During the 5th century BC, the Greek armoured infantryman, already a popular addition to Egyptian and occasionally Neo-Babylonian armies, came to dominate the infantry battlefield. Greeks took on and defeated Achaemenid armies and each other, and in the process became the most sought-after troop type in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the spectacular escape of the Ten Thousand from the Persian Empire, even the Persians decided they must have Greeks as the cutting edge of their army.
Then, less than a century later, with the rise of the Macedonian phalangite, the Greek hoplite as we know him rapidly disappears - or seems to.
This thread is intended for examination of the hoplite as a weapons system in an attempt to pin down how this peculiar infantry type achieved such an ascendancy - and why he lost it. It is also useful as a repository for any interesting details about hoplites irrespective of the big picture.
So what made the hoplite special? Was he even that special? How did he function, both individually and en masse? There are many aspects we can examine: weaponry, protection, organisation, tactics and accounts of battles which demonstrate hoplite characteristics.
What made them special I would say:
Heaviness of armour/weapons
Shieldwall
Long spears
Communal teamwork ethic
Citizen not subject infantry
Had a stake in what they were fighting for
Not afraid of close quarter fighting (in fact they fetishized it)
Small geographic and demographic size of city states fostered strong group identity.
Off the top of my head, and pretty much repeating the previous post, a combination of heavy protective armour and a file system that allowed for a continuous battleline not easily pierced. And - according to several authorities ::) - the tactic of othismos that enabled the hoplites to push back and break their opponents' line.
nooooooooooo! ;)
Long spear, large shield, small area of vulnerability (especially in close order) and a capability of operating in open or close order
Quote from: Justin Swanton on July 18, 2016, 06:39:04 AM
And - according to several authorities ::) - the tactic of othismos that enabled the hoplites to push back and break their opponents' line.
Although we remain as divided as ever over the "Big O" (as Rich T called it), I think it is clear that it is a stage of battle rather than a tactic i.e. hoplite tactics led to
othismos.
My $0.02
One set of possibilities (the 'hardware' explanation): a combination of equipment (armour, aspis, spear) and tactics (coordinated shoving by files :-\ ) that gave tactical battlefield superiority over other infantry of the period.
Or an alternative (the 'software' explanation): an ethos of mutual dependence and shared commitment to the cause, combined with a tradition of close quarters hand to hand fighting and getting stuck in, which gave moral, reputational superiority over other infantry - infantry facing hoplites expected to lose, and often ran away without putting it to the test.
The truth, in that boring way it has, probably lies somewhere in between. But I'm not a believer in there being massive hardware or tactical differences between hoplites and other infantry - either contemporary or later - since it would have been so simple to copy such differences (rather than hiring Greeks, or carrying on losing). Which doesn't mean I think hardware made no difference at all (and the Macedonian version of the hardware seems to have been widely regarded as superior), just that it's not the whole story, or even the biggest part of the story. And I'm deeply unconvinced by the idea that hoplites had a method of fighting that was unique in human history (as I may have mentioned elsewhere already).
Good points, gentlemen.
Our hoplite apparently had his genesis in the shift from monarchies to tyrannies in the Greek world in the overall mess following the Trojan war, giving us an armoured warrior in bell cuirass, Corinthian-style helm, aspis shield, greaves and not a lot of underwear, but carrying two spears, one at least of which was thrown. He also seems to have fought in unison with his comrades rather than being an out-and-out combat individualist, or at least we might so surmise from the vase depictions of files of hoplites sharing the same pose, and expressions such as:
"Men wear their helmets and their breastplates for their own needs, but they carry shields for the men of the entire line." - Plutarch, Moralia
This was the type of warrior, the 'man in bronze', who transformed the fortunes of a petty Egyptian kinglet and made him ruler of the whole country and effective founder of a new dynasty.
In WRG terms, he was "Regular C" HI, LTS, JLS, Sh. This breaks down into English as follows:
"Regular C" - disciplined, perhaps drilled, ordinary morale. (We may note that WRG elite hoplites are "B" and Spartans "A".)
HI - infantry wearing metal armour conferring protection for the vital areas (head, chest, torso) but not the entire limbs.
LTS - Long Thrusting Spear, a weapon of at least 9' length which would usually get the first strike against opponents not so equipped, and hence imposed a first-round combat penalty on them.
JLS - Javelin/Light Spear, a weapon suitable for thrusting or throwing, usually employed for the latter. Confers a first-round melee combat bonus (being assumed to be thrown just prior to contact).
Sh - a Shield sufficiently substantial to confer appreciable protection against missiles and in melee. Troops so equipped do not count as shieldless (which would confer a bonus upon opponents) except when attacked from the right or behind.
In WRG rules, the key to hoplite superiority lay in the LTS; Achaemenid opponents had JLS and, often, armour (HI), and Immortals were regular, so the LTS represented the hoplite's margin of superiority. Other things (including random factors) being equal, the -1 for facing LTS at contact would lose the Achaemenids the first round of melee - just - which would cause them to recoil, so the hoplites would get +1 for following up on the next round of melee and, again, other things being equal, this would allow the hoplites to keep pushing until their opponents cracked.
In a historical fight, epitomised by Plataea in 479 BC, the hoplite is noted as having three clear advantages over his opposition.
"While he was still in the act of praying, the men of Tegea leapt out before the rest and charged the barbarians, and immediately after Pausanias' prayer the sacrifices of the Lacedaemonians became favorable. Now they too charged the Persians, and the Persians met them, throwing away their bows. [2] First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to othismos [es ho apikonto es ōthismon]. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short. [3] Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no armor [anoploi]; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft [sophiēn], they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing.
Where Mardonius was himself, riding a white horse in the battle and surrounded by a thousand picked men who were the flower of the Persians, there they pressed their adversaries hardest. So long as Mardonius was alive the Persians stood their ground and defended themselves, overthrowing many Lacedaemonians. [2] When, however, Mardonius was killed and his guards, who were the strongest part of the army, had also fallen, then the rest too yielded and gave ground before the men of Lacedaemon. For what harmed them the most was their lack of armor*, so they fought, as it were, naked against men fully armoured." - Herodotus IX.62-3
*literally 'clothing without armour'; the hurried nature of the Persian pursuit may have led the Persians to neglect donning their armour.
The Greek advantages are given as 1) protection, 2) training and 3) othismos. The advantage conferred by longer spears was negated by the Persians' catching hold of them and breaking them short. Sorry, WRG - you got it wrong. :(
On the same day, on the Asia Minor mainland, was fought the Battle of Mycale. Here the Achaemenids, far from advancing confidently to what they imagined was a pursuit, had tucked themselves behind field defences. The result was pretty much the same.
"As for the Athenians and those whose place was nearest them, that is, for about half of the line, their way lay over the beach and level ground; for the Lacedaemonians and those that were next to them, their way lay through a ravine and among hills. While the Lacedaemonians were making a circuit, those others on the other wing were already fighting. [2] As long as the Persians' shields stood upright, they defended themselves and held their own in the battle, but when the Athenians and their neighbors in the line passed the word and went more zealously to work, that they and not the Lacedaemonians might win the victory, immediately the face of the fight changed. [3] Breaking down the shields they charged all together into the midst of the Persians, who received the onset and stood their ground for a long time, but at last fled within their wall. The Athenians and Corinthians and Sicyonians and Troezenians, who were next to each other in the line, followed close after and rushed in together. But when the walled place had been razed, the barbarians made no further defense, but took to flight, all save the Persians, [4] who gathered into bands of a few men and fought with whatever Greeks came rushing within the walls. Of the Persian leaders two escaped by flight and two were killed; Artayntes and Ithanitres, who were admirals of the fleet, escaped; Mardontes and Tigranes, the general of the land army, were killed fighting." - Herodotus IX.102
Here the Persians and their associated contingents are not noted as being deficient in armour, and managed to hold their attackers at the wall of shields, but the deciding factor appears to have been the increase in motivation among the Athenians when they thought the Spartans might carry off the laurels of the day.
These examples suggest that equipment, skill, technique and morale all mattered in giving the hoplite his superiority over non-Hellenic opponents. One might be able to copy the equipment, and even the organisation, but copying the skill, morale and the ethos of mutual cooperation that seems to stand out in the above accounts would be much more of a challenge.
Some tried, of course: the Carthaginian Sacred Band was presumably not doing too badly until it met real hoplites at the Battle of the Crimisus in 341 BC. This, incidentally, gives us another at least occasional reason for the hoplite's customary superiority: leadership.
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The Greek advantages are given as 1) protection, 2) training and 3) othismos.
Actually (and it seems we just can't avoid the O word) othismos is not given by Herodotus as one of the Greeks' advantages. It's not really clear how the account of Plataea is supposed to divide up temporally or spatially, but the disadvantages (lack of armour, lack of craft) just seem to have kicked in 'when they came to othismos' (in my interpretation, when the fighting became close, confused and hand to hand - in the scrum-theory interpretation, when the Greeks started coordinated pushing (while the Persians did what?) - take your pick).
It's worth pointing out that while Patrick (reasonably enough) transliterates 'othismos' the translation (which is Godley's, as found on Perseus) is "until they came to blows at close quarters".
It's also worth reading Macan's notes on this passage, also on Perseus (but this is a big enough digression already).
Not being fluent in ancient Greek or even well versed in the authors, I wonder if it would be advisable or profitable to take a closer look at the training mentioned by Patrick in a previous post?
Are there lines from authors describing the training that hoplites participated in? Should we also examine the depth of a hoplite phalanx to determine its ability to "push" an enemy formation more effectively - or not, as the case and context may be?
I wonder about coordination of efforts in the front lines - and here I understand I might be shouted down as I am referencing Hanson's description (don't have the pages in front of me) but seem to recall the noise and confusion of the fighting in the front lines of a phalanx versus phalanx contest . . . There was something too, about the helmet worn by the fighting soldier and how this might impede vision and hearing - especially hearing, so if the command came down to "give me one more push" - it might be very hard to hear it.
Again, I have more digging, reading, and thinking to do . . .
Hmmmm . . . it's a bit like being back in school/class again.
Chris
I'm always a bit surprised that a lot of rulesets make non-Spartan Hoplites undrilled. Same for Sparabara Infantry actually.
It is interesting that in both the Plataea accounts, the author puts the fact that the Greeks were armoured and the Persians weren't up there as a key factor. We may emphasise the "software" - training, cohesion, elan - but they thought the kit was important, so we shouldn't easily dismiss it.
Are we assuming hoplites dud nit change until they became phalangites?
I think in full panoply and in close order there is only about 5% of the hoplite vulnerable/unarmoured from the front. I suggest that form and function have co-developed with the hoplite's kit. It may even be a chicken and egg moment ie did the hoplite phalanx clump together because their armour was so heavy and not easy to move in or did the hoplite's kit get heavier due to them normally fighting in close order. or something else?
Quote from: RichT on July 18, 2016, 12:27:55 PM
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The Greek advantages are given as 1) protection, 2) training and 3) othismos.
