Gregory Daly, according to the Wikipedia page on Cannae says that Hannibal had 5,500 Gaetulian infantry with him in the main infantry force. As the Gaetuli, as I understand it, were Moorish or Berber type troops similar to Numidians, I was trying to figure out what they were doing there, since there is mention of these neither in Polybius or Livy.
I wondered, if the Daly assertion is correct and there were Gaetulian infantry at Cannae, if these were skirmishers like Numidian infantry, then were these in support of the Numidian cavalry on the right wing? If not, is this an error by the author?
On a related note, I see that at the Trebia, the 1,000 picked cavalry and 1,000 picked infantry were picked from the whole army. Also at Cannae, only Livy gives a force total for the Carthaginians of 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse.
Is he not confusing Gaul and gallatian and making up a word to look clever?
unless he's just using the word to mean libyans?
I don't think Daly says that - have a look here (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=oxOCAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA94&lpg=PA94&dq=daly+cannae+gaetulian&source=bl&ots=5IOWVF3S9B&sig=FppfAROvf4Q61GOWvx_abEItW30&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwihhZ2h8IjNAhXoJMAKHYI9AVUQ6AEIKjAC#v=onepage&q=daly%20cannae%20gaetulian&f=false). The wiki writers have got confused somewhere.
Edit: In case you can't see that, Daly says that the only reference to Gaetuli in Hannibal's army is one incident describing a small detachment.
Quote from: Richard on June 01, 2016, 11:14:47 PM
Also at Cannae, only Livy gives a force total for the Carthaginians of 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse.
Polybius gives exactly these figures:
"
The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was ten thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty thousand, including the Celts." - Polybius III.114.5
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on June 02, 2016, 12:37:39 PM
Quote from: Richard on June 01, 2016, 11:14:47 PM
Also at Cannae, only Livy gives a force total for the Carthaginians of 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse.
Polybius gives exactly these figures:
"The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was ten thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty thousand, including the Celts." - Polybius III.114.5
You're quite right. My eyes missed that sentence - that will teach me to try and research with a bloody cold!
Thanks all for the information. I can get back to teasing out an army list. :)
Quote from: Richard on June 02, 2016, 08:02:15 PM
You're quite right. My eyes missed that sentence - that will teach me to try and research with a bloody cold!
Been there, done that. Same kind of result ... it is surprising just how much a cold can affect one's processing and judgement.
Best of success with the army list. :)
Apologies for taking up more of your time and I'm possibly being thick but I'm puzzled by a mismatch of numbers in Polybius. Hannibal has 12,000 African and 8,000 Spanish foot after crossing the Alps before he links up with the Celtic tribes of Cisalpine Gaul and 6,000 cavalry. At the Trebia, he has more than 10,000 cavalry including the Celtic allies, 8,000 javelinmen and slingers and 20,000 foot made up of Africans, Spanish and Celtic infantry.
I presume that the cavalry in the first instance consist of 2,000 Spanish and 4,000 Numidian horse. The light infantry are not mentioned, though these took part in the battles crossing the Alps, so I can probably assume these were present. At the Trebia, Hannibal's line foot are 20,000
including the new Celtic contingents.
I couldn't find the strength of Hannibal's foot at the Trebia in Livy, so unless I've missed it, I wonder if the numbers in Polybius for this particular element are confused?
Thoughts?
Quote56 1 Hannibal having now got all his forces together continued the descent, and in three days' march from the precipice just described reached flat country. 2 He had lost many of his men by the hands of the enemy in the crossing of rivers and on the march in general, and the precipices and difficulties of the Alps had cost him not only many men, but a far greater number of horses and sumpter-animals. 3 The whole march from New Carthage had taken him five months, and he had spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, and now, when he thus boldly descended into the plain of the Po and the territory of the Insubres, 4 his surviving forces numbered twelve thousand African and eight thousand Iberian foot, and not more than six thousand horse in all, as he himself states in the inscription on the column at Lacinium relating to the number of his forces.
