Could the Persian Empire logistically support an army several million strong?

[Imperial Dave]

I've read the next 10 pages since I last looked and all I will say is when looking at ancient sources always err on the side of caution and apply common sense to most things. Lastly we do tend to view things through the prism of the modern world for obvious reasons

[Patrick Waterson]

You did read the argument further on, didn't you?  The one about a cultural artefact of the "barbarian horde" and how it affected the reporting of numbers?

If that is not imposing our preconceptions upon the past, I do not know what is.

Although if he did this, we get the questions 1) why would he have any such preconceptions int he first place, 2) who fed him these numbers, and why would he believe them?* and 3) how is it that he still has minor inconsistencies in his arithmetic?  If he were 'filling gaps in a consistent manner', why the inconsistencies (notably with regard to the number of smaller ships and auxiliary vessels)?

1. Because he came from a culture with these preconceptions
2. I believe you said he spoke to Persian officials?  He's believe them because they fed his cultural expectation.

Now why would they even think of doing that?

3. You yourself have excused Herodotus' arithmetic errors as not undermining his narrative.  He gets things in the right ball-park throughout but, when it comes to creating the details of lists, he makes arithmetic errors (like in the breakdown of ships - we can see easily how he creates an itemised list to back up the traditional figure of 1207 but slips in 50 ships he didn't need)

True; the important consideration is whether such comparatively minor errors invalidate his overall numbering.  I think not, as this seems to be evidence that where he gets numbers wrong it is not by an order of magnitude.

But some writers from the same cultural outlook, notably Thucydides and Plutarch, get their knives into Herodotus at every opportunity. 

But do they produce smaller numbers for the size of barbarian armies?  You've said they don't earlier. 

Then why ask?   As it happens, no, they do not - apart from Ctesias, who asserts that Xerxes had 800,000 but gives no basis for how he or his presumed source arrives at this figure.  800,000 is about half of 1,700,000 so my suspicion is that Ctesias took the figure he received from his source and halved it thinking it would have included noncombatants.  Conjectural, albeit it makes for easy reconciliation.  What does stand out is that even Ctesias does not hold with 200,000 or so, but a rather larger number.

Furthermore, a cultural outlook which compulsively over-estimates and/or overstates enemy numbers is not going to fare as well as did the Greeks in combat against the Persian Empire.

I actually don't get what you mean here.

Sorry.  If one is constantly over-estimating enemy numbers, one will see a modest enemy force and paralyse oneself with apprehension wondering where all the other enemies are hiding, and hence fail to act against the forces one does see.  (Italian generals in North Africa in 1940 did this in a major way and the results speak for themselves - to be fair, this was not the sole reason for their spectacular defeats, but it was a significant contributor to their fatal inaction.)  The result will be a consistent inability to obtain significant victories, perhaps to obtain victories at all.

We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods.  I think we are on much firmer ground with this assertion.

If we had known figures, we could test them against modern estimates.  But all we have are the numbers in the Bible and classical sources, which is what we are trying to test against our knowledge of the wider world.  So I doubt you could prove your assertion.  Where I do think you have some point is something I said right at the beginning of this discussion - some historians automatically downsize ancient figures as a kind of reflex, without critical thought and that is a failure to engage with cultural preconceptions.

While any attempt at conclusive proof is always going to run up against scepticism about the original sources, I do agree about the reflex.  That is a perceptive observation.

[Jim Webster]

Then why ask?   As it happens, no, they do not - apart from Ctesias, who asserts that Xerxes had 800,000 but gives no basis for how he or his presumed source arrives at this figure.  800,000 is about half of 1,700,000 so my suspicion is that Ctesias took the figure he received from his source and halved it thinking it would have included noncombatants. 

alternatively Herodotus could have taken the same figure Ctesias got and doubled it for effect. It's as likely as Ctesias halving a figure he received

[Dangun]

We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods.  I think we are on much firmer ground with this assertion.

This is not equivalent.
You are attributing any non-literal interpretation to cultural bias. (Ironically this is a very modern strategy of argumentation.)
But aren't you giving away your own assumption when you say, "who consistently under-estimate and understate"? - the working assumption is that the literary source is correct.

Cultural bias is only one of many possible explanations of this difference in opinion.
But there are others, perhaps: logic, precedent, academic progress...

A more neutral way of saying this might be, "modern historians consistently argue that figures in literature from the classical and biblical period are overstated."

