Why did Zama go wrong for Hannibal?

[Mark G]

I've just put both Livy and Polybius on Zama into the Battles forum.

Along with my comparison between them (a scene by scene type thing)

and an interpretations.

sorry its so long, merit award to anyone who finishes it all

[Mark G]

"'inferior in the cavalry arm' "

could just as easily mean 'not having enough to be decisive' as meaning that he had an inferior cavalry to the Roman cavalry.

[Mark G]

For Italian loyalty, I think it is just more of Livy's hyper patriotism getting in the way.

If these men are Italians who want to fight Romans, they cannot be reliable, therefore it follows that he will denigrate them.

Conversely, the comparatively poorly performing Carthaginian citizens - well, Rome was a citizen based army, Carthage was Rome's greatest foe and its most feared general, and so they should be equally matched at this point.

He also denigrates the 'barbarian' mercenaries too, in typical Roman fashion.

I note that he barely mentions the combat with the veterans whilst the other combats are worth a bit of detail - it all adds to the same picture of what is important to Livy - unreliable allies, brave citizens, traitorous turncoats and impressive but ineffective elephants.

Quite why some folk still want to see Livy as more reliable than Polybios, I really cannot fathom,

[Patrick Waterson]

Whatever Hannibal had before Tychaeus joined him, he deemed it insufficient and needed 2,000 of the 'best cavalry in Africa' before he felt comfortable.  It seems unlikely (at least to me) that his original Carthaginian cavalry contingent (which faced Laelius at Zama) could be considered superior to the Roman, even indecisively so.

On the assumption that Zama would be fought without Masinissa, Hannibal's cavalry right would have been expected to defeat about half of Laelius' cavalry (the other half would be on Tychaeus' wing).  This suggests a superiority of maybe 3:2 in 'combat factors' (numbers and/or quality) over 50% of Laelius' force, but inferiority, or perceived inferiority, to the whole of it (perhaps 3:4?).

As previously mentioned, Hannibal had an antidote in the works for Masinissa: Vermina plus 8,000 or so Numidian cavalry.  Had he believed Masinissa would get involved, then waiting for Vermina would not have been too great a strain on his patience - he had already told the Carthaginian senate to mind their own business and leave things to him regarding timing and the conduct of the campaign.

Appian (I think it is Appian) suggests that Hannibal's camp had difficulty with its water supply, which acted as an incentive for him to engage.  This may just be the author rationalising after the event, as there is usually a simple remedy for such difficulties: move to another campsite.  (Another one, which Mithridates Eupator would have done well to consider, is to dig for water.)

Livy is indeed a bit strange when describing this battle - he may be selecting from his sources in line with his cultural imperatives, as you suggest.  Personally I give him a wide berth for this engagement.  He is however useful because he mentions Vermina and his force, which puts another piece of the strategic jigsaw in place.

[Mark G]

Polybius/os has the water reference also.

[Mark G]

Have we got any more on Vermina ?

There are some things about the passage which leave a few doubts, so it would be good to check what more we have on him.



such as:
the 8000 seems a typical ancients overemphasised number - clearly 'significant' is safe to say, but 8000 cavalry after Tychaeus (the best in Africa) and Massanissa have departed AND after a civil war has been fought?
it seems a large number to accept. 

Also, Livy reports these men as being expected by Hannibal - yet Livy also reports Hannibal as force marching to the battle when instructed - it is Polybios - who does not report anything about Vermina - who says Hannibal refused to attack immediately because he was not ready. 
Force marching to a battle before you expect significant reinforcements is a bit unexpected, especially from one such as Hannibal.

What part did Vermina play in the civil war with Massanissa? 
Was Vermina on Syphax' side? 
Could he simply be Livy's name for the Syphaxians had they been victorious?

The passage would certainly fit better if it meant that the Carthaginians knew the civil war was resolved, and that there were significant reinforcements on the way - but the victor was unclear - 'Vermina' being the last name associated with the pro Carthaginian forces.

So, what more do we have on him that we can use to add credence to this part of Livy?

[Duncan Head]

Have we got any more on Vermina ?

Livy 29.33.
Livy 31.11.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0104:entry=vermina-bio-1
Appian Punica 6.33 - putting Vermina in contact with Hannibal well before Zama.
A few of his coins survive - http://www.bmimages.com/images-of-Vermina.html
He held on to Siga, his father's old capital in the western Numidian regions that eventually became Mauretanian Caesariensis, for an uncertain period - http://tinyurl.com/nmpatgj

[Mark G]

Where is the passage about Hannibal expecting Vermina?

I can see him in 30 36 arriving.

But Scipio has taken and plundered the camp on the hill, returned to his own camp, had Lentullus join him, sailed to Carthage - met supplicants, and diverted them to Tynes , returned to Uttica and marched his army to Tynes, and on route it is Scipio who receives word of Vermina coming with an army.

Which, for the defeated son of Syphax, is still pretty good going to raise any sort of army and march it out of country - but does seem pretty odd given that he was the defeated son of Syyphax and the victory had been such that Massanissa could immediately depart with something like ten thousand men.

Livy also has Hannibal being fully aware of Massanissa's arrival and the forces he had with him - there is a lot of doubt to be cast here on the notion that Hannibal had any idea of a (third and largest yet) Numidian army being on route.

[Patrick Waterson]

Where is the passage about Hannibal expecting Vermina?

Alas our sources are rarely that explicit.

The question to answer here is: why was Vermina, son of Carthage's ally Syphax, on the march with 15,000+ Numidians, mainly cavalry - and why was he attacked by the Romans?

The fact that the Romans attack him shows he is on Carthage's side.  As the force he is with when ambushed is too small to take on Scipio by itself, there is only one reason he would have been out and about with it in the first place: to join up with Hannibal.

Livy also has Hannibal being fully aware of Massanissa's arrival and the forces he had with him - there is a lot of doubt to be cast here on the notion that Hannibal had any idea of a (third and largest yet) Numidian army being on route.

Not by Livy, whose reliability of description here seems very doubtful.  Even Appian, who is not always noted for his accuracy, correctly identifies the third line as Hannibal's veterans, whereas Livy does not seem able to place them correctly.  I would put little faith in Livy's descriptions of pre-battle (or battle) events and much in what we have of Polybius'.

The question of how Vermina could acquire 15,000+ troops from a 'defeated' kingdom is simple: he tapped the manpower resources a bit further.  Numidia had a mix of tribes and cities, and it was the tribes that provided cavalry plus the lighter infantry.  Such formed troops as were occasionally fielded - e.g. the cohorts Scipio had trained for Syphax - may conceivably have come from townsmen, and these Vermina would not have to hand.  The more peripheral tribes, however, would not yet have been touched.  It is noteworthy that these probably represented his final resources, because following his defeat he sued for peace rather than fight on a la Tacfarinas.