QuoteHannibal, who was waiting for his opportunity, when he saw that the Romans had crossed the river, threw forward as a covering force his pikemen and slingers about eight thousand in number and led out his army. 8 After advancing for about •eight stades he drew up his infantry, about twenty thousand in number, and consisting of Spaniards, Celts, and Africans, in a single line, while he divided his cavalry, numbering, together with the Celtic allies, more than ten thousand, and stationed them on each wing, dividing also his elephants and placing them in front of the wings so that his flanks were doubly protected.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/3*.html (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/3*.html)
Alternative translations here:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D60 Hannibal Attacks the Taurini
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D72 Preparations for Battle
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D73 The Battle of the Trebia
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D74 The Romans Retreat to Placentia
Well, if the "surviving forces number(ing) twelve thousand African and eight thousand Iberian foot" include the 8,000 light infantry - meaning he entered Italy with only 12,000 line infantry - then at Trebia he needs 8,000 Gallic infantry to make the numbers work.
Alternatively the "twelve thousand African and eight thousand Iberian foot" are only the line infantry, meaning he enters Italy with 20,000 African and Spanish line infantry and 8,000 lights; in which case Polybios must be confused to the extent that he's dropped the light infantry from the arrival-in-Italy figures, and the number of Gallic infantry out of the Trebia narrative.
Hard to choose.
I always felt that having only 4000 African heavy infantry did seem on the low side
Would some of the Spanish have been peltasts? That would give us, say, 2,000 Balearic slingers, 2,000 peltasts and 4,000 heavy foot in the Spanish contingent together with 4,000 peltasts and 8,000 heavy infantry for the Liby-Phoenicians. Add in 8,000 Gauls and the numbers seem usable.
Livy at the Trebia mentions this for Hannibal's infantry:
"In front of the standards Hannibal placed the Baliares, light-armed troops numbering about eight thousand, and behind these his heavy infantry, tile strength and flower of his army; the wings he formed of ten thousand horse, and, dividing the elephants, stationed them outside the wings." - Livy XXI.55.2
Livy gives no strength for the Carthaginian heavy infantry and is evidently operating under the misapprehension that all Hannibal's skirmishers were Balearic slingers. We may incidentally note that in XXI.55.4 he gives 18,000 Romans and 20,000 allies as opposed to Polybius' 16,000 and 20,000. Polybius is probably correct here.
Regarding Hannibal's overall strength at the time of the Trebia, Livy has this to say:
"The strength of Hannibal's forces on his entering Italy is a point on which historians are by no means agreed. Those who put the figures highest give him a hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse; the lowest estimate is twenty thousand foot and six thousand horse. [3] Lucius Cincius Alimentus, who says that he was taken prisoner by Hannibal, would be our weightiest authority, did he not confuse the reckoning by adding in Gauls and Ligurians: including these, he says that Hannibal brought eighty thousand foot and ten thousand horse —but [4] it is more probable, and certain historians so hold, that these people joined his standard in Italy; he says, moreover, that he had learned from Hannibal's own lips that after crossing the Rhone he lost thirty-six thousand men and a vast number of horses and other animals." - Livy XXI.38.2-4
Livy is of course taking the full spectrum of writing from Polybius to partisan Roman propagandists whose accounts are not worth the paper on which they were written. Alimentus' figures seem close to Polybius' "ninety thousand infantry and about twelve thousand cavalry" (Polybius III.35.1) with which Hannibal began his campaign.
QuoteWould some of the Spanish have been peltasts? That would give us, say, 2,000 Balearic slingers, 2,000 peltasts and 4,000 heavy foot in the Spanish contingent together with 4,000 peltasts and 8,000 heavy infantry for the Liby-Phoenicians. Add in 8,000 Gauls and the numbers seem usable.
That's possible, though Polybius never refers to Spanish
longchophoroi (pikemen in the old translations - h/t to DH). It doesn't mean they're not Spanish but it could equally mean these troops were African. For me, a difficulty comes from taking the various actions into account. The longchophoroi and slingers seem to be brigaded together, with longchophoroi occasionally operating detached.
