A question that came up on the Triumph! forum, for which none present could think of any apposite examples: how good should decent or better archers (the sorts that be Bw (S) or Bw (O) in DBM(M)) be against field artillery?
I guess Formigny should be an example, but as I've mentioned before accounts I've read of it are disturbingly discordant.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 19, 2018, 05:24:38 PM
A question that came up on the Triumph! forum, for which none present could think of any apposite examples: how good should decent or better archers (the sorts that be Bw (S) or Bw (O) in DBM(M)) be against field artillery?
I guess Formigny should be an example, but as I've mentioned before accounts I've read of it are disturbingly discordant.
Can you clarify? Do you mean being shot at by artillery or shooting at artillery? or both?
Quote from: Erpingham on January 19, 2018, 05:36:33 PM
Can you clarify? Do you mean being shot at by artillery or shooting at artillery? or both?
The latter, mostly. Cannonballs presumably care very little whether the men they hit are archers or not*, so the question is mostly how good archers should be at silencing artillery by killing or scaring away the crew. You might think shooting gunners outside of fortifications should be easy, but in at least some accounts of Formigny the English (presumably including many archers) elected to run up to French guns and capture them in close combat, suggesting it maybe wasn't.
* Tho in a HYW context archers might be somewhat worse off than men-at-arms as many guns would be light enough that armour is relevant.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 19, 2018, 06:15:44 PM
You might think shooting gunners outside of fortifications should be easy, but in at least some accounts of Formigny the English (presumably including many archers) elected to run up to French guns and capture them in close combat, suggesting it maybe wasn't.
Two points on Formingny. First, we don't know if the gun was in archery range. Might be wise to use the range advantage to avoid return shooting. Second, the English seemed intend on carrying off the gun, which you can only do by overrunning it, even if you've shot those defending it.
I am struggling to think of other archers v guns battles. Gavere perhaps, though there is no evidence archery had a particular impact (and the Burgundians did have longbows, crossbows and handguns to try). The Anglo-Burgundian guns at Cravant don't seem to have suffered much from the Scots archery (though as they were again well seconded by longbows and crossbows, the enemy may not have targeted them). I don't think we have the detail of any WOTR battles which had guns and bows to judge their interaction. At Flodden, the English archers don't seem to have gone near the Scots guns, leaving it to long-range counter-battery fire to scatter their crews. Maybe some early Italian Wars or Hussite examples of guns v. archery? Anyone know?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 19, 2018, 06:15:44 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 19, 2018, 05:36:33 PM
Can you clarify? Do you mean being shot at by artillery or shooting at artillery? or both?
The latter, mostly. Cannonballs presumably care very little whether the men they hit are archers or not*, so the question is mostly how good archers should be at silencing artillery by killing or scaring away the crew. You might think shooting gunners outside of fortifications should be easy, but in at least some accounts of Formigny the English (presumably including many archers) elected to run up to French guns and capture them in close combat, suggesting it maybe wasn't.
* Tho in a HYW context archers might be somewhat worse off than men-at-arms as many guns would be light enough that armour is relevant.
I wonder whether many guns weren't protected by mantlets while reloading, or the crew provided with pavisiers? Gunners would have been a rarity and valuable.
Fwiw, the optimal tactic against horse and musket artillery was skirmishing Infantry picking off the gunners.
Any formed body presented a target, but cannon balls are useless against unformed, and canister was saved for better targets too.
Not that our period archers were deployed as skirmishers.
So probably not relevant
So we have a double challenge:
1) finding actions where archers engaged artillery
2) evaluating the effect(s) of archers on artillery in DBMM terms.
For DBMM ignoramuses like myself, a useful starting question is: how do they fare under the present rules?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 19, 2018, 07:35:54 PM
So we have a double challenge:
1) finding actions where archers engaged artillery
2) evaluating the effect(s) of archers on artillery in DBMM terms.
For DBMM ignoramuses like myself, a useful starting question is: how do they fare under the present rules?
As I said, the question arose on the Triumph! forum, so an evaluation in Triumph! terms would be more useful than one in DBMM ones :) I only mentioned DBM(M) to give an idea what sorts of archers we're talking about (non-skirmishing ones of decent or better quality) in terms I believe are widely understood.
Under the present version of the Triumph! rules (0.8
), Archers (the relevant classification under Triumph! rules - lower-case archers may end up in different classifications depending on quality, tactics, and horsiness) are heavy favorites against artillery if within bowshot, shooting twice as often and being more likely to destroy the enemy with any single attack.
Thank you.
So far, I have been unable to find any instances of longbowmen directly engaging artillery, and given the latter's slow rate of fire I suspect we shall find none, on the basis that after the first shot by the guns the longbowmen would find it easier simply to close rapidly to melee while the gunners ran away in the face of the oncoming attackers.
There are further complications.
If the guns are present in some numbers, i.e. a dozen or so rather than two or three, they can space their shooting so that one at least is always ready to fire, but will generate a significant amount of smoke when fired, which, on a windless day, will to an increasing extent obscure both themselves and their targets. This in turn would permit the targets to close with little chance of actually being hit, and would more or less dictate closing to melee as the primary tactic.
If the guns have mantlets (see 42, here (https://www.warhistoryonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/artillerie-medievale-594x640.png)) the crews will to an extent be protected while firing the weapon, although not necessarily when serving it. Of course, a breech-loading weapon (https://traveltoeat.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/wpid-Photo-Nov-7-2013-1036-AM.jpg) would benefit much more from mantlet-type protection. If mantlet coverage is good enough to render archery more or less ineffectual, the guns are best dealt with by closing rapidly to melee once they have shot and are reloading.
All of the above suggests to me that the preferred tactic for longbowmen dealing with artillery would be to let the guns shoot and then close rapidly for melee before they can reload. The course of the battles at Formigny and Castillon would appear to bear this out. I do not know if we can assume that guns on the battlefield would have mantlet protection, but suggest this would probably be the case, as the crews would have no wish to experience uninhibited longbow archery.
Not knowing the Triumph! rules, I can make no recommendations, but perhaps the above may serve as a basis for a more informed person to do so.
I would doubt your logic there Patrick.
Medieval guns were horribly unwieldy. You would not chose to add the extra encumbrance of mantlets for a field battle.
They are siege equipment, not field equipment, except in extremis.
Quote from: Mark G on January 20, 2018, 10:32:25 AM
I would doubt your logic there Patrick.
