Logistics, logistics, logistics

[Erpingham]

I think there is an interesting cross-over with our discussions in another thread on simulations and game parameters.  Patrick's idea could be turned into an "archer" game, where the player is just commanding a force of archers and concentrating on operating them tactically.  Or perhaps it is, as Jim says, an interesting place to start to create a specific set of rules to refight Agincourt.  As a wider set of rules for longbow archery, or wider still, we'd need a more extensive going over of the topic in another thread.  But as an example of how logistics might be brought into a tabletop game in an integral way, shows what can dome.

[Dangun]

Bow could get +1 on their first "shot/volley," +0 on the next, -1, -2 etc. until they "run out" and become light infantry - psiloi or Auxilia?

[Imperial Dave]

Bow could get +1 on their first "shot/volley," +0 on the next, -1, -2 etc. until they "run out" and become light infantry - psiloi or Auxilia?

what an interesting idea.....

Sometimes I think we are too 'flat' or 2 dimensional with regards to army organisation on the wargaming battlefield. I know it would mean extra figures but I am very interested in having more formation changes during a battle eg close density versus open density for troops that operated in that manner. Your example of changing a bow unit from say Bw(4) to Aux(3/4) or Ps(2) due to missile usage (and/or other operational considerations such as changing orders) could work nicely

[Erpingham]

Bow could get +1 on their first "shot/volley," +0 on the next, -1, -2 etc. until they "run out" and become light infantry - psiloi or Auxilia?

I think I would prefer something more abstract, to avoid record keeping if possible.  Running out of ammunition, to me anyway, has two main factors - supply and rate of use.  rate of use is affected by tactical circumstances and to the experience and discipline of troops.  So, perhaps we give our longbowmen three modes - skirmish, sustained and arrowstorm.  We might also give them markers for arrows issued per man (say one for a mobile role, two for a static one).  After each round of shooting, throw a dice.  There is a chance, depending on shooting mode and unit experience, that an arrow marker is expended.

[Patrick Waterson]

Bow could get +1 on their first "shot/volley," +0 on the next, -1, -2 etc. until they "run out" and become light infantry - psiloi or Auxilia?

I think I would prefer something more abstract, to avoid record keeping if possible.  Running out of ammunition, to me anyway, has two main factors - supply and rate of use.  rate of use is affected by tactical circumstances and to the experience and discipline of troops.  So, perhaps we give our longbowmen three modes - skirmish, sustained and arrowstorm.  We might also give them markers for arrows issued per man (say one for a mobile role, two for a static one).  After each round of shooting, throw a dice.  There is a chance, depending on shooting mode and unit experience, that an arrow marker is expended.

This seems to me a more 'realistic' approach, on the basis (or perhaps assumption) that archers used a set rate or rates of shooting while they had ammunition, but did not scale down their shooting as their quivers emptied 10%, 20% etc.  Three basic modes with the chance or perhaps the certainty of ammunition depletion looks very good to me - and if we want to extend this approach to a few additional periods, then skirmishers can be differentiated by not having the 'arrowstorm' mode as one of their options, while close formation volley archers (e.g. Egyptians) do not get the 'skirmish' option.  Clever types like Cretans might get all three modes.

[Imperial Dave]

or looking at it the other way

if you wanted to simulate a massed/rapid arrow deluge, you can add a one off +1 factor and then not have to do much record keeping.

I dont mind a bit of record keeping personally having cut my teeth on 5th and 6th WRG (a notebook was ever present at my side for recording casualties, writing orders and drawing deployments) so actually quite like Dangun's suggestion 

[Mark G]

This puts me in mind of an old kids dogfight game, where the shooting deck had varying levels of burst (effectiveness), and you drew one each shot.

So you knew she you had used all the good shots, but not what the next shot would be

Add two "empty" cards, and if both come out your are done, and you have an easy ammo come effect system...

[Erpingham]

or looking at it the other way

if you wanted to simulate a massed/rapid arrow deluge, you can add a one off +1 factor and then not have to do much record keeping.

But then you don't incorporate logistics in the game, which is where we came in.

I dont mind a bit of record keeping personally having cut my teeth on 5th and 6th WRG (a notebook was ever present at my side for recording casualties, writing orders and drawing deployments) so actually quite like Dangun's suggestion

My own primary objection is the same as Patrick's - did archers reduce their rate of shooting proportional to the amount of ammunition they had left or did they have a standard rate of shooting, varying perhaps with tactical requirements, until they ran out of ammunition.  The first gives you a gradual decline of effectiveness with each shot, the second gives even effect until they can't shoot anymore.  I would favour the latter.

[Jim Webster]

We run into a problem.

With estimated agricultural yields, known climate variation and modern modelling, known sources of metals and estimated outputs, quoted tax revenues etc then it is probably possible to produce an economic and logistical model of, for example, the Roman Empire.
It will be wrong in many ways but might be 'good enough' to give a sense of how things could hang together.
But the more we drill down into deeper and deeper levels of complexity, the less we actually know. Worrying about ammunition supply when with the vast majority of armies we haven't a clue about ammunition supply, stockpiles and similar is a waste of time, (unless I suppose you try and work up from the bottom to produce figures which show that to achieve a historically observed event, there had to be missile stockpiles.

Even with the Romans, we don't know what stocks of missiles they took on the march. It's only by chance that we know in the republic there were probably spare shields carried with the army on campaign. I don't think we've got a clue about missiles.

With the English longbowmen we have accounts which show how many arrows are purchased but some of these could have been dropped off to build up the stocks held in depots.

