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I spotted a reference over the weekend which I had not come across before.

The Romans reorganised their velites in 211 to improve their equipment and performance, with the implication that it was caused by the disasters against Hannibal, who managed to comprehensively out skirmish them at the opening stages of trebia, cannae etc., despite being significantly outnumbered.

there was some reference to Livy, which I had not noticed also.

does anyone know any more on this, or have they encountered this argument before?

Mark, I take it you mean Livy XXVI.4, referring to the fighting around Capua in 211 BC.

Meanwhile the whole effort of the war had been directed against Capua. But it was rather an intensive blockade than a series of assaults, and the slaves and commoners were unable either to endure hunger or to send messengers to Hannibal through guards so near to each other. [2] A Numidian was discovered who took a letter, declared that he would make his way out, and kept his promise. Going out right through the Roman camp at night he inspired in the Capuans the hope that, while they still had some strength left, they might attempt a sally in all directions. [3] But in the many engagements they were as a rule successful in cavalry battles, while in infantry they were worsted. To be victorious, however, was by no means so cheering as it was depressing to be vanquished at any point by a beleaguered and almost captured enemy. At length a method was devised, so that what was lacking to their strength might be compensated by skilful tactics. [4] Out of all the legions were picked young men who by reason of strength and lightness of build were the swiftest. These were furnished with round shields of smaller size than those used by cavalry, and seven javelins apiece four feet long and having iron heads such as are on the spears of the light-armed troops [velites][/b]. [5] The horsemen would each of them take one of these men on to their own horses, and they trained them both to ride behind and to leap down nimbly when the signal was given. [6] When thanks to daily practice they seemed to do this with sufficient daring, they advanced into the plain which was situated between the camp and the city wall in the face of the Capuan cavalry in line of battle. [7] And when they had come within range, at a given signal the light-armed leaped to the ground. Thereupon an infantry line suddenly dashes out from the cavalry at the enemy's horsemen, and while attacking they hurl one javelin after another. [8] By throwing a great number of these against horses and men in all directions, they wounded very many. But more consternation was created by the strange and the unexpected, and the cavalry charging into the frightened enemy caused them to flee with slaughter all the way to the gates. [9] Thereafter the Roman side was superior in cavalry also; it was made the practice to have light-armed in the legions. [institutum ut velites in legionibus essent] [10] The originator of combining infantry with cavalry they say was Quintus Navius, a centurion, and that for so doing honour was paid him by the general.

This passage has often been quoted, referenced and generally alluded to as evidence for either a change in velite weaponry or the date when velites were first instituted, or both.  The text supports neither contention: the double-mounted light infantry are armed with spears whose heads are 'such as are on the spears of the velites' [quale hastis velitaribus inest], and velites are attested by Polybius (who refers to them as 'grosphomachoi') at the Ticinus in 218 BC and at Bagradas in 255 BC (in the First Punic War).

The Roman light infantry (velites) are not noted as being congenitally out-skirmished in any of our sources; at the Trebia they use up their missiles pursuing the Numidian cavalry and at Cannae they seem to hold off their Carthaginian opposite numbers with ease until the time comes to retire and let the heavy troops advance.  The passage above emphasises that Navius' idea was to give cavalry a portable light infantry contingent who were then specially fitted out for the purpose - it may be noted that Livy does not call them 'velites' but 'iuvenes' - young men, selected for their agility and fitness.  The 'sore thumb' in the passage and the source of much spilt ink is Livy's comment that "it was made the practice to have light-armed [velites] in the legions" [institutum ut velites in legionibus essent].  Since velites are attested well before this date either Livy is being careless or we ended up with the worst of several variants of the original manuscript.  The sentence reads:

inde equitatu quoque superior Romana res fuit; institutum ut velites in legionibus essent. [10] auctorem peditum equiti inmiscendorum centurionem Q. Navium ferunt [or tradunt, or fuerunt, pick your MS], honorique id ei apud imperatorem fuisse.

To me, 'institutum ut velites in legionibus essent' looks like a misplaced phrase.  The passage actually makes more sense as:

inde equitatu quoque superior Romana res fuit; [10] auctorem peditum equiti inmiscendorum centurionem Q. Navium ferunt, honorique id ei apud imperatorem fuisse.

[Henceforth the Romans were also superior in cavalry; the originator of [thus] combining infantry with cavalry was said to be Quintus Navius, and the general honoured him for it.]

There is no general agreement on the significance of this passage, as Patrick suggests. To my mind it is significant that this is the first reference we have to Roman light infantry with shields, or (in the parallel passage in Frontinus, Strat. IV.7.29) with swords and helmets. A re-equipment explains why the velites equipped as described by Polybius can get stuck in with swords, as well as javelins, against the Galatians in 189; when the light infantry at Telamon in 225, in a similar situation, fought against the Gauls with javelins only. That would mean that the velites "as we know them" were indeed first used in 211, whatever the previous light infantry were called. But as I said, there is no general agreement, and any interpretation involves either doing violence to the text, as in Patrick's excision; assuming that at some point Livy has made a mistake; or interpreting what he may actually have meant.

Duncan summarises the situation excellently, as ever.

Against the 're-equipment' theory being reflected in the conduct of Telamon and Olympus is the following:

Telamon

Polybius II.30.4: "And at last, not being able to retaliate, because the javelin-throwers were out of reach, and their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage and reckless violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death."

The 'enemy' who were thus contacted and giving the Gauls death were velites, because in II.30.5 Polybius subsequently notes: "Thus the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down before the preliminary attack of the javelinmen [akontistais]. But when the throwers had rejoined their ranks, and the whole Roman line charged ..."

This confirms that the velites did not fall back into the legions until after dealing with the isolated charging Gauls.  Although Polybius does not specify their use of the sword in this respect he seems to take it as read that they were fitted for close combat.

Olympus

Livy XXXVIII.21.11: "Some rushing against the enemy were overwhelmed with darts; and when any of them came near, they were slain by the swords of the light infantry."

Apart from the explicit mention of swords, this is the same pattern of isolated Gauls charging velites and being slain in close combat by velites that we see at Telamon.

If anything, these passages suggest continuity of velite equipment and doctrine between 225 and 189 BC.

so it would be a valid interpretation to suggest that at Capua in 211, the velites were first issued with swords and shields - after which we find them engaging in melee.

which was,  think, what the reference was suggesting.

thanks both.

Quote from: Mark G on October 01, 2013, 07:16:26 AM
so it would be a valid interpretation to suggest that at Capua in 211, the velites were first issued with swords and shields - after which we find them engaging in melee.

Ah - not quite:

1) 225 BC,  when from the context the velites are meleeing stray Gauls and hence would already appear to have a close combat outfit, is pre-211.

2) The infantry accompanying the cavalry are not velites - they are drawn from 'young men out of all the legions' for speed, strength and lightness of build - admittedly good light infantry qualities, but the men are designated as 'iuvenes' (young men)  not as 'velites'.  Some of them are thus quite likely to have been hastati.  These men are picked specifically to ride with the cavalry into battle (and dismount to do their thing just before the clash occurs).

Caesar before Pharsalus does something very similar, selecting numbers of agile young men from his 'antesignani' to convert into double riders, which at that time probably designated the younger age groups as much as anything else.

3) There is no discernible difference between the combat behaviour of velites at Telamon in 225 BC (pre-211) and at Olympus in 189 BC (post-211).

For these reasons I would say that it is not valid to suggest

a) that velites were first issued with swords and shields in 211 BC, or

b) that they only engage in melee after 211 BC.