Medieval guns were horribly unwieldy. You would not chose to add the extra encumbrance of mantlets for a field battle.
They are siege equipment, not field equipment, except in extremis.
Except that is not actually true, is it. We know they were deliberately brought to field battles.
Which though.
The examples I am aware of, they were deployed around camp.
At Castillon 1453 there is an artillery camp. The French protected their guns with earthworks and fortfications. That might well be to protect the gunners from archery. Doesn't Babur do the same in India, protecting his gunners , presumably from bows. Don't the Hussites provide a fortified laager with guns as part of the mix. It would appear that guns need other infantry and fortifications to be effective.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on January 20, 2018, 05:39:51 PM
At Castillon 1453 there is an artillery camp. The French protected their guns with earthworks and fortfications. That might well be to protect the gunners from archery. Doesn't Babur do the same in India, protecting his gunners , presumably from bows. Don't the Hussites provide a fortified laager with guns as part of the mix. It would appear that guns need other infantry and fortifications to be effective.
In the 15th and 16th centuries, wagon laagers and the like with artillery are quite common across Eurasia. In many cases, tho, the evident intention is to resist cavalry rather than foot archers, e.g. Ottomans at Caldiran. I'd expect the same to aply to Babur's case, cavalry being the strike arm of 16C North Indian armies. The Hussites too - having many crossbowmen of their own - presumably weren't principally worried about being shot off the field (esp. as the crusaders tended to charge suicidally at the slightest provocation).
Castillon isn't quite the same, being a fortified camp rather than field fortification. I don't believe the French
intended to fight Talbot there.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 20, 2018, 05:55:54 PM
Castillon isn't quite the same, being a fortified camp rather than field fortification. I don't believe the French intended to fight Talbot there.
True: Bureau set up his artillery arrangements for the siege of Castillon, with an eye to breaking down the walls and beating off a relief force: he did not set up his guns and their protection specifically to engage Talbot in battle, but rather on general principles. For that matter, Talbot did not arrive expecting to fight a battle: he surprised the French out-guard of 1,000 or so archers at St Laurent Priory, and then received news that the French army was retreating. He led his men on expecting to strike a blow at their rearguard - and too late found his information was incorrect and the French were solidly ensconced in their siege camp. The rest is history.
Agreed that Castillon fortification was probably a fortified camp rather than a field fortification. We should note though that the guns which caused the English trouble were field pieces, not siege guns, and were not pointed at Castillon itself but defending the obvious line of approach.
Fortified artillery camps were not uncommon. For an English example, see Northampton. The Burgundians had a fortified defence line at Murten/Morat - where the Swiss didn't bother shooting at it, they just rushed it. The Italians have a fortified artillery position at Fornovo - like Northampton, rain affected play. Hemminstedt revolves around a field fortification with artillery as does Cerignola. There are doubtless more - the idea persisted into the 16th century. The purpose though seems to have been to prevent the position being overrun rather than protecting the guns from return fire.
Babur may well have been defending against elephants, the arm which his opponents had a plenty and was most dangerous to his largely cavalry army. However, though his opponents had many cavalry, most of those were bow armed .
At Castillon the French presumably took into account the strengths of their enemy and thus designed their camp with fortification and guns to deal with a relieving force with substantial archery .
Anthony is quite right, for a period there are many exampkes of gun camps, whether fortified carts, or earth, stakes and wicker. Likely this is about attempting to integrate non mobile firearms into the array and protect these slow firing weapons from other missiles and from assaults.
Roy
All of which suggests people liked to take care of their artillery and protect it - or rather its crews - from those nasty men with missiles.
Which brings us to: in a wargame, in which artillery is stuck in the middle of a field (table) and is shot at by longbowmen under a particular set of rules, how effective should that shooting be, and with what result?
This will very much depend upon whether we adopt the idea that battlefield artillery would be given at least a complete set of pavises or similar anti-missile screening or whether it would be left unprotected, gunpowder-era style. In the first instance, missilery will be to all intents and purposes ineffectual; in the second, the first volley will slaughter the crews or at least disable enough of them to prevent the operation of the guns.
Personally, I would go for the missile screen approach, given the illogicality of leaving static artillery crews exposed and the historical tendency of opponents to rush batteries rather than shoot at them. If this line of thinking is accepted, then artillery would be - at least from a frontal aspect - almost invulnerable to archery. If it is assumed that no such screens would be used, then the effect of archery would be the same as against unshielded men wearing whatever armour the gun crews use.
To consider Mark's earlier thought:
QuoteMedieval guns were horribly unwieldy. You would not chose to add the extra encumbrance of mantlets for a field battle.
Such guns would not expect to move in a field battle, and any extra encumbrance of mantlets or similar would be trivial compared to the weight of the gun itself. Weight for weight, a crossbowman's pavise is a greater encumbrance than an added screen or mantlet for a gun.
I think Patrick has pulled out a couple of rules-worthy points there. Tactics for attacking an artillery fortification do seem to be consistently that, if you were going to take it on, you didn't mess around trying to shoot it to death but close assaulted it. We can assume a general ineffectiveness of shooting at emplaced artillery with some justification. This doesn't entirely answer Andreas question as there seem few "guns v. archers" battles in the open.
Another was the immobility of guns and the need to emplace or at least pre-place guns. This isn't an absolute - the Burgundians were known to put light guns in the van to cover river crossings, which is a bit more of an offensive use (though obviously in this case, the attacker is controlling the battle tempo so this doesn't need to have been that quick tactically). And at Flodden, the English guns came into action off the march.
Don't most rules give a protection bonus for defensive works and camps though?
Which sort of covers the examples above of guns with big chunks of wood protecting them, while leaving guns without as normal.
I don't count wagons as artillery. Also not aware of any rules that do either, wagons are wagons and some may contain guns.
Seems to me that guns are unprotected, but can be placed in fixed defenses just like infantry, and receive bonuses for defending them.
I'd like to hear about foot archery engaging guns in a battle.
Yes, period, weight of artillery and whether it can be shifted around the battlefield on wheels will make for considerable variation in mobility and perhaps in the degree of protection actually employed. At Crecy, the guns (if we allow their existence) seem to have been fairly light (just over 3-inch calibre) and mounted on wagons, which would have allowed mobility if they were not already part of a wagon laager and which would have permitted some sort of anti-missile screens to be mounted. Villani does not claim that the Genoese managed to shoot any gunners, which might be indicative.
