Chariots as equid battering rams

[Patrick Waterson]

Trying to sum up the thread a little:

i) We all agree that Achaemeno-Hellenistic scythed chariots were suicidal shock weapons. If Lucian's account of the Elephant Victory is reliable, the Galatians' may have been a bit of an exception as they're not differentiated from the regular vehicles.

Shock weapons, yes, but not necessarily suicidal unless unsupported.  Regarding the Galatians, their attack was interrupted by the emergence of Antiochus' elephants before any distinction in chariot roles became apparent, so we are reduced to guessing what those roles were.  The one clear feature is that the chariots were expected to go to work before the infantry did.

ii) We all (except Patrick?) agree that at least some Iron Age chariots - notably British and Cyrenaean - were skirmishers.

Possibly so.  Patrick's reservations are that Cyrenean tactics described by Xenophon resemble dragoon activity rather than skirmishing, and British chariots seem to have been opportunists who, for example, do the following:

"The horse and charioteers of the enemy contended vigorously in a skirmish with our cavalry on the march; yet so that our men were conquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods and hills; but, having slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost some of their men. But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men were off their guard, and occupied in the fortification of the camp, rushed out of the woods, and making an attack upon those who were placed on duty before the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohorts being sent by Caesar to their relief, and these severally the first of two legions, when these had taken up their position at a very small distance from each other, as our men were disconcerted by the new mode of battle, the enemy broke through [perruperunt] the middle of them most courageously, and retreated thence in safety." - Caesar, Gallic War V.15

The chariots broke through 'per medios' as opposed to 'inter eos', i.e. through rather than between the cohorts.  So if looks as if even British chariots had a shock role (albeit not exclusively a shock role: they did plenty of raiding and skirmishing in addition).

iii) There's, as ever, a major disagreement about LBA Near Eastern chariots.

Interesting that such disagreement seems to have endured for almost as long as the study of LBA Near Eastern chariots.

iv) There's a similar disagreement about later Assyrian etc. vehicles, with the added complication that some historians don't believe the latest, heaviest, Assyrian vehicles had a proper tactical role at all, being for display and royal hunting. People who think these were shock weapons don't necessarily think the same of earlier, lighter versions.

Sargon's 8th campaign account should have laid to rest the display/hunting school.  The paucity of information about battlefield employment for earlier, lighter models hinders drawing conclusions about these.  What can be said is that they had impact potential, whether or not this was tactically realised.

v) Sumerian battle-carts are also subject to such disagreement. Nobody really cares about the "straddle-cars" that turn up in army lists but which I don't recall seeing any contemporary illustration of.

The 'straddle cars' have gone unmentioned thus far; crew vulnerability to missiles is likely to be a question if assigning them any battlefield role.

vi) Nobody feels they know enough to have strong opinions about how Indian or Chinese chariots were used, altho some would consider certain roles unlikely on general principles.

Seems to be pretty much the general opinion here.  The one time Indian chariots discernibly encountered the Western historical sphere, Alexander disposed of them so effectively they never even had a chance to show whether they had a role.

Patrick mentioned the Kadesh reliefs of chariot v chariot combat

[image subtracted]

With the usual caveat that the conventionalisation of Egyptian art makes interpretation of depth difficult, here we see the disciplined Egyptians defeat the disorganised  foreigners.  The Egyptians advance in a well-spaced line, relying on shooting to kill the horses of the opposing side before contact.

It's guesswork what this actually shows, but suicidal wheel to wheel attack seems less likely than a bow-based manoeuver strategy, IMO.

Questions: why would a wheel-to-wheel (or close, e.g. 3-4' between vehicles) attack be 'suicidal', and what, in plain English, is a 'bow-based manoeuvre strategy'?

I would agree that shooting to kill opposing horses looks like an integral part of Egyptian chariot warfare (good observation), and reliefs emphasise the large arrows from the powerful Egyptian bows dropping opponents.  If they can drop enough foes and horses to disrupt an opposing formation, their own undisrupted formation should prevail, routing a shaken foe or defeating a stubborn one piecemeal.

