The effect of religion on the army

[Jim Webster]

Actually in many cases these 'mercenaries' turned into native troops.
"The late Byzantine army 1204-1453" by Mark C Bartusis the example is given of one George Pissas who came before the Patriarch Germanos II (1223-40) who avoided service as a Vardariotes by becoming a monk but having eluded his pursuers he now wanted the right to marry. While the Vardariotai may have been Hungarian settlers in the 10th century, it looks as if they had been fully integrated into the Greek population and were merely soldiers as opposed to nomad horse archers. As there is no record of them holding Pronoiai it is probable that they were not heavy cavalry.

Jim

[aligern]

A mercenary army might be very  goodat fighting , but it is also very fragile. The Romans are a very good example.  When they ground down the Carthaginians they were raising army after army,with simultaneously one in Spain and two in Italy despite the huge defeats Hannibal had inflicted.  In the Vth century the resources of Italy sufficed for one army only and that rebelled and seized the state. F course Roman armies recruited from the Italian peasantry were not averse to makingba bid for power.  When mercenary armies are crushed there is no pool of trained manpower in the population to raise up another force, the citizenry are unprotected and not capable of protecting themselves.
Roy

[Dangun]

What is however very noticeable is that it did not regain lost imperial territories with any great vigour or consistency, and ended up being largely a collection of foreign mercenaries (Varangians, Latinikon, Vardariots and Skythikon) rather than native troops, and this at a time when Orthodox insistence on the need to stand against Azymite heretics was at its most clamorous.

There is no evidence here for causality, we are simply observing coincident trends.

Perhaps consider that geographic expansion might cause economic weakness. Many Roman provinces were not economically productive enough to pay for their own protection.

[Jim Webster]

It depends on the state. In the case of Carthage it is probable that citizens served on the fleet. There may have been a shortage of men to serve as marines, as we hear of troops being embarked.

Carthage is an interesting example, it fielded decent sized (if inept) armies without mercenaries after the second punic war, and the men fighting to defend the city seem to have been brave and competent enough. Whether the officers were is another matter
Jim

[Rob Miles]

Mercenary forces were always a part of every major army from Cretan archers all the way up to Milanese crossbowmen. The Roman Auxillia is a case in point- soldiers from non "Roman" tribes paid to fight and then rewarded with citizenship status.

When mercenary ARMIES are employed.... Well, let's look at the pre-match locker-room pep-talk. First of all, the citizen army:

"Men, you fight today for your families, for your land, for your emperor and your god. Defeat these foreign infidels who bring fire and rape to our cities. Kill their leaders who would have you made slaves and chattels for their whores and whelps. Remember how your fathers fought to defend this land against that threat. Hope that your sons will live to do the same. Forward for honour and the safety of the state. Forward to give your children a land to call their own. Forward against the sworn enemy of everything you hold dear! To arms! And Charge!"

(assembled soldiers cheer and thunder out of the tunnel to spank the French)

Now let us take the same scenario with mercenary armies:

"Men, today we are fighting for <looks at clip board> some rich dude who runs this foreign empire. When you die, they'll stop your pay. Think of your families sitting at home so far away nice and safe. Maybe young Theobad will win the 'Goat of the Year' this time. We were going to fight them in the borders, but since that would take us too far from the capital with all its wine and women, we thought we'd fight them here. All that burning, raping and pillaging they've been doing in the meantime will have sapped their strength. Okay, we ready? No? Ok, maybe tomorrow then...."

So it goes.

[Dangun]

Carthage is an interesting example, it fielded decent sized (if inept) armies without mercenaries after the second punic war, and the men fighting to defend the city seem to have been brave and competent enough. Whether the officers were is another matter. Jim

I think you may risk over-personalizing it. It wouldn't have mattered what officers Carthage came up with.

It depends on the state.

This I think is the crux of it.
Carthage picked on a larger, better organized, and more productive economy.
Rome's strength was being able to recruit, train and equip citizen army after citizen army no matter how many Cannaes occurred. (Maybe a slight exaggeration, 3+ Cannaes would have been a problem)
Mercenary armies do not persist.

[Patrick Waterson]

Perhaps consider that geographic expansion might cause economic weakness. Many Roman provinces were not economically productive enough to pay for their own protection.