I am still feeling towards an answer for "guns v. archers" battles in the open, but at present can only conjecture that as artillerists were both scarce and potentially highly vulnerable to archery, anyone who did not want to lose them would presumably allocate some form of anti-missile protection, even if only borrowed pavises. Naturally, this need not mean that everyone who employed artillery would be so solicitous about protection, and I suspect that the degree of protection provided (if any) would be in inverse proportion to the number and power of the guns. Turkish guns, for example, were often chained together as a defence against assault, but I do not recall mention of them being pavised or mantleted in the field.
Quote from: Mark G on January 21, 2018, 07:38:36 PM
I'd like to hear about foot archery engaging guns in a battle.
This is precisely the problem: it appears they did not, or did so too rarely or inconspicuously for chroniclers to notice. We are still looking for an instance of foot archers thus engaging guns. If you can find any, it would be helpful.
Quote from: Mark G on January 21, 2018, 07:38:36 PM
I don't count wagons as artillery. Also not aware of any rules that do either, wagons are wagons and some may contain guns.
FWIW, DBMM classes the larger Hussite wagon-mounted guns as Artillery, not War-Wagons. Triumph! may be meant to do the same - one of the options for Hussite artillery is "houfnice" (Czech for "howitzer"), which is the the name DBMM uses for the heavy wagon-mounted guns, but I don't know if the Triumph! writers took the term from WRG or if the word necessarily denotes a wagon-mounted weapon in a Hussite context.
Back closer to my original question, absent much evidence what should happen if unprotected artillery is shot at by massed bowmen, it would seem a decent design-for-effect to make it unpleasant for the gunners, the better to encourage players to follow historical precedent and put their guns in field fortifications.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 21, 2018, 09:06:55 PM
Quote from: Mark G on January 21, 2018, 07:38:36 PM
I don't count wagons as artillery. Also not aware of any rules that do either, wagons are wagons and some may contain guns.
FWIW, DBMM classes the larger Hussite wagon-mounted guns as Artillery, not War-Wagons. Triumph! may be meant to do the same - one of the options for Hussite artillery is "houfnice" (Czech for "howitzer"), which is the the name DBMM uses for the heavy wagon-mounted guns, but I don't know if the Triumph! writers took the term from WRG or if the word necessarily denotes a wagon-mounted weapon in a Hussite context.
Back closer to my original question, absent much evidence what should happen if unprotected artillery is shot at by massed bowmen, it would seem a decent design-for-effect to make it unpleasant for the gunners, the better to encourage players to follow historical precedent and put their guns in field fortifications.
To match history we might want to get to a situation where archers see artillery in field fortifications and don't waste their time shooting, but just charge in instead.
However we might run into problems here with rules because some don't let archers or missile troops charge into melee with enemy they can shoot (even if it's ineffective)
In the absence of evidence, might it not rather be the case that a gun (almost certainly singular on a field) was not worth the volley of arrows?
This mirrors horse and musket. You don't send formed infantry into range, they die before they get to make the volley. Without multiple times and canister, the other side of that equation may be relevant. The number of arrows needed to be certain if eliminating the gunners makes them a wasteful target when greater threats remain.
You send skirmishers once you know there is no cavalry threat.
It's different against a formed defensive line, the gun may even be a weaker point given the low rate of fire.
Also, consider the position if the guns themselves in a field battle, how many attacks centre on that point, and how many attacks would block the line of fire.
So perhaps if we try looking at deployments with guns in the open against forces with decent bow strength. Where do they end up relative to both the enemy bow, and the main attack?
I'm sure some WoTR ospreys show cannon in the middle of a bill / knight advance.
Is that accurate and typical?
Is so, would it not suggest that archers have better things to do than waste all that arrow supply on a gun?
QuoteI don't know if the Triumph! writers took the term from WRG or if the word necessarily denotes a wagon-mounted weapon in a Hussite context.
Hussites seem to have used three types of guns - handguns, wagon mounted light guns and heavier-calibre houfnices, which were on a wheeled carriage. They seem to have fought from within the wagonburg, so probably won't provide us with much artillery v. archer data.
Quote from: Mark G on January 22, 2018, 08:00:10 AM
In the absence of evidence, might it not rather be the case that a gun (almost certainly singular on a field) was not worth the volley of arrows?
If it was worth mounting a charge to capture it (e.g. Formigny), then it would definitely be worth a volley to knock it out and save all the time and effort involved in that messy close-quarters business.
In any event, even if historical archers for whatever reason declined to loose their grey-goose shafts at guns, their wargaming equivalents have no such scruples and are unlikely to take 'not allowed' for an answer.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 21, 2018, 09:06:55 PM
Back closer to my original question, absent much evidence what should happen if unprotected artillery is shot at by massed bowmen, it would seem a decent design-for-effect to make it unpleasant for the gunners, the better to encourage players to follow historical precedent and put their guns in field fortifications.
This I consider a good idea in order to avoid tabletop situations whereby artillery is placed in the open in the secure knowledge that it is invulnerable to opposing missiles.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2018, 12:51:56 PM
Quote from: Mark G on January 22, 2018, 08:00:10 AM
In the absence of evidence, might it not rather be the case that a gun (almost certainly singular on a field) was not worth the volley of arrows?
If it was worth mounting a charge to capture it (e.g. Formigny), then it would definitely be worth a volley to knock it out and save all the time and effort involved in that messy close-quarters business.
A volley of arrows is only useful against artillerists, not the guns themselves. I suspect once within bowshot the crews would abandon the guns and get out of range until danger had passed. That seems to be what happened at Formigny where the English captured the guns then tried to drag them off the field back to their own lines; if they'd left them in place the crews would have just reoccupied the position and resumed shooting.
Cheers
Mick
Quote from: Mick Hession on January 22, 2018, 02:36:45 PM
A volley of arrows is only useful against artillerists, not the guns themselves. I suspect once within bowshot the crews would abandon the guns and get out of range until danger had passed. That seems to be what happened at Formigny where the English captured the guns then tried to drag them off the field back to their own lines; if they'd left them in place the crews would have just reoccupied the position and resumed shooting.
Does this suggest that rules need a "suppressed" result for artillery being shot at?
