especially when the complex formation changes are in progress.
And the absence of velites and pila stands out, as does what appears to be the pvermanned triatii
Fun to watch tjough
Nice illustration of your ideas, Andrew. I thought the push and shove seemed quite realistic; it didn't have the massive casualties of RTW: 1.
But as Mark G says, the enemy don't advance and the legions are able to move how they wish, so I'm not convinced. Good to watch though. Thanks for sharing!
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 16, 2014, 01:52:17 PM
I have made a video which shows clearly how relief system worked. I studied a lot of sources.
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LzTgdz7vmPY
I love RTW2 graphics. It would be great to be able to tweak in detail the behaviour of troops so as to give a precise demo of the mechanism/theory one is trying to illustrate. Do you know if there is any way of doing that? A mod or add-on or something?
I enjoyed the video. Mille grazie!
there are actually hundreds mods for rome 2. I made this video when there was no mod yet. I could not use velites cause I had limited number of units. For the Pila throwing, there are actually very good mods which add it. At that time there was Noone. If you go into my channel you will see many more videos with examples of how cohortal legion and manipular legion could act against different enemies, like pike phalanx or barbarians.
The idea or relief system I show in the video is based on the assumption that during a battle there were a lot of minor pauses, because soldiers could not sustain the physical and emotional stress of fighting for long. This is is most accepted theory of relief system I have found and the most practical. We know in fact that each manipulum had a front centuria and a back centuria. Some author speaks about a legion with no gaps, some talks of gaps among maniples of the dimension of a maniple. So this tactic I have shown would melt together all these different things.
Sorry for my English.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 16, 2014, 07:44:08 PM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 16, 2014, 01:52:17 PM
I have made a video which shows clearly how relief system worked. I studied a lot of sources.
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LzTgdz7vmPY
I love RTW2 graphics. It would be great to be able to tweak in detail the behaviour of troops so as to give a precise demo of the mechanism/theory one is trying to illustrate. Do you know if there is any way of doing that? A mod or add-on or something?
I enjoyed the video. Mille gratia!
as I said before there are many excellent mods on the steam workshop, but one of the best is Divide ET Impera, which changes the skin of units and their behaviour in a realistic direction. So if you will buy the game try that mod, the game alone is a bit unfinished and lacks some epic feeling, but is surely a very good game.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 16, 2014, 09:36:24 PM
The idea or relief system I show in the video is based on the assumption that during a battle there were a lot of minor pauses, because soldiers could not sustain the physical and emotional stress of fighting for long. This is is most accepted theory of relief system I have found and the most practical. We know in fact that each manipulum had a front centuria and a back centuria. Some author speaks about a legion with no gaps, some talks of gaps among maniples of the dimension of a maniple. So this tactic I have shown would melt together all these different things.
Again, the ability of troops to sustain fighting for long periods seems to have depended upon the troop type, their equipment and their training. Italians generally and Romans in particular seem to have used heavy shields (held close to the body and perhaps supported on the shoulder like the Greek hoplite shield), light weaponry and a lot of training, giving them considerable endurance. Gauls seems to have relied heavily on initial impact and to have been poor at sustained fighting; Germans seem to have been better than Gauls at sustained action but still inferior to Romans, especially in an Italian climate.
There is also the consideration that if an opponent is tired enough, or lax enough, to stand by and not interfere while one carries out these relief manoeuvres, then he is probably sufficiently tired or lax that a good push would break him, making relief unnecessary.
The converse also applies: that is an excellent video, but if I were commanding the hoplite opponents the hastati would be massacred as they tried to withdraw, the more so as the first part of their withdrawal is spent exposing their flanks and getting in the way of the engaged hastati who are still trying to retreat. The same goes for the principes. And why do the hoplites put themselves into complete confusion before attacking the triarii?
I applaud your exploration of the Roman relief system - this has been extensively discussed here among Society of Ancients members and it should be a good subject on which we can compare notes.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 16, 2014, 09:36:24 PM
I could not use velites cause I had limited number of units. For the Pila throwing, there are actually very good mods which add it. At that time there was Noone.
My apologies, I didn't realise the constraints you were working under. Given this, it's an even bigger 'well done'. I've posted a link to it on the SoA facebook page so that others can see too.
Thanks again,
Aaron
what you say of endurance can be true but does not take into account there pauses in fighting existed and that was sure. I have read a lot and if you want I can give you some links, in Italian unfortunately of very good websites who list all sources.
As for the fact that enemies would have used the relief moment to attack, they would not have had time, since the timing I show in the video must not be taken as accurate, they probably did it in less tkme. Secondly even if they attacked in the little time of rank change they would have found the principes line running towards them. And the full line of principes would have deployed in seconds. So they would have had something like an estimated 20 seconds (not my idea) to attack.
Considering that they were probably resting some meters far from line of battle, they would have had excellent reflexes to understand the complex manoeuvre which was happening and attack in that very moment. Unlikely to happen. Even if they did it, they would have had no real effect, since they would have simply slowed the retreat of hastati line and the advance of principes.
I really think that this is the relief system more likely to happen.
I used to think the relief system worked this way until I began thinking about how and why the Romans would want to relieve lines. There is no point relieving a line which is doing well: relief is required only when the enemy is starting to gain superiority over the hastati, and then it is necessary to have a relief system which works well under pressure.
If the relief system depends upon a break in the fighting, then a) any relief system (not just the Roman one) will work during a break so anyone can do it, and b) if there is no break in the fighting the system cannot work.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 17, 2014, 07:40:22 PM
Considering that they were probably resting some meters far from line of battle, they would have had excellent reflexes to understand the complex manoeuvre which was happening and attack in that very moment. Unlikely to happen. Even if they did it, they would have had no real effect, since they would have simply slowed the retreat of hastati line and the advance of principes.
The argument that the enemy would be baffled by what was happening might work for the first battle they ever had against Roman forces, but by the time of the second battle they would have seen the system in action and thought about what to do. The proposed system of pulling back alternate centuries would create gaps in a tired line and allow the opponent to surge round the flanks of the prior centuries. The principes line would have to deploy 'in seconds' and rush in, but that would result in pockets of tired hastati being forced against the enemy by the intact principes line, so the hastati would be sacrificed rather than relieved.
It was this problem of trying to relieve a line under pressure that made me take another look at the sources, and this led to a couple of clues. Livy in his Book VIII description of the battle between the Romans and Latins on 340 BC refers to the hastati as
retro cedentes (retiring rearwards or backwards) in order to be relieved by the principes. Polybius, in his Book II description of Rome's victory against the Insubres, notes that the Roman deployment at the edge of a river left no room for the customary Roman
epi poda relief manouevres.
Epi poda means stepping backwards.
This suggests that the intact hastati line withdrew backwards through the line of principes. Each file (except one, on a flank) would pass between two files of principes, who would pick up the combat as it reached them. One intact line handed over the fighting to another. At no point were there gaps, nor was the formation disrupted in any way. It was unspectacular, but it could be done even when the fighting line was under strong enemy pressure.
I have also concluded that the 'quincunx' formation was never used in battle: the only apparent example of quincunx deployment in our sources is at Zama, and even there Scipio places his subunits one behind the other and fills the gaps with velites. In the battle against the Insubres (223 BC) the Romans have a continuous front line, as is evidenced by equipping the leading ranks of hastati with triarii spears. This would seem to be the norm and not the exception.
if what you said happened, which is enemies going among the centuriae of ha stati after they had positioned the back centuria in the back again, the enemies would be surrounded on 3 flanks, the principes advancing in front and the ha stati centuriae in the flanks. So this would be even worse for enemies. Enemies would have to rush following the centuriae of ha stati retreating (and I think very strange that someone seeing the Roman doing some complex maneuver has the initiative to break the line of battle to push forward in that very moment, convincing the other guys to do the same... I think that most probable reaction would be astonishment in watching this sudden manoeuvre during the fight, unless they had already seen it, but I don't think so many survived to many battles against Romans, historically if they saved their life in one battle it was a great result) only to find themselves trapped among the centuriae oh ha stati in the flanks and the fresh heavy principes running fiercely against them.
Anyway I am not saying this was a simple maneuver. It needed a big effort and timing and probably sometimes something went wrong. Since doing it in a game is a bit simpler than doing it in real life. But the general result, putting away tired men and pouring fresh men into the battle when necessary, was what gave a big advantage to Romans.
We all know that Romans liked simple and effective things, not complicated ones (watch for example the structure of their camps, simple, rational). I think they used this tactics because it was the simplest and most effective to achieve this result.
Then you have to consider that mainly enemies of Rome which were not Germans or gauls used tactics based on phalanx or shield walls (even Germans sometimes). A phalanx has not the flexibility to do a fast rush in the gaps created by Romans doing their tactical retreat. As I said, this could happen if someone understood in seconds what was happening and convinced other guys, in seconds, to follow him to make a very dangerous rush with unknown effect. This during a battle where main concern of people over there was generally to stay alive, thus keeping as possible a good order to achieve that goal. [emoji1]
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 17, 2014, 08:50:43 PM
Each file (except one, on a flank) would pass between two files of principes, who would pick up the combat as it reached them.
This hearkens back to the beginning of this thread where we looked at the precise meaning of 'ordo' for Livy. Mind if I reproduce part of an earlier post?
| Let me insert the original latin words into the English translation:
[3] The Romans had formerly used small round shields; then, after they began to serve for pay, they made oblong shields instead of round ones; [4] and what had before been a phalanx, like the Macedonian phalanxes, came afterwards to be a line of battle formed by maniples [manipulatim = 'in a maniple-like fashion'], with the rearmost troops drawn up in a number of companies [ordines]. [5] The first line, or hastati, comprised fifteen maniples [manipuli], stationed a short distance apart; the maniple [manipulus] had twenty light—armed soldiers, the rest of their number carried oblong shields; moreover those were called "light—armed" who carried only a spear and javelins. [6] this front line in the battle contained the flower of the young men who were growing ripe for service. behind These came a line of the same number of maniples [manipulorum], made up of men of a more stalwart age; these were called the principes; they carried oblong shields and were the most showily armed of all. [7] this body of thirty maniples [manipulorum] they called antepilani, because behind the standards there were again stationed other fifteen companies [ordines], each of which had three sections [partes], the first section in every company [actually 'of each'] being known as pilus. [8] The company [ordo] consisted of three vexilla [vexillis] or "banners"; a single vexillum had sixty soldiers, two centurions, one vexillarius, or colourbearer; the company [actually 'They'] numbered a hundred and eighty—six men. The first banner [vexillum] led the triarii, veteran soldiers of proven valour; the second banner [just 'the second'] the rorarii, younger and less distinguished men; the third banner [just 'the third'] the accensi, who were the least dependable, and were, for that reason, assigned to the rear most line.
[9] when an army had been marshalled in this fashion, the hastati were the first of all to engage. if the hastati were unable to defeat the enemy, they retreated slowly and were received into the intervals between the companies [ordinum] of the principes. The principes then took up the fighting and the hastati followed them. [10] The triarii knelt beneath their banners, with the left leg advanced, having their shields leaning against their shoulders and their spears thrust into the ground and pointing obliquely upwards, as if their battle—line were fortified with a bristling palisade. [11] if the principes, too, were unsuccessful in their fight, they fell back slowly from the battle—line on the triarii. (From this arose the adage, "to have come to the triarii," when things are going badly.) [12] The triarii, rising up after they had received the principes and hastati into the intervals between their companies [ordinum], would at once draw their companies [ordinibus] together and close the lanes, as it were; then, with no more reserves behind to count on, they would charge the enemy in one compact array.
One could say that from [9] onwards Livy uses 'company' to designate a file but it does seem to strain the meaning as he has used it so consistently up to now to designate a much larger body of men. Add to that the mention of intervals between the maniples - which the Triarii companies would have replicated in their own deployment - and the logical conclusion would be that the 'intervals between the companies' of [12] corresponds to gaps between one grouping of vexilla and the next. |
I just couldn't convince myself that 'ordo' in Livy's context meant 'file'.
That's another valid interpretation.
Read Roys from last week again for a third.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 17, 2014, 08:50:43 PM
If the relief system depends upon a break in the fighting, then a) any relief system (not just the Roman one) will work during a break so anyone can do it, and b) if there is no break in the fighting the system cannot work.
I think you are oversimplifying a bit. Any relief system by a highly trained army would work if it would fit into the sort of timeframe required. You have only got as long as your opponent takes to remotivate and relaunch the fight. If they were winning and you were losing, this may not be long. So, it would need to be an army organised in such a way as to allow relief and trained to do it. Is anyone else this organised? I agree on the second point but , then, some of us believe there were normally breaks and others think there weren't any breaks, so how realistic you think such a system is depends where on this continuum you sit.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 17, 2014, 09:11:45 PM
if what you said happened, which is enemies going among the centuriae of hastati after they had positioned the back centuria in the back again, the enemies would be surrounded on 3 flanks, the principes advancing in front and the hastati centuriae in the flanks. So this would be even worse for enemies. Enemies would have to rush following the centuriae of hastati retreating (and I think very strange that someone seeing the Roman doing some complex maneuver has the initiative to break the line of battle to push forward in that very moment, convincing the other guys to do the same... I think that most probable reaction would be astonishment in watching this sudden manoeuvre during the fight, unless they had already seen it, but I don't think so many survived to many battles against Romans, historically if they saved their life in one battle it was a great result) only to find themselves trapped among the centuriae of hastati in the flanks and the fresh heavy principes running fiercely against them.
Let us review what is involved: I do agree that for the relief manoeuvre the principes would have to move up close behind the hastati. However under the proposed system the hastati have to disengage alternate centuries and then move them laterally behind the still-engaged centuries. This means that 50% of the fighting line is removed from fighting and as soon as it has turned is also offering its flank to any enemy who follow them up. The remaining 50% is under attack from the front and both flanks.
Now the centuries who have fallen back and turned to offer their flanks to any enemy who follows them up have to move behind the engaged centuries - and must complete this manoeuvre before the principes can do anything at all. If they are being pressed in the flank by an enemy who has followed up they can move only by sacrificing the outer file or files. Meanwhile their movement cuts off the retreat of the engaged centuries, who are still under attack from the front and both flanks.
Quote
Anyway I am not saying this was a simple maneuver. It needed a big effort and timing and probably sometimes something went wrong. Since doing it in a game is a bit simpler than doing it in real life. But the general result, putting away tired men and pouring fresh men into the battle when necessary, was what gave a big advantage to Romans.
We all know that Romans liked simple and effective things, not complicated ones (watch for example the structure of their camps, simple, rational). I think they used this tactics because it was the simplest and most effective to achieve this result.
I think that pinpoints the problem with this relief system. ;) I think you are right about the Roman preferring simple solutions, and would suggest that the actual system they used was much simpler than that proposed.
Quote
Then you have to consider that mainly enemies of Rome which were not Germans or Gauls used tactics based on phalanx or shield walls (even Germans sometimes). A phalanx has not the flexibility to do a fast rush in the gaps created by Romans doing their tactical retreat. As I said, this could happen if someone understood in seconds what was happening and convinced other guys, in seconds, to follow him to make a very dangerous rush with unknown effect. This during a battle where main concern of people over there was generally to stay alive, thus keeping as possible a good order to achieve that goal. [emoji1]
Rome's formative campaigns were mainly fought against Sabines, Volsci, Hernici, Aequi and above all Samnites, who seem to have used more flexible formations and whom Livy portrays as being aggressive in their battlefield behaviour. They also regularly fought Etruscans, who do seem to have used at least a phalanx-related system for part of their history, and Gauls, who used their own system which involved impetuous attacks and shieldwall-type defences (cf. Sentinum 295 BC and Telamon, 225 BC). Most of Rome's opponents do not appear to have used a phalanx, but rather a more flexible system. Furthermore, even the traditional hoplite phalanx could rapidly exploit gaps in an enemy line, as at Delium in 424 BC and First Mantinea in 418 BC.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 18, 2014, 10:04:55 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 17, 2014, 08:50:43 PM
If the relief system depends upon a break in the fighting, then a) any relief system (not just the Roman one) will work during a break so anyone can do it, and b) if there is no break in the fighting the system cannot work.
I think you are oversimplifying a bit. Any relief system by a highly trained army would work if it would fit into the sort of timeframe required. You have only got as long as your opponent takes to remotivate and relaunch the fight. If they were winning and you were losing, this may not be long. So, it would need to be an army organised in such a way as to allow relief and trained to do it. Is anyone else this organised? I agree on the second point but , then, some of us believe there were normally breaks and others think there weren't any breaks, so how realistic you think such a system is depends where on this continuum you sit.
The Roman line relief system had to be able to operate under adverse pressure. If opponents were considerate enough to pause just when the Romans wanted to relieve themselves - I shall rephrase that - to exchange lines, then all well and good: one could have a trooping the colour display and it would serve. If not, then the Roman system would lead to defeat against every opponent who seized upon the simple truth that keeping up the pressure would render the system - and the Roman army - inoperative.
So - in what way can we pass a tired line through a fresh line without loss of continuity in fighting?
Patric you don't get my point. I explained exactly how enemies would find in a worse situation if they tried to follow retreating ha stati, since they would have been surrounded on 3 sides. Read newly my point. so that relief system I have shown can even take into account a very hypothetical enemy who see Romans do a quick manoeuvre and suddenly decides to do a powerful attack in that moment (how this could happen, I have no idea though, since it would imply a loss of cohesion in the battle line even for attackers)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 18, 2014, 01:14:46 PM
If not, then the Roman system would lead to defeat against every opponent who seized upon the simple truth that keeping up the pressure would render the system - and the Roman army - inoperative.
Only if we assume that, without line relief, the Roman army collapsed. Given the later examples which we have dredged up in another thread where the Romans seem to have been able to use their reserve line to manoeuver to reinforce a flank, we should also be open to the idea that Romans could use their deployment in depth to impovise a functional reserve even if prevented from line relief. It is also true that, not being Roman, the attacker can't recycle troops so the ranks doing the pressuring are growing tired as fast as, if not faster than, the Romans. The fighting would therefore still be more balanced that perhaps you suggest.
There is another way of making line relief work that takes up Patrick's idea whilst preserving the meaning of Livy's 'ordo' as a company rather than a single file. Let me give the mechanism first and then see if it fits the sources second. (This theory reproduces an idea of Paul Bardunias on the Arkaion Bellum group)
The hastati are drawn up with the standard 3' from the centrepoint of one file and rank to the next, a combat formation. Behind them the principes and triarii are drawn up in open formation, with 6' between the centrepoint of one file and the next, whilst maintaining 3' between the centrepoints of the ranks. This is a standard marching formation which leaves clear gaps between the files. Thus:
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/line%20relief%20diagrams%20jpegs/1.jpg)
The hastati are hammered back by their opponents against the principes. This is the automatic signal for line relief to begin.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/line%20relief%20diagrams%20jpegs/2.jpg)
The rearmost ranks of the hastati begin to filter down the passageways between the files of the principes.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/line%20relief%20diagrams%20jpegs/3.jpg)
This process continues until the frontmost ranks of the hastati rest against the principes.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/line%20relief%20diagrams%20jpegs/4.jpg)
The last of the hastati cover the gaps between the files of the principes. It is time for the handover to take place.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/line%20relief%20diagrams%20jpegs/5.jpg)
As the last hastati fall back in the gaps, the second man of each file of principes moves up quickly to take his place in the front rank. This switch takes only a moment, not enough time for the enemy to exploit it. The remainder of each principes file moves up.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/line%20relief%20diagrams%20jpegs/6.jpg)
As the remaining hastati pass down the passageways, the principes that count as even numbers in their files fill the gap left behind whilst the odd-numbered principes move up. The file passageways close rapidly.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/line%20relief%20diagrams%20jpegs/7.jpg)
A few moments later, the entire line of principes is formed up in close battle array and giving the tired enemy a hard time.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/line%20relief%20diagrams%20jpegs/8.jpg)
Does this interpretation fit the sources? Looking at Livy:
"If the hastati were unable to defeat the enemy, they retreated slowly
and were received into the intervals between the companies of the
principes. The principes then took up the fighting and the hastati
followed them. The triarii knelt beneath their banners, with the left
leg advanced, having their shields leaning against their shoulders and
their spears thrust into the ground and pointing obliquely upwards, as
if their battle-line were fortified with a bristling palisade. If the
principes, too, were unsuccessful in their fight, they fell back
slowly from the battle-line on the trarii. (From this arose the adage
'to have come to the triarii,' when things are going badly.) The
triarii, rising up after they had received the principes and hastati
into the intervals between their companies, would at once draw their
companies together and close the lanes, as it were; then, with no more
reserves behind to count on, they would charge the enemy in one
compact array."
inter - 'between' - can also have the meaning of 'among(st)'.
