Crecy, Poictiers and Agincourt are famous English victories which illustrate the power of the longbow. The longbow, however, was only part of the mediaeval English system, and while there has been much discussion on the longbow itself, there seems to have been little on the English system as a whole: how did it work? What made it work? How effective was it?
This thread is for those interested in the question. Anyone please feel free to initiate discussion.
Patrick
Some of the 'English System' seems to have been the ability to maintain infantry who were effectively long service regulars, althrough they might not have remained 'under arms' at all times.
Jim
OK, I'll pick up the gauntlet. While there is considerable debate to be had about the specifics (what was the origin of the longbow? Was it a new weapon at the end of the 13th century? Does it matter?) to me one of the most interesting things is that the English develop a tactical system, not just a new weapon. And although we quote the great French-bashing victories, the system was designed to deal with the threat of the Scots. Up to 1314, the English were fairly sure that mounted men-at-arms supported by archers could deal with the Scots. This was true up to a point - at Falkirk the Scots fought in static defensive way. At Bannockburn, the Scots were much better led (and the English worse) and English cavalry were worsted. Over the next few years, the English continued to be beaten but they continued to try to adapt. I don't think we know how they did this - did they formally discuss things, or just chew the fat over a pint or two of claret when the weather was too bad to go hunting? But they first came to the conclusion they needed better close order infantry. In the early 1320's, the English were calling up armoured infantry almost identically equipped to Scots armoured infantry in their 1318 regulations. The next stage may have been that the English noted that Scots men-at-arms often fought on foot - maybe this was needed to give backbone to the infantry? It seemed to work in small numbers at Boroughbridge, but that was a strong defensive position. In 1327, in the disasterous Weardale campaign, the English tried advancing on the Scots with massed dismounted men-at-arms. Alas, the Scots wouldn't play. What the English really needed was to put stuff together into a package and sometime between 1327 and 1332 it gelled. Out with the armoured infantry - too immobile? too timid? In with dismounted men-at-arms, with shooting support to their flanks, standing in a sound defensible position. The Scots, confident in their ability to beat the English and quite offensive in outlook in this period, could be trusted to attack. So, at Dupplin and Halidon, the English deployed their new system and Scots hegemony was at an end. Next stop, adapting to an enemy who relied on cavalry.
And the death of John, Duke of Brittany in 1341 brought such an enemy into the field. The English army made up for a late start by engaging the significantly larger French force at Morlaix in 1342, in a battle that seems to have been a sort of draft version of Poitiers. The French came in in three divisions, or battles, and were twice repulsed, a trench or pit system helping considerably with repulsing one of the attacks. One French attack was mounted, another afoot, but neither worked. Then the French third battle came up - and the English retired into a wood. The French surrounded the wood, the English broke out and both armies retired.
Reading between the lines, the English system seems to have broken both French attacks and then perhaps run out of arrows, but instead of making a daring flank attack on the last French battle (as at Poitiers), the Earl of Northampton appears to have played safe and pulled back to the wood, a move which nonplussed Charles de Blois' remaining French.
Although Morlaix seems to have been indecisive, in that neither army was actually chased off the field, a small English army had stood against a much larger French one (exactly how much larger is not easy to determine), and English tactical command appears to have been superior. It would improve further, and one may note the English gaining a marked ascendancy in initiative and the conduct of operations after Morlaix.
Following a truce of a few years, hostilities resumed in 1345 with Sir Thomas Dagworth apparently effortlessly routing a French force at Cadoret near Ploermel. With Northampton also on the move, the French concentrated against Dagworth and fought him again at St Pol de Leon. This was a crushing French defeat, and the English archers were mentioned as the major cause of the French debacle. The English had seemingly gained additional confidence (and perhaps also additional arrow supplies) following Morlaix.
And in the following year Edward III himself took the field against the King of France ...
If you are going to discuss the 'system' it might be best to look at the elements:
#1 Pick the battlefield (aka corner sitting)
#2 Use significant field defences to channel and break up the enemy attacks
#3 Dismount the bulk of the army
Simple but staggeringly effective in Scotland, England, France, Spain and Portugal
Tom..
Wouldn't we have to add to the system combine archery with elite infantry (dismounted men at arms.
And in the more grand tactical sense mount archers and men at arms so that the column is mobile , can raid to a ddstance and can usually choose the field to be fought over?
R
Excellent, gentlemen. So, putting this together ...
1) Pick the battlefield
2) Use significant field defences to channel and break up the enemy attacks
3) Dismount the bulk of the army
4) Combine archery with elite infantry
and, in at least some actions:
5) Use a reactive reserve system (in plain English, keep some troops in hand and use them where needed - or let the boy win his spurs, but keep the option).
Operationally, use fully-mounted forces when possible for rapid campaigning (a Scots border lesson here). This also made possible another feature of the English repertoire: the surprise attack, expertly executed by the Earl of Derby at Auberoche in 1345 (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Auberoche (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Auberoche)) and improved upon by Sir Thomas Dagworth at Roche-Derrien in 1347 - this time at night.
The rapid assault continued to be part of the English repertoire, right up to the end of the Hundred Years War, where it came to grief at Castillon against an opponent who for once was prepared.
Are we still missing something?
Patrick
A professionalism that made it possible?
It would be interesting to see whether the English did develop a group of officers, who while drawn from the aristocracy, reached their position because of their ability
Jim
They did indeed develop such a group, notably the Earls of Nottingham and Derby in the Crecy period, and also a group of leaders from humbler origins, exemplified by the likes of Robert Knowles ('Knollys') and John Hawkwood.
So yes, professionalism - good point. This gave English armies an edge which was not really matched until the French created their 'ordonnance' army in the 1440s.
