More thoughts on longbow tactics

[Jim Webster]

What we have to remember is that in an army of the period there were a large number of men of varying ranks. They had that rank whether they were given a job within the army or not.
Rank and role were loosely connected. You could be a belted Earl and just left to fight in the ranks with your own men.
So when we look for the 'master archer' or 'captain of archers' I don't think we're looking for somebody in a formal position. I think we could also see, when the army drew up, the person the Monarch had placed in command of, for example the left wing, as part of his job, would just say to the men at arms (or whoever) in charge of the archers on his wing, "I want you, you and you to coordinate the archery fire on my wing."

With regard training and drill, the individual archer would be expected to have achieved a certain level of technical competence. That was his responsibility.
Once in the battle line, why would they need more pre-battle training and drilling that Greek citizen hoplites?
A lot of what they needed to know would be passed down through the community. When they joined the army, their place in the file would be given them, they'd know who they were standing next to.
They didn't need to be taught how to hit a clout at so many paces, they came to the army knowing that. They merely needed to know when to hit that clout.

Jim

[Erpingham]

Mostly they are shooting in a single rank from behind low walls of mealie bags until the final stand around the redoubt.  Was Sir thinking of the film Waterloo (1970) and the British Guards volleying against the French Imperial Guards in the famous four-rank stand-and-shoot sequence?

You are forgetting the climactic sequence where Bromhead draws up his men in three ranks in front of the final redoubt.   

Back to the topic in hand.  Things about internal organisation are beginning to get a bit confused .  Our "Master archer" was originally a contingent archery leader.  He now seems to have become conflated with a commander of an archery wing.  The Burgundian man-at-arms with his flag is commanding a whole wing of the vanguard - hundreds of men.  This is the figure who would get the archers to step forward and shoot and call "fast" for them to stop.  We can infer his existence in English armies.  The next tier down in English, Welsh and perhaps Scottish armies is probably at the contingent leader stage.  These will be the centenars (perhaps), vintenars and assigned men-at-arms, dependent on origin of the men. There is a lack of any differentiated senior common archer - a master archer - in the English pay records (which are extensive).

As to speculation and inference, I agree we are in that territory.  But longbowmen are vulnerable to being mythologised.  Every man a Robin Hood with a similar level of organisation and discipline of a Napoleonic fusilier.   In reality, most were adequate shots at best and, while having discipline and internal organisation, weren't drilled at all. 

And, as to no-one charging archers, perhaps a little bit more study is needed.  Most of the time, archers avoided being charged by cavalry by lurking behind fieldworks or terrain features, not just relying on their shooting.  I don't think there are many occassions where shooting alone prevented an enemy from closing.

[Justin Swanton]

Keeping in mind that the point about master archers is the need for some sort of controlled system of shooting to allow archers in depth to shoot at a target that is nearer than maximum range. The manuals have skirmishers like archers deploy in 8-man files, not 3-man ones, with as many files at infantry, implying that they deployed in intermediate order though naturally with more space between each man in the file to permit them to use their bows.

It seems we agree that at most the 3 front files can shoot with direct LOS at the enemy. The other ranks will be idle unless something is done to enable them to shoot with direct LOS as well. Two possible mechanisms: rotate the front ranks or get each rank to kneel after having loosed its arrows.  Both require someone to give orders at the right time. If you don't have a mechanism then all the ranks after rank 3 are there for decoration once the enemy has advanced within the max range bracket.

[Duncan Head]

Keeping in mind that the point about master archers is the need for some sort of controlled system of shooting to allow archers in depth to shoot at a target that is nearer than maximum range. The manuals have skirmishers like archers deploy in 8-man files, not 3-man ones

What manuals?

From what Anthony has said earlier, references to archers 8 or so ranks deep come only from the later 16th century theorists, by which time the whole tactical context has changed and archers are being deployed together with pikemen and calivers at similar depths.

