At the onset of the First Punic War Rome has been described as the land superpower, while Carthage has been given this role at sea. It is clear that Rome had a clear advantage on land - centuries of battle against a variety of opponents and in various terrain have honed their armies in all aspects - from organisation, equipment, training of armies and individual soldiers, experience of both armies and commanders to siege methods and logistics. Moreover, the Romans knew the strengths and weaknesses of many troops used by Carthage - Celts, Ligurians, Campanians and Greeks at least. At the same time, Carthage has been involved in land conflicts, but mostly in Sicily and Lybia/Numidia - the conflicts they have been involved were much lower key (with major engagements few and far between) and they have never encountered anything like the Romans. Additionally, their system of recruiting mercenaries to fight meant that they started from scratch with every new batch - they could not improve the equipment, nor the system. Clearly then, the Romans had the better of it, as it showed (interestingly, Polybios credits Hamilcar with being the best commander of the war, on either side, although he achieved little other than maintaining a stalemate for five years - perhaps exactly because this was so difficult to do against superior foes).
At sea it was different. The Romans had no fleet or seamanship to start with, which clearly favoured Carthage with its long tradition of seafaring. However, I am struggling to find any evidence of Carthage being involved in huge marine battles prior to the Punic Wars. Of course, they were known to sink a few ships of competing merchants here and there and their ships were famously involved on the side of the Persian fleet at Salamis, but even these were triremes - different ships to most of those used in the Punic Wars. What this means is that the playing field was much more level on the sea than it was on land, even at the start of the war and the Romans actually had the better trained crews (and a full complement of picked soldiers) at the final and decisive battle of the Aegadi Islands - and that comes straight from Polybios.
Polybios therefore declares Carthage the maritime power, but it would appear that all it took for the Romans was to build a fleet (using a beached Carthaginian ship as a template and putting a corvus on it). It appears that his view is therefore not that well substantiated. Does anyone know of evidence of Punic fleets engaged in large sea battles, of the type fought in the First Punic War?
A parallel with the Peloponnesian Wars is also interesting - Athens was considered a sea power, but that lasted only until Sparta built a fleet using Persian money and defeated the Athenians at Aegospotami - in their very first major maritime clash. Clearly, the Spartans also had allies with maritime tradition, which helped, but again, the Athenian advantage at sea appears to have been purely that of numbers.
Any opinions?
Well there's the battle of Alalia where they were allied to the Etruscans against the Phocians.
There is also some evidence of campaigns fought against the Massilots. Also large fleets took part in Carthaginian campaigns against Sicily
One battle is the battle of Catana (397 BC) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Catana_%28397_BC%29
Jim
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Thanks. That is certainly interesting. I suppose we are lacking a lot of data on the Carthaginians, both at sea and on land. As usual, the history was written by and about the victors, while Carthage and its history was systematically destroyed.
The battles you mention are indeed spaced fairly widely - 540 and 397 BC. They are also fairly removed from the Punic Wars - by some 150 years at least and as I see different kinds of ships were used (pentokonteres and triremes) to those in the Punic Wars.
It is also interesting that the density of data on punic naval battles is to some extent comparable to their land engagements - Himera and Crimissus stand out somewhat, though there was a lot more written about Carthage's land operations against the Greeks in the same period. That still suggests that Carthage didn't really have the same level of mastery at sea as assumed. Their seamanship did prevent them losing fleets to storms (something which happened to the Romans on three occasions), but they still seemed to come off worst at sea, with a couple of exceptions (Drepana). At the same time they had no successes on land against romans, with the exception of Bagradas (and there they were led by a foreigner and perhaps more importantly had an overwhelming advantage in cavalry and elephants).
Remember that the Carthaginians were used to moving troops by sea. Virtually all their troop movements were. So they had mastered the logistics of gathering fleets, transporting many thousands of troops quite considerable distances (Spain, Sardinia, Sicily and probably along the North African coast as well) and could do this routinely.
So they could 'project power' in a way that nobody else, except perhaps the Ptolemies, could.
Also they'd been doing it consistently from probably about 500BC until the start of the Punic War. So you knew that if you upset Carthage, they could drop an army on your doorstep and there wasn't much you could do about it.
With regards naval battles, I think there are two things to remember. Firstly the fact that Carthage moved this number of troops about with this sort of regularity and fought so few naval battles probably indicates that other states had a high opinion of the Carthaginian navy.
Pyrrhus fought them, various Syracusian tyrants fought them, but mostly they didn't even attempt to, they just let them land the armies and then tried to defeat the armies.
Some of this is partially due to the difficulty of intercepting naval forces in galley warfare, especially if both sides aren't just following the coast. Some of it will be because the Carthaginian navy was regarded by its enemies as too dangerous to tangle with.
(Think of the Royal Navy. At the height of its power it fought very few battles. Mainly because it was at the height of its power.)
Jim
Jim has covered pretty much all of the important considerations: there is little for me to add except to note that Phoenicians generally had a long-standing tradition of seamanship, both military and mercantile, and had provided the lion's share of the Achaemenid Persian navy.