I am sure Anthony will have more to add. ;)
Patrick
Ah Patrick, you bring another quality to mind. Have superb self belief. Not so in the 1340s , but very much so after the great victories and particularly after Agincourt. Indeed the very reason for the loss at Castillon (If you haven't visited the site then it is well worth it and great wine and food too with the battle-site well marked) As I was saying, at Castillon the self belief of the English is such that they carry out a sequence of assaults , but are beaten when the French turn English aggression to their advantage by having an artillery camp that Talbot attempts to assault with tired men and it is in the flood plain of a river with no cover,
So self belief is a key element of the system.
Roy
And even as late as 1437 (if I remember correctly) French writers were complaining that when a French force outnumbered an English force 3:1, it was the French who avoided battle.
So we are looking at:
1) Pick the battlefield
2) Use significant field defences to channel and break up the enemy attacks
3) Dismount the bulk of the army
4) Combine archery with elite infantry
5) Professionalism
6) Amazing self-belief (we could call this 'morale' but it may be more like 'ethos')
and, in at least some actions:
7) A reactive reserve system
Plus, as a result of 4-6 above, some quite breathtaking surprise attacks - Castillon being a case of the surprise not actually being that much of a surprise.
I would like to add a small but possibly significant element to the mix: close-combat weapons. French knights, for much of the Hundred Years' War, seemed to prefer swords. The English, contrariwise, seem to have preferred axes. The results when the two nationalities met in close combat on foot were astounding: English knights often massacred significantly greater numbers of their French counterparts (this was very noticeable in 1345-47). Axes had much greater armour penetrating capability than swords, and penetration of a helmet by an axe would tend to be immediately lethal.
English archers developed the habit of carrying mallets and mauls, particularly in 1415-45. These were especially useful for reliably knocking an armoured opponent unconscious with only a small chance of permanent damage - an important consideration when armoured opponents normally came with a hefty ransom.
I'm always wary of 'technical' fixes. We're a very technical people and there is a danger that we project weapon technology and its importance back (in much the same way as our maligned predecessors always showed Alexander in the most modern medieval fashion.)
If swords were so much inferior to axes, I suspect that the French would have changed pretty damn quick. Remember these are people whose lives depended on it, they learned to get off their horses, I'm sure they'd think of trying an axe if they saw it was more useful in combat
Jim
I had never heard that the English carried axes and the French did not. I had heard that the French cut down lances to use on foot and that might be quite a good weapon giving some reach in the initial melee.
Contra Jim, the Ancients are very fond of technological explanations for victory or defeat such as the English axes at Hastings exposing the armpit, the Greeks at plateau having better armour, the Byzantines having heavier bows than the Persians. In all those cases we would see morale and societal differences too.
Interestingly, in relation to another debate on this forum, wargaming does provide some ability to test out what might be occurring in real life. If one army has a unit of really top class men and the other a larger number of average fighters then the way for the elite to win is to kill their direct opponents whilst the larger army has to get around the flanks to make its numbers tell. It strikes me that the English system pushes the opponent to only confront the elite knights and protects their flanks. Thus it may be that the French are not as good frontally as the English knights and not able to lap around them because of the degradation and funnelling caused by the archery??
Roy
That seems to fit, Roy. When dismounted French knights slam into dismounted English knights it seems to be the French who go down in numbers, although at Navarette (Najera) in 1367 things were much more balanced between Chandos' van and du Guesclin's French contingent - perhaps significantly, the latter were mercenaries ('Free Companions') and conceivably had a more pragmatic and focussed approach to the art of dismounted melee, which would have expressed itself in such matters as armour, armament and how enthusiastically or effectively one shoves. If any 14th century Frenchmen followed Jim's technological comparability route and surmounted the 'not invented here' psychological barrier, it would be these fellows rather than their tournament-raised brethren back in France.
There would seem to be two reasons why the French habitually went down the funnel: one is that troops generally tend to dislike missiles and shy away from them given the chance (or alternatively duck behind shields and slow down); the other is that archers have no ransoms - the glory and the loot are to be found under the English banners, where the knights stand defending. Renown and ransoms really did matter in the 14th century (and were the driving forces in many a tournament), and fighting archers brings neither. Add pits and/or stakes fronting the archers, and French awareness or suspicion of same, and the attractions of going for the English knights and men-at-arms are overwhelming.
Patrick
Please forgive me not quoting here but so many things I want to comment on :)
Lets start with men-at-arms. The English men-at-arms create a small revolution in providing a whole new option set. Scots, Flemings, Swiss have good close combat infantry. The English man-at-arms, however, is a transformer. He can operate as a mobile strike force on campaign, he can deliver a perfectly convincing heavy cavalry charge, he can be a well armoured, skilled close order infantryman. He's pretty good at assaulting fortifications or fighting on ships too. Cleverly, the English from the top down (Edward III) agree that the chivalric hero is not just a jouster, he's an all-rounder. Yes, the pinnacle of chivalric endeavour is the one to one mounted kind but a real knight can perform on a battlefield not just for the ladies. This attitude does spread with the tactic of dismounting - men-at-arms need to be clear that they are not acting in an undignified way by dismounting - they need to bind it into the chivalrous repertoire. BTW, it is worth considering how much the English used mounted men-at-arms outside set piece battles, certainly early on.
