https://www.warhistoryonline.com/war-articles/hannibal-won-zama-carthaginian-empire-rome-destroyed.html
Found this and although its not scintillatingly detailed it does offer a talking point for another 'what if' alternative future......
Probably a bit pessimistic about Carthage's post-Zama chances: the Romans were becoming rather unpopular in Spain and would continue to do so, which suggests Hannibal might have gained rather more cooperation, alliances and recruits than the article suggests. With Scipio dead the Romans were a bit short of talented generalship and what they had was mainly of the stay-at-home variety, so (for example) do they send Flaminius, who historically managed to beat the Macedonians at Cynoscephalae, to Greece or to Spain as of 197 BC? If the latter, does Philip prevail over whichever Roman is sent against him? Ramifications increasingly start to ripple through the tapestry of history.
The main thrust of the article is that Carthage would have anyway sued for peace - this I would question. Following the posited complete success at Zama, Hannibal would have been in a very influential position in Carthage: much as he was when he successfully ran the city's finances after the war and paid off the massive tribute imposed by the Romans. With Hannibal in charge of the city and the war effort, the money from the reformed finances would be going into Carthage's war chest, not Rome's - we should perhaps remember that it was Rome, not Carthage, which was nearing financial exhaustion as of 202 BC (they seem to have needed Carthage's tribute to finance the war against Macedon).
So, given Hannibal in charge of policy and finances, the Carthaginians could have sustained war almost indefinitely, and while Hannibal remained in charge would do so. The next question is how successful they would be.
Spain would in all likelihood be the main theatre of war: contrary to the article's assumptions, it was the most difficult theatre for the Romans to support (Africa, by contrast, was a day's sailing away from Sicily, but Fabius Maximus etc. would have ensured no further Roman expeditions were despatched to Africa) and the unreliability of the Iberian inhabitants tended to make life easier for an invader, at least up to a point. With the loss of Scipio the Romans would have lost the one Roman general who really understood Spain, so I think Hannibal would have worked his way up the peninsula and into the friendlier territory of Gaul and possibly even Liguria. There he would have run into difficulties unless the Carthaginians could wrest sea superiority from Rome, because the Romans could slip armies past him to raid and/or raise the more vulnerable or less well-affected Spanish tribes, which would have a cramping effect on his operations.
Would he have been able to invade Italy again? He would certainly want to, although detaching cities from their alliance with Rome was, as the article notes, no longer a realistic option. I think he would have managed to penetrate northern Italy, i.e. Gallia Cisalpina, and wipe out the Roman colonies there. Establishing himself further south would be problematical - too many sieges, not enough troops.
It would be at about this juncture that peace would probably be established, because the closer Hannibal got to Rome, the further away he would be from Carthage and the harder it would be for him to keep control there. I suspect that either the anti-Barcids in the Carthaginian senate would seize power and make a treaty with Rome (essentially the status quo in return for exiling Hannibal) or that Hannibal would make a truce with the Romans so he could regain power. Either way, the Romans would doubtless erode Carthaginian allies and holdings in northern Italy until war broke out again sooner or later. If Hannibal was successful, this would be sooner; if he ended up exiled, later.
I cant see Rome accepting Hannibal in office.
Victory might have brought Rome accepting better terms, but they would still require exile for hannibal.
I think he knew it too, and would have accepted it.
What might change, was the whole delenda Est thing.
Two landings in Africa, two thumping defeats. Rome might have thought twice before a third invasion, so maybe no third punic war. Maybe.
I agree with Mark, I don't think it would have changed much.
Carthage was a lost cause economically.
So much military success, and so little impact on the trajectory of the Roman Empire.
From what I read of the Romans, Hannibal could win 3 'Zamas' and it would not have stopped the Romans invading Africa. After all Trebbia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae (and another couple I can't remember just now) did not stop them fighting on AND invading Macedonia for good measure. I suspect the Romans would have gone on and on until total victory.
The more interesting What If, is Metaurus. Now if the Barca brothers had united that might well have changed history... (as might Lilybaeum)
A Punic victory at Zama would likely have put an ally of theirs back in control of the Numidian etc. lands, making further Roman campaigns in Africa harder. So innstead of a definite Roman victory in the war, a peace treaty might have been arrived at in which the Romans kept their gains but the Carthaginians would make no payments or had a restricted navy.
Carthage managed to recover economically remarkably quickly in the real world - they offered to pay the remaining 40 years reparations back as a lump sum only 10 years after the war. This recovery may, in part, have been from not having to fund an army whereas a post 2nd PW cold war would have seen them requiring some kind of force. This would likely have been smaller than pre-war - I don't know if this would have been maintained for less than the 200 talents p.a. that Carthage sent to Rome.