Rome before the First Punic War was very similar to Achaemenid Persia in one respect: its fleets consisted of other people's navies. It was not completely unfamiliar with the idea of shipbuilding or naval fighting, but just as it regarded the flanks of a battle line as the place for allied contingents, until the First Punic War it regarded paddling about on the sea as something for non-Romans.
The big difference was thus that the Romans themselves at the outset of the First Punic War lacked any tradition and experience of naval command. For the invasion of Africa their fleet was organised into three 'legions' and a fourth contingent termed 'the triarii' - Romans were evidently happier with familiar if inappropriate designations. Curiously enough, the overall fleet formation was a wedge (Polybius I.26).
Where Roman inexperience in tradition and command showed was in their blithely insouciant landsman's cavalier attitude to the weather (Napoleon was the same, ordering a naval review off Boulogne despite an imminent storm: it nearly wrecked his fleet). Roman fleet commanders viewed a naval journey as a kind of maritime march, and simply did not appreciate the hazards of storms. The result was two lost fleets. Eventually a more realistic attitude percolated in via the fruits of experience.
It's not just an ancient attitude. Consider the German attitude to Operation Sealion where it seems to be regarded by some planning it as a glorified river crossing
Jim
QuoteHowever, I am struggling to find any evidence of Carthage being involved in huge marine battles prior to the Punic Wars.
I'm not sure there were many "huge" naval battles before the First Punic War, though that may depend on your definition of "huge". Typically what battles there were seem to have been a lot smaller:
Quote from: Diodoros XX.32.3-5, 309 BCMeantime the Syracusans, hard pressed by famine and hearing that grain ships were about to make the voyage to Syracuse, manned twenty triremes and, watching the barbarians who were accustomed to lie at anchor off the harbour to catch them off guard, sailed out unseen and coasted along to Megara, where they waited for the approach of the traders. Afterwards, however, when the Carthaginians sailed out against them with thirty ships, they first tried to fight at sea, but were quickly driven to land and leapt from their ships at a certain shrine of Hera. Then a battle took place for the ships; and the Carthaginians, throwing grappling irons into the triremes and with great force dragging them off from the shore, captured ten of them, but the others were saved by men who came to the rescue from the city.
There also seems to have been a lot of running blockades and avoiding battle. For example, in 278 Pyrrhos crossed from Italy to Sicily, landing at Locri unopposed and then marching by land on Syracuse accompanied by his fleet. A Carthaginian army was besieging Syracuse, and a fleet of 100 ships was blockading its harbour. When Pyrrhos arrived 30 of the Carthaginian ships were detached on some unspecified mission, and rather than fighting him, the rest withdrew. Since Diodoros tells us that Pyrrhos then obtained about 140 ships from Syracuse, bringing him up to a total of 200, we can deduce that he had about 60 ships with him. The 70 Carthaginian ships left at Syracuse might have had a slight advantage over this force, but probably feared being caught between Pyrrhos' fleet and a sally by the Syracusan defenders' own ships.
Thanks everyone - interesting points.
After spending the last few days scouring the data on this it seems to me that the the lack of major (and even smaller) naval engagements is a true picture, rather than one given by a roman-biased record (biased because more data was available to subsequent writers from the roman side). Otherwise, writers as Didodoros might have had a bit more to say about them.
Carthage's seamanship was certainly highly regarded, which would have helped others not fight them. At the same time, the romans were as highly regarded on land, yet everyone fought them. I think the difference is probably the effort and resources required to equip a fleet of a size comparable to that of Carthage as opposed to outfitting a land army. For example, the reasonably wealthy Syracuse built a fleet of 200 warships and re-fitted 100 old warships for Dyonisios' campaign against Motya in 397BC. After their defeat at the aforementioned battle of Catana the Syracusans never re-built their war fleet to a comparable size. Additionally, a fleet of a size which could contest the sea against Carthage would be both difficult and expensive to maintain. Anyone wishing to confront Carthage at sea would therefore have to be very wealthy. Rome was, but even they were pushed to the limit - their fourth and final fleet was funded by private citizens. Polybios quotes Rome as having lost approximately 700 ships during the first punic war (plus they have built a fleet of 200 ships for the last battle) - Syracuse could only outfit a total of 300 as above. At the same time, at the beginning of the war Carthage already had a fleet of at least 200 ships.
Whatever the reason, Carthage's fleet my have had known the seas better but clearly didn't have anywhere near the same level of battle experience as the roman legions. They may have started the war as the maritime superpower, but that seems to have been a matter simply of numbers (when it came to battle at least - the Romans clearly didn't understand the danger the weather presented at sea). I'm not even so sure how effective Corvus was at changing this balance in favour of the Romans. It was highlighted and highly praised by Polybios, but was soon abandoned by Romans probably even during the war. Also, while the story of the Romans latching onto Punic ships with corvi is an attractive one it doesn't tell the whole story - that for centuries before the first punic war grappling enemy ships was a key tactic in sea battles - only grappling hooks and such were used rather than corvus. This was especially used by heavier ships to stop smaller and more manoeuvrable ones from running circles around them, before boarding them with their more numerous contingents of marines.
All in all, the sea appears to have been a much more level playing field than land.
Another thing to remember is sheer number of men involved.
