The Empire is dead, long live the army

[Jim Webster]

The number of Knights' Fees in England in 1166 was, by Dr. J. H. Round in his "Introduction of Knight Service in England," calculated at 5,000 or less, viz. 784 held by the Church, and 3,534 by such of the lay Barons as were included, with an allowance for omissions of the latter.

Now England is 50, 346 square miles. So that's ten square miles per knights fee.

So in proportion Syagrius's realm would have been ten knights fees.

I'm working from that end, top down rather than bottom up, because it sets something into high relief. The fact that the most important factor is maintaining the standard of living of those at the top of the system. If they're spending 90% of their income on defending it, they'll be better off surrendering and just paying 50% tax.
So by that reckoning Syagrius's realm could have supported ten or twenty major families.

What I'm driving at is that I suspect that these units had 'degenerated' into 'estate guards' rather than have remained 'soldiers' because I don't think there would have been the wealth or more importantly the willingness to maintain them at that social position.
In Wargaming terms I see them as men who aspire to be Ax(O) rather than those who rest confident in the face they're Bd(O) or Ax(S)  :-)

Jim

[aligern]

I agree pretty much. absolutely Jim, I recall using the calculation of knights fees (which underestimates a bit the total cavalry potential because of the retainers of larger landowners that may have included more than the total of enfeoffed knights that they owe) to look at how many cavalry the island of Britannia could have supplied in 'Arthurian' times, when at some points there appeared to be 40 or so 'kingdoms ' or statelets in an area where population was much reduced by war, plague and the collapse of trade . On average these small entities could produce 150 mounted armoured warriors at. It doesn't actually matter if the calculation is wrong to some extent because the numbers just go down to 80 or up to 250. It puts the 300 warriors at Cattraeth into  context.
Roy

[Justin Swanton]

What I'm driving at is that I suspect that these units had 'degenerated' into 'estate guards' rather than have remained 'soldiers' because I don't think there would have been the wealth or more importantly the willingness to maintain them at that social position.
In Wargaming terms I see them as men who aspire to be Ax(O) rather than those who rest confident in the face they're Bd(O) or Ax(S)  :-)

Jim

This would probably be true of the landed nobility in southern Gaul, who did not face any dire military threat and who could not undertake military ventures of their own (the Visigoths took care of that).

England in 1166 was securely under Norman control.  The Normans did not have to worry too much about the Welsh or Scots, and were largely concerned with keeping the subjugated Saxons under control. They didn't need a big army for that.

In northern Gaul, however, things were different. The area had been under constant barbarian threat from day one and showed considerable resilience in the face of that threat - it was still under Roman control nearly a century later. My reading of events is that Syagrius had decided to reaffirm Roman authority north of the Seine, first by rebuilding the Roman army, and second by reclaiming Belgica II from Clovis. This would require the best force he could create. Degenerate estate guards were no use; he needed good troops.

Presuming he started building up his army in the 470's (the 'Arborychi' started fighting for the Romans at the same time the Visigoths occupied Spain) , that gave him something like ten years to prepare for the Soissons takeover in 486 or thereabouts. He was quite confident he was ready as he had no fear of facing Clovis's Frankish coalition in battle. My impression is that he had the full support of the powerful Gallo-roman families in his realm - at least until he lost the battle, at which point he became a liability. Unlike the determined but improvised defences against the Visigoths in Auvergne, the Gallo-roman resistence in northern Gaul after Syagrius's fall stopped Clovis and kept him stopped. I can't see estate guards or a civilian militia managing that.

[Patrick Waterson]

I agree pretty much. absolutely Jim, I recall using the calculation of knights fees (which underestimates a bit the total cavalry potential because of the retainers of larger landowners that may have included more than the total of enfeoffed knights that they owe) to look at how many cavalry the island of Britannia could have supplied in 'Arthurian' times, when at some points there appeared to be 40 or so 'kingdoms ' or statelets in an area where population was much reduced by war, plague and the collapse of trade . On average these small entities could produce 150 mounted armoured warriors at. It doesn't actually matter if the calculation is wrong to some extent because the numbers just go down to 80 or up to 250. It puts the 300 warriors at Cattraeth into  context.
Roy

But, worthy though these calculations are, the Roman Empire did not use knights' fees ... and one should remember the difference between Roman and barbarian scales of revenue: in North Africa, Geilimer's Vandals took a desultory 10% and were not avid in its collection, yet maintained a stated 80,000 mounted warriors in near-Sybaritic comfort.  Justinian's tax collectors demanded 33% and accepted no excuses for lack of promptness.