Another difficulty lies with the numbers of skirmishers present at Hannibal's Italian victories. Where specified, Polybius states 8,000 slingers and longchophoroi. This does fit with the numbers above but doesn't take into account losses taken at the Trebia and Trasimene by the Africans line-foot, whereas the Spanish line-foot might only have taken significant losses at Trasimene. But Trasimene is a battle with which I having problems with the old translations online, so I've just ordered the 2010 Oxford new translation.
If we take Cannae, the total infantry do not number much above 40,000, of which we have numbers for 8,000 light infantry, leaving 32,000 infantry.
Another problem with this breakdown of troop numbers is that to reach 32,000 line-foot at Cannae, we need 20,000 Celtic foot to be serving under Hannibal. And this assumes that African and Spanish line-infantry losses will have been replaced or been insignificant, though this is allowed for by Polybius' statement that the chief loss of both battles thus far had been borne by Celts, which in turn would imply that the Africans had been forced back at the Trebia and Trasimene and not broken (thus taking heavy losses in being pursued).
Given that Polybius took his figures from one of Hannibal's statements, I wonder if the Africans had taken heavy losses at both battles and, for reasons of prestige, did not admit to this, giving the responsibility of the localised defeat at the Trebia to the Gauls and simply minimising the breakout at Trebia. This is an argument from silence and speculation but it would explain the oddness of the statement of strength in Polybius
III.54.4. Again, I'm speculating but with the African forces being the probable elite of Hannibal's army and the instrument of victory at Cannae, could Hannibal have been protecting the reputation of politically sensitive troops?
If the listed starting forces in Italy only include line-infantry and horse, leaving out the skirmishers, and assuming that there were 12,000 Africans at the start and 8,000 Spanish (given losses at Trebia and Trasimene), then we could have 8,000 African, 8,000 Spanish and 16,000 Celtic foot by Cannae. This would fit Patrick's thesis about Cannae that half the foot were Celtic and the remainder African and Spanish.
So, assuming that the strengths of the line-infantry at Cannae was 8,000 Africans, 8,000 Spanish and 16,000 Celts, could we also use PW's theory about Hannibal's imitation-legions? Two groups of 4,000 Africans on either side would fit and 40
koortis of Celts and 20 of Spanish would actually work for interleaving the
speirai at a ratio of two Celtic to one Spanish but with a second line of each supporting the first, so the line would be forty
koortis wide. Apologies, can't think of the plural for "cohort" in Greek.
Given also Hannibal and Polybius spoke Greek, I would expect peltast to be a word they used with a specific meaning.
I therefore doubt Spanish classify as peltasts, unless the acted and equipped as a Greek expected peltasts to act and equip
Quote from: Mark G on June 04, 2016, 07:21:59 AM
Given also Hannibal and Polybius spoke Greek, I would expect peltast to be a word they used with a specific meaning.
I therefore doubt Spanish classify as peltasts, unless the acted and equipped as a Greek expected peltasts to act and equip
or carried a shield that Polybius felt happy describing as a pelta,
Quote from: Richard on June 04, 2016, 01:00:05 AM
QuoteWould some of the Spanish have been peltasts? That would give us, say, 2,000 Balearic slingers, 2,000 peltasts and 4,000 heavy foot in the Spanish contingent together with 4,000 peltasts and 8,000 heavy infantry for the Liby-Phoenicians. Add in 8,000 Gauls and the numbers seem usable.
That's possible, though Polybius never refers to Spanish longchophoroi (pikemen in the old translations - h/t to DH). It doesn't mean they're not Spanish but it could equally mean these troops were African. For me, a difficulty comes from taking the various actions into account. The longchophoroi and slingers seem to be brigaded together, with longchophoroi occasionally operating detached.