If you look at the Burgundian training ordonnance, it implies to me (it's not explicitly stated) that when the archers deploy behind the kneeling pikemen, it is the three archers of one lance behind the single pikeman of that lance - so only three bows deep.

I am still not convinced that the supposed need to control archers shooting in depth applies at all to the 14th-15th centuries.

[Erpingham]

Personally, rather than a formal system of NCOs, I would go for a suggestion already made by Jim of trusting your experienced men.  There is a whole set of modern military psychology stuff on natural leaders - those the soldiers look to in a tight spot.  In a military structure which relied a lot on interrelationships for recruitment, hierarchies beyond the formal based on experience and respect are to be expected.  So, our contingent leaders, noting the skills and interrelationships, select the men who they place in front and these relay back to those behind their tactical commentary on which they act.

I agree the depth thing is a connundrum.  If shooting in turns at a static target, we might suggest different men came to the front and had a go but I can't see that working in a more intense situation, such as when the enemy are shooting strongly or advancing.  It is possible that all the rear ranks could be expected to do was help to create a "beaten zone" around the enemy or through which they intended to advance.

One other thought.  In some battles, the English were deployed on a slope.  This would help. 

[Erpingham]

I am still not convinced that the supposed need to control archers shooting in depth applies at all to the 14th-15th centuries.

This is a good point.  There will often be times when archers don't need to deploy in depth.  If we take our typical HYW English army in France, it has between one and three archers per man-at-arms.  Those operating in Gascony would be particularly low on archers (they bulked out their missilry with Gascon crossbows).  It depends on deployment how deep the archers need to be.  If we see an English battle with a centre of men-at-arms maybe in 4-6 ranks, with archer wings of same size, archers don't need to be in deep formations at the lower end of this ratio scale. 

And one point on the sixteenth century depth quote.  This was Sir John Smythe giving a view as to the maximum practical depth, not an ideal.   

[Justin Swanton]

Keeping in mind that the point about master archers is the need for some sort of controlled system of shooting to allow archers in depth to shoot at a target that is nearer than maximum range. The manuals have skirmishers like archers deploy in 8-man files, not 3-man ones

What manuals?

From what Anthony has said earlier, references to archers 8 or so ranks deep come only from the later 16th century theorists, by which time the whole tactical context has changed and archers are being deployed together with pikemen and calivers at similar depths.

If you look at the Burgundian training ordonnance, it implies to me (it's not explicitly stated) that when the archers deploy behind the kneeling pikemen, it is the three archers of one lance behind the single pikeman of that lance - so only three bows deep.

I am still not convinced that the supposed need to control archers shooting in depth applies at all to the 14th-15th centuries.

The Burgundian training ordonnance seems to imply a 3-deep archer line which further suggests a line as deep as can allow all archers to shoot together by direct LOS.

But that doesn't imply that English archers a century earlier deployed only three deep, and my point about the manuals (the hellenistic ones) is that they do stipulate archer/slinger/javelin lines 8 men deep, which would make direct LOS shooting impossible for all the skirmishers in the line. They also state the skirmisher line had as many files as the heavy infantry which rules out the skirmishers spreading out in a sort of super open order several times wider than the HI to allow all ranks to sight their targets. So if all skirmishers in a line are going to be able to shoot at any distance except extreme range, some sort of mechanism is required.

[Duncan Head]

The Burgundian training ordonnance seems to imply a 3-deep archer line which further suggests a line as deep as can allow all archers to shoot together by direct LOS.

But that doesn't imply that English archers a century earlier deployed only three deep, and my point about the manuals (the hellenistic ones) is that they do stipulate archer/slinger/javelin lines 8 men deep, which would make direct LOS shooting impossible for all the skirmishers in the line. They also state the skirmisher line had as many files as the heavy infantry which rules out the skirmishers spreading out in a sort of super open order several times wider than the HI to allow all ranks to sight their targets. So if all skirmishers in a line are going to be able to shoot at any distance except extreme range, some sort of mechanism is required.