If we say as a rule of thumb a quinquereme needed 300 oarsmen and 120 marines, a fleet of 300 ships calls on 90,000 men as oarsmen and 36,000 marines.
When you stop and look at those figures, the fact that Carthaginians didn't often fight in their own army becomes all the more reasonable, they had so many men in the navy. Obviously there appear to have been men from other cities conscripted to serve, and also we know that mercenaries from the field armies were also brought on board ships as marines.
So raising a fleet of two or three hundred ships was not just a major economic issue, paying for the ships, finding that number of men would also be difficult.
At Cannae Rome may have lost about 80,000 men (estimates vary)
But they lost more than that when they lost the fleet they sent to collect the survivors of the African campaign in the First Punic War.
Quote from: Hamilcar on January 02, 2015, 11:04:40 AM
Whatever the reason, Carthage's fleet my have had known the seas better but clearly didn't have anywhere near the same level of battle experience as the roman legions. They may have started the war as the maritime superpower, but that seems to have been a matter simply of numbers (when it came to battle at least - the Romans clearly didn't understand the danger the weather presented at sea). I'm not even so sure how effective Corvus was at changing this balance in favour of the Romans. It was highlighted and highly praised by Polybios, but was soon abandoned by Romans probably even during the war. Also, while the story of the Romans latching onto Punic ships with corvi is an attractive one it doesn't tell the whole story - that for centuries before the first punic war grappling enemy ships was a key tactic in sea battles - only grappling hooks and such were used rather than corvus. This was especially used by heavier ships to stop smaller and more manoeuvrable ones from running circles around them, before boarding them with their more numerous contingents of marines.
All in all, the sea appears to have been a much more level playing field than land.
Apparently the trick with the corvus was that it gave the legionaries a ready-made ramp along which to trot in their hobnailed caligae as opposed to having to get a leg over the gunwales (which could be painful if done incorrectly). Hence once the corvus was dropped on some poor Carthaginian vessel which had tried to ram rather than oar-rake, a flow of legionaries became inevitable. Also, you could cut grapnels, but you could not cut a corvus.
Sadly for the Carthaginians, they never really caught on to using incendiary weapons at sea. This could have made a huge difference, as emptying a fire pot onto a just-rammed Roman ship as it dropped its ramp would tend to negate anything the corvus could do. There would of course still be the problem of disengaging before both ships became a bonfire.
The difficulty with the corvus was that it made the ship unstable in any sort of heavy weather. Because of the extra upright surface area, one did not need a full-blown storm for corvus-equipped Roman galleys under sail to start keeling over. It was very much a fair-weather friend.
To add to what Jim has said about the logistics of equipping a fleet, manning one seems to have been a matter of conscripting the non-hoplite classes. This may be what would enable Rome's senators to regard the loss of a fleet with relative equanimity compared to the loss of several legions - the legions were manned by responsible property-owning citizens and the fleets apparently by lower-order plebeians who at a pinch would not be missed and whose loss might even improve domestic concord.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 02, 2015, 07:07:09 PM
Apparently the trick with the corvus was that it gave the legionaries a ready-made ramp along which to trot in their hobnailed caligae as opposed to having to get a leg over the gunwales (which could be painful if done incorrectly). Hence once the corvus was dropped on some poor Carthaginian vessel which had tried to ram rather than oar-rake, a flow of legionaries became inevitable. Also, you could cut grapnels, but you could not cut a corvus.
Not only that, but according to Polybios it had hand-rails which allowed them to hold on. More importantly, two legionaries could supposedly move abreast, protected by their shields, while those behind them thrust their shields to the side to protect the formation from missiles - a seafaring mini testudo (sea turtle?). All that thanks to stability afforded by the grappling method too.
Still, after the initial surprise in their first encounter Punic commanders and fleets should have got wiser to this trick. And let's not forget that the first encounter between the two fleets resulted in a capture of a number of roman ships at the Lipari islands, so the Carthaginians should have known what to expect - especially as the same commander led them into the first actual battle (this is slight conjecture, as there is nothing saying that the captured ships had been equipped with corvi, however they were a part of the same fleet which used them successfully not long after that).
The favourite punic tactic was to go through the gaps between enemy ships, breaking oars and causing general mayhem, before attacking the less manoeuvrable enemy ships from behind, as they struggled to turn about. This would surely make it more difficult to deploy the corvus. Supposedly, punic ships (and crews) were tactically superior thanks to their speed and training, so they could choose when and how to engage, rather than waiting to be grappled by a corvus - why did they not avoid this (usually many more were captured than sunk)?
Quote from: Hamilcar on January 02, 2015, 10:21:46 PM
Still, after the initial surprise in their first encounter Punic commanders and fleets should have got wiser to this trick. And let's not forget that the first encounter between the two fleets resulted in a capture of a number of roman ships at the Lipari islands, so the Carthaginians should have known what to expect - especially as the same commander led them into the first actual battle (this is slight conjecture, as there is nothing saying that the captured ships had been equipped with corvi, however they were a part of the same fleet which used them successfully not long after that).
