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This will be my first post on this forum, as a recently joined member. I am also fairly new to wargaming the ancient period. I hope a wargaming question in the historical section is not inappropriate.

I have been fortunate enough to meet and game with Roy Boss, and we discussed the issue of the 50 deep Theban phalanx. I have had a look at some forum discussions on the subject of how depth could make a phalanx more effective (in particular 'Depth: What Is It Good For?'). What I have heard recently seems to indicate that any kind of shoving would be ineffective beyond about 8 ranks - so why 50?

Roy's explanation was one I had not heard before, being based on exploitation. The value of the succeeding ranks would be to exploit the success of the leading ones by a sort of blitzkrieg-style expanding torrent, attacking the flanks of a hole in the defending line created by the leading hoplites.

Roy's idea gives a logical reason for the use of super-deep phalanxes whether you believe in 'othismos' or not. In a wargame context, a 50 deep phalanx could be represented by 'stacking' maybe 3 or 4 separate 'normal' phalanx units, so that success by the front unit could immediately be exploited. Could this also be true historically - that there was not a single 50 deep phalanx but maybe 6 x 8 deep phalanxes one behind the other?

In what other ways would members see a 50 deep phalanx being more effective than one of a more usual depth?

As a coda to this post, it seems to me that the success of the Thebans at Leuctra was far from guaranteed, 50 deep phalanx or not. It would seem the opposing Spartans were disordered in some way by their defeated cavalry retreating through them, or an ill-advised formation change, or the death of their senior commanders - or a combination of all three. So maybe the extra deep phalanx wasn't the deciding issue?

To conclude - if a 50 deep formation was an effective concentration of force, in what way was this effectiveness realised, and how could this be represented in a set of miniature wargames rules?

Thanks in advance for any pointers!

Quote from: Keith on January 28, 2018, 06:32:32 PM
To conclude - if a 50 deep formation was an effective concentration of force, in what way was this effectiveness realised, and how could this be represented in a set of miniature wargames rules?

One might point to two fundamental effects: steadiness and 'weight'.

'Steadiness' simply means that a 50-deep formation can be exceedingly hard to shift provided the quality of men composing it is reasonably consistent. This is more of a hedge against disaster than a battle-winning quality, but it keeps one's army on the field, at least until the enemy get around the flanks.  Having a lot of men behind adds a strong element of inertia provided of course that they do not get worried and start leaving.  The Greeks had ouragoi  - file-closers - whose tasks included discouraging early departures.

'Weight' is the effect of many ranks applying pressure (physical and psychological) against fewer.  Even when 25 deep rather than 50 deep, the Thebans usually pressed back the opposition, e.g. at Delium in 424 BC.  This makes me think that depths of more than eight could add effective pressure, because the Thebans' opponents were themselves usually eight deep, and if only eight men in a file could usefully contribute, then the Thebans should be forced back as often as they force back their opponents.  The Thebans settled on 25 as their most popular depth, and the fact that Epaminondas added another 25 indicates that he expected great things from the increase.  Interestingly, the Thebans achieved them.

This suggests that the Thebans found some way of making men contribute when 25 deep and later even 50 deep.  I can offer a hypothesis about this, namely that the Thebans trained extra-large files to operate together to deliver a stronger push.  One would expect there to be a point of diminishing returns, and 25 men was probably it.  This however does not explain why Epaminondas added another 25 - if he already had a system which worked well enough, why add to it?

Here we proceed from hypothesis to guesswork - Epaminondas found a way to make the second 25 push the first 25.  He may have instructed the second 25 to push the rear man of the first 25 as if they were the enemy line, and hence added useful additional weight to his army's push.  So much for guessing the how, but we still have the why.  Regarding this, I would see the Second Battle of Coronea in 394 BC as a possible stimulus: the Thebans. having defeated the Orchomenan contingent in the Spartan army and reached the Spartan baggage train, found the Spartan army across their return path and had a very difficult struggle to break free.  Epaminondas may have concluded from this that a depth of 25 men was not sufficient against Spartans, although it served well enough against anyone else.

Those are my thoughts.  Other members will hopefully add their own cogitations and explanations.

Quote from: Keith on January 28, 2018, 06:32:32 PM
In what other ways would members see a 50 deep phalanx being more effective than one of a more usual depth?

Welcome to the forum!

One thought from previous threads - command & control. Narrow frontages may be easier to control, lead and form, possibly particularly for less experienced troops.

Another from a previous thread - morale and the handling of losses.

I think though it might be more revealing to ask the question in reverse. Why does the 50 deep phalanx sometimes go backwards? The fact that it ever does get "pushed" backwards, suggests to me that weight is only one of a long list of factors.

Welcome Keith, and by asking such a question you are coming in at the deep end!

