It may be well-known but I came across this article (https://www.iianthropology.org/ChristopherWebber.pdf) by accident. Lots of interesting info and illustrations.
hadnt actually read this before Anthony and Thracians are a favourite of mine so thanks for the find :)
Also, on the subject of mobilisation potential, one may note the statement that a million Thracians allows an army 100,000 to 200,000 strong (10% or 20% of population). In this regard, Mr Webber seems to follow what yours truly regards as conventional wisdom.
A useful article, with plenty of information.
Thank you Patrick. I wondered if you would pick up on his fondness for literalism as regards numbers :)
Actually I was noting his use of the customary military manpower ratio, which he evidently considers sufficiently well established and generally known to use without discussion or reference.
The point of doing this is to reassure members that the calculations of prime military manpower being 10% of population and total military manpower 20% of population are generally accepted and in general use. We did earlier have some doubts on the matter.
Now that you mention it, he is quite a man for taking his material directly from the primary sources. :)
That said, my eye was particularly drawn to the illustration on p.543 (fig 11 on p.15 of the pdf) showing a king on horseback while servants hold his weapons. The spear or lance is held in such a way as to suggest it is counterweighted, while the sword appears from the configuration of its scabbard to be straight (an akinakes?) as opposed to curved and sica-like. The counterweighted shafted weapon would provide reach in melee and would have interesting characteristics if thrown.
Nice incidentally to see Head D., AOTMAPW* being referenced alongside Arrian, Diodorus, Livy and the like, notably with regard to developments in tactics and technique. It indicates that one Society member has beneficially influenced the understanding of the period.
*Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars - Must get a copy sometime.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 24, 2018, 07:23:45 AM
Actually I was noting his use of the customary military manpower ratio, which he evidently considers sufficiently well established and generally known to use without discussion or reference.
The point of doing this is to reassure members that the calculations of prime military manpower being 10% of population and total military manpower 20% of population are generally accepted and in general use. We did earlier have some doubts on the matter.
So, if we repeat it enough, it becomes a fact? As you say, he gives no reference as to why he thinks this. To deploy 20% of the population is nearly 100% of male adults, which assumes universal military obligation and no appreciable slave community, unfree labour or other exempt groups (e.g. a priesthood). To assemble all these people in one place without creating havoc and civil war as tribes lived off the land while marching through "friendly" territory would be an enormous organisational feat. Does this fit what we know of Thracian society?
Quote from: Erpingham on May 24, 2018, 08:01:26 AMAs you say, he gives no reference as to why he thinks this.
Chris quotes Strabo's suggestion that Thrace could field 200,000 foot and 15,000 cavalry; and is also aware of the figure of 150,000 that Thucydides (2.98) gives for Sitalkes' vast army for his invasion of Macedonia. Of course the former is potential resources, the latter a claim for an army actually fielded in one place, and they're centuries apart.
The population from which this is drawn, however, must be much less certain. Since Herodotus 5.1 regards the Thracians as the largest nation of earth except the Indians, a population of one million looks low compared with the figures that we've seen suggested for those parts of Greece and Thrace on Xerxes' route. I don't know where Chris got the idea that Herodotus himself said one million - can't find it in H at the moment - nor how Herodotus would know, since in his time there was no Thracian state to conduct a census.
Too much uncertainty here, I think.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 24, 2018, 08:01:26 AM
So, if we repeat it enough, it becomes a fact? As you say, he gives no reference as to why he thinks this.
I do not think it became established simply through the Goebbels approach, but because it possessed perceived intrisic validity. Any susbscriber to
Strategy and Tactics in its SPI days would have seen it many a time (S&T folks back then were fond of demographic analysis and used the conventional wisdom for same). I have never seen any other figure offered for usable military manpower as percentage of population - outside this forum, that is.
QuoteTo deploy 20% of the population is nearly 100% of male adults, which assumes universal military obligation and no appreciable slave community, unfree labour or other exempt groups (e.g. a priesthood). To assemble all these people in one place without creating havoc and civil war as tribes lived off the land while marching through "friendly" territory would be an enormous organisational feat. Does this fit what we know of Thracian society?
Which raises the question of what we know of Thracian society, and how we interpret it. They were tribal, raised corn and cattle, and by all acocunts spent most of their spare time fighting each other. Of logistical details we know little, but Xenophon lifts an occasional corner of the veil.
"After this all the soldiers crossed over to Byzantium. And Anaxibius would not give them pay, but made proclamation that the troops were to take their arms and their baggage and go forth from the city, saying that he was going to send them back home and at the same time to make an enumeration of them. At that the soldiers were angry, for they had no money with which to
procure provisions for the journey, and they set about packing up with reluctance." -
Anabasis VII.1.7
We may observe the emphasis on procuring provisions in advance. This is consistent with the general Greek aproach, and perhaps not inconsistent with that of the Thracians. The Thracians certainly do not seem to have lacked for resources.