The favourite Punic tactic was to go through the gaps between enemy ships, breaking oars and causing general mayhem, before attacking the less manoeuvrable enemy ships from behind, as they struggled to turn about. This would surely make it more difficult to deploy the corvus. Supposedly, Punic ships (and crews) were tactically superior thanks to their speed and training, so they could choose when and how to engage, rather than waiting to be grappled by a corvus - why did they not avoid this (usually many more were captured than sunk)?
It is not 100% clear, but the impression I get from Polybius' account is that Roman ships had a corvus at or near each end, with sufficient reach to drop on a Carthaginian ship which they rammed or which rammed them. Possible exceptions were a bow-to-bow ram (which the heavier Roman vessels would not mind anyway) or a direct bow-to-stern ram, which would inhibit the dropping of a corvus on account of the upcurving structures carried at some ships' rear ends (these might not have been wholly decorative as they could have been there to counterweight the bow ram). Anything else and the nearest corvus would be swung out and waiting to drop by the time the hopeful Carthaginian rammer arrived.
One would expect the Carthaginians to learn from their experiences; maybe they did think up a counter to the corvus, but if so then it failed to work as well as they thought it would. I suppose we would order our crews to oar-rake the Roman vessels and then arrange to ram the cripples with three ships against each opponent. Maybe the Carthaginians did and it was still not enough to overwhelm the legionaries carried on board.
If I remember my oar-raking diekplus theory, the way to guard against it was to deploy in more than one line. The lead attackers come through the first line, smashing up oars but they lose way in doing so and tend to swing towards the direction of the rake. They are thus swinging beam on and moving slowly between the lines, allowing even a crew of lubbers from the second rank to ram or board. The oar-raked ships in the front rank still need to be dealt with - they are only crippled - so someone is going to have to close to ram or board and could still fall victim to a deftly-used corvus. If diekplus was the standard tactic, the Carthaginians might still have tried it as it still played to their strengths (better trained and more manoueverable) but they found it didn't work and had to go back to the drawing board.
The ineffectiveness of the Carthaginian Navy in the First Punic War was due to its inability to adapt to the refinement in boarding tactics that the Romans introduced with the Corvus. The Carthaginian Navy appears to have focused its tactics on frontal ramming followed by boarding the enemy ship if feasible. With the Corvus, the Romans were able to lock an enemy ship in position and then provide a more efficient way for the Roman soldiers to board the enemy ship. If I remember correctly, Roman warships carried a larger number of Marines with a greater proportion of heavy infantry than the Carthaginian warships did.
I suppose you could say that the Carthaginian Navy greatest enemy were as their own hubris. Carthaginian admirals expected Roman fleets to fight in the tried-and-true manner used by the Carthaginians. When the Romans introduced new tactics with the use of the Corvus that negated the Carthaginian's superior ship handling abilities, the Carthaginian admirals were at a loss. Carthaginian hubris led them to believe they could easily dominate the Romans on the sea. The lesson is never to underestimate your enemy.
As a side note, the battle of Aegospotami also shows the danger of underestimating your enemy. The Athenian fleet put to sea and offered battle four days in a row to the Spartan fleet. Lysander, the Spartan naval commander, apparently did not even man his ships in response to the Athenian actions. Clearly, Lysander knew that Athenian naval superiority wasn't an illusion and wisely avoided confronting the Athenians at sea. Lysander waited until the Athenian fleet was beached and the crews were widely dispersed to gather food before he made his move. When Lysander was informed that the Athenian ships were on the beach and unmanned, he immediately launched his vessels and attacked the unmanned and beached the Athenian ships capturing or destroying most of them. Aegospotami wasn't a sea battle, but a surprise attack on an unprepared fleet grounded on the beach.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 03, 2015, 01:58:02 PM
One would expect the Carthaginians to learn from their experiences; maybe they did think up a counter to the corvus, but if so then it failed to work as well as they thought it would. I suppose we would order our crews to oar-rake the Roman vessels and then arrange to ram the cripples with three ships against each opponent. Maybe the Carthaginians did and it was still not enough to overwhelm the legionaries carried on board.
Quote from: Chuck the Grey on January 03, 2015, 06:47:58 PM
With the Corvus, the Romans were able to lock an enemy ship in position and then provide a more efficient way for the Roman soldiers to board the enemy ship. If I remember correctly, Roman warships carried a larger number of Marines with a greater proportion of heavy infantry than the Carthaginian warships did. I suppose you could say that the Carthaginian Navy greatest enemy were as their own hubris. Carthaginian admirals expected Roman fleets to fight in the tried-and-true manner used by the Carthaginians. When the Romans introduced new tactics with the use of the Corvus that negated the Carthaginian's superior ship handling abilities, the Carthaginian admirals were at a loss. Carthaginian hubris led them to believe they could easily dominate the Romans on the sea.
The simplest thing they could have done was to install this wonder weapon on their ships. They did capture some of the roman ships (presumably already armed with the corvus) at the Lipari islands, before the first large battle. They could have used these as a model, if the battle showed such effectiveness of the corvus. If they were still in doubt there, they could have done it after the battle of Cape Ecnomus.