Secondly, what were they armed with? I'm far from convinced the English had axes and the French had swords at the beginning. The English start off with lances (read Gray, who gives several examples). At Dupplin, the English re-equip with Scottish oak "staves" - anything from spears to a plancon-a-piquot might be meant. The axe was certainly a traditional English weapon for infantry, though, so doubtless some men adopted them. As the 14th century wore on, more mentions of axes all round - Scots, English, Bretons all seem to like axes. In the 1380s, Froissart often mentions French men-at-arms with mauls. The French also like shortened lances but there isn't much mention of others with them. The White Company in the 1360s favoured long lances held by two men. Long lances were used by the dismounted Austrians at Sempach and, perhaps most famously, by the Italians at Arbedo (which led the Swiss to rethink their reliance on the relatively short halberd). So, to summarise, probably lances mainly to start diversifying as the dismounted tactics became less ad hoc and percussive two handers or long stabbing swords as armour became to get more complete.
Confidence - the English certainly develop this but it isn't universal. The English, with the possible exception of Henry V, are not very confident at Agincourt, for example. The stand off at Tournahem in 1369 isn't exactly the action of a confident army. Now, in both cases the English were outnumbered but that does suggest that sometimes a pragmatic approach was taken.
Good points - and please keep commenting. :)
Just a quick comment on the secure flanks. At Verneuil the English did not have secure flanks and the French (or rather specially heavy Lombard cavalry) went either through the English centre or a bit of a wing. If centre then amazing professionalism to close the breach and keep fighting.
Good observation, Gavin.
It seems to have been the right flank, and the breakthrough force promptly made for the English camp (and its 2,000-archer guard) to begin looting. Deprived of the support of its heavily-armoured cavalry, the French left crumbled under the spirited counterattack of the English men-at-arms, and the English right, after a heartening pursuit of the fleeing foe, returned to take the Scots in the rear. All in all, the English exhibited much better control and coordination in this battle, as in many others.
At Patay in 1429 (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Patay (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Patay)) the French displayed much improved command and control, which enabled them to ride down English archers on the right flank rather than just ride through them en route to the baggage. Note also the part played by a stag in handing the French the battle.
Patrick
Quote from: gavindbm on September 08, 2012, 09:28:55 PM
Just a quick comment on the secure flanks. At Verneuil the English did not have secure flanks and the French (or rather specially heavy Lombard cavalry) went either through the English centre or a bit of a wing. If centre then amazing professionalism to close the breach and keep fighting.
Verneuil is indeed a tribute to the quality of the English army of the period. It is a battle won on an open plain and it is won by a counter attack after enemy heavy cavalry had gone through part of the army and disappeared to the rear to do who knows what. Almost certainly, Bedford's original plan had been to stand with his rear covered by his baggage and he has put in a large guard to protect this. He realises that the lack of co-ordination of the French attack means he has a window of opportunity, so he takes his confident English (some of whom are Burgundians and some Norman French) and goes on the offensive. Archers certainly play a part in this victory but the lead role has to be down to the men-at-arms.
Were the Lombard cavalry working with the French left? I think Patrick has a point about the camp guard, perhaps dealing with that held the Lombards from turning on the rear of the men at arms?
Certainly the aggression of the English looks to have yurned what should have been defeat into victory, though they had missed one of the key criteria for "english System" in that the archers who were charged apparently could not stake into the hard ground?/
Roy
Verneuil is one of those battles were details are maddeningly opaque. The accepted interpretation of the battle has also gone through a major revision in the last decade in an article by Michael Jones (very good, though I think he stretches some conclusions too far).
In the Jones version, the Lombards form across the front of the French army and charge straight through the English, going on to chase fugitives or attack the baggage. The English then reform and attack. This makes little sense to me - it seems unlikely that men-at-arms could have charged through close-order troops unless they were in very shallow formation. Could they have been deployed that shallow? Burnes more traditional interpretation that the French cavalry were in advance of the flanks and were tasked with stripping the flanks would fit what we know of French tactical thinking better. Or all the cavalry could have been on one flank. How much the Lombards were working with the rest of the army is, of course, a good question. Doubtless they should have been but it seems the timing is wrong. The English have time to recover and, in fact, to take the battle to the enemy. It's a bit like those WWI battles where the creeping barrage got too far ahead of the advance.
On the reserve, it is significant in neutralising the effect of those bits of the Lombard army that don't hare off into the distance (interestingly, as they are supposed in the Jones version to have fully plate barded horses - suggests to me there are more orthodox MAA in the mix). Doubtless Bedford could see he was at risk of having his flanks turned and planned accordingly. Incidentally, Jones debunks Burne's view that the the baggage guard was made up of super heroes who beat off the enemy cavalry then mount a flank attack that finishes the battle. He believes there is no reason to conflate the two actions, and the flank attack is when one wing of the French army collapse, allowing some of the English on side that to join the remaining battle. If the side the collapses is the French, it explains why more French seem to survive than Scots - the English can't mount a full pursuit until the Scots are dealt with. And, of course, the Scots had declared "no quarter" - the rule was give no quarter, receive none.
I wonder if too much is expected of the Lombards (by us). If their plan was to carry out the initial charge and sweep away the archers (the original plan was to do this on both flanks at Agincourt) then presumably they understood that getting the cavalry back in hand and falling on the English rear was a non starter a nd best that could be hoped for was that the Lombards would break the archers and then fall on the camp, possibly distracting the English. The camp guard or reserve would keep theLombards fixed and occupied and so would not need to be heroes. From the French point of view removing the archers and preventing the degradation of their dismounted knights and the Scots ( who possibly have a low level of armour protection.)by the arrow storm and give them the best chance of beating the English men at arms.
