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This thread has been provoked by the discussions on columns in battle.  That discussion has concentrated on the march column but it did bring up the fact that in antiquity and the Middle Ages, armies occassionally fielded very deep formations, either rectalinear or triangular.

These armies clearly felt there was advantage in doing this.  What was it, and how do we best model it on the tabletop?

As a starter, I'll throw out a few theories I've read in various places

Weight - either literally pushing or creating a momentum/inertia effect.
Psychology - place more shaky troops in the middle of a dense block so they feel safer and supported
Command/control/manoeuver - put less skilled or experienced men in the middle and use experienced/trained men front and rear to make the whole thing handleable

The last two in particular seem influenced by 19th century views.

So, what is going on and how do reflect it?

Just throwing one or two ideas on the table.

Melee combat between infantry seems broadly to be of two kinds:

The first, best represented by swordfighting though not limited to sword-armed troops, is a backwards and forwards affair. One lunges forward with a flurry of blows, and gives way if pressure/fatigue become too much. This requires that the rear ranks give the front rank troops the fighting space they need, recoiling if necessary.

The second, best seen in the phalanx, is a shoving affair. Sarissas lowered, the troops advance steadily into the enemy, who either holds his ground or is shoved backwards. In this case rear rank infantry press against the front rankers, impelling them forwards and hopefully bowling the enemy over. At least that is how I have been given to understand it.

This being the case, depth helps the second kind of melee but not the first. A certain amount of depth is nevertheless necessary for the first kind:

a) to prevent the line being too easily ruptured, and

b) to enable tired troops to be replaced by fresh ones.

Modelling it on the tabletop....most systems seem to give a + bonus in combat for second, third and even fourth rank support for some troop types (DBM: +1 for second and third rank phalangite, -1 to opponent for fourth rank).

In my own system, the second rank bases of the same command group can give morale points to the embattled bases in the front line, replicating the fresh-tired troop substitution. There exists a +1 modifier for phalanxes in depth, but I have not yet worked out all the implications of depth support to the combat factors.

As I said, just ideas on the table...

The ideas are good, Justin.  A few thoughts on Antony's opening remarks:

Quote
As a starter, I'll throw out a few theories I've read in various places

Weight - either literally pushing or creating a momentum/inertia effect.
Psychology - place more shaky troops in the middle of a dense block so they feel safer and supported
Command/control/manoeuver - put less skilled or experienced men in the middle and use experienced/trained men front and rear to make the whole thing handleable

The Theban 25-deep or 50-deep battle line seems to have relied on weight, momentum, inertia and general unshiftability for its successes: at Leuctra in 317 BC it was, with a little help from its friends in the Sacred Band, committed against Sparta's best and what followed was interesting.

"Now when Cleombrotus began to lead his army against the enemy, in the first place, before the troops under him so much as perceived that he was advancing, the horsemen had already joined battle and those of the Lacedaemonians had speedily been worsted; then in their flight they had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the Thebans were now charging upon them. Nevertheless, the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be known from this clear indication: they would not have been able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time. [14] But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the royal bodyguard, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being pushed back, gave way. Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp they grounded their arms at the spot from which they had set forth." - Xenophon, Hellenica 6.13-14.

The impression one gets is that the Spartans, fighting twelve deep, were pushed most of the way back to camp by the Thebans, fighting fifty deep.  The fifty-deep formation appears to have conferred superior pushing-power despite inferior troop quality.

This ability to storm forward carrying all before one was one apparent advantage of the very deep battle formation.  However among Greeks the Thebans alone made regular use of it and there was no rush to duplicate it either by their allies or their opponents.  We are not told the depth of the formation in which they fought at Chaeronea against the Macedonians in 338 BC, but however deep they were they were not successful against the Macedonian phalanx, which at that time seems to have fought 8 deep but at double density (18" per man) and with longer weapons.

Morale seems to have been helped by very deep formations.  One consistent feature of Biblical armies is the large numbers mentioned in contemporary sources, and if we resist the modern reflex to reduce these by a power of ten or two we are left with the impression that very deep deployments were the norm.  Possibly reinforcing this picture is the persistent Greek reporting of Persians fielding vast numbers in confined spaces (60,000 at Marathon against 10,000 Greeks; 300,000 at Plataea, etc.) which would be consistent with a pattern of large numbers in deep formations as the legacy of the Biblical era.

If one fields very large numbers, one soon encounters a limitation, namely that there are only so many good quality officers.  By arranging profuse manpower in deep formations one maximises the use if not effectiveness of one's limited number of better officers (a command and control reason).  Furthermore, being in the middle of a large formation will add confidence to troops plucked from unwarlike occupations and conscripted to follow the standard, men who may have little confidence in their own abilities (morale reason).  Given that massed conscripts will lack tactical skill, massing them in depth gives them a staying-power not conferred by shallower formations.

That said, Xenophon records Egyptians deployed 100 deep at the battle of Thymbra (Cyrus vs Croesus, 547 BC).  If we restrain the reflex to dismiss the battle and the numbers as fabrication or fable, we are left with another nation of the late Biblical period (actually well into the Classical) using very deep formations.  The Egyptians were considered to be the best troops on Croesus' side (they stayed and fought when everyone else ran) so would not have used this depth for morale purposes.

I can think of three likely reasons for Biblical armies fielding deep formations.

1) Archery - this form of combat was very popular in Biblical armies, and with archers massed 100 deep on both sides and exchanging volleys everyone would feel they were having a real battle.  However the Egyptians fielded at Thymbra (and indeed the square formations of Egyptian infantry on Ramses II's reliefs) seem to have been spearmen, so this leaves the second reason.

2) Inertia - a solid formation 100 deep would be very hard to resist except by an opponent of vastly superior combat capability or similar depth.  Morale plays a part - men in a shallow formation tend to feel apprehensive at the approach of a deep formation - but contact would be the real test and progress after contact would have to be sustained by the pressure of men behind the file leader.

3) Chariots - before the existence of infantry with sufficient initiative and training to let chariots pass through their lines, the only real counter was to make the lines too think for chariots to pas through.  If manpower was prolific, deep lines were the answer.

That scratches the surface of deep Biblical formations, but is just a curtain-raiser on the topic as a whole.

Moving on to the classical period (and armies) proper, the Romans appear to have used a battleline along the following, er, lines.  This is a working hypothesis rather than a signed, sealed certainty, but it seems to fit what we have.

Livian Legion (c.394-314 BC)

First line (hastati): six ranks of heavy infantry and two ranks of leves (light infantry).  The leves do the pre-battle skirmishing and then form the rear two ranks.

Second line (principes): eight ranks of heavy infantry.

Third line (triarii): six ranks of heavy infantry

Reserve line (rorarii): six ranks of heavy infantry.  The rorarii are 'top-up' troops who reinforce the hastati and principes when the latte rhave been in action and taken casualties.

Total depth: 8+8+6 = 22 ranks plus six ranks of rorarii, the latter not really contributing to total depth on account of their role.

At emergency strength, the legion adds six ranks of accensi (triarii lookalikes recruited from men normally rejected for military service) adding another six ranks for a total depth of 28.

Polybian legion (c.314-108 BC)

First line (hastati): six ranks of heavy infantry + 2 ranks of velites

Second line (principes): six ranks of heavy infantry + 2 ranks of velites

Third line (triarii): three ranks of heavy infantry + 2 ranks of velites

Total depth: 8+8+5 = 21 ranks.

At emergency strength, the principes and hastati each acquire additional men and increase depth to ten ranks.  Total depth becomes 25.

This depth permits an arrangement not found in Greek (or indeed Biblical) armies, namely the use of relieving lines.  Italy seems to have had a tradition of close combat without much if any letup over an afternoon of fighting, and the approach taken to maintain durability was to have two fighting lines, one of which would relieve the other when exhaustion set in.  This was a once-per-battle event (at least we have no accounts of it occurring more than once in a battle), and from c.394 BC the camp guards, the triarii, were fielded as a third emergency fighting line, perhaps on the basis that if the battle went badly they might as well fight there (and cover the retreat of the remnants of the army) as on the border of the camp.

The Roman use of depth was thus not to confer impetus but to provide endurance by permitting relief.  As a by-product, the commitment of a fresh fighting line against opponents who were tired would also provide an advantage at the sharp end.

One is tempted to hypothesise how a Roman line of battle would have fared against a 50-deep Theban 'steamroller'.  Unfortunately there are too many unknowns involved, not least how legionaries fared against traditional Greek hoplites (by the time our sources pick up the story of the Greek cities in southern Italy, they are calling in help from outside and Pyrrhus' actions are described rather than theirs).

To summarise so far.

Depth confers
1) Stability - a deep line is less likely to be pierced or otherwise overcome.
2) Impetus (if cohesive) - a deep formation seems to be more than the sum of the individuals therein.
3) Morale advantages - a large number of men in close proximity, all doing the same thing, adds confidence.
4) Command benefits - the difficulty of commanding a line of men is directly proportional to its length up to a point, after which it becomes exponentially more difficult with every increase in breadth.

Using depth slightly differently (as multiple lines in succession rather than as a single deep formation) allows line relief and/or the ability to retain a reserve.

One may note in passing that the Romans would on occasion adopt the 'battering-ram' approach, attempting to breach the enemy's centre, seemingly in a single formation of joined-up lines (e.g. at the Trebia and Cannae).  This melding of the usually separate lines into a single deep whole may be what Roman writers refer to as an 'agmen', traditionally (mis?)translated as 'column', as opposed to the usual 'acies', line of battle (often 'acies triplex' to indicate its three-line composition).