Amicus inter hostes - ' a friend amongst enemies'. Thus 'intervals between companies' -
intervalles inter ordines - can be translated as 'gaps amongst (or within) the companies'. The triarii closing the 4' gaps between their files in the same manner the principes closed theirs makes good sense of this passage.
An excellent set of diagrams, Justin.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 18, 2014, 01:27:52 PM
Patrick you don't get my point. I explained exactly how enemies would find in a worse situation if they tried to follow retreating ha stati, since they would have been surrounded on 3 sides. Read newly my point. so that relief system I have shown can even take into account a very hypothetical enemy who see Romans do a quick manoeuvre and suddenly decides to do a powerful attack in that moment (how this could happen, I have no idea though, since it would imply a loss of cohesion in the battle line even for attackers)
It would not be a matter of deciding whether or not to follow up, because there would be every reason to follow up an opponent who is giving way. And the hastati's 'prior' centuries would be under attack from three sides (and destroyed or at least much weakened) before the principes could move up to engage.
I did read your explanation. :) It just seems to assume that the enemy will let the posterior centuries withdraw and assemble behind the prior centuries and only then push into the gap. I cannot see any self-respecting Gaul or Samnite waiting that long instead of following up immediately.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 18, 2014, 04:59:54 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 18, 2014, 01:14:46 PM
If not, then the Roman system would lead to defeat against every opponent who seized upon the simple truth that keeping up the pressure would render the system - and the Roman army - inoperative.
Only if we assume that, without line relief, the Roman army collapsed. Given the later examples which we have dredged up in another thread where the Romans seem to have been able to use their reserve line to manoeuver to reinforce a flank, we should also be open to the idea that Romans could use their deployment in depth to improvise a functional reserve even if prevented from line relief.
Please bear in mind that the examples of the flexible third line derive from Caesar's time (1st century BC and the 'Marian' legion) whereas the system under specific discussion is the 3rd-2nd century BC 'Polybian' legion, in which the third line consisted of triarii which, until Scipio began innovating at Ilipa and Zama, seem to have remained immobile throughout the battle.
It may incidentally be indicative that we lack any mention (as far as I know) in sources of instances where the Romans were unable to carry out line relief because of frontal pressure - being surrounded at Cannae did seem to wreck the system, and it is not clear whether the legion being pressurised by the phalanx at Cynoscephalae had managed to relieve its first and/or second lines while being pushed back. What we do know is that Flaminius had given it up as a lost cause and moved to the Roman right to see what he could do there. He was evidently unable to improvise a functional reserve in the circumstances, even starting with an uncommitted third line (this was 197 BC and still the Polybian legion).
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It is also true that, not being Roman, the attacker can't recycle troops so the ranks doing the pressuring are growing tired as fast as, if not faster than, the Romans. The fighting would therefore still be more balanced that perhaps you suggest.
If this were the case the hastati would not feel the need for relief, as in the battle against the Insubres in 223 BC (Polybius II.33). The need for relief occurs when the opposition are getting the better of the Romans, for whatever reason - perhaps through committing their finest troops against the hastati, who are Rome's less-than-finest.
come on guys I really don't get why you discuss so much about a thing that I have clearly shown as it works in my video, more or less. "ha stati were received into The INTERVALS between the companies of the principes": this is exactly what I have shown in my video and it is not represented in the images you posted.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 18, 2014, 10:06:22 PM
come on guys I really don't get why you discuss so much about a thing that I have clearly shown as it works in my video, more or less. "ha stati were received into The INTERVALS between the companies of the principes": this is exactly what I have shown in my video and it is not represented in the images you posted.
'the intervals between the companies' -
intervalles inter ordines. The two meanings of
inter are 1. 'in the midst of' and 2. 'between'. It's one of the rare cases where Latin is ambiguous. 'Intervals in the midst of the companies' can be perfectly well interpreted as gaps between widely-spaced files of the companies, which allows for a line relief that a) is easy for the soldier to execute (he simply has to move backwards through file gaps), and b)
never leaves his flanks or rear exposed: he is not obliged to turn his back to the enemy and he does not find himself fighting more than one enemy soldier at any time. It works for me :)
(BTW in adopting this mechanism I was obliged to abandon a cherished theory of my own ;))
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 19, 2014, 06:35:11 AM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 18, 2014, 10:06:22 PM
come on guys I really don't get why you discuss so much about a thing that I have clearly shown as it works in my video, more or less. "ha stati were received into The INTERVALS between the companies of the principes": this is exactly what I have shown in my video and it is not represented in the images you posted.
'the intervals between the companies' - intervalles inter ordines. The two meanings of inter are 1. 'in the midst of' and 2. 'between'. It's one of the rare cases where Latin is ambiguous. 'Intervals in the midst of the companies' can be perfectly well interpreted as gaps between widely-spaced files of the companies, which allows for a line relief that a) is easy for the soldier to execute (he simply has to move backwards through file gaps), and b) never leaves his flanks or rear exposed: he is not obliged to turn his back to the enemy and he does not find himself fighting more than one enemy soldier at any time. It works for me :)
(BTW in adopting this mechanism I was obliged to abandon a cherished theory of my own ;))
but in that way principes have to change their formation from. close to open and newly to close. That seems not necessary.
Then, you don't have to give the back to the enemy according to the system I have shown. You can slowly go backward while still watching and fighting enemy if necessary. It is matter of seconds anyway. All can happens in 20 seconds. Enemy has no time to react.
Anyway explain me why there were 2 centuriae in each manipulum, one called front centuria the other called back centuria, and how the heck they were one in front of the other and then necessarly one next to the other to form. a continuous line.
Then why the gaps among manipulum in marching order were exactly of the size of a manipulum, which is the size of a centuria, since manipulum in marching order had one front centuria and one back.
All this brings to only one solution. [emoji1]
As I said, I is simple, easy and effective. And Romans loved simple things.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 18, 2014, 08:38:09 PM
it is not clear whether the legion being pressurised by the phalanx at Cynoscephalae had managed to relieve its first and/or second lines while being pushed back. What we do know is that Flaminius had given it up as a lost cause and moved to the Roman right to see what he could do there. He was evidently unable to improvise a functional reserve in the circumstances, even starting with an uncommitted third line (this was 197 BC and still the Polybian legion).
Forgive me my poor recollection of Hellenistic battles but isn't Cynoscephalae where an unnamed tribune rescues the situation by improvising and taking troops on a flank attack?
As you have pointed out we don't have many cases where the Romans fail to do line relief (there is the one where they don't leave enough room, but don't they win anyway?). It may have happened in some of those battles where a consular army is beaten up but we have no details. But as usual, we are speculating from the evidence we have.
Yes. The tribune left the hastati to continue pursuing the broken phalanx on the Macedonian left flank and led the principles and triarii around the rear of the right flank phalanx. One of the few cases of an actual battlefield column at work (seen in another thread somewhere).
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 19, 2014, 07:00:17 AM
but in that way principes have to change their formation from. close to open and newly to close. That seems not necessary.
Then, you don't have to give the back to the enemy according to the system I have shown. You can slowly go backward while still watching and fighting enemy if necessary. It is matter of seconds anyway. All can happens in 20 seconds. Enemy has no time to react.
You can
either go slowly
or perform the exercise in 20 seconds: one or the other. For the withdrawing centuries to fall back slowly to a depth of at least eight men (the assumed depth of the non-withdrawing centuries) requires then to take at least eight paces backwards - with the enemy maintaining contact, because when troops fall back the natural inclination is to press the advantage and follow up, not to let them go. Then the withdrawing centuries turn 90 degrees, exposing a flank to these opponents in contact: I noticed in the video they offered their right flank - in combat, a death sentence. Now, with the opponents continually cutting down helpless sideways-facing legionaries, the withdrawing centuries somehow have to move behind the centuries which did not withdraw. I cannot see this working: the left-hand files might get clear but the rest will be crowded back and slaughtered as the enemy press forward. Meanwhile, the principes can see nothing except the backs or sides of the hastati, but the enemy are flowing round three sides of each of the hastati centuries which did not withdraw.
So what can the principes do? If the whole line advances, they will simply crush pockets of hastati against the enemy. If alternate centuries of principes advance, they will enter combat as the sideways-facing hastati in front of them are massacred, but this is not line relief.
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You can slowly go backward while still watching and fighting enemy if necessary.
Yes, good observation, and this seems to be the key to the whole line relief system. If you can go backwards slowly while fighting the enemy, why not have the line of hastati go backwards through the line of principes? This is a simple and effective way of handing over the fighting and there are no intricate manoeuvres to go wrong. Furthermore, this method of relief does not depend upon the enemy giving you a break in which to execute the manoeuvre.
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Anyway explain me why there were 2 centuriae in each manipulum, one called front centuria the other called back centuria, and how the heck they were one in front of the other and then necessarly one next to the other to form. a continuous line.
Nobody has entirely explained this point, largely because our sources do not. However if we look at Polybius VI.40, where he describes the Roman army on the march when contact with the enemy is anticipated, we get a clue:
"
The order of march, however, is different at times of unusual danger, if they have open ground enough. For in that case they advance in three parallel columns, consisting of the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii: the beasts of burden belonging to the maniples in the van are placed in front of all, those belonging to the second behind the leading maniples, and those belonging to the third behind the second maniples, thus having the baggage and the maniples in alternate lines. With this order of march, on an alarm being given, the columns face to the right or left according to the quarter on which the enemy appears, and get clear of the baggage. So that in a short space of time, and by one movement, the whole of the heavy infantry are in line of battle." - Polybius VI.40
This would indicate that the 'prior' century marches in front and the 'posterior' century behind, so that when they face right or left as above they are side-by-side and the maniple is ready for action. 'Prior' and 'posterior' would thus seem to designate marching order and not position on the battlefield. This is a deduction from a clue, but seems to fit.
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Then why the gaps among manipulum in marching order were exactly of the size of a manipulum, which is the size of a centuria, since manipulum in marching order had one front centuria and one back.
But where in any of our sources does it state that such gaps between manipuli existed? Incidentally, we seem to be in agreement that 'prior' and 'posterior' designate the marching order for a maniple's centuries.
I am not an historician but most of them agree that polybian legion behaved as I said. Maybe there is a reason. There are sources talking about gaps between manipules, I am sure, but I won't go looking for them. Do it in your own if you want. On my opinion what you say is totally invented and based on your own interpretation of sources. I have never heard about your line relief system, not in one book, and maybe there is some reason.
For the fact that legion marched with a prior and posterior centuriae, when the MANIPLE turned it Whole self on the left or right, you would still see a front and a back centuria. "The columns face left or right" does not mean single centuries, or does not necessarly imply that.
As I already said, it is a fact that during ancient battles there were several pauses. No one decided them, they were silent agreements between enemies to have some small break. No man can Sustain physically or psychologically hours of bloody deadly fighting, and until late Republic Roman army there was no "mutatio" system. This imply pauses. During pauses Romans could non doubt do the quick manoeuvre I showed in the video at a given signal, probably faster than the time I showed. This is the only meaning of having the check and board line deployment rather than the continuous line, the so called "quincunx" formation we already know.
Why having the quincunx formation (with gaps exactly of a MANIPLE size implied in it) if not simply to use that formation to do the tactical relief system I have shown?
If there was a continuum line and it was possible to change first and second line as you said, everyone could have done what Romans did and what made them win, but it was not.
Then again If enemies of Rome (not the ones using phalanx, since this implies keeping the line to be effective, let's say barbarians fighting more as small units or individuals) attacked in the very moment of Romans doing the relief tactic I showed, they would be gathered in a small hole surrounded on 3 sides. Yes they can attack the legionaries on the sides but these will obviously turn and counter attack them, and enemies will find themselves pushed by both sides and probably even from the advancing principes (in the video I have shown principes take some time to reach battle line but they could be much closer so reach ha stati line in seconds). So the only result of this sudden hypothetical attack would be being closed in smaller and smaller pockets (side ha stati can push them back) among manipules of ha stati on 2 sides and principes on the front?
I really don't get your point.
For all sources I used this very good website, the author is a historician and Italian teacher in university.
http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/legione_romana_camillana.html
It gives many more details and sources than what I have talked about. Unfortunately it is in Italian. But you can understand a lot watching pictures.
For the tactic I have shown it is detailed explained here http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/disciplinati.html It talks even about the necessary time of the entire manoeuvre and it says 25 seconds with the first 14 seconds as the most critical since 7 are needed for posterior centuria to go back prior centuria and other 7 for the entire ha stati maniple to retreat. Considering the enemies being in one of the several pauses during fight some 30/40 Mts away, they should have been all excellent runners to do that distance in 14 seconds.
Then you must consider that mainly enemies of Rome during first Republic either adopted the Phalanx system (pike phalanx or hoplite one) or they adopted the "barbarian" style, like gauls. In the first case the Phalanx has no flexibility to do a sudden attack pushing over the battle line into the gaps. In the second case, barbarian tactics could do it, but gauls for instance or germans were reported to be brave warriors but lacking endurance in battle. They (gauls for sure, I don't know about germans) even went to battle drunk so they could not phisically sustain prolonged fight. Their tactic was based on one yelling charge and if enemies hold they retreated quickly. These are facts. So during one of these pauses Romans could have done their tactics in a relative peaceful condition.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 08:34:09 AM
In the second case, barbarian tactics could do it, but gauls for instance or germans were reported to be brave warriors but lacking endurance in battle. They (gauls for sure, I don't know about germans) even went to battle drunk so they could not phisically sustain prolonged fight. Their tactic was based on one yelling charge and if enemies hold they retreated quickly.
For Patrick's (with help) examination of Celtic tactics see http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=679.0
Suffice it to say, everything comes out a bit more complicated than at first it seems :) Lack of "match fitness" does seem to have been an issue, however.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 08:34:09 AM
I am not an historician but most of them agree that polybian legion behaved as I said. Maybe there is a reason. There are sources talking about gaps between manipules, I am sure, but I won't go looking for them. Do it in your own if you want.
This does not exactly provide support for your interpretation. I have actually looked through these sources (Livy, Dionysius, Appian, Plutarch) and found
nothing to suggest any gaps between maniples except at Zama, which as we have noted was an unusual and specific anti-elephant deployment. This is why my understanding changed from something resembling yours to its current position. ;)
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On my opinion what you say is totally invented and based on your own interpretation of sources. I have never heard about your line relief system, not in one book, and maybe there is some reason.
Because it has not yet appeared in a book. You may find that in some matters the Society of Ancients is actually ahead of current popular thinking (not in everything, I hasten to add).
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For the fact that legion marched with a prior and posterior centuriae, when the MANIPLE turned it Whole self on the left or right, you would still see a front and a back centuria. "The columns face left or right" does not mean single centuries, or does not necessarly imply that.
Actually, it does. For a column to face left or right requires the smallest subunits (centuries or individuals) to face left or right, otherwise it would be
deploying, not
facing, left or right.
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As I already said, it is a fact that during ancient battles there were several pauses. No one decided them, they were silent agreements between enemies to have some small break. No man can Sustain physically or psychologically hours of bloody deadly fighting, and until late Republic Roman army there was no "mutatio" system.
That statement is incorrect: there was a relief system attested from at least 486 BC: see Dionysius VIII.65.2-3. Individual maniples which were being overcome were relieved by other individual maniples drawn from the reserve line. Interestingly enough, this was done by both sides: Roman and Hernici.
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This imply pauses. During pauses Romans could non doubt do the quick manoeuvre I showed in the video at a given signal, probably faster than the time I showed. This is the only meaning of having the check and board line deployment rather than the continuous line, the so called "quincunx" formation we already know.
Except that the 'quincunx' formation does not seem to exist in our sources - nor do the imagined pauses.
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If there was a continuum line and it was possible to change first and second line as you said, everyone could have done what Romans did and what made them win, but it was not.
But only if they trained for it - which the Latins and Samnites appeared to do. Latins using a line relief system is attested in Livy VIII.8; Samnites are not as far as I recall explicitly noted as doing so but the Romans do note on occasion that that they borrowed aspects of the Samnite system.
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Then again If enemies of Rome (not the ones using phalanx, since this implies keeping the line to be effective, let's say barbarians fighting more as small units or individuals) attacked in the very moment of Romans doing the relief tactic I showed, they would be gathered in a small hole surrounded on 3 sides. Yes they can attack the legionaries on the sides but these will obviously turn and counter attack them, and enemies will find themselves pushed by both sides and probably even from the advancing principes (in the video I have shown principes take some time to reach battle line but they could be much closer so reach ha stati line in seconds). So the only result of this sudden hypothetical attack would be being closed in smaller and smaller pockets (side ha stati can push them back) among manipules of ha stati on 2 sides and principes on the front?
I really don't get your point.
The point is that by withdrawing alternate centuries the Romans would leave the initiative to their opponents. Being surrounded on three sides does not apply equally to the force exerting the pressure (the opponent) and to the force being pressed (the 'prior' hastati centuries) - the latter suffer much more because they are static and exerting no pressure, so are crowded against each other Adrianople-style and swiftly become unable to dodge or use their shields or weapons, easy targets for their opponents.
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For all sources I used this very good website, the author is a historician and Italian teacher in university.
http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/legione_romana_camillana.html
It gives many more details and sources than what I have talked about. Unfortunately it is in Italian. But you can understand a lot watching pictures.
For the tactic I have shown it is detailed explained here http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/disciplinati.html It talks even about the necessary time of the entire manoeuvre and it says 25 seconds with the first 14 seconds as the most critical since 7 are needed for posterior centuria to go back prior centuria and other 7 for the entire ha stati maniple to retreat. Considering the enemies being in one of the several pauses during fight some 30/40 Mts away, they should have been all excellent runners to do that distance in 14 seconds.
Thank you for explaining this and giving your sources. We should perhaps bear in mind that all such conclusions have to be based on original sources (Livy, Dionysius, etc.) or individual imagination, or both. I prefer to use the original sources because that way there is only one layer of possible mistakes included.
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Then you must consider that mainly enemies of Rome during first Republic either adopted the Phalanx system (pike phalanx or hoplite one) or they adopted the "barbarian" style, like gauls. In the first case the Phalanx has no flexibility to do a sudden attack pushing over the battle line into the gaps.
A Macedonian phalanx would have no need to: in the accounts of Cynoscephalae and Pydna, the formed phalanx pushes back the entire (and incidentally gapless) Roman line. We seem to have no proven account of a hoplite phalanx fighting against legions; the nearest we get is Polybius' (I.33-34) account of Bagradas (255 BC), in which the Carthaginian infantry, whom we generally assume to have been hoplite-type, easily kill the Romans who, in small groups, manage to make their way between the elephants. Battles of Romans against Etruscans seem to be hard-fought but the interaction of their military systems is not well described.
What is noticeable about these battles is the lack of any suggestion that pauses occurred by mutual consent. One rather gets the opposite impression: if one side was feeling tired, the other side increased the pressure.
in the link I mentioned there are written all the sources.
Perhaps it would be a good idea to separate the two concepts of quincunx/gaps and non-continuous combat?
surely they are separate things. But everyone knows Roman legion main feature was the existence of gaps, we cannot debate even about that. Unless you want to take a master in history and rewrite thousands books written about it so far.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 06:00:38 PM
surely they are separate things. But everyone knows Roman legion main feature was the existence of gaps, we cannot debate even about that. Unless you want to take a master in history and rewrite thousands books written about it so far.
Andrew,you haven't debated much with Patrick thus far. Do not underestimate his interest in challenging received wisdom :)
I think from last time we debated this that gaps in Roman lines are less obvious in the historical record than many of us have been led to believe by thousands of book written so far. Doesn't mean that gaps are wrong but it does mean they can be challenged.
