The mechanism of Roman line relief

[andrew881runner]

I am not an historician but most of them agree that polybian legion behaved as I said. Maybe there is a reason. There are sources talking about gaps between manipules, I am sure, but I won't go looking for them. Do it in your own if you want. On my opinion what you say is totally invented and based on your own interpretation of sources. I have never heard about your line relief system, not in one book, and maybe there is some reason.
For the fact that legion marched with a prior and posterior centuriae, when the MANIPLE turned it Whole self on the left or right, you would still see a front and a back centuria. "The columns face left or right"  does not mean single centuries, or does not necessarly imply that. 
As I already said, it is a fact that during ancient battles there were several pauses. No one decided them, they were silent agreements between enemies to have some small break.  No man can Sustain physically or psychologically  hours of bloody deadly fighting, and until late Republic Roman army there was no "mutatio" system. This imply pauses. During pauses Romans could non doubt do the quick manoeuvre I showed in the video at a given signal, probably faster than the time I showed. This is the only meaning of having the check and board line deployment rather than the continuous line, the so called "quincunx" formation we already know.
Why having the quincunx formation (with gaps exactly of a MANIPLE size implied in it) if not simply to use that formation to do the tactical relief system I have shown? 
If there was a continuum line and it was possible to change first and second line as you said, everyone could have done what Romans did and what made them win, but it was not.

Then again If enemies of Rome (not the ones using phalanx, since this implies keeping the line to be effective, let's say barbarians fighting more as small units or individuals) attacked in the very moment of Romans doing the relief tactic I showed, they would be gathered in a small hole surrounded on 3 sides. Yes they can attack the legionaries on the sides but these will obviously turn and counter attack them, and enemies will find themselves pushed by both sides and probably even from the advancing principes (in the video I have shown principes take some time to reach battle line but they could be much closer so reach ha stati line in seconds). So the only result of this sudden hypothetical attack would be being closed in smaller and smaller pockets (side ha stati can push them back) among manipules of ha stati on 2 sides and principes on the front?
I really don't get your point.

For all sources I used this very good website, the author is a historician and Italian teacher in university.
http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/legione_romana_camillana.html
It gives many more details and sources than what I have talked about. Unfortunately it is in Italian. But you can understand a lot watching pictures.
For the tactic I have shown it is detailed explained here http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/disciplinati.html It talks even about the necessary time of the entire manoeuvre and it says 25 seconds with the first 14 seconds as the most critical since 7 are needed for posterior centuria to go back prior centuria and other 7 for the entire ha stati maniple to retreat.   Considering the enemies being in one of the several pauses during fight  some 30/40 Mts away, they should have been all excellent runners to do that distance in 14 seconds.
Then you must consider that mainly enemies of Rome during first Republic either adopted the Phalanx system (pike phalanx or hoplite one) or they adopted the "barbarian" style, like gauls. In the first case the Phalanx has no flexibility to do a sudden attack pushing over the battle line into the gaps. In the second case, barbarian tactics could do it, but gauls for instance or germans were reported to be brave warriors but lacking endurance in battle. They (gauls for sure, I don't know about germans) even went to battle drunk so they could not phisically sustain prolonged fight. Their tactic was based on one yelling charge and if enemies hold they retreated quickly. These are facts. So during one of these pauses Romans could have done their tactics in a relative peaceful condition.

[Erpingham]

In the second case, barbarian tactics could do it, but gauls for instance or germans were reported to be brave warriors but lacking endurance in battle. They (gauls for sure, I don't know about germans) even went to battle drunk so they could not phisically sustain prolonged fight. Their tactic was based on one yelling charge and if enemies hold they retreated quickly.

For Patrick's (with help) examination of Celtic tactics see http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=679.0

Suffice it to say, everything comes out a bit more complicated than at first it seems   Lack of "match fitness" does seem to have been an issue, however.

[Patrick Waterson]

I am not an historician but most of them agree that polybian legion behaved as I said. Maybe there is a reason. There are sources talking about gaps between manipules, I am sure, but I won't go looking for them. Do it in your own if you want.

This does not exactly provide support for your interpretation.  I have actually looked through these sources (Livy, Dionysius, Appian, Plutarch) and found nothing to suggest any gaps between maniples except at Zama, which as we have noted was an unusual and specific anti-elephant deployment.  This is why my understanding changed from something resembling yours to its current position. 

On my opinion what you say is totally invented and based on your own interpretation of sources. I have never heard about your line relief system, not in one book, and maybe there is some reason.

