This thread is prompted by a few remarks in a recent discussion where a question arose about how well we can determine the reliability and duration of the resisting power of various troop types, and hence how long an action between such types will last.
Quote from: Erpingham on November 06, 2013, 06:27:45 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on November 06, 2013, 05:38:05 PM
For example, one can determine with fair precision how long one unit will last in melee against a superior opponent in a straight frontal fight (which I do in Optio).
You surprise me Justin. That is one area where I'd expect us to struggle as a) very few fights featured situations where the only variable is troop quality and b) our sources aren't particularly good on timing (for various reasons). But that is another topic.
This is of significance for rules systems that do not leave the duration of engagements and/or the durability of units within the provenance of dice.
I suggest we examine the following aspects:
1) Can we deduce how long a particular troop type will last against another given troop type, given no great disparity in training, experience, terrain or fatigue? (There is an incidental buried sub-question here about quantifying the latter four attributes.)
2) Can we determine how long an infantry fight lasts compared with a cavalry fight, and is this meaningful?
3) How predictable is the outcome of such a fight?
For answers to these we turn, as ever, to the historical record, which I propose to take at face value except where sources contradict each other, in which case we rule which source is likely to be more reliable and follow that source.
Hannibal's battles form a good starting-point for such attempts at analysis, being described by Polybius in reasonable, and apparently accurate, detail - and by others with less detail and perhaps accuracy.
TrebiaObservationsSkirmishers have little effect on each other but the Carthaginian skirmishers are considered by Livy to have a significant effect on the Roman cavalry and by Polybius to have a noticeable effect on the flanks of the Roman infantry.
The cavalry battle is over before the infantry battle, and gives the Carthaginian skirmishers some (indefinite) time to operate against the Roman infantry flanks.
The collapse of the Roman flanks, which are fighting predominantly against Libyans and Spaniards, is heavily influenced by frontal elephant pressure and flanking shooting by Carthaginian skirmishers, in about that order.
The Roman centre, unimpeded by elephants or shooting, breaks through the Gauls and Libyans opposing them.
Conclusions1) In a straight fight, Roman infantry break Gallic infantry and Libyans - this is the ultimate result of a long-drawn-out melee.
2) Where elephants and shooting are added, this result is reversed, at least against Libyans. The melee is still a long one.
Moving on ...
TrasimeneObservationsSkirmishers do not appear to be a factor in this classic army-sized ambush.
Cavalry is noticeable mainly in the 'pursuit' (they ride down Roman infantry in the lake - Roman cavalry are nowhere to be seen, presumably vanquished at the outset).
Despite being ambushed, a force of 6,000 Romans (possibly the extraordinarii and leading ala or legion) break through a Libyan contingent and march off the field. These seem to have been the only Roman troops who were able to take their opponents head-on as opposed to being flanked by them.
Conclusions1) In a straight fight, Roman infantry still break Libyan infantry - never mind that the Libyans are veterans and the Romans are not. (There is an evident weapon-systems-do-matter point buried in here.) They seem to have done so before the main action was concluded, otherwise they would have been taken in the rear before being able to break through - although it may be noted that being taken in the rear actually
helped the Roman centre to break through at Trebia - and would have been at least harassed while marching off the field.
CannaeObservationsAgain, skirmishers have little obvious effect on each other.
The cavalry fight on the Roman right is over quickly: Polybius times the conclusion of the action as taking place when the lines of heavy infantry met. Things last longer on the left, the Numidians freezing Varro's men in place by use of unfamiliar tactics, but the appearance of the Carthaginian cavalry from the opposite flank is enough to clear the Roman cavalry off the field.
Just for once, although the Romans cause Hannibal's mixed line of Gauls and Spaniards to fold - apparently in fairly short order - the Roman centre does not break through, although the only troops it could have come up against would be the balance of the Gauls in Hannibal's army.
On the flanks, the Libyans execute a rapid enveloping manoeuvre and trap and mince the Roman wings. This seems more rapid and effective than the Trebia combination of frontal pressure, shooting and elephants. The commitment of the Carthaginian cavalry, apparently against the unattacked portion of the Roman rear, closes the encirclement nicely.
The Roman army, which judging by the timing of the Volturnus becomes seriously engaged about noon, is slaughtered by a point in the afternoon that allows the Carthaginians enough time to rescue their own camp, take the Roman camp and take prisoner about 2,000 fugitive Roman cavalry, although the latter was performed simultaneously (by the pursuing Numidians) rather than sequentially.
Conclusions1) Hannibal's rearmed troops proved impervious to the usual Roman infantry breakthrough - as did the un-rearmed Gauls, once the Roman army was encircled. Before it was encircled, neither Gaul nor Spaniard could hold the Romans for more than a short while. Encirclement seems decisive.
2) The cavalry fights were over quite quickly compared to the infantry fights - at a guess, less than one hour compared with maybe 3 hours.
ZamaObservationsSkirmishers again had little effect on each other - the Roman skirmishers were anyway mostly busy with elephants.
Elephant pressure was largely negated by Scipio's preparations and tactics.
Cavalry fights in this battle seem to have been fighting withdrawals by the Carthaginian contingents, which were charged when off-balance and never really recovered. The cavalry was off the field quite early in proceedings and the Roman cavalry quite late to return.
The first-line combat pitted Roman hastati against Celtic opponents of greater skill and experience. The Romans won through superior weaponry and technique.
Next came Roman hastati against Carthaginian citizen troops. The Carthaginians fought long and hard (and not only against the Romans, but also against the aggrieved survivors of their first line) before the survivors broke.
Finally came the clash of the veterans: two lines of troops equal in numbers, weaponry and just about everything else. This fight went on for quite some time and Polybius hints that the Romans were getting the worst of it when they were saved by the return of their cavalry, which decided the action.
Conclusions1) Romans still beat Gauls (or Ligurians) in a straight fight.
2) Romans still beat African-style heavy infantry in a straight fight (unless the Celts fighting against both sides made a crucial difference).