I know that but I trust more the 99% of community of historians rather than a single forumist.
Occam's razor says that we should try the easier solution when we don't know which one is correct. So I go with gaps, unless someone proves me they are wrong.
It is more questionable the relief system than the deployment of Roman army, which is rather well known.
If you assume that there were no gaps, Roman legion would be nothing more than a phalanx. So why was their tactic considered superior and their army more flexible, if they used a phalanx as everyone else? Gaps were used after the army had deployed to make a fast advance possible, so that hostacles (Treees rocks holes or whatever) were left in the gaps among maniples rather than disrupt formation.
If you don't start with that, it means that Romans were still using phalanx system and all innovations meant to make army more flexible were invented by authors.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 02:04:57 PM
in the link I mentioned there are written all the sources.
But have you read them? :) One of the lessons of research is that original sources often say something very different to what is popularly imagined.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 06:13:41 PM
If you assume that there were no gaps, Roman legion would be nothing more than a phalanx. So why was their tactic considered superior and their army more flexible, if they used a phalanx as everyone else?
Actually Greek authors do on occasion refer to Roman heavy infantry as
hoplites and to their battle line as a
phalanx. In answer to your question, the legion was considered superior because Rome usually eventually won, but it is worth noting that Roman armies lost about as many battles as they won, and the factors that created Roman victories are assessed (even by a pro-Roman author like Livy) as 1) leadership, 2)
virtus and 3) weaponry and tactics, in about that order.
It should also be considered that Roman armies rarely fought with legionaries alone, but made extensive use of auxiliaries. This is particularly true in the period 210-150 BC, when Rome managed to conquer significant territories outside Italy.
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I trust more the 99% of community of historians rather than a single forumist.
It may be worth remembering that the majority is not always right, and that 99% of the majority are usually simply requoting the initial 1% who came up with the idea. I shall be interested to see how you apply this principle in the discussion about pikes and chariots. ;)
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Occam's razor says that we should try the easier solution when we don't know which one is correct. So I go with gaps, unless someone proves me they are wrong.
And how are gaps the 'easier solution'? The 'easier solution' would seem to be a continuous line, but one which is trained to filter back through a relieving line, even in the middle of combat.
To give us some material instead of simply exchanging opinions, we could with benefit examine Polybius XVIII.28, where he is considering the merits of the Roman system compared to others.
"
Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal, and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms [kathoplisma]
or their tactics [suntaxin = organisation/tactical system]
but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms [kathoplismon]
of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms [hoplois kathoplisas]
of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end."
Hannibal was evidently impressed with the virtues of the legionary system, to the point of adopting it himself. One may note the perhaps surprising omission of any indication that the Roman system was more flexible than the Carthaginian. Polybius however does address this point when he compares the Macedonian phalanx directly with the legion in XVIII.32.10-12 Having just pointed out that the Macedonian phalanx is a very specialised, dedicated formation whose focus is solely being invincible on level ground, he enumerates the qualities of Roman troops and formations:
"
The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body [merous]
, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple [semaian]
, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others."
In essence, Roman troops and organisation are less specialised
than Macedonians and so more flexible
than Macedonians. This flexibility is useful if an opportunity to use it appears, but is obtained at the cost of being weak, even useless, in a head-on fight against a phalanx:
"
The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily—seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength." - Polybius XVIII.30.9-11
In essence, the Roman system was more flexible than the Macedonian, but not necessarily more flexible than the Carthaginian, or for that matter the Samnite or Etruscan. The Roman army's formative experiences were in Italy, a land of flexible armies, many of which were based in hilly or even mountainous country. What seems to be the case is that it was as flexible as its Italian neighbours, although perhaps less so than the Samnites until 314 BC or thereabouts, and more flexible than the Hellenistic systems it found itself fighting in the period 200-150 BC.
This does not, of course, prove that it fought with gaps in its lines, or in a quincunx formation. :)
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 06:13:41 PM
I know that but I trust more the 99% of community of historians rather than a single forumist.
Make that two forumists.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 06:13:41 PMOccam's razor says that we should try the easier solution when we don't know which one is correct. So I go with gaps, unless someone proves me they are wrong.
The only way to resolve this question is to go to the primary sources,
in their original language. Something that has struck me more than once is the at times utter unreliability of some of the more authoritative translations (from Latin at least - I'm not familiar with Greek). The trouble with doing a translation is that it is often not possible to render the text word-for-word in English. One looks for an equivalent expression that conveys the meaning of the original, and that is where the translator comes unstuck, since
he decides what the meaning of the original is.
Intervalles inter ordines is a classic example of this. The translator, visualising (according to the popular received wisdom) the intervalles as being wide gaps that separate one company from the next, translates
inter as 'between'. But visualise the companies deployed in widely-spaced
files and it makes perfect sense to translate
inter as 'within' (it is the root for the English word 'internal').
To be a good translator, it is not enough to have a thorough grasp of the original language and one's own; one must also have a deep insight into the context of the passage, i.e. one must be a first-rate historian, able to deduce the author's intended meaning, a meaning he does not always make explicit since he takes for granted his readers (unlike us) will know what he is getting at.
A translator, however, who has not done his homework thoroughly enough, will tend to translate a passage following popular contemporary opinion. His translation (or mistranslation) then reinforces that opinion, which nudges future scholars towards the same mistranslation, and so on. A vicious circle.
I have studied Lathin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Lathin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Lathan, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk lathi n almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.
what andrew says makes good sense. Where there is a consensus of historians then any major departure from that interpretation would need to be very well supported. However, most translators are not looking at the text from the point of view of military history and they often will not be using comparative evidence in the MH area from before, after and during the period concerned. What I found attractive in Patrick and Rodger's article in a recent Slingshot was the combination of evidence from Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. I also felt they made a good effort to put the organisational developments into a consistent linear picture. Frankly I just do not think that the original translators were interested in that, knowledgeable though they may have been in classical languages.
Sometimes the act of deep analysis of the meanings of Latin and Greek words is helpful, but sometimes not simply because words could be used for literary style or because the original writer was just wrong and it dis not matter.
As an example of distortion through style I would cite Caesar's description of the action against the Helvetii where pila pierce the Gauls' shields and encumber them. To me , this is a statement by Caesar to his audience of traditional Roman weapons doing their job properly, showing what fine Romans his men were. I do not take it to mean that this was rare occurrence, rather that it would be poor style for Caesar to mention this at every battle. I would bore his audience. Others take it to mean that the occasion is indeed special because it is specially highlighted, To bring this to a point, why would a Roman writer mention the exact mechanism of line relief? It was a commonplace for the Romans and tied in with the barbarians being vigorous at first and then fading. Even if it was libe relief that caused the Romans to be able to face tired troops with fresh Roman authors might well not mention this because they thought that a demonstration of Roman manliness and military virtue was more important than a commonplace process. Even excellent translation would not give us this sense because the words are not there. lastly, i have many books on the Normandy invasion of 1944. I am given to understand that the chief British tactic was section based fire and movement tactics within a platoon command structure. If I look through the books this sub methodology is almost entirely lost, it is just below the level of detail that the author is operating at.
Roy
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 09:45:59 PM
I have studied Lathin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Lathin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Lathan, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk lathi n almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.
Then we are in agreement. 'gaps
among the companies' as opposed to 'between' them. I too spent several years studying Latin, after I left school.
Here is a definition (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Dinter1) of 'inter' by Lewis and Short. Here is another (http://www.ultralingua.com/onlinedictionary/dictionary#src_lang=Latin&dest_lang=English&query=inter) by Ultralingua. Notice that it has the sense of 'in the midst of' rather than 'between' when referring to more than two objects.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 20, 2014, 10:33:15 PM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 09:45:59 PM
I have studied Lathin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Lathin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Lathan, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk lathi n almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.
Then we are in agreement. 'gaps among the companies' as opposed to 'between' them. I too spent several years studying Latin, after I left school.
Here is a definition (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Dinter1) of 'inter' by Lewis and Short. Here is another (http://www.ultralingua.com/onlinedictionary/dictionary#src_lang=Latin&dest_lang=English&query=inter) by Ultralingua. Notice that it has the sense of 'in the midst of' rather than 'between' when referring to more than two objects.
sorry I meant "between" not "among". As I said my English is not perfect, and I confused the meaning of these 2 words.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 09:45:59 PM
I have studied Latin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Latin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Latin, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk latin almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.
Unfortunately such people, who are very good with the language as a whole, are often the worst when it comes to matters of military vocabulary. I would not presume, for example, to debate questions of Greek tense or gender agreement with Ian Scott-Kilver, who translated Polybius for the Penguin publishing company, but would unhesitatingly point out that he is completely wrong to translate 'logkhophorous' (Hannibal's peltasts, who accompany his slingers) as 'pikemen' in III.72 and elsewhere. A logkhophoros used the logkhe, the approximately 6' long javelin that can in no way be classed or considered as a pike. This is not the only serious translator's error that has been picked up by members of the Society, simply because the Society's members have specialised military interests whereas translators usually do not.
Regarding this particular passage (Livy VIII.8 ), I think we shall need to go through it in rather more detail. The subject is the 'Livian' legion of 340 BC at the time of the battle against the Latins, and Livy describes each line of the Roman array as follows:
"
prima acies hastati erant manipuli quindecim distantes inter se modicum spatium manipulus leves vicenos milites aliam turbam scutatorum habebat leves autem qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent vocabantur."
(The first line of battle were hastati, fifteen maniples, with a short distance between them and the maniple of twenty leves; the rest of the formation [literally 'crowd'] was composed of shieldsmen [scutati] but the leves, as they were called, carried a spear [hasta] and javelins [gaesa].)
These groups of 20 men constituted the entire skirmisher strength of the legion at the time. They were a semi-independent and differently armed part of the hastati.
"
robustior inde aetas totidem manipulorum,quibus principibus est nomen, hos sequebantur, scutati omnes, insignibus maxime armis."
(Men in the prime of life formed the same number of maniples called principes, these were deployed behind [the hastati], were all shieldsmen and had the best equipment.)
The comment that the principes are 'all shieldsmen' (scutati omnes) indicates that the leves were considered subunits of the hastati.
"
hoc triginta manipulorum agmen antepilanos appellabant"
(This array of thirty maniples was referred to as the antepilani.)
"quia sub signis iam alii quindecim ordines locabantur, ex quibus ordo unusquisque tres partes habebat"
(Because with the standards were another fifteen formations (ordines), each of which was formed of three components.)
"earum unam quamque primam pilum vocabant"
(Of these, the first was called the pilus.)
"tribus ex vexillis constabat ordo; sexagenos milites, duos centuriones, vexillarium unum habebat vexillum"
(Each ordo consisted of three vexilla; each vexillum had sixty men, two centurions and a standard.)
"centum octoginta sex homines erant"
(It [the vexillum] contained 186 men.)
"primum vexillum triarios ducebat, veteranum militem spectatae virtutis"
(The first vexillum led, consisting of triarii, veteran troops of perceived excellence.)
"secundum rorarios, minus roboris aetate factisque"
(The second [line] consisted of rorarii, men of lower age and strength.)
" tertium accensos, minimae fiduciae manum; eo et in postremam aciem reiciebantur."
(The third [line] of accensi, men of least fighting ability, and these were held back in the last line.)
So - we have five lines of troops, of which the last three are grouped under the standards, and their units are called 'ordines' (with subunits being termed 'vexilla'), and the first two lines are deployed in advance of them, their subunits being called 'manipuli'. We may note the complete absence of any indication of gaps between the maniples of antepilani or the vexilla of the ordines. This distinction between 'manipuli' and 'ordines' is important for understanding the next part of Livy's description.
Livy now turns to describing their tactical employment.
"ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant."
(When the army was drawn up in these formations, of all the troops the hastati would be the ones to begin the battle.)
"si hastati profligare hostem non possent,
pede presso eos retro cedentes in
intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant."
(If the hastati were unable to overcome the enemy, then
under pressure they would retire backwards and the principes would receive them
into the intervals of their files.)
Here we have the crux of the matter: the hastati are retiring under pressure; there is no question of a convenient pause in the fighting. The potentially ambiguous part is 'in intervalla ordinum'. Livy does not use 'ordo' to mean a formation of principes: he used 'manipulus'. 'In intervalla ordinum' here thus cannot mean 'into the gaps between the formations' - that would be 'in intervalla manipulorum'. We must look to the other meaning of 'ordo', that of a rank or file. Hence, Livy is telling us that the hastati
withdrew between the files of the principes.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 21, 2014, 12:44:43 PM
Here we have the crux of the matter: the hastati are retiring under pressure; there is no question of a convenient pause in the fighting.
Assuming that the Latin term for pressure is meant purely literally (being physically pushed) and can't be used more figuratively, as it can in English.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 21, 2014, 02:25:29 PM
Assuming that the Latin term for pressure is meant purely literally (being physically pushed) and can't be used more figuratively, as it can in English.
Looking up the relevant verb 'premo (http://www.latin-dictionary.net/search/latin/premo)' we get:
Definitions:
oppress
overwhelm
press, press hard, pursue
Not much room for figurative manoeuvre there, methinks.
The more poetic aspects, covered in the much more extensive Perseus Project Liddell-Scott lexicon entry (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=presso&la=la&can=presso0&prior=pede&d=Perseus:text:1999.02.0163:book=8:chapter=8&i=1#lexicon), are also quite tangible. There are a few oratorical expressions at the end of the list which are more of the sense of 'precise' but even these have the overtones of physical pressure being used to bring about the result.
It seems we can conclude that the pressure Livy was referring to was physical. However I have not been able to find a translation for the specific expression 'pede presso', and it is noteworthy that translators of Livy tend to miss it out altogether or conflate it with 'retro cedentes' as "retreat slowly".
There seems to be an expression in present-day Italian, 'pede pressa', and I wonder exactly what meaning that has, with the usual caveats about possible changes of meaning over cultures and centuries.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 21, 2014, 08:12:19 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on July 21, 2014, 02:25:29 PM
Assuming that the Latin term for pressure is meant purely literally (being physically pushed) and can't be used more figuratively, as it can in English.
Looking up the relevant verb 'premo (http://www.latin-dictionary.net/search/latin/premo)' we get:
Definitions:
oppress
overwhelm
press, press hard, pursue
Not much room for figurative manoeuvre there, methinks.
The more poetic aspects, covered in the much more extensive Perseus Project Liddell-Scott lexicon entry (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=presso&la=la&can=presso0&prior=pede&d=Perseus:text:1999.02.0163:book=8:chapter=8&i=1#lexicon), are also quite tangible. There are a few oratorical expressions at the end of the list which are more of the sense of 'precise' but even these have the overtones of physical pressure being used to bring about the result.
It seems we can conclude that the pressure Livy was referring to was physical. However I have not been able to find a translation for the specific expression 'pede presso', and it is noteworthy that translators of Livy tend to miss it out altogether or conflate it with 'retro cedentes' as "retreat slowly".
There seems to be an expression in present-day Italian, 'pede pressa', and I wonder exactly what meaning that has, with the usual caveats about possible changes of meaning over cultures and centuries.
don't invent things about Italian language since I am Italian. "Pede pressa" means exactly nothing in Italian. Don't do the same for Latin since I have studied it too. I don't have the Latin vocabulary near but "pede presso" is ablative form and literally means "with the foot pressed (in the ground?)" which gives me the idea of a metaphor to refer to a fast movement.
Only my idea.
But do not improvise yourself as Latin translator if you are not. Neither do that for Italian inventing non existent words (non existent tactics are enough)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 21, 2014, 08:12:19 PM
Looking up the relevant verb 'premo (http://www.latin-dictionary.net/search/latin/premo)' we get:
Definitions:
oppress
overwhelm
press, press hard, pursue
Not much room for figurative manoeuvre there, methinks.
Really? Oppress sounds psychological, rather than physical, to me. Overwhelm could mean physically or psychologically too. I would therefore suggest that pressure could mean psychological pressure - they are coming to breaking point. Thus they can pressed and forced to retreat, without constant physical pressure, IMO.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 21, 2014, 08:48:32 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 21, 2014, 08:12:19 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on July 21, 2014, 02:25:29 PM
Assuming that the Latin term for pressure is meant purely literally (being physically pushed) and can't be used more figuratively, as it can in English.
Looking up the relevant verb 'premo (http://www.latin-dictionary.net/search/latin/premo)' we get:
Definitions:
oppress
overwhelm
press, press hard, pursue
Not much room for figurative manoeuvre there, methinks.
The more poetic aspects, covered in the much more extensive Perseus Project Liddell-Scott lexicon entry (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=presso&la=la&can=presso0&prior=pede&d=Perseus:text:1999.02.0163:book=8:chapter=8&i=1#lexicon), are also quite tangible. There are a few oratorical expressions at the end of the list which are more of the sense of 'precise' but even these have the overtones of physical pressure being used to bring about the result.
It seems we can conclude that the pressure Livy was referring to was physical. However I have not been able to find a translation for the specific expression 'pede presso', and it is noteworthy that translators of Livy tend to miss it out altogether or conflate it with 'retro cedentes' as "retreat slowly".
There seems to be an expression in present-day Italian, 'pede pressa', and I wonder exactly what meaning that has, with the usual caveats about possible changes of meaning over cultures and centuries.
don't invent things about Italian language since I am Italian. "Pede pressa" means exactly nothing in Italian. Don't do the same for Latin since I have studied it too. I don't have the Latin vocabulary near but "pede presso" is ablative form and literally means "with the foot pressed (in the ground?)" which gives me the idea of a metaphor to refer to a fast movement.
Only my idea.
But do not improvise yourself as Latin translator if you are not. Neither do that for Italian inventing non existent words (non existent tactics are enough)
Patrick is not inventing anything. He is simply asking the question of whether the contemporary Italian expression 'pede pressa' has any link with the Latin 'pede presso'.
I have not always agreed with everything he says (we have a different understanding of 'ordo' for example) but I have always been impressed by the courtesy and consideration with which he expresses his opinions and listens to those of others - which is something we all appreciate on this forum.
I am only saying politely and kindly that "pede pressa" does it mean anything in Italian. And I kindly suggested not to invent things.
More a simple error than an invention. It appears to be Portuguese, with the sense of 'ask urgently' (demand?).
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 21, 2014, 08:48:32 PM
"Pede pressa" means exactly nothing in Italian.
Curious, because I saw it in a web entry. Thank you, however, for confirming this.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 21, 2014, 10:18:27 PM
More a simple error than an invention. It appears to be Portuguese, with the sense of 'ask urgently' (demand?).
And that would seem to put it where it belongs. Thanks, Justin.
Quote
I don't have the Latin vocabulary near but "pede presso" is ablative form and literally means "with the foot pressed (in the ground?)" which gives me the idea of a metaphor to refer to a fast movement.
Actually it suggests the opposite, as a man being forced back would resist 'pede presso', with his foot pressed to the ground, and one notes that translators, although avoiding 'pede presso', seem united in the idea that the Roman line retirement proceeded 'slowly'.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 21, 2014, 09:22:52 PM
Really? Oppress sounds psychological, rather than physical, to me. Overwhelm could mean physically or psychologically too. I would therefore suggest that pressure could mean psychological pressure - they are coming to breaking point. Thus they can pressed and forced to retreat, without constant physical pressure, IMO.
This is why I also checked the Liddell-Scott lexicon. The entry (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=presso&la=la&can=presso0&prior=pede&d=Perseus:text:1999.02.0163:book=8:chapter=8&i=1#lexicon) (click on the Lewis and Short link for 'premo') is rather too extensive to quote here but see if you agree about the preponderance of meanings being physical or physically-based.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 22, 2014, 10:16:04 AM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 21, 2014, 08:48:32 PM
"Pede pressa" means exactly nothing in Italian.
Curious, because I saw it in a web entry. Thank you, however, for confirming this.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 21, 2014, 10:18:27 PM
More a simple error than an invention. It appears to be Portuguese, with the sense of 'ask urgently' (demand?).
And that would seem to put it where it belongs. Thanks, Justin.