I would go further and say that this passage actually has nothing to do with velites and only tangentially touches their equipment at the point where Livy mentions that the javelins have 'iron heads such as are on the spears of the velites'.

well that would pretty much agree with my first reaction when I read the passage - what reformation.

so the author has confused a one off event - using young and fast men to act as mounted supports - with a formal reorganisation and reequipping of the velites.

Quote from: Mark G on October 01, 2013, 12:52:54 PMso the author has confused a one off event - using young and fast men to act as mounted supports - with a formal reorganisation and reequipping of the velites.

Well, that would be Patrick's interpretation. It would not be mine.

Since Polybios tells us that the velites were recruited from "the youngest and poorest", calling the men of 211 "iuvenes", "young men",  actually supports the idea that they are velites, it's not evidence against it. If Livy is correct that this is the first time that the velites were organized then it's hardly surprising that these men were drawn "out of all the legions"; they could hardly be drawn from the velites who didn't previously exist in that form. If on the contrary as Patrick suggests nothing has changed here, why is it necessary to recruit and equip young men from out of all the legions, when young men fully equipped as velites with sword, shield, and javelins already, according to his view, exist?

Nor is there, despite what Patrick says, any evidence for the light infantry fighting at close quarters in 225. Polybios says only that some of the Gaisatai rushed forward and were killed: he doesn't say how they were killed, nor how close they got to the enemy, nor mention any weapons other than javelins. To me it merely suggests that instead of standing behind their shields and being shot down, some of them charged and were shot down. The conclusion that the javelinmen had swords about which one of our better ancient authors is silent is far too speculative to bear any weight.

But this discussion has been held more than once - certainly not long ago on ancmed, and probably many times since Delbrueck suggested that this event saw the start of a reform of the velites. I doubt we'll get a general agreement this time either.

OK, if we can't reach any definite conclusions, can we at least use Delbruckian language in rubbishing every other author's theory...

Oh, we can reach definite conclusions, Tim: they just happen to be different conclusions ...  ;D

Quote from: Duncan Head on October 01, 2013, 05:01:49 PM

Since Polybios tells us that the velites were recruited from "the youngest and poorest", calling the men of 211 "iuvenes", "young men",  actually supports the idea that they are velites, it's not evidence against it.

Only if one reads Polybius' neōtatous kai penikhrotatous as linking youth with poverty, whereas my reading is that he is telling us that the poorer youth form the velites and the less poor youth (tous d' hexēs = next after them) become the hastati.

Quote
If Livy is correct that this is the first time that the velites were organized then it's hardly surprising that these men were drawn "out of all the legions"; they could hardly be drawn from the velites who didn't previously exist in that form. If on the contrary as Patrick suggests nothing has changed here, why is it necessary to recruit and equip young men from out of all the legions, when young men fully equipped as velites with sword, shield, and javelins already, according to his view, exist?

For two reasons:
1) Some of these men have been selected from among the hastati.
2) Their role is to ride into battle behind cavalrymen and then act as shooters; the reduced-size shield seems to be configured with this requirement in mind (if the man behind had a full-size parma it could be inconvenient to the rider).

Quote
Nor is there, despite what Patrick says, any evidence for the light infantry fighting at close quarters in 225. Polybios says only that some of the Gaisatai rushed forward and were killed: he doesn't say how they were killed, nor how close they got to the enemy, nor mention any weapons other than javelins. To me it merely suggests that instead of standing behind their shields and being shot down, some of them charged and were shot down. The conclusion that the javelinmen had swords about which one of our better ancient authors is silent is far too speculative to bear any weight.

Not sure we can assume that every Gaul was shot down as opposed to being despatched at close quarters: Polybius'

hoi men eis tous polemious hupo tou thumou kai tēs alogistias eikē propiptontes kai didontes sphas autous hekousiōs apethnēskon

if taken literally suggests the Gauls in question were falling prostrate and offering themselves to be despatched.

As Duncan mentions, there is no explicit mention of velite weaponry by Polybius in this action or indeed in accounts of other battles - perhaps Polybius thinks that his description in book 6 suffices - and we may note that although he mentions Hannibal's change of weaponry and the Roman adoption of Greek cavalry weapons he does not mention any change of weaponry for the velites.

What we also observe is that Polybius uses his velites-only term 'grosphomachoi' for velites back as far as the First Punic War - although he uses 'akonistas' (javelinmen) for the Roman light infantry at the Trebia and similarly at Telamon, but would we conclude from this that the Romans had used velites at Bagradas and then abandoned their use at the end of the First Punic War in favour of javelin-only infantry, only to reconstitute them in 211 BC?

Quote
But this discussion has been held more than once - certainly not long ago on ancmed, and probably many times since Delbrueck suggested that this event saw the start of a reform of the velites. I doubt we'll get a general agreement this time either.

Listen very carefully for I shall say this only once: this is not a reform of the velites because the men in question are not velites - they are a contingent specially selected to ride double with cavalry.  This simple fact seems to me to override and negate any question of velite reorganisation being involved: when Caesar did the same thing before Pharsalus in 48 BC nobody (at least nobody I know of) saw it as a reorganisation of legionary light infantry in the latter half of the 1st century BC.

Quote from: Duncan Head on October 01, 2013, 05:01:49 PM

Since Polybios tells us that the velites were recruited from "the youngest and poorest", calling the men of 211 "iuvenes", "young men",  actually supports the idea that they are velites, it's not evidence against it. If Livy is correct that this is the first time that the velites were organized then it's hardly surprising that these men were drawn "out of all the legions"; they could hardly be drawn from the velites who didn't previously exist in that form. If on the contrary as Patrick suggests nothing has changed here, why is it necessary to recruit and equip young men from out of all the legions, when young men fully equipped as velites with sword, shield, and javelins already, according to his view, exist?

Bearing in mind that velites as a class were not necessarily the fastest runners. I suspect wargamers have a stereotype image of skirmishers as little, lightweight men dashing about like springboks. In reality they had the same average build as the heavy troops. They had less armament to carry and were in loose formation, trained not to engage in close-quarters combat until conditions were right. But they were not necessarily champion sprinters, which was what was required for this particular exercise.

Quote from: Duncan Head on October 01, 2013, 05:01:49 PMNor is there, despite what Patrick says, any evidence for the light infantry fighting at close quarters in 225. Polybios says only that some of the Gaisatai rushed forward and were killed: he doesn't say how they were killed, nor how close they got to the enemy, nor mention any weapons other than javelins. To me it merely suggests that instead of standing behind their shields and being shot down, some of them charged and were shot down. The conclusion that the javelinmen had swords about which one of our better ancient authors is silent is far too speculative to bear any weight.

Would javelin-fire, alone, be enough to kill every single charging Gaul? If that was the case, then the Romans could have used Velites as battleline infantry, a bit like English longbowmen (who still had to do some hand-to-had fighting in any case). My impression is that it is highly unlikely the Velites could have mown down the Gauls before they reached them.

All recruits to the early and mid republic must still have passed the financial requirement before being accepted though, mustn't they.

so the use of the word poorest seems quite relative.  they must all still have had enough money not only to equip themselves, but also to support themselves while they were on campaign (the point of the qualification being that you had enough to keep the farm going while you were away), or had someone to sponsor them for that.

So is it safe to assume that velites must all have been either landed orphans or (mostly) the younger sons of established men?

(and isn't the legion completely different by Pharsalus, making the comparison a bit invalid?)

The financial requirements were indeed in place until Marius adjusted - some would say overturned - the system c.107 BC.