If Syagrius was still using the Roman taxation system in whole or, more likely in part, he would still be commanding a quite respectable income.  As Roy has pointed out, the main revenue providers would probably be the towns, although the coloni working the farms would also be contributing either to the state revenue or (perhaps more likely) to their lords, who might send on an agreed amount on a similar basis to the town curia.  They would perhaps have had more input than the curia in agreeing the amount.

Contemporaries seem to have been in agreement that Syagrius was still ruling Roman-fashion, much like Odoacer in Italy (who similarly declared his realm a 'kingdom' following the deposition of Romulus Augustus).

[Justin Swanton]

Taking up again the reference to a British legion north of the Loire:

'As the devout one [Dalmas] was tirelessly hurrying to him [Theudebert] in the region beyond-Loire [or: beyond-Loir], it is said he enjoyed an evening's hospitality in a certain place where some sort of Breton [or: Brittonic] legion (so to speak) nearby was stationed [or: was waiting].'

Notice the author's hesitation about the nature of the legion. It is 'some sort' of Breton/British legion 'so to speak'. Why the hesitation? I can think of only two reasons:

1.  The author knew what a true legion looked like and realised that this particular entity didn't fit the bill. This however doesn't make sense. The author had no benchmark. The only 'legions' he would have known about were those units in sixth century Gaul that called themselves such. It's like a Malawian talking about 'some sort of battalion, so to speak' in the Malawi army. A Malawi formation calls itself a battalion, to a Malawian it's a battalion.

2. The author knew what British, or more exactly, Bretons, were like and realised that this legion did not resemble them remotely. This fits the picture better. He, like his contemporaries, would have lost sight of the source of the legion's name. That legion, centuries earlier, had been stationed in Britain and acquired the name of the territory it garrisoned, a name it retained after it was recalled to Gaul. The only formation that fits this description is the II Britannica. So we have here the last recorded reference to one of the oldest and best of the old Empire's legions.

[Erpingham]

England in 1166 was securely under Norman control.  The Normans did not have to worry too much about the Welsh or Scots, and were largely concerned with keeping the subjugated Saxons under control. They didn't need a big army for that.

I think you may be missing the point a bit Justin.  I think the knight's fees analogy is about different scales of surplus productivity of land.  As for this being a peaceful period, it is in reality a lull - a civil war had finished in the 1150s and there will be another one in the 1170s. So, maybe we are looking at a measure of how much of the surplus in a militarised society at a similar technological level will be diverted to maintaining a fighting elite. 

[Justin Swanton]

Fair enough  . Having taken the trouble to read up on knight's fees, I note that they had to be large enough to maintain a knight, several horses and squires, weapons and armour. The fee could, theoretically, supply a small force of infantry in the bargain.

Transpose this to Syagrius's realm and you get something comparable to my estimates on how many horse/foot (along with servants and farm workers) 5% of the land could maintain. A small, well-equipped army of mixed cavalry and infantry in the +10 000 man range was quite feasible (excuse the pun)  .

[Patrick Waterson]

Furthermore, we may find it beneficial to make comparisons with Duke William's Normandy, which in territory was not too dissimilar to Syagrius' Domain of Soissons.  William's realm was feudal rather than late Roman, hence perhaps deficient by comparison in population and revenue, but could field a quite respectable army, especially when allied with Bretons.  He certainly brought more than ten knights to Hastings ... 

... The author knew what British, or more exactly, Bretons, were like and realised that this legion did not resemble them remotely. This fits the picture better. He, like his contemporaries, would have lost sight of the source of the legion's name. That legion, centuries earlier, had been stationed in Britain and acquired the name of the territory it garrisoned, a name it retained after it was recalled to Gaul. The only formation that fits this description is the II Britannica. So we have here the last recorded reference to one of the oldest and best of the old Empire's legions.

