Naval Warfare in the First Punic War

[Duncan Head]

The simplest thing they could have done was to install this wonder weapon on their ships. They did capture some of the roman ships (presumably already armed with the corvus) at the Lipari islands, before the first large battle. They could have used these as a model, if the battle showed such effectiveness of the corvus. If they were still in doubt there, they could have done it after the battle of Cape Ecnomus.

Simplest, perhaps; but it means they're fighting the Romans on Roman terms, and probably losing unless their marines are as good as Roman legionaries.

[Erpingham]

Simplest, perhaps; but it means they're fighting the Romans on Roman terms, and probably losing unless their marines are as good as Roman legionaries.

If we assume that the Carthaginian navy has proud traditions of seamanship and considers itself doctrinally a manouever rather than boarding fleet, just copying a corvus would be a big shift because, as Duncan says, it condemns them to match Rome's strengths with their weakness.  Their admirals would all opine that it should be the other way round.  Only if the corvus was consistently successful and all their counter-tactics failed would they be likely to seriously consider it.

[Patrick Waterson]

Curiously though, at the battle of Cape Ecnomus the balance of power varied widely. For example, the first and second roman "legions" overwhelmed their opponents rather easily, but the third and fourth were getting the worst against their opponents - until the victorious roman first and second legions turned up to help. I feel that Polybios' account misses some key points...

Here is Polybius' account:

"Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies' ships they adapted their own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar. The former was the general who had been defeated in the engagement at Agrigentum."

Essentially, the Carthaginians deployed their fleet in an 'L'-shape, with the Roman wedge in the 'L'.  The Roman wedge would be suicidal to approach, because any ship trying to ram or slip through would he rammed by the next Roman along, but Hamilcar had a plan to neutralise the careful Roman deployment.

"He now commanded the right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy.

The latter, who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now describe.

The battle began by the Romans charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth "legions" had become detached and were left behind, —the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the "Triarii" because they kept their station with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar's ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged their pursuers."

This cunning plan de-linked the all-round unapproachability of the Roman formation.  It may also have caused the pursuing Romans to slip out of their mutually-covering wedge configuration.  Now it was all up to the skill of the men on both sides.

"The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest became one of sheer strength: their engines, the "crows," grappled all that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle."

Now Hanno makes a mistake that undoes Hamilcar's careful planning: instead of closing on the Roman first and second formations from the rear, Hanno goes for the slow portion of the Roman fleet.

"This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line, and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These latter let go the towing ropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle."

Instead of cleaning up the 'escort' first, Hanno becomes involved in a fight with the slow portion of the Roman fleet, which had so far shown no inclination to get involved with the fighting.

"So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where forces were so equal.

The first to engage were the first to separate: for Hamilcar's division at last were overpowered and fled. But while Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of the second squadron which were undamaged."

Hanno had deprived Hamilcar of support and condemned him to defeat without gaining any corresponding advantage against the Roman slow force.  More precisely, he had gained an advantage, but not a corresponding one.

"As soon as he had reached and engaged Hanno's division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear, and found to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the open sea.

While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been afraid of the "crows," and confined themselves to surrounding and penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came up rapidly, and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by keeping close to the shore."

And this is why Hanno had been unable to press his advantage: his crews were afraid of the corvus, which the Romans had not needed to use as yet, though the threat of its use had kept them alive - but it presumably now came into general use as this portion of Hanno's force was caught between two Roman forces, and probably accounted for most of the sixty-four Carthaginian ships taken.

"Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-four of their vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians were so taken." - Polybius I.27-28

The impression I get is that Hanno let the side down by trying to pick an easy-looking target, only to find it was tougher than it looked, instead of helping Hamilcar to dispose of the 'escorts' and then combine against the slow force.  Either that or both commanders planned for Hamilcar to lure away the 'escort' so that Hanno could clean up the invading force while Hamilcar kept the 'escort' occupied: if so, it shows a lack of appreciation of the tactical implications of the Roman 'corvus'.  Without the 'corvus' such an arrangement would have worked nicely, with Hanno finishing off the slow force fairly quickly and then coming to Hamilcar's aid.  Maybe that was the plan.

[Hamilcar]

Simplest, perhaps; but it means they're fighting the Romans on Roman terms, and probably losing unless their marines are as good as Roman legionaries.