[evilgong]

 Did anybody go to the conference?

db


>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
First International Chariot Conference - AbstractsPalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 9(2) (2012)
© PalArch Foundation
2
Friday, 16.00 - 18.30 Registration at Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC)30 November 1, Dr. Mahmoud Azmi Street, Zamalek. 19.00 Key-note lecture by
Prof. Dr. Joost Crouwel
(Professor Emeritus of Aegean Archaeology at the University of Amsterdam): Studying the Six Chariots from the Tomb of Tutankhamun.Saturday, 08.30 Registration 1 December 09.00 Welcome 09.30
Salima Ikram
: The 'Tano' Chariot and the Egyptian Museum Chariot Project. 10.00
André J. Veldmeijer
: The 'Tano' Chariot: The Near Complete Leatherwork from an Ancient Egyptian Chariot. 10.30
Lucy Skinner
: Conservation of an Ancient Egyptian Chariot Cover: Its Secrets Revealed. 11.00 Break 11.30
Edgar B. Pusch
: Qantir/Pi-Ramesse "... Headquarters of Thy  Chariotry ...". 12.00
Silvia Prell
: The Workshops of the Chariotry of Qantir- Piramesse. 12.30
Bela Sandor
: Chariots' Inner Dynamics: Springs and Rota- tional Inertias. 13.00 Lunch 14.30
Heidi Köpp
: The Chariot as a Mode of Locomotion in Civil Contexts. 15.00
Hermann Genz
: The Introduction of the Light, Horse-Drawn Chariot and the Role of Archery in the Near East. At the Tran- sition from the Middle to the Late Bronze Ages: Is there a Connection? 15.30
Samantha L. Cook
: Cultural Implications of the Chariot and Composite Bow in New Kingdom Egypt. 16.00 Break 16.30
Arianna Sacco
: The Depiction of Chariots on Wall Reliefs in New Kingdom Egypt and Neo-Assyrian Empire. 17.00
Lisa Sabbahy
: Gendering Chariot Use in New Kingdom Egypt. 17.30 Sunday, 09.00
Mattia Raccidi
: The 3rd Millenium BC Chariots in Syria: A 2 December Study through the Documentation. 09.30
Edwin C. Brock
: A Possible Chariot Canopy for Tutankhamun. 10.00
Yukiko Sasada
: An Alternative Theory for 'Bit-Wear' found on the Second Premolar Teeth of the Buhen Horse. 10.30
Fernando Quesada-Sanz
: Physical Limits of Horses and Men and the Military Employment of Light Chariots in the Near Eastern Late Bronze Age. 11.00 Break 11.30
Roberto Díaz Hernández
: The Role of the War Chariot in the Formation of the Egyptian Empire in the Early 18th Dynasty. 12.00
Colleen Manassa
: The Chariot that Plunders Foreign Lands: Paronomasia and Chariots in New Kingdom Literature. 12.30
Ole Herslund
: Chariots in the Daily Life of New Kingdom Egypt.


First International Chariot Conference - AbstractsPalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 9(2) (2012)
© PalArch Foundation
3
13.00
Mohamed Raafat Abbas
: The Diplomatic Role of the Chari- oteers in the Ramesside Period. 13.30 Lunch 15.00
Anthony Spalinger
: Egyptian Chariots: Departing for War. 15.30
Ian Shaw
: Ballistic Missiles and Electric Cars: The Differing Aims and Trajectories of Egyptian and Syro-Hittite Chariots. 16.00 Discussion

[Patrick Waterson]

Did anybody go to the conference?

On the assumption that nobody did, the papers can be read online here.

The general thrust of the papers is on details rather than techniques; expect emphasis on such things as paronomasia in the 'Hymn to the Royal Chariot' and discussion of the atropotaic focus of the scenes on the chariot body of Thutmose IV.  All in all, expect to add to one's knowledge of chariot details and representations of chariots but little if any to one's knowledge of chariot warfare.

Amy Calvert (p.45) does comment in passing:

"Earlier theories on the effectiveness of the chariot in battle have tended to exaggerate, comparing the weapons to modern tanks (Faulkner, 1953: 43), while others have considered them taxis for archers who would fire [sic], mount the chariot, move to another spot, dismount and fire again (Schulman, 1979: 125). If that were the case, then there would be no need to have both a driver and an archer: the six chariots of Tutankhamun (1335-1325 BC), that of Yuya, and the chariot body found in the tomb of Thutmose IV were all designed to accommodate two people (Littauer & Crouwel, 1985:70)."

As a side note, it is observable that directly after a major war, academic opinion greatly favours shock tactics, while as temporal distance from such an event increases, so do academic pretexts for avoidance of shock tactics.