Because it has not yet appeared in a book.  You may find that in some matters the Society of Ancients is actually ahead of current popular thinking (not in everything, I hasten to add).

For the fact that legion marched with a prior and posterior centuriae, when the MANIPLE turned it Whole self on the left or right, you would still see a front and a back centuria. "The columns face left or right"  does not mean single centuries, or does not necessarly imply that. 

Actually, it does.  For a column to face left or right requires the smallest subunits (centuries or individuals) to face left or right, otherwise it would be deploying, not facing, left or right.

As I already said, it is a fact that during ancient battles there were several pauses. No one decided them, they were silent agreements between enemies to have some small break.  No man can Sustain physically or psychologically  hours of bloody deadly fighting, and until late Republic Roman army there was no "mutatio" system.

That statement is incorrect: there was a relief system attested from at least 486 BC: see Dionysius VIII.65.2-3.  Individual maniples which were being overcome were relieved by other individual maniples drawn from the reserve line.  Interestingly enough, this was done by both sides: Roman and Hernici.

This imply pauses. During pauses Romans could non doubt do the quick manoeuvre I showed in the video at a given signal, probably faster than the time I showed. This is the only meaning of having the check and board line deployment rather than the continuous line, the so called "quincunx" formation we already know.

Except that the 'quincunx' formation does not seem to exist in our sources - nor do the imagined pauses.

If there was a continuum line and it was possible to change first and second line as you said, everyone could have done what Romans did and what made them win, but it was not.

But only if they trained for it - which the Latins and Samnites appeared to do.  Latins using a line relief system is attested in Livy VIII.8; Samnites are not as far as I recall explicitly noted as doing so but the Romans do note on occasion that that they borrowed aspects of the Samnite system.

Then again If enemies of Rome (not the ones using phalanx, since this implies keeping the line to be effective, let's say barbarians fighting more as small units or individuals) attacked in the very moment of Romans doing the relief tactic I showed, they would be gathered in a small hole surrounded on 3 sides. Yes they can attack the legionaries on the sides but these will obviously turn and counter attack them, and enemies will find themselves pushed by both sides and probably even from the advancing principes (in the video I have shown principes take some time to reach battle line but they could be much closer so reach ha stati line in seconds). So the only result of this sudden hypothetical attack would be being closed in smaller and smaller pockets (side ha stati can push them back) among manipules of ha stati on 2 sides and principes on the front?
I really don't get your point.

The point is that by withdrawing alternate centuries the Romans would leave the initiative to their opponents.  Being surrounded on three sides does not apply equally to the force exerting the pressure (the opponent) and to the force being pressed (the 'prior' hastati centuries) - the latter suffer much more because they are static and exerting no pressure, so are crowded against each other Adrianople-style and swiftly become unable to dodge or use their shields or weapons, easy targets for their opponents.

For all sources I used this very good website, the author is a historician and Italian teacher in university.
http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/legione_romana_camillana.html
It gives many more details and sources than what I have talked about. Unfortunately it is in Italian. But you can understand a lot watching pictures.
For the tactic I have shown it is detailed explained here http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/disciplinati.html It talks even about the necessary time of the entire manoeuvre and it says 25 seconds with the first 14 seconds as the most critical since 7 are needed for posterior centuria to go back prior centuria and other 7 for the entire ha stati maniple to retreat.   Considering the enemies being in one of the several pauses during fight  some 30/40 Mts away, they should have been all excellent runners to do that distance in 14 seconds.

Thank you for explaining this and giving your sources.  We should perhaps bear in mind that all such conclusions have to be based on original sources (Livy, Dionysius, etc.) or individual imagination, or both.  I prefer to use the original sources because that way there is only one layer of possible mistakes included.

Then you must consider that mainly enemies of Rome during first Republic either adopted the Phalanx system (pike phalanx or hoplite one) or they adopted the "barbarian" style, like gauls. In the first case the Phalanx has no flexibility to do a sudden attack pushing over the battle line into the gaps.

A Macedonian phalanx would have no need to: in the accounts of Cynoscephalae and Pydna, the formed phalanx pushes back the entire (and incidentally gapless) Roman line.  We seem to have no proven account of a hoplite phalanx fighting against legions; the nearest we get is Polybius' (I.33-34) account of  Bagradas (255 BC), in which the Carthaginian infantry, whom we generally assume to have been hoplite-type, easily kill the Romans who, in small groups, manage to make their way between the elephants.  Battles of Romans against Etruscans seem to be hard-fought but the interaction of their military systems is not well described.

What is noticeable about these battles is the lack of any suggestion that pauses occurred by mutual consent.  One rather gets the opposite impression: if one side was feeling tired, the other side increased the pressure.