You'll have seen from the other threads that there are is a range of possibilities, and some strongly held opinions. A list of the options might include:

- the extra ranks acted as replacements for casualties, or for tired hoplites, in the front ranks. Pros - it's an intuitively obvious answer. Cons - casualties are never high enough to require 50 (or even eight) ranks, and no mechanism is known by which ranks could be replaced.

- the extra ranks pushed the ones in front ('scrum' or 'othismos'). Pros - sources do talk of weight and pushing. Cons - experiments sugggest ranks beyond the first eight couldn't add much to a push, and the whole concept of pushing rather than fighting with weapons is controversial.

- the extra ranks provided psychological support and solidity to the formation, making it less easy for those in front to run away. Pros - this sort of psychological explanation fits with evidence for close quarters fighting in other periods. Cons - 50 ranks still seems like overkill, and it is rather a negative explanation, that Thebans won because it was harder for them to run away, not because they were better.

- the deep formation made marching and manoeuvre easier, maintaining cohesion especially in difficult terrain. Pros - this explanation matches what we know of manoeuvre in columns in other periods. Cons - it seems to provide benefits in manoeuvre, but not in melee, so doesn't really explain why the Thebans won.

- the deep formation made command control easier. Pros - as above, matches what we know from other periods. Cons - as above, not much command control seems necessary once melee has begun.

- the deep formation allowed a small number of high quality hoplites (the Sacred Band in this case) to be spread across a large frontage, backed by a larger mass of lower quality. Pros - while the deployment of the Sacred Band is uncertain, this makes sense. Cons - doesn't really explain why the formation was so deep.

- (your/Roy's suggestion) the extra ranks were reserves for exploitation. Pros - avoids many of the difficulties above, and that the formation was 50 deep but not necessarily in files of 50 makes sense. Cons - what we think we know of hoplite warfare suggests that once the line was first broken, it was all over, so exploitation would not be of great importance, and hoplite armies so far as we know didn't use reserves.

I expect there are other explanations I've missed or haven't thought of.

Further thoughts are that the 50 deep formation was not adopted generally so its advantage was not decisive, or its corresponding disadvantages - chiefly the narrow front and so vulnerability to outflanking - perhaps outweighed its advantages, and that there was no clear conceptual or practical advantage to deeper formations, but rather a process of experimentation with different depths (around the common standard of eight), and single tests - a single pitched battle could be decisive in terms of winning a war, without settling the question of what is the best depth at which to form up.

My own view is that the psychological answer is most likely, combined with an element of physical solidity (bracing the formation). But elements of all these explanations might have been involved - perhaps the most likely explanation is 'all of the above'. Other opinions are available.

Quote from: Dangun on January 29, 2018, 12:14:34 AM
I think though it might be more revealing to ask the question in reverse. Why does the 50 deep phalanx sometimes go backwards? The fact that it ever does get "pushed" backwards, suggests to me that weight is only one of a long list of factors.

Can anyone think of any instances when it actually gets 'pushed' backwards?

Quote from: RichT on January 29, 2018, 09:29:31 AM
Further thoughts are that the 50 deep formation was not adopted generally so its advantage was not decisive, or its corresponding disadvantages - chiefly the narrow front and so vulnerability to outflanking - perhaps outweighed its advantages, and that there was no clear conceptual or practical advantage to deeper formations, but rather a process of experimentation with different depths (around the common standard of eight), and single tests - a single pitched battle could be decisive in terms of winning a war, without settling the question of what is the best depth at which to form up.

As Patrick (I think it was he - sorry for any misattribution!) pointed out in another thread, pre-Epaminondan Thebans already used deeper formations than usual elsewhere, yet didn't derive any (now) obvious advantage therefrom. One might be tempted to leap to the conclusion that it was the commander and not the formation that made the difference.

This of course leaves the question open why Epaminondas and other Theban commanders thought deep phalanxes a good idea. Since we have trouble thinking of a military rationale, might there be a political one? Perhaps the extra ranks provided place for men who, because youth or lacking equipment weren't suited for the front ranks to take part, widening the hoplite class invested in the political project of the state?

Coming at this from the comfort (if that is the correct term) of how medieval infantry fights worked, 50 deep is a very dangerous place to be.  Unless you can control the physical mass (essentially control its crushing tendency) it works against you.  So, internal command and control is important.  Patrick points to the file closer system.  This certainly worked well at 8 ranks but would a file of a foundation, 48 rows of rubble and a roof work?  I think therefore we should look for signs of more internal structure to the fifty ranks.  If we can find that, it might give us clues as to how the 50 ranks worked.  For example, if they normally had 25 deep phalanxes, have they just drawn two up one behind the other?

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 29, 2018, 10:55:55 AM
This of course leaves the question open why Epaminondas and other Theban commanders thought deep phalanxes a good idea. Since we have trouble thinking of a military rationale, might there be a political one? Perhaps the extra ranks provided place for men who, because youth or lacking equipment weren't suited for the front ranks to take part, widening the hoplite class invested in the political project of the state?