If we assume that the Carthaginian navy has proud traditions of seamanship and considers itself doctrinally a manouever rather than boarding fleet, just copying a corvus would be a big shift because, as Duncan says, it condemns them to match Rome's strengths with their weakness.  Their admirals would all opine that it should be the other way round.  Only if the corvus was consistently successful and all their counter-tactics failed would they be likely to seriously consider it.

If we look at the outcome of all the major battles of this war the only one properly won by Carthage was Drepana - where romans were caught out by their indecision and forced close to the shore. Overall, romans have consistently won. Besides, if in the first encounter corvus showed itself to be a wonder weapon then surely Carthage would have been forced to use it or at least consider it/try it out or at least do something to neutralise it. If it was such a wonder weapon then I think they would have been forced into doing something of the matching magnitude to the roman invention of the corvus.

Patrick, thanks for the reference, which clarifies things no end. Clearly the romans had the better of it at the front and were hard pressed on the flanks (with the triarii suffering badly and the third legion only penned in close to the shore, but neutralising the attackers by holding them off through a threat of the corvus). There must have been some reason for the discrepancy - perhaps the engaged triarii didn't have the same complement of marines as the front lines? It is also interesting that the number of ships sunk is approximately the same (24 to 30) - although we don't know just how badly each side suffered in the three separate encounters (i.e. were most of the ships on both sides sunk in Hamilcar's fight, or did the Carthaginians lose most of their ships in that fight while the Roman losses are more from the triarii?). The Romans also captured 64 ships - 50 of which in the engagement close to the shore and 14 (more or less) in the frontal fight. Still, even 14 Carthaginian ships captured in the frontal battle (in addition to 20-30-odd sunk) out of around 175 (half of their fleet) must have seemed like a big loss.

I think you are right to an extent Patrick. It could have been better if Hanno engaged the first two roman legions from the back (it could hardly be worse than the actual outcome!), but he could not ignore the rest of the roman fleet. I'm not sure how aware he would have been of their weakness in the first place. Maybe the plan was to break the roman formation up and simply attack it piecemeal simultaneously. Hanno may well have thought that he was holding off the roman reinforcements while the cream of Carthaginian navy dealt with the isolated Roman lead formations.

Whatever, if their first defeat was not enough then this battle should have forced the Carthaginians into changing something. Even fighting romans on their own terms would be better than simply rolling over and accepting defeat! Even if Carthage didn't want to put corvus on their ships, bumping up their complement of marines, simply to contest the romans taking over their ships so easily if nothing (which would give the other ships a chance to ram them) would have helped. Building bigger warships, with an even greater compliment of well equipped marines could have even turned tables on the romans. These are only guesses, but surely there was something they could have done! 

[Mark G]

I understood that the Carthaginians didn't adopt the corvus because of its effect on their strength, seamanship.

Judging a tech by just the tally of battle wins doesn't take into account Carthaginian naval goals.

If they stuck to seaworthiness, and sought to avoid battle unless heavily advantaged, then they had no need for something which nullified their big advantage.

It would be akin to asking Mongols to abandon ponies and bows for axes and armour so they could go toe to toe on foot with a dismounted knight.

Not to mention trying to lure the roman fleets into bad seas, which seems to be the optimal strategy in the med at any time.

And hadn't Sparta proved that naval dominance won nothing?

[Hamilcar]

I understood that the Carthaginians didn't adopt the corvus because of its effect on their strength, seamanship.

Judging a tech by just the tally of battle wins doesn't take into account Carthaginian naval goals.

If they stuck to seaworthiness, and sought to avoid battle unless heavily advantaged, then they had no need for something which nullified their big advantage.

It would be akin to asking Mongols to abandon ponies and bows for axes and armour so they could go toe to toe on foot with a dismounted knight.

Not to mention trying to lure the roman fleets into bad seas, which seems to be the optimal strategy in the med at any time.

And hadn't Sparta proved that naval dominance won nothing?

Maybe so, but their big advantage was shown to be poor in battle against the Romans. They also did continue to engage the Romans and have consistently lost. My point was that they should have done something, whatever it was, to combat the corvus.

Peloponnesian and punic wars both turned out to show that superiority on ground is what counts the most. In both cases the conflict ended after the side initially inferior at sea constructed a fleet and contested this theatre - winning rather too easily (taking Chuck's note that Aegospotami wasn't a full-on sea battle). This post was exactly about that - discussing that an advantage at sea could not equal advantage on land and why.