I think the Burgundian ordonnance is far more likely to be relevant to English practice than the Hellenistic theorists of 1500 years earlier. I am surprised that you would bring the manuals into a discussion of mediaeval tactical command, as they seem to be entirely irrelevant.

In any case, the Hellenistic manuals are only explicit about 8-deep files and matching the width of the heavy infantry in circumstances when the light infantry are exactly half as strong as the heavies and are standing deployed behind the phalanx:

Now these light infantry will also have 1024 files, if they are to stand behind the phalanx of the hoplites and extend the same distance, without, however, a depth of sixteen men — for they are only one‑half as strong — but obviously of eight men.

- not necessarily on all occasions and in all circumstances. In these circumstances, yes, they might need some sort of fire control. But Hellenistic light infantry have a known structure of officers:

a company (hekatontarchia), to which will be attached the supernumeraries, five in number, an army-herald, a signal‑man, a bugler, an aide-de‑camp, and a file-closer

- which English archers don't. So the comparison from a completely different military system with a completely different tactical doctrine is, not surprisingly, pretty irrelevant.

[Justin Swanton]

The Burgundian training ordonnance seems to imply a 3-deep archer line which further suggests a line as deep as can allow all archers to shoot together by direct LOS.

But that doesn't imply that English archers a century earlier deployed only three deep, and my point about the manuals (the hellenistic ones) is that they do stipulate archer/slinger/javelin lines 8 men deep, which would make direct LOS shooting impossible for all the skirmishers in the line. They also state the skirmisher line had as many files as the heavy infantry which rules out the skirmishers spreading out in a sort of super open order several times wider than the HI to allow all ranks to sight their targets. So if all skirmishers in a line are going to be able to shoot at any distance except extreme range, some sort of mechanism is required.

I think the Burgundian ordonnance is far more likely to be relevant to English practice than the Hellenistic theorists of 1500 years earlier. I am surprised that you would bring the manuals into a discussion of mediaeval tactical command, as they seem to be entirely irrelevant.

In any case, the Hellenistic manuals are only explicit about 8-deep files and matching the width of the heavy infantry in circumstances when the light infantry are exactly half as strong as the heavies and are standing deployed behind the phalanx:

Now these light infantry will also have 1024 files, if they are to stand behind the phalanx of the hoplites and extend the same distance, without, however, a depth of sixteen men — for they are only one‑half as strong — but obviously of eight men.

- not necessarily on all occasions and in all circumstances. In these circumstances, yes, they might need some sort of fire control. But Hellenistic light infantry have a known structure of officers:

a company (hekatontarchia), to which will be attached the supernumeraries, five in number, an army-herald, a signal‑man, a bugler, an aide-de‑camp, and a file-closer

- which English archers don't. So the comparison from a completely different military system with a completely different tactical doctrine is, not surprisingly, pretty irrelevant.

OK, I wanted to show that deploying shooters more than 3 men deep was something that demonstrably happened in the past, and if those shooters used direct LOS fire then they must have had some sort of rotation mechanism for the ranks. But as you point out the 8-deep stipulation explicitly applies only to skirmishers behind an infantry line (I overlooked that), where they are obviously using indirect fire.

If one applies the Burgundian ordonnance setup to English archers then the presence or absence of officers becomes moot. It becomes natural to conclude that the English deployed only 3 deep and just got on with pumping arrows into their visible targets. Question then is: did mediaeval archers deploy only 3 deep (or less) in every battle? If they deployed more than 3 deep were the rear rankers used for extreme rangge indirect fire only? (for sure they weren't able to use direct fire at short range without a rotation mechanism). Does this match up with numbers and frontages of battles?

[Jim Webster]

The Burgundian training ordonnance seems to imply a 3-deep archer line which further suggests a line as deep as can allow all archers to shoot together by direct LOS.