"Then Anaxibius called together the generals and captains and said: 'Get your provisions from the Thracian villages; there is
an abundance there of barley and wheat and other supplies; when you have got them, proceed to the Chersonese, and there Cyniscus will take you into his pay.'" -
idem 13
So it would seem to come down to whether the Thracians had the
nous to bring provisions with them when they set out on camapign, and if so, for how long. Once their initial stocks had run out, they would have little option but to live off the land, and their ability to do this would set the duration of their campaign. This was doubtless the reason why Greece was never inundated by a wave of unified Thracians. The 150,000-strong mobilisation under Sitalces was apparently a one-off event, although Herodotus does have 300,000 Thracians joinging Xerxes, which would place the population somewhat above 1 million (perhaps closer to 2 million given that at least one important tribe did not join).
Xenophon's
Anabasis VII.3
et seq describes the Greeks' campaigning in service of the Thracian king Seuthes. One may note that in VII.4.7 a boy 'just in the bloom of youth' is captured in arms, indicating a fairly extensive mobilisation of the available population, and Xenophon's men rarely encountered any Thracians not under arms, the latter being confined to the occasional group of geriatrics. Economically, the Greeks never lacked for provisions (there were always plenty more well-stocked Thracian villages), but as Seuthes became more successful, largely on account of the Greeks, so more and more Odrysians joined him, which seems to have resulted in specie embarrassments, particularly when the Greeks' payday arrived.
"Thereupon Seuthes said: 'As for ready money, I have only a little, and that I give you, a talent; but I have six hundred cattle, and sheep to the number of four thousand, and nearly a hundred and twenty slaves. Take these, and likewise the hostages of the people who wronged you, and go your way.'" - ibid. VII.7.53
This signalled a parting of the ways, coinciding as it did with the Spartan offer to engage the survivors of the Ten Thousand. What we see of Thrace through the eyes of Xenophon does appear to uphold the picture of a region with extensive food resources and more or less complete mobilisation of the male populatin for the campaign season.
Two Points from Caesar here.cAnd one from Weliington.
Firstly he gives a figure for the total of the Helvetii and for their militaru potential which he takes to be a quarter of the total. This is from data found onbtablets in the camp of the defeated Helvetians. We shoukd not necessarily believe Caesar's figures, it is just as lijely that he needed the Helvetians to be. a substantial number to justify his move from the province and the raising of legions.
Secondly tge Belgae assemble all their men to deal with the Roman threat, hang around for a bit and then have to go hone because their supplies have run out. This is very telling, trival areas might generate a very large number of men, but have no mechanism of comnand and control and no effective logistics. Caesar, by contrast has far fewer men, and worries constantly about the corn supply.
Lastly the adage attributed to Wellington. Spain is a country where large armies starve and small armies get get beaten. I rather think ancient countries are more lije Spain than areas such as Nirthern Italy ir the Liw countries in the middle ages. There is obviously the food around to feed the men that are called up, but moving the food to the men after they have run out of that which they brought with them requires a lot of organisation. Having 200,000 warriors is meaningless if you cannot feed them and move them . It might work for defence, but would mean that, once assembled, the army must seek battle or it will suffer the fate of the Belgae.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on May 24, 2018, 09:17:31 AM
Lastly the adage attributed to Wellington. Spain is a country where large armies starve and small armies get get beaten.
I've seen essentially the same line (substituting Sweden for Spain) attributed to a 16C Danish commander. I wonder who first made the quip.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 24, 2018, 08:57:40 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 24, 2018, 08:01:26 AM
I have never seen any other figure offered for usable military manpower as percentage of population - outside this forum, that is.
I don't want to get into this again but the military potential of a state is not just a simple percentage function of population. It depends a lot on social organisation and also on things like economy, bureacracy and infrastructure. I am genuinely surprised you have not, in your extensive reading, come across this concept beyond this forum.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 24, 2018, 09:38:03 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 24, 2018, 08:57:40 AM
I have never seen any other figure offered for usable military manpower as percentage of population - outside this forum, that is.
I don't want to get into this again but the military potential of a state is not just a simple percentage function of population. It depends a lot on social organisation and also on things like economy, bureacracy and infrastructure. I am genuinely surprised you have not, in your extensive reading, come across this concept beyond this forum.
It is surprising how little manpower economy, bureaucracy and infrastructure take up in a tribal society or indeed any society prior to the Roman Empire - provided one uses one's manpower for seasonal campaigning. It is when you want longer campaigns that the need for someone to mind the shop/farm/fort begins to bite. We see this under the Plantagenets, notably Edward I, who finds the 40-day service window to be too much of a restriction for offensive campaigns and begins instead moving towards a semi-permanent (and smaller) mercenary army effective enough to take on the opposition (bit of a simplification but it should give the idea).
Roy mentioned the Helvetii and their census listing 25% of the population as eligible military manpower. One may argue they were a special case, as they were migrating and so left nobody behind to run anything, but they were able to field practically their entire adult manpower, for all the good it did them against Caesar and his legions. The question now is how far this availability for service applies to, say, Gallic tribes.