If this alternate Zama had been of the scale of Cannae, the Romans would have lost a considerable number of veterans and possibly a very able general. It may also have had enough of a dint in its prestige to make the occupation of Spain even harder. Taking on Macedon and then the Seleucids may also have encountered more domestic resistance while also being hampered by the danger of Punic interference instead of receiving materiel aid from Carthage.
I think, then, that while Carthage would have found it difficult to recover its empire folowing a successful Zama, the main impact would have been at least a slowing of the Roman conquest of the east.
Carthage's economic recovery post-Zama seems to have owed much to Hannibal being placed in charge of its finances and running them honestly and effectively in lieu of the usual Russian-oligarchy-style arrangements. It may be a bit of a stretch to assume he could do this straight after Zama, but if he could then Carthage could have financed a war almost indefinitely, whereas Rome had already to a great extent shot its financial bolt: its senators had sent in their gold plate, the allies had been bled dry and the Republic was drawing on Spain and Africa (the latter mainly in plunder) to finance its campaigns.
Peter's is probably the most realistic scenario, although it may be worth noting that the Carthaginian senate did not of itself attempt to make peace after Zama: Hannibal
told them to make peace (Polybius XV.19), and that is when they did. Had he won Zama, I do not think anyone in Carthage would have felt peace to be necessary or even desirable: they had previously been keen enough to dump peace arrangements when they knew he was coming back to Africa (Polybius XV.2).
Ergo, with Rome struggling to make ends meet, its best general dead and picked clean by the vultures and its best troops gone while Hannibal's veterans were now without equal, Carthage could have attempted the reconquest of Spain with some success. As in the First Punic War, eventual victory - short of total victory - would probably have gone to the side with the more effective navy, and as Peter points out, without a subdued Carthage any Roman expansion eastwards would be on a tenuous leash.
Hannibal's oath would not allow him to contemplate peace unless he really had to, which suggests he would have campaigned for as long as he could keep his hold over Carthage.
Quote from: Tim on December 17, 2016, 04:25:15 PM
The more interesting What If, is Metaurus. Now if the Barca brothers had united that might well have changed history... (as might Lilybaeum)
Funnily enough, I was thinking the same thing ... for that to work, Hasdrubal has to give Livius and Nero the slip and Hannibal has to tumble to what Nero is up to, but neither is outside the bounds of probability, the key element being Hasdrubal's guides, who betrayed him on the night in which he was attempting to evade the united Roman armies. Had they been loyal, or had he obtained better guides, he would have managed to avoid his united opponents and start making his way down Italy or, at worst, back to Cisalpina/Liguria, while Hannibal would sooner or later realise that the Roman army facing him was not under command and was ripe for the taking. A few weeks of frantic manoeuvring up and down Italy would have resulted in either the two brothers linking up or Hasdrubal settling into what later became Mago's ecological niche around Liguria, with plans to try again the following year.
206 BC could thus have been the decisive year of the war. Would Scipio have been recalled from Spain to deal with the problem, missing out on Ilipa and handing back to Carthage control of the peninsula?
The primary psychology of the Romans is insecurity bordering on paranoia. They could not accept for long that a potential enemy was not hostile or thwtba modus vivendi could be found. Defeat at Zama would only convince them that they had to finish off the war in Spain and then send two armies tonAfrica. If that gets beaten they come back with another army until Carthage is de fanged. They could not accept just being a power in Italy, they could brook no rival in Spain. then they had to destroy Macedonia and then the Seleucids. Against this monstrous machine Carthage was doomed. However rich it was Carthage was just one territory.
The decisive battles in the Punic War were the naval battles in the first war. Once Rome commanded the sea it could cut off Carthaginian trade and move its armies to where it chose.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on December 17, 2016, 09:01:18 PM
The primary psychology of the Romans is insecurity bordering on paranoia. They could not accept for long that a potential enemy was not hostile or that a modus vivendi could be found. Defeat at Zama would only convince them that they had to finish off the war in Spain and then send two armies to Africa. If that gets beaten they come back with another army until Carthage is de fanged.
