Depth - what is it good for?

[Justin Taylor]

Yep I am not a fan of the othismos shoving idea,

http://www.xlegio.ru/pdfs/othismos.pdf

Mr Goldsworthys view also considers why Greek formations were typically 8 ranks deep if there was no combat enhancement for so doing, so I won't bother commenting further. His thoughts echo my own.

[Patrick Waterson]

"Iphicrates told his men, that he would ensure that they were victorious, if at a given command, they would encourage each other and advance by only a single pace. At the crisis of the battle, when victory hung in the balance, he gave the signal; the army responded with a shout, after which they advanced a pace and defeated the enemy." - Polyaenus, Stratagems, Iphicrates 27.

"Thrusting shield against shield, they shoved and fought and killed and fell." - Xenophon, Agesilaus 2.13

etc.

Sorry, gentlemen, but othismos is a reality whether believed in or not.

[Erpingham]

Yep I am not a fan of the othismos shoving idea,

In a recent discussion on Ancmed, Paul Macdonnell Staff made a fairly good case from a linguistic basis that othismos means "the getting stuck in phase" and doesn't refer to actual pushing, but contrasts with a "spear-play phase" where the two sides are feeling each other out, not going for decision.  But we already have an othismos thread 

Back to depth, I personally feel the momentum/inertia argument is better than the physical shoving.  It makes it harder to give ground and there is, in advance, an impetus.

As to similarities with Napoleonic and later columns, Mark is right to sound a note of caution.  However, I do think the controllability and the safety in numbers aspects may certainly be factors in earlier deep formations too.  Do any ancient authors comment on these aspects of deep formations in their own time?

[Patrick Waterson]

As to similarities with Napoleonic and later columns, Mark is right to sound a note of caution.  However, I do think the controllability and the safety in numbers aspects may certainly be factors in earlier deep formations too.  Do any ancient authors comment on these aspects of deep formations in their own time?

Perhaps my post was poorly stated: I simply intended to point out that the same consideration of morale was a critical factor in persuading the French revolutionary leadership to adopt deep attack formations.

Comments on controllability and safety in numbers aspects seem to be lacking, but we have a nice little piece on the disadvantages of a 50-deep formation in Xenophon's Hellenica.  The occasion (in 404 BC) involved Thrasybulus leading the Athenian exiles against the 'Thirty Tyrants', pro-Spartan oligarchs who controlled Athens.

"Soon after this Thrasybulus took the men of Phyle, who had now gathered to the number of about one thousand, and came by night to Piraeus. When the Thirty learned of this, they at once set out against him, with the Laconian guardsmen and their own cavalry and hoplites; then they advanced along the carriage road which leads up to Piraeus. [11] And for a time the men from Phyle tried to prevent their coming up, but when they saw that the line of the town wall, extensive as it was, needed a large force for its defence, whereas they were not yet numerous, they gathered in a compact body on the hill of Munichia. And the men from the city, when they came to the market-place of Hippodamus, first formed themselves in line of battle, so that they filled the road which leads to the temple of Artemis of Munichia and the sanctuary of Bendis; and they made a line not less than fifty shields in depth; then, in this formation, they advanced up the hill. [12] As for the men from Phyle, they too filled the road, but they made a line not more than ten hoplites in depth. Behind the hoplites, however, were stationed peltasts and light javelin-men, and behind them the stone-throwers [petroboloi]. And of these there were many, for they came from that neighbourhood.

The forces of the 'tyrants' deploy 50 deep, but their uphill foes are able to bring to bear a devastating array of missiles which break the cohesion of the attacking formation, as Thrasybulus eventually gets round to explaining.

And now, while the enemy were advancing, Thrasybulus ordered his men to ground their shields and did the same himself, though still keeping the rest of his arms, and then took his stand in the midst of them and spoke as follows: [13] "Fellow-citizens, I wish to inform some of you and to remind others that those who form the right wing of the approaching force are the very men whom you turned to flight and pursued four days ago, but the men upon the extreme left—they, yes they, are the Thirty, who robbed us of our city when we were guilty of no wrong, and drove us from our homes, and proscribed those who were dearest to us. But now, behold, they have found themselves in a situation in which they never expected to be, but we always prayed that they might be. [14] For with arms in our hands we stand face to face with them; and the gods, because once we were seized while dining or sleeping or trading, because some of us also were banished when we were not only guilty of no offence, but were not even in the city, are now manifestly fighting on our side. For in fair weather they send a storm, when it is to our advantage, and when we attack, they grant us, though we are few in number and our enemies are many, to set up trophies of victory; [15] and now in like manner they have brought us to a place where the men before you, because they are marching up hill, cannot throw either spears [ballein = heavy missiles] or javelins akontizein over the heads of those in front of them, while we, throwing both spears [dorata] and javelins [akontia] and stones [petrous] down hill, shall reach them and strike down many.