3) Romans cannot overcome Hannibal's rearmed 'imitation legion' types in a straight fight.
4) Cavalry fights are much more rapid than infantry fights (even allowing for a little help from the elephants).
5) Getting hit in the rear by cavalry is decisive.
The above actions suggest that infantry fights, at least in the Second Punic War, tended to be of long-ish duration, and that Roman infantry would beat Gallic or Libyan infantry in a straight fight (we can add Spanish infantry to that list, again in a straight fight). Conversely, a straight fight between Roman infantry and Hannibal's post-217 BC infantry seems to have gone, if anything, in favour of the latter (buried rearmament point there).
Cavalry fights seem to have been over much more rapidly, although a certain disparity of force was present in the above battles, so whoever won the cavalry fight would be able to influence the ongoing infantry action.
Infantry collapses seem to have been very rare in this period - the only obvious one is the Spanish at Dertosa (Ibera) in 215 BC, and that, we are told, was because they did not want to go to Italy and so were determined to lose the battle! Troops on both sides seem to have been highly motivated, with considerable staying-power.
That is a very rough and ready dive into the topic, but I believe demonstrates that we can determine with reasonable accuracy which troop type will win and to an extent how long the loser will last - the latter will need reference to other battles, notably Caesar vs Gauls and some Roman vs Roman actions in which duration is specified, but this post is already long enough! We can extend this type of approach by looking at other armies and periods, though classical armies and battles are perhaps the best-described as a whole.
Excellent article Patrick and much food for thought.
To my untrained eye, classical battles (in the wider arena) with predominantly infantry were long drawn out affairs, ie othismos (whether you take this to be the shoving match beloved of many commentators or just "staying power" generated by deeper formations). Cavalry engagements, as you point out, tend to be over quickly or occur in several discrete phases throughout a battle.
Here is a question that I am musing over outloud and that is
Do battles between unfamiliar antagonists with or without technological differences generate quicker battlefield resolutions?
I dont have the answer, I am merely extending your line of reasoning....!
Just one question, Patrick: is the speed of the cavalry fights in the examples given at least partly due to the disparity of numbers between the opposing sides? What does the record say about cavalry vs cavalry combats in which the protagonists had roughly equal numbers?
My own impression is that a horseman's morale was much more brittle than an infantryman's, due perhaps to his more exposed position on his horse, which meant that a slight change in fortune in a cavalry fight could lead to a rout more easily than in an infantry vs infantry contest. But what evidence is there for this?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 11, 2013, 11:58:00 AM
That is a very rough and ready dive into the topic, but I believe demonstrates that we can determine with reasonable accuracy which troop type will win and to an extent how long the loser will last
I'd refer you back to my earlier comment and particularly Justin's comment that led to it. Justin was comparing rate of defeat in combat versus rates of march to determine whether a flank attack would arrive before a centre gave way IIRC. I think Patrick you have demonstrated we can't do this, even with your level of mastery of the sources. Yes, we can say fights were long or short, or even longer or shorter than other fights but can we can't put a stopwatch on it. I am also not convinced for much of the period we are interested in, people on battlefields made precise records of how long a fight took. We are used to time in much more precision than they were. This is without the psychological elastic perception of time is stressful situations.
So, while I actually think your idea of comparisons is a clever one and a good model (indeed there is a computer modelling technique which allows you to predict the winners in sporting matchups that never happened which uses a series of overlapping comparisons), I'm dubious of claims of timing precision.
Quote from: Erpingham on November 11, 2013, 06:33:30 PMI'd refer you back to my earlier comment and particularly Justin's comment that led to it. Justin was comparing rate of defeat in combat versus rates of march to determine whether a flank attack would arrive before a centre gave way IIRC. I think Patrick you have demonstrated we can't do this, even with your level of mastery of the sources. Yes, we can say fights were long or short, or even longer or shorter than other fights but can we can't put a stopwatch on it. I am also not convinced for much of the period we are interested in, people on battlefields made precise records of how long a fight took. We are used to time in much more precision than they were. This is without the psychological elastic perception of time is stressful situations.
I would qualify what I said in that knowing
exactly how long a straight infantry or cavalry fight lasted is obviously impossible since we weren't there with a stopwatch. However I agree with Patrick that we can form a rough comparative idea. Cannae is the best example: Hannibal's entire plan rested on knowing how long his Gauls and Spanish would last in the centre whilst his left wing cavalry beat their Roman counterparts, marched around the Roman rear and beat the Roman left wing cavalry, then marched to the centre of the Roman rear to attack the back of the Roman infantry.
The question here is to what extent the Romans could keep up the pressure on the centre after the Libyans had wrapped around their flanks. If the wrap-around occurred after the defeat of the Roman cavalry on both wings then the implication is that the Roman legions were able to lay it on for some time without interference on their flanks. If however, the wrap-around occurred before the conclusion of the cavalry fights - i.e. Hannibal was able to tempt the Roman infantry to advance ahead of their mounted flank guards - then the Allied legions at least would have found themselves in trouble virtually from the debut of the infantry fight. That still left the Roman legions in the centre relatively unaffected until the Carthaginian cavalry began to pressurise their rear.
Final conclusion: for wargaming purposes an infantry fight between a Roman and a romanised infantry line should last long enough for all the cavalry action of Cannae - fighting and movement - to be concluded, without either infantry line being broken, even if one line is numerically superior to the other. One doesn't need a stopwatch for this, just rules that ensure the infantry engagement will last as many turns as are needed for superior cavalry to beat inferior counterparts then pile into the backs of the infantry.
The same sort of reasoning can be applied to the other examples.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on November 11, 2013, 05:33:18 PM
Just one question, Patrick: is the speed of the cavalry fights in the examples given at least partly due to the disparity of numbers between the opposing sides? What does the record say about cavalry vs cavalry combats in which the protagonists had roughly equal numbers?