Equally, Polybius does not specify the
longchophoroi as Liby-Phoenician. Since they would all have been regularised troops in paid Carthaginian service, I am happy to assume that Spanish
caetrati serving with Hannibal had been upgraded to
longchophoroi and employed the long-range dual-use
logkhe/lonchoi, equivalent to the later Roman
lanca, rather than the ordinary
akontion or standard throwing-javelin or for that matter the
grosphos (as Polybius terms it) used by Roman velites.
'Brigaded together' may be a misleading way of looking at things: the longkhophoroi and slingers formed a skirmish screen of some substance (they could cover 2,000 yards four deep, or eight deep if in open order) and at the Trebia Hannibal seems to have given them clear orders about what to do when they finished skirmishing: having pulled back through the heavy infantry, they split and headed for the wings, where the slingers helped to cow the Roman (and allied) cavalry while the
longkhophoroi arranged themselves to shower the allied infantry flanks with javelins - assisted by the Numidians. They do not appear to have closed to melee (despite some translations*); this was left to the elephants and heavy troops.
*It depends what one makes of
prospiptontes, 'falling upon' or 'attacking'. The usual mode of attack for
longkhophoroi and Numidians was to trot up, hurl javelins, trot away. They may have closed to melee as the allied wings collapsed, but until then their expected
modus operandi would be to deliver a constant rain of misiles.
Quote
Another difficulty lies with the numbers of skirmishers present at Hannibal's Italian victories. Where specified, Polybius states 8,000 slingers and longchophoroi. This does fit with the numbers above but doesn't take into account losses taken at the Trebia and Trasimene by the Africans line-foot, whereas the Spanish line-foot might only have taken significant losses at Trasimene. But Trasimene is a battle with which I having problems with the old translations online, so I've just ordered the 2010 Oxford new translation.
If we take Cannae, the total infantry do not number much above 40,000, of which we have numbers for 8,000 light infantry, leaving 32,000 infantry.
Polybius specifies 8,000 skirmishers prior to the Trebia, so this figure is obviously prior to any losses at the Trebia and Trasimene. At the Trebia, the Romans, inadvertently assisted by Mago's couple of thousand rear-enders (who need to be deducted from overall figures when lining up the armies), push through the Gauls and a 'meros' of Liby-Phoenicians and escape off the field with 10,000 men. It is unclear what size a 'meros' would be, but if roughly equivalent to a Spartan 'mora' it might be a 512-man unit, which is not a vast proportion of the original assumed 8,000 Libyan veterans. It is, however, enough to highlight to Hannibal that his Libyans' equipment and training is not up to the task of coping with Romans.
At Trasimene, the Roman van of 6,000 (just over a legion in strength, but probably an allied
ala reinforced with
extraordinarii) similarly breaks through the Libyans tasked with intercepting the Roman van. Hannibal's losses in these two battles need not amount to more than a few hundred Libyans, perhaps taking an overall figure of '8,000+' to '8,000-'. His main losses were, as Polybius notes, taken by the Gauls, which suited just about everybody.
Quote
Another problem with this breakdown of troop numbers is that to reach 32,000 line-foot at Cannae, we need 20,000 Celtic foot to be serving under Hannibal. And this assumes that African and Spanish line-infantry losses will have been replaced or been insignificant, though this is allowed for by Polybius' statement that the chief loss of both battles thus far had been borne by Celts, which in turn would imply that the Africans had been forced back at the Trebia and Trasimene and not broken (thus taking heavy losses in being pursued).
What seems to have happened at the Trebia and Trasimene is that the escaping Romans steamrollered/shouldered aside a 'meros' or so of Libyans, there being no question of pursuit. The majority of casualties would probably have been wounded, many of whom would have recovered - the point of the armour of the day was to guard the 'instant kill' areas, the head and torso, while accepting that the peripheral areas would sooner or later collect wounds. One gets the impression that a frontal opponent would as a rule be bled to unconsciousness by several minor wounds rather than killed outright with a single stroke - see Polybius II.33 on the Roman battle against the Insubres (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D33).