[Erpingham]

My point was that they should have done something, whatever it was, to combat the corvus.

Maybe they tried several unsuccessful things, which our Roman sources didn't distinguish?  I am with Mark on this - they would not have made a huge shift in emphasis lightly, and would have tried to come up with a solution consistent with their doctrine.

[Jim Webster]

I understood that the Carthaginians didn't adopt the corvus because of its effect on their strength, seamanship.

Judging a tech by just the tally of battle wins doesn't take into account Carthaginian naval goals.

If they stuck to seaworthiness, and sought to avoid battle unless heavily advantaged, then they had no need for something which nullified their big advantage.

It would be akin to asking Mongols to abandon ponies and bows for axes and armour so they could go toe to toe on foot with a dismounted knight.

Not to mention trying to lure the roman fleets into bad seas, which seems to be the optimal strategy in the med at any time.

And hadn't Sparta proved that naval dominance won nothing?

Maybe so, but their big advantage was shown to be poor in battle against the Romans. They also did continue to engage the Romans and have consistently lost. My point was that they should have done something, whatever it was, to combat the corvus.

Apparently there is no record of the Romans using the Corvus after the Battle of Cape Ecnomus in 256BC, so perhaps the Carthaginians with their superior seamanship and knowledge of wind and weather took one look at the damned thing, shook their heads and said 'They'll be sorry'.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

I think you are right to an extent Patrick. It could have been better if Hanno engaged the first two roman legions from the back (it could hardly be worse than the actual outcome!), but he could not ignore the rest of the roman fleet. I'm not sure how aware he would have been of their weakness in the first place. Maybe the plan was to break the roman formation up and simply attack it piecemeal simultaneously. Hanno may well have thought that he was holding off the roman reinforcements while the cream of Carthaginian navy dealt with the isolated Roman lead formations.

Hamilcar and Hanno probably thought out their plan on the basis of actions so far - namely Mylae and Tyndaris.  At Mylae, the Carthaginians had been introduced to the corvus and had lost fifty ships.  At Tyndaris, they caught ten Roman ships at sea, surrounded them and sank nine of them.  The idea of luring Roman vessels, corvus and all, into a situation where they could be attacked from all sides, seems to have been a basically good one, but Hamilcar appears to have tried it with insufficient vessels.

Hanno could have left a couple of small squadrons to threaten the flank and rear of the Roman slow force (which was slow because of towing the invasion transports) and taken the rest of his ships to help kill off the escorts.  This would have turned a losing fight into a Carthaginian success, assuming they could have kept up their surround-and-kill attacks on isolated Roman ships.  The Roman slow force seems to have intended to remain with the invasion transports whatever happened elsewhere, so a small force of ships should have been sufficient to watch them and keep them quiet.

Whatever, if their first defeat was not enough then this battle should have forced the Carthaginians into changing something. Even fighting romans on their own terms would be better than simply rolling over and accepting defeat! Even if Carthage didn't want to put corvus on their ships, bumping up their complement of marines, simply to contest the romans taking over their ships so easily if nothing (which would give the other ships a chance to ram them) would have helped. Building bigger warships, with an even greater compliment of well equipped marines could have even turned tables on the romans. These are only guesses, but surely there was something they could have done!

The lure-and-surround tactics first seen at Tyndaris may have been the attempted change, or at least the first attempt.  A corvus could only be deployed against one attacker at a time, so three or four attacking ships could watch their opportunities, with two coming in close to make dummy attacks to distract the corvus crews from the real ram, which would come from the ship(s) hanging back.  And if the Romans ignored the ships making a close approach, these could themselves put on a burst of speed, ram and back off before the corvus could be swung round.  On the face of it, this seems a likely Carthaginian solution: it is doctrinal, so does not require all their ships to go into dock to be refitted, and it uses the traditional Carthaginian strengths of manoeuvrable ships and experienced crews.

But it only works if the Romans obligingly scatter and follow.

Apparently there is no record of the Romans using the Corvus after the Battle of Cape Ecnomus in 256BC, so perhaps the Carthaginians with their superior seamanship and knowledge of wind and weather took one look at the damned thing, shook their heads and said 'They'll be sorry'.

They were.  However before so suffering they did shatter another Carthaginian fleet at the Hermaeum (Polybius I.36) and extract the survivors of Regulus' army from Africa.  Having crossed to Sicily and sailed coastwise round to near Camarina, they ran into a storm and 364 ships perished, corvus and all.

