The Hoplite phalanx

[Dave Knight]

Is it not likely that Hoplite lines matched each other for width with one side sacrificing depth, given that outflanking was so deadly

[Rob Miles]

Is it not likely that Hoplite lines matched each other for width with one side sacrificing depth, given that outflanking was so deadly

Xenophon in the extracts discussed above often describes how hoplite phalanxes would try to 'veer' away to the shieldless side as they advanced in order to gain an advantage there- another argument that even non-Spartan hoplites were well drilled. However, only the Spartan hoplites seem credited with being able to 'dress ranks' to suddenly out-front the enemy as they closed. Frontage occupied the minds of the generals throughout the recorded period, but particularly towards the end as the Thebans seemed to get the idea that the only way to beat the Spartans in a head on clash was to 'out-depth' them-- the more so since the average Spartan was stronger, more agile and more heavily combat trained than even the best of the rest of the Greeks. Many times they tried it, and it worked against all formations apart from the Spartiate one until a bit of quick thinking  by Pelopidas finally got them to succeed at it, bringing about the end of Spartan supremacy and the brief succession of Thebes. I think a 50-man deep phalanx is probably as far as hoplite evolution could go before someone thought up the idea of the long wobbly pole.

I like my games to be authentic, which is why I feel rules should reward players who field their armies historically, taking advantage of those factors that made these ancient empires successful, at least for a time. Rules designed to allow the Hittites to play the Vikings, and which allow the former to trounce the latter, may be 'fair', but they are also reducing the hobby to one of pure gamesmanship with homogenous armies. Viking steel would have seemed like Martian death-rays to the Hittites. I also like to see players having to outwit the historical strengths just as ancient generals had to adapt or die. Scipio personally saw to the raising of extra cavalry to deal with the Carthaginians so he could play them at their own game and win. The Syracusians used a revolutionary ship design to turn the tables on the seafaring Athenians. The Thebans had their sledgehammer phalanx. Philip had his long wobbly pole. If your slow moving infantry army cannot engage fast moving horse-archers, turn up on the day with a load of Skythian mercenaries.

And if the rules give hoplites their historical advantages, play to their historical disadvantages. Phalanxes, shield walls, wedges, quincunx etc. are all common enough to deserve column-inch space, and I at least, for one, would like to see Greek hoplites in deep formations on the tables of conventions, and not spread out in two-rank deep lines like so many basket-weaving Persians.

[Dave Knight]

I would have thought that there would be a generally accepted normal depth - the Thebans then did something new by going deeper against the Spartans.

[Duncan Head]

Xenophon in the extracts discussed above often describes how hoplite phalanxes would try to 'veer' away to the shieldless side as they advanced in order to gain an advantage there- another argument that even non-Spartan hoplites were well drilled.

Really? I'm not sure Xenophon ever says any such thing.

Before they had actually closed a thought occurred to Agis. All armies, when engaging, are apt to thrust outwards their right wing; and either of the opposing forces tends to outflank his enemy's left with his own right, because every soldier individually fears for his exposed side, which he tries to cover with the shield of his comrade on the right, conceiving that the closer he draws in the better he will be protected. The first man in the front rank of the right wing is originally responsible for the deflection, for he always wants to withdraw from the enemy his own exposed side, and the rest of the army, from a like fear, follow his example.

Thucydides, however, argues that hoplite phalanxes would tend, not "try", to veer away to the shieldless side as they advanced, not because of any desire of the commanders or of the phalanx as a whole, but because of individual fear - not to "gain an advantage", but to avoid a disadvantage. This argues that even Spartan hoplites are very imperfectly drilled, since they apparently cannot prevent this automatic drift - even if they sometimes manage to take advantage of it.

[Duncan Head]

Sure. I guess there are several schools of thought (with recent proponents of each):

Traditional othismos - hoplite phalanxes 'fought' by literally pushing each other, rugby scrum or reverse tug of war style (Hanson)

Metaphorical othismos - hoplite phalanxes didn't push, they fought, but in close order and solid formation (Goldsworthy)

Revisionist - hoplites fought as individuals in open order (van Wees)

I'm in the second camp (as - I suspect - are most people)

Sorry to excavate this post, but I've been ignoring this thread.

I think you may slightly misrepresent van Wees, Rich, since he only argues for individual combat in the early part of the hoplite period - he just sees the "mature" phalanx as a later development than most people do. It's Peter Krentz (http://www.xlegio.ru/pdfs/krentz3.pdf) who argues that "hoplite battle consisted of a multiplicity of individual combats" at all period.