I think this overstates matters, given that peace was made after the First Punic War and was being negotiated in the Second when Hannibal arrived in Africa. The First Punic War had anyway made Rome paranoid about sending armies to Africa: witness the struggle Scipio had to launch his own campaign in 204-202 BC and how the senate effectively washed their hands of it (Rome's allies were keener and fitted out the naval side from their own resources - but then it seems it was only Roman, not allied, troops which were lost under Regulus in 255 BC). Even Spain was regarded with mixed feelings: the senate had allies in Spain but not colonies, and the elder Scipios had not been very well supported in 212-211 BC. The way I see it, the Romans regarded Italy (and Sicily) as non-negotiable, but anything beyond was to be thrashed if it sent an army into Italy and ignored otherwise: this was pretty much their outlook at the start of the Second Punic War, remembering how they spent two years debating whether to go to the aid of their ally Saguntum.
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They could not accept just being a power in Italy, they could brook no rival in Spain. then they had to destroy Macedonia and then the Seleucids.
They were still a power in Italy, not as yet sending proconsuls to govern overseas. Against Macedon and the Seleucids they went to war in support of an ally (presumably having had a rethink about their conduct over Saguntum) and withdrew their forces once the campaign was over. It was not until after 146 BC and the end of the Third Punic War that they came to stay, and despite their freely intervening diplomatically with the Seleucids after the Hasmoneans made an alliance with them I think it is a mistake to read their late second century BC outlook and actions into the late third and early second centuries BC.
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Against this monstrous machine Carthage was doomed. However rich it was Carthage was just one territory.
So was Rome, but both had allies and dependent colonies. Carthage's allies however mostly lived in tents. Of the two powers, Carthage seems to have had the greater financial resources, and manpower for Carthage was largely a matter of mercenaries, so the two powers were not so imbalanced as may appear at first sight. The war was ultimately decide by generalship, not resources.
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The decisive battles in the Punic War were the naval battles in the first war. Once Rome commanded the sea it could cut off Carthaginian trade and move its armies to where it chose.
Here we agree: naval superiority was decisive in the first war (largely because the forces in Sicily had 100% dependence on naval support) and significantly influenced matters in the second, but I would question whether Rome would in fact cut off Carthaginian trade. We tend to have ideas of blockade in the tradition of Drake and Nelson, but Roman fleets stayed together (and mostly in port) rather than lying off promontories to snap up passing merchants, the exception being when the army was operating in enemy territory a few miles away. Also, not all Carthaginian trade went in and out in Carthaginian vessels: would the Romans, for example, seize an inbound/outbound Corinthian or Ptolemaic vessel? I think not, as they, too, needed to trade with these nations.
It could however move its armies more or less where it chose, and this would be a significant curb on Carthaginian campaigning.
We agree that blockade is not really feasible for galley forces . It can be maintain ned for a while, but contrary winds can disperse fleets and they have to leave station to water and to rest the rowers.
However, those trading with Carthage could be threatened with military action against their merchant shops or even their ports.
the huge difference between Rome and Carthage was that Rome had many thousands of citizen soldiers (and allies) and a new class became available every year. The economic comparison is rather like that between Nato and the Warsaw Pact. In theory Nato spent far more on armaments, in practice costs such as wages in the Communist bloc were far less than those in the West. So the comparison was skewed. Troops...the main cost of armies in the Ancient period ....... were cheaper for the Romans than for the Carthaginians . This s the Roman economy might or might not be greater than the Punic, but I contend that Rome was more productive in raising manpower.
Ladtly, Hannibal was a genius, other Carthaginian generals were not. Rather lije the Allied armies in 1813, who only attacked where Napoleon was not in direct comnand, the Romans could win on all the other fronts. and pen Carthage back into Tunisia. If Hannibal left for Spain, the Romans could invade. F He stayed in Africa they took Spain.
Quote from: Tim on December 17, 2016, 04:25:15 PM
Hannibal could win 3 'Zamas' and it would not have stopped the Romans invading Africa.
Relatively small states just can't keep this up.
If after the successes Tunis, Trebbia, Trasimine and Cannae, you have nothing other than your reputation, what was victory ever going to look like?
Quote from: Tim on December 17, 2016, 04:25:15 PM
This s the Roman economy might or might not be greater than the Punic, but I contend that Rome was more productive in raising manpower.
While we are arguing in the same direction, isn't it clear that Roman economy was far, far larger.
it's interesting to ponder the Roman v Carthaginian economy.
We see the Rome, in the interminable wars in Spain after Carthage had fallen, struggled to keep troops motivated in the face of no loot and hard fighting merely for conquest. Similarly whilst each year you do get another age class to push into the mincer, you're drawing men from the land and because of lack of success you're not replacing them with slaves.
On the other hand, was Carthage the trading nation it had been? Or was it an agriculture based African Empire exporting surplus grain, wine and figs?