Note the implied inference that rear ranks of the 50-deep formation might be able to cast missiles were they fighting on level ground rather than uphill.

[16] And though one would have supposed that we should have to fight with their front ranks at least on even terms, yet in fact, if you let fly your missiles with a will, as you should, no one will miss his man when the road is full of them, and they in their efforts to protect themselves will be continually skulking under their shields. You will therefore be able, just as if they were blind men, to strike them wherever you please and then leap upon them and overthrow them. [17] And now, comrades, we must so act that each man shall feel in his breast that he is chiefly responsible for the victory. For victory, God willing, will now give back to us country and homes, freedom and honours, children, to such as have them, and wives. Happy, indeed, are those of us who shall win the victory and live to behold the gladdest day of all! And happy also he who is slain; for no one, however rich he may be, will gain a monument so glorious. Now, when the right moment comes, I will strike up the paean; and when we call Enyalius to our aid, then let us all, moved by one spirit, take vengeance upon these men for the outrages we have suffered." [18]

After saying these words and turning about to face the enemy, he kept quiet; for the seer bade them not to attack until one of their own number was either killed or wounded. "But as soon as that happens," he said, "we shall lead on, and to you who follow will come victory, but death, methinks, to me." [19] And his saying did not prove false, for when they had taken up their shields, he, as though led on by a kind of fate, leaped forth first of all, fell upon the enemy, and was slain, and he lies buried at the ford of the Cephisus; but the others were victorious, and pursued the enemy as far as the level ground." - Xenophon, Hellenica II.4.10-19

The disadvantages of the 50-deep formation here lie in the fact that it is attacking uphill and is incapable of supporting itself.  With any impetus inhibited by an overhead shower of missiles, the advantage of the formation is lost.  The reference to being unable to shoot over the 50-deep formation appears to refer to individuals in the formation itself, as supporting missile troops (i.e. a separate missile contingent which might shoot over the hoplites) are not mentioned as part of the oligarchs' forces.  This may be oversight on Xenophon's part, but the possibility of missiles being delivered by middle and rear ranks of the 50-deep formation is interesting as it suggests a role for the men in the deeper ranks and would exonerate them from 'othismos', which would be limited to the more forward ranks.

[Patrick Waterson]

The next stage of that particular campaign also has the oligarchs adopting a very deep formation (how deep is not specified) and using it to 'push' their opponents into flight and/or disadvantageous terrain:

"Now Thrasybulus and the rest of his troops—that is, the hoplites—when they saw the situation, came running to lend aid, and quickly formed in line, eight deep, in front of their comrades.  And Pausanias, being hard pressed and retreating about four or five stadia to a hill, sent orders to the Lacedaemonians and to the allies to join him. There he formed an extremely deep phalanx and led the charge against the Athenians. The Athenians did indeed accept battle at close quarters; but in the end some of them were pushed [exeōsthēsan = thrust, forced] into the mire of the marsh of Halae and others gave way; and about one hundred and fifty of them were slain." - Xenophon, Hellenica II.4.34

The deep formation gains success by shoving the shallow formation.

[Mark G]

There is nothing which we can apply from Napoleonic columns to this debate.

Napoleonic columns are a series of successive lines (two or three men deep depending on doctrine) which maintained the distance at normal spacing which would allow them to wheel on the spot and form directly on the corner of the other.  that is a lot of distance between each one.

this is absolutely and totally unrelated to the discussion here about the merits of 8, 12, 18, etc deep single unit formations.

additionally, the command and control systems used at every level of this period is totally difference form that required for Napoleonic's -.

and there is the gunpowder effect.

in short.

no comparison to make, pleas, don't even try, its really not worth the effort, and undermines the comparison.  better to just state that you think it might be easier to control a formation with 24 men deep than a formation 8 men deep using the same manpower.

[Patrick Waterson]

There is nothing which we can apply from Napoleonic columns to this debate.

Nor are we attempting to.

*

Xenophon gives us another example of a very deep formation, this time emphasising its staying-power while pointing out its lack of flexibility.

"Egyptians were under sail to join them, and they gave the number as one hundred and twenty thousand men armed with shields that came to their feet, with huge spears, such as they carry even to this day, and with sabres [kopisi*]."

*A word coincidentally very similar to the Egyptin 'kopesh'

Cyrus has this to say (or Xenophon via 'Cyrus') about the way Croesus' army deploys:

"And so," said Cyrus, "you are acquainted not only with their numbers but also with their order of battle."