Fortunately we have some figures for this. Folowing Caesar's conquest, which eliminated no small number of Gallic warriors, Gaul mobilised 250,000 men to come to the aid of Vercingetorix's 80,000 trapped in Alesia. Caesar reckoned the population of Gaul at three million. Vercingetorix's mobilisation, which was a maximum effort, put 330,000 in the field, and this was after Caesar had been through the length and breadth of Gaul killing tens of thousands of warriors in every engagement. So even assuming the Gauls were scraping the bottom of their manpower barrel, they were still fielding over 10% of their population, more so as Caesar had by then somewhat reduced that overall population. The conclusion we can draw, again for a seasonal campaign, is that very few men needed to remain behind. Another feature to note, as Roy has indicated, is that this large Gallic army could not stay in place for very long: it launched its attacks on Caesar's lines when it did because it was running out of supplies.
Once we get away from seasonal campaigns, the percentage fieldable will tend to drop dramatically, for the simple reason that most of one's manpower is needed to work the land and carry on necessary (and some optional) trades, activities which can be dropped for a few months when a camapign season rolls round. So if the Roman Republic wants to besiege Veii year round, it has to maintain a rather reduced army over the winter, men whose own farms are going to be neglected and whose families may need support. This is where the "social organisation and ... things like economy, bureacracy and infrastructure" start to matter, not during the campaign season when one is by and large operating locally with the bulk of one's manpower during a temporary suspension of normal societal activities. That said, one does need social organisation to get the manpower on campaign in the first place, but the people doing the organising will be campaigning too.
The above generally holds true for tribal societies (and I class early mediaeval Europe as consisting essentially of tribal societies). City-states seem to have been able to mobilise much of their manpower in a similar way; Thucydides notes that in 431-430 BC Athens fielded 29,000 hoplites and crews for 200 triremes, no small achievement for a single city. (It did cheat slightly by having 16,000 of those hoplites on part-time soldiering as the city's garrison, but the economy, bureaucracy etc. were run by men who doubled as soldiery when the enemy invaded.) Once the campaign season was over, everyone returned home (apart from a few thousand unfortunates besieging Potidaea) and ran their lives and economy as usual (except for land ravanged by the Spartans) until the next campaign season, when practically everyone again donned armour or took up the oar.
Does this clarify matters at all?
QuoteDoes this clarify matters at all?
Yes, that you are actually aware that social organisation has an effect on military mobilisation :)
Whether all European tribal societies were the same through history is quite a big leap and one we should be cautious of. I do think you are correct to separate migrating from settled populations though.
City state military potential is another interesting subject. These tend to be of smaller area and more structured, which allows quite large proportions of the population to be mobilised. I don't know how many such cities the Thracians had but the population seem to me quite rural and spread over a very large area, rather than heavily urbanised.
And, finally, I can't resist noting that Edward I operated in a completely different society to the tribal or city state models. For comparison, though, he doesn't seem to have mustered much more than 30,000 men at once, out of a population of around 3 million.
You make an important point Erpingham, I do wonder if much of the social structure of barbarian societies is just brushed aside by Roman and other commentators. We know that such as Goths and Lombards had noble houses, free men , half free and slaves. 20th cent writers tended to see these societies as mainly of free men who had a democratic duty to serve ,. Latterly there gas been emphasis on the professional warriors and lordship with oath bound companions and clients. So it may well be that all the men of a tribe were not expected or trained and equipped to turn out. Those who did not come may have been part of some selective system that delivered one in five or six actual warfiors or farners who were just more use onnthe labd, paying taxes, even if in kind. Recruitment might be on the basis of the commitment of men by 'nobles' to a king and the nobles might have agreed for 50 or 100 or 1000 and not taken , more. Perhaps the idea of the free man with spear and shield is just a matter of display and is not lived up to or demanded except as a public statement that X is a free man, owns land,can swear an oath, can be a juror, pays a tax etc. He might nt fight except in extremis.
Wargamers do tend to have a model of tribal warfare as every man being liable and being called and having kit and being good at soldiering. However, providing effective military training tand kit to all would have been very expensive. The population of Gaul has beem guessed at as five millio, I think....my that is only fifteen Helvetii sized tribes. ( of course tha H numbers inclopude two small tribes) . That implies 1.25 million warriors at The divine one's 25% ratio. If everyone is expected to fight and equipped that is a hell of a lot of swords, shields and spears. Its more military kit than Rome provided at is peak!!! ( circa 620.000 thousand Late Roman soldiers) . If a sword lasts thirty years then , for the million nan free Gauls , 40,000 swords are needed a year . If it takes a Smith a week to make a sword and its fittings then for Gaul that's 40,000 weeks work so at 40 swords a year per smith that's 1000 sword smiths in Gaul...well that is around 20 smithies per tribe . All these calculations get to be like the Drake equation with a couple of variables drastically affecting the outcome. I suspect that equipping 25% of the population for war is a bit of an ask for an essentially rural society. There is also the weakness that the leadership wants trained, fit young men.