Velites would have been the poorest among the property-owners, with the wealthier young lads becoming hastati, at least as I understand the system.  Principes were picked from men 'in the prime of life', say late 20's in a classical context, while triarii were veterans, perhaps 30's to 40's - military service was for a number of years, after which men retired to their farms, sired children (if they had not already attended to that detail) and generally got on with some serious agriculture.

The children of these men would be assessed for military service in accordance with their family's wealth (at least as I understand things) so if daddy had done well on campaign and added a bit of land to the farm then sonny would probably go in as a hastatus, while the neighbour from whom daddy bought the bit of farmland might have his resources correspondingly reduced and his son(s) would go in as velites.

There was probably some cross-promotion when age groups got to the principes age bracket, by which time a somewhat older velite who had not spent his campaign winnings might be able to afford at least the minimum equipment for the principes - or he might remain a somewhat older velite (I do not know and am not sure if anyone else does - Duncan is probably our best bet here) - and triarii were picked on the basis of age and length of service.  I have no idea if triarii had a minimum property qualification or whether the gear was handed down through the family.

There was probably an element of overlap in property status, in that it seems unlikely that every year saw exactly the right number of people with exactly the right degree of poverty (or at least low value property) to become velites, so the bar was probably moved up and down a bit depending on how many men were required for each troop type.

The legion in the 1st century BC was indeed a different organisation to that of the 3rd century BC but the important common element is that Naevius (or his CO) and Caesar were both selecting men to ride double with the cavalry, and the apparent total lack of velites in Caesar's legionary organisation was no obstacle to his creating such a force.  In each case what is being described is the creation of a force of double-mounted light infantry which has nothing to do with the traditional velite.   ;)

Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 02, 2013, 06:42:09 AM

Would javelin-fire, alone, be enough to kill every single charging Gaul? If that was the case, then the Romans could have used Velites as battleline infantry, a bit like English longbowmen (who still had to do some hand-to-had fighting in any case). My impression is that it is highly unlikely the Velites could have mown down the Gauls before they reached them.

I also wondered about this: at Olympus, the Romans seem to have had at least one missileman for every Gaul and had crossfire from all angles, and yet some desperate Gauls still got through to hand-to-hand.  At Telamon, there was about one missileman for every three Gauls (though perhaps one for every Gaesatus), and instead of being able to cover all angles with crossfire they were essentially facing their targets head-on, i.e. shooting at basically shielded opponents.  While the number of stray Gauls bursting out of formation might have been lower at Telamon (which I doubt, there being perhaps four times as many Gaesati at Telamon as there were Galatians at Olympus) I doubt that javelinmen with a basically forward-angle shot would be more effective at stopping occasional chargers than a combination of long- and short-range missile types with a crossfire.

but before anyone (prior to Marius) could enter service (excepting emergencies, such as after Cannae)

they must still have met a fairly hefty income minimum.

so saying 'poorest' is very much an inaccuracy to modern ears.

its like saying that Eric Pickles would be a velite because he is the poorest within the current Cabinet.

to be a serving republican soldier requires a pretty decent sized land holding to begin with, so by no sensible definition is any velite actually poor.

We may be in danger of getting bogged down in semantics here: the essential point is that of those on the property ladder and hence eligible for military service, the velite was on the bottom rung or rungs and the hastatus on the rungs above him.  This makes the velite the poorest of the military-service-eligible 'classes' without necessarily putting him below the poverty line.

We could just call him the 'least wealthy'.

well if they are all wealthy enough to support their farm and family for a year on campaign, then any basis for reequipping them must be entirely due to a tactical requirement.

which matters for this debate, not to mention many others.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 02, 2013, 07:46:10 PM
We could just call him the 'least wealthy'.

Or even 'economically emergent small-scale production agricultural sector class'.  :o

Indeed.  ;D

The Romans paid their soldiery when on campaign (at least from the 4th century BC, traditionally starting with the siege of Veii) so the state supported the men on campaign.  Of course, this meant someone had to pay the state, and this is where property classes came in - and Rome's allies were occasionally encouraged to make contributions in cash or in kind.  The velite's problems began when he returned home to his farm and nobody was paying his upkeep any longer.

Actually he would not usually face serious problems, at least not before the mid-second century BC.  His farm would be intact (perhaps worked by a slave or two under the supervision of a relative), his tax burden would be minimal (admittedly so would his income) and he would probably have a little sideline of his own, hunting or crafting something useful.  Peer pressure and social mores would discourage him from drinking his holdings away, so with a little bit he had picked up from campaign he might manage to afford a bit more land, and at worst would carry on much as before.

There were two exceptions to this general rule.  The first was that Gallic invasions and Hannibal's campaigns, plus the occasional bit of Italian infighting, would devastate tracts of farmland, and if yours happened to be among them it was bad news - unless you could restock and replant and rebuild, your long-term prospects might not be good.   The other and far more endemically destructive occurrence was when Rome began to spread its empire beyond Italy and armies were required to campaign away from home for extended periods of time.  This had two effects: the first was that instead of being able to return to the farm every year and put things straight, the soldier would return to a neglected property several years later and have great trouble putting it into shape again.  The second was that wealth from overseas was finding its way into the hands of a number of men who were both unscrupulous and acquisitive: these men bought up vast tracts of land, worked them with slaves and cornered the market in foodstuffs.  Individually-worked farms simply could not compete, and increasingly bankrupt farmers often had to sell out to the major landowners, possibly having to become part of their retinue of guards and gangs simply in order to survive.  This ultimately killed the Roman Republic and arguably the Republican legion - as the traditional manpower base of both was eroded and institutions were overshadowed by individuals, armies became followings for successful generals rather than the instruments of the senate and people of Rome.  Men without property replaced men with property as the foundation of the legion, and men with followings replaced men with integrity as the basis of the state.

It all gets very sociological and a bit off the point about exactly what the 211 BC 'reforms' were - not really reforms, but rather the creation of a new arm: infantry to ride with cavalry.  This seems to have been ephemeral, as I find no further references to it (albeit not having looked very hard) until Caesar did much the same thing in 48 BC.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 03, 2013, 12:03:22 PM
Individually-worked farms simply could not compete, and increasingly bankrupt farmers often had to sell out to the major landowners, possibly having to become part of their retinue of guards and gangs simply in order to survive.  This ultimately killed the Roman Republic and arguably the Republican legion - as the traditional manpower base of both was eroded and institutions were overshadowed by individuals, armies became followings for successful generals rather than the instruments of the senate and people of Rome.  Men without property replaced men with property as the foundation of the legion, and men with followings replaced men with integrity as the basis of the state.

Also creating a huge crowd of dispossessed former farmers (or descendants of former farmers) at Rome, which had to be fed and amused. By Cicero's time the Republic would have been more accurately called the Senatus Turbaque Romana - The Senate and Mob of Rome.

I don't think it is sociological at all.

either the velite is too poor to have a decent sword and shield - and thus is reequipped as per the suggestion that there was a reform.

or he is more than able to provide for this himself, in which case the 'reform' beings to look a lot more like a special expeditionary force of men required to act as cavalry supports who are selected by their ability to keep up with horsemen.

additionally, there is the age factor - if he is mature enough to own his own farm, he would surely be in the hastatii at least, and much more likely, in the principes, would he not?

given the age criteria and selection, would it in fact be safe to say that almost all velities would be young sons not yet old enough to serve in the hastatii?

