The mechanism of Roman line relief

[Mark G]

have a look at Oliver Stone's Alexander movie again - there are aerial shots there of the phalanx - each taxeis or syntagma ( I didn't count the CGI men) is descrete from the others. (OK, you can stop watching now, its just the aerial of the macedonians we need)

there is still a recongnisable battle line, but each unit has a gap to its neighbours to allow it to funtion and move.  the alignments are not absolute, and the skirmishers run through these gaps to get to the front.

The Roman system takes this a step further and rather than having the depth within each unit as individual causalty replacement and 'depth', it has organised unit sized gaps to allow the new unit to move entirely forward.

there are your skirmish channels in a macedonian battle - one of the supposed single battle line armies.

Think of the descriptions we have of something huge for a hoplite battle, like Platea - not on single holplite line there either.

all this insistence on a single entirely continuous line of battle, and on men pushing past each other while maintaining rank and file spacing, it just doesnt make sense and is clearly an extremely dangerous and disorganising thing to do.  Once you get your head around there being units and spaces between the units - after than it just becomes a question of how organised and how large the gaps are.

the next step is accepting that men will not and cannot fight hand to hand for any long period of time - like boxers with their 3 minutes.  they mutually accept stepping back to a safe distance to recover themselves before the next charge.

well, your units do the same thing. and their 'flanks' are not threatened because there is no time to organise an 'exploitation' response to the enemy charge except by maybe one oor two individuals - who have to expose themselves greatly unless their comrades support them - which takes organisation.

given the risks, most men dont even think about it.

it took a legate to organise the triarii at Cynocephalae.

the hoplite wings enveloping - not exactly a swift and immediate tactic, now is it, it still requires time and distance and organisation and planning, and it is often only just beginning before the entire battle is over as the rear starts running somewhere in the middle of the field.

[aligern]

Interesting point Justin... about only the front rank fighting.  Extend that a bit further, if only the front rank engage in combat and that until they are exhausted then being in the front rank must be suicidal because eventually one of the opposing pair is disabled and then a fresh chap appears opposite and finishes off the exhausted victor. Fairly obviously there must be a system of rotating fighters  within groups or you have a very short hoplite type battle.  As the weight of opinion seems to be that Romans have generally long battles then they most likely deal with this by rotating fighters within say the Hastati until everyone has had a go. Given the relatively wide Roman spacing compared to the Greek.this looks feasible.

Far far e it for me to question an accepted wargaming convention, but perhaps when base widths were decided upon Romans should have been on twice the frontage that Greeks were on. Perhaps those old 20mm (22.5mm really) should have had Greeks on 12.5 mm bases and Romans on 20mm.  Then Wargamers would stop extrapolating back from the neatly based little men that we stand over in godlike manner.  Because we see the little chaps as solid blocks and thus fail to appreciate that there are gaps between 'units' in real life.

That might alleviate Patrick's problem with the poor fellows on the end of units that then have a gap. . I too found it hard to conceive that , if the front line is not continuous, the opponent would not just advance and flank the units concerned.  That's because  my little DBM bases of troops can break frontage and swing to the flank in front of an enemy with impunity, but in real life they likely won't break their own line or take the risk.  In fact I'd hope my ancestors if they were in such a position would say to themselves, 'Hey this is great, there is no one opposite me I can stand here and look good without a whole lot of risk of being hit.... hope the guys to the side of us beat the chaps to their front!!'
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

have a look at Oliver Stone's Alexander movie again - there are aerial shots there of the phalanx - each taxeis or syntagma ( I didn't count the CGI men) is discrete from the others. (OK, you can stop watching now, its just the aerial of the macedonians we need)

there is still a recognisable battle line, but each unit has a gap to its neighbours to allow it to funtion and move.  the alignments are not absolute, and the skirmishers run through these gaps to get to the front.

What Oliver Stone does and what Philip and Alexander did are not necessarily the same thing.

But look at Spartacus (with Laurence Olivier as Crassus) towards the end of the film where they are getting set for the final battle.  This is the film-maker trying to make sense of a gapped doctrine combined with quincunx deployment, the two sacred cows of Republican Roman military history.  It looks impressive but they cannot get it to work as a combat system - they end up blending the first row of cohorts into a single four-deep line, which then advances on the slave army (to be repelled by the Hollywood flaming loofahs).

The Roman system takes this a step further and rather than having the depth within each unit as individual causalty replacement and 'depth', it has organised unit sized gaps to allow the new unit to move entirely forward.

And we saw in Spartacus that even a film-maker gives up on these 'gaps' - keeping alignment with 'gapped' units is a real challenge, whereas keeping alignment with a line is easy enough so that even film extras can do it.