"Yes, by Zeus," answered Araspas, "I am; and I know also how they are planning to conduct the battle."

"Good," said Cyrus; "still, tell us first, in round numbers, how many of them there are." [19]

"Well," he replied, "with the exception of the Egyptians, they are all drawn up thirty deep, both foot and horse, and their front extends about forty stadia; for I took especial pains to find out how much space they covered." [20]

"And how are the Egyptians drawn up?" asked Cyrus; "for you said 'with the exception of the Egyptians.'"

"They are drawn up in formations—each one of ten thousand men, a hundred square; for this, they said, was their manner of arranging their order of battle at home. And Croesus consented to their being so drawn up, but very reluctantly, for he wished to outflank your army as much as possible." - Xenophon, Hellenica VI.3.18-20

And concerning the deep phalanx:

"And do you think, Cyrus," said one of the generals, "that drawn up with lines so shallow we shall be a match for so deep a phalanx?"

"When phalanxes are too deep to reach the enemy with weapons," answered Cyrus, "how do you think they can either hurt their enemy or help their friends? [23] For my part, I would rather have these hoplites who are arranged a hundred deep drawn up ten thousand deep; for in that case we should have very few to fight against. According to the depth that I shall give my line of battle, I think I shall bring the entire line into action and make it everywhere mutually helpful. [24] I shall bring up the spearmen immediately behind the heavy-armed troops, and the bowmen immediately behind the spearmen; for why should any one put in the front ranks those who themselves acknowledge that they could never withstand the shock of battle in a hand-to-hand encounter? But with the heavy-armed troops as a shield in front of them, they will stand their ground; and the one division with their spears, the other with their arrows will rain destruction upon the enemy, over the heads of all the lines in front. And whatever harm any one does to the enemy, in all this he obviously lightens the task of his comrades. [25] Behind all the rest I shall station the so-called rear-guard of veteran reserves. For just as a house, without a strong foundation or without the things that make a roof, is good for nothing, so likewise a phalanx is good for nothing, unless both front and rear are composed of valiant men. - ibid.22-25

Cyrus' counter to these very deep opponents is a mixed deployment with one fighting line and one supporting missile line, coincidentally similar to that of Thrasybulus at Phyle.

Skipping a good part of the narrative, Croesus' battle plan is anticipated and thwarted by Cyrus, who routs Croesus' army with the exception of this contingent of Egyptians.  A scythed chariot charge opens the attack on this particular contingent.

But in the place where Abradatas and his companions charged, the Egyptians could not make an opening for them because the men on either side of them stood firm; consequently, those of the enemy who stood upright were struck in the furious charge of the horses and overthrown, and those who fell were crushed to pieces by the horses and the wheels, they and their arms; and whatever was caught in the scythes—everything, arms and men, was horribly mangled. [32]

As in this indescribable confusion the wheels bounded over the heaps of every sort, Abradatas and others of those who went with him into the charge were thrown to the ground, and there, though they proved themselves men of valour, they were cut down and slain. - ibid.VI.4.31-32

Following the chariots came the main force of Persian infantry.

Then the Persians, following up the attack at the point where Abradatas and his men had made their charge, made havoc of the enemy in their confusion; but where the Egyptians were still unharmed—and there were many such—they advanced to oppose the Persians. [33] Here, then, was a dreadful conflict with spears and lances and swords. The Egyptians, however, had the advantage both in numbers and in weapons; for the spears that they use even unto this day are long and powerful, and their shields cover their bodies much more effectually than corselets and targets, and as they rest against the shoulder they are a help in shoving. So, locking their shields together, they advanced and shoved. [34] And because the Persians had to hold out their little shields clutched in their hands, they were unable to hold the line, but were forced back foot by foot, giving and taking blows, until they came up under cover of the moving towers. When they reached that point, the Egyptians in turn received a volley from the towers; and the forces in the extreme rear would not allow any retreat on the part of either archers or lancers [akontistai = javelinmen], but with drawn swords they compelled them to shoot and hurl. [35] Then there was a dreadful carnage, an awful din of arms and missiles of every sort, and a great tumult of men, as they called to one another for aid, or exhorted one another, or invoked the gods. - ibid.32-35

The Egyptians forced back their opponents by 'shoving', as seems to have been the norm for these deep formations.

Cyrus, arriving in this sector, worked out a way to deal with the otherwise irresistible mass of this deep phalanx.