My own impression is that a horseman's morale was much more brittle than an infantryman's, due perhaps to his more exposed position on his horse, which meant that a slight change in fortune in a cavalry fight could lead to a rout more easily than in an infantry vs infantry contest. But what evidence is there for this?
Easier to make a break for it when things go against you in an engagement? Why hang around if you feel the battle is going badly and you are sat upon the biological equivalent of a motorbike
No expert at this but I can think of two or three Cavalry engagements where the mounted stayed the course. Arbela where one flank of Alexander's army last long enough for him to defeat those facing him and come across to the other who seem to have been hard pressed. Hastings where the Norman cavalry make repeated charges uphill (the ability to rest behind their own foot may be a factor). Kadesh where again the Egyptian mounted holds on against impossible odds, probably because it has foot to go and hide behind, slay all the enemy, and then grant them very favourable terms (I accept that our primary sources for this one may be a little unreliable...)
Tim is right, and we can add Issus, where the Thessalians and Greeks on Alexander's left bottled up many times their number of Persian cavalry, although in this case they did not have to hold them for very long because Alexander's first charge took him to Darius, who remembered a pressing appointment elsewhere once his bodyguards started falling in numbers and thus pulled the rug from his own troops' continuing prospects.
At Arbela (Gaugamela to many) Parmenio's cavalry held out - just - against Mazaeus, but Parmenio did not view his prospects very brightly, sending repeated appeals for assistance right from the start of the fighting and ultimately being saved by the Persians streaming off the field following Darius' departure (again), although Alexander had turned back to help. Conversely, on the Persian left, Alexander tempted Bessus' cavalry out of position and, by Arrian's account, held the 20,000-strong but deeply packed Persian cavalry contingent with two squadrons (maybe 600 men) and hit them in the rear/flank with the prodromoi, another 300 or so, who drove them off in rout. This did not take long - just long enough for Parmenio to send his first plea for help. (Alex ignored him, went in after Darius and won the battle.)
One case of apparently evenly-matched cavalry was at Heraclea (Pyrrhus vs Romans, 280 BC) - not a particularly well-described battle, but one in which Plutarch says the action swirled back and forth with "seven changes of fortune". Now I have yet to see an infantry phalanx survive even one 'change of fortune' in a battle, so it looks as if Plutarch was referring to the cavalry action, and this suggests that it surged back and forth at least three times (initial Epirot charge, initial Roman rally and repulse of Epirotes, Epirot rally and second charge, etc.) until Pyrrhus cheated by adding the elephants so that 'fortune' was replaced by 'pachyderm fright' and the Roman cavalry were cut to pieces.
Assuming Plutarch and his source could count, this gives us a cavalry fight moving at
at least three times the rate of the infantry fight: the cavalry action was 'decided' three times (or six times?) while the infantry were still hard at it, albeit without a clear winner, and the seventh clash - with elephants - sorted matters out very quickly while the PBI were still shoving away.
Quote from: Erpingham on November 11, 2013, 06:33:30 PM
I'd refer you back to my earlier comment and particularly Justin's comment that led to it. Justin was comparing rate of defeat in combat versus rates of march to determine whether a flank attack would arrive before a centre gave way IIRC. I think Patrick you have demonstrated we can't do this, even with your level of mastery of the sources. Yes, we can say fights were long or short, or even longer or shorter than other fights but can we can't put a stopwatch on it. I am also not convinced for much of the period we are interested in, people on battlefields made precise records of how long a fight took. We are used to time in much more precision than they were. This is without the psychological elastic perception of time is stressful situations.
I think Justin's approach has validity, in that Hannibal's deployments and approach at Cannae worked really well - the timings all came together and Polybius' description has the events in sequence and related to one another, giving us a useful 'chronology' for this particular battle. The value of Cannae is that Hannibal evidently made his battle plan with the resisting times of various troop types as key building-blocks in his scheme ("I love it when a plan comes together!" :) ) - it would not have worked otherwise. The interaction of the Carthaginian manoeuvres and the almost 'timed' collapse of Hannibal's Gallo-Spanish centre plus the rapid defeat of the Roman right were integral to Hannibal's battle and it could not have worked if his cavalry took too long to defeat the Roman right or if his veterans had taken too long to gift-wrap the Roman wings. The precision and neatness of Cannae still fascinated general staff officers 2100 years later.
Granted that we cannot apply a stopwatch to these events - in any event, with hours of variable length depending on the time of year it would not work too well - but we can see how they relate to each other, and that in itself is valuable for determining relative combat persistence.
Quote from: Holly on November 11, 2013, 08:24:23 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on November 11, 2013, 05:33:18 PM
Just one question, Patrick: is the speed of the cavalry fights in the examples given at least partly due to the disparity of numbers between the opposing sides? What does the record say about cavalry vs cavalry combats in which the protagonists had roughly equal numbers?
My own impression is that a horseman's morale was much more brittle than an infantryman's, due perhaps to his more exposed position on his horse, which meant that a slight change in fortune in a cavalry fight could lead to a rout more easily than in an infantry vs infantry contest. But what evidence is there for this?
Easier to make a break for it when things go against you in an engagement? Why hang around if you feel the battle is going badly and you are sat upon the biological equivalent of a motorbike
I hope the example of Heraclea illustrates the course of a cavalry fight when capabilities are pretty much exactly equal. Cavalry if disadvantaged seems happy to give ground and
reculer pour mieux sauter, which they will do for as long as their cohesion holds. This is why I see the cavalry fight at Zama not as a rout and off-board pursuit but as a running fight in which the Carthaginian cavalry maintained their morale and cohesion but never managed to regain their formation, so they were giving ground for a long time (and well off the battlefield) before they finally came apart. Conversely, where there is absolutely no question of giving ground they will stand and fight, as the Roman right did at Cannae, even dismounting to avoid any retreat. However cavalry caught on the wrong foot, or facing the wrong way, can be very vulnerable to panic and rapid rout, witness the Persian left at Arbela/Gaugamela and Tigranes' cataphracts at Tigranocerta. Each of these contingents collapsed and ran without further ado when unexpectedly hit in flank.
