Do we have any detail on the military events of the above, or just the fact that they happened?
I think one of the greeks mentions it, herodotus or xenophon, iirc.
Pat usually knows for sure.
Thanks, Mark.
Diodorus Siculus has the details: see XI.41-44 (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/15B*.html) (scroll down until you get to the big red 41) for the initial revolt and Pharnabazus' attempt at reconquest in 373 BC and XVI.40-51 (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/15B*.html) for Artaxerxes' successful reconquest in 343 BC.
Also of possible interest might be Tachos' campaign in Syria and the revolt of Nectanebo II in his absence, and the role played by Agesilaus in these events. (Plutarch, Agesilaus 36 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0004%3Achapter%3D36) onwards)
Thanks
Stephen Ruzicka's Trouble in the West (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Trouble-West-Persian-525-332-Studies/dp/0199766622/) is an excellent book on the subject.
Looks good, though perhaps not £48 good!
Quote from: eques on July 09, 2017, 10:43:44 PM
Looks good, though perhaps not £48 good!
I have it which if nothing else proves it had to be cheaper than £48 at one point :-[
The book is definitely the one to read, and if you can do some sort of interlibrary loan, do it.
It might appear in an oxbow sale or similar at some point in the future
Quote from: Jim Webster on July 10, 2017, 06:58:19 AM
I have it which if nothing else proves it had to be cheaper than £48 at one point :-[
I paid about £42 a few years ago. But Jim's right, library loan might be the way to go; there is no sign of cheap copies about at the moment.
Hopefully Stephen Ruzicka demonstrates, or at least alludes to, the interdependence of the Greek and Egyptian situations. The success of Greek mercenaries at Cunaxa in 401 BC seems to have been assisted by the rapid departure of the Egyptians on the Persian left; given the usual Egyptian stolidity in battle, one cannot help feeling this sudden rout, taking with it the whole Persian left apart from Tissaphernes' guard cavalry, may have been intentional and aiming to let down the Great King without it looking obvious. Egyptian loyalty continued dubious until Acoris (Ushikaure) revolted, apparently while Agersilaus was loose in Asia Minor; Acoris' successor Nectanebo (Nekht-a-neb) seems to have pretended loyalty at first and then evicted the Persian garrison from Memphis (and destroyed it and its dependents in the open), subsequently securing Egypt against a Persian return.
Artaxerxes II was realistic enough to appreciate that without Greeks his chances of reconquering Egypt were non-existent, so having devoted the past decade to fomenting wars among the Greeks, he now tried to put a stop to them in order to be able to recruit some of their fighting men as mercenaries. This fell through, but the King of Kings was at least able to put enough pressure on Athens to force the recall of Chabrias and the despatch of Iphicrates to head a formidable force of 20,000 mercenaries (while waiting for the Persians to complete invasion preparations, Iphicrates had time, opportunity and the financial backing to implement his famous reforms). This attempt at reconquest fell through in 373 BC; thereafter, while the wars in Greece continued, the Persian satraps in Asia Minor engaged in an ongoing revolt from 372-362 BC, which absorbed Achaemenid energies until suppressed.
Tachos ('Swift'), the new Pharaoh (Heqmaatre), actively campaigned in Syria in 360-358 BC, enlisting Agesilaus to command his land forces. Agesilaus was peeved at not receiving overall command of all Egyptian forces (fleet included) and the conduct of the campaign, so when a pharaonic relation began a revolt back in Egypt, Agesilaus transferred his services and supported the pretender against two other claimants. The pretender (Netjerheqaiunu) became another Nectanebo, ruling from 360 to 343 BC when Artaxerxes III finally managed to get another expedition together against Egypt and led it himself - it had taken him this long because Tachos' campaigns had freed much of Phoenicia from Persian rule and Nectanebo had been supporting Sidon against Persian attempts at reconquest by sending Mentor of Rhodes and a stated 40,000 Greek mercenaries to clear the Persians out of Phoenicia.
Artaxerxes led an army against Sidon himself, aided by the Sidonian king, who was having second thoughts and betrayed his own city and people to the Persians. Artaxerxes thus collected Sidon, its remaining mercenary Greeks (which he added to his own) and Mentor of Rhodes, who changed sides and exposed every detail of the defences of Egypt.
Armed with Mentor's surviving mercenaries and inside information, plus his own substantial army, Artaxerxes reconquered Egypt in 343 BC. With Egypt gone, Artaxerxes consolidated his hold over the remainder of his domains, including Ionia, prompting Isocrates and others in Greece to call for a Hellenic champion who would free the Greek cities in Ionia and the Aegean from Persian rule. Cue Alexander the Great ...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 10, 2017, 09:29:53 AM
Hopefully Stephen Ruzicka demonstrates, or at least alludes to, the interdependence of the Greek and Egyptian situations.
I suppose Ruzicka's overriding main point is that past generations have tended to look at the Greek front without giving enough emphasis on its interdependence with Egyptian (and other) issues. Though he does see Egypt as a much higher priority for Persia than Greek affairs were.
I hought his the best so far on taking a Persian point of view, something oromised by Hollander but not delivered. Interesting the emphasis on who holds Cyprus and can therefore dictate naval affairs in the Levant. Without Cyprus the Egyptians cannot hold a forward position in Palestine, but must rely on Sinai and are vulnerable to the Persians penetrating the Nile Delta.
Roy