My thoughts,

You need a suitable depth so the line is not ruptured (picture the difference between a single rank and lets say a line 4 deep, as a man falls in the single rank that creates a hole).

Shoving idea, no I have never found it to be pushed in my back in a crowd, when also trying to fight someone to my front a real no no. As for the idea of a rugby scrum, thats a mutually supporting formation, with both sides co-operating to form it. If it collapses, people can get hurt.

Weapons with extra reach benefiting from a deeper formation, yes I can see that working.

Now the real benefit of extra ranks is the herd instinct, we take comfort from seeing a lot of us so that bolsters our morale. Likewise when others run, there is an instinct to copy them.

So, extra ranks if your weapons make it a better idea (or that neat Roman idea of line replacement) or to stop you running away. Ranks simply as such giving an advantage in combat, no.

So in TIDC no fighting advantage for being deep (except bonus for ranks, 3 for pikes, one for long spears). A plus bonus for morale of a deep unit that lost melee however, allowing them to stay fighting.

two definitions of depth on the go here.

depth within a unit (Thebans, Macedonians) and the successive lines of support offered by the roman system.

quite different things, which I doubt can be safely compared.

I only view depth as something you can ascribe as conferring advantages onto the former - where the depth is of ranks within a unit. 

and I'd suggest that there is another advantage to offer here.

only the very front ranks can really see what is going on up front, those behind are pretty clueless visually.  But their very presence makes it much harder for those at the front to run away, while convesly, the file closer system used by the helenistics, ensures that there is a constant 'two steps forward' pressure coming which forces those in front to keep up some momentum .

if there was an added weight to the push, it would come from that, rather than from the extra men packing the scrum.

its not coincidental that the extra depth formations seem to be hand in hand with longer weapons - or with static defensive mobs who are expected to hold their position but do little else, I think.

so I'd look at morale advantages and stability

I doubt any fighting advantage inherently, but there would be a difficulty in stopping an advance once it started in melee - no bonus at the first contact, but a push back rule which did confer an advantage - but which mandated a continued follow up if it has once begun.
that I, if the phalanx choses to start to follow up, it has to keep going and has an advantage to it in successive rounds as a consequence.

To clarify, as Mark said, there is deployment of an army in depth and the deployment of single continuous bodies in depth.  I was thinking particularly about the latter.

In terms of long weapons and deep formations, Mark is right they usually go hand in hand but I don't think they are essential.  How many 18 ft pikes extend beyond the front rank - 5 or 6?  Patrick has a theory that Macedonian phalanxes often fought 8 deep like hoplites, so maybe not essential to go deep.  As to the later Swiss, they develop going round in deep blocks before they have many pikes, so they are probably tapping into other advantages of depth, as we have been discussing.

One aspect of depth we need to bear in mind is the need for order.  For example, if your deep block get too crushed together, it stops having the virtues and starts becoming a powerless crowd, capable of squeezing the life out of its members Hillsborough-style. 

The point about deep formations and long weapons is not the length of the weapons projecting.

its that the shuffling of the men at the front has the extra length of the pike to stabilise itself when the file closer at the back calls two steps forward.

I've friends who were involved in some very heavy demonstrations against riot police in the 80's.
they are quite clear that what counts as a step when you are at the back or even the middle is a lot less when you are at the front and 5 metres from the riot cops.

their favourite example is the wife (row 6) shouting two steps forward, and the husband (front row) shouting back '&*£-off Honey, we are close enough as it is.

having that extra pole length gives you the wriggle room to make it clear to the file loser at row 18 that there may not be the space to push forward anymore, without totally buggering up the formation and cohesion that it would do if you were already at sword lengths - for an example of which, you can read Caesar and Cannae.

Having the pike length thus leaves it up to the front rankers to lead, not the rear to accidentally push once you get down to the business end of contact.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 22, 2013, 07:56:36 AM
To clarify, as Mark said, there is deployment of an army in depth and the deployment of single continuous bodies in depth.  I was thinking particularly about the latter.

In terms of long weapons and deep formations, Mark is right they usually go hand in hand but I don't think they are essential.  How many 18 ft pikes extend beyond the front rank - 5 or 6?  Patrick has a theory that Macedonian phalanxes often fought 8 deep like hoplites, so maybe not essential to go deep.  As to the later Swiss, they develop going round in deep blocks before they have many pikes, so they are probably tapping into other advantages of depth, as we have been discussing.

One aspect of depth we need to bear in mind is the need for order.  For example, if your deep block get too crushed together, it stops having the virtues and starts becoming a powerless crowd, capable of squeezing the life out of its members Hillsborough-style.

Polybius (XVIII.29) lets us know exactly how many pike points extend beyond the front man in the later Hellenistic phalanx: five (with 21' pikes).  With the files each having 18" of frontage, any opponent deployed with the usual (for non-pike armies) 3' per man frontage would have ten pike points facing him.  Density rather than depth seems to have been the point that gave strength and irresistibility to the Macedonian phalanx.

Justin and Mark have touched upon the morale aspects of deeper formations, and this does seem to be a very important feature (and was a critical consideration in the later adoption of column as an attack formation for French revolutionary troops).  Control and morale are two big plusses with deep formations, and if these are endemic conditions because of having large quantities of ill-trained manpower with less than dedicated morale, such formations offer a way to remain effective on the battlefield (or even just to remain on the battlefield ...).

Fifty-deep shoving is a non-starter in a 20th/21st century crowd, but may have been practicable for men dressed in firm cuirasses and holding shields with a design that protected their breathing-space.  The equipment of the 5th century Greek hoplite seems to have good anti-crush properties, at least according to Paul Bardunias, who made a study of this.  Since hoplites did not normally fight 50 deep (only Thebans did so regularly) normal equipment would not be expected to sustain a 50-deep crush, so inertia and sustained morale were probably the main feature of the Theban formation, though Xenophon's account of Leuctra does emphasise the Spartans being 'pushed' off the field by the much deeper Thebans.

The Swiss, as Anthony observes, began to use deep, fast-moving formations on the battlefield.  These 'keil' were not connected, but were coordinated.  Since only one or two ranks of polearm troops could get at the enemy and the Swiss did not have anti-crush armour and shields, the remaining ranks were presumably there to add morale, inertia and a general feeling of security to all in the formation.

There is one more aspect of deep formations that can enhance one's own morale and affect that of the enemy.  Roman accounts (Caesar in particular) emphasise the importance of the 'war shout' as a means of getting one's own troops to a peak of effectiveness and taking the edge off the enemy.  A deep formation can produce a very impressive war shout - a feature wasted at Cunaxa, when Artaxerxes' army came on in silence after Cyrus had specifically told his army not to be disturbed by the enemy's war shout.

Anthony's point about order is very important: the classical file organisation was designed to allow the keeping of order under strenuous circumstances: each man knew his place and would actively attempt to maintain it.  Having this specific allocation of individuals also made it swift and easy to form up a subunit, major unit or even the army at short notice.  Conversely, when a deep formation came into being without order, e.g. at Dupplin Moor, it could just make it easier for the opponent to wipe out the packed troops who were unable to lift a weapon in their own defence.

QuoteDensity rather than depth seems to have been the point that gave strength and irresistibility to the Macedonian phalanx.

Well said, but let us also remember, only whilst it retained its formation. So depth and formation required for weapons like pikes, long spears to be effective. (as I think you have also pointed out).

But I still don't like the idea of someone pushing me in the back whilst I am trying to fight, even if I can breath.

If fighting just means hanging onto a long spear whilst advancing then getting shoved in the back is not too bad. The trick is not to lose your grip on your sarissa since the pressure you maintain with it must equal the pressure you are being subjected to by the rear ranks. I wonder if there wasn't a way of tying the sarissa shaft to the body, or if several rear ranks helped grip it.

Not for me, I think I would have tendency to fall forward and I suppose onto the back of the guy in front of me, all OK till we get to the front rank, where the guy in front has no support and falls flat on his face, so then does the guy leaning on him. And the formation becomes a pile of rather confused bodies. Much to the amusement of their enemies I suppose.

I suggest that those inclined to believe in the 'shoving' theory try it out for themselves. Get a 16 stone friend to lean against your back (no hands of course) and see how you feel (with something soft to fall on of course). Do you have to lean back to maintain your balance?

Quoteand was a critical consideration in the later adoption of column as an attack formation for French revolutionary troops

actually, that had nothing whatsoever to do with it. 

but Napoleonic era columns are nothing like the ones we are discussing here.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 22, 2013, 11:56:34 AM

QuoteDensity rather than depth seems to have been the point that gave strength and irresistibility to the Macedonian phalanx.

Well said, but let us also remember, only whilst it retained its formation. So depth and formation required for weapons like pikes, long spears to be effective. (as I think you have also pointed out).

But I still don't like the idea of someone pushing me in the back whilst I am trying to fight, even if I can breath.

Yes, formation, or rather order, is critical to pike formations.  A pike formation that has lost or cannot attain its order is one of the sorriest collections of chaps one will ever find on a battlefield - especially if there is a bunch of elephants about 50 yards away.

The 'othismos' or shoving phase of a battle (notably a hoplite battle) followed after the 'doratismos' or initial clash of spears (and shields and maybe the occasional head) as the file leaders on each side came together.  This indicates that only once contact was made would the shoving begin, which would obviate the otherwise rather tricky forward displacement problem.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 22, 2013, 12:43:52 PM
If fighting just means hanging onto a long spear whilst advancing then getting shoved in the back is not too bad. The trick is not to lose your grip on your sarissa since the pressure you maintain with it must equal the pressure you are being subjected to by the rear ranks. I wonder if there wasn't a way of tying the sarissa shaft to the body, or if several rear ranks helped grip it.