But I'd recommend to anybody 'Rome Spreads her wings, Territorial expansion between the Punic Wars.' by Gareth C Sampson £25
He doesn't technically answer this question but he looks deeply into the relationship between the two countries
Jim
Quote from: aligern on December 18, 2016, 11:10:10 PM
However, those trading with Carthage could be threatened with military action against their merchant shops or even their ports.
Although this would involve Rome in another war and we see anyway no mention of any such measures in Livy's interminable lists of senatorial resolutions, so I think the idea of blockading trade was not really considered. Senators did not have our grasp of economics, and it was not until the 1st century BC that we get a senatorial orator stating that 'the sinews of war are infinite money', and this only after significant changes to the way in which Rome operated.
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the huge difference between Rome and Carthage was that Rome had many thousands of citizen soldiers (and allies) and a new class became available every year. The economic comparison is rather like that between Nato and the Warsaw Pact. In theory Nato spent far more on armaments, in practice costs such as wages in the Communist bloc were far less than those in the West. So the comparison was skewed. Troops...the main cost of armies in the Ancient period ....... were cheaper for the Romans than for the Carthaginians . This s the Roman economy might or might not be greater than the Punic, but I contend that Rome was more productive in raising manpower.
I would be inclined to agree. The next consideration is, of course, getting the manpower to where it matters and maintaining and using it effectively there. My impression is that Carthage had the edge in this regard.
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Lastly, Hannibal was a genius, other Carthaginian generals were not. Rather like the Allied armies in 1813, who only attacked where Napoleon was not in direct command, the Romans could win on all the other fronts and pen Carthage back into Tunisia. If Hannibal left for Spain, the Romans could invade. If he stayed in Africa they took Spain.
Quite true in theory, but invalid in practice on account of the very real Roman psychological block about invading Africa, which would have received incalculable reinforcement from Scipio's posited demise (the gods have reminded us ...). This leaves only one major front: Spain. Here the Romans, deprived of the services of both generations of Scipii, would be at a significant disadvantage both logistically and in terms of generalship and understanding of the locals. As Hannibal pushed further, through Gaul and Liguria and into northern Italy, those advantages would progressively reverse themselves, creating conditions reminiscent of the southern Italy stalemate seen in 210-202 BC.
Quote from: Dangun on December 19, 2016, 04:13:19 AM
If after the successes Tunis, Trebbia, Trasimine and Cannae, you have nothing other than your reputation, what was victory ever going to look like?
Marching on, besieging and taking Rome as prompted by Maharbal. Even the Romanophile Livy reports the Romans seriously considering evacuating the city to flee elsewhere.
P.S. -
Tunis??? Ticinus, presumably.
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... isn't it clear that Roman economy was far, far larger.
I am not sure that it is. There is a tendency to view Carthage as a single city surrounded by a few fields and villages, but it held sway over about as much of northern Africa as Rome did over Italy. Italy seems to have been more densely populated (and perhaps significantly Polybius does not roll off a 700,000-man list of accessible manpower for Carthage) but prior to the Third Punic War, when Carthage was down to just itself plus a few fields and villages in contrast to what it had held before, it put 50,000 men into the field against Masinissa and attracted the envy of Rome (the senators apparently starting to have a grasp of economics) so if a similar relationship held at the time of the Second Punic War then the Carthaginian economy was probably larger.
Dangun
The economy quote I don't believe was mine.
Regards
Tim
As I intimated earlier, it all depends upon how you count GDP. We are interested in measuring the military output of the two states. This is not the same as the traded economy. Clearly Rome could raise and maintain far more troops than the Carthaginians, because the Punic armies are largely paid in coin (allies such as Gallic tribes are a very efficient addition.)
In the the end what matters is that the Romans have the men, money and motivation to continue the death grapple until they win. they suffer losses. It is not neceessary for them to have genius generals, only good ones. Carthage suffers from having to put together armies from disparate nations that require a Hannibal to win great victories. Even Hannibal cannot put Rome down after winning three stunning victories in the field. He cannot firce them to terms and thus the Romans gain years to recuperate by avoiding battle, even whilst Hannibal is moving around Italy.
Rome does not accept defeat, so a lost Zama is a pause in an inevitable rise.Very occasionally a great man diverts the course of history, but it is very occasional. The war for dominance in the Western mediterranean was one of those conflicts in which the large considerations dominated and so economy, manpower, motivation and a good enough fighting technique were always going to see Rome through.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 19, 2016, 12:46:58 PM
I am not sure that it is. There is a tendency to view Carthage as a single city surrounded by a few fields and villages, but it held sway over about as much of northern Africa as Rome did over Italy.