I think the problem was more geographic contraction: the loss of provinces does not seem to have helped the situation.

If we base the decline of Rome on a purely or even predominantly economic argument, the loss of expensive-to-defend provinces which seem not to have entirely paid their way, such as Britannia and Gallia, or for that matter Illyria, Moesia and Pannonia, would have left the Empire with provinces which were on average richer and more populous, combined with shorter frontiers - hence economically and strategically much more advantageous.  Yet these lost provinces, even if in some cases only intermittently lost, were also the best recruiting areas of the Empire.

The loss of Gallia and Hispania left Italia and Africa as the mainstay of the Western Empire - in short, it was reduced to its richest, most populous and most defensible provinces with short and rugged frontiers (the Alps and the straits of Gibraltar) and defence - had economics been the predominant consideration - should have been both easy and well within the surviving provinces' means.  Instead, Africa fell easily to the Vandals and Italy ... well, Italy had a chequered existence, being combed by Alaric in the early 5th century and Attila in the mid-5th century but then springing forth under Majorian to reconquer - albeit temporarily - parts of Gallia and Hispania (it might have been less temporary had Ricimer not had Majorian murdered) before succumbing to its own barbarian mercenaries in the late 5th century.

So the 'uneconomic' provinces seem to have been a source of strength rather than weakness, in that they provided manpower for the armies and tended to absorb the worst of a barbarian incursion before it could reach the richest and most populous provinces, the ones which really paid for the armies.  They had their role.

What is however very noticeable is that it did not regain lost imperial territories with any great vigour or consistency, and ended up being largely a collection of foreign mercenaries (Varangians, Latinikon, Vardariots and Skythikon) rather than native troops,

It is, of course, an interesting question both why this was and how important it was.  Did religion make it hard to recruit native troops, or a loss of traditional recruiting grounds?  Also, why is a mercenary army such a bad idea?  Though the latter might be another thread entirely.

Following Manzikert (AD 1071), the Byzantine Empire lost much of Anatolia, which was a traditional recruiting ground, but it had lost 'themes' (military districts) rather than its entire recruitment base, and tried to make up the difference with 'pronoia', or a sort of contract recruitment in  which nobles raised troops.  The Fourth Crusade in AD 1204 did seize a significant slice of what was left of the Empire, including Greece itself (apart from Epirus, which became 'independent' under its own Despot) and the successes of John Vataces relied on a spearhead of Latin mercenaries (knightly cavalry) - of the very same troop type, religion and background as the men who had seized much of the Empire.  These were the Latinikon, extensively used but never wholly trusted.  While there seem to have been sufficient men to flesh out late Byzantine armies, it would seem that the rulers preferred to keep Greeks at work as taxpayers and to hire foreigners to fight and get killed.  This is all very logical, but tended to become self-propagating, as Greek military manpower grew less and less until in 1453 less than 5,000 could be found to bear arms in the final siege of Constantinople.

A mercenary army need not be an inherently bad idea, but historical experience does tend to favour good national armies, if only because they do not negotiate cash settlements with the enemy.  Such was rarely a problem for the Byzantines, as their wealthy opponents tended to be Turkish and Byzantine armies tended not to desert to Turks, although the Hungarian artillery engineer Urban happily switched allegiance when offered more money by the Turks than the Byzantines could afford.  The quintessential mercenary experience must be Italy of the condottiere era, especially after 1360 and the arrival of the Free Companies, which put much more life into campaigning and left the northern Italian cities in a deadly and endless auction to buy the services of the best mercenaries - who would stay bought only until the next city came up with a better offer.

Carthage is an interesting example, it fielded decent sized (if inept) armies without mercenaries after the second punic war, and the men fighting to defend the city seem to have been brave and competent enough. Whether the officers were is another matter. Jim

I think you may risk over-personalizing it. It wouldn't have mattered what officers Carthage came up with.

It did for the first couple of years, after which the decisive element was the officers the Romans came up with.

Carthage picked on a larger, better organized, and more productive economy.

Did it?

Rome's strength was being able to recruit, train and equip citizen army after citizen army no matter how many Cannaes occurred.

Hard to argue with that.  I would suggest that in addition to using national rather than mercenary manpower Rome's real strength was that its economy was smaller, less organised and less productive, perhaps illustrated by the absence of double-entry bookkeeping, and hence less affected by the rigours of warfare.  Trade tends to take a nosedive if a war eventuates, whereas agriculture does not (unless some inconsiderate fellow leads an army across the Alps and begins ravaging your fields).