Pike (as opposed to hoplite) formations may have done less in the way of shoving, relying more on pushing their points.  I seem to recall references to pikes going through a (Roman) shield and the man behind it, which would suggest they had not inconsiderable penetrating power, but at Cynoscephalae and Pydna they seem to have pushed the Romans back at speed rather than pincushioned them, except when some Romans (like the Paeligni at Pydna) tried to make a stand as opposed to backpedalling away.  That was kebab time (presumably pikemen 3 and 4 in the file could use their points to help to push bodies off the pikes held by pikemen 1 and 2).

othismos Pat, really?

come on.  surely you don't think othismos is an accurate description of a battle situation.

Yep I am not a fan of the othismos shoving idea,

http://www.xlegio.ru/pdfs/othismos.pdf

Mr Goldsworthys view also considers why Greek formations were typically 8 ranks deep if there was no combat enhancement for so doing, so I won't bother commenting further. His thoughts echo my own.

"Iphicrates told his men, that he would ensure that they were victorious, if at a given command, they would encourage each other and advance by only a single pace. At the crisis of the battle, when victory hung in the balance, he gave the signal; the army responded with a shout, after which they advanced a pace and defeated the enemy." - Polyaenus, Stratagems, Iphicrates 27.

"Thrusting shield against shield, they shoved and fought and killed and fell." - Xenophon, Agesilaus 2.13

etc.

Sorry, gentlemen, but othismos is a reality whether believed in or not.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 22, 2013, 05:47:26 PM
Yep I am not a fan of the othismos shoving idea,

In a recent discussion on Ancmed, Paul Macdonnell Staff made a fairly good case from a linguistic basis that othismos means "the getting stuck in phase" and doesn't refer to actual pushing, but contrasts with a "spear-play phase" where the two sides are feeling each other out, not going for decision.  But we already have an othismos thread  :)

Back to depth, I personally feel the momentum/inertia argument is better than the physical shoving.  It makes it harder to give ground and there is, in advance, an impetus.

As to similarities with Napoleonic and later columns, Mark is right to sound a note of caution.  However, I do think the controllability and the safety in numbers aspects may certainly be factors in earlier deep formations too.  Do any ancient authors comment on these aspects of deep formations in their own time?

Quote from: Erpingham on July 22, 2013, 06:35:10 PM

As to similarities with Napoleonic and later columns, Mark is right to sound a note of caution.  However, I do think the controllability and the safety in numbers aspects may certainly be factors in earlier deep formations too.  Do any ancient authors comment on these aspects of deep formations in their own time?

Perhaps my post was poorly stated: I simply intended to point out that the same consideration of morale was a critical factor in persuading the French revolutionary leadership to adopt deep attack formations.

Comments on controllability and safety in numbers aspects seem to be lacking, but we have a nice little piece on the disadvantages of a 50-deep formation in Xenophon's Hellenica.  The occasion (in 404 BC) involved Thrasybulus leading the Athenian exiles against the 'Thirty Tyrants', pro-Spartan oligarchs who controlled Athens.

"Soon after this Thrasybulus took the men of Phyle, who had now gathered to the number of about one thousand, and came by night to Piraeus. When the Thirty learned of this, they at once set out against him, with the Laconian guardsmen and their own cavalry and hoplites; then they advanced along the carriage road which leads up to Piraeus. [11] And for a time the men from Phyle tried to prevent their coming up, but when they saw that the line of the town wall, extensive as it was, needed a large force for its defence, whereas they were not yet numerous, they gathered in a compact body on the hill of Munichia. And the men from the city, when they came to the market-place of Hippodamus, first formed themselves in line of battle, so that they filled the road which leads to the temple of Artemis of Munichia and the sanctuary of Bendis; and they made a line not less than fifty shields in depth; then, in this formation, they advanced up the hill. [12] As for the men from Phyle, they too filled the road, but they made a line not more than ten hoplites in depth. Behind the hoplites, however, were stationed peltasts and light javelin-men, and behind them the stone-throwers [petroboloi]. And of these there were many, for they came from that neighbourhood.

The forces of the 'tyrants' deploy 50 deep, but their uphill foes are able to bring to bear a devastating array of missiles which break the cohesion of the attacking formation, as Thrasybulus eventually gets round to explaining.

And now, while the enemy were advancing, Thrasybulus ordered his men to ground their shields and did the same himself, though still keeping the rest of his arms, and then took his stand in the midst of them and spoke as follows: [13] "Fellow-citizens, I wish to inform some of you and to remind others that those who form the right wing of the approaching force are the very men whom you turned to flight and pursued four days ago, but the men upon the extreme left—they, yes they, are the Thirty, who robbed us of our city when we were guilty of no wrong, and drove us from our homes, and proscribed those who were dearest to us. But now, behold, they have found themselves in a situation in which they never expected to be, but we always prayed that they might be. [14] For with arms in our hands we stand face to face with them; and the gods, because once we were seized while dining or sleeping or trading, because some of us also were banished when we were not only guilty of no offence, but were not even in the city, are now manifestly fighting on our side. For in fair weather they send a storm, when it is to our advantage, and when we attack, they grant us, though we are few in number and our enemies are many, to set up trophies of victory; [15] and now in like manner they have brought us to a place where the men before you, because they are marching up hill, cannot throw either spears [ballein = heavy missiles] or javelins akontizein over the heads of those in front of them, while we, throwing both spears [dorata] and javelins [akontia] and stones [petrous] down hill, shall reach them and strike down many.

Note the implied inference that rear ranks of the 50-deep formation might be able to cast missiles were they fighting on level ground rather than uphill.

[16] And though one would have supposed that we should have to fight with their front ranks at least on even terms, yet in fact, if you let fly your missiles with a will, as you should, no one will miss his man when the road is full of them, and they in their efforts to protect themselves will be continually skulking under their shields. You will therefore be able, just as if they were blind men, to strike them wherever you please and then leap upon them and overthrow them. [17] And now, comrades, we must so act that each man shall feel in his breast that he is chiefly responsible for the victory. For victory, God willing, will now give back to us country and homes, freedom and honours, children, to such as have them, and wives. Happy, indeed, are those of us who shall win the victory and live to behold the gladdest day of all! And happy also he who is slain; for no one, however rich he may be, will gain a monument so glorious. Now, when the right moment comes, I will strike up the paean; and when we call Enyalius to our aid, then let us all, moved by one spirit, take vengeance upon these men for the outrages we have suffered." [18]

After saying these words and turning about to face the enemy, he kept quiet; for the seer bade them not to attack until one of their own number was either killed or wounded. "But as soon as that happens," he said, "we shall lead on, and to you who follow will come victory, but death, methinks, to me." [19] And his saying did not prove false, for when they had taken up their shields, he, as though led on by a kind of fate, leaped forth first of all, fell upon the enemy, and was slain, and he lies buried at the ford of the Cephisus; but the others were victorious, and pursued the enemy as far as the level ground." - Xenophon, Hellenica II.4.10-19

The disadvantages of the 50-deep formation here lie in the fact that it is attacking uphill and is incapable of supporting itself.  With any impetus inhibited by an overhead shower of missiles, the advantage of the formation is lost.  The reference to being unable to shoot over the 50-deep formation appears to refer to individuals in the formation itself, as supporting missile troops (i.e. a separate missile contingent which might shoot over the hoplites) are not mentioned as part of the oligarchs' forces.  This may be oversight on Xenophon's part, but the possibility of missiles being delivered by middle and rear ranks of the 50-deep formation is interesting as it suggests a role for the men in the deeper ranks and would exonerate them from 'othismos', which would be limited to the more forward ranks.

The next stage of that particular campaign also has the oligarchs adopting a very deep formation (how deep is not specified) and using it to 'push' their opponents into flight and/or disadvantageous terrain:

"Now Thrasybulus and the rest of his troops—that is, the hoplites—when they saw the situation, came running to lend aid, and quickly formed in line, eight deep, in front of their comrades.  And Pausanias, being hard pressed and retreating about four or five stadia to a hill, sent orders to the Lacedaemonians and to the allies to join him. There he formed an extremely deep phalanx and led the charge against the Athenians. The Athenians did indeed accept battle at close quarters; but in the end some of them were pushed [exeōsthēsan = thrust, forced] into the mire of the marsh of Halae and others gave way; and about one hundred and fifty of them were slain." - Xenophon, Hellenica II.4.34

The deep formation gains success by shoving the shallow formation.

There is nothing which we can apply from Napoleonic columns to this debate.

Napoleonic columns are a series of successive lines (two or three men deep depending on doctrine) which maintained the distance at normal spacing which would allow them to wheel on the spot and form directly on the corner of the other.  that is a lot of distance between each one.

this is absolutely and totally unrelated to the discussion here about the merits of 8, 12, 18, etc deep single unit formations.

additionally, the command and control systems used at every level of this period is totally difference form that required for Napoleonic's -.

and there is the gunpowder effect.

in short.

no comparison to make, pleas, don't even try, its really not worth the effort, and undermines the comparison.  better to just state that you think it might be easier to control a formation with 24 men deep than a formation 8 men deep using the same manpower.

Quote from: Mark G on July 23, 2013, 07:37:21 AM
There is nothing which we can apply from Napoleonic columns to this debate.

Nor are we attempting to.

*

Xenophon gives us another example of a very deep formation, this time emphasising its staying-power while pointing out its lack of flexibility.