But that doesn't imply that English archers a century earlier deployed only three deep, and my point about the manuals (the hellenistic ones) is that they do stipulate archer/slinger/javelin lines 8 men deep, which would make direct LOS shooting impossible for all the skirmishers in the line. They also state the skirmisher line had as many files as the heavy infantry which rules out the skirmishers spreading out in a sort of super open order several times wider than the HI to allow all ranks to sight their targets. So if all skirmishers in a line are going to be able to shoot at any distance except extreme range, some sort of mechanism is required.

I think the Burgundian ordonnance is far more likely to be relevant to English practice than the Hellenistic theorists of 1500 years earlier. I am surprised that you would bring the manuals into a discussion of mediaeval tactical command, as they seem to be entirely irrelevant.

My guess is that Hellenistic theorists might have had some traction with the 16th and 17th century theorists but damn all with the practical men of the 14th and 15th centuries. So we might suspect their influence on Sir John Smythe but not on Henry Vth

[RichT]

The Hellenistic manuals are really for heavy infantry, and the info on lights is, well, very light, and obviously theoretical. I don't think it would be wise to conclude that even in the Hellenistic period light infantry skirmishers (who were as often as not tribal or ethnic levies with, so far as we know, no military training) formed up in formal ranks and files, or at fixed two cubit intervals.

That said, there does seem to have been greater depth among missile-users (assuming the 'eight ranks' reflects some sort of reality, and based on the amount of ground that they would occupy) than is easily comprehensible for direct shooting. I have always assumed a great deal of mobility among loosely ordered missile users - step forward from the mass, loose off a few shots, drop back, unless concentrating for some particular purpose.

I suppose there's no evidence for Medieval longbowmen as to depth, intervals, ranks or files (presence of)? I had always assumed, based on nothing in particular - shallow, open order, and loose (no formal ranks/files - though maybe a shooting line for those at the front doing the shooting).

[Erpingham]

I suppose there's no evidence for Medieval longbowmen as to depth, intervals, ranks or files (presence of)? I had always assumed, based on nothing in particular - shallow, open order, and loose (no formal ranks/files - though maybe a shooting line for those at the front doing the shooting).

Alas no, as far as I am aware.  Possibly the best hint is the Burgundian passage we've already quoted, at least for depth.  Though we should note the archers are three deep because there are three in each lance, not for any stated reason of advantage.  Incidentally, there is a detailed description of the deployment of a Burgundian army in review at Lausanne in May 1476, if anyone can find a copy.  There is a diagram in Contamine based on it and this does show the archers of the companies deployed together, as suggested earlier.  The pikemen though are in mixed formations with the crossbowmen and handgunners.

The problem in an English army of the archers being too spaced out is their numbers.  Imagine a hypothetical English battle of 1000 MAA with 2000 archers.  The archers deploy to the flanks.  The MAA in the centre would be on about 3 ft frontage and perhaps 5 deep - a width of about 200 yds.  Assuming a slightly looser formation of 4ft for the archers, because bows are, in the words of one 16th century commentator, "a combersome tying weapon in a throng of men", a three deep wing would be nearly 450 yds long.  Less than half the men in the formation are in effective range of the flank of a force attacking the centre. Some are outside extreme range.  Their ability to support their men-at-arms is limited.

Now, it is a mistake to assume that all the archers were on the wings in every battle, or that they were always static.  I think it is perfectly possible they sometimes pushed smaller groups forward to skirmish and harass.  But it is hard, with the numbers available, not to assume there weren't deep blocks of men somewhere.

For what it is worth, my reading of 16th century military literature does show the influence of the ancient tacticians on pike formations but they didn't take their shooting tactics from there as they had stronger traditions of their own.

 

[Justin Swanton]

In any case, the Hellenistic manuals are only explicit about 8-deep files and matching the width of the heavy infantry in circumstances when the light infantry are exactly half as strong as the heavies and are standing deployed behind the phalanx:

Now these light infantry will also have 1024 files, if they are to stand behind the phalanx of the hoplites and extend the same distance, without, however, a depth of sixteen men — for they are only one‑half as strong — but obviously of eight men.