[Jim Webster]

A mercenary army need not be an inherently bad idea, but historical experience does tend to favour good national armies, if only because they do not negotiate cash settlements with the enemy.  Such was rarely a problem for the Byzantines, as their wealthy opponents tended to be Turkish and Byzantine armies tended not to desert to Turks,

Actually the frontier in Asia minor seems to have drifted west, valley by valley, as the local inhabitants and the 'militia' who guarded them discovered that life was better (or at least more reasonably taxed) under the Turks

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

It drifted west, certainly, but my impression is that this was because some clever chap on the throne (Andronicus Palaeologus, if I remember aright) decided to stop funding the klesourioi (locals who garrisoned the border passes to stop Turkish raids) and keep the money, while making vague promises that Imperial troops would do the defending.  These remained, for the most part, just promises, especially as the Empire had just entered into a frantic round of civil wars which would smoulder on for generations.

There were of course Turks and Turks.  The Seljuks, following Manzikert, had wiped out the bulk of the farming population and laid the cities under tribute.  During the First Crusade, time and again Byzantine guides assigned to Crusader contingents led them into what had been fertile and prosperous valleys and found only empty scrubland.  The Ottomans adopted a less vicious mode of conquest, and cities which had been pillaged by Ottomans and 'liberated' (pillaged again) by the Catalans of Roger de Flor, who had been hired to remove the Ottoman problem, found the Ottomans marginally less cruel and extortionate.

On a point perhaps more germane to the thread topic, we might consider the deleterious effects of heresy, schism and similar differences of opinion between Greek and Roman ecclesiastical gentlemen on the doings and fortunes of the Empire.  Rather than churn through the whole dreary list, we can just take a slice from the history of the Iconoclasts and Paulicians.

Theodora, as empress regent AD 842-855, decided to crack down on the Paulicians, who were essentially a back-to-basics Christianity movement with Gnostic overtones.  Her sweeping persecution drove them (and some surviving Iconoclasts who were swept up in their wake) into a last stronghold at Tephrice under their general Carbeas, who, in collusion with the Muslims, spent the rest of his life making destructive inroads as far as Ephesus with fire and sword - this during the reign of Basil I.

This was but one religious controversy, albeit the most devastatingly effective.  The Roman Empire, once it turned Christian (and before and after it became Byzantine) had a serious religious controversy on average about once every century.  If one attempts to assess the expended manpower, military activity and general resources used to quash these controversies, which usually began in persecutions and ended in revolts, it would seem that these side-effects of Christianity destructively absorbed a significant fraction of the Empire's military potential.

[Edit: had the wrong Basil - corrected.  Sorry about that being Fawlty. ]

[Jim Webster]

This was but one religious controversy, albeit the most devastatingly effective.  The Roman Empire, once it turned Christian (and before and after it became Byzantine) had a serious religious controversy on average about once every century.  If one attempts to assess the expended manpower, military activity and general resources used to quash these controversies, which usually began in persecutions and ended in revolts, it would seem that these side-effects of Christianity destructively absorbed a significant fraction of the Empire's military potential.

I'm not sure you could claim that religious conflicts took up a larger fraction of the Empire's military potential than the conflicts of the 3rd century

In some cases the 'religious' conflicts were effectively long term nationalistic ones resurfacing under a new name. For example Egypt had rebelled against Greek and Roman occupiers for centuries, and choosing their own brand of Christianity to provide a respectability to their next revolt owes more to nationalism than theology

Jim

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

I'm not sure you could claim that religious conflicts took up a larger fraction of the Empire's military potential than the conflicts of the 3rd century

Agreed probably not over the same space of time, but the Empire recovered rather better from the 3rd century than it did from the effects of religious conflicts.  The point of the religious disturbances and actions resulting therefrom is that the Empire, once Christian, always had a canker of one form or another eating away at its heart and sapping its strength: granted, not as spectacularly as the secession of Gaul under Postumus, but more insidiously, and recovery to a harmonious condition was never really possible.