[andrew881runner]

in the link I mentioned there are written all the sources.

[Erpingham]

Perhaps it would be a good idea to separate the two concepts of quincunx/gaps and non-continuous combat? 

[andrew881runner]

surely they are separate things. But everyone knows Roman legion main feature was the existence of gaps, we cannot debate even about that. Unless you want to take a master in history and rewrite thousands books written about it so far.

[Erpingham]

surely they are separate things. But everyone knows Roman legion main feature was the existence of gaps, we cannot debate even about that. Unless you want to take a master in history and rewrite thousands books written about it so far.

Andrew,you haven't debated much with Patrick thus far.  Do not underestimate his interest in challenging received wisdom

I think from last time we debated this that gaps in Roman lines are less obvious in the historical record than many of us have been led to believe by thousands of book written so far.  Doesn't mean that gaps are wrong but it does mean they can be challenged.

[andrew881runner]

I know that but I trust more the 99% of community of historians rather than a single forumist.
Occam's razor says that we should try the easier solution when we don't know which one is correct. So I go with gaps, unless someone proves me they are wrong.
It is more questionable the relief system than the deployment of Roman army, which is rather well known.

If you assume that there were no gaps, Roman legion would be nothing more than a phalanx. So why was their tactic considered superior and their army more flexible, if they used a phalanx as everyone else?  Gaps were used after the army had deployed to make a fast advance possible, so that hostacles (Treees rocks holes or whatever) were left in the gaps among maniples rather than disrupt formation.
If you don't start with that, it means that Romans were still using phalanx system and all innovations meant to make army more flexible were invented by authors.

[Patrick Waterson]

in the link I mentioned there are written all the sources.

But have you read them?   One of the lessons of research is that original sources often say something very different to what is popularly imagined.

If you assume that there were no gaps, Roman legion would be nothing more than a phalanx. So why was their tactic considered superior and their army more flexible, if they used a phalanx as everyone else? 

Actually Greek authors do on occasion refer to Roman heavy infantry as hoplites and to their battle line as a phalanx.  In answer to your question, the legion was considered superior because Rome usually eventually won, but it is worth noting that Roman armies lost about as many battles as they won, and the factors that created Roman victories are assessed (even by a pro-Roman author like Livy) as 1) leadership, 2) virtus and 3) weaponry and tactics, in about that order.

It should also be considered that Roman armies rarely fought with legionaries alone, but made extensive use of auxiliaries.  This is particularly true in the period 210-150 BC, when Rome managed to conquer significant territories outside Italy.

I trust more the 99% of community of historians rather than a single forumist.

It may be worth remembering that the majority is not always right, and that 99% of the majority are usually simply requoting the initial 1% who came up with the idea.  I shall be interested to see how you apply this principle in the discussion about pikes and chariots. 

Occam's razor says that we should try the easier solution when we don't know which one is correct. So I go with gaps, unless someone proves me they are wrong.

And how are gaps the 'easier solution'?  The 'easier solution' would seem to be a continuous line, but one which is trained to filter back through a relieving line, even in the middle of combat.

To give us some material instead of simply exchanging opinions, we could with benefit examine Polybius XVIII.28, where he is considering the merits of the Roman system compared to others.

" Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal, and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms [kathoplisma] or their tactics [suntaxin = organisation/tactical system] but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms [kathoplismon] of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms [hoplois kathoplisas] of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end."

Hannibal was evidently impressed with the virtues of the legionary system, to the point of adopting it himself.  One may note the perhaps surprising omission of any indication that the Roman system was more flexible than the Carthaginian.  Polybius however does address this point when he compares the Macedonian phalanx directly with the legion in XVIII.32.10-12  Having just pointed out that the Macedonian phalanx is a very specialised, dedicated formation whose focus is solely being invincible on level ground, he enumerates the qualities of Roman troops and formations:

"The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body [merous], or in a detachment, or in a single maniple [semaian], or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others."

In essence, Roman troops and organisation are less specialised than Macedonians and so more flexible than Macedonians.  This flexibility is useful if an opportunity to use it appears, but is obtained at the cost of being weak, even useless, in a head-on fight against a phalanx:

"The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily—seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength." - Polybius XVIII.30.9-11

In essence, the Roman system was more flexible than the Macedonian, but not necessarily more flexible than the Carthaginian, or for that matter the Samnite or Etruscan.  The Roman army's formative experiences were in Italy, a land of flexible armies, many of which were based in hilly or even mountainous country.  What seems to be the case is that it was as flexible as its Italian neighbours, although perhaps less so than the Samnites until 314 BC or thereabouts, and more flexible than the Hellenistic systems it found itself fighting in the period 200-150 BC.