Roy
Anyway, military manpower potential remains a constant at 10% (prime) or 20% (usual total, rising to 25% for Helvetii and perhaps other migrants) of population throughout much of history. What one does with that manpower can vary from society to society, so it is usually easier just to take the basic figure and then make any necessary adjustments for particular societies (e.g. does a trading society like Carthage or mediaeval Venice field a smaller or larger percentage under arms, or about the same; does a society with a significant slave element field more, less or about the same of its population?), but until the mid-late 20th century a populaton could rely on having up to 20% of its population to commit to war - if it could find the weaponry for them.
Roy's reckoning of perhaps 1,000 sword smiths in Gaul is interesting in that it demonstrates how (assuming a 30-year lifespan for a sword, which may be on the low side) this small number of smiths can keep a million Gallic warriors or would-be warrors in swords.
QuoteIf everyone is expected to fight and equipped that is a hell of a lot of swords, shields and spears. Its more military kit than Rome provided at is peak!!!
Not necessarily, as the Empire also provided armour and engines of war, the armour being the big consumer of time and materials. One point to note about migrating populations, including those Rome faced in the late 4th/early 5th centuries AD, is that they have no real reason to leave anyone out of the battle, however poorly armed - and that on their migration they will be looing to make good any deficiency in armaments.
Bringing this back to Thracians, is there any reason to suppose the Thracians held back any significant fraction of militarily-capable manpower when they went to war? They were essentially tribal and rural, although in Xenophon's testimony their rural settlements appear to have been well-provisioned .
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 26, 2018, 07:33:51 AM
Bringing this back to Thracians, is there any reason to suppose the Thracians held back any significant fraction of militarily-capable manpower when they went to war? They were essentially tribal and rural, although in Xenophon's testimony their rural settlements appear to have been well-provisioned .
To put it another way, is there any reason to believe that Thrace usually operated on the mass mobilisation of all available manpower? How was mobilisation structured? How did a tribe raise its forces? Was it based on who fancied turning up on the day or was there some kind of expectation that tribal nobility would turn up when called with a following of sorts? As Roy has said, we are in danger of falling into a
topos of massed hordes of barbarians again, without trying to understand the nature of the society from which they came.
We must not forget that Caesar has motive for exaggerating the effective numbers of the Gauls, because he is justifying his attack upon them. If the Helvetii really have only 20,000 decently equipped and trained warriors tgen the threat level is far less and can probably be coped with by building fortifications as Caesar did,mand there being no need for an advance into Gaul. ( Thus no need for Caesar to build an army that could enthrone him in Rome.)
I suggest that schokars have done a poor job of extracting the social construction of societies and armies from the Greek, Roman and archeological information.
For example , if we were to assume that all free males took oart in warfare then what evidence is there of regular mustering and annual attacks on neighbours? Interestinly there is some for the Helvetii contesting against the Germans,though, of course they decide to move away to a less challenging environment. Whilst there is evidence of fighting in the rest of Gaul, how frequent and how involving is it. If we have tribes of 100,000 individuals producing armies of 20,000 then it is very different from conflict being a matter of a couple of thousand warriors or less, because the first is a war, the second a raid. I would be interested to hear the Irish experience of how such a society worked, how militarised it was and what proportion of males took part. How does a society survive when in mst years tgerebis major conflict?
Migration, as we all agree, is a different model, because there is no agricultural demand, little carpentry, no stonework , restricted smithing, little administration, so more manpower is liberated for fighting ( and wagon moving) There you would have the potential to deliver most men to the armed force.
Roy
I think the model of tribal society in which every man is a free man and every free man a warrior is probably simplistic generally. We do have survivals of tribal societies into a more literate age and these tend to be more complex structures (the Irish, the Welsh, the Frisians for example). If we took the Welsh, we would see a core of household troops (teulu) round the king who would be the standing military force. Then there were the uchelwyr, the upper class freemen, the more important of whom might have their own teulu, who were the usual military resource. Then there were the aillt/eilltion, the peasant class, who could be called on in emergencies. Then there were the unfree (kaeog/kaeth), who could be called up in a non-fighting capacity as servants and animal wranglers.
For the Thracians, we are largely dependent upon notes by Herodotus, obiter dictu by Xenophon and the occasional mention in Greek and Roman authors. The Wikipedia Odrysian article (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odrysian_kingdom) is worth reading for general orientation.
Strabo (VII.47) notes:
"Thrace as a whole consists of twenty-two tribes. But although it has been devastated to an exceptional degree, it can send into the field fifteen thousand cavalry and also two hundred thousand infantry."
I would be wary of labelling a model 'simplistic' just because it is simple - if it provides the right overall results, it is a good model.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 26, 2018, 07:52:09 PM
I would be wary of labelling a model 'simplistic' just because it is simple - if it provides the right overall results, it is a good model.