Yes that's a good point - which I think comes under my 'allowed a small number of high quality hoplites to be spread across a large frontage' - though I'm not aware off the top of my head of any Theban franchise expansion or such at this point. And we can think of lots of military rationales but have trouble deciding which might be true! But yes I think there is mileage in a suggestion of this kind - if the Thebans had a small good quality hoplite corps but wanted a lot of citizens involved in battle, then a deep narrow formation would achieve this, and would avoid the typical situation where some hapless Spartan allies are left to get stomped on the left wing while the Spartiates have a bloodless victory on the right, or where the collapse of some unwilling contingent fatally compromises the position of their better motivated neighbours.

Another thought is that writers of battle accounts, ancient and modern, are keen on single explanations - Side A won because it was 50 deep, or because the sun was in their opponents' eyes, or because they had had a proper breakfast, or because their spears were made of better wood, and so on. It is doubtful such a clear, simple cause and effect would be quite so clear on the battlefield. When the dust settled and commanders and men exchanged stories of what happened, various factors might emerge, some or one of which might get picked up by a historian - but it is unlikely this was ever the whole story. In the case of Leuctra, Xenophon talks of his beloved Spartans defeated by the Theban 'mass' (the word he uses has a slightly pejorative sense - 'mob' might convey it) so we look to tactical, technical, physical explanations. But maybe in this case the Thebans fought better, were braver or stronger, or better led and motivated, and the depth of the formation chiefly served, as you suggest, some other purpose.

I think the cavalry are the really decisive bit here.

As noted above, the greater depth doesn't seem to help other times for the thebans, and the 50 is not adopted after this battle.

That suggests that the extra depth may be be an obvious but irrelevant factor, noted by observers as significant because it was notable, but actually not important.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 29, 2018, 09:58:56 AM
Can anyone think of any instances when it actually gets 'pushed' backwards?

It was dug up for one of the other threads.
The 50 deep phalanx was attacked and initially beaten. Not ultimately beaten, but initially.

Quote from: Dangun on January 29, 2018, 03:34:01 PM
It was dug up for one of the other threads.
The 50 deep phalanx was attacked and initially beaten. Not ultimately beaten, but initially.

Presumably Xen Hell 6.4.13: "Nevertheless, the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be known from this clear indication: they would not have been able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time."

Thanks to all responders for taking the trouble to post such thoughtful replies.

With the greatest of respect to Patrick, whose knowledge is far in excess of mine, I find the theory of 50 ranks being capable of some sort of additional push rather hard to fathom. More appealing is the theory that this was an experimental period for the Thebans and Epaminondas, and victory in this case may have occurred for other reasons than the 50 ranks (see my original post).

Anthony's mention of internal structure is interesting, in that in fits in with Roy's suggestion. I find this a very tempting line of thought. But the idea that such a deep formation has an irresistibility all of its own also appeals.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 29, 2018, 11:09:46 AM
Coming at this from the comfort (if that is the correct term) of how medieval infantry fights worked, 50 deep is a very dangerous place to be.  Unless you can control the physical mass (essentially control its crushing tendency) it works against you.  So, internal command and control is important.  Patrick points to the file closer system.  This certainly worked well at 8 ranks but would a file of a foundation, 48 rows of rubble and a roof work?  I think therefore we should look for signs of more internal structure to the fifty ranks. 

The Greeks, or at least classical Greeks, seem to have taken extreme care in the placement of individuals within their formations.  I was particularly struck by this anecdote:

After he had drawn up his men-at-arms, one of them went out far in advance of the rest, and then was stricken with fear when an enemy advanced to meet him, and went back again to his post. 'Shame on thee, young man,' said Phocion, 'for having abandoned two posts, the one which was given thee by thy general, and the one which thou didst give thyself.' - Plutarch, Life of Phocion 25.2

This, together with hints in Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas 18.2:

And a pleasantry of Pammenes is cited, in which he said that Homer's Nestor was no tactician when he urged the Greeks to form in companies by clans and tribes,

    That clan might give assistance unto clan, and tribes to tribes,

since he should have stationed lover by beloved.

indicate that Greek generals may even have specified who stood in front of whom in individual files, it being not too difficult to make such assignments knowledgeably in a city where everyone knew everyone else.  This kind of attention to detail would make the file a highly efficient and cohesive entity, and seemingly allowed benefits to having 12 or 16 or even 25-deep files, as all these were in use during this period (see Xenophon, Hellenica IV.2.12 and 18 and VI.4.12).  Xenophon's remark that the Spartans at Leuctra were trained to fall in with an form up on anyone in a crisis also indirectly indicates the default condition as the individual being assigned a specific place in the file.

If we can find that, it might give us clues as to how the 50 ranks worked.  For example, if they normally had 25-deep phalanxes, have they just drawn two up one behind the other?