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 22, 2018, 02:50:45 PM
Quote from: Mick Hession on January 22, 2018, 02:36:45 PM
A volley of arrows is only useful against artillerists, not the guns themselves. I suspect once within bowshot the crews would abandon the guns and get out of range until danger had passed. That seems to be what happened at Formigny where the English captured the guns then tried to drag them off the field back to their own lines; if they'd left them in place the crews would have just reoccupied the position and resumed shooting.
Does this suggest that rules need a "suppressed" result for artillery being shot at?
Possibly, though I'm always wary of basing anything on a sample of 1 :) - in this case the guns were unfortified so perhaps it's something to consider for unemplaced artillery.
Based entirely on Wikipedia I gather the Ming used artillery extensively in 1413/14 against the Mongols who were of course primarily archers, though mounted. I know Chinese sources don't "do" narrative like western sources but do we have any details of the interaction?
Cheers
Mick
Quote from: Mick Hession on January 22, 2018, 03:21:57 PM
Possibly, though I'm always wary of basing anything on a sample of 1 :)
One wishes all wargame rules were based on samples that big :P
A "suppressed" result is probably not going to happen in Triumph!, it's aiming at a DBA-like level of complexity and a combat outcome that only applies to a single fairly rare troop type doesn't fit well with that.
Slightly heretical thought but what happened to artillery in the sixteenth century? I have a vague recollection that gunners under fire/attack would abandon guns and hide behind the nearest foot. The battle then flowed over the gun and the winning side recovered it at the end of the battle. So, abstracting, guns can become "casualties" which may mean the crew has died round the gun but could equally be they had decided, as technical specialists, they should should make a tactical withdrawal until the technology was required again.
Quote from: Mick Hession on January 22, 2018, 03:21:57 PMBased entirely on Wikipedia I gather the Ming used artillery extensively in 1413/14 against the Mongols who were of course primarily archers, though mounted. I know Chinese sources don't "do" narrative like western sources but do we have any details of the interaction?
Not sure about this specific campaign, but in general the Ming, like the Europeans, favoured putting their artillery behind fortifications.
Quote from: Lorge, "War, Politics and Society inEarly Modern China, 900-1795"Generally speaking, the Ming emphasized cannon over hand-held guns, though both were understood to be much more effective against steppe cavalry when deployed behind fixed fortifications.
- or in wagon forts as in http://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/2017/02/qi-ji-guangs-che-ying-p1.html
A quick search on Turks shows them using an artillery fortification at Chaldiran 1507 likely with the Janissaries with the guns. At Varna the Jannissaries are behind fortifications and I wonder if there are some guns there too.
' The Ottomans deployed heavy artillery and thousands of Janissaries equipped with gunpowder weapons behind a barrier of carts. The Safavids, who did not have artillery at their disposal at Chaldiran,[25] used cavalry to engage the Ottoman forces. The Safavids attacked the Ottoman wings in an effort to avoid the Ottoman artillery positioned at the center. However, the Ottoman artillery was highly maneuverable and the Safavids suffered disastrous losses.[26] The advanced Ottoman weaponry was the deciding factor of the battle as the Safavid forces, who only had traditional weaponry, were decimated. The Safavids also suffered from poor planning and ill-disciplined troops unlike the Ottomans.[27]bWikipedia. I don't buy the manoeuvreability of the guns, but they may have been placed to fire to the flank as that would be where the Persian cavalry were expected to be.
It is nteresting that the gun fort or gun camp or gun besring wagen burg occurs across the Balkans to Europe, to the Turks, the Mughals even the Chinese. Is it a matter of an idea being transmitted or does it originate separately in an age where guns and handgubs are becoming widespread and very threatening to a mounted elite , but cavalry are everywhere dominant. The interaction of guns and opposing bows is probably not the prime reason, rather each army deploying a frtified gun line was looking to defend its artillery against whatever was the prime agent in its enemy's attack, so longbowmen, Swiis pikes, charging knights, Persians or Mamelukes, ir even elehants. However they attacked it was necessary to rotect guns and handguns from them.
Quote from: aligern on January 22, 2018, 11:26:09 PM
It is interesting that the gun fort or gun camp or gun bearing wagenburg occurs across the Balkans to Europe, to the Turks, the Mughals even the Chinese. Is it a matter of an idea being transmitted or does it originate separately in an age where guns and handguns are becoming widespread and very threatening to a mounted elite , but cavalry are everywhere dominant. The interaction of guns and opposing bows is probably not the prime reason, rather each army deploying a fortified gun line was looking to defend its artillery against whatever was the prime agent in its enemy's attack, so longbowmen, Swiss pikes, charging knights, Persians or Mamelukes, or even elephants. However they attacked it was necessary to protect guns and handguns from them.
That makes very good sense, at least to me.
Within the limited context of this thread, it looks as if the question of the effectiveness of longbowmen (or other missile troops) vs artillery is turning into a question of getting the artillery to pay a few extra points for field fortifications. (If through perversity they do not, they have the options of running away when missile troops come within range or dying in place.)
That seems a reasonable summation for western Europe at least.
I do wonder whether more effort could go into placing guns relative to bows and attack lines though.
What I hypothesise is that guns are not placed in line of a main attack by the attacker, and are not often seen lined up against archery by the defenders (excluding battles around camps of fortifications).
From which I would conclude that guns are not powerful enough to prepare the main attack, as HnM guns are, and are not dangerous enough to warrant concentrated archery by the defender.
My pre supposition us that in general, they are a frippery to the field battle. Nice to have, presenting something additional to the army, but not at all central to the plan until you reach an opponent which is fixed in place and not going anywhere.
And then I would go to the table effect. If guns are doing enough damage to necessitate a major bow unit to get after them, then they may be over powered, and that needs addressing.
We all seem to agree that gunners are pretty helpless against arrows. But consider how many gunners are there to be got at. How many archers ate you committing to clear them out?
More than 1-2-1 seems total overkill unless your archers are hopeless shots, or the bows take half an hour to reload.
That is my idea, anyway.
If it offers anything to the question.
Quote from: Mark G on January 23, 2018, 02:15:06 PMMy pre supposition us that in general, they are a frippery to the field battle. Nice to have, presenting something additional to the army, but not at all central to the plan until you reach an opponent which is fixed in place and not going anywhere.
My suspicion is that this depends exactly what period you are talking about; it may be true in the 14th century, but I'm not sure it is by the later 15th.