[Duncan Head]

v) Sumerian battle-carts are also subject to such disagreement. Nobody really cares about the "straddle-cars" that turn up in army lists but which I don't recall seeing any contemporary illustration of.

Perhaps the best ancient rendering of the straddle car is the Tell Agrab model.

In this same time period there was another wheeled vehicle that might have had military applications: a two wheeled car commonly referred to as "straddle car". It consisted of a main log, to which the wheels were attached, where the driver (single occupant) would sit astraddle, thus justifying the name. The wheels were the same type as the ones used on regular four wheel wagons. These vehicles, despite being armed with javelin sheaths, were never depicted in a  strictly military context, and thus might have been used only for hunting

- https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/5485/1/Elias%20Pinheiro%20-%20The%20Origin%20and%20Spread%20of%20the%20War%20Chariot.pdf

[Justin Swanton]

Why the speed? Chariots were by far and away the fastest means of transport in Antiquity and I suspect that they were, at least initially, faster than cavalry. A one-horse chariot could easily outpace any man on foot. And if speed mattered in chariot vs chariot combat then why weren't all chariots pulled by a 4-horse team?

Multiple horses make chariots faster. Why you need speed in battle is a different question. Speed would seem to be important in any mobile missile platform- as we see with tanks.  Why were all chariots were not 4 horses? You can have twice as many chariots if they are pulled by 2 horses and still be fast enough. If you move to 4 one horse chariots, you are not faster than a horse alone. A one horse chariot can outpace a man when it gets going on level ground, but it cannot out-accelerate a man.  More importantly, your single horse gets blown fast when pulling a chariot by itself.

Are you familiar with "chariot runners"?  That they exist seems to indicate that chariots did not usually go much faster that a man could follow. They would have functioned much like the Greek runners who accompanied horse. I don't remember if it is Drews, but someone suggested the sword and shield men we see at the time of the sea peoples originated as a troop type as chariot runners.  I am not a fan of that theory.

Would a chariot need out-accelerate a man if it was meant to be used exclusively for a missile role? The chariot wouldn't need to get closer than about 30 yards from the infantry it was skirmishing, and if the infantry charged it, it would reach full speed long before the infantry were close enough to attack it. And why would infantry charge? That would get them out of formation, making them vulnerable targets for a chariot counter-charge.

Patrick pointed out that even pony-pulled British chariots would charge Roman infantry if the circumstances were right. Thinking about it, I suspect Cyrenaean chariots would also charge foot in the right situation, but right situations were getting increasingly rare, even for 4-horse chariots, hence Cyrus' decision to make over the entire design.

So the present state of the hypothesis: the moment chariots could not effectively charge infantry, at least on occasion, they were dumped. Their role as skirmisher taxi wasn't enough on its own to keep them in existence.

[Erpingham]

Questions: why would a wheel-to-wheel (or close, e.g. 3-4' between vehicles) attack be 'suicidal', and what, in plain English, is a 'bow-based manoeuvre strategy'?

A wheel to wheel attack between two lines of chariots, using the horses as equid battering rams, would inevitable mean mutual destruction of the vehicles and, effectively, the animals.  Some of the crew might survive, possibly with major injuries.  The military advantage of using your elite military personnel and expensive technology in this way escapes me.

"Bow-based" - the bow is central to the function of chariot as a weapon system. In simple terms, shooting is more important than crashing.
"manoeouvre" - about using the mobility of the chariot, rather than just its kinetic energy.  In simple terms, turning and moving is more important than crashing.
"strategy" - admittedly incorrect in this context - I should have said tactics.

[Justin Swanton]

Patrick mentioned the Kadesh reliefs of chariot v chariot combat



With the usual caveat that the conventionalisation of Egyptian art makes interpretation of depth difficult, here we see the disciplined Egyptians defeat the disorganised  foreigners.  The Egyptians advance in a well-spaced line, relying on shooting to kill the horses of the opposing side before contact.

It's guesswork what this actually shows, but suicidal wheel to wheel attack seems less likely than a bow-based manoeuver strategy, IMO.

Notice that the foreigners break before being contacted by the Egyptians, who are a small distance from them and still in a neat formation. The implication seems to be that the foreigners rout from a combination of arrow fire and steely eye, rather than the free-for-all confusion of melee combat. Or this whole picture is just fanciful propaganda.

I can't imagine opposing charioteers actually driving their charge home as it would be an instant lose-lose, nor can I imagine horses running into each other if they can't see gaps to run between or can't head for any gaps. Horses might think (or rather know) that humans are pushovers, but they would hardly think the same of other horses.