While interesting, its tough to build up macro economic data this way.
I think we'll find estimates of population, or land under cultivation, or output measures will suggest Rome is far larger.
I haven't had time to find the best looking estimates, but just scanning a piece called "Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2006 AD" from the University of Groningen suggests that the population of Italy in 1AD was 1.92x, and the GDP 3.2x that of North Africa (ex-Egypt).
If we try to finesse the Groningen data and assume that, at the time, Rome controlled Italy + half of Spain and Carthage controlled what is now Tunisia and Libya, then the data suggests that the population of the Roman Empire in 1AD was 8.2x, and the GDP 11.2x that of Carthage.
Now obviously this or any other estimate is going to be awfully rough, but I think this gives a strong sense of the inevitability.
Quote from: Tim on December 19, 2016, 07:42:41 PM
The economy quote I don't believe was mine.
Indeed it wasn't. My apologies.
It was Roy's and I don't know why the quote generator did that.
Quote from: aligern on December 19, 2016, 11:39:59 PM
In the the end what matters is that the Romans have the men, money and motivation to continue the death grapple until they win. they suffer losses. It is not necessary for them to have genius generals, only good ones.
That is what they thought in 149 BC, when they had just the city of Carthage to deal with. For two years they got nowhere. It took a Scipio to make headway and finally finish the job.
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Carthage suffers from having to put together armies from disparate nations that require a Hannibal to win great victories. Even Hannibal cannot put Rome down after winning three stunning victories in the field. He cannot force them to terms and thus the Romans gain years to recuperate by avoiding battle, even whilst Hannibal is moving around Italy.
But he could have. Marching on Rome straight after Cannae would have done the trick, and if Carthage, which after years of dragging its feet finally got around to sending him reinforcements in 215 BC, had actually sent the lot instead of dissipating most of them in secondary theatres, he could have finished the war that year.
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Rome does not accept defeat, so a lost Zama is a pause in an inevitable rise.
But Rome still manages to be defeated, and unless one considers the gods had really marked the city out for world domination, its rise was not inevitable.
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Very occasionally a great man diverts the course of history, but it is very occasional. The war for dominance in the Western mediterranean was one of those conflicts in which the large considerations dominated and so economy, manpower, motivation and a good enough fighting technique were always going to see Rome through.
Easy enough to say in retrospect, but I think it is fair to say that Rome did not win the war so much as Carthage lost it. In the early part of the war, they dithered and failed to support Hannibal, and seem to have put very little effort into the war itself. Like the Third Reich, they remained on a peacetime economy until things began to get really dire (following the Metaurus, 207 BC) at which point they moved into high gear and started habitually fielding armies the Romans were hard pressed to match: 70,000 at Ilipa, 93,000 in the combined Carthaginian-Numidian army under Hasdrubal and Syphax which Scipio destroyed with a night attack during a truce. Put an average Roman general or two in Scipio's shoes and he would lose at Ilipa; Scipio knew that he himself could not succeed against the combined army he faced in Africa (which is why he cheated).
Interestingly, Cornelius Nepos mentions that following Zama, Hannibal managed to get yet another army together to face the Romans. I think when it comes to organising and applying economy, manpower, motivation and a good enough fighting technique, it was Carthage and not Rome which had the edge. Scipio, not economics, won the war for Rome. Without him, and with Hannibal still in play, I do not see the Romans winning at all, however determined they may have been (and by 203 BC that determination was perceptibly slackening: there was no 'delenda est Carthago' in speeches in the senate).
On the subject of Carthaginian resources, we may remember the way they consistently and steadily put large armies into Sicily in earlier centuries. This was before the Barcids conquered Spain.
Quote from: Dangun on December 20, 2016, 12:25:30 AM
I think we'll find estimates of population, or land under cultivation, or output measures will suggest Rome is far larger.
I haven't had time to find the best looking estimates, but just scanning a piece called "Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2006 AD" from the University of Groningen suggests that the population of Italy in 1AD was 1.92x, and the GDP 3.2x that of North Africa (ex-Egypt).
We can do better than this. Strabo in
Geographia VII.3.15 wrote that before its fall (in 146 BC) Carthage enjoyed a population of 700,000 and directed an alliance of 300 cities. Since under the Roman empire its population (after being refounded by Julius Caesar in 49 BC) rose to 500,000, a figure of 700,000 does not seem too far off. This of course is just Carthage, not its 300 cities and allied Numidian tribes.
Rome would struggle to be 'far larger'.