Roy
I broadly agree with that. Stripping the archers then going after the camp would fit the Agincourt model (assuming the French analysis of that battle was that the tactics were OK, the terrain and execution being the problem). Bedford's strong baggage guard suggests he realised that such a strike was likely. What does seem to go wrong for the French is the co-ordination. If the cavalry had stuck with the infantry until a long bowshot (300 yds or so) from the English, then charged, the English would have struggled to reorganise before the infantry arrived. Instead the English seem to have attacked them, perhaps with the intention of beating the enemy before there was any danger of the cavalry returning.
Yes, very sensible tactics by the English general, rather than waiting for worse things to happen to him he sets his men in motion towards the advancing French and gets into melee because he probably expects to win that. Salisbury holds the Scots and it all comes good when the French flee and Bedford's Men at arms can swing round and trap the Scots.
It does make one wonder about the composition of the forces. Were the French opposite Bedford comprising some rather inferior types? Perhaps he looked at their advance and decided that he could take them??
Roy
It does strike me that one thing this battle shows is that the English captains were able to avoid being trapped like a rabbit in the headlights. "Yes things have gone wrong, but we can still win this."
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on September 10, 2012, 09:13:44 AM
It does strike me that one thing this battle shows is that the English captains were able to avoid being trapped like a rabbit in the headlights. "Yes things have gone wrong, but we can still win this."
Jim
I think the good ones were able to adapt but that is one of the things that separates a good general from a poor one. Poitiers is also a very adaptive battle - the English are very much fielding their command A-team there. It is also interesting to see how many examples of not doing it by the "system" there are, some successful e.g. Auberoche, Cravant others not e.g. Bauge,Castillion. The English are sometimes accused of being too rigid in their tactics in the HYW, and maybe they were towards the end, but they could be imaginative under the right commander.
I think Agincourt and Crecy are interesting examples in regards to this discussion as, for me, the English did not so much win these battles, but rather the French lost them.
Both were essentially defensive battles for the English, something which favours the archer set behind stakes. I do think the English made the best use of the geography and forces in both cases, a reflection of sound tactics, but French tactics simply seemed dogged and undermined by pride, ego and 'chivalry'. Their disdain and derision for the lowly archer, and their apparent fervour for glory is what threw it all away for them in my book. Self-confidence has been offered up as a pro in the English camp, but I think it has more relevance as a con in the French camp. The jostling and competition to get stuck in horribly hindered any hope of a successful, or organised, closing with the enemy in the light of withering arrow storms. At Agincourt the mud compounded this, at Crecy it was the ridgeline and the inefficient use of the Genoese crossbowmen (forced forward without their pavises, thus undermining their ability to screen the knights).
The following book is an interesting one too on the subject of tactics, although I'm sure it's not new to many of you.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/29854877/Armies-of-the-Middle-Ages-1 (http://www.scribd.com/doc/29854877/Armies-of-the-Middle-Ages-1)
Quote from: TDF on September 28, 2012, 03:45:50 PM
I do think the English made the best use of the geography and forces in both cases, a reflection of sound tactics, but French tactics simply seemed dogged and undermined by pride, ego and 'chivalry'. Their disdain and derision for the lowly archer, and their apparent fervour for glory is what threw it all away for them in my book.
We have to be careful about the attribution of "pride" as the reason for the French failure. Playing up the pride of the French and their contempt for the lowly fitted the moral narrative the English were building, as the victories could be seen as God humbling the proud and lifting up the humble (i.e. the English). It also fitted the French moral narrative, as the nobles, whose place in the social order is dependent on them protecting the realm, instead are seized by vainglory and so France is punished by God. That said, the French are clearly overconfident at both Crecy and Agincourt and the class tensions in the French army are much worse than in the English. At Agincourt, the professional soldiers have produced a sound tactical plan. Unfortunately, they are only middle ranking men and the royal princes think they automatically outrank the Marshal and Constable. Everyone thinks victory will be so easy that the lower orders are kept back to allow all the glory to go to the nobility. But not everything is straightforwardly to do with pride. Burgundian and Armangnac factions are reluctant to serve under each others command, so tended to absent themselves from their stations and go off to some other part of the battlefield. The result is chaos. But the English don't just let the French beat themselves. Henry V takes the risky decision to take the offensive to provoke a French counter attack. A bit of desperation in there perhaps but certainly tactically pro-active.
Fair points there, especially with regards to the narratives.
But I think the pride argument is perhaps semantic, as in my book,
this...
QuoteEveryone thinks victory will be so easy that the lower orders are kept back to allow all the glory to go to the nobility...
Burgundian and Armangnac factions are reluctant to serve under each others command...
...smacks of pride.
But perhaps 'greed' would make an interesting substitute?
Quotethe professional soldiers have produced a sound tactical plan...
I'm also not suggesting there was no sound tactical plan, but certainly poor execution (and an apparent inability to learn and adapt?), which played notably into the English hands.
I don't think we disagree much on this. Pride and vainglory were curses of the medieval military system and it was up to a good leader to control them. At Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt we see the English do this much better than the French. It's not that the English were immune - read the sorry tale of the 1383 Crusade. But a good leader could get the nobles to play for the team. There is a good example in the run up to Auray, where Calverley refuses to take the rearguard because it would dishonour him (the man is a mercenary leader, not a knight errant, for goodness sake). However, his old friend and commander John Chandos takes him aside and explains that only the best soldier can do the job and if Calverley doesn't do it, he would need to do it himself, which could jeopardise victory. Calverley gives way and, as Chandos knows he will, as one of the most experienced soldiers on the field, he handles the reserve with great skill.
This kind of tactful consideration is also seen in Salisbury's treatment of his Burgundian allies in the Cravant campaign (1423): he had the same rules apply to everyone, split duties equally and appointed two marshals - one English and one Burgundian - to control movement and discipline of the troops. He thus gained and retained the enthusiastic cooperation of the Burgundians at a time when English national chauvinism and contempt of foreigners made Macedonian contempt of Persians look mild.