Actually (and it seems we just can't avoid the O word) othismos is not given by Herodotus as one of the Greeks' advantages. It's not really clear how the account of Plataea is supposed to divide up temporally or spatially, but the disadvantages (lack of armour, lack of craft) just seem to have kicked in 'when they came to othismos' (in my interpretation, when the fighting became close, confused and hand to hand - in the scrum-theory interpretation, when the Greeks started coordinated pushing (while the Persians did what?) - take your pick).
The way I read Herodotus' account is:
1) The Account of the Action (IX.62): "
First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to [ōthismon]. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short."
This I read as the fight being hotly contested - not necessarily equal, just fiercely fought - because the Persians were breaking the Greek spears and denying them their reach advantage
until it came to othismos. Once it came to othismos, the Persians lost.
2) Reflections on Why it Went as it Did (IX.63): "
Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no armor [anoploi]; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft [sophiēn], they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing. "
We may note in passing that rushing out singly or in groups is not really compatible with an othismos stage of the battle, however one understands the term. Ergo, the way I read it is that this behaviour preceded the othismos stage and the Greek advantages were apparent prior to othismos, but once othismos began the Greek superiority became crushing and indeed decisive. This is why I rate othismos as an additional Greek advantage: when it occurred it effectively finished off the Persian ability to resist - although the loss of Mardonius and the resultant collapse of his bodyguard was also a major contributor to this and one gets the impression that he and his bodyguard did manage to hold against Spartan othismos albeit at considerable cost in lives, i.e. annihilation.
Quote from: Chris on July 18, 2016, 01:33:29 PM
Not being fluent in ancient Greek or even well versed in the authors, I wonder if it would be advisable or profitable to take a closer look at the training mentioned by Patrick in a previous post?
Are there lines from authors describing the training that hoplites participated in? Should we also examine the depth of a hoplite phalanx to determine its ability to "push" an enemy formation more effectively - or not, as the case and context may be?
If there is ever a subject neglected by historians, it is the training of troops. The ex-soldier historians assume the reader knows how it was done, and the more scholarly types do not themselves know, so mentions of training in any army are exceedingly rare and usually indirect. What does appear to be the case is that Greek hoplites - and here I refer to the ordinary Athenian, Corinthian or Theban as opposed to Spartans or select Argive 'professionals' who were always ready to go at immediate notice - were habitually kept in a state of training that permitted instant mobilisation at need, i.e. no need to spend time training before moving out on campaign.
Concerning the content of that training, we have even less to work on. We have to surmise back from what hoplites are noted as doing in battle.
Regarding depth, there does seem to be a correlation between depth and prevailing in a push (there are other considerations, notably troop quality, so that eight ranks of Athenians proved superior to sixteen ranks of Syracusans; depth alone is not sovereign). 25 ranks of Thebans push back 8 ranks of Athenians at Delium in 424 BC. 50 ranks of Thebans prevail over 12 ranks of Spartans at Leuctra in 371 BC. By the time of the Nemea in 394 BC Sparta's opponents are agreeing to deploy sixteen ranks deep to give the whole line a fighting chance against the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies (the Thebans renege and deploy 25 deep, leaving the Athenians outflanked - the Theban contingent prevails, but Sparta wins the battle).
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I wonder about coordination of efforts in the front lines - and here I understand I might be shouted down as I am referencing Hanson's description (don't have the pages in front of me) but seem to recall the noise and confusion of the fighting in the front lines of a phalanx versus phalanx contest . . . There was something too, about the helmet worn by the fighting soldier and how this might impede vision and hearing - especially hearing, so if the command came down to "give me one more push" - it might be very hard to hear it.
It is worth noting how helmet design changed over the 5th century BC away from the Corinthian (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corinthian_helmet#/media/File:Corinthian_helmet_Denda_Staatliche_Antikensammlungen_4330.jpg) type with its full ear coverage to the Chalcidian (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chalcidian_helmet#/media/File:Greek_-_Chalcidian-Type_Helmet_-_Walters_542468.jpg) and Attic (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attic_helmet#/media/File:Ancient_bronze_greek_helmet_-South_Italy.jpg) helmet types, which left the ears free. By Epaminondas' time, every hoplite would have had his ears free and the leader's command could be repeated by those near him and conveyed throughout the formation.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 18, 2016, 04:57:18 PM
It is interesting that in both the Plataea accounts, the author puts the fact that the Greeks were armoured and the Persians weren't up there as a key factor. We may emphasise the "software" - training, cohesion, elan - but they thought the kit was important, so we shouldn't easily dismiss it.
A good observation. The challenge for a non-Hellenic opponent trying to grow his own hoplites was not so much the equipment as the culture: the equipment could be copied; the culture could not. Hence the tendency of some to take equipment for granted. Perhaps the most important consideration is that it was not a case of the 'soft'
or the 'hard' factors conferring superiority, but the combination of the two.
Quote from: Mark G on July 18, 2016, 05:51:10 PM
Are we assuming hoplites dud nit change until they became phalangites?
During the 5th century BC the hoplite's equipment underwent considerable change: the second spear was abandoned, the helmet style changed considerably and linen armour almost universally replaced the metal cuirass. The key question is whether hoplite technique also changed: attack at the run [dromon] does not appear to have occurred prior to Marathon in 490 BC, and hoplite equipment seems to be changing more or less from that point (helmet changes from the Corinthian to the Chalcidian type may be earlier).
All of this points to increased battlefield tempo and a more rapid deployment and fighting style.
The 4th century BC hoplite seems to have changed more in quality than in equipment: mass Persian hirings encouraged the raising of professional
epilektoi, fully-trained, drilled and disciplined hoplites on the Argive model. These had an edge in skill over the average citizen hoplite, but even the latter seem to have improved in quality, notably the Thebans, who were encouraged to spend much of their time on gymnastic exercises to improve fitness. Iphicrates' much-debated reforms do not seem to have been in evidence on the Greek mainland, but may have served as the basis for the Macedonian phalangite. The versatility of the 4th century hoplite is evident from Xenophon's writings: younger Spartan hoplites of this period could catch peltasts, which would be hard to envisage for the metal-armoured 6th and early 5th century hoplite.
To continue the Plataea digression a little, Herodotus' account doesn't describe a single set piece encounter between deployed forces, but more of a piecemeal meeting engagement. Putting his account in context:
Hdt 9.59
With that, he [Mardonius] led the Persians with all speed across the Asopus in pursuit of the Greeks, supposing that they were in flight; it was the army of Lacedaemon and Tegea alone which was his goal, for the Athenians marched another way over the broken ground, and were out of his sight. Seeing the Persians setting forth in pursuit of the Greeks, the rest of the barbarian battalions straightway raised their standards and also gave pursuit, each at top speed, no battalion having order in its ranks nor place assigned in the line.
60 So they ran pell-mell and shouting, as though they would utterly make an end of the Greeks.
...
61 The Lacedaemonians and Tegeans accordingly stood alone, men-at-arms and light-armed together... These offered sacrifice so that they would fare better in battle with Mardonius and the army which was with him. They could get no favorable omen from their sacrifices, and in the meanwhile many of them were killed and by far more wounded (for the Persians set up their shields for a fence, and shot showers of arrows). Since the Spartans were being hard-pressed (piezo) and their sacrifices were of no avail, Pausanias lifted up his eyes to the temple of Hera at Plataea and called on the goddess, praying that they might not be disappointed in their hope.
62 While he was still in the act of praying, the men of Tegea leapt out before the rest and charged the barbarians, and immediately after Pausanias' prayer the sacrifices of the Lacedaemonians became favorable. Now they too charged the Persians, and the Persians met them, throwing away their bows. First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to blows at close quarters [othismos]. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short. Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no armor; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft, they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing.
63 Where Mardonius was himself, riding a white horse in the battle and surrounded by a thousand picked men who were the flower of the Persians, there they pressed their adversaries hardest (piezo). So long as Mardonius was alive the Persians stood their ground and defended themselves, overthrowing many Lacedaemonians. When, however, Mardonius was killed and his guards, who were the strongest part of the army, had also fallen, then the rest too yielded and gave ground before the men of Lacedaemon. For what harmed them the most was the fact that they wore no armor over their clothes and fought, as it were, naked against men fully armed.
So the stages of the fighting are more confused, with contingents perhaps engaging in sequence and over some distance of ground - as Macan observes:
"In this particular case, if the battle has shifted down the ridge, and is now going forward beside the Demetrion (as above located), the fugitive Persians would probably be met by swarms advancing to the assault, or support, none too regularly, and escape would be doubly difficult. But we cannot be sure that the words which follow do not describe the scene immediately on the overthrow of the gerra. Stein, indeed, marks a lacuna after othismon on the ground that the next sentence is not in logical or natural sequence of the argument or narrative."
The idea of a piecemeal engagement is supported by the account in Plato, for what it is worth:
Plato Laches 191c
For they say that at Plataea, when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields, they were not willing to stand and fight against these, but fled; when, however, the Persian ranks were broken, the Spartans kept turning round and fighting like cavalry, and so won that great battle.
Which doesn't fit well with Herodotus' account, but emphasises the idea of engaging in smaller bodies against broken ranks.
This is why I think Plataea is not a good example to use in support of the scrum othismos - not least because it is unclear what the Persians are supposed to have been doing on their side. We may note incidentally that piezo, the verb used for Mardonius' picked men (and earlier the archers) pressing their adversaries hardest, is the common 'push' verb from Polybius et al (used for the 'pushing', 'pressing' role of the rear ranks of the Macedonian phalanx).
If we are just saying that in close quarters hand to hand fighting the Spartans had the advantage over the Persians (largely because of their better armour, as Herodotus says twice) then we are in full agreement.
Agree also that we shouldn't discount hardware factors - just that they aren't the whole story. According to Lendon, emphasis on hardware is a part of the Greek historiographical tradition, as opposed to the Roman which emphasised software ('virtus' etc). Just worth keeping this in mind. In wargame terms, Greek historians would enjoy WRG 6th ed and see Spartans as 'HI, LTS, Sh'. Romans might prefer Lost Battles ('Veteran Hoplites').
The context actually demonstrates that the action has made the transition from the pursuit to a set-piece engagement where the Spartans are holed up on a hill while the massed ranks of Persian infantry are lined up to use the Spartans as a shooting gallery.
"The Lacedaemonians and Tegeans accordingly stood alone, men-at-arms and light-armed together; there were of the Lacedaemonians fifty thousand and of the Tegeans, who had never been parted from the Lacedaemonians, three thousand. These offered sacrifice so that they would fare better in battle with Mardonius and the army which was with him. [3] They could get no favorable omen from their sacrifices, and in the meanwhile many of them were killed and by far more wounded (for the Persians set up their shields for a fence, and shot showers of arrows). Since the Spartans were being hard-pressed and their sacrifices were of no avail, Pausanias lifted up his eyes to the temple of Hera at Plataea and called on the goddess, praying that they might not be disappointed in their hope." - Herodotus IX.61.2-3
The impression is that the entire Persian infantry contingent ('Mardonius and the army ... with him') is present and shooting, having 'set up their shields for a fence' and shooting 'showers of arrows', not just an inconsequential patter of missiles from detached groups, but enough shafts to kill many and wound far more. The delay in Spartan response on account of the continually unpropitious sacrifices would anyway have given any laggard Persians time to join up and form up - Macan's notes on the subject seem incidentally to be largely imagination with no actual basis in Herodotus' narrative.