'Marching on Rome straight after Cannae would have done the trick.' Hannibal chose not to. Patrick's argument rather depends upon Hannibal being a military genius. Hannibal did not march, but Patrick tells us he should have and Rome would have geen brought down. Therefore Patrick is rather more of a military genius than Hannibal. 😉
The flaw in the argument that Carthage had much the same size of military economy as Rome is that the Carthaginians do not produce an army in Africa that can match Rome. At Zama Hannibal is reliant for 2/3 of his heavy infantry on imports of his old mercenaries or Celts and Spaniards. If Carthage had such power as 300 citiies must give then put forth that power. Why, when Hannibal was scuttling around Italy for a decade hiding from Roman armies (and vice versa) and gradually seeing his allies peeled away, did not the Carthaginians send him another army by sea to overwhelm the Romans?
I looked back and cannot see that the quote on the economies was mine,but it does praphrase my view on the military economies of both states. The situation for Carthage is rather like that of the Japanese in WWII they royse a sleeping giant and the consequences are inevitable. Hannibal could win at Zama, its just a delay of five, ten years or twenty before the Romans come again because they cannot tolerate the Carthaginians either as a land power , knowing that Hannibal's feats could be reproduced from a Sanish base, or more scary still that a week out from Carthage a fleet full of mercenaries could be disembarking at the mouth of the Tiber.
A point Phil Barker made many years ago in the first AMPW, I recall, was that Rome had a man litary system that meant that they did not need a great general to win. There is also a saw that Strategy derives from tactics. If your strength is in a face to face grinding match then your strategy aims to bring that on. That was the Romans strength and it dictated their strategy. They had to confront Carthage face to face. Carthage was a city and that meant that the Romans had to go there to win. Once it became a matter of a siege the Romans would win if it took two years or ten.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 20, 2016, 11:55:29 AM
We can do better than this. Strabo in Geographia VII.3.15 wrote that before its fall (in 146 BC) Carthage enjoyed a population of 700,000 and directed an alliance of 300 cities. Since under the Roman empire its population (after being refounded by Julius Caesar in 49 BC) rose to 500,000, a figure of 700,000 does not seem too far off. This of course is just Carthage, not its 300 cities and allied Numidian tribes.
Rome would struggle to be 'far larger'.
Again, the quote from Strabo is interesting.
But the modern academic estimates of the Roman Empire's population and GDP are [bF]AR[/b] larger.
The Groningen study for 1AD gives a population of almost 10million for what was the Roman Empire in 200BC and 1.2million for the area controlled by what was Carthage in 200BC. As I said above the GDP is given to be 11x times larger.
The estimates across studies vary, but Rome is always larger.
I think you'd have to mount a heroic all population/GDP estimates are wrong kind of argument to be persuasive here.
Best of luck.
This is entirely consistent with Rome's ability to continue to pump out new armies and civil works during this period.
PS: While the economic argument could be seen to be dry and colourless, its the exceptions that make things interesting - Greece perhaps.
Quote from: aligern on December 20, 2016, 12:41:02 PM
'Marching on Rome straight after Cannae would have done the trick.' Hannibal chose not to. Patrick's argument rather depends upon Hannibal being a military genius. Hannibal did not march, but Patrick tells us he should have and Rome would have geen brought down. Therefore Patrick is rather more of a military genius than Hannibal. 😉
And modest with it ... ;)
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The flaw in the argument that Carthage had much the same size of military economy as Rome is that the Carthaginians do not produce an army in Africa that can match Rome.
Actually they do: see Polybius XIV.1.14:
"For there were two camps, one that of Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from it of the Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty thousand infantry."
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At Zama Hannibal is reliant for 2/3 of his heavy infantry on imports of his old mercenaries or Celts and Spaniards. If Carthage had such power as 300 citiies must give then put forth that power. Why, when Hannibal was scuttling around Italy for a decade hiding from Roman armies (and vice versa) and gradually seeing his allies peeled away, did not the Carthaginians send him another army by sea to overwhelm the Romans?
Reading my previous post would have indicated that Carthage was not taking its support of Hannibal seriously. It did nothing of note from 218-216 BC, only bestirring itself in 215 BC and then frittering away the army it raised on three separate ventures rather than sending it all to Hannibal. Thereafter it languidly reinforced the armies in Spain and reluctantly sent occasional contingents to Hannibal in Italy; only after the fall of New Carthage did it begin taking the war seriously. Once it did, its recruitment and outfitting machinery swung into action: 70,000 troops were raised for Ilipa (larger than any Roman army except that at Cannae) and three years later 93,000 to defend Africa against Scipio.
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I looked back and cannot see that the quote on the economies was mine, but it does paraphrase my view on the military economies of both states.