Guns and handguns/ early arquebus are slow to fire, but ( let us assume) quite damaging when they do. Where they are not defending the camp, or where the camp is placed so as to form part of the battle line then they are being empkaced with a purpose. in Eastern battles the centrally placed and firtified shooters are there to act as a force multiplier. The Lodi troops oppising Babur are expecting their cavalry and elephants which have a large advantage in numbers to roll over him, but the fort to their fron baljs them and they suffer severely in front of it (Shades of Kagemusha here) . Similarly at Chaldiran the Persians have the better cavalry. Here the artillery camps are used like earlier steppe waggon forts, they channel the oppising cavalry who will find that they are exposing their flanks both to fire from the fort and cavalry placed behind it. The Hussites, ne presumes, are using the fort / wagonburg concept because they doubt that they could hold off the Crusaders in the open.
The question they all seek to answer is how to get value from gunpowder weapons which are deadly but slow and lack defensive capability. The weakness of providing the cannon and handguns with field fortifications is that these can be avoided, or assaulted by good infantry. The key innvation that occurred in the awest was to combine pike and shot and produce a moving fort that could attack as well as defend and where the shot degraded the enemy before the white weapons did their work. The English had managed a similar combination in the 14th century , but had only in a defensive stance and it would take until the later 17th century to get it to work well enough , but then it went on to dominate the world.
I suggest that the gunpowder weapons should be slow to fire, but deadly when they do to anyone stuck in front of them and that they should be able to shoot out laterally at a flat angle so that they cannot just be bypassed, which opponents of the period seem not to have been able to do?
R
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 23, 2018, 02:19:57 PM
Quote from: Mark G on January 23, 2018, 02:15:06 PMMy pre supposition us that in general, they are a frippery to the field battle. Nice to have, presenting something additional to the army, but not at all central to the plan until you reach an opponent which is fixed in place and not going anywhere.
My suspicion is that this depends exactly what period you are talking about; it may be true in the 14th century, but I'm not sure it is by the later 15th.
Agreed. At Formigny the fire of just two culverins was galling enough for the English to risk abandoning their defensive position to capture them and try to carry them off. That suggests guns were effective by then at least.
Cheers
Mick
Quote from: Mick Hession on January 23, 2018, 05:06:02 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 23, 2018, 02:19:57 PM
Quote from: Mark G on January 23, 2018, 02:15:06 PMMy pre supposition us that in general, they are a frippery to the field battle. Nice to have, presenting something additional to the army, but not at all central to the plan until you reach an opponent which is fixed in place and not going anywhere.
My suspicion is that this depends exactly what period you are talking about; it may be true in the 14th century, but I'm not sure it is by the later 15th.
Agreed. At Formigny the fire of just two culverins was galling enough for the English to risk abandoning their defensive position to capture them and try to carry them off. That suggests guns were effective by then at least.
Cheers
Mick
I think that by a certain period (not entirely sure the cut of date) I don't think you could just stand in range of artillery and ignore it for long.
But it's interesting that they tried to carry off the guns, not merely shoot down the gunners with archery.
I'd suggest that in 'field conditions' it wasn't something worth attempting.
We've not found anybody who claimed to have done it or even attempted it
Quote from: Mick Hession on January 23, 2018, 05:06:02 PM
At Formigny the fire of just two culverins was galling enough for the English to risk abandoning their defensive position to capture them and try to carry them off. That suggests guns were effective by then at least.
At least annoying. I assume they were set up beyond the shooting range of archers and were effectively shooting at a large immobile target. Each shot may have killed several men (we have sixteenth century records of this effect) but, given the low rate of fire, how lethal this was in the big scheme of things? But it isn't the only battle in which troops wouldn't remain static under fire they couldn't answer.
QuoteBut it's interesting that they tried to carry off the guns, not merely shoot down the gunners with archery.
This may be confirmation of earlier speculation that gunners legged it rather than fight for the guns. The only way the English could prevent the French remanning them was to drag them off. Or, then again, it could be trophy hunting :)
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2018, 05:39:47 PM
This may be confirmation of earlier speculation that gunners legged it rather than fight for the guns. The only way the English could prevent the French remanning them was to drag them off. Or, then again, it could be trophy hunting :)
When do we first hear of guns being spiked to render recapture irrelevant?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 23, 2018, 05:50:56 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2018, 05:39:47 PM
This may be confirmation of earlier speculation that gunners legged it rather than fight for the guns. The only way the English could prevent the French remanning them was to drag them off. Or, then again, it could be trophy hunting :)
When do we first hear of guns being spiked to render recapture irrelevant?
According to OED, term first used in 1617
1617 F. Moryson Itinerary ii. 166 Some were found having spikes and hammers to cloy the cannon.Use in other places or if there was an earlier name for the practice, don't know.
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 23, 2018, 02:19:57 PM
Quote from: Mark G on January 23, 2018, 02:15:06 PMMy pre supposition us that in general, they are a frippery to the field battle. Nice to have, presenting something additional to the army, but not at all central to the plan until you reach an opponent which is fixed in place and not going anywhere.
My suspicion is that this depends exactly what period you are talking about; it may be true in the 14th century, but I'm not sure it is by the later 15th.
In AD 1494, Charles VIII invaded Italy with the first really effective train of field artillery. However, between the difficulties of bringing the guns up to where they were needed and Italian rainstorms wetting the powder, it was not until AD 1512 that artillery began to be really effective on the battlefield. At Ravenna that same year, both sides fielded dozens of artillery pieces and the French were able to move some of theirs during the battle to enfilade the Spanish encampment. In essence, the French artillery hit the Spanish cavalry and the Spanish artillery hit the French infantry; the Spanish then lost the cavalry fight and the French the infantry fight, but the commitment of the victorious French cavalry enabled the hitherto unsuccessful French infantry to prevail over their Spanish counterparts. It is noteworthy that the Spanish cavalry did not attempt to charge the 24 French guns which had moved to enfilade them, but instead went for their traditional opponents, the French cavalry.
The following year, (1513), the French fell out with the Swiss, and in the resultant battle of Novara the Swiss, making a dawn surprise attack, took an estimated 2,000 casualties (out of 12,000 attackers) from the French artillery, but still pressed their attack home, broke the landsknechts in French service and captured the French guns.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2018, 06:00:09 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 23, 2018, 05:50:56 PM
When do we first hear of guns being spiked to render recapture irrelevant?