"Egyptians were under sail to join them, and they gave the number as one hundred and twenty thousand men armed with shields that came to their feet, with huge spears, such as they carry even to this day, and with sabres [kopisi*]."

*A word coincidentally very similar to the Egyptin 'kopesh'

Cyrus has this to say (or Xenophon via 'Cyrus') about the way Croesus' army deploys:

"And so," said Cyrus, "you are acquainted not only with their numbers but also with their order of battle."

"Yes, by Zeus," answered Araspas, "I am; and I know also how they are planning to conduct the battle."

"Good," said Cyrus; "still, tell us first, in round numbers, how many of them there are." [19]

"Well," he replied, "with the exception of the Egyptians, they are all drawn up thirty deep, both foot and horse, and their front extends about forty stadia; for I took especial pains to find out how much space they covered." [20]

"And how are the Egyptians drawn up?" asked Cyrus; "for you said 'with the exception of the Egyptians.'"

"They are drawn up in formations—each one of ten thousand men, a hundred square; for this, they said, was their manner of arranging their order of battle at home. And Croesus consented to their being so drawn up, but very reluctantly, for he wished to outflank your army as much as possible." - Xenophon, Hellenica VI.3.18-20

And concerning the deep phalanx:

"And do you think, Cyrus," said one of the generals, "that drawn up with lines so shallow we shall be a match for so deep a phalanx?"

"When phalanxes are too deep to reach the enemy with weapons," answered Cyrus, "how do you think they can either hurt their enemy or help their friends? [23] For my part, I would rather have these hoplites who are arranged a hundred deep drawn up ten thousand deep; for in that case we should have very few to fight against. According to the depth that I shall give my line of battle, I think I shall bring the entire line into action and make it everywhere mutually helpful. [24] I shall bring up the spearmen immediately behind the heavy-armed troops, and the bowmen immediately behind the spearmen; for why should any one put in the front ranks those who themselves acknowledge that they could never withstand the shock of battle in a hand-to-hand encounter? But with the heavy-armed troops as a shield in front of them, they will stand their ground; and the one division with their spears, the other with their arrows will rain destruction upon the enemy, over the heads of all the lines in front. And whatever harm any one does to the enemy, in all this he obviously lightens the task of his comrades. [25] Behind all the rest I shall station the so-called rear-guard of veteran reserves. For just as a house, without a strong foundation or without the things that make a roof, is good for nothing, so likewise a phalanx is good for nothing, unless both front and rear are composed of valiant men. - ibid.22-25

Cyrus' counter to these very deep opponents is a mixed deployment with one fighting line and one supporting missile line, coincidentally similar to that of Thrasybulus at Phyle.

Skipping a good part of the narrative, Croesus' battle plan is anticipated and thwarted by Cyrus, who routs Croesus' army with the exception of this contingent of Egyptians.  A scythed chariot charge opens the attack on this particular contingent.

But in the place where Abradatas and his companions charged, the Egyptians could not make an opening for them because the men on either side of them stood firm; consequently, those of the enemy who stood upright were struck in the furious charge of the horses and overthrown, and those who fell were crushed to pieces by the horses and the wheels, they and their arms; and whatever was caught in the scythes—everything, arms and men, was horribly mangled. [32]

As in this indescribable confusion the wheels bounded over the heaps of every sort, Abradatas and others of those who went with him into the charge were thrown to the ground, and there, though they proved themselves men of valour, they were cut down and slain. - ibid.VI.4.31-32

Following the chariots came the main force of Persian infantry.

Then the Persians, following up the attack at the point where Abradatas and his men had made their charge, made havoc of the enemy in their confusion; but where the Egyptians were still unharmed—and there were many such—they advanced to oppose the Persians. [33] Here, then, was a dreadful conflict with spears and lances and swords. The Egyptians, however, had the advantage both in numbers and in weapons; for the spears that they use even unto this day are long and powerful, and their shields cover their bodies much more effectually than corselets and targets, and as they rest against the shoulder they are a help in shoving. So, locking their shields together, they advanced and shoved. [34] And because the Persians had to hold out their little shields clutched in their hands, they were unable to hold the line, but were forced back foot by foot, giving and taking blows, until they came up under cover of the moving towers. When they reached that point, the Egyptians in turn received a volley from the towers; and the forces in the extreme rear would not allow any retreat on the part of either archers or lancers [akontistai = javelinmen], but with drawn swords they compelled them to shoot and hurl. [35] Then there was a dreadful carnage, an awful din of arms and missiles of every sort, and a great tumult of men, as they called to one another for aid, or exhorted one another, or invoked the gods. - ibid.32-35

The Egyptians forced back their opponents by 'shoving', as seems to have been the norm for these deep formations.

Cyrus, arriving in this sector, worked out a way to deal with the otherwise irresistible mass of this deep phalanx.

At this juncture Cyrus came up in pursuit of the part that had been opposed to him; and when he saw that the Persians had been forced from their position, he was grieved; but as he realized that he could in no way check the enemy's progress more quickly than by marching around behind them, he ordered his men to follow him and rode around to the rear. There he fell upon the enemy as they faced the other way and smote them and slew many of them. [37] And when the Egyptians became aware of their position they shouted out that the enemy was in their rear, and amidst the blows they faced about. - ibid.36-37

A rear attack is usually quite devastating, but even so the great depth of the Egyptian formation enabled it to hold out.  The turning of men in the rear to face a cavalry attack from behind seems to have been standard practice with disciplined troops.

And then they fought promiscuously both foot and horse; and a certain man, who had fallen under Cyrus's horse and was under the animal's heels, struck the horse in the belly with his sword. And the horse thus wounded plunged convulsively and threw Cyrus off. [38] Then one might have realized how much it is worth to an officer to be loved by his men; for they all at once cried out and leaping forward they fought, shoved and were shoved, gave and received blows. And one of his aides-de-camp leaped down from his own horse and helped him mount upon it; [39] and when Cyrus had mounted he saw that the Egyptians were now assailed on every side; for Hystaspas also and Chrysantas had now come up with the Persian cavalry. But he did not permit them yet to charge into the Egyptian phalanx, but bade them shoot and hurl from a distance. - ibid.37-39

Once bitten, twice shy.  Cyrus now reverted to the usual cavalry procedure for attacking infantry, having stopped the advance of the Egyptians.  Cyrus now climbed one of his mobile towers to check on the progress of the battle.

And when he had ascended the tower, he looked down upon the field full of horses and men and chariots, some fleeing, some pursuing, some victorious, other vanquished; but nowhere could he discover any division that was still standing its ground, except that of the Egyptians; and they, inasmuch as they found themselves in a desperate condition, formed in a complete circle and crouched behind their shields, so that only their weapons were visible; but they were no longer accomplishing anything, but were suffering very heavy loss. - ibid.40

Cyrus then ordered that they be spared on account of their valour and came to terms with them.

We can summarise the advantages of the deep Egyptian formation as durability, irresistibility and unshakeability.  Its disadvantage was inflexibility.

Quoteadditionally, the command and control systems used at every level of this period is totally difference form that required for Napoleonic's

Really, I think the command and control of Napoleonic armies is very similar to that of an ancient battle, simply because of the level of technology available. And the nice thing is that there are far more records available about Napoleonic battles to learn from.

But if people don't think that ancient commanders had a group of people around them to send messages when they want to communicate to other commanders, I suppose thats up to them.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 23, 2013, 11:27:29 AM

Quote from: Mark G on July 23, 2013, 07:37:21 AM
There is nothing which we can apply from Napoleonic columns to this debate.

We can summarise the advantages of the deep Egyptian formation as durability, irresistibility and unshakeability.  Its disadvantage was inflexibility.

And some evidence of using large shields to shove, although in the context of pushing into the enemy rather than 99 ranks pushing into the back of the one in front.

a shield bash at the enemy is somewhat different in character from a comrade shoving you from behind while you attempt to maintain your balance in a melee.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 22, 2013, 08:24:54 PM
The next stage of that particular campaign also has the oligarchs adopting a very deep formation (how deep is not specified) and using it to 'push' their opponents into flight and/or disadvantageous terrain:

"Now Thrasybulus and the rest of his troops—that is, the hoplites—when they saw the situation, came running to lend aid, and quickly formed in line, eight deep, in front of their comrades.  And Pausanias, being hard pressed and retreating about four or five stadia to a hill, sent orders to the Lacedaemonians and to the allies to join him. There he formed an extremely deep phalanx and led the charge against the Athenians. The Athenians did indeed accept battle at close quarters; but in the end some of them were pushed [exeōsthēsan = thrust, forced] into the mire of the marsh of Halae and others gave way; and about one hundred and fifty of them were slain." - Xenophon, Hellenica II.4.34

The deep formation gains success by shoving the shallow formation.

Personally I can't see why there is an argument about the othismos at all. The only way you can get an 8-deep line of men into a marsh is by pushing them into it with a deeper line, which means not just the front rank pushing.

If hoplites face their foes at an angle, left shoulder forwards with the shield, right shoulder further back, they should have no problem keeping their balance if pushed from behind. It's not their back that gets pushed, but their right shoulder. I tried it out: if I was fighting an enemy equipped as a hoplite, I would tend to stand more side-on than facing forwards, I'd say at an angle of about 70 degrees. This:

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 23, 2013, 03:35:28 PM


Personally I can't see why there is an argument about the othismos at all. The only way you can get an 8-deep line of men into a marsh is by pushing them into it with a deeper line, which means not just the front rank pushing.