In view of the fact that our sources say they were 50 deep, implying one formation, as opposed to 25 deep with another such formation behind, we can take it that Epaminondas had reconfigured the 25-deep phalanx as a 50-deep phalanx and had done so for a reason and because there was a tangible benefit.  I can only guess at what the benefit may have been, but since the 25-deep formation was sufficiently steady and did not run in any of the battles where it is specified, extra steadiness would not seem to be the answer.  Ergo, I am left to conclude that there was a clear benefit in offensive capability, enough to make it worth halving the battlefield frontage on which the Theban army could operate.

Quote from: Mark G on January 29, 2018, 01:12:12 PM
As noted above, the greater depth doesn't seem to help other times for the thebans, and the 50 is not adopted after this battle.

It is not specified in Xenophon's account of Second Mantinea in 362 BC - which the Thebans also won with a pretty much identical; battleplan, albeit at the cost of Epaminondas himself.  None of our sources tell us what depth they used in actions subsequent to Second Mantinea, so it is unclear whether they kept Epaminondas' 50 deep or reverted to their previous 25 deep.  But Xenophon does mention that at Second Mantinea Epaminondas 'also formed his cavalry into a strong column', suggesting a continuity of the 50-deep practice.

Quote from: Keith on January 29, 2018, 06:09:23 PM
I find the theory of 50 ranks being capable of some sort of additional push rather hard to fathom.

Well, it seemed to manage an additional something, which Xenophon (Hellenica VI.4.14) refers to as "the pressure of the Theban mass" (okhlou ōthoumenoi), so however hard it may have been to fathom, it seems to have been easier to perform. ;)

That said, Greek cities other than Thebans presumably felt that whatever additional thrust or other tangible benefit could be gained was not worth the considerable additional manpower required, not least because they lacked the cavalier attitude of the Thebans to letting their allies get outflanked.  And for a Greek hoplite army, to be outflanked was to be defeated on that flank, a price not everyone was willing to pay.

My own purely personal conclusion, in wargaming rather than historical terms, is that a very deep formation has the advantage of 'steadiness' (as you put it Patrick), or 'staying power' (as Adrian Goldsworthy has expressed it). In other words, it might be very difficult to force back such a mass and it would keep coming at you, assuming the troops composing it were of reasonable quality.

How to represent this in a set of rules? The way my rules function, Roy's idea of a stack of units (i.e. a very deep formation but with an internal structure) would work well - beat the leading unit, but then you have to deal with the one behind. This may not be exactly how things were historically, but it would perhaps produce the same effect.

Thanks again for all the responses.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 30, 2018, 03:09:22 PM
Thanks Patrick for your comments.  If one so knowledgeable as your self can find nothing on the internal organisation of the Theban mass, I conclude we don't know :)

The Pelopidas quote presumably references the Sacred Band, which we know was organised in couples.  Some accounts claim the Sacred Band formed the first two of the 50 ranks, though if the formation really was organised in 50 deep files with no internal divisions, I don't know how that worked.

Apologies, Anthony: I accidentally deleted your post while trying to delete one of mine.  Smacked wrist! :(  Fortunately the content was still in memory as a quote so I preserve it above and promise to be more alert in future.

The Sacred Band is recorded as acting independently at Leuctra (Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas 23.2), so could not have formed the first two ranks of the main phalanx.  The main phalanx itself has not had the kind of detailed treatment lavished on, say, Spartans by the likes of Thucydides and Xenophon, so we have no specific details of any 'under-officers' at points along the file and can only surmise that certain individuals in whom particular trust was reposed would be stationed at intervals to help things along - files 25 deep require few file leaders and closers in comparison with files 8 deep, so there should have been a number of potential 'helpers' spare.

We really are reduced to guessing from basic principles about the internal composition of the 50-deep formation.  My guess, as previously mentioned, is that Epaminondas took the existing 25-man file, set one behind the other and told it: henceforth, instead of pushing the enemy, you push the file ahead of you in much the same way but without the sharp pointy things.  Xenophon in his description of Leuctra makes reference to Theban lokhoi, which in his 401 BC-based Anabasis are companies of 100 men; if this is also the case for the Thebans, it implies a small unit organisation of four 25-man files, who at Leuctra would be doubled up into 50-man file combinations.

The Sacred Band itself was the 'hieros lokhos', and was 300 strong, although being a special formation it might or might not reflect the 'standard' Theban lokhos at the time.  If it did, then a Theban 'lokhos' would be 300 men in six double-files of 50 (previously twelve files of 25).  Essentially, take your pick - unless we can unearth a clue buried deep within our sources.

Quote from: Keith on January 30, 2018, 08:49:03 AM
How to represent this in a set of rules? The way my rules function, Roy's idea of a stack of units (i.e. a very deep formation but with an internal structure) would work well - beat the leading unit, but then you have to deal with the one behind. This may not be exactly how things were historically, but it would perhaps produce the same effect.