At this juncture Cyrus came up in pursuit of the part that had been opposed to him; and when he saw that the Persians had been forced from their position, he was grieved; but as he realized that he could in no way check the enemy's progress more quickly than by marching around behind them, he ordered his men to follow him and rode around to the rear. There he fell upon the enemy as they faced the other way and smote them and slew many of them. [37] And when the Egyptians became aware of their position they shouted out that the enemy was in their rear, and amidst the blows they faced about. - ibid.36-37

A rear attack is usually quite devastating, but even so the great depth of the Egyptian formation enabled it to hold out.  The turning of men in the rear to face a cavalry attack from behind seems to have been standard practice with disciplined troops.

And then they fought promiscuously both foot and horse; and a certain man, who had fallen under Cyrus's horse and was under the animal's heels, struck the horse in the belly with his sword. And the horse thus wounded plunged convulsively and threw Cyrus off. [38] Then one might have realized how much it is worth to an officer to be loved by his men; for they all at once cried out and leaping forward they fought, shoved and were shoved, gave and received blows. And one of his aides-de-camp leaped down from his own horse and helped him mount upon it; [39] and when Cyrus had mounted he saw that the Egyptians were now assailed on every side; for Hystaspas also and Chrysantas had now come up with the Persian cavalry. But he did not permit them yet to charge into the Egyptian phalanx, but bade them shoot and hurl from a distance. - ibid.37-39

Once bitten, twice shy.  Cyrus now reverted to the usual cavalry procedure for attacking infantry, having stopped the advance of the Egyptians.  Cyrus now climbed one of his mobile towers to check on the progress of the battle.

And when he had ascended the tower, he looked down upon the field full of horses and men and chariots, some fleeing, some pursuing, some victorious, other vanquished; but nowhere could he discover any division that was still standing its ground, except that of the Egyptians; and they, inasmuch as they found themselves in a desperate condition, formed in a complete circle and crouched behind their shields, so that only their weapons were visible; but they were no longer accomplishing anything, but were suffering very heavy loss. - ibid.40

Cyrus then ordered that they be spared on account of their valour and came to terms with them.

We can summarise the advantages of the deep Egyptian formation as durability, irresistibility and unshakeability.  Its disadvantage was inflexibility.

[Justin Taylor]

additionally, the command and control systems used at every level of this period is totally difference form that required for Napoleonic's

Really, I think the command and control of Napoleonic armies is very similar to that of an ancient battle, simply because of the level of technology available. And the nice thing is that there are far more records available about Napoleonic battles to learn from.

But if people don't think that ancient commanders had a group of people around them to send messages when they want to communicate to other commanders, I suppose thats up to them.

[Erpingham]

There is nothing which we can apply from Napoleonic columns to this debate.

We can summarise the advantages of the deep Egyptian formation as durability, irresistibility and unshakeability.  Its disadvantage was inflexibility.

And some evidence of using large shields to shove, although in the context of pushing into the enemy rather than 99 ranks pushing into the back of the one in front.

[Mark G]

a shield bash at the enemy is somewhat different in character from a comrade shoving you from behind while you attempt to maintain your balance in a melee.

[Justin Swanton]

The next stage of that particular campaign also has the oligarchs adopting a very deep formation (how deep is not specified) and using it to 'push' their opponents into flight and/or disadvantageous terrain:

"Now Thrasybulus and the rest of his troops—that is, the hoplites—when they saw the situation, came running to lend aid, and quickly formed in line, eight deep, in front of their comrades.  And Pausanias, being hard pressed and retreating about four or five stadia to a hill, sent orders to the Lacedaemonians and to the allies to join him. There he formed an extremely deep phalanx and led the charge against the Athenians. The Athenians did indeed accept battle at close quarters; but in the end some of them were pushed [exeōsthēsan = thrust, forced] into the mire of the marsh of Halae and others gave way; and about one hundred and fifty of them were slain." - Xenophon, Hellenica II.4.34

The deep formation gains success by shoving the shallow formation.

Personally I can't see why there is an argument about the othismos at all. The only way you can get an 8-deep line of men into a marsh is by pushing them into it with a deeper line, which means not just the front rank pushing.

If hoplites face their foes at an angle, left shoulder forwards with the shield, right shoulder further back, they should have no problem keeping their balance if pushed from behind. It's not their back that gets pushed, but their right shoulder. I tried it out: if I was fighting an enemy equipped as a hoplite, I would tend to stand more side-on than facing forwards, I'd say at an angle of about 70 degrees. This:

Rather than this:

[Erpingham]

Personally I can't see why there is an argument about the othismos at all. The only way you can get an 8-deep line of men into a marsh is by pushing them into it with a deeper line, which means not just the front rank pushing.