This does not, of course, prove that it fought with gaps in its lines, or in a quincunx formation. 

[Justin Swanton]

I know that but I trust more the 99% of community of historians rather than a single forumist.

Make that two forumists.

Occam's razor says that we should try the easier solution when we don't know which one is correct. So I go with gaps, unless someone proves me they are wrong.

The only way to resolve this question is to go to the primary sources, in their original language. Something that has struck me more than once is the at times utter unreliability of some of the more authoritative translations (from Latin at least - I'm not familiar with Greek). The trouble with doing a translation is that it is often not possible to render the text word-for-word in English. One looks for an equivalent expression that conveys the meaning of the original, and that is where the translator comes unstuck, since he decides what the meaning of the original is.

Intervalles inter ordines is a classic example of this. The translator, visualising (according to the popular received wisdom)  the intervalles as being wide gaps that separate one company from the next, translates inter as 'between'. But visualise the companies deployed in widely-spaced files and it makes perfect sense to translate inter as 'within' (it is the root for the English word 'internal').

To be a good translator, it is not enough to have a thorough grasp of the original language and one's own; one must also have a deep insight into the context of the passage, i.e. one must be a first-rate historian, able to deduce the author's intended meaning, a meaning he does not always make explicit since he takes for granted his readers (unlike us) will know what he is getting at.

A translator, however, who has not done his homework thoroughly enough, will tend to translate a passage following popular contemporary opinion. His translation (or mistranslation) then reinforces that opinion, which nudges future scholars towards the same mistranslation, and so on. A vicious circle.

[andrew881runner]

I have studied Lathin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Lathin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Lathan, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk lathi n almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.

[aligern]

what andrew says makes good sense.  Where there is a consensus of historians then any major departure from that interpretation would need to be very well supported. However, most translators are not looking at the text from the point of view of military history and they often will not be using comparative  evidence in the MH area from before, after and during the period concerned. What I found attractive in Patrick and Rodger's article in a recent Slingshot was the combination of evidence from Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. I also felt they made a good effort to put the organisational developments into a consistent linear picture. Frankly I just do not think that the original translators were interested in that, knowledgeable though they may have been in classical languages.
Sometimes the act of deep analysis of the meanings of Latin and Greek words is helpful, but sometimes not simply because words could be used for literary style or because the original writer was just wrong and it dis not matter.
As an example of distortion through style I would cite Caesar's description of the action against the Helvetii where pila pierce  the Gauls' shields and encumber them. To me , this is a statement by Caesar to his audience of traditional Roman weapons doing their job properly, showing what fine Romans his men were. I do not take it to mean that this was rare occurrence, rather that it would be poor style for Caesar to mention this at every  battle. I would bore his audience. Others take it to mean that the occasion is indeed special because it is specially highlighted,   To bring this to a point, why would a Roman writer mention the exact mechanism of line relief? It was a commonplace for the Romans and tied in with the barbarians being vigorous at first and then fading. Even if it was libe relief that caused the Romans to be able to face tired troops with fresh Roman authors might well not mention this because they thought that a demonstration of Roman manliness  and military virtue was more important than a commonplace process. Even excellent translation would not give us this sense because the words are not there.  lastly, i have many books on the Normandy invasion of 1944.  I am given to understand that the chief British tactic was section based fire and movement tactics within a platoon command  structure.  If I look through the books this sub methodology is almost entirely lost, it is just below the level of detail that the author is operating at.

Roy

[Justin Swanton]

I have studied Lathin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Lathin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Lathan, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk lathi n almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.

Then we are in agreement. 'gaps among the companies' as opposed to 'between' them. I too spent several years studying Latin, after I left school.

Here is a definition of 'inter' by Lewis and Short. Here is another by Ultralingua. Notice that it has the sense of 'in the midst of' rather than 'between' when referring to more than two objects.

[andrew881runner]

I have studied Lathin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Lathin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Lathan, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk lathi n almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.

Then we are in agreement. 'gaps among the companies' as opposed to 'between' them. I too spent several years studying Latin, after I left school.

Here is a definition of 'inter' by Lewis and Short. Here is another by Ultralingua. Notice that it has the sense of 'in the midst of' rather than 'between' when referring to more than two objects.

sorry I meant "between" not "among". As I said my English is not perfect, and I confused the meaning of these 2 words.