And I have to disagree: in 480 BC Carthage launched a 300,000-man expedition by sea to conquer Sicily. Rome never managed anything like that.
QuoteThe situation for Carthage is rather like that of the Japanese in WWII they rouse a sleeping giant and the consequences are inevitable.
Not really - it is more like Nazi Germany vs the British Empire in WW2: Britain, like Rome, went into total war production almost immediately whereas Nazi Germany, like the Carthaginians, left it too late - mid-1944 in the Nazis' case and around 206 BC for the Carthaginians.
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A point Phil Barker made many years ago in the first AMPW, I recall, was that Rome had a military system that meant that they did not need a great general to win.
The irony is that they did need a great general to win when up against anyone of any quality: the system by itself was not enough. Regulus easily defeated Carthage's military amateurs in Africa until he came up against Xanthippus, at which point Xanthippus eliminated the Roman army as a fighting force, system or no. During the Second Punic War they lost a succession of armies against Hannibal plus a pair of armies in Spain (at Castulo and Ilorca). It took a great general to retrieve the situation.
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There is also a saw that Strategy derives from tactics. If your strength is in a face to face grinding match then your strategy aims to bring that on. That was the Romans strength and it dictated their strategy. They had to confront Carthage face to face. Carthage was a city and that meant that the Romans had to go there to win. Once it became a matter of a siege the Romans would win if it took two years or ten.
Once it becomes a matter of a siege the besieger will win whether or not he is Roman unless he plans things so badly as to run out of supplies, or he gets hit by a plague or a destroying angel. 'Confronting face to face' means what in practical terms? Seeking battle? How did that work out at Cannae? ;)
Interestingly enough, Polybius' explanation for Rome's eventual success is not economic, but political:
"But about the period of its entering on the Hannibalian war the political state of Carthage was on the decline, that of Rome improving. For whereas there is in every body, or polity, or business a natural stage of growth, zenith, and decay; and whereas everything in them is at its best at the zenith; we may thereby judge of the difference between these two constitutions as they existed at that period. For exactly so far as the strength and prosperity of Carthage preceded that of Rome in point of time, by so much was Carthage then past its prime, while Rome was exactly at its zenith, as far as its political constitution was concerned. In Carthage therefore the influence of the people in the policy of the state had already risen to be supreme, while at Rome the Senate was at the height of its power: and so, as in the one measures were deliberated upon by the many, in the other by the best men, the policy of the Romans in all public undertakings proved the stronger; on which account, though they met with capital disasters, by force of prudent counsels they finally conquered the Carthaginians in the war." - Polybius VI.51
Yes Patrick it is a particularly Hellenic mindset to see constitutions as major drivers of a successful state and this continues on into Roman thought, where they Parthians are all the slaves of one man, wheread Roman citizens are free men, even though the Roman emperors are every bit as unbridled as the Parthian kings. So no surprises that Polybius sees, in effect, that Fortuna has passed from Carthage to Rome. Myself I can see the point that Polybius is aiming at. Doubtless geography and economics are the main discriminators in successful warfare, we can add in martial tradition and the relative effectiveness of the opposing armaments, but there is also something about 'animal spirits' . Just as the Macedonians have a tremendous will to win which drives them onwards and then fades so that, despite having much larger resources none of the successors has the drive of a Philip or an Alexander. Similarly, in the nineteenth century the Austrian Empire does not have the spirit of the Prussian kingdom, but theoretically it has the resources to match it. The British Empire is a good example, where small numbers of daring men conquered an area and then mobilised its resources to bring neighbouring areas under control, or we might cite the Conquistadors whose lust for Gold and God drove them to conquer empires that, on a balance sheet basis, should have easily been able to cope.
Carthage may have lost to Rome because of the different psychologies of the ruling classes, but both sides knew that this was a death grapple because only one could control the Western Mediterranean basin. The Roman mindset may have given them an advantage, but Carthage knew that bith sides were playing for keeps.
As to Patrick!s numbers, we will never agree on something as fundamental as Carthage sending 300,000 men to Sicily. Similarly I don't buy the idea that there were 50,000 Numidian troops. We differ so deeply on ancient numbers that it is not worth going round the houses again on it.
Cheers
Roy
Polybius certainly has a point, and one can see its effects when one contrasts the fits-and-starts Carthaginian commitment to their war effort with the steady if largely unimaginative determination of the Roman senate. I am less sure that Carthage and Rome saw each other as irreconcilable last-man-standing opponents; they had been allies as late as 275 BC and could have been so again had, for example, an unusually successful Macedonian monarch seized Sicily. Only Hannibal and Cato advocated all-out destruction for the other side.