I think we can safely say that cavalry is quite resilient while its morale is good, that its battlefield system is much more flexible than infantry, especially when it comes to yielding and regaining ground, and that it can panic more rapidly when unpleasantly surprised, unless this is simply panic travelling at the same speed but four-legged panickers being faster at implementing it!
I would make one additional comment: the timing of infantry and cavalry fights was something sufficiently precise for Hannibal to be able to build his battleplan around it. He did not form up at Cannae crossing his fingers he would throw a few lucky 6's in the centre whilst his opponent threw a few unlucky 1's. Hannibal was anything but a gambler.
I oncedid a week's bookbinding course and was impressed at how they taught us to get measurements right. The tutors did not keep measuring paper and card to get them to equal size. Wherever possible they made one measurement and then matched the paper to that. That way it was impossible to end up with a situation where, for example the holes fir sewing the paper into the cover did not match with the holes in the cover.
I suggest that the way that the Ancients made objects and developments relied a lot upon mebthods where the initial measurement was made and then other processes followed and were matched to that measurement.
Hence to say Cannae. Rather than Hannibal being able to make a fine calculation as to the time events would take I envisage him learning from previous actions and thus interspersing his Gauls and Spaniards to stiffen the Gauls and bowing their line forwards so that it would become denser as it was pushed back and then having the African assault triggered by the Celto-Iberians passing a certain point. The retirement of the Carthaginian skirmishers will have been triggered by the advancing Romans reaching a certain range and the attack of the Carthaginian cavalry by the arrival and deployment of the skirmishers which gave them superiority they needed over the Roman horse.
So the Cannae plan runs like clockwork and is based on H's accurate perception of the way the Romans would react, but it is even more like clockwork because each Roman move triggers the next Carthaginian action. I would not call the Carthaginian moves responses, though, because they are moving to Hannibal's plan, it is just that the Romans dictate the timing of the Carthaginian actions.
If Cannae works as I suggest then it does not need Hannibal to have a stopwatch on events, because his men only move as the Roman advance triggers them.
Roy
Roy's point about interdependence of actions is a good one, in that Cannae depended upon a lot of parts slotting into place - with the cooperation of the Romans, which is why Hannibal waited for a day when Varro was in charge. He needed a belligerent ignoramus in charge of the opposition for his plan to work.
Naturally, integral to the self-adjusting mechanisms involved is some idea of how long it will take those mechanisms to do the adjusting - there is little point in designing an encirclement that traps empty air because the 'anvil' could not hold the enemy for long enough to close the trap. Hannibal would know almost to a breath how long it would take troops to execute a particular manoeuvre, and he had just had a whole winter to work on getting it exact, so the combination of interdependent activities and precise timings for execution of the parts under his control left him fully in charge of events on the day.
As Roy says, the whole thing is not run according to an inflexible schedule, but the respective manoeuvres are triggered as the appropriate battlefield conditions/criteria are reached. Once these are reached and the manoeuvres triggered Hannibal knows exactly how long they will take to execute, having had the opportunity to practice for most of the winter. We can also see how Hannibal's dispositions helped these trigger criteria to come about: the curved line of Gauls and Spaniards would temporarily stop the Romans where they touched it, so the ends of the Roman line would advance further than the centre and, more significant, further than their protecting cavalry, leaving a space for Hannibal's enveloping veterans to get behind them without risk or delay. The curved line was not an affectation, it was a means of opening up a gap behind the Roman flanks. It also meant that when the Gauls and Spaniards could resist no longer the Romans would follow up starting from the centre, straightening the line again just as the encirclement was going in and hence moving forwards the troops in the Roman rear that might have impeded the encirclement had they remained where they were.
Hannibal's plan was a classic combination of knowing what his troops could do and anticipating what the enemy troops would do. He still needed to anticipate how long a particular phase of the battle was likely to take, otherwise the best-laid plans would be thrown out of kilter and he would have, at best, an incomplete victory. As it happened, he got everything right (including the enemy leadership), and Cannae was his best-ever battle.
Quote from: aligern on November 12, 2013, 10:07:06 AM
If Cannae works as I suggest then it does not need Hannibal to have a stopwatch on events, because his men only move as the Roman advance triggers them.
Roy
So, more IGO-UGO than simultaneous moves then :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2013, 11:17:45 AM
Hannibal's plan was a classic combination of knowing what his troops could do and anticipating what the enemy troops would do. He still needed to anticipate how long a particular phase of the battle was likely to take, otherwise the best-laid plans would be thrown out of kilter and he would have, at best, an incomplete victory. As it happened, he got everything right (including the enemy leadership), and Cannae was his best-ever battle.
I suspect it was more like a medieval mastermason than a modern civil engineer. He knew his materials and their properties by experience, not by scientific experiment.
Having disposed of the canard of high precision, what, if any, general conclusions can be drawn about the length of combat in the ancient and medieval periods?
Quote from: Erpingham on November 12, 2013, 06:40:24 PM
I suspect it was more like a medieval mastermason than a modern civil engineer. He knew his materials and their properties by experience, not by scientific experiment.
While I can see and appreciate the thinking, I am intrigued by the assumed distinction between experiment and experience: what would be the practical difference in applicable knowledge, if any?
Quote
Having disposed of the canard of high precision, what, if any, general conclusions can be drawn about the length of combat in the ancient and medieval periods?
I shall take that up if we ever dispose of the 'canard'. ;) Hannibal was able to execute manoeuvres with precision and to assess how long it would take for certain troop types to overcome other troop types. Familiarity was, as correctly observed, an integral part of the ability to make such assessments, though Hannibal was not the only one to be able to do so: Alexander delighted in knifing through opposing formations believed to be tough enough to stop him. His handling of Gaugamela was a remarkable balancing act, as with about 600 cavalry he kept 20,000 enemy cavalry occupied, and then routed them with another 300 of his own cavalry in the right place. If that is not high precision, I do not know what is.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2013, 07:13:04 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on November 12, 2013, 06:40:24 PM
I suspect it was more like a medieval mastermason than a modern civil engineer. He knew his materials and their properties by experience, not by scientific experiment.