But is the only way if the rear ranks physically push?  If their presence creates a "pressure", either a crowding effect or a simple breathing-down-the-neck psychological effect to move forward, the other side can either hold this or start stepping back.  If the pressure is uncontrolled and the enemy line does hold, the front rankers start to run out of room and die nd the men behind find themselves falling over the bodies and so on and so forth (see Agincourt or Dupplin Moor).  If it is controlled, the front men maintain enough space to fight effectively, the checked formation gathers itself till someone shouts out "Give me one more step".

I suspect it will take a good deal more than psychological intimidation to oblige men to back into a marsh where they will quite probably drown.

Is there anything that inherently makes physical pressure impractical? Presuming that the fronk ranks of a phalanx are side-on to the enemy in a battle posture, and at the same time quite able to keep their balance whilst under pressure from the rear ranks, do those rear ranks need to be in the same posture? Nothing prevents them from facing directly forwards and pushing one against the back of the other. This is stabler than pushing shield against shoulder. Look at this diagram:


In this sixteen deep line, the 15 rear ranks face directly forwards, shields in front of them. Pushing one against the back of other, they are no danger of getting bowled over, there being no room for them to fall. The front hoplite, with enormous pressure from the rear, will need to keep his fighting posture only until he rams into his opponent, at which point there is little he can do except push with the others. His spear is useless unless held overarm and used to poke the fellow in the third or fourth rank in the eye. Hence during the actual othismos there is little fighting. The losing side gets pushed back until its formation breaks up in disadvantageous terrain or its men get literally bowled over.

Addendum: if all the ranks hold their spears overarm then quite a bit of poking can go on. Which would explain why the Corinthian helmet covered the entire face.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 23, 2013, 05:44:01 PM
I suspect it will take a good deal more than psychological intimidation to oblige men to back into a marsh where they will quite probably drown.

I've not made myself clear.  The physical pressure on the opposing line is made by the co-ordinated move forward step-by-step by it's opponents, which causes their front rank to aggressively push into their opponents.  If the opponent can't withstand this, either they are cut down, exposing gaps in their  front and potential rapid destruction or step back to maintain the front.  If the choice was to break and be cut down as you ran or try to hold on in the hope that something might tip in your favour, which would you choose?

Quote
Hence during the actual othismos there is little fighting. The losing side gets pushed back until its formation breaks up in disadvantageous terrain or its men get literally bowled over.

This is to assume that othismos was what was represented by a deep scrum, which I don't agree with.  Othismos in some cases seems to be brutal hand to hand fight, to reach a decision.  I think it could be quite short at times.  Anyway, while we can't really talk depth without talking othismos, there must have been more to it, as deep formations occur outside of hoplite armies, among people who don't carry big shields, like the Swiss. 

Whatever sort of pressure was exerted by deep melee-oriented formations, it was sufficient to push back shallower lines.  Another example, this one from Delium in 424 BC.  Pagondas' Thebans have deployed 25 deep on the right, facing the Athenian left.  Thucydides takes up the story:

The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep, the rest as they pleased. [5] Such was the strength and disposition of the Boeotian army.  On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the whole army formed eight deep ... Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up the paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians advancing to meet them, and closing at a run. [2] The extreme wing of neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield. [3] The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each other. [4] In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them further and further back, though gradually at first. - Thucydides IV.92-3 and 96

The entire infantry battle seems to have been a shoving match.  Given that the Athenians closed at a run, one imagines the succeeding ranks piled in behind the front ranks following initial contact and in the absence of any other battlewinning advantage on the Athenian side it looks as if this extra impetus won the action for them.  It may be limited imagination, but I cannot see any explanation other than men piling in behind the file leaders with more impact than possessed by the Athenians' opponents (Boeotian troops were, if anything, considered to be superior to Ionian).  Step-by-step does not work for this battle, although one step did work for Iphicrates in Polynaeus' previously quoted stratagem.  The moral seems to be that whether or not we call it 'othismos', a good sustained shove was an integral part of these battles.

Anthony is correct that not every deep formation was necessarily othismotic; deep Persian formations seem to have been more along the lines of 'darkening the sun' with showers of missiles: their traditional Asiatic front-ranks-javelin-rear-ranks-bow system proved of limited use against the deep Egyptian spearmen at Thymbra (and for that matter against less deep Spartans at Thermopylae and Plataea).

Incidentaly, I do not see a problem maintaining one's balance in a classical melee (a mediaeval melee could be a different matter, as the Duke of York at Agincourt would undoubtedly agree).  It would actually be quite hard to fall over with enemies to the front of one, friends to the side of one and a friend behind giving you some helpful pressure with his shield.

Paul Bardunias (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=edoGJw8Xg0Q)  makes the interesting observation that the shape of the Greek shield was a key element in the mechanism of othismos. The shield was about a metre in diameter and was convex, which meant that if held in front of the body, the top edge rested against the upper part of the sternum, the manubrium, whilst the lower edge rested against the thighs. This protected the middle part of the body from being compressed by the pressure of the rear ranks. It was this that made othismos possible and obliged opponents not similarly equipped to recoil if they did not wish to be crushed to death.

QuoteIs there anything that inherently makes physical pressure impractical?

Yes from that diagram the pressure on the right shoulder, causing the man in the front rank to spin round and when he goes down the rest of the guys fall down.

Think about it, humans have a very small area over which to place their centre of gravity (their two feet) and when your centre of gravity (now burdened with armour, a shield and other bits of kit) moves outside of that area, you have to push back or fall over.

But we have the tradition in the SOA, you get a dustbin lid and broom handle and try it for yourself!

Actually tradition in the SoA seems to be to pile up academics, so let us have Paul Bardunias hold forth about some academic efforts ...

A few months back, I promised a review of Adam Schwartz's "Reinstating the Hoplite: Arms, Armour and Phalanx Fighting in Archaic and Classical Greece". In this post I am going to specifically address Section 3.4, Othismos. I'll restate that this book is a remarkable resource. If you own only one book on hoplite combat, own this one. Much of the book is a filtering and restatement of arguments put forth in a series of papers that make up the great "Heresy-v-Orthodoxy" debate, meticulously footnoted. If you have read all of these papers, then much of this book will not seem novel, but it is nice to have all of this in one place and Schwartz's commentary is often quite insightful.  His description of othismos is a weakness of the book.

This section begins with a description of othismos as "a common effort, ostensibly by a common push...of the entire phalanx...into the enemy in order to drive them back", following Hanson's usage. I agree with this definition and we will need to keep it in mind as we go forward, for Schwartz deviates from it in important ways in his presentation. Following the prevailing notion, which you now know to be incorrect if you have been reading my previous posts, he goes on to describe men hoplites in othismos:

    "The hoplites in the front stemmed their left shoulder against their shield and thrust it against the shields and bodies of the enemy with all their might; and the ranks behind them in turn stemmed their shields against the backs and right side of the man in front in a ¾ stance, as it were.

    In this way, a tremendous pressure could be generated and conveyed through the entire phalanx from the rearmost rank, its force increasing on the way."


Right away, Schwartz has unwittingly presented us in these two sentences with contradictory mechanics. This is the most glaring problem with the current portrayal of othismos, and the focus of my campaign to correct our understanding. You cannot both stand at a "¾ stance" and sustain "tremendous pressure". A ¾ stance is one in which your body is held at a diagonal behind the shield, which is facing flush to your foes. The arm is bent, with the arm and body forming an acute angle. This is the natural stance for just about all combat sports, from Asian martial arts to renaissance fencing. Hoplites probably stood this way when engaged in spear fencing. I will do a full post on stances and weapons grips used in hoplite combat at a later date, but for now it is important to understand that in this pose, the only thing holding the shield away from the front of your body is the strength of your arm and shoulder. Were I to grab you by the right shoulder with one hand and the shield with the other and try to force your shield to touch your chest, it is easy to see that very little of your musculature resists my pushing.

Now, even the biggest weight lifter cannot resist "tremendous pressure" with the strength of his arm and shoulder alone. Remember that less than 10 men can generate 1,000 lbs of force or more. So if we take the description of men at ¾ and apply anything approaching the force that can be generated by files of hoplites, the end result will be that the hoplites collapse into the bowl of their shields, chest to underside of the shield rim. Once they collapse into the shield in this way, they occupy less space than they did in the ¾ stance. Thus, as the file closes in there is no room to move back into ¾ stance again unless the file spreads out.

This is important because the current orthodoxy posits a stance with the left shoulder inside the bowl of the shield, pushing on the inner shield-face. Many have interpreted Arrian, the Roman tactician, describing this in a section of his Tactica (16.13). Arrian of course was not a hoplite and the passage in question does not exist in earlier sources for his tactia. He did on the other hand live at a time when Romans formed shield-walls, later called a fulcum, wherein men with very different, single gripped, shields may well have pushed standing sideways at far lower pressure than a hoplite with an aspis could survive.

If we toss out the ¾ stance when pushing, then we can also eliminate the notion that the depth of the aspis was to allow the shield to be rested on the shoulder while pushing. I won't go on here, but look back to my previous posts to learn how hoplites stood with their shields and a further examination of why the "shoulder rest" function was a side benefit and not the purpose for the depth.

At 3.4.2, the book moves on to describe arguments for and against a literal othismos defined as above. This section is a good distillation of the various viewpoints, but in rebutting the opinions against othismos, Schwartz goes awry. He specifically addresses two arguments: 1) the tremendous force generated by deep files of men would cause a squeeze that would be "distressing to contemplate" in Fraser's words (1942), and 2) the great pressure would impede weapons usage.