Nothing daunted, the Romans built another 300-ship fleet, crossed to Africa, became stranded on some shoals, managed to refloat their vessels and return to Sicily, and were sailing back to Rome when another storm sank 150 of them.  After that we hear no more of the corvus.

The final battle of the war, the Aegates Islands, which is today yielding up rams and other debris of naval war, saw a Roman fleet relying on light ships and disciplined crews, the traditional Carthaginian formula, against a Carthaginian fleet of loaded ships and untrained crews, the traditional Roman combination.  The Romans won handily.  Maybe for this battle the Carthaginians should have considered the corvus ...

[Hamilcar]

The lure-and-surround tactics first seen at Tyndaris may have been the attempted change, or at least the first attempt.  A corvus could only be deployed against one attacker at a time, so three or four attacking ships could watch their opportunities, with two coming in close to make dummy attacks to distract the corvus crews from the real ram, which would come from the ship(s) hanging back.  And if the Romans ignored the ships making a close approach, these could themselves put on a burst of speed, ram and back off before the corvus could be swung round.  On the face of it, this seems a likely Carthaginian solution: it is doctrinal, so does not require all their ships to go into dock to be refitted, and it uses the traditional Carthaginian strengths of manoeuvrable ships and experienced crews.
But it only works if the Romans obligingly scatter and follow.

If I was a Carthaginian navy commander lure and surround would be my first tactic, denying the tactically inferior enemy the benefit of fighting in formation and defeating him in detail, where seamanship really shows. The problem is that it requires several ships to engage a single enemy and the opposing sides tended to be evenly matched in numbers. The number of Carthaginian ships sunk at Ecnomus suggests that the Roman ships worked together - if the roman seamanship was not on par with punic then the only way to achieve a similar number of ships sunk is for supporting ships to ram those locked by a corvus. So Carthaginians got it wrong here.

The final battle of the war, the Aegates Islands, which is today yielding up rams and other debris of naval war, saw a Roman fleet relying on light ships and disciplined crews, the traditional Carthaginian formula, against a Carthaginian fleet of loaded ships and untrained crews, the traditional Roman combination.  The Romans won handily.  Maybe for this battle the Carthaginians should have considered the corvus ...

Polybios says that this final Roman fleet was modelled on the lighter ship of "Hannibal the Rhodian", which was captured during the siege of Lilybaion. He also suggests that the Carthaginian plan was to firstly deliver the grain to Drepana and embark Hamilcar's troops before giving battle. Not only were their ships heavier with grain and propelled by less experienced crews, but they were faced with enemy marines consisting of picked troops. They never stood a chance. The only sensible option would have been to sail back to Carthage. No wonder Hanno got crucified.

[Patrick Waterson]

If I was a Carthaginian navy commander lure and surround would be my first tactic, denying the tactically inferior enemy the benefit of fighting in formation and defeating him in detail, where seamanship really shows. The problem is that it requires several ships to engage a single enemy and the opposing sides tended to be evenly matched in numbers. The number of Carthaginian ships sunk at Ecnomus suggests that the Roman ships worked together - if the roman seamanship was not on par with punic then the only way to achieve a similar number of ships sunk is for supporting ships to ram those locked by a corvus. So Carthaginians got it wrong here.

Yes.  Adding most of Hanno's ships might have made the difference, but Hanno seems to have been convinced that he could deal with the transports and their accompanying warships and then help to mop up the escort.  For some reason this approach never seems to work.

Polybios says that this final Roman fleet was modelled on the lighter ship of "Hannibal the Rhodian", which was captured during the siege of Lilybaion. He also suggests that the Carthaginian plan was to firstly deliver the grain to Drepana and embark Hamilcar's troops before giving battle. Not only were their ships heavier with grain and propelled by less experienced crews, but they were faced with enemy marines consisting of picked troops. They never stood a chance. The only sensible option would have been to sail back to Carthage. No wonder Hanno got crucified.

True.  One may note in passing the Roman intelligence arrangements that allowed them to know what the Carthaginian fleet was doing, and when, and where.  It would have been interesting to see the result had the Carthaginians been able to drop off the grain and load up with troops prior to the action - Polybius notes that the Romans feared Hamilcar (and presumably his troops) above all else.