Quote
I don't have the Latin vocabulary near but "pede presso" is ablative form and literally means "with the foot pressed (in the ground?)" which gives me the idea of a metaphor to refer to a fast movement.
presso is a form of the verb Premere which is the same even in Italian (though changing in declination obviously). Premere in Italian and in Latin too refers mainly to pushing something. If I should translate Push into Italian I would use Prémere. So "pede presso" literally means pushing the foot (into the ground, where would you push your foot?). Then everyone could interprete this metaphorically in different ways. Like running (when you run you push the foot in the ground harder) or like holding ground (keeping the left foot, the one behind the shield, steady, so to hold your position against an enemy pushing). I would go for this second meaning. So ha stati would retreat slowly while not giving their back and running (like they did in my video).
It would mean some time more to execute the relief tactic, but a more secure way to do it.
anyway going back to the relief system, the one I showed is the only possible, since the other you talked about (retreat of lines inside lines) cannot be made with soldiers in cose formation. You don't have to Forget that Romans used (phalanx, as Polybius calls it) close formation. Each man had 3 feet of space, which is 90 cm. Considering that the shoulders of an average fit man are 55/65 cm, there was 35/25 cm left for another man to go through. And you cannot consider that they could turn themselves 90 degrees to make the other guys pass, because the manoeuvre implies that a rank advances as the other retreats. So they all have to be with parallel shoulders, advancing or retreating.
And simply room is not enough.
Even if it was possible in some degree, it would be chaos to melt 2 maniples together. I can only imagine Shields hitting people or other Shields... and swords hold in hands do a lot of scratches to team mates (would you put your sword away with enemy few meters away?)
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 23, 2014, 01:52:51 AM
anyway going back to the relief system, the one I showed is the only possible, since the other you talked about (retreat of lines inside lines) cannot be made with soldiers in cose formation. You don't have to Forget that Romans used (phalanx, as Polybius calls it) close formation. Each man had 3 feet of space, which is 90 cm. Considering that the shoulders of an average fit man are 55/65 cm, there was 35/25 cm left for another man to go through. And you cannot consider that they could turn themselves 90 degrees to make the other guys pass, because the manoeuvre implies that a rank advances as the other retreats. So they all have to be with parallel shoulders, advancing or retreating.
And simply room is not enough.
Even if it was possible in some degree, it would be chaos to melt 2 maniples together. I can only imagine Shields hitting people or other Shields... and swords hold in hands do a lot of scratches to team mates (would you put your sword away with enemy few meters away?)
If you reread my post (with the diagrams) you will notice that I have the principes files spaced 6 feet (180cm) apart, from centrepoint to centrepoint. This leaves a physical gap of about 4 feet between the men of one principes file and the next - plenty of space for retiring hastati to pass through.
The fact that Polybius talks about 'intervals' or 'gaps' among or within the 'ordines' suggests that the files are not in battle formation, with shields almost touching, but in a much more open formation which, as I mention in my post, closes up to a tighter battle formation once the hastati have passed through.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 23, 2014, 01:39:14 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 22, 2014, 10:16:04 AM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 21, 2014, 08:48:32 PM
"Pede pressa" means exactly nothing in Italian.
Curious, because I saw it in a web entry. Thank you, however, for confirming this.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 21, 2014, 10:18:27 PM
More a simple error than an invention. It appears to be Portuguese, with the sense of 'ask urgently' (demand?).
And that would seem to put it where it belongs. Thanks, Justin.
Quote
I don't have the Latin vocabulary near but "pede presso" is ablative form and literally means "with the foot pressed (in the ground?)" which gives me the idea of a metaphor to refer to a fast movement.
presso is a form of the verb Premere which is the same even in Italian (though changing in declination obviously). Premere in Italian and in Latin too refers mainly to pushing something. If I should translate Push into Italian I would use Prémere. So "pede presso" literally means pushing the foot (into the ground, where would you push your foot?). Then everyone could interprete this metaphorically in different ways. Like running (when you run you push the foot in the ground harder) or like holding ground (keeping the left foot, the one behind the shield, steady, so to hold your position against an enemy pushing). I would go for this second meaning. So ha stati would retreat slowly while not giving their back and running (like they did in my video).
It would mean some time more to execute the relief tactic, but a more secure way to do it.
Strictly-speaking 'presso' is a past, not present, participle, with the passive sense of 'pushed' rather than the active sense of 'pushing'. 'Pede presso' is an ablative absolute with the sense of 'whilst the feet were pushed' or 'with the feet being pushed', which to me at least conveys the impression of the owners of the feet being put under pressure that is driving, or tending to drive, them back.
'With the feet
pushing' would be 'pede premente'.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 23, 2014, 06:42:52 AM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 23, 2014, 01:39:14 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 22, 2014, 10:16:04 AM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 21, 2014, 08:48:32 PM
"Pede pressa" means exactly nothing in Italian.
Curious, because I saw it in a web entry. Thank you, however, for confirming this.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 21, 2014, 10:18:27 PM
More a simple error than an invention. It appears to be Portuguese, with the sense of 'ask urgently' (demand?).
And that would seem to put it where it belongs. Thanks, Justin.
Quote
I don't have the Latin vocabulary near but "pede presso" is ablative form and literally means "with the foot pressed (in the ground?)" which gives me the idea of a metaphor to refer to a fast movement.
presso is a form of the verb Premere which is the same even in Italian (though changing in declination obviously). Premere in Italian and in Latin too refers mainly to pushing something. If I should translate Push into Italian I would use Prémere. So "pede presso" literally means pushing the foot (into the ground, where would you push your foot?). Then everyone could interprete this metaphorically in different ways. Like running (when you run you push the foot in the ground harder) or like holding ground (keeping the left foot, the one behind the shield, steady, so to hold your position against an enemy pushing). I would go for this second meaning. So ha stati would retreat slowly while not giving their back and running (like they did in my video).
It would mean some time more to execute the relief tactic, but a more secure way to do it.
Strictly-speaking 'presso' is a past, not present, participle, with the passive sense of 'pushed' rather than the active sense of 'pushing'. 'Pede presso' is an ablative absolute with the sense of 'whilst the feet were pushed' or 'with the feet being pushed', which to me at least conveys the impression of the owners of the feet being put under pressure that is driving, or tending to drive, them back.
'With the feet pushing' would be 'pede premente'.
yep I knew that... [emoji6]
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 23, 2014, 01:52:51 AM
anyway going back to the relief system, the one I showed is the only possible, since the other you talked about (retreat of lines inside lines) cannot be made with soldiers in close formation. You don't have to Forget that Romans used (phalanx, as Polybius calls it) close formation. Each man had 3 feet of space, which is 90 cm. Considering that the shoulders of an average fit man are 55/65 cm, there was 35/25 cm left for another man to go through.
The limiting factor is actually the width of the shields, and even this can be reduced if the shield is held at an angle rather than face-on. A man needs 18" of space (45 cm) as an irreducible minimum for deploying next to other men (coincidentally this is the frontal spacing of Macedonian phalangites in battle formation). With men deployed 3' (90 cm) apart, this provides enough room for the files of one formation to filter through the files of another formation provided it is done slowly.
Quote
And you cannot consider that they could turn themselves 90 degrees to make the other guys pass, because the manoeuvre implies that a rank advances as the other retreats. So they all have to be with parallel shoulders, advancing or retreating.
We can deal with that objection easily. The principes remain static as the hastati pass through, so there is no case of one rank advancing as another retreats.
Quote
Even if it was possible in some degree, it would be chaos to melt 2 maniples together. I can only imagine Shields hitting people or other Shields... and swords hold in hands do a lot of scratches to team mates (would you put your sword away with enemy few meters away?)
It would not be chaos because everyone knows what they are doing and the manoeuvre is simple to execute: the files of hastati back through the files of principes. Nobody would be fool enough to hold his sword in a way that could imperil a comrade - any such tendencies (and any clumsiness with shields) would be eliminated during training by heavy use of the centurion's vine stick!
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 21, 2014, 12:44:43 PM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 20, 2014, 09:45:59 PM
I have studied Latin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Latin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Latin, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk latin almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.
Unfortunately such people, who are very good with the language as a whole, are often the worst when it comes to matters of military vocabulary. I would not presume, for example, to debate questions of Greek tense or gender agreement with Ian Scott-Kilver, who translated Polybius for the Penguin publishing company, but would unhesitatingly point out that he is completely wrong to translate 'logkhophorous' (Hannibal's peltasts, who accompany his slingers) as 'pikemen' in III.72 and elsewhere. A logkhophoros used the logkhe, the approximately 6' long javelin that can in no way be classed or considered as a pike. This is not the only serious translator's error that has been picked up by members of the Society, simply because the Society's members have specialised military interests whereas translators usually do not.
Regarding this particular passage (Livy VIII.8 ), I think we shall need to go through it in rather more detail. The subject is the 'Livian' legion of 340 BC at the time of the battle against the Latins, and Livy describes each line of the Roman array as follows:
" prima acies hastati erant manipuli quindecim distantes inter se modicum spatium manipulus leves vicenos milites aliam turbam scutatorum habebat leves autem qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent vocabantur."
(The first line of battle were hastati, fifteen maniples, with a short distance between them and the maniple of twenty leves; the rest of the formation [literally 'crowd'] was composed of shieldsmen [scutati] but the leves, as they were called, carried a spear [hasta] and javelins [gaesa].)
These groups of 20 men constituted the entire skirmisher strength of the legion at the time. They were a semi-independent and differently armed part of the hastati.
"robustior inde aetas totidem manipulorum,quibus principibus est nomen, hos sequebantur, scutati omnes, insignibus maxime armis."
(Men in the prime of life formed the same number of maniples called principes, these were deployed behind [the hastati], were all shieldsmen and had the best equipment.)
The comment that the principes are 'all shieldsmen' (scutati omnes) indicates that the leves were considered subunits of the hastati.
" hoc triginta manipulorum agmen antepilanos appellabant"
(This array of thirty maniples was referred to as the antepilani.)
"quia sub signis iam alii quindecim ordines locabantur, ex quibus ordo unusquisque tres partes habebat"
(Because with the standards were another fifteen formations (ordines), each of which was formed of three components.)
"earum unam quamque primam pilum vocabant"
(Of these, the first was called the pilus.)
"tribus ex vexillis constabat ordo; sexagenos milites, duos centuriones, vexillarium unum habebat vexillum"
(Each ordo consisted of three vexilla; each vexillum had sixty men, two centurions and a standard.)
"centum octoginta sex homines erant"
(It [the vexillum] contained 186 men.)
"primum vexillum triarios ducebat, veteranum militem spectatae virtutis"
(The first vexillum led, consisting of triarii, veteran troops of perceived excellence.)
"secundum rorarios, minus roboris aetate factisque"
(The second [line] consisted of rorarii, men of lower age and strength.)
" tertium accensos, minimae fiduciae manum; eo et in postremam aciem reiciebantur."
(The third [line] of accensi, men of least fighting ability, and these were held back in the last line.)
So - we have five lines of troops, of which the last three are grouped under the standards, and their units are called 'ordines' (with subunits being termed 'vexilla'), and the first two lines are deployed in advance of them, their subunits being called 'manipuli'. We may note the complete absence of any indication of gaps between the maniples of antepilani or the vexilla of the ordines. This distinction between 'manipuli' and 'ordines' is important for understanding the next part of Livy's description.
Livy now turns to describing their tactical employment.
"ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant."
(When the army was drawn up in these formations, of all the troops the hastati would be the ones to begin the battle.)
"si hastati profligare hostem non possent, pede presso eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant."
(If the hastati were unable to overcome the enemy, then under pressure they would retire backwards and the principes would receive them into the intervals of their files.)
Here we have the crux of the matter: the hastati are retiring under pressure; there is no question of a convenient pause in the fighting. The potentially ambiguous part is 'in intervalla ordinum'. Livy does not use 'ordo' to mean a formation of principes: he used 'manipulus'. 'In intervalla ordinum' here thus cannot mean 'into the gaps between the formations' - that would be 'in intervalla manipulorum'. We must look to the other meaning of 'ordo', that of a rank or file. Hence, Livy is telling us that the hastati withdrew between the files of the principes.
Latin "ordo" does not mean "row". Latin or do can be translated directly into Italian "ordine" which refers to the opposite of chaos or in a figurative way to a group of people with follows an "order". We talk for example of "religious orders" (transliterating from italian) such as the "order" of Francescani, gesuiti, et cetera. There are many other Latin words to refer to the rows of men in a formation. So the first idea which comes to my mind when speaking of an "ordo" in a military context is a ("ordered") group of people, or a unit. And basic unit for Romans was manipulum.
Now, "inter" has different meanings but we should not forget that first meaning is "between" rather than "inside, in the middle". From that (inter, intra) comes the Italian word "tra" which means "between".
"Inter ordines", "tra gli ordini" (literally) makes me think firstly to something happening between groups of people.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 23, 2014, 02:48:13 PM
Now, "inter" has different meanings but we should not forget that first meaning is "between" rather than "inside, in the middle". From that (inter, intra) comes the Italian word "tra" which means "between".
"Inter ordines", "tra gli ordini" (literally) makes me think firstly to something happening between groups of people.
Inter does not have a primary meaning of 'between'. It is a rather general word, with the sense of 'among', 'between', 'in the midst of', 'amidst', 'during' (for time), etc., depending on the context.
When describing two objects
inter means 'between':
inter urbem ac Tiberim - 'between the city and the Tiber'. When describing a group or collectivity it means 'among', 'in the midst of':
inter paucos - 'among the poor';
inter multitudinem - 'in the midst of the multitude'.
In the case of the
ordines, we have a group of groups/collectivities: 15
ordines each composed of a number of legionaries. Does
inter refer to the spaces between the individual units of the ordines - i.e. the legionaries - or the spaces between one ordo and the next? Answer: it could be referring to either. One needs to look at the context, in this case the context of which mechanism of line relief is better suited to the realities of combat, to deduce the more likely translation.
There are other options still, Andrew.
Why, for example, must there be a solid front line at all?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 23, 2014, 04:43:40 PM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 23, 2014, 02:48:13 PM
Now, "inter" has different meanings but we should not forget that first meaning is "between" rather than "inside, in the middle". From that (inter, intra) comes the Italian word "tra" which means "between".
"Inter ordines", "tra gli ordini" (literally) makes me think firstly to something happening between groups of people.
Inter does not have a primary meaning of 'between'. It is a rather general word, with the sense of 'among', 'between', 'in the midst of', 'amidst', 'during' (for time), etc., depending on the context.
I would also direct attention to the specific meaning of 'inter ordinium' in Lucius Junius Moderatus Columella's
Res Rustica III.13.3, IV.14.2 and V.5.3, which is 'the space between two rows'. See the Perseus lexicon entry here (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=inter&la=la&can=inter0&prior=cum#lexicon).
Quote
When describing two objects inter means 'between': inter urbem ac Tiberim - 'between the city and the Tiber'. When describing a group or collectivity it means 'among', 'in the midst of': inter paucos - 'among the poor'; inter multitudinem - 'in the midst of the multitude'.
In the case of the ordines, we have a group of groups/collectivities: 15 ordines each composed of a number of legionaries. Does inter refer to the spaces between the individual units of the ordines - i.e. the legionaries - or the spaces between one ordo and the next? Answer: it could be referring to either. One needs to look at the context, in this case the context of which mechanism of line relief is better suited to the realities of combat, to deduce the more likely translation.
In the case of Livy's legion, he explicitly limits
ordines to the
pilani, the troops under and behind the standards (
triarii,
rorarii and in this particular battle
accensi). The
antepilani (
hastati and
principes) are organised in
manipuli, not
ordines.
We should incidentally note, gentlemen, that Livy's text (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0169%3Abook%3D8%3Achapter%3D8) (VIII.8.9) describing the relief of the hastati does not say 'inter ordines' but 'in intervalla ordinum', into the intervals of the files.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 23, 2014, 02:48:13 PM
Latin "ordo" does not mean "row".
Actually it does. Have a look at the 'ordo' entry (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=ordinem&la=la&can=ordinem0&prior=extra&d=Perseus:text:1999.02.0169:book=8:chapter=6&i=1#lexicon) in the Perseus lexicon, first meaning.
Present Italian usage is not a reliable guide, although it can occasionally confer insights. Latin changed from the early Empire to the late Empire to the Vulgar Latin of Italy in the 10th century AD that served as the basis for the emergence of Italian in the 12th and subsequent centuries. Dante's
Commedia was the first widely propagated document in what we can recognise as the Italian language. There are significant differences between Italian and Latin, not only in pronunciation (the Italian 'Ches-ah-re' for Caesar is much less accurate than the German 'Kaiser') but also in vocabulary (think of 'German' in Italian and Latin). Arguing that a word has a certain meaning in Italian so
must have meant the same in Latin is as unsafe as arguing that a word in Coptic infallibly demonstrates Twelfth Dynasty Egyptian (or even Ptolemaic) usage.
I know but as an Italian I have always find translating from Latin pretty intuitive, because a lot of words kept the same root and same meaning. I am not saying that this happens for every Latin word, there are several Latin word Very different, but most are not. I have always noticed when translating that when I looked for all the meanings of the word I was confused, when I chosed the most similar Italian language I found the sense. This is most cases. So my choice of the most intuitive translation has its own meaning.
What you have said about history of Latin language and neo latin languages is very well known and totally true.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 23, 2014, 09:22:03 PM
I know but as an Italian I have always find translating from Latin pretty intuitive, because a lot of words kept the same root and same meaning. I am not saying that this happens for every Latin word, there are several Latin word Very different, but most are not. I have always noticed when translating that when I looked for all the meanings of the word I was confused, when I chosed the most similar Italian language I found the sense. This is most cases. So my choice of the most intuitive translation has its own meaning.
What you have said about history of Latin language and neo latin languages is very well known and totally true.
I expect you could be very helpful for giving us the 'feel' of intended meanings in Latin. Do please feel free to do so when you find us discussing the meaning and usage of Latin words and expressions: you are the nearest thing we have to a native speaker on the subject. :)
Looking at the Latin closely, I get a slightly different intepretation (sub iudicio!). First, for context, the preceding passage:
| Clipeis antea Romani usi sunt; dein, postquam stipendiarii facti sunt, scuta pro clipeis fecere; et quod antea phalanges similes Macedonicis, hoc postea manipulatim structa acies coepit esse: postremo in plures ordines instruebantur. Ordo sexagenos milites, duos centuriones, vexillarium unum habebat.
Romans formerly used the buckler, then, after they were put on pay, they replaced the buckler with the shield, and whereas they had formerly been Phalangites like the Macedonians, afterwards their lines were organised in a manipular fashion [manipulatim]. A company [ordo] had sixty soldiers, two centurions and one standard-bearer. |
Notice that Livy
defines what a company is. It is a group of 63 men, not a file.
Now for the passage in question. There is of course no punctuation in Latin, so one has to surmise from the context where the commas, semicolons and full stops go. This means ascertaining which subjects belong to which verbs and objects.
| Prima acies hastati erant, manipuli quindecim, distantes inter se modicum spatium; manipulus levis vicenos milites, aliam turbam scutatorum habebat; leves autem, qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent, vocabantur. |
I cannot get 'The first line of battle were hastati, fifteen maniples, with a short distance between them and the maniple of twenty leves' out of the first two lines. There is no 'between' in the text. My interpretation is:
| The first line were the Hastati, fifteen maniples with a small distance among/between them. |
The 'small distance'
must refer to the fifteen maniples. Question is: does it refer to gaps between one maniple and the next, or to gaps
within the maniples? It could mean either. If the latter, these gaps would exist to receive the leves troops described below after they had done with skirmishing, before closing up in battle formation. It seems clear that Livy is using 'maniple' here as a synonym for 'ordo'.
| Manipulus levis vicenos milites, aliam turbam scutatorum habebat. Leves autem, qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent, vocabantur.
A leves maniple (twenty men) had another group of shieldbearers. They were called 'Leves' who carried only a spear and javelins. |
The Latin is rather obscure here (I suspect textual corruption). What Livy seems to be saying is that the 'Light' company had twenty light men and an additional group of heavier, shield-carrying troops. The true 'light' troops carried only a spear and javelins, i.e. don't be fooled by the company's name.
| Haec prima frons in acie florem iuvenum pubescentium ad militiam habebat.