But is the only way if the rear ranks physically push?  If their presence creates a "pressure", either a crowding effect or a simple breathing-down-the-neck psychological effect to move forward, the other side can either hold this or start stepping back.  If the pressure is uncontrolled and the enemy line does hold, the front rankers start to run out of room and die nd the men behind find themselves falling over the bodies and so on and so forth (see Agincourt or Dupplin Moor).  If it is controlled, the front men maintain enough space to fight effectively, the checked formation gathers itself till someone shouts out "Give me one more step".

[Justin Swanton]

I suspect it will take a good deal more than psychological intimidation to oblige men to back into a marsh where they will quite probably drown.

Is there anything that inherently makes physical pressure impractical? Presuming that the fronk ranks of a phalanx are side-on to the enemy in a battle posture, and at the same time quite able to keep their balance whilst under pressure from the rear ranks, do those rear ranks need to be in the same posture? Nothing prevents them from facing directly forwards and pushing one against the back of the other. This is stabler than pushing shield against shoulder. Look at this diagram:

In this sixteen deep line, the 15 rear ranks face directly forwards, shields in front of them. Pushing one against the back of other, they are no danger of getting bowled over, there being no room for them to fall. The front hoplite, with enormous pressure from the rear, will need to keep his fighting posture only until he rams into his opponent, at which point there is little he can do except push with the others. His spear is useless unless held overarm and used to poke the fellow in the third or fourth rank in the eye. Hence during the actual othismos there is little fighting. The losing side gets pushed back until its formation breaks up in disadvantageous terrain or its men get literally bowled over.

Addendum: if all the ranks hold their spears overarm then quite a bit of poking can go on. Which would explain why the Corinthian helmet covered the entire face.

[Erpingham]

I suspect it will take a good deal more than psychological intimidation to oblige men to back into a marsh where they will quite probably drown.

I've not made myself clear.  The physical pressure on the opposing line is made by the co-ordinated move forward step-by-step by it's opponents, which causes their front rank to aggressively push into their opponents.  If the opponent can't withstand this, either they are cut down, exposing gaps in their  front and potential rapid destruction or step back to maintain the front.  If the choice was to break and be cut down as you ran or try to hold on in the hope that something might tip in your favour, which would you choose?

Hence during the actual othismos there is little fighting. The losing side gets pushed back until its formation breaks up in disadvantageous terrain or its men get literally bowled over.

This is to assume that othismos was what was represented by a deep scrum, which I don't agree with.  Othismos in some cases seems to be brutal hand to hand fight, to reach a decision.  I think it could be quite short at times.  Anyway, while we can't really talk depth without talking othismos, there must have been more to it, as deep formations occur outside of hoplite armies, among people who don't carry big shields, like the Swiss. 

[Patrick Waterson]

Whatever sort of pressure was exerted by deep melee-oriented formations, it was sufficient to push back shallower lines.  Another example, this one from Delium in 424 BC.  Pagondas' Thebans have deployed 25 deep on the right, facing the Athenian left.  Thucydides takes up the story:

The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep, the rest as they pleased. [5] Such was the strength and disposition of the Boeotian army.  On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the whole army formed eight deep ... Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up the paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians advancing to meet them, and closing at a run. [2] The extreme wing of neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield. [3] The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each other. [4] In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them further and further back, though gradually at first. - Thucydides IV.92-3 and 96

The entire infantry battle seems to have been a shoving match.  Given that the Athenians closed at a run, one imagines the succeeding ranks piled in behind the front ranks following initial contact and in the absence of any other battlewinning advantage on the Athenian side it looks as if this extra impetus won the action for them.  It may be limited imagination, but I cannot see any explanation other than men piling in behind the file leaders with more impact than possessed by the Athenians' opponents (Boeotian troops were, if anything, considered to be superior to Ionian).  Step-by-step does not work for this battle, although one step did work for Iphicrates in Polynaeus' previously quoted stratagem.  The moral seems to be that whether or not we call it 'othismos', a good sustained shove was an integral part of these battles.

Anthony is correct that not every deep formation was necessarily othismotic; deep Persian formations seem to have been more along the lines of 'darkening the sun' with showers of missiles: their traditional Asiatic front-ranks-javelin-rear-ranks-bow system proved of limited use against the deep Egyptian spearmen at Thymbra (and for that matter against less deep Spartans at Thermopylae and Plataea).

Incidentaly, I do not see a problem maintaining one's balance in a classical melee (a mediaeval melee could be a different matter, as the Duke of York at Agincourt would undoubtedly agree).  It would actually be quite hard to fall over with enemies to the front of one, friends to the side of one and a friend behind giving you some helpful pressure with his shield.