That might feel a bit more historical and work more historically than an "I've got 50 ranks therefore I have +5 on the die roll and beat anyone in a single turn" approach.  The one caveat might be that if you do not give the leading unit some sort of bonus for all that potential support, a shallowly-deployed crack opponent might simply chew his way through each part of the 'stack' in turn.  A 'stack' with a mild to moderate bonus for support might cover all eventualities.

No one has so far explored the implications of the depths adopted. What does it do the frontage? Over what frontage is the 25 man depth deployed? What frontage for the 50 man? If the Thebans have an excess of men then I suppise you can match the frontage of the opponent and be deeper . Why would you not deploy wider and go around the flanks?
A slight correction to the impression that I gave Keith. If the 50 man deep formation is only the Sacred Band it is 6 men wide. Is it possible that you put your best 50 men in the front eight ranks and punch through, then make a turn to lef or right into a formation that is now 50 men wide and procede against flank or rear.  I accept that  it might maje sense to break through with six 50 man units which then deploy out.
As I think Richard said, the idea of 50 men pushing on each other is a nonsense, even if they are otganised in blocks eight deep.  Men  would just die in the crush, the sides would bulge out.
To me its a orime consideration that a formationof all the hoplites in the Theban army 25 deep gives them the problem of having one third the frontage and yet not much benefit, 50 would just compound the problem. Wouldn't they be asking for trouble on the flanks?  To me it makes much more sense if the deployment is the mass of Thebans eight deep , with a penetration squad of the best men in a 50 deep formation thst can exploit once its through.
Roy

Quote from: aligern on January 31, 2018, 11:50:59 AM
As I think Richard said, the idea of 50 men pushing on each other is a nonsense, even if they are organised in blocks eight deep.  Men  would just die in the crush, the sides would bulge out.

I agree. It could go horribly wrong.
Nirvana, live at the Hordern Pavillion, 1992, in the mosh pit - the band appears, a thousand people push forward, about 300 people fall over and twice as many again are suddenly very scared of being crushed to death.

The advantage that our 50 strong Theban phalanx has over a mosh pit is internal organisation.  It is in files, keeping station with other files.  With the proper organisation, it can avoid falling into a scrum and crushing itself to death. 

Where we inevitably part company is how the 50 ranks apply pressure and what exactly the effect is.  Earlier in the topic, there was talk of "inertia".  It is hard to stop it trundling forward and, if you do, its hard to get it rolling backward.  This makes sense to me - it is far easier to go with the flow of a crowd as against stopping, going across or backing against it.

I think there is an interesting question out there of if 50 ranks was so good, why didn't everybody do it?  My suspicion would be post-operational analysis showed it wasn't that much better than 25 ranks and, by reducing frontage, added risks.

Well we've had variations on the 'can 50 men push?' discussion often enough, we all know where we stand (like good hoplites), and we all know exactly where it will lead (somewhere I'd rather not go).

The very narrow deep column - just the Sacred Band 50 deep - is an interesting idea, though I'd always thought the fact this just left them a frontage of 6 men rules it out as terribly wasteful of the best men. Plus it does sort of go against the spirit of Xenophon's and Diodorus' accounts - to me, they read as if the Thebans are all deep, not just the Sacred Band. A Sacred Band cutting edge at the front of a much deeper formation seems to avoid some difficulties and still allows the SB to dash forward under Pelopidas. It might also account for the apparent two stage combat described by Diodorus - first Pelopidas + SB kill Cleombrotus, then Epaminondas + heavy column drive the Spartans back - thus also accounting for Xenophon's initial Spartan success allowing Cleombrotus to be borne off. A formation deployed laterally across a different formation would be unusual - but then Epaminondas was an innovator.

But the fact is we will never know for sure - we can only offer speculations.

Concerning Theban organisation - a lot is known of the Boiotian army in the 3rd C, but it's doubtful how much of this can be applied to the 4th (probably not much) and anyway IIRC there's not much on low level organisation.

One possibility suggested by the use of 25 and 50 ranks - these are odd numbers in every sense, since we are used to hoplites and Macedonians using multiples of 8, or at least even numbers (like 12) - this allows files to be halved and remain equal, not possible with 25 of course. So maybe Thebans used multiples of 5 ('pempads') - this organisation is applied by Xenophon to his idealised army of Cyrus - multiples of 5 each with their own officer (or NCO), and also was apparently used by the Phliasians (Argives, not Boiotians, but at any rate it shows that variations on 8 were available). Maybe Thebans were organised in pempads, and typically formed a phalanx 5 pempads deep. This would give an NCO every fifth man to maintain order. If this is so, and highly speculatively, the Sacred Band could have formed the front pempad of the phalanx, so 60 men wide, and the regular Thebans 9 pempads, 45 deep, behind (which would need 2700 men to cover the same frontage). 