The change in the omens and the Spartan charge led to the fight 'at the fence of shields'. Subsequent activities by small groups of Persians and Greek (or general) othismos occurred only after this shield-wall was down. Plato's Laches reference may supply the missing detail from Herodotus about how this was achieved.
The Laches reference suggests that the Spartans lured the Persians out of their shield wall by a Thermopylae-style pretended flight. This is conceivable, and although not quite in the spirit of Herodotus' narrative is reconcilable with the latter. I suspect Richard has unintentionally turned up something quite important here. It has, however, nothing to do with the subsequent Persian small group fighting or the othismos, which incidents in Herodotus' narrative occur after the overthrow or rupture of the Persian shield wall.
One presumably non-othismotic aspect of the Spartan stand is that the 'men-at-arms and light-armed together' [mounōthentes ... sun psiloisi] appear to have constituted, intentionally or otherwise, a single formation. An open question is just how closely the hoplites and their supporting psiloi were integrated, the Spartans in particular having seven light troops per hoplite instead of the usual one. With everyone grouped together on a hill, would the hoplites have been forming a ring inside which were the psiloi, and would the latter have had any part to play in the subsequently developing action?
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I suspect Richard has unintentionally turned up something quite important here.
How nice of you to say so! But intentional or otherwise, I can't claim to have turned it up, it is well enough known.
I think "largely imagination with no actual basis in Herodotus' narrative" is the best summary and marks the time to leave this topic alone.
That was a pretty good summary, pat. I think it also dovetails with the change in intensity in warfare from seasonal city state clashes for hegemony to wars of conquest - Persian invasions, then the Peloponnesian war.
So given all this change, and the equipment changed, and the increased professionalism, and the overall change in force composition.
Which hoplites do we mean by hoplite?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 17, 2016, 08:22:05 PM
During the 5th century BC, the Greek armoured infantryman, already a popular addition to Egyptian and occasionally Neo-Babylonian armies, came to dominate the infantry battlefield.
Tangential, but the evidence for Greek mercenaries in Neo-Babylonian armies seems to be quite thin:
Alcaeus and Antimenidas: Reassessing the Evidence for Greek Mercenaries in the Neo-Babylonian Army (http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle.fullcontentlink:pdfeventlink/$002fj$002fklio.2016.98.issue-1$002fklio-2016-0002$002fklio-2016-0002.pdf/klio-2016-0002.pdf?t:ac=j$002fklio.2016.98.issue-1$002fklio-2016-0002$002fklio-2016-0002.xml), by Alexander Fantalkin and Ephraim Lytle.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on July 19, 2016, 04:15:33 PM
Tangential, but the evidence for Greek mercenaries in Neo-Babylonian armies seems to be quite thin:
Alcaeus and Antimenidas: Reassessing the Evidence for Greek Mercenaries in the Neo-Babylonian Army (http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle.fullcontentlink:pdfeventlink/$002fj$002fklio.2016.98.issue-1$002fklio-2016-0002$002fklio-2016-0002.pdf/klio-2016-0002.pdf?t:ac=j$002fklio.2016.98.issue-1$002fklio-2016-0002$002fklio-2016-0002.xml), by Alexander Fantalkin and Ephraim Lytle.
I have seen it recently, and note that it deals only with Mesopotamian sources. Greek mercenaries hired by the Neo-Babylonians are more likely to have served in and around the Levant and especially in Asia Minor. One might also expect them to be more likely to encounter occasional opponents of above average height in such areas - Philistia in particular had a tradition of providing these. ;)
I also did not like the attempted assassination of Strabo's reliability for no better reason than what he related did not fit the authors' pet theory.
Quote from: Mark G on July 19, 2016, 01:59:54 PM
So given all this change, and the equipment changed, and the increased professionalism, and the overall change in force composition.
Which hoplites do we mean by hoplite?
To begin with, the gentlemen in bronze with the aspis shield and two spears. As we progress through the 5th century BC, we come to mean the linen-corseleted, Attic-helmed aspis-carrying spearmen who clash shields with their opponents and engage in a bit of weapon-play (doratismos, 'the spearing') before continuing with othismos ('the shove'). This leads - eventually - to trope, 'the collapse' and then it is off to the races in pursuit and never mind what is happening to your left wing - unless you are Spartan.
The Greeks seem to have used the term 'hoplite' to mean a heavy infantryman, whatever his equipment and nationality: for example, Roman infantry are often referred to by Greek authors as 'hoplites'. But because by far and away the most frequent use is for Greek city-state armoured soldiers, that is the usage applied to it by English-speakers (and I suspect most other scholars) and hence any Greek citizen infantryman with spear, shield, helmet and armour is considered a 'hoplite'. As we have seen, they alter their equipment and adjust their techniques during the flourishing period of the Greek city-state, but remain 'hoplites'.
Quote from: RichT on July 19, 2016, 01:40:11 PM
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I suspect Richard has unintentionally turned up something quite important here.
How nice of you to say so! But intentional or otherwise, I can't claim to have turned it up, it is well enough known.
It is nevertheless potentially significant as a possible - even probable - explanation of how the Spartans brought down the Persian fence of shields, echoing as it does Leonidas' Thermopylae tactics in Herodotus VII.211:
"
When the Medes had been roughly handled, they retired, and the Persians whom the king called Immortals, led by Hydarnes, attacked in turn. It was thought that they would easily accomplish the task. [2] When they joined battle with the Hellenes, they fared neither better nor worse than the Median army, since they used shorter spears than the Hellenes and could not use their numbers fighting in a narrow space. [3] The Lacedaemonians fought memorably, showing themselves skilled fighters amidst unskilled on many occasions, as when they would turn their backs and feign flight. The barbarians would see them fleeing and give chase with shouting and noise, but when the Lacedaemonians were overtaken, they would turn to face the barbarians and overthrow innumerable Persians."
It is interesting to attempt this under WRG 6th Edition rules, albeit one needs a special Persian 'shield fence' rule giving them a defensive bonus, and should class the shield fence as an obstacle (i.e. immobile).
First, the Spartans ("Reg A" HI, LTS, Sh) charge the Persians (a mix of "Reg A" HI, JLS, B, Sh* Immortals and "Irreg B" HI JLS, B, Sh Persians - except that the HI are downgraded to MI for leaving their armour behind). The shield fence defensive bonus produces a draw, and after a couple of rounds of this the Spartans find they are getting nowhere. They may be giving better than they get, not least because of their advantage in armour, but against the deep opposing formation they are not getting the one casualty per figure that would shift the Persians (force them to recoil).
(*
Heavy Infantry with Javelin/Light Spear, Bow, Shield)
So the Spartans break off.
This is executed as an evade move (20 paces plus (10 paces times the roll of an average die)) and they achieve perhaps 60 paces in total, halting facing the enemy, who pursues 20 paces plus (10 paces times the roll of a normal die) for most Persians (Immortals, as regulars, use an average die) but with a 20 pace subtraction for being more than 2 figures deep. They achieve around 40 paces in total and fail to regain contact.
The Spartans regain their order at the end of the move. Next move, they charge the Persians, who stand or countercharge, but it matters not as the shieldless Persians are promptly bundled back with serious casualties. Now the Persians themselves break off and head for the Temple of Demeter, the Spartans methodically following up in good order. After some brave but futile charges by Persian subunits the Spartans lock horns with the main body of unprotected Persians and start to othismise them off the field.
It seems a bit forced in places, but the whole episode is just about possible under WRG 6th mechanics (re-enacting Thermopylae is similarly possible but takes both sides cooperating).
WRG rules apart, The
Laches quote would seem to provide a useful insight into how the Spartans dealt with the shield fence problem, and my thanks to Richard for airing it. The Athenians at Mycale, up against a similar situation on the Asia Minor coast on the same day, presumably dealt with the problem in a different way as their tactical repertoire was not as varied as the Spartans'.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 19, 2016, 08:23:36 PM
As we progress through the 5th century BC, we come to mean the linen-corseleted, Attic-helmed aspis-carrying spearmen who clash shields with their opponents and engage in a bit of weapon-play (doratismos, 'the spearing') before continuing with othismos ('the shove'). This leads - eventually - to trope, 'the collapse'
Or not. ::)
Patrick is here echoing (chiefly) Hanson:
"There was generally a certain regularity to Greek battle: charge, collision, hand-to-hand combat, push and eventual rout. This sequence of events is borne out by ancient observers who developed a vocabulary to describe what they saw or heard: the charge (
ephodos or
epidrome), the clash of spears (
doratismos), the hand-to-hand struggle (
en chersi), the push (
othismos), and the collapse (
trope)."
Hanson, The Western Way of War p. 185
If I may throw in another digression - we have seen that 'othismos' is a very long way from being the common (or even exclusive) term for a phase of hoplite battle that is sometimes thought, and is used just once (by 'ancient observers') for hoplites v hoplites.
Just for fun, try doing the same exercise for 'doratismos' - I have found just two uses of the word:
Plut Pyrr 7.5 (single combat between Pyrrhus and Pantauches)
"At first they hurled their spears [doratismos], then, coming to close quarters, they plied their swords with might and skill. Pyrrhus got one wound, but gave Pantauchus two, one in the thigh, and one along the neck, and put him to flight and overthrew him; he did not kill him, however, for his friends hauled him away."
(Note that 'hurled their spears' is a very free translation here though seems reasonable).
Plut Timoleon 28.1 (Crimisus, Timoleon v. Carthaginians)
"But these withstood his first onset sturdily, and owing to the iron breastplates and bronze helmets with which their persons were protected, and the great shields which they held in front of them, repelled the spear thrusts [doratismon]. But when the struggle came to swords and the work required skill no less than strength, suddenly, from the hills, fearful peals of thunder crashed down, and vivid flashes of lightning darted forth with them."
Does anyone know of any other uses? This is all Perseus found. No uses whatever for Greek hoplite battles. It looks to me as if we may be in the presence of another of ancient history's urban myths - a meme that gets started in some secondary source and repeated until accepted as the truth. Which isn't to say of course that hoplites and other infantry didn't fight with spears, but that the confidently repeated assertions of the secondary literature (and internet forum posters) may be built on the flimsiest of foundations.
Xenophon (Hellenica IV.3.17) uses
doru aphikomenoi ('spear's reach') for the same stage in a battle - a Greek hoplite battle, to be precise, Second Coronea - which suggests that 'doratismos' was a later appellation for this stage of hoplite battle which is nevertheless a convenient label for English-speaking scholars.
Quote from: RichT on July 20, 2016, 10:21:02 AM
Does anyone know of any other uses? This is all Perseus found. No uses whatever for Greek hoplite battles. It looks to me as if we may be in the presence of another of ancient history's urban myths - a meme that gets started in some secondary source and repeated until accepted as the truth. Which isn't to say of course that hoplites and other infantry didn't fight with spears, but that the confidently repeated assertions of the secondary literature (and internet forum posters) may be built on the flimsiest of foundations.