Probably, Mark: Polybius' explanation goes thus:

"The Military Tribunes at Rome, after the administering of the oath to their men, and giving out the day and place at which they are to appear without arms, for the present dismiss them. When they arrive on the appointed day, they first select the youngest and poorest [neōtatous kai penikhrotatous] to form the Velites, the next to them the Hastati [tous d' hexēs toutois eis tous hastatous kaloumenous], while those who are in the prime of life [akmaiotatous] they select as Principes, and the oldest of all [presbutatous = aged, senior] as Triarii. For in the Roman army these divisions, distinct not only as to their ages [helikiais = time of life or military age grouping] and nomenclature [onomaision = designation], but also as to the manner in which they are armed, exist in each legion. The division is made in such proportions that the senior men, called Triarii, should number six hundred, the Principes twelve hundred, the Hastati twelve hundred, and that all the rest as the youngest [tous de loipous kai neōtatous = (lit.) all the remaining and youngest] should be reckoned among the Velites. And if the whole number of the legion is more than four thousand, they vary the numbers of these divisions proportionally, except those of the Triarii, which is always the same." - Polybius VI.21.6-10

This has occasionally been read as the very youngest (only) becoming the velites, but the essential division appears to be between the velites and hastati who are 'youngest' and the principes who are in their 'prime of life'.

There does seem to be a bias towards the velites being the youngest, as in VI.22.1 he writes:

The youngest soldiers [neōtatois] are ordered to carry a sword [makhaira], spears [grosphous = specifically the velite javelin], and target [parmen = parma].

I also get the impression from VI.23.1 that the hastati are an age category up from the velites:

tois ge mēn deuterois men kata tēn hēlikian, hastatois ...

This can be rendered:

The second age group along, the hastati ...

Which puts the hastati in a separate age group.  Both the velites and the hastati are too young to be 'in the prime of life', a category specific to the principes.  The impression I get from VI.22.1 and VI.23.1 is that the age group is supposed to determine all and predominate even over the wealth category, whereas VI.21 suggests that velites and hastati are categorised more according to need (how big a legion do we want?) than on strict property or age qualifications.  One imagines that the rules or guidelines would be more rigorously applied when the need for troops was least, and somewhat bent during emergencies.  In 211 BC the Romans were scraping up troops wherever they could find them, so there would in all likelihood be plenty of what would in other times have been strictly underage men in the hastati.

Quote from: Mark G on October 03, 2013, 01:22:01 PM

... the 'reform' beings to look a lot more like a special expeditionary force of men required to act as cavalry supports who are selected by their ability to keep up with horsemen.

Or ride double behind the horsemen, which would be a reason for giving them the unusual smaller shield - a full-size parma might be too inconvenient if the infantryman 'riding pillion' has to hold onto the cavalryman.  If this was the reason for the smaller shield, one is struck by the attention to detail exhibited by classical armies, which were prepared to make or procure equipment specially designed for a particular role, and to do it quickly and without fuss.

so having disposed of the red herring which is poverty.

we can look again at whether there was a tactical decision to re-equip these skirmishers.

option 1 - a one off role to act as cavalry supports.
option 2 - a more permanent change to better equip them for hand to hand encounters with other skirmishers.

evidence seems widely open to interpretation.

if we had some notions of what other latin skirmishers were equipped with, it might help - would you need to carry a sword and shield against them?
were they also drawn from the younger men?

the basis for the case I initially found and questioned seems to be that despite having many times more velites than their counterparts, Rome was out skirmished repeatedly by the professional mercenaries which Hannibal had with him while in Italy.

we know those guys include Balearic slingers in some numbers (much better weapons and longer range - and adults), and I think also a good number of adult javelin skirmishers too - so there is a consistency to the case, just as there is with the mounted support interpretation.

perhaps if we had a bit more evidence on what they faced prior to Hannibal descending it might give a clue as to whether they needed shields and proper side arms before then.

This leads into the question of what the legion was composed of and when.  As of 340 BC (before the Romans really got stuck into the Samnites, although they had a brush in 343-342 which according to Livy went well for them) there were only 300 skirmishing types in the whole legion (20 leves as part of each of 15 maniples of hastati).  At some indeterminate point between then and the First Punic War the legionary organisation changed - exactly when has been a past point of furious debate and hopeful rather than definite conclusions.

The overall picture seems to be that before seriously taking on the Samnites the Romans had only a sprinkling of skirmishers.  After two Samnite wars (or perhaps after three) they had about a quarter of the legion as skirmishers.  Unfortunately we know even less about Samnite organisation (or for that matter any other Italian army) than we do about Roman organisation, so we have no obvious way of telling whether this was a case of adapting to match Samnite practice or a change for some other reason.

Livy, interestingly, refers to 'Samnite legions' (legiones Samnitium, e.g. in IX.23.3), suggesting the Samnites had developed a legionary organisation of their own.

A key event determining and perhaps timing the change in legionary organisation may have been the Battle of Tarracina in 314 BC: here, Livy tells us that

The troops on the left, besides being drawn up in closer order, had received an accession to their strength from a plan conceived on the spur of the moment by Poetelius. [10] for those subsidiary cohorts which were wont to be kept fresh in reserve, to meet the chance needs of a long engagement, he sent immediately into the fighting line; and by using all his strength at once, he forced the enemy back at the first assault. - Livy IX.27.9-10

While there is nothing about skirmishers, Poetelius seems to have committed his rorarii (whose role iin the 340 BC legion was to reinforce the hastati and principes part-way through the action) at the outset, and the result was success.  This could well have been the spur for changing the legion to a 'front-loaded' configuration with the triarii as a vestigial contingent and the main strength in the hastati and principes (the rorarii had previously been the youngest and least experienced men in the army).  The increased complement of velites would have arisen from another cause, and here one might speculate that the Romans had been consistently out-skirmished by the Samnites, which would have encouraged them to increase the number of skirmishers in the legion.  Unfortunately we have no proof one way or the other, only the apparent fact that before the Samnite wars the Romans had only a sprinkling of skirmishers (300) who carried 'a spear and javelins' and following the Samnite wars the Romans had a lot of skirmishers (1,200) whose equipment as of the mid-2nd century BC is described by Polybius (javelins, sword, shield) but we have no hint in Livy or Polybius that this had changed during or between the Punic Wars.  Possibly the easiest conclusion is that re-equipment with sword and shield in place of the spear took place as a result of the Samnite wars, together with adopting the new legionary organisation with its abolition of the rorarii and introduction of the velites.  Number-wise, 300 leves and 900 rorarii seem to provide us with 1,200 velites, though whether there is a direct relationship here is less clear.  It can nevertheless do as a working hypothesis.

Hannibal fielded a considerable contingent of skirmishers - Polybius gives him 8,000 at the Trebia.  The Roman force there amounted to four legions and four allied alae (Italian legion-equivalents), which between them could field perhaps 9,600 velite-type skirmishers.  Numbers were thus more or less comparable, but the Romans were disadvantaged by having thrown most of their javelins at the Numidians in earlier skirmishing, not to mention getting wet in the near-freezing river.  Conditions rather than equipment handicapped the Romans.

The next skirmisher vs skirmisher lineup was at Cannae, and here the restricted frontage meant that a probable 18,000 Roman and Italian skirmishers were deployed facing 8-10,000 Carthaginian skirmishers (there may or may not have been some Gallic skirmishers helping out Hannibal's original 8,000).  In this engagement there was really nothing for the skirmishers to do except exchange missiles until the main armies were ready for action, so neither contingent put much effort into trying to overcome the other.