While I can see and appreciate the thinking, I am intrigued by the assumed distinction between experiment and experience: what would be the practical difference in applicable knowledge, if any?
Interesting question. How you get to proficiency would be different - theoretical learning, academic as against hands on. And you could become proficient quicker. Also, I suspect that innovation would be easier/ more likely. I leave it to you to apply that to a battlefield, though I would draw the parallel to the staff college model developed in the 19th century against what came before.
Sabin has some bits on this, the short of which is that as the punic wars went on, the battles go longer.
earlier wars - especially the better documented greek wars, seem to be very quick indeed, as do most but not all of those involving gauls and germans.
and the short of all that is that its not down to predicting individual behaviour, as much as it is about the changing nature of the armies and the changing nature of the battle outcomes - subjugation, extermination, enslavement or hegemony - which we have overlooked a lot so far.
Quote from: Erpingham on November 12, 2013, 07:52:34 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2013, 07:13:04 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on November 12, 2013, 06:40:24 PM
I suspect it was more like a medieval mastermason than a modern civil engineer. He knew his materials and their properties by experience, not by scientific experiment.
While I can see and appreciate the thinking, I am intrigued by the assumed distinction between experiment and experience: what would be the practical difference in applicable knowledge, if any?
Interesting question. How you get to proficiency would be different - theoretical learning, academic as against hands on. And you could become proficient quicker. Also, I suspect that innovation would be easier/ more likely. I leave it to you to apply that to a battlefield, though I would draw the parallel to the staff college model developed in the 19th century against what came before.
And the 19th century staff college concept seems to have arisen because the pace of warfare - both mobilisation and campaigning - had stepped up to the point where traditional methods of troop concentration, movement control and supply were becoming overwhelmed.
Hannibal seems to have been that comparative rarity: a thinking general whose aspirations and proficiency reached beyond his experience, or perhaps more accurately enabled him to combine facets of his experience in order to develop novel concepts on the battlefield. While there is nothing new in the concept of the ambush, there was in the way he lured Sempronius into one, and encirclement was not in itself a novel concept, although there was novelty and ingenuity in the way Hannibal set Varro up to take the fall at Cannae.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2013, 07:13:04 PM
Hannibal was able to execute manoeuvres with precision and to assess how long it would take for certain troop types to overcome other troop types.
Not wanting to dwell but the original reference was to precision of timing, not of manoeuver. I think the ability of generals to estimate how long troops could hold for is one of the basic skills for generals. It was down to experience, intelligence (as both thinking power and knowledge of the troops and conditions) and skill. Which makes it a tricky element to build into any refight, of course.
We are dealing with battles where, mostly, the general can see everything. hence I have great doubt that they would attempt to calculate how long a melee will last and long redoplyment will the for skirmishers and mostly operate on the 'master mason' principle of when x happens I order the cavalry to move forward, when Y happens the skirmishers are to pull back through the line. Whilst the Ancients could estimate time and distance I just don't see them making a plan on that basis because there is too much friction in war. Indeed Hannibal might have had a reserve behind the Celts and Iberians to feed in and keep to his plan or he might just have reasoned on them holding long enough. Until the 18th century march and deployment rates are not particularly scientific.
Roy
Quote from: Mark G on November 13, 2013, 07:30:42 AM
Sabin has some bits on this, the short of which is that as the punic wars went on, the battles go longer.
earlier wars - especially the better documented greek wars, seem to be very quick indeed, as do most but not all of those involving gauls and germans.
and the short of all that is that its not down to predicting individual behaviour, as much as it is about the changing nature of the armies and the changing nature of the battle outcomes - subjugation, extermination, enslavement or hegemony - which we have overlooked a lot so far.
And which deserve further study, or at least attention.
The Punic Wars do show an imbalance of forces in many of the engagements described: the actions tend however to be decided by an imbalance in command as much as anything else. In the First Punic War, we have several actions in Sicily that centre around sieges, and two in North Africa (Adys and Bagradas) which involve an army attacking an army. We can look at Bagradas below. Then, once Regulus has been removed from the scene the war shifts back to Sicily, with Hamilcar Barca commanding the Carthaginian army, and he conducts NO battles!
In the Second Punic War, the Trebia lasts the better part of a day, Trasimene somewhat less, Cannae the better part of an afternoon and Zama a good part of the day. The battle at Herdonea in 210 BC (Livy XXVII.1) seems to be over in fairly short order, with the Romans enveloped and suffering a spreading rout along the line after the 6th Legion was charged in the rear. After this defeat, Claudius Marcellus and his army turn up to fight Hannibal and the battle lasts "from early morning to nightfall" (Livy XXVII.2) with neither side prevailing.
Now Bagradas: the Roman army under Regulus had previously defeated a Carthaginian army at the Adys: the one change the Carthaginians made was the commander, and all else flowed from that. The armies were the same as before (except that the Carthaginians had lost a number of Celtic mercenaries at the Adys and had them partly replaced by the mercenaries - apparently Greek - Xanthippus arrived with) but the Carthaginian commander was not, and he proceeded to find a good battlefield to maximise the effectiveness of Carthaginian cavalry and elephants, something his predecessor had conspicuously failed to do. He also drew up his forces in an effective manner in which they could synergise their strengths - we call it 'combined arms'.