However the 'new unit' does not move forward - Livy us quite clear (as is Polybius in II.33 in the battle against the Insubres) that it is the leading line which moves backwards.

there are your skirmish channels in a macedonian battle - one of the supposed single battle line armies.

Let us not confuse Oliver Stone with Philip II. 

Think of the descriptions we have of something huge for a hoplite battle, like Platea - not on single hoplite line there either.

all this insistence on a single entirely continuous line of battle, and on men pushing past each other while maintaining rank and file spacing, it just doesnt make sense and is clearly an extremely dangerous and disorganising thing to do.  Once you get your head around there being units and spaces between the units - after than it just becomes a question of how organised and how large the gaps are.

Delium 424 BC:

"The extreme wing of neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield. [3] The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand" - Thucydides IV.96.2-3

Note the absence of gaps, and what happens to the Thespians when gaps appear on each side of them.

First Mantinea 418 BC:

"On the present occasion the Mantineans reached with their wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans still farther beyond the Athenians, as their army was the largest. [3] Agis afraid of his left being surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans outflanked it too far, ordered the Sciritae and Brasideans to move out from their place in the ranks and make the line even with the Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristocles to fill up the gap thus formed, by throwing themselves into it with two companies taken from the right wing; thinking that his right would still be strong enough and to spare, and that the line fronting the Mantineans would gain in solidity.

72. However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset, and at short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta, as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed before the Sciritae （whom Agis on seeing that the two companies did not move over ordered to return to their place） had time to fill up the breach in question. [2] Now it was, however, that the Lacedaemonians, utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as superior in point of courage. [3] As soon as they came to close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and bursting in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed breach in their line cut up and surrounded the Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there." - Thucydides V.71-72

We see the same thing happening to the Sciritae and Brasideans as happened to the Thespians at Delium: gaps = death, or at least rapid defeat.

the next step is accepting that men will not and cannot fight hand to hand for any long period of time - like boxers with their 3 minutes.  they mutually accept stepping back to a safe distance to recover themselves before the next charge.

well, your units do the same thing. and their 'flanks' are not threatened because there is no time to organise an 'exploitation' response to the enemy charge except by maybe one oor two individuals - who have to expose themselves greatly unless their comrades support them - which takes organisation.

Is there any source evidence for this?  There is plenty for Romans being trained for extended combat and staying in a fight for extended periods (Plutarch, Josephus, Caesar).

the hoplite wings enveloping - not exactly a swift and immediate tactic, now is it, it still requires time and distance and organisation and planning, and it is often only just beginning before the entire battle is over as the rear starts running somewhere in the middle of the field.

But see what happened at Delium and First Mantinea above.  The 'gapped' units there went under swiftly and with style.

Patrick

[aligern]

Very neat Patrick. Mark invites you to look at a picture of Thespians gapped and you counter with the historic Thespians surrounded.

Might I suggest that there is a big difference between gaps that have another enemy unit facing you further down in the gap and a completely open flank as the Thespians presented. In the latter case an opponent can lap around to your rear because there is no friendly unit covering you to which the enemy would expose his flanks and rear whilst lapping around.  I don't think Mark would expect a flank cleft just in the air to be self sustaining.
Roy

[Justin Swanton]

I suspect that Mark's idea of a second line of gapped units covering the gaps between the first lines might have one difficulty. Let me illustrate with some diagrams:


Should the brown troops in front of the gaps try to flank the orange troops they will be charged in flank themselves by the orange troops covering the gaps. So far so good.




I feel though that the brown troops would not sit still. Nothing stops them charging the orange troops opposite them. In the heat of battle that would be almost inevitable.




The side edges of the advanced brown units must now turn to face the orange troops on their flanks, who must in turn face the brown units now on their own flanks. This exposes troops on both sides to corner killing and ruptures their rank-by-rank line relief. Disorder and confusion mount on both sides increasing the likelihood of a rout. A classic lose-lose situation. Would the generals on either side be happy with that?

[aligern]

I thought I had been pretty clear about this, troops don't just break their line and go forward.  Reading the descriptions of Celts and Germans for example they clearly form lines with overlapped shields.
My concept (and there are others) of Ancient combat is that 'order' is hugely important, groups stick together because that is how you are protected and supported. So in my conceptualisation the opponent has huge inhibitions about running into the gaps. Your men who turn to the side are in disorder, they cannot give effective support to the front and their unit will lose. The brown army has effectively surrounded itself  and will die.
Yu have to remember that there is a lot of fear and insecurity around and that to counter that fear you stay together, formed and under command.  The benefits of initiative are far outweighed by the risks. Real people  lack the courage of the little lead heroes.  Once you start taking individual initiative it all falls apart.