In some cases the 'religious' conflicts were effectively long term nationalistic ones resurfacing under a new name. For example Egypt had rebelled against Greek and Roman occupiers for centuries, and choosing their own brand of Christianity to provide a respectability to their next revolt owes more to nationalism than theology

An interesting suggestion, but Egypt had been essentially quiescent since the 1st century AD, and the minimal and often understrength garrison there was more to keep Blemmyes out and taxes moving than from any fear of would-be successors to the pharaohs (in any event, most Roman emperors had themselves entered as pharaoh just to remind everyone who was boss).  Syria likewise was by the 2nd century AD a contented part of the Empire provided they could get on with sport, horizontal gymnastics and commerce - generally in that order of importance.  Similarly, Africa, home of the Donatists, had long ago laid aside any thoughts of being Punic, independent etc.

On the general thread topic, a point that might bear examination is the positive influence of Christianity on the Roman army.  This seems necessarily a rather brief subject, but we should at least mention the 'sacred' standards: the Labarum and Our Lady of Blachernae, these being the more successful.  A standard which promised victory for the army which bore it would have contributed something of a plus to morale, at least up to the point where it was captured in battle.  The loss of a sacred standard seems to have depressed Byzantine military performance for a couple of decades after it happened - at least that is my impression - but bringing one to the battlefield presumably helped to secure the occasional victory.

[Jim Webster]

Actually I suggest you check your history with regards Egypt
There was the Jewish Diaspora revolt in 116-117 which impacted on Egypt
In 139 there was a revolt over oppressive taxation which took some years fighting to put down
Another revolt broke out in 193AD
According to wiki there was a series of revolts in the 3rd century (plus Zenobia)

The argument could be made that under Christianity Egypt was actually less prone to revolt

With regards Africa, the revolts of  Firmus and others have been described as part of a long struggle between pastoral and agricultural peoples, but certainly it wasn't a religious struggle.

Indeed if you agree that the Empire recovered well from the chaos of the 3rd century, then the argument could be made that Constantine, the architect of the recovery, was right, and picking Christianity as the state religion gave the state and the dynasty the stability it needed. Certainly it is an argument every bit as coherent as pointing to evidence of Christian pacifism. Indeed it is difficult to find a Christian Emperor who warrants the term pacifist. Honorius and Arcadius were incompetent but their father was every bit as Christian as them and his pacifism is hardly obvious

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

Actually I suggest you check your history with regards Egypt
There was the Jewish Diaspora revolt in 116-117 which impacted on Egypt
In 139 there was a revolt over oppressive taxation which took some years fighting to put down
Another revolt broke out in 193AD
According to wiki there was a series of revolts in the 3rd century (plus Zenobia)

None of this seems to have been nationalistic, which was the original point at issue if I remember aright.

The argument could be made that under Christianity Egypt was actually less prone to revolt

An argument that looks a bit thin if we look at 4th century Egypt and the religious (essentially Christian faction) riots there.  Granted, these were not revolts per se, but were disturbances that had serious effects on the province and its people.

With regards Africa, the revolts of  Firmus and others have been described as part of a long struggle between pastoral and agricultural peoples, but certainly it wasn't a religious struggle.

So the Donatist heresy had nothing to do with it?

Indeed if you agree that the Empire recovered well from the chaos of the 3rd century, then the argument could be made that Constantine, the architect of the recovery ...

For Constantine, read Aurelian.

Constantine ... was right, and picking Christianity as the state religion gave the state and the dynasty the stability it needed.

But it did not: the Christian world awoke to find itself Arian, and the Athanasians spent the rest of the century fomenting trouble.  The 'stability of the dynasty' manifested in the crushing of Constantine II by his brothers, the murder of Constans by Magnentius and - following a drastic reduction in the number of available family members by Constantius II - the reversion to traditional Hellenism under Julian.

Certainly it is an argument every bit as coherent as pointing to evidence of Christian pacifism. Indeed it is difficult to find a Christian Emperor who warrants the term pacifist. Honorius and Arcadius were incompetent but their father was every bit as Christian as them and his pacifism is hardly obvious

Christians and Christian emperors (several of whom were not technically Christian until they converted on their deathbed) are two different things.  The Christians of the 4th century seem to have shrunk from opposing barbarians but joyfully bashed in each other's skulls over theological disputes (we can list some of these if desired).  'Christian' emperors such as Constantine and Valentinian campaigned aggressively and for the most part successfully.  One does however notice that the offspring of Christian emperors tended to be more attached to the palace than the army - Constantine's progeny and Theodosius' were noted for their military incompetence on the rare occasions they could be bothered to demean themselves with military matters.  (To be fair, Constantius II handled the Sarmatians successfully, despite being useless against the Persians.)