This frontmost part of the army had the freshest of the youth who had joined the military. |
This refers to the twenty leves troops who would definitely need to hop, skip and jump in their role of skirmishers.
| Robustior inde aetas totidem manipulorum, quibus principibus est nomen, hos sequebantur, scutati omnes, insignibus maxime armis.
Those of a stronger age, called Principes, followed them in the same number of maniples. They all had shields and were the most heavily armed. |
| Hoc triginta manipulorum agmen antepilanos appellabant, quia sub signis iam alii quindecim ordines locabantur, ex quibus ordo unus quisque tres partes habebat.
This force of thirty maniples were called 'antipilani' because under their banners another fifteen companies were placed. Of these each company had three parts. |
Notice how Livy talks of 'another' fifteen ordines, in addition to the two groups of maniples already mentioned. This confirms he is using 'ordo' and 'manipulus' interchangeably.
| Earum primam quamque primum pilum vocabant; tribus ex vexillis constabat; vexillum centum octoginta sex homines erant; primum vexillum triarios ducebat, veteranum militem spectatae virtutis, secundum rorarios, minus roboris aetate factisque, tertium [p. 460] accensos, minimae fiduciae manum; eo et in postremam aciem reiciebantur.
The first of these parts was also called the primus pilus. One third [of the army] consisted of three banners. A banner had 186 men. The first banner led the Triarii, A force of older men of known ability, the second the Rorarii, of lesser strength in age and deed, the third the Accensi, the least capable, who were relegated to the last line. |
This a different definition of the size of an 'ordo'. Each ordo is split into three banners (vexilla). Following the text literally, each banner has 186 men, which gives a total of 558 men for these rearward companies. Granted the the frontmost companies deploy 8 men wide by 8 deep, that will give a total depth of 88 men, which is wrong. Any theories?
| Ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant. si hastati profligare hostem non possent, pede presso eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant. Tum principum pugna erat, hastati sequebantur.
Where the army was formed up in these companies, the Hastati were the first to engage in battle. If the Hastati could not prevail against the enemy, they were received, as they fell back under pressure, into the gaps of the Principes' companies. The Hastati followed the Principes as they took up the fight. |
Thus far Livy has defined an ordo as having 63 men (the size of a maniple) or 186 x 3 men (the size of nine maniples). Hence the 'gaps of the Principes' companies must, in context, refer to their maniples. The use of the genitive
ordinum - suggests that these gaps were intrinsic to the companies, which is better understood as spaces between the files within a company rather than a gap between one company and the next. The Hastati then took their place behind the Principes and supported them - i.e. the engaged line was now 16 men deep.
| Triarii sub vexillis considebant sinistro crure porrecto, scuta innixa umeris, hastas subrecta cuspide in terra fixas, haud secus quam vallo saepta inhorreret acies.
The Triarii continued kneeling behind the ensigns, their left leg extended forward, holding their shields resting on their shoulders, and their spears fixed in the ground, with the points erect, so that their line bristled as if enclosed by a rampart. |
| Tenentes si apud principes quoque haud satis prospere esset pugnatum, gradun a prima acie ad triarios sensim referebant. inde rem ad triarios redisse, cum laboratur, proverbio increbruit. [12] triarii consurgentes, ubi in intervalla ordinum suorum principes et hastatos recepissent, [13] extemplo conpressis ordinibus velut claudebant vias unoque continenti agmine iam nulla spe post relicta in hostem incidebant.
If the Principes also did not make sufficient impression in the fight, they retreated slowly from the front to the Triarii. Hence, when a difficulty is felt, "Matters have come to the Triarii," became a usual proverb. The Triarii rising up, after receiving the Principes and Hastati into the intervals of their companies, those companies then immediately pressed together as they, so to speak, closed the openings, in one compact body fell upon the enemy, no other hope being now left. |
Notice how the Triarii immediately close up their companies after the Principes and Hastati have passed through them. This suggests not only file gaps (as opposed to spaces between maniples) but also wide file gaps - files standing 6 rather than 3 feet apart. The latter would not need to close up openings.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 23, 2014, 09:05:50 PM
I would also direct attention to the specific meaning of 'inter ordinium' in Lucius Junius Moderatus Columella's Res Rustica III.13.3, IV.14.2 and V.5.3, which is 'the space between two rows'. See the Perseus lexicon entry here (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=inter&la=la&can=inter0&prior=cum#lexicon).
True, but the expression is a little odd. Literally, it means 'between/among
of the ordines', or perhaps more clearly: 'between/among that which is of the ordines.' 'That which is of the ordines' would correspond to rows, the component of the ordines and not the ordines themselves.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 27, 2014, 01:16:53 PM
I cannot get 'The first line of battle were hastati, fifteen maniples, with a short distance between them and the maniple of twenty leves' out of the first two lines. There is no 'between' in the text. My interpretation is:
| The first line were the Hastati, fifteen maniples with a small distance among/between them. |
The 'small distance' must refer to the fifteen maniples. Question is: does it refer to gaps between one maniple and the next, or to gaps within the maniples? It could mean either. If the latter, these gaps would exist to receive the leves troops described below after they had done with skirmishing, before closing up in battle formation. It seems clear that Livy is using 'maniple' here as a synonym for 'ordo'.
| Manipulus levis vicenos milites, aliam turbam scutatorum habebat. Leves autem, qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent, vocabantur.
A leves maniple (twenty men) had another group of shieldbearers. They were called 'Leves' who carried only a spear and javelins. |
The Latin is rather obscure here (I suspect textual corruption). What Livy seems to be saying is that the 'Light' company had twenty light men and an additional group of heavier, shield-carrying troops. The true 'light' troops carried only a spear and javelins, i.e. don't be fooled by the company's name.
I see it as more 'Livian' than obscure. What he is telling us, or trying to (assuming he follows his source correctly, which is debatable) is that each hastati maniple consists of 20 leves and the balance of 'scutati', the pilum-wielding, scutum-carrying troop type we traditionally regard as hastati.
That these maniples must be hastati becomes clear when we do the sums for legion strength as a whole. The rear-line 'ordines' provide 15x180 (or 186) = 2,700 (or 2,790) legionaries out of 5,000-ish. This leaves 2,300-ish to come form the first 30 maniples, half of whom are principes. Dividing 2,300 by 30 gives 76.67 men per maniple, suggesting 80 men per maniple (as opposed to 60 per vexillum in the 180-strong ordo). We can thus see that a maniple (of 80 men) is not interchangeable with a ordo (of 60 men), and it may be instructive that Livy
never refers to an 'ordo' of hastati or principes in this description (they are always 'manipuli') but
always uses 'ordo' to denote the pilani, the assemblage of triarii, rorarii and accensi under the standards.
Quote
Notice how Livy talks of 'another' fifteen ordines, in addition to the two groups of maniples already mentioned. This confirms he is using 'ordo' and 'manipulus' interchangeably.
Or perhaps not, as explained above. I would not read too much into that single 'alii'.
Quote
| Earum primam quamque primum pilum vocabant; tribus ex vexillis constabat; vexillum centum octoginta sex homines erant; primum vexillum triarios ducebat, veteranum militem spectatae virtutis, secundum rorarios, minus roboris aetate factisque, tertium [p. 460] accensos, minimae fiduciae manum; eo et in postremam aciem reiciebantur.
The first of these parts was also called the primus pilus. One third [of the army] consisted of three banners. A banner had 186 men. The first banner led the Triarii, A force of older men of known ability, the second the Rorarii, of lesser strength in age and deed, the third the Accensi, the least capable, who were relegated to the last line. |
This a different definition of the size of an 'ordo'. Each ordo is split into three banners (vexilla). Following the text literally, each banner has 186 men, which gives a total of 558 men for these rearward companies. Granted the the frontmost companies deploy 8 men wide by 8 deep, that will give a total depth of 88 men, which is wrong. Any theories?
Actually the Livian maniple (manipulus) would deploy 10 wide and 8 deep, a natural configuration for 80 men (and one which allows the 20 leves to back-rank the 60 hastati scutati once skirmishing is done).
Livy lists an ordo as 186 men because he is adding in two officers per vexillum. He lists a vexillum as 60 men because that is how many
men it had. One suspects he is following his own source statements without seeing the apparent inconsistency. Triarii (and similarly accensi, although I suspect they would normally just back up triarii) would fight 10 wide and 6 deep; rorarii, when committed, probably the same.
Depth is thus 8 men for each maniple line (hastati and principes) and 18 for the ordo line (triarii, rorarii and accensi). The total depth is thus 16+18 = 34 men.
Quote
| Ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant. si hastati profligare hostem non possent, pede presso eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant. Tum principum pugna erat, hastati sequebantur.
Where the army was formed up in these companies, the Hastati were the first to engage in battle. If the Hastati could not prevail against the enemy, they were received, as they fell back under pressure, into the gaps of the Principes' companies. The Hastati followed the Principes as they took up the fight. |
Thus far Livy has defined an ordo as having 63 men (the size of a maniple) or 186 x 3 men (the size of nine maniples). Hence the 'gaps of the Principes' companies must, in context, refer to their maniples. The use of the genitive ordinum - suggests that these gaps were intrinsic to the companies, which is better understood as spaces between the files within a company rather than a gap between one company and the next. The Hastati then took their place behind the Principes and supported them - i.e. the engaged line was now 16 men deep.
Indeed. Though as Livy never uses 'ordo' to represent a maniple, as demonstrated above, I rather suspect his 'in intervalla ordinum' refers directly to the gaps between files. The essential conclusion is the same, anyway. :)
Quote
| Tenentes si apud principes quoque haud satis prospere esset pugnatum, gradun a prima acie ad triarios sensim referebant. inde rem ad triarios redisse, cum laboratur, proverbio increbruit. [12] triarii consurgentes, ubi in intervalla ordinum suorum principes et hastatos recepissent, [13] extemplo conpressis ordinibus velut claudebant vias unoque continenti agmine iam nulla spe post relicta in hostem incidebant.
If the Principes also did not make sufficient impression in the fight, they retreated slowly from the front to the Triarii. Hence, when a difficulty is felt, "Matters have come to the Triarii," became a usual proverb. The Triarii rising up, after receiving the Principes and Hastati into the intervals of their companies, those companies then immediately pressed together as they, so to speak, closed the openings, in one compact body fell upon the enemy, no other hope being now left. |
Notice how the Triarii immediately close up their companies after the Principes and Hastati have passed through them. This suggests not only file gaps (as opposed to spaces between maniples) but also wide file gaps - files standing 6 rather than 3 feet apart. The latter would not need to close up openings.
True, especially as the rorarii would earlier have had to move through the triarii in order to make their contribution. I think 6' gaps for triarii files is implied both by this passage and by battlefield convenience.
Conversely, the principes might not need to have 6' gaps to let the hastati through; 3' intervals would be sufficient and would have the advantage of allowing mid-combat hand over without the need to race alternate files into position while one's front rankers were being double-teamed by the opposition.
Two thoughts have struck me considering the line relief problem again.
Firstly, in wargames terms, the scale of the representation may mean the exact mechanism doesn't matter. If working at a high enough scale, an abstraction such as allowing the principes to interpenetrate a unit of principes who are close enough behind them may be enough. Similarly between the antepilani and the triarii. If fighting at a more detailed level, would line relief be carries out at a level lower than a legion? Indeed, if fighting at a level of less than a legion, would all three lines be there at all?
Second thought is more a question. Our detailed examples of line relief are quite early in the evolution of the army. At what point does line relief stop? Or does it not stop but evolve. Caesar's legions still seem to have three lines but the third line appears to be a tactical reserve rather than a final line of defence. Lines one and two do interconnect. Indeed, Roy has suggested in another thread that lines one and two at this point are one tactical entity which enter the fray together. So do we have line relief at this point? In the Empire, multiline deployments continue but does any system of line relief?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 27, 2014, 08:53:12 PM
That these maniples must be hastati becomes clear when we do the sums for legion strength as a whole. The rear-line 'ordines' provide 15x180 (or 186) = 2,700 (or 2,790) legionaries out of 5,000-ish. This leaves 2,300-ish to come form the first 30 maniples, half of whom are principes. Dividing 2,300 by 30 gives 76.67 men per maniple, suggesting 80 men per maniple (as opposed to 60 per vexillum in the 180-strong ordo). We can thus see that a maniple (of 80 men) is not interchangeable with a ordo (of 60 men), and it may be instructive that Livy never refers to an 'ordo' of hastati or principes in this description (they are always 'manipuli') but always uses 'ordo' to denote the pilani, the assemblage of triarii, rorarii and accensi under the standards.
Indirectly he does. The 'other fifteen companies' (ordines) each consist of one vexillum of Triarii, one of Rorarii and one of Accensi. He does not call each one a company, true, the reason being that they were considered to form a single entity, the 'one third' of the army composed of banners (vexilla), and not separate lines like the Hastati and Principes.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 27, 2014, 08:53:12 PMLivy lists an ordo as 186 men because he is adding in two officers per vexillum. He lists a vexillum as 60 men because that is how many men it had. One suspects he is following his own source statements without seeing the apparent inconsistency. Triarii (and similarly accensi, although I suspect they would normally just back up triarii) would fight 10 wide and 6 deep; rorarii, when committed, probably the same.
My problem was that
each vexillum seems to have 186 men, which is far too many. But taking a closer look at the Latin:
vexillum centum octoginta sex homines erant. The 'erant' (plural) has 'homines' as subject, not 'vexillum' (singular). Using a plural verb in this manner with the object in the beginning of the sentence seems a bit strange to my (admittedly inexperienced) eye. Correct
vexillum to
vexilla and the Latin flows much more smoothly: "The banners were 186 men', i.e. the three banners of the rear company totalled 186 men, each banner 62 men, and everything then clicks into place. Just a suggestion.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 27, 2014, 08:53:12 PMI think 6' gaps for triarii files is implied both by this passage and by battlefield convenience.
Conversely, the principes might not need to have 6' gaps to let the hastati through; 3' intervals would be sufficient and would have the advantage of allowing mid-combat hand over without the need to race alternate files into position while one's front rankers were being double-teamed by the opposition.
If the Triarii are arranged with wide gaps between the files it makes sense that the Principes and Hastati are similarly arranged, since the same relief process happens with them (the Hastati receiving the skirmishers). Seems more logical. With my proposed relief mechanism the front rankers would not face more than one opponent at any time.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 28, 2014, 11:29:27 AM
Two thoughts have struck me considering the line relief problem again.
Firstly, in wargames terms, the scale of the representation may mean the exact mechanism doesn't matter. If working at a high enough scale, an abstraction such as allowing the principes to interpenetrate a unit of principes who are close enough behind them may be enough. Similarly between the antepilani and the triarii.
At that level of abstraction, a simple exchange of one line of figures for another would indeed suffice. The precise mechanism is primarily of historical interest so we can - hopefully - understand how this particular army worked. This in turn helps to depict it and its functioning with greater accuracy when attempting less abstract systems - and also to learn why it fared as it did against particular opponents.
Quote
If fighting at a more detailed level, would line relief be carries out at a level lower than a legion? Indeed, if fighting at a level of less than a legion, would all three lines be there at all?
Actually line relief seems to have been an army-level thing not a legion-level thing. There are few instances of a single legion fighting on its own and as far as I know none of these detail what it did or how. Until the Empire a legion tended to be regarded as indivisible, although in the 1st century BC there was a tendency for a commander to have so many 'cohorts' which might or might not be partially or fully organised into legions. Cohorts seem to have fought as discrete entities rather than splitting into three lines.
Quote
Second thought is more a question. Our detailed examples of line relief are quite early in the evolution of the army. At what point does line relief stop? Or does it not stop but evolve. Caesar's legions still seem to have three lines but the third line appears to be a tactical reserve rather than a final line of defence. Lines one and two do interconnect. Indeed, Roy has suggested in another thread that lines one and two at this point are one tactical entity which enter the fray together. So do we have line relief at this point? In the Empire, multiline deployments continue but does any system of line relief?
Answering this one will require a bit of a trawl through our sources from Tactius to Zosimus; in the 4th century AD, which is Ammianus' era, the legions have already been diminished (perhaps by Constantine) to about one third of their former size (and multiplied in number accordingly). In the one battle Ammianus describes in detail (Argentoratum - he says a lot about Adrianople but rather less to the point) there is commitment of reserves (the Cornuti and Bracchiati) but no apparent line relief as such. Whether the reserves were able to conduct a traditional line relief and substitute for failing units in the front line is an open question.
Tacitus, writing about AD 69, gives us a lively description of the Second Battle of Bedriacum, which was distinguished by one side having leadership and the other none (having just put their commander in chains on the not unjustified suspicion of treason), and the unit of action seems to be the legion, not part of a legion. Whether this terminology conceals or assumes internal line relief is an unanswered question.
Writing in the 4th century AD, Vegetius observes (III.16, Reserves):
"
The method of having bodies of reserves in rear of the army, composed of choice infantry and cavalry, commanded by the supernumerary lieutenant generals, counts and tribunes, is very judicious and of great consequence towards the gaining of a battle. Some should be posted in rear of the wings and some near the centre, to be ready to fly immediately to the assistance of any part of the line which is hard pressed, to prevent its being pierced, to supply the vacancies made therein during the action and thereby to keep up the courage of their fellow soldiers and check the impetuosity of the enemy. This was an invention of the Lacedaemonians, in which they were imitated by the Carthaginians. The Romans have since observed it, and indeed no better disposition can be found."
The absence of line relief is noticeable, and would seem to be the norm for the 4th century AD. However in II.10 (Drawing up a Legion in Order of Battle) Vegetius describes the 'ancient legion', which appears to be an updated and rearmed version of the late Republican legion, and may in fact be a description of the pre-4th century Imperial legion (much ink has been spilt on this point).
"
We shall exemplify the manner of drawing up an army in order of battle in the instance of one legion, which may serve for any number. The cavalry are posted on the wings. The infantry begin to form on a line with the :first cohort on the right. The second cohort draws up on the left of the first; the third occupies the center; the fourth is posted next; and the fifth closes the left flank. The ordinarii, the other officers and the soldiers of the first line, ranged before and round the ensigns, were called the principes. They were all heavy armed troops and had helmets, cuirasses, greaves, and shields. Their offensive weapons were large swords, called spathae, and smaller ones called semispathae together with five loaded javelins in the concavity of the shield, which they threw at the first charge. They had likewise two other javelins, the largest of which was composed of a staff five feet and a half long and a triangular head of iron nine inches long. This was formerly called the pilum, but now it is known by the name of spiculum. The soldiers were particularly exercised in the use of this weapon, because when thrown with force and skill it often penetrated the shields of the foot and the cuirasses of the horse. The other javelin was of smaller size; its triangular point was only five inches long and the staff three feet and one half. It was anciently called verriculum but now verutum.
The first line, as I said before, was composed of the principes; the hastati formed the second and were armed in the same manner. In the second line the sixth cohort was posted on the right flank, with the seventh on its left; the eighth drew up in the center; the ninth was the next; and the tenth always closed the left flank. In the rear of these two lines were the ferentarii, light infantry and the troops armed with shields, loaded javelins, swords and common missile weapons, much in the same manner as our modern soldiers. This was also the post of the archers who had helmets, cuirasses, swords, bows and arrows; of the slingers who threw stones with the common sling or with the fustibalus; and of the tragularii who annoyed the enemy with arrows from the manubalistae or arcubalistae.
In the rear of all the lines, the triarii, completely armed, were drawn up. They had shields, cuirasses, helmets, greaves, swords, daggers, loaded javelins, and two of the common missile weapons. They rested during the action on one knee, so that if the first lines were obliged to give way, they might be fresh when brought up to the charge, and thereby retrieve what was lost and recover the victory. All the ensigns though, of the infantry, wore cuirasses of a smaller sort and covered their helmets with the shaggy skins of beasts to make themselves appear more terrible to the enemy. But the centurions had complete cuirasses, shields, and helmets of iron, the crest of which, placed transversely thereon, were ornamented with silver that they might be more easily distinguished by their respective soldiers."