A notable difference in doctrine was exhibited at the Trebia.  All indications are that when Roman velites finished skirmishing, they rejoined and were reintegrated into their parent maniples of hastati, principes or triarii.  Carthaginian skirmishers, on the other hand, fell back through their heavy infantry and regrouped on the flanks - and at the Trebia made themselves very useful this way.  At Cannae we have no indication they still did this, and it is quite likely that Hannibal had adopted the Roman system of absorbing them into his 'legions' - not necessarily all of them, as the Balearic slingers would not fit well into a legionary system, but the bulk of the javelinmen (logkhephoroi) would be natural candidates for this.

What may be noteworthy is that the Romans did not feel it incumbent on themselves to make any changes to their skirmisher organisation in response to their defeats by Hannibal in 218-216 BC.  Had they felt the need, such changes would have taken place in 215 or at the latest 214 BC - they would not have waited until 211.  The absence of any reference to changes in velite equipment in 215-214 is perhaps telling.

if we are postulating all of these changes as being caused by fighting up in Samnite hill country - which is not at all unreasonable to do - then it does seem that having a massed skirmishing component, backed up by a flexible fighting skirmish component (hastatii) would enable you to feel out the deployments before committing properly and potentially exposing your flanks.

which in turn does support the idea that the early velites were not equipped with a substantial side arm or a shield, as they were not expected to need it.

further, I can quite easily see javelin armed high school seniors and undergraduates being forced back by professional slingers - for which you obviously give them a small shield - and monstered up close by the adults if they do stay in position - again, for which you add a side arm.

it strikes me that skirmishing as a youngster is a comparatively safe way to be introduced to warfare - when that skirmishing is on a reasonably equal footing.  But is a very risky thing to do long term with your boys when they are facing professional adults.

conversely, if your cavalry are being bested, and you decide to bolster them by adding light supports, you would want men used to getting in close, rather than men used to keeping a distance.

Unless there was an ambush there would be no need to 'feel out' deployments, as it was customary for both armies to deploy in full view of each other.  Hastati were formed line-of-battle troops: it was the velites who would have been really useful for rough terrain scouting and ambush-tripping, and the Caudine Forks (321 BC) and Latulae (315 or 316 BC), in each of which the Romans were trapped or ambushed by the Samnites, were both before the change to the velite-heavy Polybian legion.

If messing about in rough terrain a shield is quite handy as one will not always be able to dodge every missile coming one's way, and at times will get up close and personal with bolder enemy skirmishers or will be faced with a wounded opponent who has to be finished off but is still capable of wielding a weapon.

Skirmishing in this era seemed to have a fairly low casualty ratio, so yes, it does seem a good way to start youngsters on their military career - and allows one to find out early who exhibits soldierly qualities and who is inclined to duck out or fumble their actions, because the lads are performing in full view of the army.

Perhaps more significant than slingers in a skirmish were the more numerous opposing Carthaginian lonchophoroi, professional javelinmen with thonged javelins, giving them a range and accuracy advantage.  None of our sources, however, seem to indicate that the Carthaginians had any major skirmishing advantage despite the experience and professionalism of their skirmishers, although as skirmishing is not usually a battle-decider nobody seems to have bothered detailing it, but if the Carthaginians did have a dramatic skirmishing superiority the Romans would not have waited seven years to do something about it.

hang on Pat, that is exactly the attitude which the lowland Romans took into the hills - and got caught out by a Claudine forks and a few other places.

if both armies did always agree to fight in the open and clear, then there would be no need to make any change when fighting the Samnites at all.

Not quite, Mark: please observe the distinction between 'customary' and 'always'.

perhaps, but you probably do need to give an alternative explanation for Roman army reforms which are currently taken by most as to be concurrent with the Samnite wars.

why change the army when fighting these guys? why introduce such a massive skirmish component? why such a half way stage of partially armoured heavy-javelin men before the fully armoured (originally spear armed) chaps get introduced?

especially as these wars take place in forested hill country, which is quite distinct from the previous lowland agricultural land opponents which preceded that reorganisation.

Are we actually saying the same thing, namely that the change from 300 leves to 1,200 velites as the skirmishing component of the legion resulted from, or at least took place during, the Samnite wars?

Quote from: Mark G on October 28, 2013, 03:47:47 PM

why change the army when fighting these guys? why introduce such a massive skirmish component?

The answer regarding the 'massive skirmish component' may lie in the ambush at Latulae, or it may just be that the Romans increasingly felt that the traditional system of using maniples of rorarii for piecemeal reinforcement of disadvantaged sections of the hastati and principes lines was no longer useful against the Samnites - in 314 BC at the battle of Tarracina the consul Marcus Poetelius Libo did something different:

"For those subsidiary cohorts [subsidarias cohortes] which were wont to be kept fresh in reserve, to meet the chance needs of a long engagement, he sent immediately into the fighting line; and by using all his strength at once, he forced the enemy back at the first assault."

The success of this measure may have brought to a head a growing feeling that the legion of 15 maniples per line with rorarii 'top-up' reserves and a sprinkling of leves for skirmishing was past its use-by date.  At any rate, the next legion pattern we encounter is the Polybian, with identical (1,200-man) establishments of hastati and principes (although the leves have gone and the hastati are now all heavy infantry), a reduced triarii contingent (600 rather than 900) and the new troop component: 1,200 velites.  Leves are expressly described by Livy as unshielded: there are, as far as I know, no references whatsoever to unshielded velites.

Velites, if one looks through Polybius' Book VI, do more than just skirmish on the battlefield.

"The perimeter [kharax = palisade] is lined by the velites, who are on guard all along it from day to day. That is their special duty; while they also guard all the entrances to the camp, telling off ten sentinels to take their turn at each of them."

Triarii gave up camp guard duty at some point between 437 and 394 BC; velites assumed it at some point following 314 BC, perhaps in 309 when Lucius Papirius Cursor was appointed dictator, perhaps even earlier, as Papirius was consul in 313 BC.  Nobody states who did it in the interim period, though my guess is that it would have fallen to the rorarii.

Quote

... why such a half way stage of partially armoured heavy-javelin men before the fully armoured (originally spear armed) chaps get introduced?

Not sure exactly what you mean here, Mark.  Would it be possible to elaborate?

The move from the 'Livian' legion described in Livy VIII.8 at the Battle of Vesuvius in 340 BC to the 'Polybian' legion in Book VI of the eponymous history marks a considerable change and reorganisation: numbers remain constant, or nearly so, but the legion changes from a deliberately-paced fighting machine with 15-maniple lines and almost half its strength 'behind the standards' to a more aggressive configuration with 10-maniple lines and four-fifths of its strength in advance of the standards.  Instead of keeping back rorarii to top up failing maniples of hastati and subsequently principes, the new legion sends its velites to begin the battle by skirmishing and then drop back to form the rear two ranks of each heavy infantry formation.  The velites seem to be a compromise between the more specific functions of the old leves and the old rorarii - and their equipment as described by Polybius reflects this.

"The youngest soldiers, the velites, are ordered to carry a sword [makhaira], javelins [grosphous] and a shield [parmen]."