Schwartz is failed here by his reliance on Franz (2002). I must be clear that Franz wrote in German, a language I do not read, so I am only commenting on Schwartz's translated quotations from that work. With that in mind, what is attributed to Franz shows a lack of understanding of how force is generated in groups of pushing men. He is quoted as writing:

    "The mass pressure was not achieved by the weight of the warriors, but by their muscles...the mass of the hoplites played a relatively minor role. It came into play chiefly when brief, thrusting impulses were transmitted from one warrior to another."


Schwartz focuses on this and tells us that it "corrects a common enough oversight in the othismos debate." In fact, Franz, via Schwartz, is propagating a misunderstanding of crowd forces while at the same time being represented as an authority on the subject. Mass is the most important factor in transmitting forces through dense crowds. It is through "leaning" and resting your weight on the man in front, more than "pushing with the legs" that force adds cumulatively in crowds. Members of crowds stand for the most part upright and lean into each other with the upper body angled to some degree. The amount of pressure that can be generated in pushing with the legs is restricted by the angle the legs make with the ground- the closer to perpendicular the less pressure you can generate, with an optimal angle at something acute like 45 degrees depending on how well your feet grip the substrate.

This is important because, as we have seen in crowd data that I presented previously, high pressures within crowds can be maintained for long periods of time. It is in fact the duration of pressure even more than the sheer amount that causes asphyxia in crowds. So, contra Schwartz, the pressure in ranks of hoplites would be "impossible to resisist" without an aspis to protect the diaphragm. His mention of armor as protection against asphyxia, even if true (some reenactors of ECW push of pike battles tell me that the breast and back does help) becomes problematic when we consider the rise in the era of deepest ranks of the organic corslet, sometimes called "tube and yoke" or linothorax.

Schwartz further quotes Franz about what occurs in crowds:

    "When people behind sense that the pushing does not bring about any immediate advantage, they stop pushing. The result is a kind of reverse thrust."

This statement shows a fundamental difference in a "crowd" of pedestrians and a "crowd" of hoplites in othismos. The hoplites want to generate lethal levels of forces, while crowds do so only accidentally. If we start from the definition of othismos presented at the beginning of this post, then the goal of opposing ranks is to produce the maximum pushing force that they can. What he describes is true for pedestrian crowds, and this behavior is also why we don't see othismos in every other battle-line in history. Once the front of the file gets squeezed to their limit, they push back on their own men, causing the file to open. In hoplites this did not happen until the pressure became enormous because of their ability to withstand being squeezed without suffocating.

An analogy to what happens between men in Franz's depiction would be you walking down a hall and pushing against a closed door. If the door does not open, you stop pushing, the feedback telling you it is locked. But if you know the door is locked and your goal is to break down the door, then you do not stop pushing even when the same exact feedback tells you it is locked. You push harder in order to bust it opened. This is what hoplites did. Their "crowds" were meant to push against resistance and overcome it.

Schwartz touches upon this in mentioning crowd disasters, but does not connect the crowd of hoplites to the type of crowd that ends in deaths from asphyxia because he cannot describe why hoplites could survive this. My own examination of the aspis's role in protecting against crushing of the diaphragm can. There is no reason to expect a group of motivated pushing hoplites to be "like any other crowd moving in a particular direction."  They are intentionally attempting to generate the maximum sustained force against their opponents, and could generate sustainable forces far in excess of those which occur accidentally in crowds of similar size.

A bit further on, he discusses that othismos could not last long. This has been an objection of many: "How can you push for an extended period?" The answer again comes from an understanding of crowds. Pressure can be maintained within crowds at rock concerts for long periods.  Force will vary over time, but not in the quick oscillations Schwartz envisions.  There could be "lulls", the force reducing as men simply unpack to catch their breath, perhaps even pulling completely apart and engaging at spear range again.

At the end of this section, following the prevalent notion of hoplites charging directly into othismos, he brings up the fact that many units charge, even when occupying positions of superior height. He portrays them as abandoning tactical advantage for momentum. I won't dwell on this, but Polybios specifically describes the problem with not charging downhill during the battle of Sellasia (2.68), and it has nothing to do with momentum for othismos.

The second objection he addresses is that weapons cannot be used in othismos. He quotes Cawkwell's statement that men would "better be able to use their teeth than their weapons". I've addressed this at length, and I was glad to see that Schwartz also saw the utility of the short sword in the press of othismos. He correctly sees the limitations of the spear in othismos and presents the overhand grip as the exclusive strike for use within the phalanx as well. I'll delve into that deeper in a future post.

He also does a great job of showing the folly of van Wees's notion that the aspis cannot be used to push because it was held up at a slant and only the bottom rims would collide. Obviously, the men would simply collapse into their shields as they push and Schwartz points this out. Unfortunately, he did not see that this same logic applies to men standing at ¾ stances as I described above.

He also twists Xenophon (Cyr. 7.1.33) to mean that the aspis was rested on, not against, the shoulder. The clear reading of the passage is that the shield was rested against the shoulder/upper arm, and this can certainly be read as a description of the way I portray hoplites as resting the rim against the front of the shoulder, on the broad shoulder piece of the organic corslet. Note that some depictions show these stiff shoulder pieces extending wider than the shoulder, so if you push with the shield on the shoulder the stiff pad gets jammed into your neck!

Section 3.4.3 is an examination of the morale effects of added ranks, which are in no way incompatible with othismos, but works alongside it. In 3.4.4, he discusses the need to maintain cohesion. Goldsworthy's notion of depth as a means of maintaining cohesion in the presence of broken terrain is mentioned, but as I have shown previously, there is no record of 25 or 50 rank phalanxes deploying from this depth into a shallower, broader line. Unless these men are meant to stand idle until the front ranks somehow break through, getting more men into the area is not helpful unless they can move to a shallower formation and engage the enemy.

He describes the Argive predilection to run too early into the charge and notes that this tore holes in the formation between them an adjacent units. Interestingly, he goes on to describe Spartans foregoing the charge, but does not seem to realize that this too must result in gaps between them and adjacent units that did have a running charge. The whole line cannot have arrived simultaneously against the enemy line if part walked and part ran. This has been overlooked by everyone to my knowledge.

Following the common model of othismos, he mentions hoplites charging 50 m (later 20-25m) in order to impart "a maximum of penetration power at the collision". The real cause of the charge has more to do with the "tremendous nervous pressure" he also describes, because it takes only a few yards to achieve the "ramming speed" suggested by the orthodoxy. Any distance in excess of that simply causes fatigue and a loss of cohesion for no gain of momentum. In fact, the whole notion of a charge like an un-horsed medieval knight imparting maximum pressure is a fallacy, as I have previously demonstrated. Dense packing is far more important for a strong and sustainable force even if it occurs at slow speed.

It is in the final section, 3.4.5, that Schwartz's portrait of othismos falls apart. He again draws on "observations of crowd behavior" to portray othismos as a "phenomenon occurring at intervals". He applies what I is think a wildly inappropriate reference on Spartan leaders having trouble keeping the rear ranks from pushing forward to initiate the charge to show that rear ranks could push forward when locked in combat. I do believe that they did push forward within the file, but this reference cannot be applied. Cavalry were famous for "chomping at the bit" to rush into the charge as well, but there is not corresponding push when engaged in combat.  Using an innapropriate reference gives ammo to the foes of othismos.

Inexplicably, he abandons the ¾ stance, where men push their shields into the back of those in front, for Luginbill's "T" shaped, side-on stance where men push into the side and right shoulder of those in front. Then he has the file leaders being propelled into the enemy ranks by the file behind them "killing left and right". Far more likely is getting "killed from left and right". More importantly, the overlapping of shields within each succesive rank make any single file pushing through the stacked ranks and out of formation, then into the enemy's overlapped ranks, unlikely.

He states that: "Such othismos may have occurred in short bursts, and at random intervals, as the rear ranks felt they might help their comrades by applying pressure. And not all 7 ranks need to participate in shoving simultaneously..." This is a radical departure from Hanson's "a common effort, ostensibly by a common push...of the entire phalanx...into the enemy in order to drive them back". In fact, what he goes on to describe is nothing unique to hoplites. Romans and pretty much any linear formation in ranks surely had disorganized pushing by eager men behind the front ranks. This interpretation makes "othismos" so common in the history of warfare that it hardly warrants a special term in the Greek context. This commonality also goes a long way towards unraveling all of the arguments for the form of the panoply being derived from the need to be effective in the "push". Any Roman with a scutum could do what Schwartz advocates and frequently did.

Part of the problem is that Schwartz is in a bit over his head. I do not say this disparagingly. I applaud him for attempting to bring in concepts from crowd mechanics even if he ultimately does not sufficiently understand them. A statement that hoplite battles were "essentially chaotic" is ironic, because I agree with him, but my understanding of chaos is clearly far different from his own. The phrase "no one to direct the movements of the enormous organism" is so close to what I believe the truth, but we need to add an understanding of how order emerges from seemingly 'chaotic' interactions within groups. The study of how this occurs through what is called self-organization will ultimately yield a clearer understanding of hoplite combat. Groups of men, like flocks of birds or schools of fish, can achieve a great degree of cohesion and coordination through simple interactions between men in a bottom-up fashion, and do not require the top-down direction of generals for much of what occurs in combat. Thus, we do not need "a referee with a whistle" as Holladay (1982) said would be needed to move from one phase to another. Such "phase transitions" can arise simply from the interactions of individual hoplites in the absence of specific orders.

All of which is fair enough.  At the end of the day we are faced with the fact that we have several accounts of deep formations pushing shallow formations, battles consisting largely of shoving matches and generals placing importance on a massed shove.  It happened, whether or not we can explain exactly how.