Interesting deduction.

[Erpingham]

To return for a moment to Round and the knight's fee, I think it is safe to say that there was no one specific size of landholding that equalled a knight's fee.  Indeed, already in the 12th century the English were shifting to value rather than acreage as the measure (allowing for the fact some fees were more productive than others).  But Round himself reckoned that 10 hides was a typical figure and estimated an average hide as 120 acres.  So typically a fully equipped horseman with entourage would be equivalent to an 1200 acres (so more, some less). 

Sorry for working this through at length but it does show that the economic and political systems matter in trying to work out the military potential of these post-Roman states.  Using Romanised production figures, justin can use 5% of the land to produce 3500 cavalry.  To use feudal English estimates, the whole area would produce less than 2700.  So, a big question has to be was there still an efficient administration in place to create productivity at the Roman rate or was the economy much more similar to the early Middle Ages?

[Justin Swanton]

Using Romanised production figures, justin can use 5% of the land to produce 3500 cavalry.  To use feudal English estimates, the whole area would produce less than 2700.  So, a big question has to be was there still an efficient administration in place to create productivity at the Roman rate or was the economy much more similar to the early Middle Ages?

I  based myself on Jim Webster's figures (over to you, Jim):

Mind you, if we take a landlord with 1500 acres.
He'd need 500 to maintain himself and his family (minimum)
Another 500 would support three or four full time cavalry
Another 500 would support 16 infantry.

That's one cavalryman (with servants and farm labourers) per 150-odd acres, as opposed to one (with entourage) per 1200. Personally, I find the latter figure a bit incredible. With contemporary agricultural methods you can feed one person from just over 1 acre of farmland. Even presuming that Roman farming methods makes that 1 person per 2 acres, that still means you would need hundreds of people to put an armed man on a horse.

[Erpingham]

That's one cavalryman (with servants and farm labourers) per 150-odd acres, as opposed to one (with entourage) per 1200. Personally, I find the latter figure a bit incredible. With contemporary agricultural methods you can feed one person from just over 1 acre of farmland. Even presuming that Roman farming methods makes that 1 person per 2 acres, that still means you would need hundreds of people to put an armed man on a horse.

Well, if we go with Round's minimum figure (2 hides), that's 240 acres for a cavalryman etc., which is closer.  We can of course bring in the one armed man for 5 hides of the (at least parts of) late Anglo-Saxon system, which is a middle ground.  He too would have had a horse (even if only for transport) and armour.  Again looking to the social comparison, a knight doesn't just need a fee to keep him in military equipment.  He needs it to live according to his estate.  If our post-Roman soldier is quite soldier like, he doesn't have much social position to maintain.  If he is already some sort of local bigshot, he does.

[Jim Webster]

But, worthy though these calculations are, the Roman Empire did not use knights' fees ... and one should remember the difference between Roman and barbarian scales of revenue: in North Africa, Geilimer's Vandals took a desultory 10% and were not avid in its collection, yet maintained a stated 80,000 mounted warriors in near-Sybaritic comfort.  Justinian's tax collectors demanded 33% and accepted no excuses for lack of promptness.

If Syagrius was still using the Roman taxation system in whole or, more likely in part, he would still be commanding a quite respectable income.  As Roy has pointed out, the main revenue providers would probably be the towns, although the coloni working the farms would also be contributing either to the state revenue or (perhaps more likely) to their lords, who might send on an agreed amount on a similar basis to the town curia.  They would perhaps have had more input than the curia in agreeing the amount.

Contemporaries seem to have been in agreement that Syagrius was still ruling Roman-fashion, much like Odoacer in Italy (who similarly declared his realm a 'kingdom' following the deposition of Romulus Augustus).