I am a bit of a loss how a "simple" model which produces the right result but misrepresents the facts could be seen as "good" let alone useful. Also, just a reminder there is more to the Thracians than their occassional mention in classical texts. Quite a bit of archaeology, for example. However, I think we've abandoned the Thracians to open a new front in the ancient numbers debate, so time to quit.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 26, 2018, 07:33:51 AM
Roy's reckoning of perhaps 1,000 sword smiths in Gaul is interesting in that it demonstrates how (assuming a 30-year lifespan for a sword, which may be on the low side) this small number of smiths can keep a million Gallic warriors or would-be warrors in swords.
Are the swords issued by the tribe or does each individual Gaul have to buy his own sword?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 27, 2018, 07:56:48 PM
Are the swords issued by the tribe or does each individual Gaul have to buy his own sword?
Good question. As far as I can determine it was more a matter of a warrior going to the smith and demanding a sword when he needed one (i.e. did not have a hand-me-down from his antecedents). The smith would produce the sword and the warrior would accept it. Exactly what else changed hands depended upon the relationship between the smith and the warrior aristocracy, i.e. were the smiths commercial entities or were they in effect retainers who operated on demand? I suspect the latter but would welcome clarification from anyone who does know.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 27, 2018, 08:11:04 AM
I am a bit of a loss how a "simple" model which produces the right result but misrepresents the facts could be seen as "good" let alone useful.
Because it produces the right result. If dumping 'the facts' on it leads it to produce the wrong result, then perhaps one needs to look more closely at 'the facts'.
QuoteAlso, just a reminder there is more to the Thracians than their occassional mention in classical texts. Quite a bit of archaeology, for example.
Yes, quite true and a good observation, albeit I am not sure how much archaeology contributes to our understanding of Thracian mobilisation potential and patterns.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 27, 2018, 08:25:46 PM
If dumping 'the facts' on it leads it to produce the wrong result, then perhaps one needs to look more closely at 'the facts'.
Have you considered a career in tabloid journalism :)
QuoteI am not sure how much archaeology contributes to our understanding of Thracian mobilisation potential and patterns.
You will recall social organisation and how we are agreed it affects military potential? Archaeologists spend a lot of time trying to work out social structures from ruins and rubbish. Burials are quite important too, especially if they demonstrate patterns of grave goods. Settlement archaeology is important for looking at the economy too and surveys of settlement distribution can help with population estimates. And, of course, it produces examples of actual weaponry for us to base our reconstructions on.
I do worry about the apparent certainty of archaeology. For example, the weapon depositions in A/S cemeteries do not appear to be nicely systematic. For example, we do not know the detailed dates and so depositions tend to be by century. Secondly we don't know how representative the kit tgat is buried is , so does this tell us that two spears and a shield are basic kit and that better off warriors had a heftier spear and sword, or do we see an approach where you were kitted for the afterlife in what was appropriate to your rank, so you might have a sword in life, but you are not buried with it unless sumptuary tradition allowed for this? Perhaps there were many free men who did not fight ( say because they followed a five hide like system for selective recruitment) but were byried with the symbols of free status. Whatnif burial was a fashion choice and some nen who actually were buried without weapons were fighters, because of incipient Christian conversion or just a change in fashion. A lot of the confidence with which we could read the analysis of grave goods has been shattered.
Increasingly I doubt whether tribal societies that had theoretical right to muster all males actually did so,mthough there were very lijely special circumstances such as;
Migration a la Cimbri, Teutones, Helvetii.
Colonisation such as the Goths in Dacia where previous provincials might have provided a class of non militarised food priducers,
Mercenary service where avtribe moves to serving as warriors abd obtaining food through pay such as the sixth century Heruls.
Roy
Burial archaeology is certainly complicated and interpretative. We must also always note that grave goods perform roles both for the dead and the living. Placing spears in a grave as a symbol of status restated your family's claim to that status. Burying a load of luxury products demonstrated your family's wealth and position.
Personally, I'm more inclined as a generalisation to see European tribes as having differing degrees of free status, with differing levels of obligation, like the Welsh (or the Frisians, or the Kentish Jutes). All freemen might have a defensive obligation and be expected to own basic weapons, but a smaller (richer? selected?) group were properly equipped and had a greater degree of experience from regular call ups. Top these off with an elite group of nobles and their households, who were primarily fighters and hierarchy officials/enforcers. So, your migrating tribe would have access to a horde of untrained, basically equipped men who would normally just be used for local defence, whereas a raiding army would be smaller but contain men with proper kit who had some idea of what they were doing.
Quote from: aligern on May 28, 2018, 09:43:35 AM
Increasingly I doubt whether tribal societies that had theoretical right to muster all males actually did so ...
It would probably depend to a great extent on how much of a threat was perceived. For example, a typical Chatti raid on the Sugambrii would probably involve a fraction of the warrior total and perhaps only the keenest and most impecunious warrior types - the one looking to add to reputation, the other to wealth. However if someone like Drusus Germanicus turns up with a third of the Empire's legions, then probably every male warm body in the tribe is going to be mustered and only the palpably unfit excluded. Emergencies of this nature would understandably be comparatively rare, and the potential for a full mobilisation would help to keep neighbours' raids short and sharp in order to be in and out before the main strength of the tribe could be mustered against them.