But for some reason the men involved did not spin round and fall over.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 24, 2013, 09:27:38 AM

QuoteIs there anything that inherently makes physical pressure impractical?

Yes from that diagram the pressure on the right shoulder, causing the man in the front rank to spin round and when he goes down the rest of the guys fall down.

Unless he faces front at the moment of impact. That way everyone is pushing and being pushed shield to back directly forwards and the whole thing is relatively stable.

But that it is not supposed to be how it happens, the supposed sequence

1) Ephodos (the charge)
2) Doratismos (the spearing)
3) En  Chersi (the hand-to-hand)
4) Othismos (the shoving)
5) Trope (the collapse)

So just substitute the backwards and forwards nature of the combat for actually pushing people, it all makes sense and no squashing of people required. But thats just my (and Mr Goldworthys) 2p of course.

Not everyone will necessarily devote time to each of the stages, especially if one side (often the Athenians) runs into contact.  Then one might find stages 1-3 significantly telescoped.

In any event, if one side just relies on the backwards and forwards nature of combat and the other side is lined up and shoves, I am willing to predict a winner.  :)

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 24, 2013, 07:59:12 PM
Not everyone will necessarily devote time to each of the stages, especially if one side (often the Athenians) runs into contact.  Then one might find stages 1-3 significantly telescoped.

It is perhaps an artefact of the importance of the hoplite battle to the Greek psyche (yes, I'm going a bit Hanson) that we have energy devoted to the phases of the hoplite battle.  Similar phases might have been identified in other traditions but nobody really thought detailed analysis of infantry fighting was a topic for educated people.  However, if we really want to dissect hoplite battle we could do that in another thread - there is certainly enough conflicting evidence to keep us occupied  :)  However, to pick up the depth theme again, does anyone in the classical world say that the reason for more depth is to maximise othismos?  And to repeat, for those to whom othismos is all about the shape of the hoplite aspis, other times, other places, armies saw an advantage in deep formations.  Even if the aspis allowed the perfection of pushing, it clearly wasn't enough to prevent the hoplite being replaced by deep formations with small shields and pikes.

Quote from: Erpingham on July 25, 2013, 08:43:01 AM
However, to pick up the depth theme again, does anyone in the classical world say that the reason for more depth is to maximise othismos? 

Not in so many words, no; if Socrates and Plato had been interested in such things then undoubtedly they would, but what we have is simply description of formation and description of results so we need to evaluate whether the two have a cause-and-effect relationship.  Comparing the consistency of outcomes and the lack of narrator surprise at the results with other actions in which the depths are more even and resolution is attributed specifically to such factors as morale, troop quality and/or leadership leave one with the strong impression that an inferential link between depth of formation and success in othismos (the success of such deep formations seems to be eventual rather than immediate) is quite natural.

Quote
And to repeat, for those to whom othismos is all about the shape of the hoplite aspis, other times, other places, armies saw an advantage in deep formations.  Even if the aspis allowed the perfection of pushing, it clearly wasn't enough to prevent the hoplite being replaced by deep formations with small shields and pikes.

A very pertinent observation: we are not told what depth the Thebans used at Chaeronea (338 BC), where the combined armies of Thebes and Athens faced up to Philip II's Macedonians, but it would be surprising if Thebes had abandoned its preferred 50-deep hoplite phalanx.  Athens and Thebes lost.  At the Granicus, a significant force of hoplites was cut apart for trivial loss.  At Issus, a larger force of hoplites seems to have fought one-third of their number of phalangites to a standstill - with the aid of palisades and a river bank (the hoplites at Issus seem to have been deployed in very great depth, which should have given them an irresistible othismotic advantage) and at Gaugamela, as seemingly at Chaeronea, Alexander's cavalry (never mind infantry) went through hoplites like a knife through butter.

It would seem that while in othismos the shield was the principal instrument of transmitting force, the Macedonians used the pike point for this purpose - apparently to greater effect, as to the best of my knowledge a hoplite shield has not impaled anyone yet.

Deep formations seem to have characterised armies of the Biblical period and its tail-end tradition-holder, the Achaemenid Empire.  My impression (without being able to produce source references) is that other armies which relied on mass rather than professionalism had a penchant for deep formations, perhaps as a way of combining the fighting potential of the few (usually front-rankers) with the potential intimidatory effect of the many (Herodotus VII.207 tells us that at the approach of the huge Persian army the Greeks guarding Thermopylae were 'seized with fear') and as a means of allowing a possibly stretched pool of officer talent to maintain control.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 25, 2013, 12:15:04 PM

Quote from: Erpingham on July 25, 2013, 08:43:01 AM
However, to pick up the depth theme again, does anyone in the classical world say that the reason for more depth is to maximise othismos? 

It would seem that while in othismos the shield was the principal instrument of transmitting force, the Macedonians used the pike point for this purpose - apparently to greater effect, as to the best of my knowledge a hoplite shield has not impaled anyone yet.

It occurred to me that the Macedonian phalanx was a very different animal to the Greek one. Even granted that the phalangite gripped his pike with two hands, the forward pressure he could produce with the pike would not be anywhere near the combined forward pressure of a 16 deep (never mind 50 deep) Greek phalanx. There is possibly a clue in the length of the pike: so many pike points projecting beyond the front rank of the Macedonian phalanx would most probably impale any Greek Hoplite who tried to advance into them, penetrating shields and body armour. The Greek othismos would never get a chance to weigh into effect.

QuoteIt would seem that while in othismos the shield was the principal instrument of transmitting force,

Or perhaps it was nothing other than a shield and no force was transmitted at all, which is certainly my view.

The Macedonian pike then just becomes a weapon with longer reach, better combat performance and hence wins.

Quote from: Justin Taylor on July 25, 2013, 04:39:17 PM

QuoteIt would seem that while in othismos the shield was the principal instrument of transmitting force,

Or perhaps it was nothing other than a shield and no force was transmitted at all, which is certainly my view.

The Macedonian pike then just becomes a weapon with longer reach, better combat performance and hence wins.

Let me play devil's advocate and help you out here. Thinking about it, a pike, even if firmly held with two hands, should not deliver enough punch to penetrate a Greek shield, which was made of wood lined with bronze. Theoretically, what should happen when a Greek phalanx moves into a Macedonian one is that the Greek shields, with the enormous pressure conferred by othismos, knock the pikes out of the hands of the front Macedonian ranks, leaving the phalangites helpless when the hoplites ram into them, holding their own spears overarm to jab at their disarmed adversaries.

Comments, anyone?

We have a description of what happened when a Roman cohort tried conclusions with a Macedonian phalanx, and this emphasises the penetrative power of the sarissa.

Meanwhile Aemilius advanced, and when he saw not only the other Macedonians, but those who constituted the phalanx, some with their bucklers, and some with their targets removed from their shoulders, and with their pikes inclined in one direction receiving the attack of the Romans, admiring the firmness of the serried ranks, and the bristling rampart of outstretched pikes, he was smitten at once with astonishment and terror, as if he had never seen so fearful a spectacle, and was afterwards in the habit of frequently referring to it, and making this statement respecting himself. Carefully concealing however at the time the agitation of his troubled mind, he with serene countenance and careless aspect, and with his head and body undefended, drew up his line. The Pelignians were now fighting against the targeteers ['caetrati' = peltasts, i.e. hypaspists], who were ranged opposite to them, and when, after long and laborious efforts, they were unable to break through that compact array, Salius, who was commanding the Pelignians, seized a standard and threw it among the enemy. [8] On this a prodigious conflict was excited, whilst on the one side the Pelignians strove with all their might to recover the standard, the Macedonians on the other to retain possession of it. The former strove either to cut through the long spears of the Macedonians, or to repel them with the bosses of their bucklers, or in some instances to turn them aside even with their naked hands, while the latter drove them firmly grasped with both hands with such force against the enemy, who rushed on with rash and heedless fury, that, penetrating shields and bucklers, they overthrew the men transfixed in like manner. The first ranks of the Pelignians having been thus defeated, those who stood behind them were also cut down, and the rest retreated towards the mountain which the inhabitants call Mount Olocrus, though not yet in open flight. - Livy XLIV.40.7-8

We might expect the Roman shields, which were presumably no less tough than hoplite shields, to have the pike points bounce off them - instead, the points went straight through the shield, the armour and the man himself.  Yet where the Romans did not force the issue they were simply held at bay.

As the attack began, Aemilius came up and found that the Macedonian battalions had already planted the tips of their long spears in the shields of the Romans, who were thus prevented from reaching them with their swords. - Plutarch, Aemilius 19.1

The key to what happened seems to be that as long as the fight did not involve mutual pressing forwards, the pikes simply held the enemy at a distance and encouraged him backwards.  The moment the opponent tried to force the issue (and attempting othismos would do this), he adds force to the point where the pike meets the shield and the pike, strongly gripped by its owner (who can feel the application of extra force and so applies stronger grip and counterpressure) has enough poundage per square inch to go through the shield and the armour behind it.

One trick in the days of UK pre-decimal coinage was to drive a needle through a penny.  This could not be done by hand, but a stroke from a small hammer on the end of the needle made it happen.  (Getting the needle out afterwards was well-nigh impossible, but bronze-lined wooden shields and mail/linen armour tend not to grip when penetrated.)  Application of additional force changes what points can and can not penetrate.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 25, 2013, 07:47:58 PM
We might expect the Roman shields, which were presumably no less tough than hoplite shields, to have the pike points bounce off them - instead, the points went straight through the shield, the armour and the man himself.  Yet where the Romans did not force the issue they were simply held at bay.