According to OED, term first used in 1617
1617 F. Moryson Itinerary ii. 166 Some were found having spikes and hammers to cloy the cannon.
Use in other places or if there was an earlier name for the practice, don't know.
Thanks. While there might have earlier names for it, I think we can reasonably assume that England wasn't too far behind anywhere else in matters of gunpowder warfare.
Smith & De Vries' Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UAL0SfuyUGQC&pg=PA143&lpg=PA143&dq=charles+the+bold%27s+artillery&source=bl&ots=u1KkU4Gswl&sig=T0y8qcWYdRwj5JoXOqMfiGvGiCM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjq_46gt_DYAhVC6RQKHaY5C-UQ6AEIOTAH#v=onepage&q=charles%20the%20bold's%20artillery&f=false) has an interesting account of Montlhery 1465. Some sources - de Haynin, Olivier de la Marche - have Burgundian gunfire apparently provoking the French charge, French capturing Burgo guns, Charles trying to retake them, and eventually gunfire driving the French back and making them flee. Such success, plus their role at Brusten against the Liegeois, helps to explain why Charles may have expected too much of his guns against the Swiss.
But despite the French presumably having lots of archers, both Ordonnance and francs-, they seem to have chosen to attack rather than try to shoot down gun-crews.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 23, 2018, 05:50:56 PM
When do we first hear of guns being spiked to render recapture irrelevant?
Translations of Balbi refer to spiking guns at Malta 1565 - though this is spiking your own guns when abandoning an outwork.
To add a couple of elements to Duncan's report of Montlhery, The Burgundians had most of their guns "dug in", with a few in advance of the main line. Also, the French not only overan the guns but dragged some off and the Burgundians counter attacked to get them back, so Formingny isn't an isolated instance.
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 24, 2018, 11:29:59 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 23, 2018, 05:50:56 PM
When do we first hear of guns being spiked to render recapture irrelevant?
Translations of Balbi refer to spiking guns at Malta 1565 - though this is spiking your own guns when abandoning an outwork.
Thanks. Inching closer to our period.
I've read the Smith & De Vries book, but I'd forgotten the account of Montlhery (based mostly on Haynin - Commines from memory pays rather less attention to gunnery in his account). It's not clear to me from the account tho if the serpentines in front of the main line were protected or exposed. Overall, tho, the battle is clearly another example of artillery being used from field fortifications.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 24, 2018, 04:14:34 PM
I've read the Smith & De Vries book, but I'd forgotten the account of Montlhery (based mostly on Haynin - Commines from memory pays rather less attention to gunnery in his account). It's not clear to me from the account tho if the serpentines in front of the main line were protected or exposed. Overall, tho, the battle is clearly another example of artillery being used from field fortifications.
Agree on the serpentines. S & DV do place more emphasis on those accounts that pay a lot of attention to the guns, for obvious reasons. The French guns are brought into action from the march and so had no time to emplace but the Burgundians had plenty of prep time.
For those who haven't read it and are interested in battlefield use of artillery in this period should note the Burgundians had a lot of it - 700-800 wagons were in the artillery train - and they opened fire at range to provoke the French to attack in an unco-ordinated manner. The French obliged but the Burgundian plan seems to have gone wrong because instead of being cut down as they attack the gun position, they overran it. S & DV claim that the artillery was very effective but this is hard to prove as it is unclear what the casualties were, let alone what caused them. The Burgundian despatch claimed, however, that in the initial phase, involving the guns, 1200-1400 French and a large number of horses were killed. It is hard to see how this could be determined other than guesswork, though.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 24, 2018, 05:00:12 PM
S & DV claim that the artillery was very effective but this is hard to prove as it is unclear what the casualties were, let alone what caused them. The Burgundian despatch claimed, however, that in the initial phase, involving the guns, 1200-1400 French and a large number of horses were killed. It is hard to see how this could be determined other than guesswork, though.
When the heralds and priests were counting the slain as the locals separated them out for burial, it would have been possible, assuming some sufficiently diligent heralds and/or scribes, to count the number of bodies with missing heads, torsos, limbs, cannonball-sized holes and similar indicators that the simple arrow or
arme blanche had not been the cause of death.
These casualties would also presumably be laid out on the field in a location distinct from the bodies of both sides piled on the actual gun positions, which might anyway allow a guesstimate-by-eye of how many bodies were in that particular part of the field, at least in time for a despatch. Such a
coup d'oeil estimate would obviously have a certain plus or minus factor; might this tie in with the indefiniteness of the actual figures given? ("Sire, it looks like more than a thousand but less than 1,500; the horses are many, but whether three hundred or seven hundred I could not say.")
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 24, 2018, 08:31:48 PM
When the heralds and priests were counting the slain as the locals separated them out for burial, it would have been possible, assuming some sufficiently diligent heralds and/or scribes, to count the number of bodies with missing heads, torsos, limbs, cannonball-sized holes and similar indicators that the simple arrow or arme blanche had not been the cause of death.
Apologies, I haven't given you all the information in our source. We know this is a guesstimate not a count because , although written four days after the battle, it states
Concerning the number of French dead, the truth has not yet been ascertained, but there are said to be many and inummerable wounded.This may in part be because the situation after the battle was chaotic and all sorts of pursuits and skirmishes took place, so the Burgundians hadn't collated the reports. The number given may be the number of bodies collected in that area of the field - it was July, so I doubt there was much CSI type inspection of cause of death.
Incidentally, Richard Vaughan : Philip the Good quotes both the first French and Burgundian reports. Both eye witness, the French written the day after the battle.
The Burgundians reckon they killed "many" French, but at least 1200-1400 on the field. They say they lost 300-400 men killed.
The French report ( by Louis XI himself) reckons they killed 1400-1500 Burgundians on the field, captured 2-300 and killed or captured 2000 in pursuit. French killed were said to be a tenth of the Burgundian, so 140-150 men.
One or both parties isn't telling the truth. I'm very dubious about the French figures because the letter proclaims a French victory when they had been beaten and were in retreat. But it does show the risk of accepting medieval figures, even from well-connected eye witnesses, at face value.
One final fact is that Vaughan says in a footnote that the ammunition expenditure of the Burgundian archers and artillery at the battle is in the archives. Alas, he doesn't quote it.
Good stuff chaps,
But I am seeing lots of examples of guns against a fixed target (in a static defensive position, even if without wood or stone), which is countered not by archery, but by a charge (provoked or not).