So I would suggest the extent of tribal mobilisation would tend to be governed by the situation. The special situations Roy outlines would lead to a tribe tapping its mobilisation potential quite thoroughly. For 'business as usual' (i.e. just endemic hostility with neighbouring tribes) I would tend to agree that something less than a full mobilisation would be the norm. This would also seem to agree with Anthony's thinking.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 28, 2018, 09:02:51 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 27, 2018, 08:25:46 PM
If dumping 'the facts' on it leads it to produce the wrong result, then perhaps one needs to look more closely at 'the facts'.
Have you considered a career in tabloid journalism :)
Low blow, sir!! But they do appear to need someone to straighten them out. :)
QuoteQuoteI am not sure how much archaeology contributes to our understanding of Thracian mobilisation potential and patterns.
You will recall social organisation and how we are agreed it affects military potential? Archaeologists spend a lot of time trying to work out social structures from ruins and rubbish. Burials are quite important too, especially if they demonstrate patterns of grave goods. Settlement archaeology is important for looking at the economy too and surveys of settlement distribution can help with population estimates. And, of course, it produces examples of actual weaponry for us to base our reconstructions on.
Roy has covered this point; I shall simply add that while archaeology can provide some information, it faces great challenges trying to provide understanding or anything like a useful, let alone complete, overall picture.. Exactly how it helps us to determine what percentage of men were of military age and how many were fielded and in what circumstances is, I suspect, rather beyond its powers. It can provide analysis of grave sites and estimate age distribution, true; it can examine mass burials containing damaged male skeletons and help us to understand the effects of weaponry; it can of course make (varying) estimates of population, but I am not sure it can answer the question of whether Strabo's figures for Thrace are accurate.
During World War II, the US mobilized about 8.5% of its total population for military service in an all out effort. That was about the limit we could mobilize without harming war production, food supplies, etc. That percentage doesn't include members of the Merchant Marine who were a vital part of the war effort.
I realize that comparing a modern, highly organized society to an ancient society may seem to be an apples to oranges comparison, but I think it illustrates the maximum percentage of a population group that can be called up for military service without harming the support available from the home front.
Of course, if an invasion is imminent that percentage can skyrocket dramatically and probably exceed the 20% mentioned previously. An examination of the preparations by the Imperial Japanese Military and their mobilization of the home islands' population will probably produce a percentage far north of 20%. you have to consider the desparation or fanaticism of the society in that case.
The US experience in WW II demonstrates that a mobilization of 10% of the total population is probably the maximum that a society can endure without harming the home front.
Quote from: Chuck the Grey on May 30, 2018, 03:41:08 AMDuring World War II, the US mobilized about 8.5% of its total population for military service in an all out effort.
The US experience in WW II demonstrates that a mobilization of 10% of the total population is probably the maximum that a society can endure without harming the home front.
Its interesting if you look at the data for Japan or Germany, because they didn't mobilize much more, and distinctly damaged the home front.
Just a quick example, but Japan's mobilization peaked at about 6mn (excluding the factory and agriculture jobs which were classified as draftees to eliminate the employees ability to leave.) which is 8.3% of a 1939 72mn home island population.
For those who wish to see the numbers debate fought out with passion and determination, I advise reading the epic thread on the mobilisation potential of Achaemenid Persian - all 75 pages :( There is some dispute whether the mobilisation potential of all societies was the same, or whether social organisation and technology play a part. So, for example, if Germany in WWI could mobilise an army in 1914 of 10% of the population, based on industrial technology and sophisticated laws on universal military service, could ancient Thrace do the same? We have not yet (in this thread at least) demonstrated enough knowledge of Thracian social structures to answer the question. Truly, I'd prefer to know more about Thracians than argue hypothetical mobilisation rates.
Quote from: Dangun on May 30, 2018, 04:54:31 AM
Its interesting if you look at the data for Japan or Germany, because they didn't mobilize much more, and distinctly damaged the home front.
The damage to the home front was inflicted more by British and American strategic bombing and naval blockade; Germany did not begin total war production until mid-1944, at which point manpower mobilisation also increased steeply. Japan began to feel the pinch from 1943, when American submarine commanders finally managed to get their torpedoes to work, and with its merchant marine being sunk in bulk suffered a raw materials crisis from mid-1944 and a food crisis from late 1944 (a significant proportion of Japan's food was imported).
It may be noted that Nazi Germany adopted a very traditional solution to the demands of their armed services for manpower: they brought in slaves from conquered countries to replace the men mobilised.
QuoteJust a quick example, but Japan's mobilization peaked at about 6mn (excluding the factory and agriculture jobs which were classified as draftees to eliminate the employees ability to leave.) which is 8.3% of a 1939 72mn home island population.