Roy

[Erpingham]

We see the same thing happening to the Sciritae and Brasideans as happened to the Thespians at Delium: gaps = death, or at least rapid defeat.

At the risk of repeating myself, there is a difference between a unit in whose formation unplanned gaps appear and one that trains to fight with gaps.  Actually, I'm not sure that the line in contact had gaps (certainly not all the time) but I don't think what happens when gaps happen/or are forced on a phalanx is actually conclusive about what the Romans did.

Is there any source evidence for this?  There is plenty for Romans being trained for extended combat and staying in a fight for extended periods (Plutarch, Josephus, Caesar).


Patrick

Again, part of the problem is a fundamental difference in understanding of what "staying in a fight for extended periods" means in the sources.  In the view of some here (and in secondary literature) a unit can be in a fight while shouting abuse, hurling missiles, spear fencing, sending out the odd idiot to moon at the enemy etc. as well as when hammering away with the shield and jabbing with the sword at breath-smelling range.  The unit is out of the fight when it collectively ceases to think it's next move will be engaging the enemy in some way, either because of fatigue or fear or disorder or its leaders say "You've done enough lads - somebody else's turn"

[Justin Swanton]

I thought I had been pretty clear about this, troops don't just break their line and go forward.  Reading the descriptions of Celts and Germans for example they clearly form lines with overlapped shields.

Yes, for the initial lineup before the actual battle begins.

My concept (and there are others) of Ancient combat is that 'order' is hugely important, groups stick together because that is how you are protected and supported. So in my conceptualisation the opponent has huge inhibitions about running into the gaps. Your men who turn to the side are in disorder, they cannot give effective support to the front and their unit will lose. The brown army has effectively surrounded itself  and will die.

In my scenario the orange army is just as surrounded as the brown and actually has as much chance of routing as the browns do.

Yu have to remember that there is a lot of fear and insecurity around and that to counter that fear you stay together, formed and under command.  The benefits of initiative are far outweighed by the risks. Real people  lack the courage of the little lead heroes.  Once you start taking individual initiative it all falls apart.

Somehow I can't visualise these considerations holding blood-maddened Gauls or Germans back from pouring into the gaps. Once they had charged in there was no stopping them. Only the failure to sweep away their opponents might induce them to panic and break.

[Mick Hession]

"blood-maddened Gauls or Germans" ?

I'd suggest that's more a literary stereotype (from a "civilised" perspective of course) than a reality. Members of tribal societies, even those with a strong warrior/heroic ethos, are not stupid. One example from Ian Knight's recent (and highly readable) book on Isandhlwana is telling - at the end of the battle a lone cornered redcoat held off a band of Zulus (presumably "blood-maddened" by the pursuit) with his fixed bayonet; instead of rushing him with their much shorter spears they sensibly called over a man with a rifle, who duly shot him. 

And of course there are plenty of instances of blood-maddened Romans too....
   

Regards
Mick 

[Erpingham]

Somehow I can't visualise these considerations holding blood-maddened Gauls or Germans back from pouring into the gaps. Once they had charged in there was no stopping them. Only the failure to sweep away their opponents might induce them to panic and break.

I'm sure Roy will say something on this (and probably Jim if he's watching) but this does assume a literal reading of the topoi of how barbarians fought.   Were they really like "blood-maddened" wild animals, or did they get tired like everyone else? (note Patrick's point that Romans trained for extended combat, so they could go on when the big, tall etc. etc. barbarians had worn themselves out with their animal like frenzy).  I'm much more willing to have a concept of a massed barbarian army which was not made up of big fanatics but was mainly of bog standard freemen who were mainly there to follow - how well those men got stuck in would depend on circumstances.  Worn out, with most of their leaders and heroes down, how quickly will these guys think "Line change - must attack now!", actually get over the inertia of who actually starts them moving and whether others will follow and deliver a cohesive attack?

[aligern]

Justin, please go to the Ancient and Mediaeval Battles section here and look at Vosges and Bibracte and Mons Graupius. They are all examples where Germans, Gauls and Britons tand in relatively good order with overlapped shields and await the Romans. Jim Webster wrote an article in Slingshot , this year, I think, reinforcing the point that these 'barbarians' are really quite disciplined and controlled and not subject to wild out of control charges.  All those  rule-sets that feature uncontrollable hairies launching themselves at Romans or Macedonians have it romantic but wrong.