The Battle of Cravant is interesting in itself http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Cravant (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Cravant). [Note: the Wikipedia entry could use a little help if anyone has the time, sources and inclination.]
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 29, 2012, 11:04:13 AM
The Battle of Cravant is interesting in itself http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Cravant (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Cravant). [Note: the Wikipedia entry could use a little help if anyone has the time, sources and inclination.]
It's a bit better now.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cravant
Certainly better. :)
In 1994 I published a piece called 'The Development of Tactics during the Hundred Years War' (although it covered earlier material on Hastings and the 12th century as well) in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, editors Anne Curry and Michael Hughes. I think I published something derived from that in Slingshot as well. I may have invented the term 'the English system' (or I may have read it somewhere else!). This is available on the De Re Militari website, I think. It is only a brief overview of the topic, but I try to bring out how the French were thinking about winning a battle and not just see it from the English point of view. In this strand I like the approach of building up from 'choose a good battlefield' etc. Of course, there is no battle unless both sides decide to engage and many campaigns were 'no battle' events, despite what Clifford Rogers says about the Dialectics of Medieval Strategy. Chevauchees were not always intended to bring about a battle, indeed the chevauchier usually wanted to avoid them IMHO. Matt Bennett (doh, you now know who Bohemond is...) P.S. why does this system have over a dozen stupid face icons and no spellcheck or cut + paste facility?
'In 1994 I published a piece called 'The Development of Tactics during the Hundred Years War' (although it covered earlier material on Hastings and the 12th century as well) in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, editors Anne Curry and Michael Hughes. I think I published '
I just copied and pasted that from your response
I just copied and pasted that from my sentence above. I could have cut and pasted it but that would leave no trail.
So right click gives me cut and paste.
Roy
The point of view of both French and English in the HYW is a very interesting study because it shows action and reaction plus potential borrowing from foreign campaigns such as Nicopolis, but often the learning takes a long time to be implemented because the interval between field battles is long, though there are brief flurries when several occur and we can see the French trying different routes.
In England Edward II is an interesting case because ,looking with the benefit of hindsight we see Edward I as beginning the longbow system and then Edward II taking a backward step towards ignoring those longbows and sending knights forward. Of course They are both doing much the same thing and Edward I is in control of his army whereas his son is not.
Roy
Quote from: Bohemond on October 18, 2012, 04:53:59 PM
It is only a brief overview of the topic, but I try to bring out how the French were thinking about winning a battle and not just see it from the English point of view. In this strand I like the approach of building up from 'choose a good battlefield' etc.
Your 1994 paper is influential on one person in this debate at least (me). BTW, I'd like to see you update it at some point, given some of the stuff which has been published since e.g. by Rogers. Your point that the French weren't complete idiots and were trying to win too is well made - the English do have to win most of these battles, they aren't handed over on a plate. On the French system, there is a nice summary by Matthew Strickland in Great Warbow comparing Christine de Pisan, the French Agincourt Plan and the Burgundian standing orders of 1417. Read that and it becomes clear that the French side have been developing their tactical system too.
As to the development of the strand, I think the deliberate decision at the beginning to say the English didn't have longbows, they had a system - lets talk generalship, lets talk command & control, lets look at what the men-at-arms were doing rather than whether or not longbows could pierce plate armour at 300 yds - has been a distinct benefit.
Quote from: Erpingham on October 18, 2012, 06:53:36 PM
As to the development of the strand, I think the deliberate decision at the beginning to say the English didn't have longbows, they had a system - lets talk generalship, lets talk command & control, lets look at what the men-at-arms were doing rather than whether or not longbows could pierce plate armour at 300 yds - has been a distinct benefit.
Very much agreed, and it sets a good pattern for considering other military systems.
While still on the subject of the English system, perhaps someone can explain to me how it was that, following Valmont (1416), the exiguous English force, while returning to Harfleur, scored an impressive success over the French forces of 1) de Loigny and 2) Armagnac at the cliffs of St Andress. It seems that de Loigny's men, who were lining the clifftop while the English made their way along the base of the cliff, charged down by paths and goat-tracks and were one-sidedly slaughtered by the English upon arrival at beach level. Then, it seems, Armagnac's force put in an appearance, and this time the English swarmed
up the paths and goat-tracks and put the fresh French force to rout - no mean achievement for men who had just completed a long and tiring march and were apparently significantly outnumbered by each of the French contingents. The uphill attack was the more impressive because the English commander, Thomas Beaufort, Earl of Dorset, had been taken off by boat on account of being wounded, and command had devolved upon another captain (Fastolf?).
Militarily, the English achieved the seemingly impossible. But how?
Patrick
P.S. - M'lord Bohemond, the associated 'iconography' results from the site being an off-the-shelf system rather than an expensive custom-designed one, hence the
de rigeur concomitants of modern taste and depth of culture. That apart, it is not at all bad for those of us who do not need spell checkers ... ;D
What is the battle where the English and Burgundians are facing the 'French', attempt to cross a bridge and then march off to the flank and arrive and cut down their opponents including most of the Scots.
I recall this as being remarked upon as very tough because the Scots obligingly stood and fought to the death whilst their colleagues ran away. One is reminded of other super-troops, guards in the Crimea, Ss in Normandy, Caesar's tenth. There is something about elan and self belief and unit integrity that carries you through hunger, privarion and tiredness. The Japanese achieved this in WW2 too. Similarly in a way the men of 1914 who charged machine guns had the same irrational grit. I think that the English in the early XVth century had that irrational self belief that could make light of exhaustion.