Take formigny . Were there any archers near to use against those provoking guns?
That might tell us whether the arrows were better kept for something else. Or not, if they were elsewhere.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 25, 2018, 10:26:36 AM
Incidentally, Richard Vaughan : Philip the Good quotes both the first French and Burgundian reports. Both eye witness, the French written the day after the battle.
The Burgundians reckon they killed "many" French, but at least 1200-1400 on the field. They say they lost 300-400 men killed.
The French report ( by Louis XI himself) reckons they killed 1400-1500 Burgundians on the field, captured 2-300 and killed or captured 2000 in pursuit. French killed were said to be a tenth of the Burgundian, so 140-150 men.
One or both parties isn't telling the truth. I'm very dubious about the French figures because the letter proclaims a French victory when they had been beaten and were in retreat. But it does show the risk of accepting medieval figures, even from well-connected eye witnesses, at face value.
That it does; something of a hazard with this period, it appears, although I would be more inclined to doubt specifically those which contradict each other and, as you have done, look to context for clues as to who might have been more economical with the truth rather than assuming that everyone habitually got it wrong. Classical figures seem by contrast to have been firmer because of traditions like giving back the dead, counting bodies to qualify for a (Roman) triumph, the Persian habit of 'resuming arrows' after a campaign, etc.
One might expect Roman generals to inflate figures of enemy dead in order to get a triumph, but they did not: I think it was Cato who stood accused of killing a few hundred local villagers to make up the requisite number, which indicates the count was real even if there was a temptation to make up any shortfall in nefarious ways.
Quote
One final fact is that Vaughan says in a footnote that the ammunition expenditure of the Burgundian archers and artillery at the battle is in the archives. Alas, he doesn't quote it.
A pity, as this sort of thing is useful to wargamers and even more so to rules writers.
Quote from: Mark G on January 25, 2018, 12:47:35 PM
Take formigny . Were there any archers near to use against those provoking guns?
Lt-Col Burne (
The Agincourt War) specifically states that it was archers who charged and took the French guns.
QuoteThat it does; something of a hazard with this period, it appears, although I would be more inclined to doubt specifically those which contradict each other and, as you have done, look to context for clues as to who might have been more economical with the truth rather than assuming that everyone habitually got it wrong.
I admit to having the advantage of having Vaughan's book in front of me and having been reading the accounts, secondary and contemporary (if you haven't read Commines wonderful participant's account, please do. It was written a long time later but it is vivid, engaging, poignant and humourous in places and gives a marvelously chaotic view of a medieval battle from the inside).
Looking at context, Loius XI is withdrawing with quite a small remnant of his army. It is the day after the battle and he is probably just receiving first reports, which he is spinning to best effect (Louis XI wasn't the universal spider for nothing). His low casualty estimate is probably based on assuming most of his missing army just being scattered and not lost.
The Burgundian despatch is four days after the battle. They have probably arranged the disposal of the dead and have a count. They've retrieved their strays, the pursuers have come back, may have received back some of their prisoners which their captors have released on licence and have probably sent heralds to enquire after others.
Context wise, we can see what the levels of reliability are.
The archers charged the guns, rather than volleyed at the gunners.
Now that must surely tell us something.
QuoteLt-Col Burne (The Agincourt War) specifically states that it was archers who charged and took the French guns.
Which fact he takes from Robert Blondel's account. The action starts with the English deployed in three lines behind a ditch and emplacement of stakes. The archers are at the front in three bodies, one beside the other. The French archers make an attack on the position and are beaten off. The French gunner Master Girault brings up two guns to provide more firepower, which are covered by the archers. The English archers attack their French opposite numbers, drive them off and try to drag off the guns. Pierre de Breze, commanding the French van, launches a counter attack and drives off the English retaking the guns. Thus ends phase 1 of the action.
For those who like co-incidences, the seizure of the serpentines at Montlhery was done by men under Pierre de Breze's command. Among the Burgundian gunners was one Master Girault (though we can't be sure it was the same man).
So, the archers attack because they are the men in front. They are not just dealing with two guns in isolation but guns supporting archers. To pick up Mark's point, the arrows may have primarily been expended at them as the primary threat.
There doesn't seem to be an English translation of Blondel. There's an English edition of the original Latin (https://archive.org/details/narrativesofexpu00stev)(
which I can't find the bit about guns is on p.172) but there is a French translation of Blondel's works on Gallica (you need vol 2 (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1054015?rk=42918;4), starts p.355)
Goodness, Anthony, you have been busy!
Reading between the lines (as the lines themselves are not entirely explicit about the answers we seek) it looks as if the French gunners shot their pieces, then while they were reloading the English, who had been exchanging arrows with the French missilemen generally, charged, defeated the French archers and took the guns. What we do not appear to have is an explicit statement that either the gunners perished under the clothyard shafts or that they betook themselves out of harm's way.
The guns were brought up during the action, the question being whether they brought anti-missile protection with them. They presumably went into action while the English were still shooting, and perhaps from the same distance as the French archers (unless the latter opened a gap in the centre for them to shoot through). If alongside the French archers, they would have needed protection. If they were further back, they would not. Best guess? They were further back, the French archers having divided to let them shoot, and lacked protection. Being vulnerable would not have mattered while they remained out of bowshot. It would mean that if anything happened to their covering archers the crews would have to run for their lives faster than one can say "civilian artillery driver". :)
Andreas' original question presupposed the longbowmen being in range and free to shoot (i.e. not dealing with more pressing matters, e.g. French archers). So far we have mainly been skirting around that issue by looking at other considerations. I think we owe Andreas our best attempt at an answer, which as far as I can see is that unprotected gun crews in range would have been slaughtered in short order, while protected gun crews (those with mantlets or pavises or equivalent structures attached to the gun frames) would have been able to operate almost without risk of casualties. I shall qualify that last statement by saying this would be true of breechloaders; muzzle-loaders (the Formigny 'culverins' would have been such) would be able to benefit from screening provided the guns recoiled upon firing and the screens did not so that reloading could be carried out without half the crew needing to be exposed, but having to reposition the guns exactly at the screens would have noticeably slowed the rate of fire. The process of reloading and moving such a muzzle-loader back into position would render the crew somewhat vulnerable to indirect shooting while performing these activities if the enemy could see them (the guns' smoke would help to inhibit this), indicating that the higher the mantlets (if any), the better.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 25, 2018, 10:26:36 AM
One or both parties isn't telling the truth... But it does show the risk of accepting medieval figures, even from well-connected eye witnesses, at face value.