I might say it is pretty much the same for knights. Where once we saw 'uncontrolled advance'  and   'impetuous charge' we are now more likely to understand poor command and control and local commanders acting to drive off a threat that they cannot otherwise sustain, but that is NOT a blood lust maddened charge.

Roy

[Justin Swanton]

"blood-maddened Gauls or Germans" ?

I'd suggest that's more a literary stereotype (from a "civilised" perspective of course) than a reality. Members of tribal societies, even those with a strong warrior/heroic ethos, are not stupid. One example from Ian Knight's recent (and highly readable) book on Isandhlwana is telling - at the end of the battle a lone cornered redcoat held off a band of Zulus (presumably "blood-maddened" by the pursuit) with his fixed bayonet; instead of rushing him with their much shorter spears they sensibly called over a man with a rifle, who duly shot him. 

And of course there are plenty of instances of blood-maddened Romans too....
   

Regards
Mick

True, but one needs to read the account of the Zulu assault at Rorke's Drift, where the Zulus attacked an improvised fortified position from 4.30 pm until 2.00 am the following morning, clambering over the bodies of their fallen to get at the British. The mopping up of individual British soldiers in the aftermath of Isandlwana was done when the heat of the battle was over, and could be accomplished economically. When the battle was at its height losses were not a primary consideration for the Zulu. One could fit Gauls into this category of fighter.

Speaking of the blood-maddened Gaul, wasn't it his Galatian relatives who, alone in the ancient world, were able to defeat a phalanx frontally by getting their front ranks to run straight into the sarissas, enabling the rear ranks to step over them and, um, incapacitate the hapless phalangites?

[Justin Swanton]

Justin, please go to the Ancient and Mediaeval Battles section here and look at Vosges and Bibracte and Mons Graupius. They are all examples where Germans, Gauls and Britons tand in relatively good order with overlapped shields and await the Romans. Jim Webster wrote an article in Slingshot , this year, I think, reinforcing the point that these 'barbarians' are really quite disciplined and controlled and not subject to wild out of control charges.  All those  rule-sets that feature uncontrollable hairies launching themselves at Romans or Macedonians have it romantic but wrong.

I might say it is pretty much the same for knights. Where once we saw 'uncontrolled advance'  and   'impetuous charge' we are now more likely to understand poor command and control and local commanders acting to drive off a threat that they cannot otherwise sustain, but that is NOT a blood lust maddened charge.

Roy

Thanks for pointing me to these threads, Roy. Reading through them I agree that the Gauls and Gaul-like tribes could adopt defensive formations on the battlefield and could come on in a fairly disciplined fashion. I'm just thinking that when they did attack it was all-out. I still suspect they would pour through gaps in the Roman lines (if gaps there were) in order to get at the Romans. The moment of contact between the two lines was time of maximum aggressivity, not a time to be cautious and hold back.

[aligern]

Did the Galatians defeat a phalanx frontally? It would be great if someone could find the description and then post it in the battles section.  When we meet Galatians acting against Romans they stay on the tops of hills and are shot down by light troops.

Gauls do defeat a Macedonian army, I am expecting Jim to be the expert on this, but I thought that it was a fairly scratch force that they fought and that it was outnumbered and outflanked.

Roy

[Duncan Head]

Speaking of the blood-maddened Gaul, wasn't it his Galatian relatives who, alone in the ancient world, were able to defeat a phalanx frontally by getting their front ranks to run straight into the sarissas, enabling the rear ranks to step over them and, um, incapacitate the hapless phalangites?

No.

That sounds like complete fiction to me. There are no surviving narratives of Galatian victories over the Macedonians that give any tactical detail.

We do have Pausanias' account of the Galatian fight against old-style hoplites at Thermopylai, which does play up the barbarian stereotype a bit:

The Gauls were worse armed than the Greeks, having no other defensive armour than their national shields, while they were still more inferior in war experience. On they marched against their enemies with the unreasoning fury and passion of brutes. Slashed with axe or sword they kept their desperation while they still breathed; pierced by arrow or javelin, they did not abate of their passion so long as life remained. Some drew out from their wounds the spears, by which they had been hit, and threw them at the Greeks or used them in close fighting. Meanwhile the Athenians on the triremes, with difficulty and with danger, nevertheless coasted along through the mud that extends far out to sea, brought their ships as close to the barbarians as possible, and raked them with arrows and every other kind of missile. The Celts were in unspeakable distress, and as in the confined space they inflicted few losses but suffered twice or four times as many, their captains gave the signal to retire to their camp. Retreating in confusion and without any order, many were crushed beneath the feet of their friends, and many others fell into the swamp and disappeared under the mud. Their loss in the retreat was no less than the loss that occurred while the battle raged.

I think that's the closest you'll get, though.