The point at issue as I see it is that the progress of Christianity undermined, and the adoption of Christianity vitiated, the recruitment for and performance of the Roman armies, which became increasingly barbarised as recruitment became more difficult to attain.  The pacifistic pronouncements of Christianity (notably "Thou shalt not kill") and concomitant canonical constraints have every appearance of providing excuses to avoid military service (consider the military age manpower locked up on monasteries and the increasingly prevalent priesthood) and of providing disincentives to soldiers no longer encouraged to emulate the military virtues of Mars and Mithras.

[Jim Webster]

Point 1)
Given that Nationalism might not have existed before the 17th century AD nothing was nationalistic. But this was certainly not Roman politics as usual, most was Egyptians trying to drive out the current lot of tax collectors

Point 2)
Given that various riots were orchestrated by members of the local governing body, a lot of it can be regarded as politics by other means, using 'tribal', 'religious' or 'cultural' differences to their own advantage. Much like Roman politics under the late republic for example

Point 3)

No, the Donatist heresy had started in 313 (ish) and they weren't actually regarded as Heretical until 409
So when Firmus revolted some of his supporters were doubtless Donatists, some were orthodox/Catholic, and some were doubtless pagans.
He was also supported by the Circumcellions  who existed before the Donatists, being Berbers who had grievances, social and political. (tied up with pastoral and agricultural peoples etc) However they did link up with the donatist and eventually became donatists

Point 4
No, I'd prefer to read Constantine. After all Aurelian failed, it was Diocletian who provided the first bit of stability, it was Constantine who created a dynasty, and after him Dynasties had a legitimacy which lasted, with a few hiccups, to the fifteenth century
Compared to the previous century, the reign of Constantine and his dynasty was an era of peace. There were very few battles fought between Roman soldiers.

To blame Christianity for the ineptitude of second or third generations of a dynasty is nonsense. Nero, Caligula and Caracalla prove that lack of a Christian upbringing is irrelevent.
The reversion to Paganism was hardly a success either

Frankly to think that the 'pacifistic' pronouncements of religion are likely to have much effect on a society are not supported by any evidence.
'Thou shalt not kill' is actually a Jewish pacifistic religious pronouncement, and we've all seen how these tranquil peaceful people spent the centuries.
The same pacifistic pronouncements produced the English armies that fought at Agincourt

To assume that for some reason late Roman society was, for a century, uniquely sold on pacifism, something that Christian societies (for example the Egyptians who you say Christianity made more turbulent and violent)
By Justinians reign even the Isaurians were Christians, pacifists to a man

Jim

 

[Patrick Waterson]

Point 3)
No, the Donatist heresy had started in 313 (ish) and they weren't actually regarded as Heretical until 409

But they were the subject of an edict from Constantine in AD 317 which "threatened the death penalty to anyone who disturbed the peace of the empire" - and then another which essentially confiscated their property.  Cue armed suppression of the Donatists in Carthage.  Constantine tried the stick and carrot; Valentinian the stick.  Augustine asked for them to be persecuted, which they were beginning in AD 409 - whereupon Augustine protested at how they were being treated.  Then along came the Vandals and it was the Athanasians' turn to sing small - not that the Vandals favoured Donatists, but being Arian, they despised Athanasians.

So when Firmus revolted some of his supporters were doubtless Donatists, some were orthodox/Catholic, and some were doubtless pagans.
He was also supported by the Circumcellions  who existed before the Donatists, being Berbers who had grievances, social and political. (tied up with pastoral and agricultural peoples etc) However they did link up with the donatist and eventually became donatists

Indeed; the picture was somewhat messy and complicated, though Christian faction made it yet messier to the detriment of the Empire.

Point 4
No, I'd prefer to read Constantine. After all Aurelian failed, it was Diocletian who provided the first bit of stability

Aurelian did not fail; he reunited the Empire; Probus consolidated and expanded his work; Diocletian tried to sort out the administration (which admittedly was in need of a good sort-out, and not necessarily the one he gave it).