My reading is that in each case the Romans cut their way through their immediate opposition and then funnelled through the gap and kept going. After the excitement died down, the Carthaginians went over the battlefield and picked out those on their side who were still living, many of whom would have returned to service within a few months. Carthaginian heavy infantry casualties would thus have been modest, but the inability of the Libyans to stand up to Romans frontally would still be clear, giving Hannibal a powerful incentive towards reconfiguring his Libyans as imitation legions.
That at least is the theory. What if it is wrong, and Hannibal's Libyans took, say, 500 irrecoverable losses at the Trebia and another 1,000 at Trasimene? That would make a significant hole in the original 8,000: how could that be filled, as no fresh troops from Carthage would arrive until 215 BC? One answer is that having penetrated to southern Italy, Hannibal could have been collecting recruits from among the Roman allies: he had from the first allowed Rome's allies to be released without ransom, explaining that he had come to liberate them from Rome, and one might expect individuals to begin flocking to his standards. Such individuals, familiar with the Roman way of war, would incidentally have been of great value for training Libyan troops in Roman methods prior to Cannae.
Quote
Given that Polybius took his figures from one of Hannibal's statements, I wonder if the Africans had taken heavy losses at both battles and, for reasons of prestige, did not admit to this, giving the responsibility of the localised defeat at the Trebia to the Gauls and simply minimising the breakout at Trebia. This is an argument from silence and speculation but it would explain the oddness of the statement of strength in Polybius III.54.4. Again, I'm speculating but with the African forces being the probable elite of Hannibal's army and the instrument of victory at Cannae, could Hannibal have been protecting the reputation of politically sensitive troops?
Methinks probably not, as they were not a highly-regarded part of Carthaginian society: this kind of speculation also creates OB complications by the time of Cannae. Occam's razor and all that. ;) BTW III.54.4 is about losing animals on the way down from the Alps: presumably you mean III.56.4?
Quote
If the listed starting forces in Italy only include line-infantry and horse, leaving out the skirmishers, and assuming that there were 12,000 Africans at the start and 8,000 Spanish (given losses at Trebia and Trasimene), then we could have 8,000 African, 8,000 Spanish and 16,000 Celtic foot by Cannae. This would fit Patrick's thesis about Cannae that half the foot were Celtic and the remainder African and Spanish.
So, assuming that the strengths of the line-infantry at Cannae was 8,000 Africans, 8,000 Spanish and 16,000 Celts, could we also use PW's theory about Hannibal's imitation-legions? Two groups of 4,000 Africans on either side would fit and 40 koortis of Celts and 20 of Spanish would actually work for interleaving the speirai at a ratio of two Celtic to one Spanish but with a second line of each supporting the first, so the line would be forty koortis wide. Apologies, can't think of the plural for "cohort" in Greek.
No problem, it is not a Greek word and lexicons cannot think of it either. :)
I had assumed - rightly or wrongly - that at Cannae Hannibal would interleave 4,000 Spanish heavy foot with 4,000 Gauls five deep in his first line, leaving 16,000 Gauls ten deep for the heavier second line which would have been intended to stop the Romans, not just delay them. Th Balearic slingers and Spanish
longkhophoroi would have continued their customary role as skirmishers, as would the assumed 4,000 Libyan
longkhophoroi - and would have needed to, considering how many velites they would have been up against in the initial skirmishing stages.
The Romans appear to have deployed their infantry in double depth, so their eight legions and eight
alae would have occupied the same frontage (c.1,600 yards) as a double-consular army of 4 legions and 4
alae. This is consistent with Appian's assertion that the Roman cavalry had to 'extend their line of battle to a dangerous thinness' (Hannibalic War 4/21) as the cavalry would have had to cover the remaining c.1,400 yards of frontage (split between two wings). 4,000 Gauls interleaved with 4,000 Spaniards (Polybius says nothing about the respective
speirai being of different sizes) could cover the same frontage five deep, allowing them to resist for a while but also ensuring they would start to fold after that while. It also allowed the Libyans to be drawn up outside the main battle line - 'auton' or 'free' as Polybius puts it - and able to pitch in when opportunity offered. He also had another deployment trick to make sure the opportunity would occur.