As the attack began, Aemilius came up and found that the Macedonian battalions had already planted the tips of their long spears in the shields of the Romans, who were thus prevented from reaching them with their swords. - Plutarch, Aemilius 19.1

The key to what happened seems to be that as long as the fight did not involve mutual pressing forwards, the pikes simply held the enemy at a distance and encouraged him backwards.  The moment the opponent tried to force the issue (and attempting othismos would do this), he adds force to the point where the pike meets the shield and the pike, strongly gripped by its owner (who can feel the application of extra force and so applies stronger grip and counterpressure) has enough poundage per square inch to go through the shield and the armour behind it.

One trick in the days of UK pre-decimal coinage was to drive a needle through a penny.  This could not be done by hand, but a stroke from a small hammer on the end of the needle made it happen.  (Getting the needle out afterwards was well-nigh impossible, but bronze-lined wooden shields and mail/linen armour tend not to grip when penetrated.)  Application of additional force changes what points can and can not penetrate.

One difference between the Greek and Roman shield is that the former was covered by a thin layer of bronze. A hammer blow to a needle equates to a large force concentrated onto a very small area - the needlepoint. A pike point is much broader and the phalangite does not have a hammer to increase the force he can apply to the pike handle. Is the force he can apply merely by gripping the handle enough to penetrate bronze and wood? Has anyone tried this experimentally? My gut feeling is that it would be impossible without something else coming into play.

Should the phalangite rest the butt of his pike in the ground and let the hoplites press into the point then there would certainly be enough penetrating power. Or should several phalangites grip the same pike one might also get the same effect. But one man by himself? Not so sure...

It clearly did happen, I'm just wondering how.

QuoteLet me play devil's advocate and help you out here. Thinking about it, a pike, even if firmly held with two hands, should not deliver enough punch to penetrate a Greek shield, which was made of wood lined with bronze.

What I would prefer to do, is rather than go through the shield would be to go around it, into the face or shoulder of the enemy (assuming that the legs are not a target area)

(http://i1.ytimg.com/vi/QZ6vO59LoAg/hqdefault.jpg)

Basically the soft and easy targets.

Is there any point in making a shield that does not protect you? Now the pilum is supposed to be able to go through a shield and spear the user behind but thats a very narrow point.

Advantage of the pike over the long spear? More points for the enemy to deal with.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 25, 2013, 08:03:42 PM

One difference between the Greek and Roman shield is that the former was covered by a thin layer of bronze.

IIRC, a very thin layer.  It isn't bronze armour, just a protective/decorative layer.  Other cultures (e.g. Romans) went with a leather cover for the same purpose.

QuoteShould the phalangite rest the butt of his pike in the ground and let the hoplites press into the point then there would certainly be enough penetrating power. Or should several phalangites grip the same pike one might also get the same effect. But one man by himself? Not so sure...

It clearly did happen, I'm just wondering how.

You're now coming entangled with the idea that all people are doing is leaning and pushing.  Almost certainly, hoplites didn't throw themselves onto pike points to get them to work :)  Spear and pike techniques of other times (and bayonet drills) involved a violent thrust over a short distance.  Humans can put a great deal of power into a short, explosive thrust.  With the weight of a pike behind it, it probably had decent armour piercing capabilities.  I'm more baffled as to why you'd want to push your pike into someones shield - seems like a good way of disarming yourself.  Therefore, I suspect that a line of jabbing pike points meets some hoplites.  Unsuccessful ones wedge in shields, successful ones in bodies. 

This seems very reasonable.  Our accounts of sarissa phalanx vs traditional hoplite do not have the same detail as Livy's account of the opening stages of Pydna, but we note there:

the latter drove them firmly grasped with both hands with such force against the enemy, who rushed on with rash and heedless fury, that, penetrating shields and bucklers, they overthrew the men transfixed in like manner.

The phrase 'drove them firmly' suggests active wielding by their users.

Violent jabbing with the pike....yes, that should do it. The wood of a shield was up to 2cm in thickness, less than an inch, and a powerful jab with a heavy pike (more momentum) should penetrate it. Given that the Hoplite shield was held directly against front of the body the pike point would not need to penetrate too far to cause serious injury.

Philip must have designed the weaponry and tactics of his phalanx specifically to penetrate the Hoplite shield.

But don't forget the first rule of armour, inclination increases the effective thickness of your armour as well as providing a surface that your enemies attack is likely to glance off.

Not saying of course that Philip did not design an armour piercing weapon but it does seem like a lot of bother for little effect. What we do know for certain is that pikes have greater reach and used deeper formations.

He may even have had help along the way.  Iphicrates of Athens developed new equipment for troops under his command.

"Hence we are told, after he had acquired his long experience of
military operations in the Persian War, he devised many improvements in
the tools of war, devoting himself especially to the matter of arms. For
instance, the Greeks were using shields which were large (megalais
aspisi) and consequently difficult to handle; these he discarded and
made small oval ones (peltas symmetrous) of moderate size, thus
successfully achieving both objects, to furnish the body with adequate
cover and to enable the user of the small shield, on account of its
lightness, to be completely free in his movements. After a trial of the
new shield its easy manipulation secured its adoption, and the infantry
who had formerly been called "hoplites" (hoplitai) because of their
heavy shield (aspidon), then had their name changed to "peltasts"
(peltastai) from the light pelta they carried. As regards spear
(doratos) and sword (xiphous), he made changes in the contrary
direction: namely, he increased the length of the spears by half
(hemiolio megethei), and made the swords almost twice as long (skhedon
diplasia). The actual use of these arms confirmed the initial test and
from the success of the experiment won great fame for the inventive
genius of the general. He made soldiers' boots (hypodeseis ...
stratiotais) that were easy to untie and light and they continue to this
day to be called "Iphicratids" after him. He also introduced many other
useful improvements into warfare, but it would be tedious to write about
them. So the Persian expedition against Egypt, for all its huge
preparations, disappointed expectations and proved a failure in the
end. " - Diodorus about Iphicrates' reforms

Iphicrates' reforms (not universal in Greece and probably limited to mercenary contingents) produced a smaller shield and larger spear.  The shield, in addition to being handier, may have allowed the (longer and thus weightier) spear to be wielded with both hands, giving a much more powerful thrust.  The Iphicratic spear would have been c.13-14' long, assuming a basic 9' spear to start with.  Philip's phalanx used an 18' sarissa (as near as we can establish) and a small-ish (2' diameter?) shield.  One can see the outline of a developing trend.  The pike would have been even weightier than the Iphicratic spear and would have had correspondingly more impact at the sharp end.

Even so, if events at Pydna are any guide, it would only go through shields and armour if the other side added a bit of force or if their equipment was not of the best.  Still, it was quite a surprise for the opponent when it happened.  :)

Searching about for parallels on pike fighting, I came across Sir John Smythe's comments from 1591.  Now, being John Smythe, he was determined to tackle the rather amateurish state of English forces by explaining how it was, in his considerable experience really done.  What he is looking at is the value of pike fencing, as opposed to a solid attack.  This is his conclusion :

By all which particularities before alleaged and declared, I thinke it may be apparant to all such as are not obstinatelie ignorant, that battles and squadrons of piques in the field when they do incounter and charge one another, are not by reason or experience mylitarie to stand all day thrusting, pushing, and foining [feinting] one at another, as some do most vainlie imagine, but ought according to all experiance with one puissant charge and thrust to enter and disorder, wound, open, and break the one the other, as is before at large declared.

The whole piece is actually quite interesting (if a bit long to quote as something out of period) - he talks about the importance of advancing in step on the heels of the man in front so as to present multiple rows of pike heads, of thrusting together not individually fencing, of what to do if you get to close to use your pike (drop it or throw it at the enemy and go in with your sword).  OK, we mustn't be too literal in our use of this but it is an example of the sort of thing we are missing for our earlier pikeblocks - the fighting technique, not just the formations.

Refering back to our earlier discussions on the phases of hoplite fighting, one might see a parallel between spear play (thrusting and foining) and othismos - a unified, step by step attack.

For those wishing to read Sir John in full flow (always worth it - he doesn't suffer fools gladly) the relevant passage is quoted here :

http://www.marquisofwinchesters.co.uk/Ecwr-Research/Research%20-%20Extracts%20from%20Certain%20Discourses%20Military%201590.html

A useful find.  :)

Spear-play might correspond more closely to 'doratismos', the use of 'dorata' (spears - singular: doru, 'spear').  This, in the typical hoplite battle - or the typical pattern envisaged for same - precedes 'en chersi', a 'hand-to-hand' stage (the two expressions have very similar connotations and usage) and then we get 'othismos', the shoving, which brings about the collapse ('trope') of one side - sooner or later.

The Athenians tended to enter battle at a run, and others often emulated them, which would mean the earlier stages tended to play through in fast speed or telescoped fashion and the impact of othismos would rapidly be resorted to and felt.  Some emulated them; others were more deliberate in their advance, including the Spartans.  The initial Spartan success at Leuctra (if one can term recovering their dying king a success) might be explained by the combat still being 'doratismos' rather than 'othismos', i.e. the Thebans were not yet coordinatedly applying their depth.  Or it could be that the more experienced and practised Spartans were, until they became tired, able to coordinate their pushes better than the deeper Thebans.

In any event, Sir John's observations are valuable, and seem  to support a general principle that a force which does act in unison will overcome one which leaves actions up to the whims of different groups or individuals, also that unified vigorous action will defeat unified non-vigorous action.