On balance, this would seem to better describe an Imperial legion despite the Republican (or presumed Republican) terminology. If so, then line relief is implicit in the descriptions, though not explicitly described in the brief paragraph that follows:
"
The following disposition deserves the greatest attention. In the beginning of an engagement, the first and second lines remained immovable on their ground, and the trairii in their usual positions. The light-armed troops, composed as above mentioned, advanced in the front of the line, and attacked the enemy. If they could make them give way, they pursued them; but if they were repulsed by superior bravery or numbers, they retired behind their own heavy armed infantry, which appeared like a wall of iron and renewed the action, at first with their missile weapons, then sword in hand. If they broke the enemy they never pursued them, least they should break their ranks or throw the line into confusion, and lest the enemy, taking advantage of their disorder, should return to the attack and destroy them without difficulty. The pursuit therefore was entirely left to the light-armed troops and the cavalry. By these precautions and dispositions the legion was victorious without danger, or if the contrary happened, was preserved without any considerable loss, for as it is not calculated for pursuit, it is likewise not easily thrown into disorder."
In essence, we can say that line relief
probably continued under the Empire, but our sources lack sufficient detail to be sure.
Thanks Patrick. I personally find Vegetius difficult in his description- is he describing anything that really existed or is he collating a variety of sources into what looks like a whole? He clearly has a description of an early Republican legion (possibly the same one as we have) and he knows how modern legionaries are equipped but does he have a real lost manual on the operation of the army in between? (I think to answer that we would need a major new theme :) )
I don't think Arrian's formation against the Alans features three line legions and line relief, but I could be wrong. But that would give us an example between Bedriacum and Argentoratum.
Anyway, plenty of scope I think in the evolution between the earlier and later Republican (which we do have info on) to see how things were changing and what trends there might be.
One thing that I've not noticed anybody comment on is 'Who ordered line relief to take place?'
Was it ordered at the level of the Legion or the level of the Maniple, because there isn't really any level of command in between, unless it was a job assigned to tribunes
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on July 28, 2014, 01:49:30 PM
One thing that I've not noticed anybody comment on is 'Who ordered line relief to take place?'
Was it ordered at the level of the Legion or the level of the Maniple, because there isn't really any level of command in between, unless it was a job assigned to tribunes
Jim
It wasn't necessarily ordered. Assume the Hastati are being given a hard time and yield ground to their opponents. After a while the rearmost rank of the Hastati contacts the front rank of the Principes. At this point the Hastati files automatically start streaming back through the Principes lanes (it is something they have trained for and execute when the occasion arises). The same thing happens for the Principes (now backed by the Hastati - they file through the Triarii the moment they make contact with them, being driven back by the enemy.
I am afraid that is a misreading of Roman history Justin. These things are done on command and only on command . The Romans go to a lot of trouble to give examples if how even the most socially superior must submit to discipline and command.
A general just cannot have the men doing their own thing, it leads to disaster. The hastati have to hold until they are told to fall back, otherwise it will happen at different tomes in different areas and the whole legion will be put in danger. In the example that we have from Caesar the whole third line of the army is ordered up...that is an army level order.
Roy
I cannot see line relief being organised by mutual agreement between a couple of guys at the back of the Hastati and a couple of mates in the front ranks of the Principes.
My guess is that a centurion has to send a messenger saying "We need relief" and someone, probably the person he sends the messenger to, has to give the order.
Jim
We are up against a great unknown of how exactly did command and control in the Roman army work. The army is organised in lines but those lines have no clearly defined commander. If patrick is correct and the legion is the basic command unit, the lowest level that makes sense is that a legion judges when it is pressed and signals a change by whole line. How a legion would judge is a bit of a mystery, however. Or the decision could be made at wing level or army level. Some of the later examples dug up above suggest that a wing of an army might be pressed and the third line is deployed while in other parts of battle are going better and reserves aren't needed. In such examples, the army commander seems to make a decision.
I wonder if it is one of the jobs given to a senior tribune. Basically he has to keep in touch with the centurions in the front line, and they'll get word to him when they need pulling out. He then either gives the order of his own authority or passes it up to the Legionary commander.
Depending on what is happening, the Legionary commander might be behind the front line anyway, but he could also have other things to worry about so it would make sense for him to have a deputy in this matter
Jim
If I might beat the dying horse of
ordo and
manipulus one more time...
| Earum primam quamque primum pilum vocabant; tribus ex vexillis constabat; vexillum centum octoginta sex homines erant; primum vexillum triarios ducebat, veteranum militem spectatae virtutis, secundum rorarios, minus roboris aetate factisque, tertium [p. 460] accensos, minimae fiduciae manum; eo et in postremam aciem reiciebantur. |
I mistranslated this.
tribus means 'three' in the ablative plural, hence:
| The first of these parts was also called the primus pilus. It [the company] consisted of three banners. 186 men were a banner [perhaps: the banners were 186 men in total]. The first banner led the Triarii, a force of older men of known ability, the second the Rorarii, of lesser strength in age and deed, the third the Accensi, the least capable, who were relegated to the last line. |
QuoteThat these maniples must be hastati becomes clear when we do the sums for legion strength as a whole. The rear-line 'ordines' provide 15x180 (or 186) = 2,700 (or 2,790) legionaries out of 5,000-ish. This leaves 2,300-ish to come form the first 30 maniples, half of whom are principes. Dividing 2,300 by 30 gives 76.67 men per maniple, suggesting 80 men per maniple (as opposed to 60 per vexillum in the 180-strong ordo). We can thus see that a maniple (of 80 men) is not interchangeable with a ordo (of 60 men), and it may be instructive that Livy never refers to an 'ordo' of hastati or principes in this description (they are always 'manipuli') but always uses 'ordo' to denote the pilani, the assemblage of triarii, rorarii and accensi under the standards.
Two points: first, Livy's ordines are flexible in size. He starts by defining an ordo as 63 men in strength, then a few lines later he gives it a strength of 186 men when referring to the ordines behind the Principes.
Second, he describes the fighting style of an
entire army made up of 'these companies' [ordines]:
| Ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant. si hastati profligare hostem non possent, pede presso eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant. Tum principum pugna erat, hastati sequebantur.
Where the army was formed up in these companies, the Hastati were the first to engage in battle. If the Hastati could not prevail against the enemy, they were received, as they fell back under pressure, into the gaps of the Principes' companies. The Hastati followed the Principes as they took up the fight. |
Here,
his ordinibus refers not only to the Triarii-Rorarii-Accensi combination, but also to the Principes and Hastati.
Ordo is a loose, generic term, denoting any ordered body of infantry of whatever size or composition.
If we turn the page to Livy VIII.10.1-2, we get:
"... the consul Manlius learned of his colleague's end, and having paid to so memorable a death —as justice and piety demanded —its well —merited [2] meed of tears as well as praise, he was for a little while in doubt whether the moment were yet come for the triarii to rise; but afterwards deeming it better to keep them fresh for the final push, he commanded the accensi to advance from the rear before the standards."
Here the consul is deciding which line will be committed and when: I suspect this was standard practice and the whole army thus changed lines at the same time. One advantage of an infantry battlefield about 800 yards wide is that one man could keep an eye on the entire battle and judge accordingly. In the Livian legion he (or the nearest tribune) could send in rorarii to patch a local difficulty, the line changes being kept for when local repair was past helping. In the Polybian legion the consul definitely commanded when and how line relief and, in some cases, whole legion reserve commitment, should take place (see, for example, Polybius XV.14, where Scipio decides what each line will do, and Livy XXX.18.1-4, where the proconsul clearly commands but allows a praetor to use his own initiative). This was an army-level command decision, and I can think of no instances when individual legions made their own choices.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 28, 2014, 08:56:16 PM
If I might beat the dying horse of ordo and manipulus one more time...
If it can be done without cruelty ... ;)
Quote
Two points: first, Livy's ordines are flexible in size. He starts by defining an ordo as 63 men in strength, then a few lines later he gives it a strength of 186 men when referring to the ordines behind the Principes.
The 63-man 'ordo' looks just like a 60-man vexillum with two officers and a signifer.
I suspect the survival of a sentence that should have been eliminated from the finished draft (when Livy finally got his own terminology straight) but never was. It looks clumsy even in the Latin, and I observe that some translators opt to leave it out entirely.
Quote
Second, he describes the fighting style of an entire army made up of 'these companies' [ordines]:
| Ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant. si hastati profligare hostem non possent, pede presso eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant. Tum principum pugna erat, hastati sequebantur.
Where the army was formed up in these companies, the Hastati were the first to engage in battle. If the Hastati could not prevail against the enemy, they were received, as they fell back under pressure, into the gaps of the Principes' companies. The Hastati followed the Principes as they took up the fight. |
Here, his ordinibus refers not only to the Triarii-Rorarii-Accensi combination, but also to the Principes and Hastati. Ordo is a loose, generic term, denoting any ordered body of infantry of whatever size or composition.
Fair enough. I would however be careful to distinguish between the general use as 'formation' (and apparently subordinate formation) and the specific use as 'assemblage of three vexilla of pilani which are grouped together but which appear to act separately'.
One might postulate that each maniple of hastati was grouped with a maniple of principes in an 'ordo' of its own, but without specific mention this is of course conjectural - and does nothing to clarify 'in intervalla ordinum'.
explain me: so if there were no gaps between manipula, where was the famous flexibility or Roman legion? which was the difference between a legion and a phalanx on more lines? we know that Romans at the beginning used a real phalanx on 5 lines based on wealth. This is the age of King Servius who changed the army.
Now, we know that the Romans abandoned the phalanx, the round Shields to use different weapons and armors and a more flexible system.
Now, was this system really different if it was simply 5 ranks where people were put depending on wealth and age, so equipment?
I think that intervals between manipula would allow not only the relief system we talked about, but even a faster and easier movement on battlefield of the deployed legion, which could manoeuvre in every battlefield, because manipula could avoid natural or artificial obstacles simply going around them. Something a normal phalanx deployed with no gaps cannot do. And thus is why legion was superior to phalanx, because it could move and deploy everywhere, not only in open flat fields. This is what Romans learned from samnite wars throughout the Latin wars and slowly developed to the so called livian legion, dated probably around 4th century.
I think there is more to the control and operation of a legion than either having or not having gaps between subunits. Xenophon's
Anabasis shows a predominantly hoplite force operating effectively in all types of terrain, usually with the assistance of peltasts and missilemen, and in one instance he deploys 100-man hoplite companies (lochoi) with gaps between them in mountainous terrain, mutual support being provided by the fact that they could move laterally along the slopes to support each other faster than their opponents could climb up or down. Hoplite formations
could operate with gaps if they wanted to: they usually did not because in normal circumstances it was suicidal.
The flexibility of the legion is described by Polybius is XVIII.32.10-12:
"
The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others."
Polybius ascribes the Roman flexibility to their all-purpose equipment, organisation and training, which he contrasts with the single-purpose orientation of the Macedonian phalangite.
From 505 BC the Republican Romans were fighting Sabines, Volsci and other hill-country peoples in addition to the Etruscans. Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to the Romans using 'hussois' (pila) in 503 BC, so we can put the transition to a manipular-type army in 504 or 503 BC, during the Sabine War of 505-503 BC. The 'Livian' legion seems to have evolved between 437 and 394 BC, and the Polybian legion after 314 BC. This was considered and explained at length in an article in Slingshot 292.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 29, 2014, 01:01:02 AM
I think that intervals between manipula would allow not only the relief system we talked about, but even a faster and easier movement on battlefield of the deployed legion, which could manoeuvre in every battlefield, because manipula could avoid natural or artificial obstacles simply going around them.
Battlefields were usually selected precisely because they had
no obstacles that needed to be manoeuvred around. Generations of wargamers have obscured this essential point by cluttering their battlefield tables with terrain and obstacles that a real-life general would have avoided, and real battlefields usually had just a slope and/or a shallow river - or nothing. The most important quality in an army (especially an Italian army, which usually lacked the impetus to defeat an opponent at first contact) during a pitched battle was staying-power, and this the Romans, with their line relief system, developed to a fine art.
In essence, the Roman legion was very undeveloped compared to the highly specialised, purpose-built, single-purpose Macedonian phalanx, and consequently stood no chance against it in frontal combat. The great legion-against-phalanx victories (Beneventum, Cynoscephalae, Magnesia and Pydna) were all won when
elephants broke the phalanx and the legions moved in to take advantage of the disruption.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 29, 2014, 11:49:52 AM
I think there is more to the control and operation of a legion than either having or not having gaps between subunits. Xenophon's Anabasis shows a predominantly hoplite force operating effectively in all types of terrain, usually with the assistance of peltasts and missilemen, and in one instance he deploys 100-man hoplite companies (lochoi) with gaps between them in mountainous terrain, mutual support being provided by the fact that they could move laterally along the slopes to support each other faster than their opponents could climb up or down. Hoplite formations could operate with gaps if they wanted to: they usually did not because in normal circumstances it was suicidal.
The flexibility of the legion is described by Polybius is XVIII.32.10-12:
"The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others."
Polybius ascribes the Roman flexibility to their all-purpose equipment, organisation and training, which he contrasts with the single-purpose orientation of the Macedonian phalangite.
From 505 BC the Republican Romans were fighting Sabines, Volsci and other hill-country peoples in addition to the Etruscans. Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to the Romans using 'hussois' (pila) in 503 BC, so we can put the transition to a manipular-type army in 504 or 503 BC, during the Sabine War of 505-503 BC. The 'Livian' legion seems to have evolved between 437 and 394 BC, and the Polybian legion after 314 BC. This was considered and explained at length in an article in Slingshot 292.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 29, 2014, 01:01:02 AM
I think that intervals between manipula would allow not only the relief system we talked about, but even a faster and easier movement on battlefield of the deployed legion, which could manoeuvre in every battlefield, because manipula could avoid natural or artificial obstacles simply going around them.
Battlefields were usually selected precisely because they had no obstacles that needed to be manoeuvred around. Generations of wargamers have obscured this essential point by cluttering their battlefield tables with terrain and obstacles that a real-life general would have avoided, and real battlefields usually had just a slope and/or a shallow river - or nothing. The most important quality in an army (especially an Italian army, which usually lacked the impetus to defeat an opponent at first contact) during a pitched battle was staying-power, and this the Romans, with their line relief system, developed to a fine art.
In essence, the Roman legion was very undeveloped compared to the highly specialised, purpose-built, single-purpose Macedonian phalanx, and consequently stood no chance against it in frontal combat. The great legion-against-phalanx victories (Beneventum, Cynoscephalae, Magnesia and Pydna) were all won when elephants broke the phalanx and the legions moved in to take advantage of the disruption.
I don't agree about numbers. Firstly in 5th century Romans changed equipment, changing the round Clipeus together with typical hoplite phalanx with the oval scutum and introducing the use of Pilum and reinforcements for shield after the defeat against gauls. Livian legion with antepilani and triarii rorari accensi seems to be dated to the middle of 4th century, 340/338 bc, at the time of the war against Latins. Then it evolved after the second war against samnites, particular after the big humiliation and defeat of 321 bc, when manipular legion was copied (before they used the servian system of centuriae, so we must suppose that now happens the shift from a hoplitic linear tactic, even if without typical hoplite equipment, towards a manipular tactic with gaps between companies). Finally throughou the 3rd century legion evolved newly in the sense of abolishing the wealth system which divided the men into different classes/ranks in battle towards a system based only on age and experience. Firstly even poor people were recruited. Polybian legion can be referred, by majority of opinions, to the beginning of second punic war (218) for sure, maybe before according to someone. So we are talking of late 3rd century for the typical Roman legion on 3 ranks we all imagine.
For what I know, at least Pydna and Magnesia were not lost because of elephants. In the first case because phalanx disrupted in an incoherent ground when it tried to pursue retreating Romans, in the case of Magnesia phalanx was already retreating under heavy missile fire, unable to attack back in the heavy slow 10 pike squares 50 x 32, when elephants gave the final hit. Ellenistic phalanges were all defeated with one exception with Pyrrus. Problem was not elephants but lacking of flexibility. Even the same throwing of Pila could be devastatimg against the close ranks in a pike phalanx.
As for the fact that battlefields had no obstacles, tell it to the Romans losing against samnites (not sabins) exactly because it was a montane ous terrain very well suited to the sabins manipular/cohortal tactics and poorly suited to the Romans who still used some type of linear deployment. The big shift happens during the war against samnites because these Sheepherds lived in a terrain with woods, hills, and mountains, more than the terrain Romans had fought so far (if you go to Rome you will see Hills, but mild and mainly plains). I guess they used the linear deployment of companies with gaps between companies well suited to avoid an obstacle and reform the line after it, Romans will copy and readapt to the relief system too in the manipular legion. Etruscans and other nations met by Romans still used phalanx system to the end of their days.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 29, 2014, 02:10:18 PM
I don't agree about numbers. Firstly in 5th century Romans changed equipment, changing the round Clipeus together with typical hoplite phalanx with the oval scutum and introducing the use of Pilum and reinforcements for shield after the defeat against gauls.
Popular opinion on this point is wrong: the pilum is in use from 503 BC and the descriptions of battles from 486 BC indicate a missile-and-sword combination which is definitely manipular, not phalangite. I can quote references if you like.
Quote
Livian legion with antepilani and triarii rorari accensi seems to be dated to the middle of 4th century, 340/338 bc, at the time of the war against Latins.
Actually triarii started out as camp guards and remained so until at least 437 BC; the first mention of triarii on the battlefield is in 394 BC. so we can date the Livian legion to this point or slightly earlier. Livy's
description is indeed dated to 340 BC but the legion he describes was in existence earlier.
Quote
Then it evolved after the second war against samnites, particular after the big humiliation and defeat of 321 bc, when manipular legion was copied (before they used the servian system of centuriae, so we must suppose that now happens the shift from a hoplitic linear tactic, even if without typical hoplite equipment, towards a manipular tactic with gaps between companies).
Again, this popular view is not supported by our sources. The shift to the Polybian legion seems to have taken place after Poetilius' victory at Terracina in 314 BC, the reorganisation probably occurring around 311 BC or thereabouts.
Quote
Finally throughou the 3rd century legion evolved newly in the sense of abolishing the wealth system which divided the men into different classes/ranks in battle towards a system based only on age and experience. Firstly even poor people were recruited.
Is this a reference to the changes made by Caius Marius, usually assumed to begin around 107 BC?
Quote
Polybian legion can be referred, by majority of opinions, to the beginning of second punic war (218) for sure, maybe before according to someone. So we are talking of late 3rd century for the typical Roman legion on 3 ranks we all imagine.
Definitely before. Source material is more valuable than opinions.
Quote
For what I know, at least Pydna and Magnesia were not lost because of elephants. In the first case because phalanx disrupted in an incoherent ground when it tried to pursue retreating Romans,
But Livy himself points out:
"
On the right wing, where the battle had begun near the river, the consul brought up the elephants and the squadrons of the allies; and from this point the flight of the Macedonians first began." - XLIV.41.3
He further notes:
"
The charge of the elephants was followed up by the allies of the Latin Name, who routed the left wing." - XLIV.41.5
Only after that does he note the "
many scattered engagements which first threw into confusion and then disrupted the wavering phalanx"
Quote
in the case of Magnesia phalanx was already retreating under heavy missile fire, unable to attack back in the heavy slow 10 pike squares 50 x 32, when elephants gave the final hit.
Actually they were not retreating but standing, and continued to do so until the panicking elephants burst through, allowing the Romans to attack the broken formation.
Quote
Problem was not elephants but lacking of flexibility. Even the same throwing of Pila could be devastating against the close ranks in a pike phalanx.
Actually throwing pila at a pike formation's front had no noticeable effect: at Atrax, the Romans spent much of a day trying to defeat a pike phalanx frontally (it was plugging a gap in the city wall). They achieved nothing, despite using pila, swords and everything they could think of. See Livy XXXII.17, especially the following:
"
When the Macedonians, in close array, stretched out before them their long spears against the target fence which was formed by the close position of their antagonists' shields, and when the Romans, after discharging their javelins without effect [pilis nequiquam emissis]
, drew their swords, these could neither press on to a closer combat, nor cut off the heads of the spears; [14] and if they did cut or break off any, the shaft, being sharp at the part where it was broken, filled up its place among the points of those which were unbroken, in a kind of palisade."