Indeed, though if those foundations describe an actual stage in a hoplite battle, as they seem to do, then we do not have a problem. Loose vocabulary and inaccurate vocabulary are not necessarily the same thing, although I would encourage Richard to seek out any more commonly accepted concepts and see what underlies them. It might be worth another Slingshot article. :)
Meanwhile, we may benefit from examining a hoplite battle: Athenians vs Syracusans, near Syracuse, 415 BC. The Athenians had hoplites of superior quality, the Syracusans, a superiority in numbers, especially of cavalry and light troops. Thucydides (VI.67-70) writes:
"
The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, their dispositions being as follows:—Their right wing was occupied by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the rest of the field by the other allies. Half their army was drawn up eight deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square, formed also eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to go to the support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers were placed inside this reserve. [2] The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass-levy [pandēmei] of their own people, and such allies as had joined them, the strongest contingent being that of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers from Camarina. The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred strong, and next to it the darters [akontistas - javelinmen]."
We may note the unusual Athenian disposition, presumably intended to foil flanking attacks by the numerous Syracusan cavalry, and the Syracusan 'pandēmei' or mass-levy ('the whole
demos') of everyone who qualified as a hoplite.
"[3]
As the Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias went along the lines, and addressed these words of encouragement to the army and the nations composing it:—
'Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like ourselves, who are here to fight in the same battle, the force itself being, to my thinking, more fit to inspire confidence than a fine speech with a weak army. [2] Where we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the islanders in the ranks together, it were strange indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms, if we did not feel confident of victory; especially when we have mass-levies [pandēmei] opposed to our picked troops [apolektous], and what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but will not stand against us, their skill not being at all commensurate to their rashness. [3] You may also remember that we are far from home and have no friendly land near, except what your own swords shall win you; and here I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which the enemy are appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country, mine that we shall fight for a country that is not ours, where we must conquer or hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great numbers. [4] Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the enemy, thinking the present strait and necessity more terrible than they.'"
We can take a break here to observe that Nicias is emphasising that his hoplites are 'picked troops' [apolektous], which would seem to signify that they are men trained to the standards of the Argive 'Thousand' at Second Mantinea and hence capable of meeting even Spartans on more or less even terms, so a 'pandēmei' of ordinary Sicilian hoplites should not be serious opposition.
Was he right? The battle continues:
"
After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans were not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some had even gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran up as hard as they could, and though behind time, took their places here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of zeal or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage, so far as their military science might carry them, when this failed them they were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the present occasion, although they had not supposed that the Athenians would begin the attack, and although constrained to stand upon their defence at short notice, they at once took up their arms and advanced to meet them. [2] First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected between light troops; next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged on the heavy infantry to the charge; [3] and thus they advanced, the Syracusans to fight for their country, and each individual for his safety that day and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army, the Athenians to make another's country theirs and to save their own from suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies to help them in getting what they came for, and to earn by victory another sight of the country they had left behind; while the subject allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of self-preservation, which they could only hope for if victorious; next to which, as a secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms, after helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest."
Preliminaries over (and we may note how the skirmishing was ended, and the advance of the heavy infantry begin, by trumpet), the action commenced.
"
The armies now came to close quarters [en khersi], and for a long while fought without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to the fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. [2] At last the Argives drove in [ōsamenōn, from ōtheō, a word which should be familiar to us] the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians routed [parerrēgnuto = broke by attacking the flank] the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut in two and betook itself to flight. [3] The Athenians did not pursue far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors followed so far as was safe in a body, and then went back and set up a trophy. [4] Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the Helorine road, where they reformed as well as they could under the circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there. The rest returned to the town."
We may note that although spears crossed there is no mention of
doratismos or any other designation for this stage, suggesting that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence and hence literary term-searching may not be a good way of demythologising Hellenic battle procedure. The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos', or at least by successful Argive
otheo-ing against the Sicilian left, which uncovers the flank of the Athenians' opponents, permitting the Athenians to exploit the exposed flank and precipitate a collapse which saw off the rest of the Syracusan army.
It would be good to have some examples which separate doratismos, en khersi and othismos as distinct phases, so that we can be sure this division isn't a modern artefact. Given the limited evidence for the term doratismos, is it possible it can become absorbed into another author's concept of en khersi, for example?
Well to be abundantly clear I'm not saying hoplites didn't fight with their spears - we can take that as a given. I'm objecting to people saying "there were phases that Greeks called doratismos, othismos, etc" since that isn't true.
It is a slightly different subject as to whether there were (more or less) discrete phases at all, whatever we want to call them. Difficult to prove to everyone's satisfaction since it's always possible to see a battle as happening in discrete phases if you want to - Patrick's account of the Syracuse battle being a case in point.
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We may note that although spears crossed there is no mention of doratismos or any other designation for this stage, suggesting that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence and hence literary term-searching may not be a good way of demythologising Hellenic battle procedure.
OK - some misunderstanding then since I'm not denying the presence of fighting with spears - just that it wasn't called doratismos (if you want to apply a label to it, fine, but let's be clear it is a modern label).
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The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos', or at least by successful Argive otheo-ing against the Sicilian left, which uncovers the flank of the Athenians' opponents, permitting the Athenians to exploit the exposed flank and precipitate a collapse which saw off the rest of the Syracusan army.
You see, there is nothing whatever in Thucydides description that makes me read this as separate phases (to which we might apply the labels 'doratismos', 'othismos' etc, if so inclined). It is perfectly clear to me that they fought for a while until the Argives and Athenians each defeated their respective opponents. Thucydies uses different words for 'defeated' because it is good style to do so, not because they are different phases or types of fighting (you are greatly overinterpreting the 'attack in the flank' part, by the way). Saying "The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos'" is a classic example (I know you qualify it) of the way discrete phases, with modern labels attached to them, get invented and applied.
Anthony:
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It would be good to have some examples which separate doratismos, en khersi and othismos as distinct phases, so that we can be sure this division isn't a modern artefact. Given the limited evidence for the term doratismos, is it possible it can become absorbed into another author's concept of en khersi, for example?
Absolutely, though getting an example that we all agreed did, or didn't, show distinct phases, doesn't seem very likely to happen. It is my belief that 'hand to hand', 'with swords', 'with spears', 'pushing' etc are all broadly speaking different words for the same thing (ie close quarters fighting between closely serried heavy infantry).
What we need is an analysis of Thucydides' and Xenophon's combat vocabulary, equivalent to Sam Koon's analysis of Livy's. This would be a huge job, but on a more modest scale, I'm working on something like this that may find its way into Slingshot.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 20, 2016, 12:22:08 PM
It would be good to have some examples which separate doratismos, en khersi and othismos as distinct phases, so that we can be sure this division isn't a modern artefact. Given the limited evidence for the term doratismos, is it possible it can become absorbed into another author's concept of en khersi, for example?
It could: Thucydides does not employ 'doratismos' at all, or at least not detectably by the Perseus lexicon, but has 'en khersi' or its variations dozens of times to cover armies coming together and engaging in fighting which may or may not extend to othismos. Since there are 82 instances of 'kheiras'/'khersi' variations in Thucydides I shall leave the diligent Richard to separate the wheat from the chaff. :)
Quote from: RichT on July 20, 2016, 04:14:21 PM
Well to be abundantly clear I'm not saying hoplites didn't fight with their spears - we can take that as a given. I'm objecting to people saying "there were phases that Greeks called doratismos, othismos, etc" since that isn't true.
Though there do seem to have been phases, whatever the Greeks called them and whatever the modern label. I accept the thought that we should not assume the Greeks had a tidy little battle stages diagram with labels identical to Hanson's. I decline to accept that such phases did not exist on the basis that Hanson may have overdone the definition.
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It is a slightly different subject as to whether there were (more or less) discrete phases at all, whatever we want to call them. Difficult to prove to everyone's satisfaction since it's always possible to see a battle as happening in discrete phases if you want to - Patrick's account of the Syracuse battle being a case in point.
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The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos', or at least by successful Argive otheo-ing against the Sicilian left, which uncovers the flank of the Athenians' opponents, permitting the Athenians to exploit the exposed flank and precipitate a collapse which saw off the rest of the Syracusan army.
You see, there is nothing whatever in Thucydides description that makes me read this as separate phases (to which we might apply the labels 'doratismos', 'othismos' etc, if so inclined). It is perfectly clear to me that they fought for a while until the Argives and Athenians each defeated their respective opponents. Thucydies uses different words for 'defeated' because it is good style to do so, not because they are different phases or types of fighting (you are greatly overinterpreting the 'attack in the flank' part, by the way). Saying "The 'en chersi' struggle is followed by 'othismos'" is a classic example (I know you qualify it) of the way discrete phases, with modern labels attached to them, get invented and applied.
Except that the 'othismos' by the Argives follows the 'en chersi' struggle both in the text and in the timing of the battle.
"...
much more alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. [2] At last the Argives drove in [ōsamenōn] the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians the troops opposed to them [kai met' autous tōn Athēnaiōn to kata sphas autous] ..."
The 'at last' seems to be a translator's interpolation, but the fact that this development follows an extended session of 'continued resistance of the enemy' shows it is not the same stage of the fighting.
Richard is right on one point, however: the flanking aspect occurs after, not before, the Athenians see off their own opponents.
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What we need is an analysis of Thucydides' and Xenophon's combat vocabulary, equivalent to Sam Koon's analysis of Livy's. This would be a huge job, but on a more modest scale, I'm working on something like this that may find its way into Slingshot.
Well ... actually, that is
not what we need. What we need is an understanding of how the troops concerned fought, which requires perspective from many aspects and angles.
Well it appears we are limping toward some agreement.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 20, 2016, 08:28:32 PM
Except that the 'othismos' by the Argives follows the 'en chersi' struggle both in the text and in the timing of the battle.
...
The 'at last' seems to be a translator's interpolation, but the fact that this development follows an extended session of 'continued resistance of the enemy' shows it is not the same stage of the fighting.
Again to be absolutely clear - I'm not denying that the defeat came after the fighting. No dispute about that. That does not however mean that there were two phases of fighting. As my othismos article shows (to my satisfaction), 'otheo' is a general word for defeat, repel, push back, drive off, discomfit. So Thucydides is just saying - they fought for a while, as a result of which the Argives defeated their opponents, and the Athenians defeated theirs. No separate phases of fighting, just that one event follows the other. (The word 'othismos' is not used, remember).
What we need is to start by being clear what the ancient authors actually said, rather than just repeating modern assumptions. I will set to checking out those word usages :)
Quote from: RichT on July 20, 2016, 09:50:48 PM
Well it appears we are limping toward some agreement.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 20, 2016, 08:28:32 PM
Except that the 'othismos' by the Argives follows the 'en chersi' struggle both in the text and in the timing of the battle.
...
The 'at last' seems to be a translator's interpolation, but the fact that this development follows an extended session of 'continued resistance of the enemy' shows it is not the same stage of the fighting.