Despite the dangers of outflanking, the narrow frontage seems to have been the point of the formation, not a handicap, since it allowed the Thebans to concentrate on the Spartan knights around Cleombrotus - smashing the head of the snake.

Quote from: RichT on January 31, 2018, 01:28:14 PM
Despite the dangers of outflanking, the narrow frontage seems to have been the point of the formation, not a handicap, since it allowed the Thebans to concentrate on the Spartan knights around Cleombrotus - smashing the head of the snake.

And this was the point of massing '50 shields deep' as Xenophon describes:

"Coming now to the infantry, it was said that the Lacedaemonians led each half-company three files abreast, and that this resulted in the phalanx being not more than twelve men deep. The Thebans, however, were massed not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that if they conquered that part of the army which was around the king, all the rest of it would be easy to overcome."  - Hellenica VI.4.12

It was indeed the main body of the Thebans who formed 50 deep and the purpose was indeed to crush the 12-deep Spartans.  Epaminondas' whole battle plan was a complete departure from previous tradition: he formed his best troops on the left, not the right, and refused his right in order to avoid it being engaged before he had dealt with the Spartans.  Her was helped in this by the reluctance of many of the Spartan allies, who were tardy in advance, reluctant to engage and over-eager to retire, but the key to his formula was to crush a twelve deep formation with a 50-deep formation, this being double the usual already over-deep Theban deployment.

And what of the Sacred Band?  The idea that they formed the front ranks of the Theban mass appears to have a basis in traditional Theban practice, but not at Leuctra.

"Gorgidas, then, by distributing this sacred band among the front ranks of the whole phalanx of men-at-arms, made the high excellence of the men inconspicuous, and did not direct their strength upon a common object, since it was dissipated and blended with that of a large body of inferior troops; but Pelopidas, after their valour had shone out at Tegyra, where they fought by themselves and about his own person, never afterwards divided or scattered them, but, treating them as a unit, put them into the forefront of the greatest conflicts."  - Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas 19.3

(The next section in Pelopidas has an interesting sideline: "For just as horses run faster when yoked to a chariot than when men ride them singly, not because they cleave the air with more impetus owing to their united weight, but because their mutual rivalry and ambition inflame their spirits; so he thought that brave men were most ardent and serviceable in a common cause when they inspired one another with a zeal for high achievement." Do we need to consider revising chariot and cavalry movement rates?)

At Leuctra the Sacred Band appear to have moved up with the rest of the Theban phalanx, but to have broken off on Pelopidas' initiative to intercept the Spartan formation change.  One might envisage them as being six wide and 50 deep adjacent to the extreme left flank of the Theban force, but with discretion to do their own thing under their own commander.

Richard's idea of Theban 'pempads' is an interesting one which might repay further study.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 31, 2018, 01:18:16 PM
I think there is an interesting question out there of if 50 ranks was so good, why didn't everybody do it?  My suspicion would be post-operational analysis showed it wasn't that much better than 25 ranks and, by reducing frontage, added risks.

As earlier indicated, the Thebans seem to have cared less about subjecting their allies on the 'short flank' to increased risks through the Thebans' own reduced frontage, at least until Epaminondas' novel deployment at Leuctra.  One may note from Plutarch's description (Life of Pelopidas 23) that the Spartans had a simple counter for this sort of arrangement: they extended their wing and began to use the extension to outflank the Thebans.  Six ranks in front and six on the flank and wrapping round the rear were evidently considered a better bet for dealing with a 50-deep opponent than improvising a 48-deep counter-mass.  This in itself is interesting: if a 50-deep formation merely added extra casualty replacements, why not get your own 12-deep files into 48-deep combinations and match the Thebans more or less man for man?  To me, this indicates the Thebans were trained to push as a mass, using their practice-acquired cohesion and momentum in great depth, whereas the Spartans, even with their training to improvise cooperation, did not consider that they would be able to oppose this cohesive formation with an improvised one of their own.

Pelopidas ruined the Spartan counter by racing off with the Sacred Band and catching the Spartans in mid-manoeuvre.  If his 300 men started out six wide and 50 deep, they would have formed a very narrow 'spear'.  They could have reconfigured either before moving or on the move in order to arrive with more frontage and less depth, but if Epaminondas managed to bring on the main body as quickly as Plutarch implies then he would have engaged before the Spartans could sort themselves out and start wrapping up the Sacred Band, who might thus have been viable in either formation (whether still in 6x50 or in a shallower configuration, 30x10 or even 50x6).  I am tempted to think that Pelopidas might have wheeled them off sideways at first, moving parallel to the Spartan extension, then faced right and slammed a six-deep Sacred Band into a six-deep Spartan line, temporarily paralysing them on a 50-man frontage.

QuoteI am tempted to think that Pelopidas might have wheeled them off sideways at first, moving parallel to the Spartan extension, then faced right and slammed a six-deep Sacred Band into a six-deep Spartan line, temporarily paralysing them on a 50-man frontage.