I wonder, also, if in an age of religious belief the victory against odds at Agincourt convinced them that their cause was God's cause. it is possible to see some of that in crusade or jihad, though there we might add that dying could be seen as almost preferable to living on as you went straight to paradise.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on October 19, 2012, 05:25:33 PM
What is the battle where the English and Burgundians are facing the 'French', attempt to cross a bridge and then march off to the flank and arrive and cut down their opponents including most of the Scots.
Cravant, 1423 . Discussed a few posts above. What the Anglo-Burgundians do is, after a missile exchange which drives the enemy back from the waters edge, attack across a waste deep river and a narrow bridge. The Scots on the bridge hold, the French and assorted mercenaries leg it, leaving the Scots flank in the air. The river assault party drive in the flank and it is goodbye Scots. One might suggest that English shouldn't have been able to win this battle - men-at-arms charging across a waist deep river and up the far bank. Combat modifiers must have been dreadful :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 19, 2012, 11:16:54 AM
While still on the subject of the English system, perhaps someone can explain to me how it was that, following Valmont (1416), the exiguous English force, while returning to Harfleur, scored an impressive success over the French forces of 1) de Loigny and 2) Armagnac at the cliffs of St Andress.
Ah, Valmont! Another victory (or at least draw) from the jaws of defeat. I have pondered this on a number of occassions and, while I haven't got the answer, I can identify a few factors.
- The English are desperate and their goal is nearly in their grasp
Any mounted advance guard that doesn't wait for its main body but charges down a cliff at a formed enemy deserves anything it gets
The English morale is boosted by defeating one lot of French but have still got to get past the second lot, so situation is still desperate
Speculating, the English may attack before the French can fully marshal their force on the cliff top
Unknown factor - at what point did the sally from Harfleur appear? Were the French fighting on two fronts?
Interesting thoughts: conventional wisdom has it that the Harfleur garrison saw the routed French streaming past and decided to have a go at them; if on the other hand the garrison had organised a sortie a la Cravant it would have had a considerable impact on French cohesion and morale.
Streaming down the cliffs against a formed opponent would indeed have been asking for trouble: the English up-cliff assault would presumably need to know that there were Frenchmen to assault at the top of the cliff (i.e. they would need to have made their presence known somehow). Would it be reasonable to suggest that the English archers concentrated their attentions on French men-at-arms holding the tops of the cliff paths, causing casualties, disruption and the odd chap falling down the cliff, hence inducing the French to pull back just as the English men-at-arms made their climb to the top?
Then there is an observation by Lt-Col. Alfred Burne that "The French were utterly routed, the English making great play with their axes". (This may be what gave me the impression that English men-at-arms preferred axes during this period.) Might weaponry of significantly greater penetrating power (or at least concussive effect) have conferred a combat advantage to add icing to the cake of determination, desperation, combined-arms action and a firm belief that when all is said and done, Englishmen who do not flinch from danger are properly invincible?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 19, 2012, 07:23:31 PM
Would it be reasonable to suggest that the English archers concentrated their attentions on French men-at-arms holding the tops of the cliff paths, causing casualties, disruption and the odd chap falling down the cliff, hence inducing the French to pull back just as the English men-at-arms made their climb to the top?
Remember, there won't be many arrows left - they had fought a long battle near Valmont then slunk off at night, with no chance to resupply.
QuoteThen there is an observation by Lt-Col. Alfred Burne that "The French were utterly routed, the English making great play with their axes". (This may be what gave me the impression that English men-at-arms preferred axes during this period.) Might weaponry of significantly greater penetrating power (or at least concussive effect) have conferred a combat advantage to add icing to the cake of determination, desperation, combined-arms action and a firm belief that when all is said and done, Englishmen who do not flinch from danger are properly invincible?
While axes were almost certainly the weapon of choice for English men-at-arms, we don't know what the French had. As dismounted cavalry, they might have used their lances (but probably no time to cut them down). Long lances at the top of the cliff should have given them an advantage one would have thought.
BTW, Patrick, have you got a copy of Sumption's Divided Houses? It contains a piece by Walsingham which seems to quote a participants letter describing a skirmish at Montebourg in 1379. Much of this is about how effective the English were with their axes "Brave men everyone of them, they laid about the French with their axes, slaughtering them like cattle." It goes on about not wasting a blow, never having to strike twice, splitting helmets and crushing the heads in them. Read that, and you'll definitely think the English favoured axes :) Bit of a topos maybe but the economy of effort of these professionals rings true.
Thanks for that, Anthony: I lack
Divided Houses, so had missed out on that little gem, whether it is a sparklingly faceted piece of information or simply a rough diamond. :)
Quote from: Erpingham on October 19, 2012, 07:52:02 PM
Remember, there won't be many arrows left - they had fought a long battle near Valmont then slunk off at night, with no chance to resupply.
I would expect two or three each, if that - but a couple of volleys at the right moment could work wonders.
Mention is made of the Earl of Dorset being evacuated by boat. What was the boat doing there? I do wonder if an alert garrison commander thought to send along a few sheaves of arrows by the same method (and for that matter the same vessel) on the offchance that Dorset's force might be returning that way. Conjecture, of course.
In any event, we seem to be left with the likelihood that adept axe-wielding provided an effective edge to the up-cliff assault, and the conjecture that a few shafts in the right place at the right time may have helped, especially if the French had formed up dismounted with long lances.