Again to be absolutely clear - I'm not denying that the defeat came after the fighting. No dispute about that. That does not however mean that there were two phases of fighting. As my othismos article shows (to my satisfaction), 'otheo' is a general word for defeat, repel, push back, drive off, discomfit. So Thucydides is just saying - they fought for a while, as a result of which the Argives defeated their opponents, and the Athenians defeated theirs. No separate phases of fighting, just that one event follows the other. (The word 'othismos' is not used, remember).
Whereas to me, this just looks like woolly thinking and an inability to grasp the subject except by its literary coat-tails, reminiscent of a blind Brahmin with an elephant (just my perception - no offence intended :) ). One might similarly lump together all the uses of 'barrage' and conclude that as the term was used for reporters' questions it could not have meant an inhibitory wall of shellfire to keep out enemy troops, or one might similarly assume or presume that 'kick out' simply meant 'evict' and never the actual application of boot to posterior to accelerate departure. Try stripping out the non-battle uses of otheo/othismos and see when and how they are actually employed
in the context of battle.
Let us look at another Greek hoplite battle (they are quite rare in this era): First Mantinea, in 418 BC. The Spartans (and allies) have been surprised by the Argives and Athenians (and allies) but have rapidly drawn up their order of battle when the Spartan king Agis tries tinkering with his line and ends up with a damaging gap in his left centre.
"
However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset [ephodō = first assault], and at short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta, as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed [prosmeixei = come near/attack, assault] before the Sciritae （whom Agis on seeing that the two companies did not move over ordered to return to their place） had time to fill up the breach in question. [2] Now it was, however, that the Lacedaemonians, utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as superior in point of courage. [3] As soon as they came to close quarters [en khersin] with the enemy, the Mantinean right broke [trepei = turned] the Sciritae and Brasideans, and bursting in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed breach in their line cut up [diephtheiron = broke up, destroyed] and surrounded [kuklosamenoi = going around, enveloping] the Lacedaemonians, and drove them [exeōsan, from exōtheō] in full rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there. [4] But the Lacedaemonians, worsted [hessonto - overcome] in this part of the field, with the rest of their army, and especially the center, where the three hundred knights, as they are called, fought round King Agis, fell on the older men of the Argives and the five companies so named, and on the Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and the Athenians next them, and instantly routed them; the greater number not even waiting to strike a blow [etrepsan oude es kheiras = turning without hand-to-hand], but giving way the moment that they came on, some even being trodden under foot, in their fear of being overtaken by their assailants. "
We have the 'ephodos' or what we would consider the 'charge', the initial coming-together of the lines, followed by 'en khersin' hand-to-hand combat, albeit with the customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to 'doratismos', with the outwinged left of each line immediately collapsing ('trope'). Apart from the left-wing Spartans being 'exotheo-ed' back to the baggage, nobody does anything resembling a push, but this is because of the instantaneous collapse of their opponents. These are not just different ways of saying 'the enemy was beaten'. One can see how Hanson would have started compiling his list, and why.
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What we need is to start by being clear what the ancient authors actually said, rather than just repeating modern assumptions. I will set to checking out those word usages :)
I suggest beginning with the above. ;)
Not being an expert on the sources like Patrick and Rich, I'm limited to avid reading of the examples and trying to make sense of them.
I'm increasingly dubious about doratismos as a separate phase. When does it happen? Several descriptions have shown that hoplites closed at a run, impacting shield to shield. When was this stand-off at spears length? There seems actually to be an impact stage, when the spear is for a few seconds vital, moving rapidly to an active hand-to-hand phase which becomes a crowded melee by natural process if one of the parties does not collapse from the off.
No offence taken! In turn, my perception is of someone so determined to maintain that black is white he would argue with himself, if no one else was available, right up to being killed on the next zebra crossing.
Having dispensed with the pleasantries :) -
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Try stripping out the non-battle uses of otheo/othismos and see when and how they are actually employed in the context of battle.
I wrote an article for Slingshot, published in the latest issue (306) which does exactly this. Please do read it, you might find it interesting.
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Let us look at another Greek hoplite battle (they are quite rare in this era): First Mantinea, in 418 BC.
Yes, I consider this in the article I mentioned (the use of exotheo).
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We have the 'ephodos' or what we would consider the 'charge', the initial coming-together of the lines, followed by 'en khersin' hand-to-hand combat, albeit with the customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to 'doratismos', with the outwinged left of each line immediately collapsing ('trope'). Apart from the left-wing Spartans being 'exotheo-ed' back to the baggage, nobody does anything resembling a push, but this is because of the instantaneous collapse of their opponents.
Then we are in agreement, are we not? I've lost the thread of your argument and don't know what you think this passage proves. I assume you don't think the left-wing Spartans were literally shoved back to the baggage? Or that 'customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to doratismos' is down to a quirk of Thucydides' writing, rather than because there wasn't any separate doratismos?
Perhaps you should find a passage or passages, as Anthony suggests, where there are clear examples of fighting in different phases (hint - there IS some evidence for fighting in phases - you will find some collected for you in my article). NB that if your evidence for a pushing phase is just the use of 'otheo' verbs, then you will need to demonstrate how and why the use of such verbs in hoplite battles is proof of a literal pushing phase, while in all other types of battle it is not. You will find the relevant references collected in my article, if you read it.
Anthony:
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There seems actually to be an impact stage, when the spear is for a few seconds vital, moving rapidly to an active hand-to-hand phase which becomes a crowded melee by natural process if one of the parties does not collapse from the off.
Yes, that's how I see it too (though there could be lots of variation in degree of getting stuck in depending on circumstances).
I shall nip in between the clash of titans to ask whether Homer talks about doratismos in a pre-hoplite context? Wild speculation here but could the spear phase be a poetic hangover from when two-spear hoplites walked into combat (most people think hoplites charging was an innovation at Marathon) and throwing spears before contact?
I think it's clear that Plut Pyrrhus 7.4 (one of the only two uses of 'doratismos' Perseus finds) is Homeric in inspiration - both the details of the combat, and the way Plutarch describes it, are obviously and deliberately Homeric. But so far as I, and Perseus, know, Homer does not use the word himself.
This is a case where I can't quite believe Perseus is right, since the word 'doratismos' is so embedded in the secondary literature it's hard to believe it is only used twice, and only by Plutarch. But it seems to be the case, in the absence of other examples.
While the single combat and Plutarch's language are Homeric, I don't doubt that spear fighting did take place, if that is all we mean by a spear phase.
Quote from: RichT on July 21, 2016, 02:14:50 PM
While the single combat and Plutarch's language are Homeric, I don't doubt that spear fighting did take place, if that is all we mean by a spear phase.
I think we can assume spear fighting was a part of hoplite combat - after all, why trail around a 9ft spear if you don't intend to use it. But a "phase" where only spears were used and, if anyone drew a sword, a new phase began seems at odds with a quite violent and surprisingly dynamic clash given in lots of the quotes both above and in Richard's paper. If hoplites rushed at one another and clashed shield on shield, when did the fighting at spear-length occur? If there were formal phases, how did hoplites move between them? So many questions to answer about how it all worked?
Quote from: Erpingham on July 21, 2016, 01:14:02 PM
I shall nip in between the clash of titans to ask whether Homer talks about doratismos in a pre-hoplite context?
The problem with looking for combat-related activity in Homer is twofold:
1) He tends to describe in detail single combats rather than massed engagements.
2) Spears of this era were thrown rather than thrust (the exception being naval spears, of which there is only one instance of use in land combat in the Iliad). If you had two spears, you threw two spears, then if your opponent was still standing you went in with the sword.
Quote from: RichT on July 21, 2016, 12:39:41 PM
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Try stripping out the non-battle uses of otheo/othismos and see when and how they are actually employed in the context of battle.
I wrote an article for Slingshot, published in the latest issue (306) which does exactly this. Please do read it, you might find it interesting.
Ah yes, the one with "After Militades had otheo-ed the Apsinthians by walling off the neck of the Chersonese" and "For when they had otheo-ed the Persians and the war was no longer for their territory but for his." Clearly within the context of battle.
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We have the 'ephodos' or what we would consider the 'charge', the initial coming-together of the lines, followed by 'en khersin' hand-to-hand combat, albeit with the customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to 'doratismos', with the outwinged left of each line immediately collapsing ('trope'). Apart from the left-wing Spartans being 'exotheo-ed' back to the baggage, nobody does anything resembling a push, but this is because of the instantaneous collapse of their opponents.
Then we are in agreement, are we not? I've lost the thread of your argument and don't know what you think this passage proves. I assume you don't think the left-wing Spartans were literally shoved back to the baggage? Or that 'customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to doratismos' is down to a quirk of Thucydides' writing, rather than because there wasn't any separate doratismos?
The passage demonstrates that Thucydides is using certain terms in the context of specific phases of the battle - closure, contact and the abrupt transition to rout (apart from the Spartans, who were pushed back to their baggage - and why not: at Leuctra they were pushed right back to their camp). I am sure you can identify which term is which. :)
So here we have a Greek author who identifies phases in the battle and uses terminology to reflect this.
The basic problem I have with Richard's approach is that it does not distinguish contexts. As a result, shades of meaning and application of meaning are lost in the rush to promote generalised uncertainty.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 21, 2016, 02:38:38 PM
I think we can assume spear fighting was a part of hoplite combat - after all, why trail around a 9ft spear if you don't intend to use it. But a "phase" where only spears were used and, if anyone drew a sword, a new phase began seems at odds with a quite violent and surprisingly dynamic clash given in lots of the quotes both above and in Richard's paper. If hoplites rushed at one another and clashed shield on shield, when did the fighting at spear-length occur? If there were formal phases, how did hoplites move between them? So many questions to answer about how it all worked?
True, and hopefully we can make some progress by looking at accounts of various battles. At present, I would suggest that at mutual army closure the file leaders would each do their best to plant their spearpoint where it would do most good, and as shield met shield so spearpoints would be desperately seeking flesh and, as Dave indicates with his reckoning that about 95% of the hoplite was frontally covered, usually not finding it.
What happens next is interesting. One might assume that the files immediately start to apply pressure and go into othismos, but from the various battle accounts it looks as if a period of weapon use preceded the files closing up to an othismotic press to decide the issue - and indeed as often as nto the issue seems to have been decided prior to othismos. While spears were being broken and discarded (or reversed to use the
sauroter on the butt-end), combatants would still need their customary 3' per man depth to move and fight in any meaningful fashion. Closing up to physical contact for othismos would reduce individual depth to about 18" or so, and once committed to the 'shove' a formation had to prevail or yield - there was no middle ground*. It would be a push of formation against formation, because room for individual weapon use would have been so limited. The only weapon likely to be in any way usable in such circumstances would be the shortsword.
*
Although there could be an interim condition of mutual balance in which Epaminondas' calling for 'one more step' decides the issue.
It is tempting to suggest that while spears were still mainly intact, hoplites would continue fighting 'en khersin' and not yet move to othismos. In this context, it is interesting to note Herodotus' account of Plataea, in which the Persians break the Spartan spears prior to being overthrown by the Spartans' othismos - a self-inflicted case of 'out of the frying-pan and into the fire?