The hastati are heavy infantry pure and simple:

"The second group, the Hastati, are ordered to have the complete panoply [panoplian]. This to a Roman means, first, a large shield [thureos], the surface of which is curved outwards, its breadth two and a half feet, its length four feet, - though there is also an extra sized shield in which these measures are increased by a palm's breadth ... With the shield they also carry a sword [makhaira] hanging down by their right thigh, which is called a Spanish [Iberiken] sword ... In addition to these they have two pila, a brass helmet, and greaves ... Besides these each man is decorated with a plume of feathers, with three purple or black feathers standing upright, about a cubit long. The effect of these being placed on the helmet, combined with the rest of the armour, is to give the man the appearance of being twice his real height, and to give him a noble aspect calculated to strike terror into the enemy. The common soldiers also receive a brass plate [khalkoma = bronze plate], a span square, which they put upon their breast and call a breastpiece [kardiophulaka = heart-guard], and so complete their panoply. Those who are rated above a hundred thousand asses, instead of these breastpieces wear, with the rest of their armour, coats of mail [thorakas]. The Principes and Triarii are armed in the same way as the Hastati, except that instead of pila the triarii carry long spears [dorata]." - Polybius VI.23

Just to note that about the time we're discussing (211) wasn't there a big drop in the property qualification for the legions?

Jim

not that big a drop to make a velite shield or a sword unaffordable - although it would make a neat solution if it were

No but a big enough drop to make body armour unaffordable. So the state was picking up a lot bigger bill for equipment
Suddenly equipping more of them as velites might have seemed quite a bright idea to the accountants :-)

Do we have a source which tells us about this drop in property qualification?  I just want to be sure it is not just a theory that arose to explain an assumed increase in light infantry c.211 BC which is now being drawn upon to justify the original assumption ...  ;)

It is also hard to link any such drop in property qualification (which would take place early in the year, before the legions were enrolled or re-enrolled) with a supposed reform that did not take place until well into the campaign season.  For several months the legions would have to be operating as neither one thing nor the other.

For me, this casts a measure of doubt on the suggestion.

I think we are confusing a couple of things.

there was a reduction in qualifications for enlistment at the start of a campaign year during the punic wars after the disastrous losses
- but this is not the same as the suggested reequipping of velites around Capua mid way through a campaign which this thread raised
- nor is it the same as the change in legion from what is commonly called camillan to what is commonly called polybian - which was when the 1200 velites make an appearance.

Trouble is, I read it in Arnold J. Toynbee's, Hannibal's Legacy, back in the 1970s and don't have the books to hand :-(  (Library loan I'm afraid)

The Velites were drawn from the Legion, guessing from the Hastati? When did the Hastati stop being a mainly skirmishing troop type? This has always confuse me .

As far as I can tell, hastati never were a skirmishing troop type (with the exception below*).  We have little detail on the legion prior to 340 BC, at which point Livy springs upon us the following organisation:

Livian ('Camillan') Legion

Antepilani
Hastati: 15 maniples each of 60 heavy infantry and 20 leves (skirmishers) - *each hastati maniple contains two troop types.
Principes: 15 maniples each of 80 heavy infantry

Pilani (ordines)
Triarii: 15 maniples each of 60 heavy infantry
Rorarii: 15 maniples each of 60 heavy infantry

Also present in 340 BC were the emergency supplementary troops, the Accensi, in 15 maniples each of 60 heavy infantry.  Livy gives the impression that these were an integral part of the legion, but they were only levied in emergencies.  Without them, the legion coincidentally has its traditional strength of 4,200 infantry (often rounded to 4,000 in our sources).  With them, it has 5,100 (usually rounded to 5,000 in our sources).

Note that this legion has only 300 skirmishers (15x20 leves).

From perhaps 311 BC we have the 'Polybian' legion.

Polybian Legion

Antepilani
Hastati: 10 maniples each of 120 heavy infantry
Principes: 10 manipes each of 120 heavy infantry

Pilani
Triarii: 10 maniples each of 60 infantry

Each maniple of hastati, principes and triarii also attached 40 velites.  As with the earlier leves, once their skirmishing duties were over, they formed the last two ranks of their respective heavy infantry maniples (which got them out of the way and meant they could still make a useful contribution).

The increase from 300 skirmishing types to 1,200 appears to result from the Samnite wars, specifically the second.

The Polybian legion also had an emergency strength of 5,000, obtained by increasing the hastati and principes maniples to 160 each.  During and after the Second Punic war, this notional emergency strength became the norm.  Curiously enough, centuries as on-field military subunits make their first appearance in the Polybian legion, and in a 5,000-strong legion with the velites added in to their respective maniples, each century is coincidentally 100 men.  We may also note that, like its predecessor, it had a 4,200-man and a 5,000-man establishment.

I agree with Pat that the Hastatii were never skirmishing troops.

but their development does offer the possibility that they were intended as being a half way step before the main line -able to get out of camp and into line faster than the fully armoured guys.

their equipment also suggests that they were not intended to move directly into hand to hand, but could hold a line until such troops were in position - big shields and throwing weapons are - to my mind - intended for more fluid defence than for aggressive attacks.

that this combination actually worked as line of battle in itself enabled the further change to full line of battle hand to hand men - and I expect it happened quite quickly - but I muse that it was not the full original intention.

there is also the possibility that the velites were scouting on the march, and the hastatii - again, being less encumbered and presumably younger also, could run into position and form a holding line while the main men formed out when attacked en-route.  I say possibility, because these Romans were always particularly poor at scouting and screening themselves on the march, but up in the forested hills, it becomes essential to have the option, I think.

Quote from: Mark G on November 28, 2013, 08:09:18 AM

there is also the possibility that the velites were scouting on the march, and the hastatii - again, being less encumbered and presumably younger also, could run into position and form a holding line while the main men formed out when attacked en-route.  I say possibility, because these Romans were always particularly poor at scouting and screening themselves on the march, but up in the forested hills, it becomes essential to have the option, I think.

Polybius (VI.40) tells us that this sort of thing, or at least vanguard/rearguard duty, was undertaken by the extraordinarii, the pick of the allied Italian alae (legion equivalents).  We are not told whether their equipment differed from that of their compatriots.

He does however specify (VI.23) that the hastati and principes of his time carried identical equipment.  Livy's 340 BC legion has the hastati (other than the attached leves) and the principes apparently armed with the same equipment, although the principes have "insignibus maxime armis", equipment of the best quality.

I cannot find any account of hastati acting as other than formed heavy infantry; although the peltast model has obvious appeal, our accounts of hastati in action have them getting stuck in just like principes, only earlier.  In particular, in the battle against the Insubres on 223 BC (Polybius II.33) the hastati are issued with triarii spears which they hold out point-first to encourage the Gauls to chop the hafts, and as soon as the Gauls have finished their downstroke the hastati close mano a mano and give them the point of the gladius.  Although this is an unusual battle, it does demonstrate the hastati having a close combat role from the outset.

and do you have any descriptions of the early samnite battles, Pat?

Pat and Mark, thank you for replying. I know my argument is weak, but I just can't understand a nation like Rome putting their youth and the future of their country in the front battle-line  lightly armorer and trained   to fight, if that was the case why not equip them as shock troops instead of what seems to be light infantry equipment?

And the hastati were indeed equipped as close-combat troops; the one thing we can be certain of (thanks to Livy) is that they carried a scutum in 340 BC and were still carrying it when Polybius wrote c.150 BC.  Polybius notes that the hastati "were required to wear a complete panoply" (VI.23) which he describes as a thureos (scutum), bronze helmet, greaves and chest-piece.  This is definitely heavy infantry equipment.

Again according to Polybius the degree of body (torso) armour was a function of individual wealth: the chest-piece seems to have been standard issue but men rated at 10,000 drachmae or more bought their own mail thorax which would provide better protection.

Quote from: Mark G on November 28, 2013, 01:12:58 PM
and do you have any descriptions of the early samnite battles, Pat?

We have those in Livy, which are usually depicted as Roman walk-overs, but one can learn something from them.