[Erpingham]

Somewhat to my surprise, I think we largely agree here.  Egyptian military reliefs usually show disciplined bodies of Egyptians, which we must assume is the image they wished to project.  But what else can we tell?  Here the Egyptians deploy in a spaced line and attack head on.  We don't know what they would do if the enemy don't break - some have suggested "dog-fighting" would take place as a set of individual combats broke out.  Or perhaps they passed through, exchanging short range archery, javelins, spear thrusts etc.  Or maybe the Egyptians would execute a turn and try to draw their opponents into a chase, breaking up their formation and allowing the Egyptians to turn and get in among their now disordered line?  This picture doesn't tell us anything about that.

As an example of speculation based on conventionalised images, see this Italian example.  As far as I can tell, this evolves from a reading of the original image as intending to show the chariots in tight echeloned column and goes from there.

[Andreas Johansson]

Sargon's 8th campaign account should have laid to rest the display/hunting school.

I don't have access to my library to check what timetables have been argued for, but Sargon II reigned about a century before the fall of Assyria, so doesn't necessarily count as "latest" Assyrian.

[Andreas Johansson]

Thanks, BTW, to Anthony and Duncan for the info on straddle-cars.

[Patrick Waterson]

Sargon's 8th campaign account should have laid to rest the display/hunting school.

I don't have access to my library to check what timetables have been argued for, but Sargon II reigned about a century before the fall of Assyria, so doesn't necessarily count as "latest" Assyrian.

He reigned from 722-705 BC and his style of chariot is of the same massive kind as Ashurbanipal's.

Sargon 722-705 BC

Ashurbanipal 668-627 BC

(Apologies for the small size of the Ashurbanipal image, but that is the Louvre for you.)

A wheel to wheel attack between two lines of chariots, using the horses as equid battering rams, would inevitable mean mutual destruction of the vehicles and, effectively, the animals.  Some of the crew might survive, possibly with major injuries.  The military advantage of using your elite military personnel and expensive technology in this way escapes me.

But would it?  Assuming we get one of the seemingly very rare cases of one side not chickening out beforehand (I think we may be broadly in agreement that one side usually would), we get horses coming together at speed, but does this actually kill or even maim the horses?  I would imagine it would produce some bruising, but how sure are we about crippling injuries and/or deaths?  The chariot crews themselves are safe from the initial impact and only have to worry about inertia vs safety straps and the inherent strength of chariot frames (if either fails they go headfirst into the rear of a horse - a relatively soft landing, considering, provided there is no follow-up with the rear hooves.)  The chariots I think would survive an instant deceleration from 15 mph to zero (maybe some day someone can try a chariot 'crash dummies' test).

"Bow-based" - the bow is central to the function of chariot as a weapon system. In simple terms, shooting is more important than crashing.
"manoeouvre" - about using the mobility of the chariot, rather than just its kinetic energy.  In simple terms, turning and moving is more important than crashing.

OK, thanks, although I would suggest substituting 'charging' for 'crashing' for a more accurate tactical picture.  Does this 'bow-based tactic' require a shoot-and-scoot system and complete avoidance of melee in any shape or form?  Or would it permit something of each, depending upon circumstances?

[Dangun]

The one time Indian chariots discernibly encountered the Western historical sphere, Alexander disposed of them so effectively they never even had a chance to show whether they had a role.

Not my period. So I have an obvious question.
Do we know how or why they were disposed of?

[PMBardunias]

Would a chariot need out-accelerate a man if it was meant to be used exclusively for a missile role? The chariot wouldn't need to get closer than about 30 yards from the infantry it was skirmishing, and if the infantry charged it, it would reach full speed long before the infantry were close enough to attack it. And why would infantry charge? That would get them out of formation, making them vulnerable targets for a chariot counter-charge.

So the present state of the hypothesis: the moment chariots could not effectively charge infantry, at least on occasion, they were dumped. Their role as skirmisher taxi wasn't enough on its own to keep them in existence.