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 20, 2012, 05:57:28 PM
Thanks for that, Anthony: I lack Divided Houses, so had missed out on that little gem, whether it is a sparklingly faceted piece of information or simply a rough diamond. :)
Patrick
I got mine when it came out in paperback recently. It has a chapter devoted to men-at-arms and their activities, which is where the quote came from. He devotes a number of pages to wounds and their treatment, another topic we have discussed. There is a nice piece about Guy de Chauliac, a learned physician, who scorned the ignorant battlefield medicine of soldiers - cleaning wounds with wine or spirits then wrapping them in clean white bandages to keep dirt out indeed!
Chaps, it might be worth checking out Froissart's description of the battle of Otterburn. IIRC that has the English and scots whacking each other with axes.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on October 20, 2012, 09:51:02 PM
Chaps, it might be worth checking out Froissart's description of the battle of Otterburn. IIRC that has the English and scots whacking each other with axes.
Roy
Two scenes of Froissart from the Battle of Otterburn featuring axes :
"then the earl Douglas, who was of great heart and high of enterprise, seeing his men recule back, then to recover the place and to shew knightly valour he took his axe in both his hands, and entered so into the press that he made himself way in such wise, that none durst approach near him, and he was so well armed that he bare well off such strokes as he received.
Note: 'No man was so well armed that he did not fear the great strokes which he gave.' Thus he went ever forward like a hardy Hector, willing alone to conquer the field and to discomfit his enemies: but at last he was encountered with three spears all at once, the one strake him on the shoulder, the other on the breast and the stroke glinted down to his belly, and the third strake him in the thigh, and sore hurt with all three strokes, so that he was borne perforce to the earth and after that he could not be again relieved. Some of his knights and squires followed him, but not all, for it was night, and no light but by the shining of the moon. The Englishmen knew well they had borne one down to the earth, but they wist not who it was; for if they had known that it had been the earl Douglas, they had been thereof so joyful and so proud that the victory had been theirs. Nor also the Scots knew not of that adventure till the end of the battle; for if they had known it, they should have been so sore despaired and discouraged that they would have fled away. Thus as the earl Douglas was felled to the earth, he was stricken into the head with an axe, and another stroke through the thigh: the Englishmen passed forth and took no heed of him: they thought none otherwise but that they had slain a man of arms."Note that Douglas is done to death by three Englishmen with spears, then the body is hacked about with axes, showing the English were using both.
"Then sir Matthew (Redman) strake asunder the spear with his sword; and when sir James Lindsay saw how he had lost his spear, he cast away the truncheon and lighted afoot, and took a little battle-axe that he carried at his back and handled it with his one hand quickly and deliverly, in the which feat Scots be well expert, and then he set at sir Matthew and he defended himself properly. Thus they tourneyed together, one with an axe and the other with a sword, a long season, and no man to let them."
This is a pursuit story - Redman is fleeing the battle and is caught by Lindsay. Note Froissart's comment the Scots were good with battle-axes (as Bruce had shown at Bannockburn). The Redman/Lindsay tale is a typically interesting anecdote about capturing prisoners in the pursuit, with the twist that, having released Redman on parole, Lindsay joins a group of knights, thinking in the dark they are Scots, but they are English and he is captured in turn.
There is also the difference between
"took his axe in both his hands" and "took a little battle-axe that he carried at his back and handled it with his one hand quickly and deliverly"
It may well be that the French, being more orientated to fight on horseback, might not have found long handled axes/pole axes too easy to carry. Or it may just be that for the English and Scots, a small axe was a ubiquitous secondary weapon
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 21, 2012, 11:48:54 AM
It may well be that the French, being more orientated to fight on horseback, might not have found long handled axes/pole axes too easy to carry. Or it may just be that for the English and Scots, a small axe was a ubiquitous secondary weapon
Jim
You may be right about long axes - that they wouldn't be carried on horseback but with the baggage, so if you don't have access to your baggage, you don't have a long axe. Note here Douglas is in camp at the beginning of his tale, while in Lindsay's case, he is in mounted pursuit. But I'm not sure there is a general principle that the English and Scots favoured poleweapons more than the French - plenty of manuscript pictures show French men-at-arms with various polearms. At Roosebeke Froissart makes a point of saying the French men-at-arms fight dismounted with mauls. Jean II of France makes his last stand at Poitiers axe in hand. So I'd suggest both sides carried them, probably in increasing numbers in the late 14th/early 15th century. What does seem to be very French is shortening of lances for foot combat. The English, Austrians, Italians don't seem to do this - they just use lances as is (though this may be a preparation time thing).
I must admit that in the back of my mind, I have the suspicion that we are a technical people for whom a technological edge in warfare is important, so we worry about these things.
I suspect that the participants in the battles we are discussion could regard our fascination with technology with the same amused contempt as we regard their belief that God gave the battle to the more righteous
Jim
Ancient sources consistently make a point of weapon difference. That might be because it is a matter of curiosity to them, or it might be that they really felt that it made a difference. However, when we get to Byzantine manuals specifically describing how their spears are too flimsy to resist cataphract charges, but need to have a specially equipped group of menaulatoi to hold them off I am inclined to believe. Similarly , when early Byzantine sources say that Roman bows are more powerful and slower than Sasanians bows I am inclined to believe that we are seeing real tactical choice differences.
Similarly the description of Roman versus Celtic or Macedonian fights contain weapon and armour descriptions that are generalities, but none the less true and one suspects that how you use your sword and its design does make a difference.
I think that for Froissart makes a point about tha English and the Scots that they hack hard at each other and keep on hacking with their pole arms. That suggests that the weapon stands both literally and metaphorically for the severity of their combat.
The troops concerned have a choice about their weaponry and, to an extent, indicate how they are going to fight by that choice. By going for axes the English risk more than by using spears which can keep an opponent at a distance, but they become more deadly. Does this stand symbolically for a more aggressive English attitude to the fighting or is it that in reality they made a more aggressive choice.