In 1945, the Japanese also mobilised a militia numbered at 28 million. While its combat capabilities were extremely limited (there is only so much you can do with a handbook and a bamboo spear) and its organisation often more theoretical than real, when added to the 6 million or so then in the regular armed services this was actualy well in excess of 20% of the total Japanese population which they rated as 80 million in January 1945. As Chuck says, "if an invasion is imminent that percentage can skyrocket dramatically and probably exceed the 20% mentioned previously". The Japanese mobilisation, (or mobilisation plans, as implementation was spotty,) represented a commitment of about 40% of population, practically the entire national manpower of all age groups.
Incidentally, in 1945 the Japanese estimated the USA had put 11,700,000 men into its armed services, with a further 60,000,000 (including women) in the labour force.
Quote from: Chuck the Grey on May 30, 2018, 03:41:08 AM
The US experience in WW II demonstrates that a mobilization of 10% of the total population is probably the maximum that a society can endure without harming the home front.
This seems to confirm the general wisdom for sustained campaigning. Seasonal campaigning can go higher manpower percentage wise provided it stays seasonal.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 30, 2018, 08:58:04 AM
There is some dispute whether the mobilisation potential of all societies was the same, or whether social organisation and technology play a part. So, for example, if Germany in WWI could mobilise an army in 1914 of 10% of the population, based on industrial technology and sophisticated laws on universal military service, could ancient Thrace do the same? We have not yet (in this thread at least) demonstrated enough knowledge of Thracian social structures to answer the question. Truly, I'd prefer to know more about Thracians than argue hypothetical mobilisation rates.
From about 470 BC the history of Thrace is to a significant extent that of the Odrysian kingdom (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odrysian_kingdom). This suffered its ups and downs, but was noted for its mobilisation of 150,000 men for an invasion of Macedonia in 429 BC. This figure is given by the sombrely conservative Thucydides, who is in the opinion of present-day historians not noted for exaggeration. The occasion also gives us a brief look at Sitalces' Thracian army.
"Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian tribes subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine and Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled south of the Danube in the neighborhood of the Euxine, who, like the Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same manner, being all mounted archers. [2] Besides these he summoned many of the Hill Thracian independent swordsmen [
makhairophorōn], called Dii and mostly inhabiting Mount Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others as volunteers; [3] also the Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the Paeonian tribes in his empire, at the confines of which these lay, extending up to the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianes and Laeaeans; there the empire of Sitalces ends and the territory of the independent Paeonians begins." - Thucydides II.96.1-3
It makes quite an interesting wargames army. :) Thucydides also has this to say about the Odrysian kingdom:
"The tribute from all the barbarian districts and the Hellenic cities, taking what they brought in under Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, who raised it to its greatest height, amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and silver. There were also presents in gold and silver to a no less amount, besides stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made not only for the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles ... It was thus a very powerful kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe between the Ionian gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians." - idem 97.3,5
Just a point on archaeological evidence, using what might be an apocryphal, but illuminating story. In WW2 Someone's expert was asked to look at the armouring of 'planes. Research was under way and an analysis of damaged aircraft showed where they had taken hits. However one of those who was examining the problem surmised that the evidence was showing the danage to planes that got back to base and a look at those that did not return drew different conclusions ( don't lose the glycol buddy the plane goes diwn in minutes). A similar illumination was provided, possibly in these pages, with reference to bayonet wounds. These are generally classified as very infrequent, but the claim was that the wound data was based upon hospital returns and thus misreported bayonet wounds as after a close combat, having had a foot of steel stuck into them, no one was going to hospital to be categorised. ( Though I still doubt that bayonets woud be crossed it looks like too easy a way to kill both combatants) That's the problem, there is a selectivity imposed by life that may not be easily apparent in the evidence.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 30, 2018, 09:17:57 AM
In 1945, the Japanese also mobilised a militia numbered at 28 million. While its combat capabilities were extremely limited (there is only so much you can do with a handbook and a bamboo spear) and its organisation often more theoretical than real, when added to the 6 million or so then in the regular armed services this was actualy well in excess of 20% of the total Japanese population which they rated as 80 million in January 1945. As Chuck says, "if an invasion is imminent that percentage can skyrocket dramatically and probably exceed the 20% mentioned previously". The Japanese mobilisation, (or mobilisation plans, as implementation was spotty,) represented a commitment of about 40% of population, practically the entire national manpower of all age groups.
I don't think this is really relevant? Firstly, Russia was invaded and didn't achieve this level of mobilization. Secondly, Germany, was invaded and didn't achieve this level of mobilization.
Lastly, bamboo spears are so irrelevant as to stretch the meaning of the word mobilization to meaninglessness.
The home front in Japan was already very damaged even before the US started bombing. Japan had introduced rationing in 1938! Metal rationing began at about the same time - melting down garden fences etc. They had also, I believe it was 1937, maybe in 1938, reduced the height limit for conscription from 5' to 4'9". 4'9"?? Things were already quite damaged.
But this is all off topic. Back to Thrace! :)
A second front in the numbers war? Going for 76 pages on the size of Thracian armies?