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Ah yes, the one with "After Militades had otheo-ed the Apsinthians by walling off the neck of the Chersonese" and "For when they had otheo-ed the Persians and the war was no longer for their territory but for his." Clearly within the context of battle.
What? Have you completely missed the point of the whole exercise?
OK, I should have known better. If anyone else is interested in a mature discussion of hoplite battle then I'd like to take part. Just listening to Patrick expound his Revealed Truth, in which his faith is unshakable, is an utter waste of time.
Just my perception - no offence intended. :)
QuoteIt is tempting to suggest that while spears were still mainly intact, hoplites would continue fighting 'en khersin' and not yet move to othismos.
Tempting indeed. From reading your latest exposition patrick, I think you are not as wedded to the formality of phases as at first appeared and are willing to accept the fluidity of the boundaries. I think the biggest difference is it seems to me that the phases of battle follow from the nature of combat - clash leads to close combat leads to the crisis of othismos - rather than the nature of the battle from some artificial phasing.
Concerning phases, one of the objections has always been that, in the absence of a referee, there would be no way (or reason) to coordinate the shift from one phase to the next. But even Hanson, for example, who devised the list of phases so often repeated on the interweb, has a more subtle view:
"Yet to consider hoplite battle in such stages may be misleading if one assumes that there were always such 'segments' of distinct action rather than a continuous blur of movement, uninterrupted and always somewhat unsure of its next course" (The Western Way of War p. 185).
Some of the phases (the charge, or at least the approach, and the rout) are uncontroversial - they must have happened, but aren't really part of the fighting. It's what happened in between that is less clear. That there would have been, in different battles, or in different times and places within the same battle, variations in the exact nature of the fighting - arising largely from the degree of commitment of both sides - seems entirely reasonable and fits what we know of other eras. The differences between proponents and opponents of phases are probably not really very great at all, except for a few zealots.
Here's an alternative general model of hoplite combat - not that it's really alternative, as it's the mainstream view and was probably universal pre-scrum, and differs only in emphasis and detail, but anyway, here it is:
Hoplite phalanxes, formed eight deep or whatever depth was agreed, advanced towards contact, whether at the run or at a walk, and with varying degrees of loss of cohesion in the advance, according to training, enthusiasm and terrain. If one side greatly intimidated the other at this stage, the weaker side might break and run before contact - but the file closers would be doing their best to keep the rest of the phalanx together and moving forwards, and any tendency to slow to a halt from the front ranks could result in the ranks behind, urged on by the file closers, forcing the men in front forwards. The phalanxes would close to within spear reach - depending on the enthusiasm of both sides they might slow to a halt at this point and begin 'fencing and foyning' (to use a later term) with their spears - or in some cases (Delium, Coroneia part 2) where both sides were fully motivated and determined, they could get closer, even crashing together their shields, and getting stuck straight in to a close up struggle of shield bashing and stabbing. If they fought first at spear range, then spears would get broken and hoplites would take to their swords, plus the ebb and flow of the fighting, in a space restricted by the presence of the rear ranks which would prevent any attempt by the front ranks to step back and increase the range, would tend to make the combat increasingly close, right up to shield bashing. All such combat - spear fighting, shield bashing, sword play - went by the general name of 'en chersi', 'hand to hand', as distinguished from the long range missile fighting of skirmishers, and the closest quarters fighting was very occasionally called 'othismos'. After a variable amount of time of this - again depending on the skill and enthusiasm of the combatants and other circumstances - two things might happen; one side might collapse as, with a general failure of nerve, the phalanx disintegrated from the back - this was known by various terms, most often 'rout' ('trope'). Alternatively, a phalanx might retain cohesion but with the front ranks, feeling themselves outmatched, backing off, and the rear ranks, instead of standing firm, backing off also, so that the whole battle line flexed backwards, the opponents surging forwards in turn. This could be called being 'pushed back' (an 'otheo' verb), though such terms were also used for being repulsed or driven off generally so there is not a simple correlation between word used and type of defeat - further qualification would be needed (such as 'pushed back slowly at first'). Of course different success would be met with in different parts of the field, and would not be uniform across a line. A failure at one point would lead to a breaking of the line, and almost certainly the rapid rout of those hoplites stationed alongside the break. A push back would also usually lead quickly to a rout, though in rare cases a line might have been 'pushed back' some distance while still retaining order and facing the front. A complete rout might or might not have been followed by a pursuit - often, a victorious wing would need to avoid pursuit in order to retain formation and wheel to fight other enemy contingents.
There it is, that's how I see it. Nothing very controversial there I don't think, or wildly different from other views except in detail.
so to summarise
close to contact
spear fencing with occasional shield to shield stabbing/jostling with swords/daggers etc
loss of will to fight by one side or slow withdrawal
potentially a final push or shove by the 'winning side' to make this fall back permanent (ie full retreat or rout)
could, and I stress could, the othismos therefore be just an element of the hoplite battle that represents the point as which one side is broken to shatter its cohesion?
or is that too simple (i deal in simple, my brain hurts too much otherwise)
Simple is good - I expect it was pretty simple. :)
Summary fine depending what you mean by "potentially a final push or shove by the 'winning side'".
I don't think 'othismos' is really anything much - it is just a very rare word for close quarters fighting (when used in a battle context - more usually it is used for the jostling of crowds). I don't believe we need to elevate it to any special status and I don't really understand why it has been so elevated.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 21, 2016, 10:26:26 PM
I think the biggest difference is it seems to me that the phases of battle follow from the nature of combat - clash leads to close combat leads to the crisis of othismos - rather than the nature of the battle from some artificial phasing.
Well, it leads to othismos if one or both sides start a coordinated shove, a recourse open to hoplites but not, for example, to Persians, who do not appear to have trained for this sort of thing. The list of phases seems to have arisen for people of our era to get a grip on what happened on the hoplite battlefield, it seems to convey a workable idea, and I am not sure where 'artificial phasing' comes in.
Quote from: RichT on July 22, 2016, 12:26:35 PM
I don't think 'othismos' is really anything much - it is just a very rare word for close quarters fighting (when used in a battle context - more usually it is used for the jostling of crowds). I don't believe we need to elevate it to any special status and I don't really understand why it has been so elevated.
Largely on account of Greek file organisation, some battlefield 'pushes' of considerable length and the ability of Greeks to crush non-Greeks when it came to othismos, which seems to have involved more than just a rare word for close-quarters fighting. I gain the impression that some think the
term is the be-all and end-all of analysis, whereas I prefer to look at the
phenomenon.
The implications are considerable: if coordinated pushing by files was part of the Greek tactical repertoire, it goes a long way to explaining the instances of Spartans being driven back that Richard is so keen to gloss over, it explains the Persian collapse at Plataea when ordinary close-quarters fighting had failed to shift them and it explains why Epaminondas called for 'one more step' to win his battle (I am still waiting for Richard's attempt to explain this. ;)).
And it helps to explain why from Marathon onwards, Greeks were consistently defeating the best the Persians had to offer. There were of course other reasons: ethos, training and equipment being prominent, but do these alone explain the crushing Greek successes over the Persians in land battles?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on July 22, 2016, 12:52:12 PM
Well, it leads to othismos if one or both sides start a coordinated shove, a recourse open to hoplites but not, for example, to Persians, who do not appear to have trained for this sort of thing.
Just when you think you are making progress .....
Most of our references to othismos don't have hoplites on both sides, if at all. The general meaning of othismos cannot, therefore, just be related to a phase of hoplite combat. Phases of combat, from evidence presented, seem to be descriptions of what happens rather than a structured melee where someone orders a move from phase to phase (its not like Roman line relief, for example).
As to "one more step", surely the only certainty is that it is a call for collective offensive action? To say he really meant "one more push" is working backwards from a pre-made conclusion.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 22, 2016, 01:52:05 PM
Most of our references to othismos don't have hoplites on both sides, if at all. The general meaning of othismos cannot, therefore, just be related to a phase of hoplite combat.
True, but the key point would seem to be: when it
is related to hoplite combat, what does it mean?
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Phases of combat, from evidence presented, seem to be descriptions of what happens rather than a structured melee where someone orders a move from phase to phase (its not like Roman line relief, for example).
Yes, in essence, if 'structured' means 'transition occurring by command'. I think Greek melees were perforce 'structured' by the strengths and inflexibilities of the hoplite file system but there was more to the tactical repertoire than just that, so that while melee naturally follows charge unless someone bottles out at the last moment, within the actual melee there may have been more active attempts at control, particularly once it became clear that spear-thrusting and/or sword-fighting was not bringing a decision. Rather than a general transition to ''scrumming' or talking about the weather, someone in authority would tell his chaps to start pushing for their lives.
It would be interesting to see how the idea of battlefield othismos arose. There must have been some initial reason.
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As to "one more step", surely the only certainty is that it is a call for collective offensive action? To say he really meant "one more push" is working backwards from a pre-made conclusion.
Is it? What kind of 'collective offensive action' could "one more step" indicate if not one ... more ... actual ... step? And how could 'one step' have significance unless it crossed a threshold which broke enemy resistance? And how would it do that except by forcing back their formation?
'One more step'
Polyaenus 2.3.2
In the battle at Leuctra, Epaminondas commanded the Thebans, and Cleombrotus commanded the Lacedaemonians. The battle remained finely balanced for a long time, until Epaminondas called on his troops to give him one step more, and he would ensure the victory. They did as he asked; and they gained the victory.
I don't see the relevance of this anecdote to mass shoving, as I have already said in the previous thread. But if the incident needs explaining, here's one explanation, from Adrian Goldsworthy's The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle. Adrian follows Phil Sabin's 'dynamic standoff model', in which fighting is punctuated by lulls, with the forces separated by a small distance. It's not important whether anyone buys into this model, this is just an example of one explanation (so don't waste time picking fault with it):
It must have required a great effort on the part of a weary hoplite to advance after a lull and renew the struggle. The longer a battle went on, and the more pauses in the fighting that took place, the harder this would have become. The lulls may well have lasted much longer than the bursts of fighting. Both sides were nervous, teetering on the brink of collapse. The appearance of determination or confidence became as important factors as actual fighting power. It might have often been necessary for a few brave men to lead the way and advance to renew the fight with the enemy, in the hope that the rest of the front rank would join them. The aim would have been to persuade the whole phalanx to move forward together, the front rank advancing side by side and shield by shield to renew the fight. The enemy phalanx needed to advance in a similar way to meet the fresh attack, or at least maintain a cohesive front, if it was not to be beaten. It is easy to see how the mental association of stubborn fighting with 'pushing of shields' or 'locked shields' developed. If a few hoplites advanced alone and the rest of the phalanx did not follow, they would be cut down, like the small groups of Persians who charged alone at Plataea. A concerted, group effort was needed, and was an important part of a general's role to encourage this. It is in this context, the need to persuade the phalanx to make one last effort to move forward and show the confidence that would beat the enemy, that we should see Epaminondas' cry for 'one pace more' at Leuctra (Polyaenus 2. 3. 2). Xenophon makes it clear that there was prolonged fighting, some of it going the Spartans' way, before the Thebans broke through in this battle. The Spartans were able to carry off the mortally wounded Cleombrotus, presumably during a lull in the fighting (Hell.6. 4.13-14). Success in a hoplite battle, especially in a long, hard fight, relied ultimately on the courage and aggression of individual hoplites.