Taking a closer look, the manuals are clear that ideally the light infantry are half the number of the heavies and organised in a hierarchy that matches that of the heavies but just with different names for the units. Aelian affirms elsewhere that the lights have as many files as the heavies without specifying that this was so only if they deployed behind the heavy infantry:

The name and size of the various units of light troops are as follows: four files make up what is called a systasis [σύστασις] containing thirty-two men. Two systases make up a pentacontarchia [πεντηκονταρχία] containing sixty-four men. (See Plate 6.) Two pentacontarchiae make up a hecatontarchia [ἑκατονταρχία] containing 128 men. In each hecatontarchia there should be five supernumeraries [ektaktoi, ἔκτακτοι]: a standard-bearer [semeiphoros, σημειφόρος], a rear commander [ouragos, οὐραγός], a trumpeter [salpigktēs, σαλπιγκτής], an aide-de-camp [huperetēs, ὑπηρέτης], and a herald [stratokērux, στρατοκῆρυξ]. Two hecatontarchiae, containing 256 men, are called a psilagia [ψιλαγία]. Two psilagiae make a xenagia [ξεναγία] of 512 men. Two xenagiae form a systremma [σύστρεμμα] of 1,024 men.2 Two systremmae make an epixenagia [ἐπιξεναγία] of 2,048 men. Two epixenagiae form a stiphos [στίφος] containing 4,096 men. Two stiphoi form an epitagma [ἐπίταγμα] of 8,192 men arranged in 1,024 files. - Aelian 16

Also that the lights when deployed in front of the heavies will match them file for file:

Protaxis [πρόταξις] describes the positioning of the light-armed troops in front of the armed infantry who make up the phalanx. The repositioned light troops then assume the role of file-leaders, or protostatae. - Aelian 30

It seems fairly clear that however the lights deployed in front of the heavies they would have the equivalent of 8 men per file in intermediate order, so the question of how the rear ranks managed direct shooting still stands. If English archers did deploy deep they would probably have solved that problem in a similar way.

[Patrick Waterson]

Now, it is a mistake to assume that all the archers were on the wings in every battle, or that they were always static.  I think it is perfectly possible they sometimes pushed smaller groups forward to skirmish and harass.  But it is hard, with the numbers available, not to assume there weren't deep blocks of men somewhere.

Based on my 'feel' for the period (such as it is) I would agree.  Depth gives a gain in controlability, and the additional point about everyone needing to be in easy range is a very pertinent one.

For what it is worth, my reading of 16th century military literature does show the influence of the ancient tacticians on pike formations but they didn't take their shooting tactics from there as they had stronger traditions of their own.

Hellenistic manuals presumably began circulating in the 13th century following the fall of Constantinople to the Latins in AD 1204; whether anyone paid as much attention to them as to Vegetius is another question, but pike-type weapons and formations did become increasingly popular from AD 1300 or so, which might suggest some degree of influence.  English shooting tactics did, of course, have their own tradition and practice.

[Erpingham]

Hellenistic manuals presumably began circulating in the 13th century following the fall of Constantinople to the Latins in AD 1204; whether anyone paid as much attention to them as to Vegetius is another question, but pike-type weapons and formations did become increasingly popular from AD 1300 or so, which might suggest some degree of influence.  English shooting tactics did, of course, have their own tradition and practice.

I'm not sure the Greek pike treatises were much known/noticed before the 16th century, when armies were filling up with pikemen.  The late medieval pike tradition seems not to be related to Hellenistic traditions.  Vegetius seems to have sufficed for most.  It is of course not just the English who have their own traditions and practice.  Most of Europe had a love affair with the crossbow.  Overall, it seems to me that massed archery tactics are something the Hellenistic era couldn't teach medieval Europeans.