Curiously though, at the battle of Cape Ecnomus the balance of power varied widely. For example, the first and second roman "legions" overwhelmed their opponents rather easily, but the third and fourth were getting the worst against their opponents - until the victorious roman first and second legions turned up to help. I feel that Polybios' account misses some key points...
Quote from: Erpingham on January 03, 2015, 02:12:28 PM
If I remember my oar-raking diekplus theory, the way to guard against it was to deploy in more than one line. The lead attackers come through the first line, smashing up oars but they lose way in doing so and tend to swing towards the direction of the rake. They are thus swinging beam on and moving slowly between the lines, allowing even a crew of lubbers from the second rank to ram or board. The oar-raked ships in the front rank still need to be dealt with - they are only crippled - so someone is going to have to close to ram or board and could still fall victim to a deftly-used corvus. If diekplus was the standard tactic, the Carthaginians might still have tried it as it still played to their strengths (better trained and more manoueverable) but they found it didn't work and had to go back to the drawing board.
Polybios describes the fleets deploying in "a line" in several of the battles and even at Cape Ecnomus the different roman legions comprised of single lines of ships. This doesn't make sense to me either, as like you I would deploy a second rank of ships to stop this tactic, especially if I was the less manoeuvrable side (romans). However, like in land battles, the most vulnerable part of a fleet of ships were probably its flanks, which (again like land) lead to them being spread out in as thin a line as possible.
Quote from: Chuck the Grey on January 03, 2015, 06:47:58 PM
As a side note, the battle of Aegospotami also shows the danger of underestimating your enemy. The Athenian fleet put to sea and offered battle four days in a row to the Spartan fleet. Lysander, the Spartan naval commander, apparently did not even man his ships in response to the Athenian actions. Clearly, Lysander knew that Athenian naval superiority wasn't an illusion and wisely avoided confronting the Athenians at sea. Lysander waited until the Athenian fleet was beached and the crews were widely dispersed to gather food before he made his move. When Lysander was informed that the Athenian ships were on the beach and unmanned, he immediately launched his vessels and attacked the unmanned and beached the Athenian ships capturing or destroying most of them. Aegospotami wasn't a sea battle, but a surprise attack on an unprepared fleet grounded on the beach.
Point taken and a good one it is. Maybe a better example to highlight a contest between trained and untrained fleets were the battles between Athenians and Syracusans in Syracuse's bay during the same war. The Athenians were initially dominant and pinned in the less experienced Syracusans. However, the Syracusan rowers precticed in the bay for a while before eventually giving combat. Again, they were eventually successful against the better (certainly more experienced) Athenians.
Quote from: Hamilcar on January 05, 2015, 11:23:23 AM
The simplest thing they could have done was to install this wonder weapon on their ships. They did capture some of the roman ships (presumably already armed with the corvus) at the Lipari islands, before the first large battle. They could have used these as a model, if the battle showed such effectiveness of the corvus. If they were still in doubt there, they could have done it after the battle of Cape Ecnomus.
Simplest, perhaps; but it means they're fighting the Romans on Roman terms, and probably losing unless their marines are as good as Roman legionaries.
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 05, 2015, 11:36:41 AM
Simplest, perhaps; but it means they're fighting the Romans on Roman terms, and probably losing unless their marines are as good as Roman legionaries.
If we assume that the Carthaginian navy has proud traditions of seamanship and considers itself doctrinally a manouever rather than boarding fleet, just copying a corvus would be a big shift because, as Duncan says, it condemns them to match Rome's strengths with their weakness. Their admirals would all opine that it should be the other way round. Only if the corvus was consistently successful and all their counter-tactics failed would they be likely to seriously consider it.
Quote from: Hamilcar on January 05, 2015, 11:23:23 AM
Curiously though, at the battle of Cape Ecnomus the balance of power varied widely. For example, the first and second roman "legions" overwhelmed their opponents rather easily, but the third and fourth were getting the worst against their opponents - until the victorious roman first and second legions turned up to help. I feel that Polybios' account misses some key points...
Here is Polybius' account:
"
Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies' ships they adapted their own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar. The former was the general who had been defeated in the engagement at Agrigentum."
Essentially, the Carthaginians deployed their fleet in an 'L'-shape, with the Roman wedge in the 'L'. The Roman wedge would be suicidal to approach, because any ship trying to ram or slip through would he rammed by the next Roman along, but Hamilcar had a plan to neutralise the careful Roman deployment.
"
He now commanded the right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy.
The latter, who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now describe.
The battle began by the Romans charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth "legions" had become detached and were left behind, —the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the "Triarii" because they kept their station with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar's ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged their pursuers."
This cunning plan de-linked the all-round unapproachability of the Roman formation. It may also have caused the pursuing Romans to slip out of their mutually-covering wedge configuration. Now it was all up to the skill of the men on both sides.
"
The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest became one of sheer strength: their engines, the "crows," grappled all that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle."
Now Hanno makes a mistake that undoes Hamilcar's careful planning: instead of closing on the Roman first and second formations from the rear, Hanno goes for the slow portion of the Roman fleet.
"
This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line, and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These latter let go the towing ropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle."