The bowed front line served a definite purpose: it encouraged the Roman allies on the wings to press forward beyond the first contact at the centre, bringing their flanks out of reach of friendly cavalry cover and allowing the Libyans in their nice borrowed Roman kit to slip round behind them and get to work without fear of interference from Roman cavalry and without needing to wait until the Roman cavalry had been driven off. I conclude that Hannibal was quite a clever fellow.
Quote from: Mark G on June 04, 2016, 07:21:59 AM
Given also Hannibal and Polybius spoke Greek, I would expect peltast to be a word they used with a specific meaning.
Ah, but which specific meaning?
QuoteI therefore doubt Spanish classify as peltasts, unless the acted and equipped as a Greek expected peltasts to act and equip
Livy, of course, explicitly equates caetrati, the Latin term that originally means Spanish light infantry, with peltasts, and the caetra with the pelte. More seriously - because we all know what sort of peltast he was using the label for! - Spanish caetrati fight, as far as I can see, in much the same way as classical Greek peltasts.
I suspect the overwhelming majority of the longchophoroi of being Libyan partly because the word longche is not typically used for Spanish weapons, but is characteristic of descriptions of North African armament; but there may have been some Spanish caetrati among them.
My dear Patrick, whether on the forum or in your Slingshot, pieces, you leave me as ever much enlightened! :)
Your explanation of Cannae does make an awful lot of sense and either approach would work. Your notes about "meros" make sense too. I'm not quite sure about Latin deserters or recruits filling the Africans' ranks but it would work if the common language is Greek.
Thanks again! :)
My point was, if these two Greek speakers defined the Spanish as not peltasts initially, they are highly unlikely to redefine them later when the demand for new troops was for front line men to take on legionaries, and the new equipment source was captured Roman.
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to see Hannibal rearming them as peltasts, and even less likely that they would be classifiable as such when they arrived yet this not be recognised for months of service, and then accepted without comment.
So you are stretching a lot to swap them in categories just to make the numbers fit.
Nobody's talking about redefining them or re-arming them as peltasts, surely. (In fact introducing the word peltast is a red herring, slap whoever did it on the wrist.) The point is that the original inscription quoted by Polybios simply says so many Africans and so many Spanish; it doesn't divide them into heavy and light. So when we get 8,000 light infantry mentioned later on, we don't know how they fit in to the "African or Spanish" categories.
Quote from: Richard on June 04, 2016, 09:26:47 PM
My dear Patrick, whether on the forum or in your Slingshot, pieces, you leave me as ever much enlightened! :)
Your explanation of Cannae does make an awful lot of sense and either approach would work. Your notes about "meros" make sense too. I'm not quite sure about Latin deserters or recruits filling the Africans' ranks but it would work if the common language is Greek.
Thanks again! :)
Always glad to be of service, my dear Richard! :)
Punic military commands were apparently given in Greek (cf. Polybius' (I.32) narrative of Xanthippus taking over command prior to Bagradas in the First Punic War and being able to give orders correctly straight away, unlike his predecessors). So yes, good point: Greek-speakers, whether as a first or second language, of southern Italy would fit in nicely.
Quote from: Duncan Head on June 05, 2016, 12:39:37 PM
(In fact introducing the word peltast is a red herring, slap whoever did it on the wrist.)
Polybius does indeed use 'logkhophorous', not 'peltastoi'.
There is one more aspect of Cannae to consider.