The result was a one-sided massacre. The Roman cavalry, outnumbered 8:1, fled at the first charge (and appear to have been the 500 men picked up with Regulus after the battle), whereupon the Carthaginian cavalry, assisted by the 'most agile' of Xanthippus' foot, surrounded the Roman infantry who found themselves being gradually stamped out of existence by the solid line of elephants backed by Carthaginian spearmen and shot to pieces by the Carthaginian cavalry. Carthage's spearmen only had to kebab a few groups of Romans who forced their way between the elephants. Polybius does not tell us how long the action took, but it was over soon enough for the Carthaginian to catch Regulus and his cavalry before the day was over, so given that the armies would have been deployed and closing each other by, say, mid-day, we can surmise that the serious fighting, or rather killing, took perhaps three hours, as the Carthaginians had time to strip the dead and get back to camp before the close of day (in addition to picking up Regulus).
This is similar to the duration of Cannae, which we know began shortly before mid-day (the Volturnus got up soon afterward) and was over in time for the Carthaginians to rescue their own camp, take the Roman camp and round up practically every escapee from the battlefield.
Zama, which involved much speechmaking along with unusual deployments, could hardly have got underway before noon, and thereafter had a prolonged struggle between the Roman first line and the first two Carthaginian lines followed by an even longer one between the Carthaginian third line and the whole Roman infantry force. We do not seem to have any reliable time indicators for this battle, except that it would have begun around noon or very late in the morning and was over before dusk. Livy has Scipio plunder Hannibal's camp 'immediately' (confestim = straight away, without delay, forthwith) after the battle
and take the booty to Lentulus' fleet at Utica, but one presumes the carriage of booty to Utica, a straight-line distance of 100 miles, was not accomplished the same day. We might estimate a duration of perhaps five hours for Zama, which represents how long an outfoxed Hannibal was able to stave off defeat.
Quote from: Erpingham on November 13, 2013, 09:14:12 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2013, 07:13:04 PM
Hannibal was able to execute manoeuvres with precision and to assess how long it would take for certain troop types to overcome other troop types.
Not wanting to dwell but the original reference was to precision of timing, not of manoeuver. I think the ability of generals to estimate how long troops could hold for is one of the basic skills for generals. It was down to experience, intelligence (as both thinking power and knowledge of the troops and conditions) and skill. Which makes it a tricky element to build into any refight, of course.
Both precision of timing and precision of manoeuvre are important, though as you say building the accumulated wisdom and experience of generals into a refight is decidedly challenging - substituting players for the original generals is already a major change from the historical prototype. Paradoxically, even the most dedicated players rarely if ever seem to have the same grasp of deployment and manoeuvre timings as real period generals, and how long a troop type can hold, or how long it takes to overcome particular opponents, is very much at the mercy of wargame rules abstraction and interpretation.
What I hope to establish is that there are cases where resisting power, and hence duration, can be quantified and shown to be (reasonably) consistent, which would make it possible for designers validly to use mechanisms along the lines of: troop type A is facing troop type B; troop qualities and experience are similar and there is no leadership advantage, so troop type A will overwhelm troop type B in X turns. The owner of troop type B had better have some idea of how he is going to either relieve them or otherwise relieve the situation, but he knows he has about X turns before the first cracks appear. This kind of approach seems to reflect the pattern of many classical period infantry battles and could be a great time-saver on the tabletop without losing essential realism.
How useful it will be for other periods and armies I am less sure. Less disciplined and more volatile armies may not be entirely anemable to this approach.
Quote from: aligern on November 13, 2013, 09:33:46 AM
We are dealing with battles where, mostly, the general can see everything. hence I have great doubt that they would attempt to calculate how long a melee will last and long redoplyment will the for skirmishers and mostly operate on the 'master mason' principle of when x happens I order the cavalry to move forward, when Y happens the skirmishers are to pull back through the line. Whilst the Ancients could estimate time and distance I just don't see them making a plan on that basis because there is too much friction in war. Indeed Hannibal might have had a reserve behind the Celts and Iberians to feed in and keep to his plan or he might just have reasoned on them holding long enough. Until the 18th century march and deployment rates are not particularly scientific.
Roy
Scientific, no, empirical, yes, as Anthony pointed out. One can be just as predictively accurate empirically as scientifically, perhaps even more so as the intrusive and occasionally distorting layer of theory is not imposed. However I would point out that Greek and Roman commanders had march and deployment rates down to a fine art thanks to regular drill and practice and the institution of the parade ground, Field of Mars etc. and had accepted conventions about such movement rates (and look at the planning and execution of, for example, Claudius Nero's march north in 207 BC, Livy XXVII.43 and 45).
I disagree that 'there is too much friction in war': this would only apply if one's army is not a well-oiled machine. ;) We might also note that a cooperative opponent goes a long way towards making effective prediction possible.
While Hannibal might have employed a reserve to feed in to support his Gallo-Spanish line, our sources indicate that he did not, but let it collapse, which had the effect of sucking the Romans into the trap. His remaining Gauls (c.16,000) are not accounted for in his visible lineup, the obvious place to put them being in a solid second line behind the variegated and attenuated first. In that situation they would be well placed to stop a somewhat disordered Roman pursuit of the first line and stop it cold long enough for the trap to close. This Hannibal evidently deemed a superior approach to piecemeal reinforcement, especially as it had the effect of sucking the Romans into the trap rather than expending force to keep them out of it.
Cannae depends upon an accurate estimation of how long Gauls and Spaniards can resist Romans (and for that matter on how long Roman cavalry can resist Gallic and Spanish cavalry) so that the triggered actions will be triggered in the correct relationship.
Just to expand on our frame of reference, I dug out Rollason & prestwich The battle of Nevilles Cross 1346 because I remembered they'd given some thought to the duration of the action and had compared the sources. Translated into modern timings, this gives the following
6.30 am - a clash between a Scottish foraging party and the English van alerts the Scots to the approach of the English
9.00 am - the English have assembled on the battlefield and hear speeches
9-00 - 2.00pm - the English and Scots look at each other across the battlefield, banners displayed
2.00pm - 5.30pm - the battle is fought. There are at least two breaks for rest (this is one of the clearest accounts of a medieval battle having periods of mutual separation of armies). Scots are broken by degrees, with parts of the army running but part attempting ( but ultimately failing) to make a fighting withdrawal. Pursuit probably limited by nightfall.