[Patrick Waterson]

I have studied Latin 7 years at school and I can assure that the meaning of "inter" in that context means "among". Translators translate Latin in a certain way not for chance. They are usually people who know very well Latin, more than you do. There are people, and my school teacher was one of them, who can talk latin almost as first language. So believe me if I tell you that to go against a given assumption you must be better than the one whose opinion you go against.

Unfortunately such people, who are very good with the language as a whole, are often the worst when it comes to matters of military vocabulary.  I would not presume, for example, to debate questions of Greek tense or gender agreement with Ian Scott-Kilver, who translated Polybius for the Penguin publishing company, but would unhesitatingly point out that he is completely wrong to translate 'logkhophorous' (Hannibal's peltasts, who accompany his slingers) as 'pikemen' in III.72 and elsewhere.  A logkhophoros used the logkhe, the approximately 6' long javelin that can in no way be classed or considered as a pike.  This is not the only serious translator's error that has been picked up by members of the Society, simply because the Society's members have specialised military interests whereas translators usually do not.


Regarding this particular passage (Livy VIII.8 ), I think we shall need to go through it in rather more detail.  The subject is the 'Livian' legion of 340 BC at the time of the battle against the Latins, and Livy describes each line of the Roman array as follows:

" prima acies hastati erant manipuli quindecim distantes inter se modicum spatium manipulus leves vicenos milites aliam turbam scutatorum habebat leves autem qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent vocabantur."

(The first line of battle were hastati, fifteen maniples, with a short distance between them and the maniple of twenty leves; the rest of the formation [literally 'crowd'] was composed of shieldsmen [scutati] but the leves, as they were called, carried a spear [hasta] and javelins [gaesa].)

These groups of 20 men constituted the entire skirmisher strength of the legion at the time.  They were a semi-independent and differently armed part of the hastati.

"robustior inde aetas totidem manipulorum,quibus principibus est nomen, hos sequebantur, scutati omnes, insignibus maxime armis."

(Men in the prime of life formed the same number of maniples called principes, these were deployed behind [the hastati], were all shieldsmen and had the best equipment.)


The comment that the principes are 'all shieldsmen' (scutati omnes) indicates that the leves were considered subunits of the hastati.


" hoc triginta manipulorum agmen antepilanos appellabant"

(This array of thirty maniples was referred to as the antepilani.)

"quia sub signis iam alii quindecim ordines locabantur, ex quibus ordo unusquisque tres partes habebat"

(Because with the standards were another fifteen formations (ordines), each of which was formed of three components.)

"earum unam quamque primam pilum vocabant"

(Of these, the first was called the pilus.)

"tribus ex vexillis constabat ordo; sexagenos milites, duos centuriones, vexillarium unum habebat vexillum"

(Each ordo consisted of three vexilla; each vexillum had sixty men, two centurions and a standard.)

"centum octoginta sex homines erant"

(It [the vexillum] contained 186 men.)

"primum vexillum triarios ducebat, veteranum militem spectatae virtutis"

(The first vexillum led, consisting of triarii, veteran troops of perceived excellence.)

"secundum rorarios, minus roboris aetate factisque"

(The second [line] consisted of rorarii, men of lower age and strength.)

" tertium accensos, minimae fiduciae manum; eo et in postremam aciem reiciebantur."

(The third [line] of accensi, men of least fighting ability, and these were held back in the last line.)


So - we have five lines of troops, of which the last three are grouped under the standards, and their units are called 'ordines' (with subunits being termed 'vexilla'), and the first two lines are deployed in advance of them, their subunits being called 'manipuli'.  We may note the complete absence of any indication of gaps between the maniples of antepilani or the vexilla of the ordines.  This distinction between 'manipuli' and 'ordines' is important for understanding the next part of Livy's description.


Livy now turns to describing their tactical employment.


"ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant."

(When the army was drawn up in these formations, of all the troops the hastati would be the ones to begin the battle.)

"si hastati profligare hostem non possent, pede presso eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant."

(If the hastati were unable to overcome the enemy, then under pressure they would retire backwards and the principes would receive them into the intervals of their files.)


Here we have the crux of the matter: the hastati are retiring under pressure; there is no question of a convenient pause in the fighting.  The potentially ambiguous part is 'in intervalla ordinum'.  Livy does not use 'ordo' to mean a formation of principes: he used 'manipulus'.  'In intervalla ordinum' here thus cannot mean 'into the gaps between the formations' - that would be 'in intervalla manipulorum'.  We must look to the other meaning of 'ordo', that of a rank or file.  Hence, Livy is telling us that the hastati withdrew between the files of the principes.