[Flaminpig0]

Sorry.  If one is constantly over-estimating enemy numbers, one will see a modest enemy force and paralyse oneself with apprehension wondering where all the other enemies are hiding, and hence fail to act against the forces one does see.  (Italian generals in North Africa in 1940 did this in a major way and the results speak for themselves - to be fair, this was not the sole reason for their spectacular defeats, but it was a significant contributor to their fatal inaction.)  The result will be a consistent inability to obtain significant victories, perhaps to obtain victories at all.

No one wouldn't because your troops are indoctrinated  to see the enemy as useless-; if 7,000 of us can hold a pass for several days against  millions of these  whipped subhumans we can deal with the apprehension of  wondering where the rest are,  victory will be even easier as  there are hundreds of thousands less of them than there are usually.

[Justin Swanton]

When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations

Actually I based my calculations on the legal limit for a late Roman military pack mule which was well below the theoretical limit the animal of that period could stand.

This means that the late Roman military pack mule was a better animal than the modern Indian and American army mules, even through it was bred from smaller horses. I honestly doubt it

See post #768. I took Anthony's figure of 65.5kg stipulated for a Roman army pack mule and went with that.

i was remembering back to about 711/13, I perhaps hadn't noticed the bit with Anthony sorry

Actually, looking back earlier I did use loads of 100kg when calculating how many mules would be needed for 5-day incursions inland by the army. The 65kg load (after Anthony supplied it) was used to calculate how long a grain caravan could travel and still have most of its grain. So I need to go back and redo the army calculations. Some day...

Only 36 pages to go! 

[Jim Webster]

When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations

Actually I based my calculations on the legal limit for a late Roman military pack mule which was well below the theoretical limit the animal of that period could stand.

This means that the late Roman military pack mule was a better animal than the modern Indian and American army mules, even through it was bred from smaller horses. I honestly doubt it

See post #768. I took Anthony's figure of 65.5kg stipulated for a Roman army pack mule and went with that.

i was remembering back to about 711/13, I perhaps hadn't noticed the bit with Anthony sorry

Actually, looking back earlier I did use loads of 100kg when calculating how many mules would be needed for 5-day incursions inland by the army. The 65kg load (after Anthony supplied it) was used to calculate how long a grain caravan could travel and still have most of its grain. So I need to go back and redo the army calculations. Some day...

Only 36 pages to go! 

apparently we've got to keep going until we've got a page for every man we think was in the army. I'm seriously considering arguing for fifteen thousand 

[Patrick Waterson]

Also have you a clue what the annual calving of a herd or lambing of a flock is like. It's every bit as labour intensive as harvest

With modern species, yes.  Do you know how dependent upon human help the species of the period were?

yes
It's pretty standard stuff,

Jim, did this get posted incomplete?  I shall hold off any response until you have had your say.

no, it's complete, the ancient breeds still exist in many areas, largely unchanged. We know that from skeletal analysis and the ancient writers

OK, thanks.  However, herder cultures traditionally manage to free up a high proportion of their manpower for war, so I suspect they treated the multiplication season somewhat differently from present practice.  My impression of past cultures is that they essentially left the animals to get on with it, which is not labour-intensive at all.  Confirmation of this might be seen in US cattle-raising practices as recently as the 19th century, where the animals were pretty much left to their own devices all year round and the only real need for manpower (and not particularly intensive manpower) was when cattle were rounded up for branding or a drive.

alternatively Herodotus could have taken the same figure Ctesias got and doubled it for effect. It's as likely as Ctesias halving a figure he received

What effect, pray?  And why?  (And why stop there?)  In any event, Herodotus' reliability is quite high compared to that of Ctesias, which means Ctesias is the suspect here.

[Patrick Waterson]

Sorry.  If one is constantly over-estimating enemy numbers, one will see a modest enemy force and paralyse oneself with apprehension wondering where all the other enemies are hiding, and hence fail to act against the forces one does see.  (Italian generals in North Africa in 1940 did this in a major way and the results speak for themselves - to be fair, this was not the sole reason for their spectacular defeats, but it was a significant contributor to their fatal inaction.)  The result will be a consistent inability to obtain significant victories, perhaps to obtain victories at all.

No one wouldn't because your troops are indoctrinated  to see the enemy as useless-; if 7,000 of us can hold a pass for several days against  millions of these  whipped subhumans we can deal with the apprehension of  wondering where the rest are,  victory will be even easier as  there are hundreds of thousands less of them than there are usually.

This is another reason one's troops would do poorly: having been indoctrinated to see the enemy as useless, they would go into action carelessly expecting simply to walk over the opposition and would instead receive a short, sharp shock.  The Athenian expedition to Egypt in 460 BC may have been such an expression of over-confidence; that one turned out very badly indeed (nobody got back).  Warfare has little room for vanity and misconception: only a good, strong appreciation of reality will help one prevail.  High morale is obviously helpful, but high morale combined with delusion is a formula for overreaching oneself and going down as another historical disaster.