The first such engagement,  in which each side was trying out the other, occurred in 343 BC and went like this: 

"The battle began, if ever battle did, with like hopes on both sides and equal strength, and a self-confidence which yet was not mixed with contempt for the enemy. [6] The Samnites were' emboldened by their recent exploits and by their double victory of a few days before [against the Sidicini and Campanians - PW], the Romans on their part by the glories of four centuries and a victorious career that dated from the founding of the City; [7] each side nevertheless experienced some anxiety at meeting an untried foe. The engagement testified how resolute they were, for they so fought that for some time neither battle-line gave ground. [8] Then the consul, thinking that he must inspire his enemies with fear, since he could not drive them back by force, attempted by sending in the cavalry to 'throw their front ranks into disorder. [9] But when he saw that nothing came of the confused fighting of the squadrons, as they tried to manœuvre in a narrow space, and that they could not break the enemy's line, he rode back: to the front ranks of his legions, and, dismounting from his horse, exclaimed, "Soldiers, it is for us, the infantry, to accomplish yonder task! [10] Come, as you shall see me making a path for myself with my sword wherever I advance against the enemy's line, so do you every man strike down whom you encounter; all that array where now uplifted spears are glancing you shall see laid open with great carnage." [11] No sooner had he said these words, than the horsemen, by the consul's order, drew off towards the wings and left the legions room to attack the centre. [12] The consul was the very foremost in the charge, and slew the man he chanced to meet with. Kindled by this sight, the Romans on the right and on the left pushed forward, every man of them, and fought a memorable combat; the Samnites stood manfully at bay, but they took more strokes than they delivered.

[13] The battle had now lasted a considerable time; there was dreadful slaughter about the standards of the Samnites, but as yet no retreating anywhere, so determined were they to be overcome by naught but death. [14] And so the Romans, who saw that their strength was fast ebbing away in weariness and that little daylight yet remained, were filled with rage, and hurled themselves against the enemy. [15] Then for the first time were there signs of giving way and the beginning of a rout; then were the Samnites captured or slain; nor would many have survived, if night had not ended what was now a victory rather than a battle. [16] The Romans admitted that never had they fought with a more stubborn adversary; [17] and the Samnites, on being asked what it was that first had turned them, resolute as they were, to flight, replied that it was the eyes of the Romans, which had seemed to blaze, and their frenzied expression and infuriated looks; this it was more than anything else that had caused their panic."

What we can extract from this is that the consul seems to be exhorting the 'front ranks of the legions' [antesignanos legionum, i.e. the hastati and principes] to do their utmost in close combat.  The character of the action is of close combat, with the consul on foot among the hastati being the first to slay his man, or at least being portrayed as such.

Quote from: oldbob on November 28, 2013, 03:56:52 PM
Pat and Mark, thank you for replying. I know my argument is weak, but I just can't understand a nation like Rome putting their youth and the future of their country in the front battle-line  lightly armorer and trained   to fight, if that was the case why not equip them as shock troops instead of what seems to be light infantry equipment?

Remember that for a start it was up to the individual to equip himself, it was not, initially at least, the state's responsibility.
So Hastati equipment would doubtless range from entirely adequate down to barely adequate.
One suspects that if a velite came into money (or captured good kit) he might find himself drifted seamlessly into the Hastati :-)

Jim

Didn't you find something a year or so ago indicating that this was not automatically the case during a campaign, Pat?

Quote from: Mark G on November 29, 2013, 12:11:30 PM
Didn't you find something a year or so ago indicating that this was not automatically the case during a campaign, Pat?

In a campaign things are flexible. It's just that when a man returns home with his loot, that can lift him to a different property band and his contribution would then be reassessed next time he's called up

Jim

That makes sense.  Changing status during a campaign is not something I have found evidence for, but doing so between campaigns is quite logical.  Have better property, will upgrade.  :)

The Romans started using the Pila both heavy and light some time after the Samnite Wars. The first troop types to receive these weapons were the Hastati, was because they were lightly armored,I'm not sure? but they have a troop type who skirmishs and fight close in now,what I think to be some of skirmish/light infantry killers. When exactly did they start using true skirmisher  and gave them smaller shields I not sure and who did the skirmishing before the Hastati,once again I find this be confusing!

Rodger Williams and yours truly looked into this question last year, with results that should be appearing in a forthcoming Slingshot.  The Romans apparently started to use pila much earlier than expected - not after the Samnite Wars of the 4th-3rd century BC, but after or even during the Sabine War of 505-503 BC!!!

Principes and hastati both used this weaponry from 503 BC-ish, judging by obiter dictu comments and described fighting styles in both Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus; triarii, who were originally camp guards and do not appear on the battlefield prior to 394 BC, seem always to have used the dora-type long(-ish) spear.  Skirmishers seem to have originally been the Servian 'Class V' types with sling and/or javelin, although they are not really covered by our sources and we have to guess that they hung around as a thin screen from c.550 BC; by 340 BC they were equipped with javelins and a spear and attached to maniples of heavy infantry hastati.

At some point between 340 BC and the First Punic War (when Polybius starts referring to 'grosphomachoi', his term for velites), probably c.311 BC during the Second Samnite War, which saw the Romans in trouble a few times, the legion changed, with a greatly increased establishment of skirmishers (velites).  These seem (although conclusive proof remains elusive) to have been equipped with javelins, sword and shield from the start - Polybius notably does not refer to any armament changes when describing them although he does detail such for the Roman cavalry.

Velites seem to have used the 3' parma throughout their existence from the putative c.311 BC date to their apparent disappearance when the 'Marian' legion became the norm in the years following 107 BC, and the smaller (2') shield seems unique to the double-mounted light infantry accompanying the cavalry at Capua in 211 BC - at least, it is not as far as I know mentioned elsewhere.

Patrick; thank's for that reply. I look forward to your article in Slingshot, anything that help clear up some of my confusion on this issue will be greatly appreciated!

I look forward to it also Pat, but warn against announcing 'forthcoming unpublished radical new research interpretations'.

you cited this one over a year ago on this forum without any follow up then either - till its in print, its not safe to report, as you well know.

not that I doubt you or Rodge, but for passing viewers, they have nothing to go on.

It was actually due to appear in Slingshot 285 or 286 but then someone sent in a series evaluating the 'WMWW' theory which displaced it from the schedule.  ;)

I can throw in a bit of material here and now: the first mention of pila in any shape or form seems to be Dionysius of Halicaranssus describing a portent on the night before the final battle against the Sabines in 503 BC:

"It was as follows: From the javelins [hussos] that were fixed in the ground beside their tents (these javelins [hussos] are Roman weapons which they hurl and having pointed iron heads, not less than three feet in length, projecting straight forward from one end, and with the iron they are as long as spears of moderate length) — from these javelins [hussos] flames issued forth round the tips of the heads and the glare extended through the whole camp like that of torches and lasted a great part of the night." (Dionysius V.46.2)

Dionysius not only explicitly uses the Greek specialist pilum-word 'hussos' three times but also gives a description of the weapon.  From the length of the weapon and mention of the distinctive long iron shank it is pretty obvious what kind of weapon Dionysius is referring to.

Trying to establish whether these were the weapons of a minority or of the whole army was a bit harder (not to mention settling the question of whether Dionysius was simply anachronising), but to cut a long story short the character of engagements of the 5th century BC in both Livy and Dionysius is of missile exchanges preceding close combat and piecemeal reinforcement of wavering parts of the battle line from a reserve line, i.e. not hoplite warfare (by contrast, the first battle fought by the Roman republic - in 509 BC, against the Tarquins - had some of the key characteristics of a hoplite battle, so it looks as if a few things changed quite rapidly in the first few years of the early republic).  Anyway, we should get the chance to read all about it in an issue or two.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 30, 2013, 09:00:19 PMVelites seem to have used the 3' parma throughout their existence from the putative c.311 BC date to their apparent disappearance when the 'Marian' legion became the norm in the years following 107 BC...