Instead of cleaning up the 'escort' first, Hanno becomes involved in a fight with the slow portion of the Roman fleet, which had so far shown no inclination to get involved with the fighting.
"
So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where forces were so equal.
The first to engage were the first to separate: for Hamilcar's division at last were overpowered and fled. But while Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of the second squadron which were undamaged."
Hanno had deprived Hamilcar of support and condemned him to defeat without gaining any corresponding advantage against the Roman slow force. More precisely, he had gained an advantage, but not a corresponding one.
"
As soon as he had reached and engaged Hanno's division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear, and found to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the open sea.
While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been afraid of the "crows," and confined themselves to surrounding and penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came up rapidly, and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by keeping close to the shore."
And this is why Hanno had been unable to press his advantage: his crews were afraid of the corvus, which the Romans had not needed to use as yet, though the threat of its use had kept them alive - but it presumably now came into general use as this portion of Hanno's force was caught between two Roman forces, and probably accounted for most of the sixty-four Carthaginian ships taken.
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Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-four of their vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians were so taken." - Polybius I.27-28
The impression I get is that Hanno let the side down by trying to pick an easy-looking target, only to find it was tougher than it looked, instead of helping Hamilcar to dispose of the 'escorts' and then combine against the slow force. Either that or both commanders planned for Hamilcar to lure away the 'escort' so that Hanno could clean up the invading force while Hamilcar kept the 'escort' occupied: if so, it shows a lack of appreciation of the tactical implications of the Roman 'corvus'. Without the 'corvus' such an arrangement would have worked nicely, with Hanno finishing off the slow force fairly quickly and then coming to Hamilcar's aid. Maybe that was the plan.
Quote from: Erpingham on January 05, 2015, 12:01:24 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on January 05, 2015, 11:36:41 AM
Simplest, perhaps; but it means they're fighting the Romans on Roman terms, and probably losing unless their marines are as good as Roman legionaries.
If we assume that the Carthaginian navy has proud traditions of seamanship and considers itself doctrinally a manouever rather than boarding fleet, just copying a corvus would be a big shift because, as Duncan says, it condemns them to match Rome's strengths with their weakness. Their admirals would all opine that it should be the other way round. Only if the corvus was consistently successful and all their counter-tactics failed would they be likely to seriously consider it.
If we look at the outcome of all the major battles of this war the only one properly won by Carthage was Drepana - where romans were caught out by their indecision and forced close to the shore. Overall, romans have consistently won. Besides, if in the first encounter corvus showed itself to be a wonder weapon then surely Carthage would have been forced to use it or at least consider it/try it out or at least do something to neutralise it. If it was such a wonder weapon then I think they would have been forced into doing something of the matching magnitude to the roman invention of the corvus.
Patrick, thanks for the reference, which clarifies things no end. Clearly the romans had the better of it at the front and were hard pressed on the flanks (with the triarii suffering badly and the third legion only penned in close to the shore, but neutralising the attackers by holding them off through a threat of the corvus). There must have been some reason for the discrepancy - perhaps the engaged triarii didn't have the same complement of marines as the front lines? It is also interesting that the number of ships sunk is approximately the same (24 to 30) - although we don't know just how badly each side suffered in the three separate encounters (i.e. were most of the ships on both sides sunk in Hamilcar's fight, or did the Carthaginians lose most of their ships in that fight while the Roman losses are more from the triarii?). The Romans also captured 64 ships - 50 of which in the engagement close to the shore and 14 (more or less) in the frontal fight. Still, even 14 Carthaginian ships captured in the frontal battle (in addition to 20-30-odd sunk) out of around 175 (half of their fleet) must have seemed like a big loss.
I think you are right to an extent Patrick. It could have been better if Hanno engaged the first two roman legions from the back (it could hardly be worse than the actual outcome!), but he could not ignore the rest of the roman fleet. I'm not sure how aware he would have been of their weakness in the first place. Maybe the plan was to break the roman formation up and simply attack it piecemeal simultaneously. Hanno may well have thought that he was holding off the roman reinforcements while the cream of Carthaginian navy dealt with the isolated Roman lead formations.
Whatever, if their first defeat was not enough then this battle should have forced the Carthaginians into changing something. Even fighting romans on their own terms would be better than simply rolling over and accepting defeat! Even if Carthage didn't want to put corvus on their ships, bumping up their complement of marines, simply to contest the romans taking over their ships so easily if nothing (which would give the other ships a chance to ram them) would have helped. Building bigger warships, with an even greater compliment of well equipped marines could have even turned tables on the romans. These are only guesses, but surely there was something they could have done!
I understood that the Carthaginians didn't adopt the corvus because of its effect on their strength, seamanship.
Judging a tech by just the tally of battle wins doesn't take into account Carthaginian naval goals.
If they stuck to seaworthiness, and sought to avoid battle unless heavily advantaged, then they had no need for something which nullified their big advantage.
It would be akin to asking Mongols to abandon ponies and bows for axes and armour so they could go toe to toe on foot with a dismounted knight.
Not to mention trying to lure the roman fleets into bad seas, which seems to be the optimal strategy in the med at any time.
And hadn't Sparta proved that naval dominance won nothing?