Quote"The ten thousand Romans who were captured had not, as I said, been engaged in the actual battle; and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius left ten thousand infantry in his camp that, in case Hannibal should disregard the safety of his own camp, and take his whole army on to the field, they might seize the opportunity, while the battle was going on, of forcing their way in and capturing the enemy's baggage; or if, on the other hand, Hannibal should, in view of this contingency, leave a guard in his camp, the number of the enemy in the field might thereby be diminished. These men were captured in the following circumstances. Hannibal, as a matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard in his camp; and as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their instructions, assaulted and tried to take those thus left by Hannibal. At first they held their own: but just as they were beginning to waver, Hannibal, who was by this time gaining a victory all along the line, came to their relief, and routing the Romans, shut them up in their own camp; killed two thousand of them; and took all the rest prisoners." - Polybius III.117.7-11
The number and composition of this 'sufficient guard' is not stated. The Roman contingent of 10,000 would most probably have consisted of the army's 8,000 or so
extraordinarii plus about 2,000 velites of the previous night's camp guard (they could perhaps have snatched a little sleep while the armies were deploying); this kind of unusual action would be exactly what extraordinarii would be called upon to perform. In order to hold off these numbers my estimate is that the Carthaginian camp guard would have to amount to at least 2,000, which would either have to be either skimmed from the 40,000 infantry given by Polybius or would be over and above their total. If Hannibal had been receiving a trickle of Italian defectors, the numbers left over after filling any gaps among his Libyans might amount to 2,000, but this is pure conjecture. One might also, or instead, conjecture that he had trained the personnel of his commissariat to fight in defence of the camp, which would allow him to put every soldier in the field and still leave the camp in a state of defence.
Also conjectural, but with a firmer candidate in hand, is the question of which troops Hannibal extracted from the battlefield to perform the relief: his Gauls, Spanish, Libyans and cavalry were fully committed. The only substantial body of troops which he would have had to hand would be the lighter troops which had opened the action by skirmishing, namely his
longkhophoroi and slingers. These look right both in numbers and availability to be committed under his leadership to relieving the camp while the battle was still raging.
This hopefully addresses the final OB enigma of the battle.
Hats are taken off to you, Mr W. :)
You are too kind, Mr G. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on June 05, 2016, 01:14:41 PM
Punic military commands were apparently given in Greek (cf. Polybius' (I.32) narrative of Xanthippus taking over command prior to Bagradas in the First Punic War and being able to give orders correctly straight away, unlike his predecessors). So yes, good point: Greek-speakers, whether as a first or second language, of southern Italy would fit in nicely.
Language in the Punic army is an interesting snakepit. Xanthippos may have been only giving orders to the Greek-speaking mercenary part of the army:
Quotebut on his leading the army out and drawing it up in good order before the city and even beginning to manoeuvre some portions of it correctly and give the word of command in the orthodox military terms...
Because in I.67 it looks like there is very little common language at all in the army of the Mercenary Revolt:
Quotethe soldiers began to hold constant meetings, sometimes of particular nations and sometimes general. As they were neither all of the same nationality nor spoke the same language, the camp was full of confusion and tumult and what is known as τύρβη or turbulence. For the Carthaginian practice of employing hired troops of various nationalities is indeed well calculated to prevent them from combining rapidly in acts of insubordination or disrespect to their officers, but in cases of an outburst of anger or of slanderous rumours or disaffection it is most prejudicial to all efforts to convey the truth to them, to calm their passions, or to show the ignorant their error. Indeed, such forces, when once their anger is aroused against anyone, or slander spreads among them, are not content with mere human wickedness, but end by becoming like wild beasts or men deranged, as happened in the present case. Some of these troops were Iberians, some Celts, some Ligurians, and some from the Balearic islands; there were a good many Greek half-breeds, mostly deserters and slaves, but the largest portion consisted of Libyans. It was therefore impossible to assemble them and address them as a body or to do so by any other means; for how could any general be expected to know all their languages? And again to address them through several interpreters, repeating the same thing four or five times, was, if anything, more impracticable. The only means was to make demands or entreaties through their officers, as Hanno continued to attempt on the present occasion, and even these did not understand all that was told them, or at times, after seeming to agree with the general, addressed their troops in just the opposite sense either from ignorance or from malice.