I think that with wargames logistics we might be better off worrying about food and water and supplying that and the effect that has on lines of advance and defensive positions.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

It really depends upon whether we want to focus on battlefield logistics or campaign logistics.  Granted that we lack firm information on such things as the 'basic load' of missiles carried by most archers and the level of resupply present, though we can surmise from the exceptions what the norm was likely to be.

At Dyrrhachium, one of Caesar's forts beat off a Pompeian attack and the centurion Scaevola's shield was found to have 120 arrows or holes in it.  This suggests (along with anecdotes such as Pontic archers using bundles of arrows instead of swords at Orchomenus) that the classical period civilised archer was generally quite well supplied with missile ammunition.

Conversely, at Carrhae, the Romans were expecting the Parthians to run out of arrows and have to come to hand-strokes.  When they learned that the Surena had brought along a whole camel-train stocked with arrows they became distinctly less happy.  From this we can deduce that such thoughtful resupply arrangements were the exception for Parthians, at least up to that date, and that a limited 'basic load' was normal.

Campaign logistics bring in a whole different game: hilltops and springs of water, or stretches of farmlands with ripe corn (or pasture land where flocks and herds are still present) become significant considerations.  Maps replace tabletops for 99% of the campaign and planning of routes and marches becomes essential, as does obtaining reliable guides.  Scouting becomes a vital activity rather than just a way to see if someone gets a flank march.  Cities become places where you can fix or replace your kit and pick up an easy instalment of food.  This is real soldiering as it was in the pre-gunpowder era.  It might not be that easy to fix a quick game at the club, though.

[Imperial Dave]

or looking at it the other way

if you wanted to simulate a massed/rapid arrow deluge, you can add a one off +1 factor and then not have to do much record keeping.

But then you don't incorporate logistics in the game, which is where we came in.

I dont mind a bit of record keeping personally having cut my teeth on 5th and 6th WRG (a notebook was ever present at my side for recording casualties, writing orders and drawing deployments) so actually quite like Dangun's suggestion

My own primary objection is the same as Patrick's - did archers reduce their rate of shooting proportional to the amount of ammunition they had left or did they have a standard rate of shooting, varying perhaps with tactical requirements, until they ran out of ammunition.  The first gives you a gradual decline of effectiveness with each shot, the second gives even effect until they can't shoot anymore.  I would favour the latter.

I probably didnt explain myself well enough, the +1 is the simplest way of simulating arrow logistics (without record keeping) by 'allowing' a one of massed arrow storm before reverting to standard usage. If we expand this method then we have the +1,0,-1,-2 scenario already described. If you want to look at it a slightly different way then archers shoot at standard rate for the first volley then have a -1 for the rest of the game

[Imperial Dave]

It really depends upon whether we want to focus on battlefield logistics or campaign logistics.

both are important although should be treated differently and of course not everyone plays campaign games

you could simulate some aspects of logistics on the battlefield in one off battles by 'spending' some point allocated to the army composition or by having a 'pot' of points specifically for logistics elements. eg spend points on water and food, missiles, secure supply lines which has an effect on battlefield effectiveness.

[Patrick Waterson]

Ultimately, from the wargamer's point of view it does seem to come down to battlefield effectiveness.  What might also be usable as a quasi-logistical exercise is to swap troop effectiveness for 'victory points', so that by degrading one's army under a variety of viable logistical excuses one can start with some victory points already under one's belt.  The only reason for this would be if one has a cunning plan for an early success in competition play, and if not carefully regulated could see both sides auctioning off army point value for victory points as they gleefully commit their troops to thirst, hunger and/or ammunition depletion in quest of an early victory point margin.

Now who was it said that competition play encourages bad generalship?

In essence, logistical effects on the battlefield would be to permit extra capabilities (e.g. more ammo = more shooting or better shooting effect) or impose limitations (e.g. hungry = limited movement).  There might also be small but significant behavioral aspects, e.g. thirsty troops in proximity to a stream will on their next move unless attacked form up facing the stream and spend (say) two turns without moving.

If running an operational campaign, finding sufficient water for one's troops and locating campsites near water sources becomes important.  Failure to do this will perhaps have gleeful umpires imposing penalties in the form of random percentages of units wandering off in search of water.  I know of two cases where an army suffered from a deficient water source just before or during a battle: Hannibal prior to Zama had to make do with a poor water supply, which imposed extra burdens on the camp followers, and Bayazid at Angora (AD 1402) found that Timurlane had inconsiderately diverted the nearby creek on which the Ottomans were relying for water.  (One could add the second day of Hattin to this list, and doubtless others.)  The intriguing point is that the affected side does not seem to have had its combat effectiveness reduced until well into the battle.

Food is another consideration.  Missing breakfast is said to have disadvantaged the Romans at the Trebia and the Carthaginians at Ilipa.  Given that 10,000 Romans broke through the Carthaginian (mainly Gallic) centre at the Trebia and the engaged Spanish in the Carthaginian army at Ilipa fought on for hours before melting away, one wonders just how much of a disadvantage it really was.  Again, any debilitating effects seem to have taken place late rather than early.

What this post has drifted into is that logistical deficiencies seem to have inflicted effects late rather than early in a battle.  This might best be represented by allowing a logistically-deficient force a set number of turns at full capability and then having its capabilities taper off - perhaps rapidly for troops in combat, more slowly for those simply moving or waiting.

[Imperial Dave]

really good points Patrick

I like the idea of imposing penalties such as units staying in position near water sources and the capability reduction after a few turns for logistically challenged forces.

Another way would be to have rolls for random events or drawing 'event' cards during a game.