There is also a fourth camp, or perhaps "camp 1A": Christopher Matthew argues that "othismos" is sometimes meant literally, and sometimes figuratively; that in some circumstances two phalanxes would end up pushing shield to shield, but the physical push was not a universal, nor even a particularly common, feature of hoplite battles.

[Rob Miles]

Xenophon in the extracts discussed above often describes how hoplite phalanxes would try to 'veer' away to the shieldless side as they advanced in order to gain an advantage there- another argument that even non-Spartan hoplites were well drilled.

Really? I'm not sure Xenophon ever says any such thing.

My Greek is VERY rusty, so I may have got it wrong (when I first translated it I had the flame of youth), but I think Hellenica IV chapter two.

[Duncan Head]

My Greek is VERY rusty, so I may have got it wrong (when I first translated it I had the flame of youth), but I think Hellenica IV chapter two.

I had indeed forgotten that passage, but looking at it I am not sure that it makes your point. Certainly, both sides edge to the right - but Xenophon doesn't actually say why they do it, simply that it happens. He could be taken to imply that it's a nasty sneaky Theban trick, but does not say so outright, nor say that either side did it deliberately or intending to outflank the other. So there is nothing that contradicts Thucydides' explicit statement that this is just what phalanxes do, whether you want them to or not.

[Patrick Waterson]

As usual, I generally agree with Rob's thoughts, though

Viking steel would have seemed like Martian death-rays to the Hittites.

It might not: the men of Hatti periodically controlled the Anatolian iron supply, and Anatolian iron seems to have had a very superior reputation in its day - Midas becoming rich when he had the monopoly because nobody wanted iron from anywhere else.  It may not have been entirely up to Viking standards but it seems to have been close, as far as I can judge without actual surviving implements.

As Duncan has pointed out, the bit about hoplite lines drifting right comes from Thucydides' description of First Mantinea (418 BC).  However Hellenica IV.2 is useful in other ways (see below).

Now back to agreeing ...

I at least, for one, would like to see Greek hoplites in deep formations on the tables of conventions, and not spread out in two-rank deep lines like so many basket-weaving Persians.

And presumably most importantly see them gaining some benefit for such a deep formation as opposed to simply blocking each other's retreats.

I would have thought that there would be a generally accepted normal depth - the Thebans then did something new by going deeper against the Spartans.

Yes and no - the Athenians deployed eight deep and the Thebans 25 deep at Delium (Thucydides IV.93-94).  Interestingly, Thucydides remarks of Thebes' allies: "The others were drawn up in varying formation," which might explain why the Thespians held when the contingents to the left and right of them were broken.

Hellenica IV.2 also illustrates a degree of diversity on this point:

"But while they were negotiating about the leadership and trying to come to an agreement with one another as to the number of ranks in depth in which the whole army should be drawn up, in order to prevent the states from making their phalanxes too deep and thus giving the enemy a chance of surrounding them ..." - IV.2.13

"Now the Boeotians, so long as they occupied the left wing, were not in the least eager to join battle; but when13 the Athenians took position opposite the Lacedaemonians, and the Boeotians themselves got the right wing and were stationed opposite the Achaeans, they immediately said that the sacrifices were favourable and gave the order to make ready, saying that there would be a battle. And in the first place, disregarding the sixteen-rank formation, they made their phalanx exceedingly deep, and, besides, they also veered to the right in leading the advance, in order to outflank the enemy with their wing; and the Athenians, in order not to be detached from the rest of the line, followed them towards the right, although they knew that there was danger of their being surrounded." - IV.2.18

The half-sentence in bold is the one Rob remembered about deliberately veering.

... This argues that even Spartan hoplites are very imperfectly drilled, since they apparently cannot prevent this automatic drift - even if they sometimes manage to take advantage of it.

This assumes that someone might actually wish to prevent such drift; if not, it does not really reflect upon their drill status.  One may note that Spartan contingents were able to peel off and move leftward during an advance - even if some declined to do so when ordered at First Mantinea, thus compromising those who did.

[Imperial Dave]

There is also a fourth camp, or perhaps "camp 1A": Christopher Matthew argues that "othismos" is sometimes meant literally, and sometimes figuratively; that in some circumstances two phalanxes would end up pushing shield to shield, but the physical push was not a universal, nor even a particularly common, feature of hoplite battles.

of which I currently am sitting in as it stands

[Rob Miles]

I'm going to resist the temptation to re-assert all the above (and, I suspect, previous) arguments concerning the function of the deep phalanx in the pre-wobbly pole era and....<nnnnggghh!> move <nnnnnngggyrrrrrghhh> on <phew>.