Infantry could surely swarm a chariot, this is why they had chariot runners.  Just as elephants were best accompanied by a light infantry screen to keep light troops from mobbing them, a chariot too would be vulnerable to being mobbed if it came too close to infantry prior to turning.  In fact I think it was elephants that put the nail in the chariot coffin.  With chariots, you had missile platforms OR later scythed chariots that did damage by driving along the edges of formations or through mobs of broken troops at a swift pace. With elephants you had a much more elevated missile platform AND a means of doing great damage along the front ranks of your foes or through mobs of broken ranks.  Neither the chariot, nor the elephant crashed into deep formed ranks like a bulldozer, because to do so was suicidal. Both require mobility to defend their flanks. With chariots this is obvious, but if you know your book of Maccabees, or have ever seen an African pygmy kill and elephant with a spear to the gut, you know that elephants too are highly vulnerable from the flanks.  This is most obviously shown by the tactics used against both elephants and scythed chariots.  You clear a lane for them to go down, chariots at Cunaxa, Elephants at Zama, then either kill them as they stall from flank attack, or shunt them off behind your ranks to be driven off by light troops.  It is often overlooked that in neither case would this tactic work if chariots or elephants regularly charged directly into massed men, rather than along the front and flanks of formations or expected to slaughter broken troops.

[Justin Swanton]

Would a chariot need out-accelerate a man if it was meant to be used exclusively for a missile role? The chariot wouldn't need to get closer than about 30 yards from the infantry it was skirmishing, and if the infantry charged it, it would reach full speed long before the infantry were close enough to attack it. And why would infantry charge? That would get them out of formation, making them vulnerable targets for a chariot counter-charge.

So the present state of the hypothesis: the moment chariots could not effectively charge infantry, at least on occasion, they were dumped. Their role as skirmisher taxi wasn't enough on its own to keep them in existence.

Infantry could surely swarm a chariot, this is why they had chariot runners.  Just as elephants were best accompanied by a light infantry screen to keep light troops from mobbing them, a chariot too would be vulnerable to being mobbed if it came too close to infantry prior to turning.  In fact I think it was elephants that put the nail in the chariot coffin.  With chariots, you had missile platforms OR later scythed chariots that did damage by driving along the edges of formations or through mobs of broken troops at a swift pace. With elephants you had a much more elevated missile platform AND a means of doing great damage along the front ranks of your foes or through mobs of broken ranks.  Neither the chariot, nor the elephant crashed into deep formed ranks like a bulldozer, because to do so was suicidal. Both require mobility to defend their flanks. With chariots this is obvious, but if you know your book of Maccabees, or have ever seen an African pygmy kill and elephant with a spear to the gut, you know that elephants too are highly vulnerable from the flanks.  This is most obviously shown by the tactics used against both elephants and scythed chariots.  You clear a lane for them to go down, chariots at Cunaxa, Elephants at Zama, then either kill them as they stall from flank attack, or shunt them off behind your ranks to be driven off by light troops.  It is often overlooked that in neither case would this tactic work if chariots or elephants regularly charged directly into massed men, rather than along the front and flanks of formations or expected to slaughter broken troops.

But that's just it - infantry couldn't swarm a chariot. Chariots could turn on a dime and be off long before the infantry could reach them. My own theory on chariot runners is that they were there to dispatch infantry that had been knocked over by the chariot but had survived. Elephants don't have anything like the speed of a chariot and were not employed to charge through infantry formations, but rather disrupt them from the front, killing many infantry in the process, as at Bagradas.

My take is that chariots did crash into deep formations because horses were able to knock down infantry that weren't properly disposed to stop them, hence the need for specific formations like the anti-cavalry fulcum, which involved turning shields into an overlapping wall and making the first three ranks bunch together into a compact mass, much stabler than a man standing alone.

Clearing lanes was a trick that required trained and disciplined troops to pull off, and it worked the same way as the punctuated Roman lines at Zama - elephants and horses will naturally follow the line of least resistance and go down inviting spaces, keeping clear of a mass of men making terrific racket. But notice that it was only at Zama that the Romans finally caught on to the tactic, as it was only at Gaugamela that someone tried it against scythed chariots for the first time.

[Jim Webster]

But that's just it - infantry couldn't swarm a chariot. Chariots could turn on a dime and be off long before the infantry could reach them.

I think the idea is that chariot runners support their chariot when their chariot is in combat with the other chariots
I think the idea is that the two lines of chariots 'clash' by passing through each other, and then the chariot runners mug those weakened by the clash
Given the fact that a chariot has a far larger turning circle than a man on foot or a horse, especially when moving at speed (or with one horse or driver wounded) then this would give the chariot force with chariot runners a big advantage over the chariot force without chariot runners