Though that depends partly on how you interpret Festus on replacing parmae with Bruttianae, of course.

Hence "apparent".  ;)  One wonders if this would have been when the 'ferentarii' acquired their nomenclature.

Rodger's and my Slingshot piece largely avoids treatment of light infantry (sorry, OldBob!) so it might be an idea to discuss a few points here.

Good information on the subject prior to 340 BC seems to be as abundant as hens' teeth, but after that at some unspecified but presumably 4th century date we have the shift from the Livian to the Polybian model (a modest 300 shieldless leves are replaced with 1,200 velites) which, given Polybius' lack of mention in Book VI (where he describes Roman equipment in some detail) of any change in velite armament whereas he does mention an earlier change in the armament of Roman cavalry, probably means the velites were configured in the familiar shield+sword+javelins format right from the start of this particular type of legion.

The impetus for and occasion of the change in legion format may be the Second Samnite War, as after that we cease to get references to piecemeal reinforcement during a battle - which is less helpful than it sounds, because we get few useful details of engagements until Polybius starts up with the First Punic War, so we do not know exactly what we are missing.  My current conjecture is that the impetus for the change to the 'Polybian' legion came in 314 BC when the consul Poetelius, commanding the Roman left at the battle of Tarracina, did things differently to the 'book':

"The troops on the left, besides being drawn up in closer order [confertiores], had received an accession to their strength from a plan conceived on the spur of the moment by Poetelius. For those subsidiary cohorts [subsidarias cohortes] which were wont to be kept fresh in reserve, to meet the chance needs of a long engagement, he sent immediately into the fighting line; and by using all his strength at once, he forced the enemy back at the first assault." - Livy IX.27.9-10

The advantages of starting with the 'reserves' as part of the first troops into combat may have been sufficiently apparent to begin melding them into the front-line formations, and in the new legion the rorarii disappear while the 'heavy' hastati increase from 900 to 1,200.  At the same time the 300 leves become history and are replaced by 1,200 velites, which suggests that it was found to be beneficial to have a much larger skirmish-capable contingent in the legion, perhaps as a consequence of being thrashed at Lautulae in 315 BC.  Combining these lessons would have resulted in the new type of legion being fielded within a few years - exactly when is conjectural, but it is tempting to associate it with either the consulship of Lucius Papirius Cursor and Gaius Iunius Bubulcus Brutus in 313 BC or the dictatorship of Lucius Papirius Cursor in 309 BC.

All of this - if correctly deduced - suggests a transition from the sedate multi-stage legion described by Livy (VIII.8 ) in 340 BC to the leaner and meaner Polybius version with its much higher skirmishing capacity somewhere in the 313-309 BC bracket as a result of Second Samnite War experiences.  This may also tell us something - indirectly - about Samnite organisation at this point in time, the inference being that the Romans adapted their own legion to reflect certain Samnite practices.  Henceforth the Roman legion would be rich in skirmishers (the velites), and these skirmishers would serve a dual role, for once they finished pre-battle skirmishing they would (following Connolly) form as the two rear ranks behind the six ranks of heavy hastati and principes and contribute moral support and perhaps a few left-over javelins to the efforts of these lines.

They would also form as the last two ranks behind the three ranks of triarii, giving a five-deep triarii formation for the comparatively few times when this arm actually engaged in combat.

Whether this is firm enough to start rewriting army lists is another matter.  It all seems to fit so far, at any rate.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 01, 2013, 09:47:03 PM... while the 'heavy' hastati increase from 900 to 1,200.

Which reminds me: I recently came across an early statement of the idea that hastati were originally light infantry:

Quote from: William SmithThe names [of hastati, principes, etc] were first bestowed when the Roman army was disciplined according to the tactics of the Grecian phalanx. At that time the hastati were the skirmishers armed with a light javelin (the hasta velitaris), who were thrown forward in advance of the main body, and it is with reference to their ancient duty that Ennius in the eighth book of his annals uses an expression no longer applicable in his day.

                "Hastati spargunt hastas, fit ferreus imber."

"The hastati throw hastae, making an iron shower"

From Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Exercitus.html (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Exercitus.html)

This is the closest I have seen to a reasoned argument as to why the hastati should at some stage have been seen as light infantry; and when you remember that the pilum can be called a hasta ("pilum proprie est hasta Romana", Servius on the Aeneid 7,664) the Ennius quote need not mean anything more than that the hastati were throwing pila when Ennius wrote.

Thanks, Duncan.

There may have originally been some differentiation between the hasta and the pilum, e.g. Livy VII.23.8 (350 BC; Gauls attack uphill against Marcus Popilius Laenas' army):

"Besides their valour, they had an advantage from the elevation, for their javelins [pila] and spears [hastae], instead of falling without effect, as they mostly do when thrown on a level field, were steadied by their own weight and all struck home."

Here it is possible - this is admittedly my conjecture - that the 'hastae' in question may equate to the lighter and longer-ranged pilum type described by Polybius (VI.23.9):

"In addition to these they have two pila ... Some of the pila are thick, some fine. Of the thicker, some are round with the diameter of a palm's length, others are a palm square. The fine pila are like moderate sized hunting spears [sibunion], and they are carried along with the former sort. The wooden haft of them all is about three cubits long; and the iron head fixed to each half is barbed, and of the same length as the haft."

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 02, 2013, 11:20:41 AMHere it is possible - this is admittedly my conjecture - that the 'hastae' in question may equate to the lighter and longer-ranged pilum type described by Polybius (VI.23.9)...

There is a theory - I think I have seen it in one of Nick Sekunda's works, but I'm not sure if it is originally his or older - that "hasta velitaris" was originally a name for the socketed pilum. It would then have come to mean the spear of the light infantry because that spear looks like a miniature socketed pilum. Hence "pila and hastae" could perhaps have meant "the two types of pilum", as you suggest - though it could just as well have meant pila and conventional javelins, or pila and gaesa, for instance.

("The lighter and longer-ranged pilum type described by Polybius" - of course Polybios doesn't call it either lighter or longer-ranged, but simply "thin" or "slender". The only reconstruction evidence I am aware of is Connolly's experiments recorded in JRMES 11, which suggests that the long socketed pilum was actually heavier and shorter-ranged than the tanged "thick" types reconstructed.)

Quote from: Duncan Head on December 02, 2013, 09:26:12 PM

("The lighter and longer-ranged pilum type described by Polybius" - of course Polybios doesn't call it either lighter or longer-ranged, but simply "thin" or "slender". The only reconstruction evidence I am aware of is Connolly's experiments recorded in JRMES 11, which suggests that the long socketed pilum was actually heavier and shorter-ranged than the tanged "thick" types reconstructed.)

True: if I have guessed incorrectly which one was for longer-range use that was my mistake.  ;)  Interestingly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (VIII.84.1) has both sides 'use up their logkhas and saunia' before closing to melee - this in 484 or 483 BC when Coriolanus had re-patterned the Volsci Roman-style and both sides were using similar tactics and equipment.  The combination of light and heavy 'pilum'-equivalents, or at least shafted hurling weapon types, is suggestive, although Dionysius' variable terminology makes drawing conclusions tricky.

This will be an article to look out for :)