So, to the participants, this is a dawn to dusk battle. If we were refighting though, we'd probably take the 3 1/2 hours of action. This includes the initial archery skirmishing through to the final collapse of the Scots and the capture of the king. So we'd probably call the battle rather than play the rout and last stand phases, which might have taken an hour (one source credits the Scots with falling back two miles before they were finally brought to bay).
I'd have to do more research to find out the length of other battles but I don't think this is untypical. But some were very short. The battle of Bulgneville in 1431 was famously short, for example, with modern estimates from 15 minutes to an hour.
Classical armies tended to measure a battle by the duration of fighting: first there was the deployment, then the sacrifices, then the speechmaking, then the skirmishing and then the action. The troops were also unusually fit by the standards of other times, the Lycurgan Spartans and, as noted by Josephus, the Imperial Romans in particular placing great emphasis on regular and intensive training:
" ... they do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they then put their hands first into motion, while they avoided so to do in times of peace; but, as if their weapons did always cling to them, they have never any truce from warlike exercises; nor do they stay till times of war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises differ not at all from the real use of their arms, but every soldier is every day exercised, and that with great diligence, as if it were in time of war, which is the reason why they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; for neither can any disorder remove them from their usual regularity, nor can fear affright them out of it, nor can labor tire them; which firmness of conduct makes them always to overcome those that have not the same firmness; nor would he be mistaken that should call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their battles bloody exercises." - Josephus, Jewish War, III.72-75
Romans were thus well fitted for longer battles, and an all-day fight (albeit with reliefs noted as occurring at least once) is perhaps not too surprising.
But let us look at another mediaeval action.
Roche-Derrien in 1347 is interesting as being mainly a night battle. Sir Thomas Dagworth left Beghard, nine miles away, at about midnight and ploughed into the sleeping French camp at "a quarter before dawn". Between then and dawn his men had a fine time and fended off three improvised French counterattacks, then at daybreak the French began to get their act together and things started to look sticky for the English when Totsham and the garrison of Roche-Derrien, seeing what was happening, organised a sortie into the French rear and broke them.
Dagworth's '300 men-at-arms and 400 archers' had sustained a fight against several thousand French troops (Froissart has 1,600 men-at-arms and 12,000 foot; Dagworth himself reckoned 1,800 men-at-arms, 600 archers, 2,000 crossbowmen and an unknown number of 'commune' (presumably levied foot). Depending upon what is meant by 'a quarter before dawn', Sir Thomas' force may have sustained the action for twenty to thirty minutes or two to three hours.
The Earl of Derby had achieved a similar success at Auberoche in 1345, in daylight, but time indicators for this one are much harder to come by. Even at the time nobody seems to have hazarded a guess.
And one of our few classical era engagements with a definite timespan: Hispania, 193 BC.
" Nor is there any doubt that all Spain would have taken courage to rebel had not the other praetor, Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of Gnaeus, fought many successful battles beyond the Ebro and so intimidated the natives that not less than fifty towns surrendered to him. These were Scipio's achievements as praetor; when he was propraetor he fell upon the Lusitani as they were returning home after plundering the farther province, laden with much spoil, while they were still on the march, and from the third hour of the day to the eighth maintained an indecisive action. He was unequal in number of troops, superior in all else; for with his troops in a compact body he had clashed with a column long drawn out and hindered by the great number of its pack-animals, and he fought with fresh troops against an enemy worn out by a long march. For they had set out during the third watch; three daylight hours had been added to their night march, and the battle had followed at once upon the labour of the journey, with no time given for repose. Accordingly, only at the outset of the fight did they retain some energy of mind and body, and at first they had thrown the Romans into confusion; later the battle became gradually more even. At this crisis the propraetor vowed games to Jupiter if he should rout and slaughter the enemy. At length the Romans pressed on with greater vigour and the Lusitani gave way and finally fled; and while the victors pursued the fleeing foe, about twelve thousand of the enemy were killed, five hundred and forty were taken prisoners, almost all cavalry, and one hundred thirty-four standards were captured. From the Roman army seventy-three were lost." - Livy XXXV.1.3-10
This action has five hours of fighting before the battle began to shift the Romans' way: not, according to Livy, because of superior Roman stamina or technique, but because the proconsul had vowed games to Jupiter. Could be worth a try if a tabletop battle is not going one's way ... if one knows Jupiter's favourite boardgame. ;)
And another: the battle of Carystum, 173 BC.
"There was a battle also in Liguria at the town of Carystum in the Statellate country. A large force of Ligurians had concentrated there. After the consul M. Popilius reached the place they at first kept within their walls, but when they saw the Romans preparing to attack, they formed their line of battle in front of their gates. This had been the consul's object in threatening an attack and he lost no time, therefore, in commencing the action. They fought for more than three hours without any certain prospect of victory on either side. When the consul found that in no part of the field were the Ligurians giving way, he ordered the cavalry to mount and deliver as fierce a charge as possible on the front and flanks of the enemy's line. A good many broke through the enemy's centre and got behind the fighting line. This created a panic amongst the Ligurians; they broke and fled in all directions, very few reached the town, the cavalry mostly intercepting them. The obstinacy of the fighting proved costly to the Ligurians; 10,000 men are said to have been killed and more than 700 prisoners taken; 82 standards were carried off the field. The victory was not a bloodless one for the Romans: they lost more than 3000 men; the loss fell mainly on the front ranks owing to both sides refusing to give ground." - Livy XL.7.3-10
That's a good example that I hadn't previously noticed, of cavalry breaking frontally through "line" infantry (if not especially "heavy" ones).
Quote from: Duncan Head on November 23, 2013, 07:00:11 PM
That's a good example that I hadn't previously noticed, of cavalry breaking frontally through "line" infantry (if not especially "heavy" ones).