QuoteDoubtless geography and economics are the main discriminators in successful warfare, we can add in martial tradition and the relative effectiveness of the opposing armaments, but there is also something about 'animal spirits' . Just as the Macedonians have a tremendous will to win which drives them onwards and then fades so that, despite having much larger resources none of the successors has the drive of a Philip or an Alexander. Similarly, in the nineteenth century the Austrian Empire does not have the spirit of the Prussian kingdom, but theoretically it has the resources to match it.
A good observation, Roy. The essence of the matter seems to be that resources are all very well, and allow one to redeem losing bets in the casino of history, but it is the effective direction and use of those resources which wins wars (one may further adduce the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 to demonstrate this point), together with a spirit of commitment which is usually found on the side of the victor.
QuoteAs to Patrick's numbers, we will never agree on something as fundamental as Carthage sending 300,000 men to Sicily. Similarly I don't buy the idea that there were 50,000 Numidian troops.
'Patrick's numbers' ... ::) These figures are from Herodotus and Diodorus on the one hand, and Polybius on the other. Arbitrary rejection of such material is generally the first step in misjudging history. Out of interest, any problem with Polybius' 80,000 Romans at Cannae?
No great problem with Cannae. The numbers fit around the structure of the Roman army. No great problem with 50,000 Carthaginians, but great problems with 300,000 of them. I am not alone in not trusting ancient numbers and not alone in not seeing their numbers as essentially linked to the veracity of other statements they might make. Herodotus guesses or lies about the numbers of Persians ( he has plenty of motive to exaggerate) and no doubt other enemies of the Greeks, I see that as quite different from say his description of Persian armament or the tactics of Marathon. I and others have a long history of maintaining that simple faith in ancient numbers is a mistake, largely because they are often not believable in terms of logistics as understood by later periods where we have sensible numbers from more trustworthy observers and comparisons with other ancient sources. I understand that Patrick's opinion on numbers is by way of an outlier. I claim no originality in doubting the counting of ancient historians.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on December 21, 2016, 03:44:53 PM
No great problem with Cannae. The numbers fit around the structure of the Roman army. No great problem with 50,000 Carthaginians, but great problems with 300,000 of them.
And what are these problems?
QuoteHerodotus guesses or lies about the numbers of Persians ( he has plenty of motive to exaggerate) and no doubt other enemies of the Greeks,
His number structure seems consistent, associated effects seem consistent - and fibbing usually results in inconsistency. Funnily enough, the inconsistency problems arise from efforts to downsize Xerxes' army (one of the first being squeezing down the army to 100,000 men and then finding the fleet still had 250,000).
QuoteI and others have a long history of maintaining that simple faith in ancient numbers is a mistake, largely because they are often not believable in terms of logistics as understood by later periods where we have sensible numbers from more trustworthy observers and comparisons with other ancient sources.
Hence drawing conclusions by comparing like with unlike. Hitler did the same with estimates of Soviet troop build-ups in 1944-45: any numbers he did not like, he disbelieved. It was a bluff, a trick, a logistical impossibility (and Gehlen ought to be shot for being taken in by such an outrageous bluff). Of course, in WW2 there was an empirical way of finding out the truth about the numbers ...
And I would advise not confusing 'simple faith' with objective analysis.
Given that we do this argument every year, can we move the ancient numbers posts to a different theead.
Then we can just ignore it and refer back to it when it comes up again.
Or a sticky poll.
Do you believe we should accept all ancient numbers as literally true.
Anything to avoid pat reposting half of Herodotus again .
I don't think the Carthaginian/Punic wars figures need to be lumped in with Herodotus
We have a pretty good idea of fleet sizes, from a number of sources and they seem to be accepted. Once you take that into account and assume the Carthaginian force includes men serving in the fleet, then the land component isn't too ridiculous.
In fact, assuming the land component arrived on 'merchant shipping' or its equivalent rather than being carried as marines on warships, then it could well be that the Land component includes the seamen etc needed to get them there.
It was a legitimate way for the writer to provide an inflated figure for the forces of the bad guys ;)
It is a thought, Jim: in our accounts of this Carthaginian expedition there is no division into fighting effectives and camp followers* or equivalents.
*or should that be camp-followers?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 22, 2016, 11:39:30 AM
It is a thought, Jim: in our accounts of this Carthaginian expedition there is no division into fighting effectives and camp followers* or equivalents.
*or should that be camp-followers?
When you think about it, they might be two very different types of people ;D