Roy
Quote from: Erpingham on October 21, 2012, 12:26:29 PM
What does seem to be very French is shortening of lances for foot combat. The English, Austrians, Italians don't seem to do this - they just use lances as is (though this may be a preparation time thing).
It may also be a doctrinal thing: one recalls descriptions of the White Company using lances held by two men, the additional esquire or varlet providing the necessary additional muscle-power in the absence of a Hellenistic-style counterweight so that shortening was not required. To me it reflects an apparent English emphasis on fighting as a unit and a traditional French emphasis on fighting as individuals.
As Froissart's description of Douglas' death at Otterburn suggests, the axe was probably reserved for close quarters, with the lance being the weapon of choice for initial contact. One imagines Douglas would have survived the lance ('spear') wounds, and the only reason he was subsequently 'axed' was because he was not recognised - a Douglas ransom (assuming quarter was an option in this fight) was one of the greatest prizes an English borderer of any rank could hope for.
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2012, 11:10:31 AM
One imagines Douglas would have survived the lance ('spear') wounds, and the only reason he was subsequently 'axed' was because he was not recognised - a Douglas ransom (assuming quarter was an option in this fight) was one of the greatest prizes an English borderer of any rank could hope for.
Patrick
I'd think you are right here, although it is just possible that he fell at the wrong moment in the fight - there was a time for prisoner taking and a time for making sure a man stayed down. Prisoner taking was pretty standard in Anglo-Scottish fights, at least among the gentry. Sir Thomas Gray wrote his chronicle while a prisoner in Scotland, and his father had also been a prisoner post Bannockburn. No quarter at Verneuil was an exception.
As also illustrated by the Redman-Lindsay incident previously quoted. :)
In terms of relative capabilities of the English and French systems, it is instructive to compare the fight at the cliffs of St Andress (1416) with the battle of Formigny in 1450.
http://www.longbow-archers.com/historyformigny.html (http://www.longbow-archers.com/historyformigny.html)
Formigny saw an English force successively take on two French forces of roughly comparable size, but Sir Thomas Kyriell found that, having engaged and beaten the first force (Clermont's) and turned to deal with the second (Richemont), Clermont's force managed to rally and re-enter the fray, giving the French the field, the day and before long the whole of Normandy. The increase in quality and discipline as a result of creating an ordonnance army apparently had a considerable effect on French capabilities: the ability of Clermont's defeated force to rally as Richemont's men were preparing to engage seems to have been crucial in deciding this engagement. In the good old days, once a French army started retreating it continued retreating. Not so at Formigny.
One suspects that Talbot (the Earl of Shrewsbury) would not have been so hesitant in the same situation, but would have gone on to finish off Clermont before Richemont could deploy. It is perhaps interesting to speculate what might have occurred at Formigny and Castillon (1453) had the English commanders been exchanged, with the more forceful Talbot going to Normandy in 1450 and the less enterprising Kyriell going to Gascony in 1452-3.
Patrick
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 23, 2012, 11:42:50 AM
One suspects that Talbot (the Earl of Shrewsbury) would not have been so hesitant in the same situation, but would have gone on to finish off Clermont before Richemont could deploy. It is perhaps interesting to speculate what might have occurred at Formigny and Castillon (1453) had the English commanders been exchanged, with the more forceful Talbot going to Normandy in 1450 and the less enterprising Kyriell going to Gascony in 1452-3.
Patrick
Talbot may not have done much better at Formingny - he didn't have much of a record in set battles. That said, the French may have approached the fight differently knowing Talbot was in command. Kyriell would probably have avoided disaster at Castillion but I doubt he could have won the campaign - with France able to concentrate her resources against Gascony and England was scrabbling around to put an army together it was only a matter of time. Even if Talbot had won at Castillion I doubt it would have been decisive, as the internal conflicts in England would have undermined any major strategic initiative and the French would have only suffered a bloody nose, not a knock out blow.
That makes eminent sense: given Henry VI on the throne and all that this meant in terms of the Earl of Suffolk throwing away England's possessions and military potential, plus the subsequent coalescence of powerful opposing factions which later undertook the Wars of the Roses, it is hard to see any outcome other than a gradual or not so gradual losing war in France.
Curiously enough, Talbot probably would have been leading at Formigny had not Somerset surrendered Rouen in 1449 just after Talbot had thrown the French out of that town - part of Somerset's surrender 'deal' was that Talbot became a hostage, so was unavailable in 1450. He does seem to have been held in some dread by the French, especially during and after his campaign of 1441, when he relieved Pontoise and chased a much larger French army (commanded by the King, whom Talbot very nearly caught at Poissy) back to the gates of Paris.
The aftermath of Talbot's brilliant 1441 campaign says much about the way things were going: following Talbot's spectacular relief of Pontoise, Jean Bureau's guns got back to work and soon afterwards the town fell to the French. Bureau's artillery train changed the equation of how long fortified places could hold out and hence how long the English had to prepare a relieving army. Cannon were also starting to appear on the battlefield, and would feature significantly at Formigny and particularly Castillon. While not necessarily decisive, they did have a 'galling' effect on opponents (making them want to charge rather than endure bombardment), hitherto seemingly the sole province of English longbowmen.
One suspects that in the circumstances of the late 1440s the quality and discipline of English troops had also suffered a decline: Kyriell's troops seem to have caused disturbances prior to embarkation from England, which does not seem usual, or at least they caused disturbances on a scale sufficiently unusual for chroniclers to remark upon. We thus see a likely decline in the quality of English troops at the same time as a very considerable improvement in the quality of French troops.
Still, it was nice while the superiority of the English system lasted.