... it was Constantine who created a dynasty, and after him Dynasties had a legitimacy which lasted, with a few hiccups, to the fifteenth century

Albeit somewhat like Egypt's Thirteenth Dynasty, which was for the most part a 'dynasty of usurpers'.

Compared to the previous century, the reign of Constantine and his dynasty was an era of peace. There were very few battles fought between Roman soldiers.

But one of them was Mursa, which was by all accounts more destructive to the Roman army than the others put together.

To blame Christianity for the ineptitude of second or third generations of a dynasty is nonsense. Nero, Caligula and Caracalla prove that lack of a Christian upbringing is irrelevent.

One could add Commodus, Elagabalus and even Gallienus.  The problem is that the Empire recovered from all of these but not from Honorius and Arcadius.  Granted that dynastic succession in the Roman Empire did not go well, at any time, the Christian creation of legitimacy for a dynasty seems a bit like an own goal.

Frankly to think that the 'pacifistic' pronouncements of religion are likely to have much effect on a society are not supported by any evidence.

Actually we have the evidence of a long tradition of Christian concealment and martyrdom rather than revolt while Christianity was not the state religion.

'Thou shalt not kill' is actually a Jewish pacifistic religious pronouncement, and we've all seen how these tranquil peaceful people spent the centuries.

But one which was imported into Christianity, along with Jesus' injunctions to go the extra mile and turn the other cheek.

The same pacifistic pronouncements produced the English armies that fought at Agincourt

No, a good tactical system and proud military tradition produced that army.  Christianity simply made them pray and kiss the soil before the battle began.  They were of course under Western Christianity, a rather more militant beast than its Orthodox counterpart.


It looks to me as if this discussion is becoming increasingly stale and more importantly sidetracked from the principal topic, namely the effect of religion on an army and on the Late Roman and Byzantine armies in particular.

We can perhaps broaden the spectrum somewhat, perhaps to consider how far an army was usually bound up with the religion of its nation or culture.

Our earliest reliable information on this seems to come from Biblical times, and here we see certain of the major cultures, notably Egyptians, Assyrians and Babylonians, with divine standard accompanying the army - which, given the assumption that a representation of the deity connected with the deity itself, effectively equated to taking a portable deity to war.  Sumerians may have done the same, although the Ur Standard appears on balance perhaps not to be a standard.

Taking a deity, or at least a tutelary deity, to war seems to have been quite popular.  The Romans of the early Empire assigned one to each legion - nothing quite like having your own god along to keep everyone up to scratch.  However the Greeks and Macedonians seem to have restricted standards to battlefield purposes and connected with the deities by looking at a bit of liver beforehand - and taking note of battlefield omens.  The Republican Romans followed a similar procedure.

The other side of the religious coin is soldier superstition.  Most soldiers seem to have been superstitious (and some still are).  Normally this just results in a bit of quirky behaviour before battle, but where something very symbolic occurs which is evident to much of the army, battlefield performance and morale generally can nosedive.  The eclipse of a crescent moon had dire effects on the morale of an Ottoman army even in the 17th century, and legionary eagles which refused to let themselves be pulled up from the ground made alarm bells ring in the mind of every Roman soldier.

Crassus' 53 BC campaign against the Parthians seems to have been particularly well sprinkled with adverse omens.  The official omens at the start of the campaign are inauspicious.  Arriving at the Euphrates, lightning strikes the crossing-point.  Crassus' horse drags its groom into the river and both drown.  Crassus' army crosses a river on a temporary bridge, and he then tells the army he will have the bridge demolished "... so that none of you will return."  Distributing rations, lentils and salt - traditionally offerings to the dead - are served out first.  Then on the day of the battle Crassus emerges from his tent wearing a black cloak instead of a red one and the standards part company with the ground most reluctantly.

The ultimate question is: just how far did this catalogue of ill omen affect the performance of the Roman army at Carrhae?  They seem to have fought well enough on the day, but perhaps the effect is to be found on the following night, in which "... it was a grievous night for the Romans. They took no steps to bury their dead nor to care for their wounded and dying, but every man was lamenting his own fate." - Plutarch, Life of Crassus 27.3

In essence, it seems that adverse religious morale effects had their main impact off the battlefield. Would this be a fair assessment?