I remember reading AHM Jones, Edessa, capital of Osrhoene and a town of commercial important, paid 2520 solidi a year. Heracleopolis, an Egyptian city with a large territory paid 57,500 Solidi and Oxyrhynchus with Cynopolis, 59,500.
Economically the tax from people living in the towns was almost irrelevant, they were important only where they could collect the tax from their agricultural hinterland. At times this was a very large agricultural hinterland and it was the Coloni who actually paid for everything.
Once you lost control of the countryside around a town, the town was fiscally irrelevant, it is doubtful whether the tax it raised would subsidise the grain the inhabitants needed to stay alive

Jim

[Jim Webster]

That's one cavalryman (with servants and farm labourers) per 150-odd acres, as opposed to one (with entourage) per 1200. Personally, I find the latter figure a bit incredible. With contemporary agricultural methods you can feed one person from just over 1 acre of farmland. Even presuming that Roman farming methods makes that 1 person per 2 acres, that still means you would need hundreds of people to put an armed man on a horse.

No because you are assuming the state is geared and optimised towards war.
In reality the state is geared and optimised to maintaining the standard of living of those who own it. One of the reasons the west fell was that the great landowners wouldn't pay tax or release men to the army. They're hardly likely to have suddenly had a burst of patriotic fever when it had fallen.
From their point of view the situation is simple.
If you bring in Barbarians, be they Visigoths or Franks, you'll end up losing about 50% of your income at the most and in return you'll keep your standard of living, you'll be no more exposed to arbitrary justice and the iron hand of the civil power than you were before, indeed in that regard things may actually improve.
In crude terms, to be worth supporting, Syagrius has to offer a better deal. Offer a worse deal and they'll not support him.
He cannot restructure the territory to hand out land to his men to support them, because if he does he'll alienate those who already own it, and without their support he'll have no legitimacy.
So effectively he has to take what is available, not what he'd like.

Jim

[Jim Webster]

Well, if we go with Round's minimum figure (2 hides), that's 240 acres for a cavalryman etc., which is closer.  We can of course bring in the one armed man for 5 hides of the (at least parts of) late Anglo-Saxon system, which is a middle ground.  He too would have had a horse (even if only for transport) and armour.  Again looking to the social comparison, a knight doesn't just need a fee to keep him in military equipment.  He needs it to live according to his estate.  If our post-Roman soldier is quite soldier like, he doesn't have much social position to maintain.  If he is already some sort of local bigshot, he does.

Remember that being a 'soldier' was to have a social position to maintain. In a world where a very high proportion of the population lived pretty much hand to mouth, you were salaried and fed. You were provided with clothing and equipment. You even had spare money to spend. Hell, you were almost as well off as a petty bureaucrat.
That's why I've drawn a big distinction between 'estate guards' and 'soldiers'.

Jim

[Justin Swanton]

Again looking to the social comparison, a knight doesn't just need a fee to keep him in military equipment.  He needs it to live according to his estate.  If our post-Roman soldier is quite soldier like, he doesn't have much social position to maintain.  If he is already some sort of local bigshot, he does.

One can presume a sharp social distinction between the ordinary Roman soldiers, mounted and foot, who didn't have that much social prestige, and their commanders who did.

What percentage of the land of a mediaeval hide was under agriculture? Was most of it forested? Late Roman agriculture did not substantially decline in areas that preserved the Roman social and economic structures, and Syagrius's region was agriculturally rich. I really can't see it needing hundreds of acres to feed the labourers, artisans and specialists required to husband a horse and equip a single rider.

Given the situation, one can also presume that landed gentry would have spared all the land they could to equip as large a force as possible. These were practical times: the Syagrian nobility dropped the luxurious country-villa lifestyle of their southern compatriots without a qualm.

Why would they have backed Syagrius? And why did they continue resisting the Franks after he fell? I suggest that they were beginning to feel their identity was threatened. Through the greater part of the 5th century I don't get the impression the Gallic aristocracy seriously considered that the Roman social order was on its way out. It was as if they felt the barbarians would eventually be assimilated into the Roman system or at least leave it intact. Serious resistance to the barbarians began only in the latter half of the century and climaxed in the war between Syagrius's realm and the Franks, in which a city like Paris would starve rather than surrender. Clovis could not be incorporated into the Roman structures. He was no longer a foederatus and he was not baptized: he had to be resisted at all costs.

It's possible of course that the Gallo-roman resistance was in part a popular movement and the nobility had no choice but to go along with it. The result was the same: they felt obliged to oppose Clovis or go under.