But infantry that have 'fought for three hours'.
So you could 'soften' your enemy infantry up with prolonged 'combat' and then hit them with cavalry.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on November 23, 2013, 10:24:03 PM
So you could 'soften' your enemy infantry up with prolonged 'combat' and then hit them with cavalry.
The Romans did do this on occasion, e.g. in 203 BC:
"
In the same summer in which these measures were taken at Rome and these operations carried on in Africa, Publius Quinctilius Varus, a praetor, and Marcus Cornelius, the proconsul, fought a pitched battle with Mago the Carthaginian in the territory of the Insubrian Gauls. The praetor's legions were in the first line. [2] Cornelius kept his legions in reserve while he himself rode up to the front. And from in front of the two wings praetor and proconsul kept urging the soldiers to advance their ranks against the enemy with all their strength. [3] When they failed to drive the enemy back, Quinctilius then said to Cornelius: "The battle is slowing down, as you see, and their unexpected resistance is hardening the enemy against fright, and the danger is that fear may turn into daring. We must rouse our cavalry to a sudden charge if we wish to confuse and dislodge them. [4] Accordingly, either do you in the front line keep up the fight, and I will lead the cavalry into the fray. Or I will command here at the front, and you shall send out the horse of four legions into the enemy." [5] As the proconsul was ready to accept whichever part of the task the praetor wished him to take, Quinctilius, the praetor, with his son, an active youth whose praenomen was Marcus, made his way to the cavalry and ordering them to mount suddenly sent them out against the enemy. [6] The confusion wrought by the cavalry was heightened also by the shouting of the legions, and the enemy's line would not have kept its position if Mago at the first movement of the cavalry had not at once led the elephants, which were kept in readiness, into battle. [7] Terrified by their roar and odour and by the sight of them the horses made the assistance of the cavalry useless. And although, so long as they were in the thick of the fight, where they could make use of the lance [cuspis]
and, at close quarters, of the sword, the Roman horsemen were the stronger, still when they were carried to a distance by frightened horses, the Numidians were the more successful in hurling javelins from a longer range." - Livy XXX.18.1-7
Forgetting about the elephants rather spoilt the surprise in this instance, but the idea was there, although in this case desperation rather than calculation seems to have been behind what seemed like a good idea at the time. The Romans eventually won by committing their reserve legions.
I seem to remember someone doing a Slingshot article on this particular battle. ;)
Yes, at the time it was one of the battles which made me wonder if Roman cavalry would best be described as Irregular Knights (perhaps inferior?) who dismounted as Warband :-)
Jim
A few more medieval examples. Because these tend to be less than unequivocal, I've put my sources
Agincourt : Battle starts with English advance c. 10 am, fighting to between 12.00 and 1.00 (Curry)
Courtrai : Battle starts with crossbow exchanges around 12.00, finished by 3.00 (Verbruggen)
Flodden : Fighting starts between 4.00 and 5.00, finished by 7.00 (nightfall) though pursuit and looting continues (EH battlefield survey)
These were just three I had to hand - I didn't just select them because they were the same length :) Though obviously not a scientific sample, we seem to be finding quite a number of actions around the three hour mark. What, if any, effect should this have on our gaming? E.g. what is the average length of time represented by a move and does this affect how we view what happens in that time?
The temptation is to try for, say, ten turns of 20 minutes each or twelve of 15 minutes each, but the problem, as ever, is that once things started happening they could happen quite quickly, and the ideal turn is of about the same length as the historical 'command loop'. This could be 30 seconds to 30 minutes depending upon the army and the circumstances!
Furthermore, time tends to be flexible in action: not just subjectively, when it speeds up in direct combat (and apparently 'speeds down' for some unfortunate individuals who tend to become early casualties), but also because two lines can batter away at each other for some time without result or a contingent can fold very rapidly and create an opportunity that a talented leader can exploit with speed and effect if in the right place at the right time: I am thinking of Alexander at Issus, where he clove through the Kardakes and headed straight for Darius, winning the battle in short order - probably within 10 minutes or so, the rest being phalanx-rescuing and pursuit. Rapid resolution may have been one of the factors that made Alexander's victories so surprisingly cheap in Macedonian lives and he achieved rapid resolution by going for the decisive point: the Persian leadership.
Which leads to a question: would a hypothetical ideal rules set best model this feature by giving a talented commander extra movement/combat capability? Would he get to fight, win, move and fight again before the opponent could respond? GMT Games' Great Battles of History series reached in this direction by allowing a 'momentum' die roll for a commander who had just finished his move: if he rolled equal to or below his initiative rating he got another go - straight away. His troops, however, would pick up some loss of cohesion for moving multiple times, it being assumed that momentum and maintenance of formation were mutually antagonistic.
One factor that made for long duration battles was when both armies were predominantly infantry of matched ability, equipment and technique and cavalry was very much a junior arm. Livy VII.33.13-15 narrates the closing stages of a battle between Romans and Samnites c.344 BC: the Romans have tried their occasional trick of having the cavalry charge the centre of a tired enemy line - it just bounced off.
"The battle had now lasted a considerable time; there was dreadful slaughter about the standards of the Samnites, but as yet no retreating anywhere, so determined were they to be overcome by naught but death. [14] And so the Romans, who saw that their strength was fast ebbing away in weariness and that little daylight yet remained, were filled with rage, and hurled themselves against the enemy. [15] Then for the first time were there signs of giving way and the beginning of a rout; then were the Samnites captured or slain; nor would many have survived, if night had not ended what was now a victory rather than a battle."
If we assume the battle began around noon (there seems to have been plenty of time for deployment and subsequent speechmaking) then it lasted from noon to a summer nightfall. This could be anything up to nine hours: an infantry struggle with brute force as its main characteristic. Such an action was exceptional
"The Romans admitted that never had they fought with a more stubborn adversary." - Livy VII.33.16
but demonstrates how long two essentially infantry armies could fight a fiercely contested engagement.