This is cool Anthony. I don't know this encounter at all, but when we get two eye-witness literary accounts that obviously conflict, it makes you wonder how often our single literary sources are (unbeknownst to us) giving us similar fiction.
Quote from: Dangun on January 27, 2018, 06:45:02 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 25, 2018, 10:26:36 AM
One or both parties isn't telling the truth... But it does show the risk of accepting medieval figures, even from well-connected eye witnesses, at face value.
This is cool Anthony. I don't know this encounter at all, but when we get two eye-witness literary accounts that obviously conflict, it makes you wonder how often our single literary sources are (unbeknownst to us) giving us similar fiction.
well on Ancmed we had the discussion about whether the battle of Zama actually happened.
All historians have their bias, it's probably that people who don't really care about what's going on don't bother writing history :-[
Jim
Quote from: Dangun on January 27, 2018, 06:45:02 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 25, 2018, 10:26:36 AM
One or both parties isn't telling the truth... But it does show the risk of accepting medieval figures, even from well-connected eye witnesses, at face value.
This is cool Anthony. I don't know this encounter at all, but when we get two eye-witness literary accounts that obviously conflict, it makes you wonder how often our single literary sources are (unbeknownst to us) giving us similar fiction.
It's a battle which isn't well covered in a modern critical way in English. Paul Murray Kendall produces an excellently vivid version in his biography of Louis XI (very pro-French) but it is a narrative, not an analysis of sources, geography, contemporary parallel etc etc we might like.
It's a good one to reflect on sources. There are at least five eye witness accounts, at least four from people who fought. Some are immediate. like the letter quoted, while others are from later reflections. They have their biases as they were on different sides. Commines account (probably the best known in English) is interesting because he wrote it many years later, long after he left Burgundian employ for the French court. So you expect a degree of balance. Yet he still very much identifies with the Burgundian army, albeit rather critically. Haynin's account is one I'd like to read but its only available in French. He fought with the Burgundian van and is the one giving the details about the guns. Haynin gives lots of incidental military detail but I've only found isolated anecdotes thus far in English. It is out there on the internet, so when I have time, I shall pit my schoolboy French against it :)
Quotewell on Ancmed we had the discussion about whether the battle of Zama actually happened.
Still continuing for late commers and has settled down into a more civilised debate. :)
Quote from: Erpingham on January 27, 2018, 09:42:51 AM
It's a battle which isn't well covered in a modern critical way in English. Paul Murray Kendall produces an excellently vivid version in his biography of Louis XI (very pro-French) but it is a narrative, not an analysis of sources, geography, contemporary parallel etc etc we might like.
In a footnote, Smith & De Vries characterize Kendall's version as "rather fanciful". Still, it
is good reading.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 27, 2018, 10:37:38 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on January 27, 2018, 09:42:51 AM
It's a battle which isn't well covered in a modern critical way in English. Paul Murray Kendall produces an excellently vivid version in his biography of Louis XI (very pro-French) but it is a narrative, not an analysis of sources, geography, contemporary parallel etc etc we might like.
In a footnote, Smith & De Vries characterize Kendall's version as "rather fanciful". Still, it is good reading.
Yes, Oman or Delbruck it ain't :) Filled with incidental detail (like livery colours and badges). But technical deficiencies limit it (like being unclear when he is quoting or paraphrasing or interpretting his sources, lack of cited footnotes or inline citation).
Quote from: Erpingham on January 27, 2018, 09:42:51 AM
It's a good one to reflect on sources. There are at least five eye witness accounts, at least four from people who fought. Some are immediate. like the letter quoted, while others are from later reflections. They have their biases as they were on different sides.
Agreed.
Tangentially related, but in a similar vein, I was tossing up as to whether to write a short note for Slingshot on the four sources for the sack of Chang'an. But they might not conflict enough to be interesting.
Well, I've managed to track down versions of Jean de Haynin's account and also Jean-Pierre Panigarola (who wrote two letters about the battle).
Other than a continued disparity in numbers of losses (combining Panigarola's two narratives, he thought the Burgundians had lost 4,000-5,000 men, including 1600 dead, while the French had lost 200 dead) and a very confused set of activities (it is really hard to make a coherent narrative from the accounts, let alone determine any kind of plan), there is little to report on artillery and archers. However, it seems attributing all the casualties where the guns were to the guns is to exaggerate their effect. Archers caused a lot and waves of hand to hand fighting added others. Panigarola mentions the archers killed a lot of the horses, for example.
Quote from: Dangun on January 27, 2018, 03:21:12 PM
Tangentially related, but in a similar vein, I was tossing up as to whether to write a short note for Slingshot on the four sources for the sack of Chang'an. But they might not conflict enough to be interesting.
The actual sack and events leading up to it and following it might be, though - and having four sources in reasonable agreement on at least some points while differing in others should make the analysis part interesting.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 27, 2018, 04:14:20 PM
However, it seems attributing all the casualties where the guns were to the guns is to exaggerate their effect. Archers caused a lot and waves of hand to hand fighting added others. Panigarola mentions the archers killed a lot of the horses, for example.
Yes, good points. One wonders whether anyone Burgundian was hoping to instil a fear of guns in potential opponents, which might (if it had worked) have had the effect of making opponents reluctant to close with gun positions in future, at least from the front.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 27, 2018, 07:38:40 PM
One wonders whether anyone Burgundian was hoping to instil a fear of guns in potential opponents, which might (if it had worked) have had the effect of making opponents reluctant to close with gun positions in future, at least from the front.
As the letter was back to the Burgundian court, it was more likely it was to demonstrate all this expensive new technology was worth the investment :)
If we look at the career of Charles the Bold, he seems to have concluded massed artillery was a useful tactic, as he regularly uses massed guns hereafter.
Quote from: Dangun on January 27, 2018, 03:21:12 PM
Tangentially related, but in a similar vein, I was tossing up as to whether to write a short note for Slingshot on the four sources for the sack of Chang'an. But they might not conflict enough to be interesting.
The 763 sack by the Tibetans, the 880 sack by Huang Zhao, or some other one I've missed?
Either way, I for one would be delighted to read such a note.