This would have messed up their internal cohesion, giving you most files with no leaders and closers.

Quote from: Erpingham on February 01, 2018, 09:36:38 AM
This would have messed up their internal cohesion, giving you most files with no leaders and closers.

Quite true, but as this is the Sacred Band, the heroes of Tegyra, the best-trained and most intimately interconnected unit the Thebans fielded, they would anyway have very high inherent 'two-man-file' internal cohesion, such that Pelopidas might have judged it acceptable to commit them to action 'sideways on' against an opponent who was himself still in the middle of an evolution.  The Sacred Band would not have been expecting to win a straight fight by themselves, but to arrest or impede the Spartan motion long enough for the Theban deep phalanx to come up and smack into its target.  After that, the Sacred Band could be expected to win against its immediate opponents, given its own very high inherent (as opposed to purely organisational) internal cohesion and the fact that by this time Thebans were on the whole individually physically stronger than Spartans.

I shall ultimately leave it to the classicists to determine the right of it but I think I would make some observations

Reading secondary accounts, we can't be sure where the Sacred Band started the fight but most suggest they were separate from the line phalanx (in front, to the left or behind).  This gives us the possibility they weren't in the same formation.

We don't know the internal organisation of a Theban phalanx.  If the pempad idea is right, we need to reconcile it with the one certain thing we have about Sacred Band organisations, that it was organised in pairs.  Is it organised in paired files (which pempads would work with) or pairs within the file (which it wouldn't)?  This is, of course, a completely different topic to depth and ought to be considered separately (e.g. Army Research Theban army).

However, I am not convinced , just because a unit is elite heroes, it will abandon its drill and internal structure to expose its flank to another unit of elite heroes.  Invoking IMP, I think it will follow its drill to expand frontage.  We know from a previous battle that the Spartans were surprised at the drill competence of the Sacred Band.  Expanding frontage while facing the enemy, rather than wheeling out and turning to the flank, would be safer and, in the absence of contrary evidence, a preferred option, IMO.

Anthony:

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If the pempad idea is right, we need to reconcile it with the one certain thing we have about Sacred Band organisations, that it was organised in pairs.  Is it organised in paired files (which pempads would work with) or pairs within the file (which it wouldn't)?

Maybe each pempad was two pairs and a gooseberry? I've always assumed the pairs, if it really worked this way, would be side by side. How else to decide who goes in front (and potentially gets killed first)?

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However, I am not convinced, just because a unit is elite heroes, it will abandon its drill and internal structure to expose its flank to another unit of elite heroes.  Invoking IMP, I think it will follow its drill to expand frontage.  We know from a previous battle that the Spartans were surprised at the drill competence of the Sacred Band.  Expanding frontage while facing the enemy, rather than wheeling out and turning to the flank, would be safer and, in the absence of contrary evidence, a preferred option, IMO.

I'm not convinced there were any complex manoeuvres of any sort (from the Thebans). All the emphasis is on speed:

Xenophon: "in their flight they [the cavalry] had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the Thebans were now charging upon them"
Diodorus: "the Boeotians retreated on one wing, but on the other engaged the enemy in double-quick time".
Plutarch: "But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his position, and with his band of three hundred on the run ... and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness".

So the order of the day seems to be a rapid advance and hitting the Spartans while they were still disordered by cavalry (Xenophon) or by their attempted redeployment (Plutarch). Any redeployment by the Thebans would compromise the rapidity of the advance. The aim was to crush the head of the snake before the body can even get involved (and it worked).

We'll never determine the right of it though, just ruminate over possibilities.

To use a WW2 example is this a "meat-grinder" formation that just keeps feeding men in until the enemy are exhausted?

Quote from: Ade G on February 01, 2018, 05:03:25 PM
To use a WW2 example is this a "meat-grinder" formation that just keeps feeding men in until the enemy are exhausted?

More of a steamroller, I would say, but one which did not simply swap casualties until the opponent had none standing.  Total losses in the Spartan army (the losers) were 1,000 men out of perhaps 12,000 while the Thebans appear to have lost noticeably less.  The effect of the 50 deep Theban formation was to bundle the Spartans back to their starting line with losses along the way, suggesting a coordinated grind )or push) by everyone as opposed to a mutual grinding away of front ranks.

Quote from: RichT on February 01, 2018, 03:17:37 PM
However, I am not convinced, just because a unit is elite heroes, it will abandon its drill and internal structure to expose its flank to another unit of elite heroes.  Invoking IMP, I think it will follow its drill to expand frontage.  We know from a previous battle that the Spartans were surprised at the drill competence of the Sacred Band.  Expanding frontage while facing the enemy, rather than wheeling out and turning to the flank, would be safer and, in the absence of contrary evidence, a preferred option, IMO.