Quote
As for the fact that battlefields had no obstacles, tell it to the Romans losing against samnites (not sabins) exactly because it was a montane ous terrain very well suited to the sabins manipular/cohortal tactics and poorly suited to the Romans who still used some type of linear deployment. The big shift happens during the war against samnites because these Sheepherds lived in a terrain with woods, hills, and mountains, more than the terrain Romans had fought so far (if you go to Rome you will see Hills, but mild and mainly plains).
The Caudine Forks was a classic trap: my point is that when generals sought a
battlefield as opposed to wandering into an ambush, they looked for something without annoying disruptive terrain, for example when Perseus was looking for a battlefield at Pydna:
"
With such arguments his friends encouraged Perseus. So he pitched a camp and arranged his forces for battle, examining the field and distributing his commands, purposing to confront the Romans as soon as they came up. [5] The place afforded a plain for his phalanx, which required firm standing and smooth ground, and there were hills succeeding one another continuously, which gave his skirmishers and light-armed troops opportunity for retreat and flank attack. Moreover, through the middle of it ran the rivers Aeson and Leucus, which were not very deep at that time (for it was the latter end of summer), but were likely, nevertheless, to give the Romans considerable trouble." - Plutarch, Life of Aemilius Paulus 16.4-5
A very useful source on the early Roman army is Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He provides much information that clarifies the rather confused story of legion development offered by Livy. For some reason Dionysius has not been as well studied as Livy, which is a pity as he supplies much of the missing information and clarifies the point about when the Romans gave up the clipeus and adopted the scutum - it was when they became
eisphoras, contributors, which is the correct meaning of Livy's
stipendiarii. The Romans adopted the scutum not when they received pay, but when private individuals financed state campaigns - a process begin during the first Sabine war of 505-503 BC.
If you order Slingshot 292 you will see the whole matter discussed and explained there in Rodger Williams' article. This is the
latest thinking on the early Roman legion.
you should rewrite wikipedia's page about Roman legion.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote his history of Rome in the late 1st century BC, if not AD. He could have based his narrative on heroic stories to provide Rome with a historic past to inform the Greek world. I am not sure he described the move from the hoplite phalanx to the deployment of the more flexible manipular formation - which may have been a response to the Samnite wars in the 3rd century BC.
Robert
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 29, 2014, 10:25:15 PM
you should rewrite wikipedia's page about Roman legion.
Alas, it would be a classic case of OR - original research. Wikipedia should be based on published sources subject to academic scutiny (no laughing at the back :) ), and a Slingshot article wouldn't count.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 30, 2014, 08:27:12 AM
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 29, 2014, 10:25:15 PM
you should rewrite wikipedia's page about Roman legion.
Alas, it would be a classic case of OR - original research. Wikipedia should be based on published sources subject to academic scutiny (no laughing at the back :) ), and a Slingshot article wouldn't count.
yes, exactly, it does not count. Wikipedia is based on published sources, if you scroll to end of the page you will notice them.
I'll add my two pence worth, if I may.
Having a mix of shield types organised by shape appears to be a standard Italian mode of operation. The Romans are the result of a mix of Latins and Etruscans......and Trojans if you take a very literal view of sources:-)).
In Italy there are illustrations of soldiers in Greek inspired armour, or what we take to be Greek inspired armour , with Italian weapons, throwing spears , early pila etc. I say Greek inspired armour because we have a very Hellenocentric view of armour styles. If something was invented in Egypt (the linothorax) or in Caria (men of bronze) we see it as Greek. In Italy we see a mix of styles, Celtic, native Italian, Spanish, if disc cuirasses are from there or are they from Italy to Spain or mutually independent? That gives rise to what appears to be aspides (hoplite shields) being used by Campanians and Etruscans. however, I wonder if this indicates the adoption of a foreign shield type into an Italian context, simply replacing the rimless Italian round shield with the aspis and keeping the Italian missile weapon. This adoption could well take place at the same time as the Greeks are using the aspis/ hoplon with a pair of javelins, perhaps interchangeably with a thrusting spear.
Generally the Greek colonies in Italy were established early. They will have brought Greek methods of warfare, but they appear to adapt to Italian conditions, so Capuans become famous heavy cavalry, Tarantines light. Unfortunately I am unaware of Contemporary sources that show how the infantry of these Greek colonies fought. I except Sicily, though I wonder whether the sources would tell us if Sicilian Greeks were throwing or thrusting their spears (personally I would suggest that the Sicels and Sicans were not as influential on the Siciliot Greeks).
So may I suggest that the Roman situation is not some simple move from being spear armed hoplites to being javelin armed scutatoi, but simply a change of shield type for those already using a throwing a weapon.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on July 30, 2014, 09:31:05 AM
I'll add my two pence worth, if I may.
Having a mix of shield types organised by shape appears to be a standard Italian mode of operation. The Romans are the result of a mix of Latins and Etruscans......and Trojans if you take a very literal view of sources:-)).
In Italy there are illustrations of soldiers in Greek inspired armour, or what we take to be Greek inspired armour , with Italian weapons, throwing spears , early pila etc. I say Greek inspired armour because we have a very Hellenocentric view of armour styles. If something was invented in Egypt (the linothorax) or in Caria (men of bronze) we see it as Greek. In Italy we see a mix of styles, Celtic, native Italian, Spanish, if disc cuirasses are from there or are they from Italy to Spain or mutually independent? That gives rise to what appears to be aspides (hoplite shields) being used by Campanians and Etruscans. however, I wonder if this indicates the adoption of a foreign shield type into an Italian context, simply replacing the rimless Italian round shield with the aspis and keeping the Italian missile weapon. This adoption could well take place at the same time as the Greeks are using the aspis/ hoplon with a pair of javelins, perhaps interchangeably with a thrusting spear.
Generally the Greek colonies in Italy were established early. They will have brought Greek methods of warfare, but they appear to adapt to Italian conditions, so Capuans become famous heavy cavalry, Tarantines light. Unfortunately I am unaware of Contemporary sources that show how the infantry of these Greek colonies fought. I except Sicily, though I wonder whether the sources would tell us if Sicilian Greeks were throwing or thrusting their spears (personally I would suggest that the Sicels and Sicans were not as influential on the Siciliot Greeks).
So may I suggest that the Roman situation is not some simple move from being spear armed hoplites to being javelin armed scutatoi, but simply a change of shield type for those already using a throwing a weapon.
Roy
for what I know about ancient Italian warfare, it was basically hoplite style phalanges, until Romans changed it. Surely the Etruscans (possibly my early ancestors [emoji1] since I live in Florence) used hoplite phalanx. At the time when Romans conquered the peninsula Etruscans were one of the main cultures together with Greek colonies in the South, from where they probably learnt the use of hoplite phalanx. Early Romans too used hoplite phalanx (early Romans had deep deep Etruscans influence for the only fact that they were ruled by Etruscan kings until the last king). Then there were Celts in the northern peninsula. These were the main cultures. Samnites in the South a d early italic were very influenced by these. So I don't know what you are talking about when you talk about Spanish. And the Trojan thing is only a myth invented to link the Augusta n descendence to Aeneas. Nothing more. There is no etnic link between Italians (born as indoerupeans, and especially early Romans were not the dark midgets often imagined... we know that both from bones remaining who represent tall men, 175/180 cm, and the frequency of latin names referring to being blond, to being redhead or having blue eyes) and Eastern people. Even the idea of Etruscan coming from East is very confused and is based only on obscurity of language, the most accepted opinion is that they were a result of Villanova civilization.
Then the idea of Romans using javelins from the beginning... hell not. They used Spears, they used them together with hoplite phalanx until the gallic invasions of 5th century. It was with the javelins that they managed to repell the second gallic invasion, together with new type oh helmets
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 30, 2014, 08:30:36 AM
yes, exactly, it does not count. Wikipedia is based on published sources, if you scroll to end of the page you will notice them.
What our distinguished Wikipedia editor means is that it does not count
as a Wikipedia entry. As will undoubtedly be pointed out by others (it has been in the past), Wikipedia entries are not necessarily truth, simply what has been submitted by members of the public on the basis of attributable secondary sources and not removed. Sometimes the two coincide ...
However if one is genuinely interested in what happened in history, Wikipedia is a useful starting-point from which to undertake one's own serious research.
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 30, 2014, 10:31:45 AM
for what I know about ancient Italian warfare, it was basically hoplite style phalanges, until Romans changed it.
Oh, dear. :(
Quote
Surely the Etruscans (possibly my early ancestors [emoji1] since I live in Florence) used hoplite phalanx.
Why 'surely'? A statement like that needs
evidence: literary source evidence, archaeological evidence, primary source evidence (a fuller decipherment of Etruscan would be a help here, though I am not expecting anyone in this group to do it!). Without evidence such a statement has no support whatsoever. If one has a source for such an assertion, the least one can do is mention the source.
Actually, 'The Etruscan Military System' might make a suitable separate topic, if anyone is interested. Material on it is not extensive, but there are sufficient tomb paintings and records of 19th century finds to give us ideas about individual equipment, and records of Rome's early campaigns against the Etruscans have descriptions of combat which do not seem to quite fit the 'hoplite' model (Horatius Cocles holding the bridge and then swimming across a river under a barrage of missiles, for example).
Quote
At the time when Romans conquered the peninsula Etruscans were one of the main cultures together with Greek colonies in the South, from where they probably learnt the use of hoplite phalanx. Early Romans too used hoplite phalanx (early Romans had deep deep Etruscans influence for the only fact that they were ruled by Etruscan kings until the last king). Then there were Celts in the northern peninsula. These were the main cultures.
This leaves out the Volsci, Hernici, Aequi and various other important Apennine peoples - who were coincidentally Rome's main opponents when the Etruscans were on holiday.
Quote
And the Trojan thing is only a myth invented to link the Augusta n descendence to Aeneas. Nothing more. There is no etnic link between Italians (born as indoerupeans, and especially early Romans were not the dark midgets often imagined... we know that both from bones remaining who represent tall men, 175/180 cm, and the frequency of latin names referring to being blond, to being redhead or having blue eyes) and Eastern people. Even the idea of Etruscan coming from East is very confused and is based only on obscurity of language, the most accepted opinion is that they were a result of Villanova civilization.
If you were to look further at Lydian and Etruscan cultures you might revise that opinion.
Quote
Then the idea of Romans using javelins from the beginning... hell not. They used Spears, they used them together with hoplite phalanx until the gallic invasions of 5th century. It was with the javelins that they managed to repell the second gallic invasion, together with new type oh helmets
This is simple misinformation. I strongly suggest taking a good look at original sources before making any more statements on this subject. If you find some material to support your view, quote it - simply making unsupported statements as if they were fact does not prove anything (do not worry, I was told this in the past, too ... ;) ).
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 30, 2014, 10:31:45 AM
Then the idea of Romans using javelins from the beginning... hell not. They used Spears, they used them together with hoplite phalanx until the gallic invasions of 5th century. It was with the javelins that they managed to repell the second gallic invasion, together with new type oh helmets
While the congruence of armour and shield styles between Greeks and Etruscans does suggest an adoption of similar tactics, Roy's point about the proto-phalanx having two throwing spears rather than one long thrusting spear is worth noting. If the Greeks could fight phalanx style with throwing spears (or dual purpose spears), the Etruscans could do likewise. Did phalanx fighting arrive in Italy before or after the Greeks switched to the
dory?
everything I said is the result of things I have read in books, or websites dedicated to history. Every one of these gives all the sources but most of times what I say is what I remember from a lot of books, newspapers or websites I have read finding them good sources of information. So sorry but I cannot recollect exactly where I have read something in particular. For this reason you can totally not care what I write. Anyway I can assure you that is not my personal opinion. Even wikipedia is a good source of information to START since it always give all first sources, gives picturues of archeological findings and links to informative websites. So I would not despise wikipedia as somehow inferior, because it is in the Internet and not on some old book. While with most regards to you all guys, what you write here is generally your personal opinions (not the result of many opinions like in wikipedia or in books written by historians who do that as their job) made reading books or interpretating sources. Which can be wrong or not.
Anyway I noticed that most times what I read here is the opposite of what I have found not in one place, but in exactly all websites, newspapers, books I have read about that topic. Which is a bit strange to me. Either you are the only enlightened few people about history in this world and all the rest of historic research more or less agreeing about one topic is wrong, or... you could be wrong.
For example I have always read everywhere that Etruscans used hoplite phalanx. Everywhere even in school books. Now you tell me that this is false. What should I think?
Well Andrew , you could make a start by looking at the ancient Italian artworks that feature the Etruscans in at least one of them you will find pila in the context of Etruscan's military equipment. If you look for the appropriate battle in Livy you will find that both Etruscans and Romans jettison their weapons to get to hand strokes which strongly implies that both have throwing spears because why would a hoplite throw down his spear which should give him an advantage against a swordsman. So there is evidence that the Etruscans used throwing weapons. To an extent that evidence could also prove a case that the Etruscans used thrusting weapons and converted to pila to confront the Romans. However, they would appear to have been using pila with the aspis!
I tend to see th Etruscans as an alliance of city based colonies which covers a wide area of central and northern Italy. It is thus quite possible hat their army is not unitary , but differs in each city state, with troop types derived from Etruscan, other Italian and Greek models. Unfortunately we do not have any Etruscan literature to illuminate their way of fighting.
One of the main purposes of the Society is to explore Ancient and Mediaeval warfare. We are quite happy to use both original and secondary sources, but ideally we would refer to an original source, even if in translation. Naturally we seek to incorporate the evidence of archaeology and art history. We relate all this history stuff to wargaming, not necessarily with figures. I suppose you could say we seek to enhance wargaming with a knowledge of history and the study of military history through the insights gained through wargaming.
If we accepted Wikipedia or secondary written sources as the last word on military history then , what would be the point? where would be the fun.
I might also suggest that many secondary sources are not better than the members of the Society when it comes to looking at the military systems, tactics and battles of the Ancients than the people who debate on this site. I might also suggest that many of the points that we debate are not solveable. To take an example of the Etruscans, there is a conventional view that shows them as hoplites, however, the evidence is not conclusive.The evidence we have is partial and incomplete. It can be made into a coherent case to support different interpretations. I know of no secondary source that fully explains the interaction of Greek Etruscan and Italian warfare and gives a good line for the development both chronological and geographic of the pilum.
Roy
And I am not too critical of Wikipedia. It is a brilliant resource, just not one that we would usually cite at this level of discussion.
Andrew, what is your view of the warriors on the Certosa Situla?
Roy
Quote from: aligern on July 30, 2014, 05:07:15 PM
And I am not too critical of Wikipedia. It is a brilliant resource, just not one that we would usually cite at this level of discussion.
Andrew, what is your view of the warriors on the Certosa Situla?
Roy
yes, I read something about it. My point is that it does not represent a proto manipular system which was evolving in Upper Etruscan area so to prove that the servian reform was even a proto manipular one, but it is simply a representation of a hoplite style parade of different types of hoplites, probably different on wealth which reflected with different equipment. Something which is coherent with the idea that in 6th and 5th century or late Etruscan age main type of warrior was the hoplite (with a slightly different equipment than that of Greeks though). I don't think that the stipula shows an army marching since the order is not that of the army marching (light troops in front, as the order of battle of Arriano -i don't know the English name sorry- against the Alans shows). So stipula shows nothing more of a hoplites army in parade. If we consider different types of soldiers as belonging to different social classes we could see it as a first step into proto manipular army, since manipular army is based on different classes based on wealth. Nothing more.
Otherwise we could see it as a march of different continents of allied cities, each with its own style. Noblemen would lead the March in front, then would come the hoplites of major city, then the others. Finally the worse armored, maybe the servants of last hoplites.
This is my idea. [emoji6]
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 30, 2014, 01:08:06 PM
everything I said is the result of things I have read in books, or websites dedicated to history. Every one of these gives all the sources but most of times what I say is what I remember from a lot of books, newspapers or websites I have read finding them good sources of information. So sorry but I cannot recollect exactly where I have read something in particular. For this reason you can totally not care what I write. Anyway I can assure you that is not my personal opinion. Even wikipedia is a good source of information to START since it always give all first sources, gives picturues of archeological findings and links to informative websites. So I would not despise wikipedia as somehow inferior, because it is in the Internet and not on some old book. While with most regards to you all guys, what you write here is generally your personal opinions (not the result of many opinions like in wikipedia or in books written by historians who do that as their job) made reading books or interpretating sources. Which can be wrong or not.
Anyway I noticed that most times what I read here is the opposite of what I have found not in one place, but in exactly all websites, newspapers, books I have read about that topic. Which is a bit strange to me. Either you are the only enlightened few people about history in this world and all the rest of historic research more or less agreeing about one topic is wrong, or... you could be wrong.
For example I have always read everywhere that Etruscans used hoplite phalanx. Everywhere even in school books. Now you tell me that this is false. What should I think?
It is important to compare the research methods of experimental scientists with those of historians. In the case of experimental scientists, numbers do count. 1000 researchers working in 1000 different labs performing different experiments with different equipment will acquire vastly more raw data than one single researcher working on his own. 1000 historians however who study the primary texts do not increase the raw data by a single word. Archaeology helps, but not that much.
In consequence, historians, who all have the same obscure and problematic texts to work from, tend (IMHO) to reach a tacit consensus on what the texts mean. In our era of hypercommunication, this consensus is transmitted rapidly through the media and becomes a Truth, reproduced in schoolbooks, movies, documetaries, articles, etc. We live in an age of repetition, where a hypothesis by one academic can easily reappear in a thousand different publications and acquire force of law. Anyone who enters the field is subjected to pretty much the same argument of authority you have reproduced in your post: "Gosh, all these distinguished dons and prestigious professors are saying the same thing. Who am I, a mere mortal, to contradict them?"
In the SoA, however, we like tilting at the goliaths, especially if their feet are made of clay. ;D
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 31, 2014, 06:40:31 AM
In the SoA, however, we like tilting at the goliaths, especially if their feet are made of clay. ;D
I think, to be fair, it should be said you don't have to be an out-and-out inconoclast to post here :) You are allowed to believe that there is more to academic consensus than slavish copying and a plot by academe. Not everything needs to be proven with reference to the grammar of ancient historians. Indeed, sometimes I think we can focus in when we should widen out and bring in other disciplines (archaeology, art history and experimental reconstruction all have a part to play). But stick with it, be prepared to defend your corner and you will emerge from here better equipped to critically approach your hobby. As a medievalist, I will admit I have learned tons about Roman warfare from our debates.
Let me tell you a story.
A couple of years ago, a member of the Society emailed me to ask whether it would be possible to examine his idea that the Roman army ceased to be hoplite-style rather earlier than is generally thought. At the time I had not studied the matter but had absorbed the general consensus that it remained hoplite-style until it met the Samnites and then somehow developed its manipular arrangement. Being thoroughly confident that this was the case, I looked for a gentle way to let our enquirer know his idea was wrong.
Because all academics ultimately depend upon the same primary sources, I thought the best way to show the truth of the matter was to extract some telling quotes from Livy, Dionysius etc. to demonstrate that the Roman army had kept its hoplite nature until the 4th century BC. So I delved into these volumes, expecting vindication of the prevailing academic opinion - after all, an opinion so widely held must be based on something.
How wrong I was! Going back to the origins of Republican Rome, its very first battle (against Tarquin, in 509 BC) looked like a hoplite battle - each side's right wing won and the battle as a whole was indecisive - but very soon after that the picture changed. In 503 BC Romans were using 'hussois' - the Greek word for pila - and Dionysius (V.46.2) actually provides a description which matches that of a pilum.
So I looked further.
One of the landmarks in the development of the legion is Livy's (III.8.3) assertion that "
The Romans had formerly used round shields [clipeis]
; then, postquam stipendiarii facti sunt, they made oblong shields [scuta]
instead of round ones."
'Stipendiarii facti sunt' has been taken to signify 'they began to serve for pay' but this is not Livy's meaning. What Livy meant can be seen in a related passage in Dionysius V.47.1:
"
This booty having been sold at public auction, all the citizens received back the amount of the contributions [eisphoras]
which they had severally paid for the equipment of the expedition."