[Justin Swanton]

apparently we've got to keep going until we've got a page for every man we think was in the army. I'm seriously considering arguing for fifteen thousand 

This the first time I've been obliged to seriously consider abandoning 1 700 000 men. 

[Jim Webster]

OK, thanks.  However, herder cultures traditionally manage to free up a high proportion of their manpower for war,

please can we have some figures here? Some examples. And be careful about Manpower figures. The Spartans could put a very high proportion of their Spartan manpower in the field, but a comparatively low proportion of their male population. A lot of herding cultures had numbers of slaves and semi-free males who would continue to work even when the warriors had left.
Also for a comparison can we have an example of one of these herder cultures who sent 41% of their manpower away for over a year

[Jim Webster]

apparently we've got to keep going until we've got a page for every man we think was in the army. I'm seriously considering arguing for fifteen thousand 

This the first time I've been obliged to seriously consider abandoning 1 700 000 men. 

[Erpingham]

Sorry.  If one is constantly over-estimating enemy numbers, one will see a modest enemy force and paralyse oneself with apprehension wondering where all the other enemies are hiding, and hence fail to act against the forces one does see.  (Italian generals in North Africa in 1940 did this in a major way and the results speak for themselves - to be fair, this was not the sole reason for their spectacular defeats, but it was a significant contributor to their fatal inaction.)  The result will be a consistent inability to obtain significant victories, perhaps to obtain victories at all.

No one wouldn't because your troops are indoctrinated  to see the enemy as useless-; if 7,000 of us can hold a pass for several days against  millions of these  whipped subhumans we can deal with the apprehension of  wondering where the rest are,  victory will be even easier as  there are hundreds of thousands less of them than there are usually.

This is another reason one's troops would do poorly: having been indoctrinated to see the enemy as useless, they would go into action carelessly expecting simply to walk over the opposition and would instead receive a short, sharp shock.  The Athenian expedition to Egypt in 460 BC may have been such an expression of over-confidence; that one turned out very badly indeed (nobody got back).  Warfare has little room for vanity and misconception: only a good, strong appreciation of reality will help one prevail.  High morale is obviously helpful, but high morale combined with delusion is a formula for overreaching oneself and going down as another historical disaster.

This is a bit of a bizarre argument, even by normal standards.  The Greeks are convinced of their superiority over the Persians.  They think a small number of Greeks can beat any number of Persians because that is what they have grown up believing.  The idea that, on meeting the enemy, they say lets do an accurate count of that big horde just to make sure its as big as we have been led to believe, is a bit fantastic.

[Jim Webster]

What effect, pray?  And why?  (And why stop there?)  In any event, Herodotus' reliability is quite high compared to that of Ctesias, which means Ctesias is the suspect here.

sorry but on what evidence to you base the claim that Herodotus is more reliable that Ctesias?
I noted the comment on the wiki, "Although many ancient authorities valued it highly, and used it to discredit Herodotus, a modern author writes that "(Ctesias's) unreliability makes Herodotus seem a model of accuracy"
Given that we don't actually have a text of Ctesias, merely abridgements and fragments used by ancient authors, a modern assessment isn't an assessment of the work, merely the bits the assessor has decided were originally the work of Ctesias

As far as I can see the only argument against Ctesias is that he was used to discredit Herodotus, which you can hardly use when you're using Herodotus to discredit Ctesias   

[Patrick Waterson]

A lot of herding cultures had numbers of slaves and semi-free males who would continue to work even when the warriors had left.

Aha ...

So there is actually no problem with mobilising the warrior population.  This is what I wished to establish.

sorry but on what evidence to you base the claim that Herodotus is more reliable that Ctesias?
I noted the comment on the wiki, "Although many ancient authorities valued it highly, and used it to discredit Herodotus, a modern author writes that "(Ctesias's) unreliability makes Herodotus seem a model of accuracy"
Given that we don't actually have a text of Ctesias, merely abridgements and fragments used by ancient authors, a modern assessment isn't an assessment of the work, merely the bits the assessor has decided were originally the work of Ctesias

You have pretty much answered your own question.  What we have of Ctesias is, for one reason or another, suspect.  There is nothing to support his 800,000-man figure whereas Herodotus has the process by which the count was made and the final figure of 1.7 million arrived at, plus incidental details which correspond with a figure of this scale (e.g. trans Hellespont crossing time).