Quote from: Mark G on January 05, 2015, 04:35:56 PM
I understood that the Carthaginians didn't adopt the corvus because of its effect on their strength, seamanship.
Judging a tech by just the tally of battle wins doesn't take into account Carthaginian naval goals.
If they stuck to seaworthiness, and sought to avoid battle unless heavily advantaged, then they had no need for something which nullified their big advantage.
It would be akin to asking Mongols to abandon ponies and bows for axes and armour so they could go toe to toe on foot with a dismounted knight.
Not to mention trying to lure the roman fleets into bad seas, which seems to be the optimal strategy in the med at any time.
And hadn't Sparta proved that naval dominance won nothing?
Maybe so, but their big advantage was shown to be poor in battle against the Romans. They also did continue to engage the Romans and have consistently lost. My point was that they should have done something, whatever it was, to combat the corvus.
Peloponnesian and punic wars both turned out to show that superiority on ground is what counts the most. In both cases the conflict ended after the side initially inferior at sea constructed a fleet and contested this theatre - winning rather too easily (taking Chuck's note that Aegospotami wasn't a full-on sea battle). This post was exactly about that - discussing that an advantage at sea could not equal advantage on land and why.
Quote from: Hamilcar on January 05, 2015, 04:58:29 PM
Quote from: Mark G on January 05, 2015, 04:35:56 PM
My point was that they should have done something, whatever it was, to combat the corvus.
Maybe they tried several unsuccessful things, which our Roman sources didn't distinguish? I am with Mark on this - they would not have made a huge shift in emphasis lightly, and would have tried to come up with a solution consistent with their doctrine.
Quote from: Hamilcar on January 05, 2015, 04:58:29 PM
Quote from: Mark G on January 05, 2015, 04:35:56 PM
I understood that the Carthaginians didn't adopt the corvus because of its effect on their strength, seamanship.
Judging a tech by just the tally of battle wins doesn't take into account Carthaginian naval goals.
If they stuck to seaworthiness, and sought to avoid battle unless heavily advantaged, then they had no need for something which nullified their big advantage.
It would be akin to asking Mongols to abandon ponies and bows for axes and armour so they could go toe to toe on foot with a dismounted knight.
Not to mention trying to lure the roman fleets into bad seas, which seems to be the optimal strategy in the med at any time.
And hadn't Sparta proved that naval dominance won nothing?
Maybe so, but their big advantage was shown to be poor in battle against the Romans. They also did continue to engage the Romans and have consistently lost. My point was that they should have done something, whatever it was, to combat the corvus.
Apparently there is no record of the Romans using the Corvus after the Battle of Cape Ecnomus in 256BC, so perhaps the Carthaginians with their superior seamanship and knowledge of wind and weather took one look at the damned thing, shook their heads and said 'They'll be sorry'.
Jim
Quote from: Hamilcar on January 05, 2015, 01:57:27 PM
I think you are right to an extent Patrick. It could have been better if Hanno engaged the first two roman legions from the back (it could hardly be worse than the actual outcome!), but he could not ignore the rest of the roman fleet. I'm not sure how aware he would have been of their weakness in the first place. Maybe the plan was to break the roman formation up and simply attack it piecemeal simultaneously. Hanno may well have thought that he was holding off the roman reinforcements while the cream of Carthaginian navy dealt with the isolated Roman lead formations.
Hamilcar and Hanno probably thought out their plan on the basis of actions so far - namely Mylae and Tyndaris. At Mylae, the Carthaginians had been introduced to the corvus and had lost fifty ships. At Tyndaris, they caught ten Roman ships at sea, surrounded them and sank nine of them. The idea of luring Roman vessels, corvus and all, into a situation where they could be attacked from all sides, seems to have been a basically good one, but Hamilcar appears to have tried it with insufficient vessels.
Hanno could have left a couple of small squadrons to threaten the flank and rear of the Roman slow force (which was slow because of towing the invasion transports) and taken the rest of his ships to help kill off the escorts. This would have turned a losing fight into a Carthaginian success, assuming they could have kept up their surround-and-kill attacks on isolated Roman ships. The Roman slow force seems to have intended to remain with the invasion transports whatever happened elsewhere, so a small force of ships should have been sufficient to watch them and keep them quiet.
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Whatever, if their first defeat was not enough then this battle should have forced the Carthaginians into changing something. Even fighting romans on their own terms would be better than simply rolling over and accepting defeat! Even if Carthage didn't want to put corvus on their ships, bumping up their complement of marines, simply to contest the romans taking over their ships so easily if nothing (which would give the other ships a chance to ram them) would have helped. Building bigger warships, with an even greater compliment of well equipped marines could have even turned tables on the romans. These are only guesses, but surely there was something they could have done!
The lure-and-surround tactics first seen at Tyndaris may have been the attempted change, or at least the first attempt. A corvus could only be deployed against one attacker at a time, so three or four attacking ships could watch their opportunities, with two coming in close to make dummy attacks to distract the corvus crews from the real ram, which would come from the ship(s) hanging back. And if the Romans ignored the ships making a close approach, these could themselves put on a burst of speed, ram and back off before the corvus could be swung round. On the face of it, this seems a likely Carthaginian solution: it is doctrinal, so does not require all their ships to go into dock to be refitted, and it uses the traditional Carthaginian strengths of manoeuvrable ships and experienced crews.