'Stipendiarii' would thus appear to signify 'contributors' who financed the campaign, a system still in use in Athens in Xenophon's time: he notes this in
Ways and Means 3.8:
"
I am also aware that large expenditure is frequently incurred to send warships abroad, though none can tell whether the venture will be for better or worse, and the only thing certain is that the subscribers will never see their money back nor even enjoy any part of what they contribute."
Since Dionysius' 'eisphoras' (contributions) provided by the citizens relate to the First Sabine War (505-503 BC), the date for shifting from the 'clipeus' to the 'scutum' shifts with it, to the First Sabine War and not the siege of Veii.
Having seen this, I got in touch with Rodger (for it was he) and together we looked through the accounts of Roman battles in the 5th century BC. To cut a long story short, not only were the weapons in customary use a combination of heavy javelin, light javelin (Livy's pilum and hasta; Dionysius' saunion and logkhe) and sword, but also the armies themselves showed primitive manipular behaviour characteristics, fighting in two lines one of which acted as a reserve, sending small contingents to bolster weak parts of the front line. I had to admit that Rodger had been right. We then traced the history of the development of the legion from clues in accounts of battles, and were able to place the appearance of the Livian legion in the 437-394 bracket and the Polybian legion in the 314-311 BC bracket. This was an extensive though by no means prohibitive exercise, and would have been well within the capacity of a couple of academics. Instead, the academic world has tried to muddle through with a model that rests on nothing more than a couple of misunderstandings.
It is not that academics are stupid: quite the contrary. Those I have met are very intelligent and have a remarkable breadth of information. What is at fault is the system by which academics build on the mistakes of other academics and use the original sources for target practice rather than information. Curing this basic methodological fault could result in much being learned about many ancient and classical military systems (and perhaps some Dark Ages and mediaeval systems, too). Unfortunately until the system of seeing what the sources tell us and adducing information from battlefield behaviour becomes the norm, significant discovery in these fields will probably be limited to the efforts of the Society of Ancients.
The whole episode was a good illustration of the principle that secondary sources will, sooner or later, let you down. And I learned that, to paraphrase Socrates, an unexamined opinion is not worth having. :)
Quote from: Erpingham on July 31, 2014, 08:17:47 AM
Indeed, sometimes I think we can focus in when we should widen out and bring in other disciplines (archaeology, art history and experimental reconstruction all have a part to play).
Truly spoken - or rather typed - but unfortunately these tend to provide at best an incomplete picture, though the real challenge with using archaeology and to an extent art history is that of interpretation. The Certosa Situla would like to speak for itself but it is mute, and different people see different things in it (although what is not seeable is a homogenous hoplite force). Experimental reconstruction can provide very useful insights, particularly if based on the actual weaponry and formations of the time (and not, for example, hay bales 3' apart with sticks protruding as a supposed model of the phalanx's ability to resist missiles). Unfortunately we never have enough of any of these elements to form a complete picture and rarely do we have enough even to fill in the outlines of a picture derived, rightly or wrongly, from literary sources.
What we do have is of course worth mentioning, and when Duncan is not on holiday it does tend to get mentioned. More often, it seems to me, art and archaeology throw up questions rather than answering them (not a reason for not mentioning them but one indicating why they are not often able to decide the kind of questions we are currently airing.) The current question of whether or not Late Romans in muscled cuirasses and 'Attic' helmets represent palatini is a classic art-and-archaeology situation which is being resolved, or at least resolution is being attempted, by reference to period sources.
Quote
As a medievalist, I will admit I have learned tons about Roman warfare from our debates.
I am sometimes tempted to wonder how a Roman army would have fared against a mediaeval one (leaving aside Byzantines), the styles of war being so very different. This however would be another subject for another thread.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 31, 2014, 11:06:32 AM
The Certosa Situla would like to speak for itself but it is mute, and different people see different things in it (although what is not seeable is a homogenous hoplite force).
It is a good one to raise, because it has been cited as an example of a class-based military system in the manner of the Livian legion (e.g. by Connolly). Yet Andrew correctly points out, it could show a set of allied contingents, shown in a uniform manner so contemporaries would have picked them out by their dress. So much is interpretation. But it can say to us "These types of arms were used at the same time" with more conviction.
Quote
Experimental reconstruction can provide very useful insights, particularly if based on the actual weaponry and formations of the time
Indeed. Properly designed experiments/reconstructions can help us answer questions. Random musings of re-enactors don't fit in this category. Roy could bring forward the underarm throwing of
plumbata or the bouncing
francisca at this point :) But even well constructed experiments can be challenged. Paul Macdonnell-Staff, for example, is strongly opposed to the current paradigm that hoplite armour was ever made of linen and would point out that an experiment proving you could make a linen yoked cuirass doesn't mean that the Greeks ever made one.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 31, 2014, 08:17:47 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 31, 2014, 06:40:31 AM
In the SoA, however, we like tilting at the goliaths, especially if their feet are made of clay. ;D
I think, to be fair, it should be said you don't have to be an out-and-out inconoclast to post here :) You are allowed to believe that there is more to academic consensus than slavish copying and a plot by academe.
True. Academics are able to bring sources together and get one to illuminate aspects of the other. Acquiring this kind of erudition (which I don't have) is full time job. The danger though is relying on the opinion of one's peers where the sources are not clear and susceptible to more than one interpretation. I do seriously think a lot of this kind of consensus-building goes on in academe - not so much a plot as a respect by one academic for the thinking of his colleagues.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 31, 2014, 08:17:47 AMNot everything needs to be proven with reference to the grammar of ancient historians. Indeed, sometimes I think we can focus in when we should widen out and bring in other disciplines (archaeology, art history and experimental reconstruction all have a part to play).
Granted, but just how much clarification do non-textual sources bring? My own take is that at the end of the day we rely 90% on the primary textual sources for our picture of the past.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 31, 2014, 12:22:31 PM
Granted, but just how much clarification do non-textual sources bring? My own take is that at the end of the day we rely 90% on the primary textual sources for our picture of the past.
Well, one factor is how many primary textual sources do we have for a period. Take Etruscans. We are pretty much entirely limited to sources by non-Etruscans. So the art and artefacts of the Etruscans themselves take on a particular signifcance.
To take another example, Rodger Williams has an article in the current Slingshot about Byzantines in Spain in which he refers to the textual sources amounting to 250 words. Archaeological finds are important in defining the extent of the Byzantine presence.
I think you are undervaluing the job of many academics. There are thousands, maybe hundred thousands people over there doing an analytical job comparing original sources and I cannot believe they use only secondary sources or ignore what is different from main accepted interpretation. Basically the job of every academic is exactely this, to take into account all. different interpretations, compare it and make a conclusion with deep analytical motivation. There are people very acknowledged, very clever, very much trained to do this kind of effort on a level which a common person who decides to be more informed on a subject cannot reach, exactly as a professional athlete will be always much superior to any common guys who wants to try a new sport. Simply because it is his job, he dedicated years to it, he is naturally better in that thing (otherwise it would not be his job). So when you want to discredit a generally accepted idea, you can, but you have to do a very hard analytical job.
Surely there are some academics who don't do well their job and limit to repeat what they have learnt. But I cannot believe that there are not a good amount of academics who do their job and compare sources and find the most accurate interpretation from them.
Andrew, there are many representations of hoplites in Etruscan art on painted pottery vases, plaques, statuettes and terra-cotta friezes from the fourth to the third century BC. Although the hoplite held a high profile in warfare he was probably never the only troop type. Certainly there are enough images of the hoplite to indicate the long spear phalanx formed a significant part of Etruscan warfare.
Robert
http://uk.images.search.yahoo.com/images/view;_ylt=A2KLktkGgNpToFQA4KdNBQx.;_ylu=X3oDMTIybXBscmlmBHNlYwNzcgRzbGsDaW1nBG9pZAM1ZmU5M2MwMDBiYTQ3OGFmZGVjMTczYjUxNzZjZWNiOQRncG9zAzYEaXQDYmluZw--?back=http%3A%2F%2Fuk.images.search.yahoo.com%2Fsearch%2Fimages%3F_adv_prop%3Dimage%26va%3Detruscan%2Bpainted%2Bvases%26fr%3Dipad%26tab%3Dorganic%26ri%3D6&w=736&h=947&imgurl=media-cache-ec0.pinimg.com%2F736x%2Fce%2Ffb%2F3a%2Fcefb3a0f63fd3f5518418b2782df4042.jpg&rurl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pinterest.com%2Fpin%2F302444931196802739%2F&size=112.7KB&name=%3Cb%3EEtruscan%3C%2Fb%3E+%3Cb%3Epainted%3C%2Fb%3E+%3Cb%3Evase%3C%2Fb%3E+detail+print%3A+Europe+snd+the+bull&p=etruscan+painted+vases&oid=5fe93c000ba478afdec173b5176cecb9&fr2=&fr=ipad&tt=%3Cb%3EEtruscan%3C%2Fb%3E+%3Cb%3Epainted%3C%2Fb%3E+%3Cb%3Evase%3C%2Fb%3E+detail+print%3A+Europe+snd+the+bull&b=0&ni=21&no=6&ts=&tab=organic&sigr=11g68rnqs&sigb=13ia4cvjt&sigi=12dabl82c&sigt=12chf91oe&sign=12chf91oe&.crumb=jTgb/Z24i3i&fr=ipad
If the above link works it will take you to an Etruscan vase showing what looks like a hoplite with aspis and Greek helmet holding two javelins. Now that is evidence for greek armour style, but I would not take it as evidence of a 'long spear phalanx'
I did like your point about 'not the only troop type, though!
Roy
Here's some for situla fans :
The Arnoaldi
http://www.sassuolo2000.it/2011/10/10/nuovi-prestiti-per-il-museo-archeologico-di-bologna/
The Benvenuti
http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/illustration/benvenuti-situla-detail-showing-a-prisoner-being-led-stock-graphic/148357965
Quote from: andrew881runner on July 31, 2014, 02:42:05 PM
I think you are undervaluing the job of many academics. There are thousands, maybe hundred thousands people over there doing an analytical job comparing original sources and I cannot believe they use only secondary sources or ignore what is different from main accepted interpretation.
Then you need to meet some academics and read some papers. Seriously.
Quote
Basically the job of every academic is exactely this, to take into account all. different interpretations, compare it and make a conclusion with deep analytical motivation.
Yes, but in practice there are severe limits on what one is allowed to compare, and in what way. Talk to retired academics and you will learn that the strictures of orthodoxy are just as unforgiving as in a major religion. In many ways, discovery is considered less desirable than conformity, which is one reason why so much allocated budget produces so little useful result.
Quote
There are people very acknowledged, very clever, very much trained to do this kind of effort on a level which a common person who decides to be more informed on a subject cannot reach, exactly as a professional athlete will be always much superior to any common guys who wants to try a new sport. Simply because it is his job, he dedicated years to it, he is naturally better in that thing (otherwise it would not be his job). So when you want to discredit a generally accepted idea, you can, but you have to do a very hard analytical job.
Actually it is less a matter of analysis (though this is an utterly essential component) than starting a new fashion.
Jurassic Park did for palaeontology what years of trying by Doctors Horner, Bakker and Ostrom could not: in one of the most significant scientific
volte-faces of the twentieth century, the 'heretical theory' of warm-blooded, bird-related dinosaurs became accepted fact. But what does this tell us about the "very acknowledged, very clever, very much trained" academics
before Drs Horner, Ostrom and Bakker?
Quote
Surely there are some academics who don't do well their job and limit to repeat what they have learnt. But I cannot believe that there are not a good amount of academics who do their job and compare sources and find the most accurate interpretation from them.
You will ... ;)
It is not that good academics are incapable of analysing evidence and drawing conclusions: they are, given the opportunity, very good at it. The fault lies in the way it is done, in the habits of thought that stifle truly rational enquiry in favour of insipid
in vacuo theorising.
I love the Sassuolo Situla, different types of shields in groups, all with a pair if javelins, including guys with something very like an aspis and crested helmet!
Roy
The problem is, andrew.
Those books you refer to, which we all saw versions of many years ago too, have no evidence behind them.
When we try to prove this "fact", we find nothing behind it except a vague notion that Greeks came first, Greeks went to parts of Italy, therefore Italians fought ad Greek hoplites until Rome changed things.
When we start with period evidence, we find a different picture. Roy covers it nicely, he is worth re reading again.
It is also worth noting that the greeks themselves change over time too, not just from hoplites to phalangites, but before that.
The evidence we find discredits the old truth.
When you look at this history of that old truth, it is usually based on very bad simplifications or myth.
Hence, patrick asks each time for the source you used, because 99% of those sources are going to be ones someone here knows has been roundly discredited, and we can then demonstrate that to you, so your research can gain a stronger footing for the next thing you want to look at.
Roy,
The Etruscan black-figure amphora, circa 300 BC, looks like a classical Greek hoplite encounter. The varied body armour could be linen or leather as well as a scaled corslet. I presume the hoplites formed the core of a respectable Etruscan army. I take your point that a hoplite could just as well throw a javelin or spear.
Robert
Quote from: aligern on July 31, 2014, 09:22:44 PM
I love the Sassuolo Situla, different types of shields in groups, all with a pair if javelins, including guys with something very like an aspis and crested helmet!
Roy
Interesting, isn't it?
They even have a cavalry component
http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/etruscan-civilization-bronze-arnoaldi-high-res-stock-photography/103024605
It would appear that a weapon set of helmet, shield and two dual purpose spears has some background in this area. Yet we also seem to have others with thrusting spear and shield.
Consider the known quote on the Macedonians seeing the w wounds inflicted by romans in a skirmish before their first major battle and being dishertened by the savagery of the wound.
Years of reading that in academic but not military histories told me this referred to gladius wounds.
Actually, it was a cavalry spatha.
But why let that truth get in the way of a simple narative of roman i fantry being better equipped and more deadly, which was how all the historians had copied it from their secondary sources for generations.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 31, 2014, 12:43:51 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 31, 2014, 12:22:31 PM
Granted, but just how much clarification do non-textual sources bring? My own take is that at the end of the day we rely 90% on the primary textual sources for our picture of the past.
Well, one factor is how many primary textual sources do we have for a period. Take Etruscans. We are pretty much entirely limited to sources by non-Etruscans. So the art and artefacts of the Etruscans themselves take on a particular signifcance.
And there's the problem. Where there are few or no reliable textual sources, the battle/civilisation/nation in question remains wrapped in mystery - even if the art and artefacts have something to say.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 01, 2014, 06:52:04 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on July 31, 2014, 12:43:51 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 31, 2014, 12:22:31 PM
Granted, but just how much clarification do non-textual sources bring? My own take is that at the end of the day we rely 90% on the primary textual sources for our picture of the past.
Well, one factor is how many primary textual sources do we have for a period. Take Etruscans. We are pretty much entirely limited to sources by non-Etruscans. So the art and artefacts of the Etruscans themselves take on a particular signifcance.
And there's the problem. Where there are few or no reliable textual sources, the battle/civilisation/nation in question remains wrapped in mystery - even if the art and artefacts have something to say.
few primary sources? well maybe few, but we have some sources, even with translation to carthaginian in one case. Not reliable? why? we know very well etruscan alphabet, grammar and a lot of words. Some Latin words too have etruscan origin. [emoji6]
But we have no works by Etruscan historians or poets that shed a light on the way they make war. Just about everything we have are inscriptions of various sorts, many of them short. Even if we dug up (or may have already dug up) inscriptions which speak of military ranks, as Roman tombstones sometimes do, would we know what the ranks meant? My limited reading round this suggests, for example, that we know the names of a lot of types of magistrate in Etruscan but we don't know what their functions are.
Quote from: Mark G on August 01, 2014, 06:48:43 AM
Consider the known quote on the Macedonians seeing the w wounds inflicted by romans in a skirmish before their first major battle and being dishertened by the savagery of the wound.
Years of reading that in academic but not military histories told me this referred to gladius wounds.
Actually, it was a cavalry spatha.
Actually, the "academic historians" were quite right. Livy specifically says it was the Spanish gladius:
Quote from: Livy XXXI.34With the view of doing more to win the affections of his men and make them more ready to meet danger on his behalf, Philip paid special attention to the burial of the men who had fallen in the cavalry action and ordered the bodies to be brought into camp that all might see the honour paid to the dead. But nothing is so uncertain or so difficult to gauge as the temper of a mass of people. The very thing which was expected to make them keener to face any conflict only inspired them with hesitancy and fear. Philip's men had been accustomed to fighting with Greeks and Illyrians and had only seen wounds inflicted by javelins and arrows and in rare instances by lances. But when they saw bodies dismembered with the Spanish sword (gladio Hispaniensi), arms cut off from the shoulder, heads struck off from the trunk, bowels exposed and other horrible wounds, they recognised the style of weapon and the kind of man against whom they had to fight, and a shudder of horror ran through the ranks.
And it was about two centuries before Roman cavalry started uising the spatha, anyway.
spatha was wrong, but cavalry swords none the less.
QuoteLiv. 31 33
[8] The consul was equally at a loss; he knew that the king had left his winter quarters, though ignorant of the region to which he had marched. He too sent out cavalry to scout. These two cavalry forces, coming from different directions, after they had wandered long and aimlessly over the roads in the land of the Dassaretii, finally met on the same highway. Neither was unaware, since they heard the sound of men and horses from far off, that the enemy was approaching. [9] So, before they came in sight of one another, they had prepared horses and arms for [p. 101]battle, nor was there any delay in charging as soon5 as the enemy came in sight. Not unequal, as it chanced, in either numbers or courage, since both consisted of picked men, they fought on equal terms for some hours. [10] The weariness of men and horses ended the struggle without a decision in favour of either party. Of the Macedonians, forty troopers fell; of the Romans, thirty-five.
...
Liv. 31 34
Philip, thinking that he would do something to secure the affection of his people and increase their readiness to encounter danger on his behalf [2] if he undertook the burial of the cavalrymen who had fallen on the expedition, ordered their bodies brought into camp, that the funeral honour might be seen by all. [3] Nothing is so uncertain or so unpredictable as the mental reaction of a crowd. What he thought would make them more ready to enter any conflict caused, instead, reluctance and fear; [4] for men who had seen the wounds dealt by javelins and arrows and occasionally by lances, since they were used to fighting with the Greeks and Illyrians, when they had seen bodies chopped to pieces by the Spanish sword,1 arms torn away, shoulders and all, or heads separated from bodies, with the necks completely severed, or vitals laid open, and the other fearful wounds, realized in a general panic with what weapons and what men they had to fight.
notes
1 The long and heavy sabre, adapted to slashing blows, carried by Roman cavalry: cf. Dion. Hal. VIII. 67.
The short infantry weapon, used for both cutting and thrusting, was called gladius Hispanus in XXII. xlvi. 5.
Livy. Books XXXI-XXXIV with an English Translation. Cambridge. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1935
A cavalry skirmish involving cavalry weapons, and not infantry stabbing swords.
a point the translator also took time to point out.
Well ... in Dionysius VIII.67.5 the Roman cavalry of the 5th/4th century BC carry 'xiphesi makroterois' (long swords), and as we assume that Roman infantry had rearmed with the gladius Hispaniensis by the time of the war against Macedon we might with some justification assume that the cavalry had, too.
Whether the cavalry's gladius Hispaniensis was identical to that of the infantry is another question, which I should not care to attempt to answer. Livy does however explicitly use the term for the Roman cavalry's swords, so the prima facie interpretation would have them the same.
Exactly - a cavalry skirmish involving the Spanish sword, not some imaginary "sabre".
It's interesting that when the first real Republican-period gladii hispanienses were identified, like the Delos sword for example, some people suspected that they might be cavalry swords, because they were so much longer than expected. The Republican infantry Spanish sword was not a short stabbing sword at all, but a medium-length cut-and-thrust weapon - "It has an excellent point, and can deal a formidable blow with either edge" - as Polybios puts it.
It needs to be a hell of a lot longer to be any use on horseback
The gladius hispaniensis was about 65-75 cm long (the Delos sword is 76 cm overall). This is of the same order as the longest versions of the kopis, as used by Greek/Macedonian cavalry - one at http://comitatus.net/greekswords.html (http://comitatus.net/greekswords.html) is 68.5 cm overall - so is presumably long enough for cavalry use.