Could well have been the case.  That said, Pelopidas was not noted for caution or doing things by the book.

Quote
I'm not convinced there were any complex manoeuvres of any sort (from the Thebans). All the emphasis is on speed:

Xenophon: "in their flight they [the cavalry] had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the Thebans were now charging upon them"
Diodorus: "the Boeotians retreated on one wing, but on the other engaged the enemy in double-quick time".
Plutarch: "But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his position, and with his band of three hundred on the run ... and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness".

So the order of the day seems to be a rapid advance and hitting the Spartans while they were still disordered by cavalry (Xenophon) or by their attempted redeployment (Plutarch). Any redeployment by the Thebans would compromise the rapidity of the advance. The aim was to crush the head of the snake before the body can even get involved (and it worked).

Pelopidas would need to execute some form of redeployment if expanding his frontage, not least because he would have to expand left while advancing at the run.  While this might be possible if the run was not too rapid, he could get to where he wanted to be much faster by yelling "Sacred Band, follow me!" or equivalent, leading them off in a six-wide column at the trot to move parallel to the expanding Spartans (who in order to expand are themselves offering their sides, albeit shielded) and when level with the head of the Spartan extension he yells "Sacred, Band, face right, charge!" or some such brief instruction.  I like the idea because it is rapid and simple in execution and puts the Sacred Band exactly where they need to be in order to interrupt the Spartan redeployment.

It is of course a conjecture.  It is how I would have done it given the circumstances, the men available and the arithmetic of deployment and distance.  What actually was done is, as Richard indicates, something we shall probably never know.

Quote from: Dangun on January 29, 2018, 12:14:34 AM

I think though it might be more revealing to ask the question in reverse. Why does the 50 deep phalanx sometimes go backwards? The fact that it ever does get "pushed" backwards, suggests to me that weight is only one of a long list of factors.
Nirvana, live at the Hordern Pavillion, 1992, in the mosh pit - the band appears, a thousand people push forward, about 300 people fall over and twice as many again are suddenly very scared of being crushed to death.

You can see now on the new Othismos thread why these do not happen. 

Quote from: Erpingham on January 31, 2018, 01:18:16 PM
I think there is an interesting question out there of if 50 ranks was so good, why didn't everybody do it? 

It was great, it was also a one trick pony that failed the second time it was tried because it is essentially a trick.  To understand why it worked at Leuktra, we have to look at what the goal of a taxis in hoplite combat was. In my opinion the phalanx was not a solid line, but a string of taxeis arrayed alongside each other, a parataxeis as Thucydides tells us.  This means that the fate of each unit is not as tightly bound to the whole as many seem to portray. An example that shows what I mean is that in most big battles of the period, you win on the right and lose on the left.  This means that somewhere in the middle, you have a taxis moving forward, while the one right next to it is moving back! The taxis beating your neighbor to the left just chases them off the field. If the Argive 1,000 had bothered to turn left after marching through a great bloody gap in the Spartan allied ranks, Mantinea would have gone much differently. The Thebans had been forming deep, 25 ranks, to achieve local superiority since Pagondas did so at Delium.  That they kept doing so even at the cost of a cyclosis to the line as a whole can be seen in the fact that their allies attempted to bind them to only 16 ranks at Nemea- and failed.
So if we look at Leuktra, the goal was a showcase battle between the Thebans and the Spartiates. Epaminondas knew that if he won this clash the rest were just as irrelevant as any of the times that the left lost in previous battles.  The deep ranks would give a great advantage in othismos, but as I have shown elsewhere it was not a steamroller. The Spartiates were in fact holding their own for some time. The Spartan plan was actually wholly appropriate for this battle. The problem, as was common with Spartan armies, is that the execution was not up to the complexity of the plan.  The Spartans, not the Thebans, launched a cavalry attack on the Theban. This had two purposes. To lock the Thebans in combat and end the leftward veering of their advance. They had been using such veering to move on the enemy flank since Nemea. Also, the cavalry battle would screen the hoplites own movement towards cyclosis, which is the obvious counter-tactic if your enemy forms deep and narrow.  Xenophon's fanciful Thymbara is a replay of this showing how to overcome deep ranks. Both failed due to troop quality.  The Theban horse spanked the poorly manned Spartan, and the quality of Pelopidas and his men was such that they took the initiative to strike when they realized the Spartans were caught in mid-extension. When the Spartiates engaged, the rest of the allies were content to watch the show.
Mantinea was an attempt to replicate this, with both armies jamming their flank against a hill to limit outflanking.  The big difference was that Epaminondas was not "crushing the head" of the Spartan snake, because the Mantineans had formed up against him.  When he beat them, he in turn was taken in the flank, which I think explains why the Thebans could not advance even though the routed the Mantineans, and also how he managed to get killed because he would have formed on the Theban right.
It was never used again simply because it was too easy to counter.