For my part, it strikes me that we have three pretty full accounts of Leuctra in Xenophon, Diodorus and Plutarch, none of which make any reference to this supposedly decisive moment. Plus Polyaenus has a nearly identical anecdote for Iphicrates (he doesn't say at which battle this is supposed to have happened):
Polyaenus 3.9.27
Iphicrates told his men, that he would ensure that they were victorious, if at a given command, they would encourage each other and advance by only a single pace. At the crisis of the battle, when victory hung in the balance, he gave the signal; the army responded with a shout, after which they advanced a pace and defeated the enemy.
You might also compare with this for Alexander:
Polyaenus 4.3.8
In his first action with the Persians, Alexander seeing the Macedonians give way, rode through the ranks, calling out to his men, "One effort more, my Macedonians, one glorious effort." Animated by their prince, they made a vigorous attack: and the enemy abandoned themselves to flight. Thus did that critical moment determine the victory.
So it seems to be a commonplace that a general could demand one last effort from his men to win a victory, not needing any particular explanation.
Taking a pace or three is credited with great powers by Polyaenus - how about:
Polyaenus 7.14.3
Orontes, with ten thousand Greek hoplites, fought at Cyme against Autophradates, who advanced against him with the same number of cavalry. Orontes ordered his men to look around, and observe the extensiveness of the plain. He told them that, if they loosened their ranks, it would be impossible to withstand the charge of the enemy's cavalry. Accordingly, they kept their ranks compact and close, and received the cavalry upon their spears. When the cavalry found that they could make no impression on them, they retreated. Orontes ordered the Greeks, when the cavalry made a second attack upon them, to advance three paces forward to meet them. The cavalry supposed that they meant to charge them, and fled away from the battlefield.
If you are going to build a model of ancient combat on an anecdote in Polyaenus, there are other examples ripe for being used this way, such as:
Polyaenus 4.3.5
When Alexander advanced against Darius, he ordered the Macedonians, as soon as they drew near the Persians, to fall down on their hands and knees: and, as soon as ever the trumpet sounded the charge, to rise up and vigorously attack the enemy. They did so: and the Persians, considering it as an act of reverence, abated of their impetuosity, and their minds became softened towards the prostrate foe. Darius too was led to think, he had gained a victory without the hazard of a battle. When on sound of the trumpet, the Macedonians sprung up, and made such an impression on the enemy, that their centre was broken, and the Persians entirely defeated.
Or how about:
Polyaenus 2.2.9
When Clearchus's hoplites were being harassed by the enemy's cavalry, he formed his army eight deep, in a looser formation than the usual square. He ordered his men to lower their shields, and under cover of the shields to use their swords to dig ditches, as large as they could conveniently make them. As soon as this was finished, he advanced beyond the ditches into the plain which lay in front of them, and ordered his troops, as soon as they were pressed by the enemy, to retreat behind the ditches which they had recently made. The enemy's cavalry, charging eagerly after them, fell one over another into the ditches, and became easy victims to the troops of Clearchus.
Why do these anecdotes not get similar exposure?
QuoteTrue, but the key point would seem to be: when it is related to hoplite combat, what does it mean?
Why does it mean something special in this case, except that Hanson believes it so? Why does it not mean a particularly hard fought melee, as it seems to elsewhere?
QuoteIs it? What kind of 'collective offensive action' could "one more step" indicate if not one ... more ... actual ... step?
I'm not the one arguing that it means more than one more step. Scrum-othismos believers are arguing it actually means "push hard at the back". It means "One more step..." Subtext "Get moving again, attack again. They've got no more fight left, we have them". The anecdote is about leadership and the moment, not the mechanics of hoplite battle, which I'm guessing is why Polyaenus uses for several great leaders.
The history of the modern concept of othismos as mass pushing is interesting - Peter Krentz covers this in his chapter in Men in Bronze (which obviously inspired my article).
Edited highlights:
For all its prominence in modern discussions of Archaic battle... the word othismos occurs rarely in the battle narratives of the classical historians: twice in Herodotus (7.225.1, the struggle over Leonidas' body at Thermopylae, and 9.62.2, the end of the battle of Plataia), once in Thucydides (4.96, the battle of Delion), and never in Xenophon. The word for the great shoving contest supposed to be the essence of Greek battle, in other words, occurs once in a description of Greek fighting Greek.
...
Years ago, scholars did not take othismos to mean something like a rugby scrum on steroids. Look at how translators used to render Herodotus. George Rawlinson in 1858-60 was typical: "a fierce struggle" and "a hand to hand struggle". Commentators and lexicographers were no different. In the first American edition of A Greek Englisdh Lexicon (1848), Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott gave "a very hot, close fight" and "to come to close quarters".... As late as 1938 J. E. Powell's Lexicon to Herodotus translated othismos as "hand to hand combat".
...
The earliest use of the rugby analogy that I have found occurs in G. B. Grundy's Thucydides and the History of His Age, originally published in 1911:
"When [the hoplite phalanx] first came into contact with the enemy, it relied in the first instance on shock tactics, that is to say, on the weight put into the first onset and developed in the subsequent thrust. The principle as very much the same as that followed by the forwards in a scrummage at the Rugby game of football".
...
W.J. Woodhouse in his 1933 book King Agis III of Sparta... is the first clear statment I have found of what became the dominant view:
"a conflict of hoplites was in the main a matter of brawn, of shock of the mass developed instantaneously as a steady thrust with the whole weight of the file behind it - a literal shoving of the enemy off the ground on which he stood."
The context for this pasage is Woodhouse's peculiar discussion of Thucydides 5.71, where Thucydides says that each man kept close to his right hand neighbour's shield out of fear. Woodhouse labelled this "notion... to put it bluntly nothing but a fatuous delusion and stark nonsense"
...
Not surprisingly, the great commentator on Thucydides, A.W Gomme, objected:
"a Greek battle was not so simply 'a matter of brawn'... (did the back rows push the men in front?), as Professor Woodhouse supposes. It was not a scrummage."
The parenthetical remark drips with sarcasm... No publicity is bad publicity, however, and Gomme had mentioned the rugby scrum again.
The analogy caught on in spite of both Gomme and a short 1942 article by A.D Fraser called 'The Myth of the Phalanx Scrimmage', which takes as its point of departure the assumption that the rugby scrum model dominates the field, at least in England.
So it's an early twentieth century concept that became widely accepted until Cawkwell, Krentz and others started to pull it apart in the 1980s.
Now I don't have time for all this any more and as we all can clearly see, some people already believe they have nothing to learn, so it feels too much like a frustrating waste of time. I hope others may find some of this stuff interesting, however.
Sabin and Goldsworthy making an interpretation is always going to get my vote.
Adding an Edwardian historiography to the contentious point, even more convincing.
For those guys, a visually recognisable comparison with rugby would suffice to neuter further thought, so it doesn't surprise me that we are still having to undo that a century later.
Historical interpretations flow in fashion like anything else, and all they need is a passage able to be quoted to justify it against all other evidence.
Quote from: Erpingham on July 22, 2016, 05:06:09 PM
QuoteTrue, but the key point would seem to be: when it is related to hoplite combat, what does it mean?
Why does it mean something special in this case, except that Hanson believes it so? Why does it not mean a particularly hard fought melee, as it seems to elsewhere?
Because there are other and better ways of expressing a particularly hard-fought melee.
Herodotus IX.63
"
Where Mardonius was himself, riding a white horse in the battle and surrounded by a thousand picked men who were the flower of the Persians, there they pressed their adversaries hardest [tautē de kai malista tous enantious epiesan]. So long as Mardonius was alive the Persians stood their ground and defended themselves, overthrowing many Lacedaemonians [hoi de anteikhon kai amunomenoi kateballon pollous tōn Lakedaimoniōn]."
Herodotus IX.67
"
All the rest of the Greeks who were on the king's side fought badly on purpose, but not so the Boeotians; they fought for a long time against the Athenians. For those Thebans who were on the Persian side had great enthusiasm in the battle, and did not want to fight in a cowardly manner."
Herodotus IX.70.2
"
When the Athenians came up, however, the fight for the wall became intense [iskhurē] and lasted for a long time. In the end the Athenians, by valor and constant effort [de aretē te kai lipariē], scaled the wall and breached it."
These all relate to the battle of Plataea, yet 'othismos' is only mentioned in the final stage of the fight at the temple. By Richard's measure, it should have been present in all of these instances, especially the crowded assault on the camp.
Quote
QuoteIs it? What kind of 'collective offensive action' could "one more step" indicate if not one ... more ... actual ... step?
I'm not the one arguing that it means more than one more step. Scrum-othismos believers are arguing it actually means "push hard at the back". It means "One more step..." Subtext "Get moving again, attack again. They've got no more fight left, we have them". The anecdote is about leadership and the moment, not the mechanics of hoplite battle, which I'm guessing is why Polyaenus uses for several great leaders.
Let us consider how 'one more step' could bring victory. Gaining 2' 6" of ground (or less) is not, in most circumstances, going to win a battle. If Epaminondas wanted to persuade his men the foe had no fight left in them (contrary to the evidence of their eyes and shield arms) one suspects he would have done so by saying so. However he actually wanted to persuade them to take one more step, and said so, and this meant they had to generate the push to move the enemy back one more step.
Interestingly, Polyaenus has an almost identical incident involving Iphicrates - another noted hoplite commander, who understood how to get the most from his men on the battlefield. The difference is that he arranged the effort in advance as opposed to demanding it on the spur of the moment.
Quote from: RichT on July 22, 2016, 04:01:00 PM
I don't see the relevance of this anecdote to mass shoving, as I have already said in the previous thread. But if the incident needs explaining, here's one explanation, from Adrian Goldsworthy's The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle. Adrian follows Phil Sabin's 'dynamic standoff model', in which fighting is punctuated by lulls, with the forces separated by a small distance. It's not important whether anyone buys into this model, this is just an example of one explanation (so don't waste time picking fault with it):
Do you agree with this explanation, or why air it?
Quote
For my part, it strikes me that we have three pretty full accounts of Leuctra in Xenophon, Diodorus and Plutarch, none of which make any reference to this supposedly decisive moment.
'Pretty full' or 'entirely complete'? Each account provides some details the others lack, so non-mention of Polynaeus' item is not proof of its non-existence.
Quote
Plus Polyaenus has a nearly identical anecdote for Iphicrates (he doesn't say at which battle this is supposed to have happened):
Polyaenus 3.9.27
Iphicrates told his men, that he would ensure that they were victorious, if at a given command, they would encourage each other and advance by only a single pace. At the crisis of the battle, when victory hung in the balance, he gave the signal; the army responded with a shout, after which they advanced a pace and defeated the enemy.