But it only works if the Romans obligingly scatter and follow.
Quote from: Jim Webster on January 05, 2015, 05:19:57 PM
Apparently there is no record of the Romans using the Corvus after the Battle of Cape Ecnomus in 256BC, so perhaps the Carthaginians with their superior seamanship and knowledge of wind and weather took one look at the damned thing, shook their heads and said 'They'll be sorry'.
They were. However before so suffering they did shatter another Carthaginian fleet at the Hermaeum (Polybius I.36) and extract the survivors of Regulus' army from Africa. Having crossed to Sicily and sailed coastwise round to near Camarina, they ran into a storm and 364 ships perished, corvus and all.
Nothing daunted, the Romans built another 300-ship fleet, crossed to Africa, became stranded on some shoals, managed to refloat their vessels and return to Sicily, and were sailing back to Rome when another storm sank 150 of them. After that we hear no more of the corvus.
The final battle of the war, the Aegates Islands, which is today yielding up rams and other debris of naval war, saw a Roman fleet relying on light ships and disciplined crews, the traditional Carthaginian formula, against a Carthaginian fleet of loaded ships and untrained crews, the traditional Roman combination. The Romans won handily. Maybe for this battle the Carthaginians should have considered the corvus ...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 05, 2015, 10:42:44 PM
The lure-and-surround tactics first seen at Tyndaris may have been the attempted change, or at least the first attempt. A corvus could only be deployed against one attacker at a time, so three or four attacking ships could watch their opportunities, with two coming in close to make dummy attacks to distract the corvus crews from the real ram, which would come from the ship(s) hanging back. And if the Romans ignored the ships making a close approach, these could themselves put on a burst of speed, ram and back off before the corvus could be swung round. On the face of it, this seems a likely Carthaginian solution: it is doctrinal, so does not require all their ships to go into dock to be refitted, and it uses the traditional Carthaginian strengths of manoeuvrable ships and experienced crews.
But it only works if the Romans obligingly scatter and follow.
If I was a Carthaginian navy commander lure and surround would be my first tactic, denying the tactically inferior enemy the benefit of fighting in formation and defeating him in detail, where seamanship really shows. The problem is that it requires several ships to engage a single enemy and the opposing sides tended to be evenly matched in numbers. The number of Carthaginian ships sunk at Ecnomus suggests that the Roman ships worked together - if the roman seamanship was not on par with punic then the only way to achieve a similar number of ships sunk is for supporting ships to ram those locked by a corvus. So Carthaginians got it wrong here.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 05, 2015, 10:42:44 PM
The final battle of the war, the Aegates Islands, which is today yielding up rams and other debris of naval war, saw a Roman fleet relying on light ships and disciplined crews, the traditional Carthaginian formula, against a Carthaginian fleet of loaded ships and untrained crews, the traditional Roman combination. The Romans won handily. Maybe for this battle the Carthaginians should have considered the corvus ...
Polybios says that this final Roman fleet was modelled on the lighter ship of "Hannibal the Rhodian", which was captured during the siege of Lilybaion. He also suggests that the Carthaginian plan was to firstly deliver the grain to Drepana and embark Hamilcar's troops before giving battle. Not only were their ships heavier with grain and propelled by less experienced crews, but they were faced with enemy marines consisting of picked troops. They never stood a chance. The only sensible option would have been to sail back to Carthage. No wonder Hanno got crucified.
Quote from: Hamilcar on January 06, 2015, 03:01:29 PM
If I was a Carthaginian navy commander lure and surround would be my first tactic, denying the tactically inferior enemy the benefit of fighting in formation and defeating him in detail, where seamanship really shows. The problem is that it requires several ships to engage a single enemy and the opposing sides tended to be evenly matched in numbers. The number of Carthaginian ships sunk at Ecnomus suggests that the Roman ships worked together - if the roman seamanship was not on par with punic then the only way to achieve a similar number of ships sunk is for supporting ships to ram those locked by a corvus. So Carthaginians got it wrong here.
Yes. Adding most of Hanno's ships might have made the difference, but Hanno seems to have been convinced that he could deal with the transports and their accompanying warships and then help to mop up the escort. For some reason this approach never seems to work.
Quote
Polybios says that this final Roman fleet was modelled on the lighter ship of "Hannibal the Rhodian", which was captured during the siege of Lilybaion. He also suggests that the Carthaginian plan was to firstly deliver the grain to Drepana and embark Hamilcar's troops before giving battle. Not only were their ships heavier with grain and propelled by less experienced crews, but they were faced with enemy marines consisting of picked troops. They never stood a chance. The only sensible option would have been to sail back to Carthage. No wonder Hanno got crucified.
True. One may note in passing the Roman intelligence arrangements that allowed them to know what the Carthaginian fleet was doing, and when, and where. It would have been interesting to see the result had the Carthaginians been able to drop off the grain and load up with troops prior to the action - Polybius notes that the Romans feared Hamilcar (and presumably his troops) above all else.