And in I.80, it looks as if the closest to a common language was Punic:
QuoteAutaritus the Gaul was the next speaker. He said that the only hope of safety for them was to abandon all reliance on the Carthaginians ... He was much the most effective speaker in their councils, because a number of them could understand him. He had been a long time in the service and had learned Phoenician, a language which had become more or less agreeable to their ears owing to the length of the previous war. His speech therefore met with universal approbation, and he retired from the platform amid applause.
I suppose it is still possible that words of command were in Greek, but that was as far as the language went for most of the soldiers.
My best guess is that tactical ("Double files!" "Prepare to charge!") and possibly procedural ("Set camp!" "Commence march!") commands would indeed be given in Greek, and to the whole army, but that would be about as far as it went. Livy (XXX.34.1-2) notes at Zama the discordant Carthaginian war shout of many tongues and many nations contrasted with the single, harmonious and powerful Roman war cry. Duncan's Polybian observations about language difficulties when disobedience or negotiation rather than obedience become the agenda confirms that no common
lingua franca (or
lingua punica?) existed among the troops for informal use.
Quote from: Duncan Head on June 08, 2016, 02:08:26 PM
Quotebut on his leading the army out and drawing it up in good order before the city and even beginning to manoeuvre some portions of it correctly and give the word of command in the orthodox military terms...
Another translation reads:
Quote"This was confirmed when he had once handled the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had led them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due conformity to the rules of tactics, at once impressed every one with the contrast to the blundering of their former generals."
The relevant Greek is:
"
hōs d' exagagōn pro tēs poleōs tēn dunamin en kosmō parenebale kai ti kai kinein tōn merōn en taxei kai paraggellein kata nomous ērxato, tēlikautēn epoiei diaphoran para tēn tōn proteron stratēgōn apeirian hōste meta kraugēs episēmainesthai tous pollous kai speudein hōs takhista sumbalein tois polemiois"
It seems to indicate he was handling the parts of the army swiftly and skilfully in the context of an integrated whole (cf. a military parade), but I would welcome a second opinion. It suggests - without necessarily proving - that the military vocabulary involved was Greek rather than, say, rapidly assimilated Punic. It is of course conceivable that he was issuing commands through interpreters, but if there is one field of human endeavour where direct and unambiguous command as opposed to interpreted intention is essential, it is tactical warfare.
The passage incidentally seems to confirm the 'meros' as a subunit of the Carthaginian 'taxis'. On this basis I would suggest a
meros of 512 men and a
taxis of 1,536 as a starting-point for thinking about Carthaginian heavy infantry organisation.
Quote from: Duncan Head on June 08, 2016, 02:08:26 PM
I suppose it is still possible that words of command were in Greek, but that was as far as the language went for most of the soldiers.
Didn't the Byzantines go through a phase where the words of command were still in Latin but the men would tend to be Greek speaking?
In a Carthaginian army it would be a useful compromise. Having Greek words of command would mean that new recruits basically have to learn a few phrases to get by, because in their unit they'd doubtless speak their native language.
I thought it was interesting that Autaritus the Gaul spoke Punic/Phoenician 'because of the length of the war'. A lot of Carthaginian mercenaries prior to the First Punic War were probably on 'short term contracts', recruited for the campaign. Having to learn a handful of Greek commands is probably all that can be expected of them
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on June 09, 2016, 08:22:06 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on June 08, 2016, 02:08:26 PM
I suppose it is still possible that words of command were in Greek, but that was as far as the language went for most of the soldiers.
Didn't the Byzantines go through a phase where the words of command were still in Latin but the men would tend to be Greek speaking?
That is right, Jim: I remember seeing something to that effect more than once. No idea where to look it up, though, except that apparently according to this page (http://www.legionxxiv.org/drillcommands/legion__xxiv__marching__drill__c.htm) Maurice's
Strategikon has the oldest known list of Latin drill commands (it lists them at the bottom of the page).
I think one could soon pick them up, although "Agmen a sex Formate" might initially raise a few eyebrows ... however it just means forming a line six deep.