The Iphicrates incident is interesting because we can reasonably assume that Iphicrates is also commanding a hoplite army. If anything, it emphasises the importance of a coordinated effort by the whole formation to displace the foe's formation by just one pace, which does something to that formation causing it to lose the battle.
Quote
You might also compare with this for Alexander:
Polyaenus 4.3.8
In his first action with the Persians, Alexander seeing the Macedonians give way, rode through the ranks, calling out to his men, "One effort more, my Macedonians, one glorious effort." Animated by their prince, they made a vigorous attack: and the enemy abandoned themselves to flight. Thus did that critical moment determine the victory.
But an 'effort' rather than a 'step', and Alexander would have been with his cavalry. So why lump this together with exhortations of hoplite commanders to their infantry? It would appear that the idea behind quoting these cases without distinction between them is not to seek what they may reveal but to blur them together as some kind of literary commonplace.
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So it seems to be a commonplace that a general could demand one last effort from his men to win a victory, not needing any particular explanation.
*Raises eyebrow*
Perhaps it would be more sensible to examine each case in context rather than keep plugging away at evidential assassination, of which there are two basic methods:
1) If there is only one mention, try to present it as an exception which proves the rule.
2) If there are several mentions, try to present them as a
topos.
Next case.
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Polyaenus 7.14.3
Orontes, with ten thousand Greek hoplites, fought at Cyme against Autophradates, who advanced against him with the same number of cavalry. Orontes ordered his men to look around, and observe the extensiveness of the plain. He told them that, if they loosened their ranks, it would be impossible to withstand the charge of the enemy's cavalry. Accordingly, they kept their ranks compact and close, and received the cavalry upon their spears. When the cavalry found that they could make no impression on them, they retreated. Orontes ordered the Greeks, when the cavalry made a second attack upon them, to advance three paces forward to meet them. The cavalry supposed that they meant to charge them, and fled away from the battlefield.
Interesting, because it demonstrates how even mounted Persians had by this time developed a distinct fear of a hoplite charge, and Orontes was able to use this to his advantage.
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Polyaenus 4.3.5
When Alexander advanced against Darius, he ordered the Macedonians, as soon as they drew near the Persians, to fall down on their hands and knees: and, as soon as ever the trumpet sounded the charge, to rise up and vigorously attack the enemy. They did so: and the Persians, considering it as an act of reverence, abated of their impetuosity, and their minds became softened towards the prostrate foe. Darius too was led to think, he had gained a victory without the hazard of a battle. When on sound of the trumpet, the Macedonians sprung up, and made such an impression on the enemy, that their centre was broken, and the Persians entirely defeated.
Or how about:
Polyaenus 2.2.9
When Clearchus's hoplites were being harassed by the enemy's cavalry, he formed his army eight deep, in a looser formation than the usual square. He ordered his men to lower their shields, and under cover of the shields to use their swords to dig ditches, as large as they could conveniently make them. As soon as this was finished, he advanced beyond the ditches into the plain which lay in front of them, and ordered his troops, as soon as they were pressed by the enemy, to retreat behind the ditches which they had recently made. The enemy's cavalry, charging eagerly after them, fell one over another into the ditches, and became easy victims to the troops of Clearchus.
Why do these anecdotes not get similar exposure?
Simple - How well are they known? And how easy are they to reconcile with what we know of the conduct of the respective actions?
QuoteThese all relate to the battle of Plataea, yet 'othismos' is only mentioned in the final stage of the fight at the temple.
Maybe Herodotus didn't realise he was supposed to be defining a formal phase in some other author's schema, so used a variety of words for the same thing because he was a competent writer? He wanted some emphasis on how hard fought this piece of battle was? He wanted an emphasis on the Persians standing and fighting desperately and up close, not fighting in an effete Eastern manner? So many reasons much more convincing than he had a formal phase of hoplite battle in mind.
QuoteLet us consider how 'one more step' could bring victory. Gaining 2' 6" of ground (or less) is not, in most circumstances, going to win a battle. ........ he actually wanted to persuade them to take one more step, and said so, and this meant they had to generate the push to move the enemy back one more step.
Gaining 2ft 6 " of ground isn't going to win a battle, so it doesn't matter if you push, walk, skip or jump. He very clearly means a small effort now will bring victory - he is not literally saying they only have to go 2 1/2 feet. It's heroic rhetoric, not a parade ground instruction.
Addendum : I strongly suspect it is time to move on beyond this element of hoplites and talk of something else - by this stage it is probably boring and infuriating equally to a dwindling band of readers. There are many other questions, some already raised. For example, why did hoplites go from two spear to one spear and did it fundamentally change them? Are non-Greeks equipped as hoplites hoplites (e.g. Etruscans, Carthaginian Sacred band?). If not, why not?
Quote from: Erpingham on July 22, 2016, 09:34:54 PM
Addendum : I strongly suspect it is time to move on beyond this element of hoplites and talk of something else - by this stage it is probably boring and infuriating equally to a dwindling band of readers. There are many other questions, some already raised. For example, why did hoplites go from two spear to one spear and did it fundamentally change them?
Excellent idea.
The change from two spears to one appears to have been pioneered by the Spartans, who in the time of the poet Tyrtaeus (7th century BC) have one spear while everyone else has two. This can probably be connected to the adoption of the Lycurgan constitution, not that living in barracks and eating black broth makes one incapable of carrying two spears, but that a new fighting style emphasising moving rapidly to close combat was beginning to give Sparta success on the battlefield. (It was either that or the discovery and reburial of the bones of Orestes which allowed them to defeat their long-standing foes the Tegeans: take your pick.)
Combining shooting with closing to combat, especially when using short-ranged weapons, is something if a challenge and only the Romans seem to have got it right. The basic problem is that when closing you can prepare for throwing or you can prepare for melee, but not both simultaneously. hence, the faster you close, the more challenging it becomes to 'hurl on the run'. And hence the more training that is required to make such a manoeuvre effective. Once this goes beyond the 'cultural comfort' level, one needs to undertake extended training, extended service or professionalise in order to make it work, so given the limited availability of the average job-holding citizen hoplite for such additional commitment, there would have been a tendency to settle for doing one thing well - that which proved most effective in combat.
The key departure here may be the Athenian innovation of charging at the run, first employed at Marathon in 490 BC. By First Mantinea in 418 BC, the Athenians, Argives and Mantineans - in fact all of Sparta's opponents - were attacking at the run, while Spartans - and hence their allies making up the rest of the army - continued to march, albeit swiftly, to the music of flutes. (This incidentally prompted a misjudgement by Agis, the Spartan commander: used to Spartan tempos of advance, he thought he had time to adjust his line before the armies closed - but his faster-moving opponents caught him in mid-manoeuvre.) By Cunaxa in 401 BC, the entire Greek contingent, Spartans included, were attacking at the run - and finding that their Asiatic opponents, with one exception (Tissaphernes' cavalry, opposed to the peltasts), failed to await their onset.
It looks as if the extra spear dropped out as the tempo of advancing picked up, with the advance perhaps also becoming more fluid and continuous (i.e. no pauses for dressing the line or shooting). Hoplite warfare in the 5th century BC seems to have been faster then in the 6th century BC, and this appears to be reflected in lighter equipment. In the 4th century BC, we find (younger) Spartan hoplites able to chase and catch peltasts, no mean achievement for a heavy infantryman, which suggests lightened equipment but also dedicated training for speed (I doubt that even Boucicault could have caught a peltast while wearing full armour). Iphicrates' reforms appear aimed at lightening equipment still further, or at least redistributing the exisiting weight to favour offensive capability, a trend which ultimately resulted in the Macedonian phalanx.
QuoteAre non-Greeks equipped as hoplites hoplites (e.g. Etruscans, Carthaginian Sacred band?). If not, why not?
A good question for someone else to opine upon. Please feel free. :)
Quote from: Erpingham on July 22, 2016, 09:34:54 PMAre non-Greeks equipped as hoplites hoplites (e.g. Etruscans, Carthaginian Sacred band?). If not, why not?
The Greeks thought they were. Plutarch,
Timoleon 27.2, of the Carthaginians at Krimeisos:
Quote"and behind these ten thousand hoplites with white shields (hoplitais leukaspisi)"
Quote from: Duncan Head on July 24, 2016, 08:25:59 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on July 22, 2016, 09:34:54 PMAre non-Greeks equipped as hoplites hoplites (e.g. Etruscans, Carthaginian Sacred band?). If not, why not?
The Greeks thought they were. Plutarch, Timoleon 27.2, of the Carthaginians at Krimeisos:
Quote"and behind these ten thousand hoplites with white shields (hoplitais leukaspisi)"
Interesting in the light of the modern fashion for saying hoplites were special because of their Greek values, not their equipment or tactics.
The Greeks happily apply the
word hoplite to foreign heavy infantry who may not even be equipped in Greek style:
Quote from: Xenophon Anabasis 7.8.15there came to their assistance Itamenes with his own force, and from Comania Assyrian hoplites ("hoplitai Assyrioi") and Hyrcanian horsemen—these also being mercenaries in the service of the King
But I am not sure that the use of the word as a generic for "heavy infantry" necessarily has any bearing on what might make Greek (and Carian?) hoplitai "special". To definitively say how far it was or was not the equipment that was decisive, we'd need a clear picture of how foreign infantry in Greek gear performed in battle both against Greek hoplites and against non-hoplite opposition.
True.
In this respect the Carthaginians are rather disappointing, perhaps mainly on account of the absence of Punic records, though we do have the snippet from Diodorus covering Dionysius I's supply of hoplite equipment to the Illyrians in their war against the Molossians.
Quote"While these events were taking place, in Sicily Dionysius, the tyrant of the Syracusans, resolved to plant cities on the Adriatic Sea. His idea in doing this was to get control of the Ionian Sea, in order that there he might make the route to Epeirus safe and have his own cities which could give haven to ships. For it was his intent to descend unexpectedly with great armaments upon the regions about Epeirus and to sack the temple at Delphi, which was filled with great wealth. 2 Consequently he made an alliance with the Illyrians with the help of Alcetas the Molossian, who was at the time an exile and spending his days in Syracuse. Since the Illyrians were at war, he dispatched to them an allied force of two thousand soldiers and five hundred suits of Greek armour. The Illyrians distributed the suits of armour among their best warriors and incorporated the soldiers among their own troops. 3 Now that they had gathered a large army, they invaded Epeirus and would have restored Alcetas to the kingship over the Molossians. But when no one paid any attention to him, they first ravaged the country, and after that, when the Molossians drew up against them, there followed a sharp battle in which the Illyrians were victorious and slew more than fifteen thousand Molossians. After such a disaster befell the inhabitants of Epeirus, the Lacedaemonians, as soon as they had learned the facts, sent a force to give aid to the Molossians, by means of which they curbed the barbarians' great audacity." - Diodorus XV.13.1-3
While it is easy to conclude that the supply of armour and 'allied' troops gave the Illyrians a decisive edge, the finer points of technology, tactics and techniques remain more elusive.