Perhaps a ruleset could allow for such 'conventional' factors relating to hoplites as long spears when facing non-hoplites. In such encounters, normal spear mechanics would apply (cavalry gets shafted when attacking stationary spears frontally, not long spear vs long spear suffers penalty, two ranks fully contribute to combat outcome etc.). However, the front of the phalanx would be substantially armoured. Maybe not at the sides and rear, but definitely to the front in the kind of open ground that all hoplite generals tried to fight in. When not in phalanx or if disordered, then the armour level would decrease significantly. Remember that the whole point of the aspis is that half of it protected the neighbour. When it cannot, the hoplite is half exposed.

This raises the issue of whether even the left flank of the hoplite phalanx can be regarded as shielded. The shield is needed to face the front, not the side, and turning such a massive dome of wood and metal to protect the side would at best be inhibited by the man in front and at worst prevent the othismos effect when in use. Later wobbly pole phalanxes had lighter shields BUT the weapon needed both hands for use.

The other, more common manner in which the phalanx would break up into more conventional armoured spearmen would be in pursuit (and rout as well I suppose). Xenophon again writes in the same book about what happens when such hoplites are caught by a formed phalanx- they are lesser men destined for stomping.

The phalanx is more than a concentration of men- it is a machine with a sole purpose executing practised drills. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

Metaphors and artistic conventions! Tuh! <damn, nearly made it to the end>

[Rob Miles]

As usual, I generally agree with Rob's thoughts, though

Viking steel would have seemed like Martian death-rays to the Hittites.

It might not: the men of Hatti periodically controlled the Anatolian iron supply, and Anatolian iron seems to have had a very superior reputation in its day - Midas becoming rich when he had the monopoly because nobody wanted iron from anywhere else.  It may not have been entirely up to Viking standards but it seems to have been close, as far as I can judge without actual surviving implements.

The reason I picked on the Hittites was precisely because of their regional supremacy in metal working (learned from the Babylonians). Viking steel was often 'crucible' steel imported via the Volga which was unknown in most of Europe even several hundred years afterwards. Nothing any race of Biblical era could have done would have got a fire THAT hot (IIRC the Indians were the first with their clever valve system in their bellows), never mind make the transition to high-carbon steel. A Hittite would be proud of his iron sword. He would then have watched it get sheared in two by a Viking sword. Hence Martian death-ray analogy.

[Patrick Waterson]

Nothing any race of Biblical era could have done would have got a fire THAT hot

Daniel 3:19

"Then Nebuchadnezzar was so filled with rage against Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego that his face was distorted. He ordered the furnace to be heated up seven times more than was customary ..."

One of these modern translations.  But you get the idea.

[Rob Miles]

Daniel 3:19

"Then Nebuchadnezzar was so filled with rage against Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego that his face was distorted. He ordered the furnace to be heated up seven times more than was customary ..."

One of these modern translations.  But you get the idea.

Ah, but whenever a Hebrew writer uses the number 7, he means any number up to 7. And, probably, quite a few above it.

[Patrick Waterson]

Suffice to say they had the furnace - quite a big one too, if three men and one deity could stroll around inside it.  So I think they could manage enough heat - they had enough to kill the stokers.

It is a trivial point anyway, but Biblical era metalwork should not be underrated, particularly if that clever chap Tubal-Cain left any of his secrets lying around.  Or if anyone actually did start alloying chromium - obtainable from Asia Minor - with iron or steel (as opposed to simply plating weapons with it, as per the Terracotta Army).  Intertestingly, Jeremiah 15:12 has:

"Shall iron (brzl) break northern iron (brzl m'tzphun) and steel (u'nchshth*)?"

This suggests that 'northern iron' had a superior quality, rendering it effectively unbreakable - at least by ordinary iron.

*Hebrew 'necosheth' is usually used to mean copper or bronze.  Here it presumably means something different: the King James translator opted for 'steel'.  This may or may not be correct, but it probably signifies an alloy.

But enough about metallurgy.  Is there anything we need to add about the hoplite phalanx?

[Justin Swanton]

But enough about metallurgy.  Is there anything we need to add about the hoplite phalanx?

That they were made of iron men with wills of steel and hearts of gold?