I hope not, but just for anyone interested in the Thucydidean number under discussion, which is:
Thuc 2.98.2-3 "Passing ever these mountains, with the Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations, many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder; so that the whole is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty thousand."
Note 'is said to' - legetai in Greek. This is one of those signal words to indicate (broadly speaking) that the author does not personally vouch for the accuracy of what he is reporting. Herodotus uses the word very frequently for the various stories he reports. Thucydides uses it less - for those interested and able to access it, see H. D. Westlake, 'LEGETAI in Thucydides', Mnemosyne 30 (1977), 345–62. To quote a summary from this:
"He [Thucydides] expresses his uncertainty in different ways, which vary in accordance with the circumstances of each case. Where he is dealing with a major event, or series of events, about which there was considerable dispute, such as the mutilation of the Hermae and the profanation of the Mysteries (VI 27-8 and 60-I), he discusses the problem fully and refers in explicit terms to the deficiencies of the evidence (cf. VI 27, 2; 60, 2 and 5) 3). There are, however, many cases where he has misgivings, or at least is unwilling to commit himself, on some more or less subsidiary point which does not appear, in his view, to call for detailed discussion. Occasionally he qualifies a statement by an admission that he is only giving his personal opinion (hos emoi dokei). Much more commonly, however, he uses the passive of lego in phrases such as hos legetai or hos elegeto with a dependent infinitive. Modern scholars have tended to regard these phrases as though they present no problems, being more or less uniform and merely conveying a feeling of uncertainty. In the following investigation I hope to show they are diverse and that, while almost all suggest some degree of uncertainty, there may be other shades of meaning which are in some cases equally or more important. Although Thucydides doubtless found them convenient, his partiality for them is unfortunate because it may engender obscurity or ambiguity and may lead his readers to regret that he has not been more explicit."
Specifically on this passage: "II 98, 3: the entire expeditionary force mobilised by Sitalces is reported to have amounted to at least 150,000 men.
Thucydides is well informed about the Odrysian kingdom, but it was clearly impossible for him to obtain an accurate figure for the strength of this ill-organised army: he describes part of it as homilos xummeiktos ['mixed multitude'] (ibid. 4), and its size can only have been roughly known even to its leaders. He might have used here his favourite term malista which so often denotes an approximation, but he evidently prefers a more emphatic expression of uncertainty. [Note] This is a passage where the use of a past tense elegeto might seem more appropriate than that of the present, but the size of the army may have continued for some years to be a subject for discussion."
So far as the logistics of the Thracians are concerned, we should note the outcome of this invasion:
Thuc 2.101.4-6: "finding that he [Sitalces] was not succeeding in any of the objects of his invasion, and that his army was without provisions and was suffering from the severity of the season, he listened to the advice of Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew and highest officer, and decided to retreat without delay. ... In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as quickly as he could."
Thanks Richard. The obvious question with Thucydides and the 150,000 Thracians was "how would he personally know in detail the breakdown of this barbarian army?". The answer is he didn't but he had heard estimates, of unknown accuracy.
We are back to testing the figures by other means (those of us from the orthodox school anyway). As we seem to be short of detail e.g. on population density, or social organisation, or movement networks we will probably have to leave it as uncertain.
The breakdown of army detailed by Patrick does suggest a widespread mustering of forces, some of which had travelled a considerable way to join up. How were these troops supported on the march to the muster point, I wonder? We might ask a similar question of other barbarian musters in widespread territory I suppose. We must assume they didn't live of the land (or not excessively so) or inter-tribal warfare would break out as they traversed other territories. I am reminded of the Frankish rule (much loved of the Bachrachs) - troops moving to a muster were entitled to grass and water. Everything else, they carried or bought en route. With a reasonable population density and and a market for surplus, this would support moderate forces quite well. Ironically, when the army breaks into enemy territory and has to live off the land, the lack of co-operation of the locals by hiding their grain and herds and, where available, holding their stores behind city walls, soon caused shortages.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 30, 2018, 12:24:03 PM
How were these troops supported on the march to the muster point, I wonder? We might ask a similar question of other barbarian musters in widespread territory I suppose. We must assume they didn't live of the land (or not excessively so) or inter-tribal warfare would break out as they traversed other territories. I am reminded of the Frankish rule (much loved of the Bachrachs) - troops moving to a muster were entitled to grass and water. Everything else, they carried or bought en route. With a reasonable population density and and a market for surplus, this would support moderate forces quite well. Ironically, when the army breaks into enemy territory and has to live off the land, the lack of co-operation of the locals by hiding their grain and herds and, where available, holding their stores behind city walls, soon caused shortages.
Also important is whether the contingent, or army, is static or on the move. If static (as the Odrysian army was while the Macedonians were negotiating), it will soon consume supplies in the locality, and the larger it is, the faster it will consume them. In this particular campaign the Macedonians were especially uncooperative, secreting their supplies in towns and using their cavalry for raids. One would imagine Thracian foraging parties being a favourite target.
On Thucydides'
legetai - evidently he had no way of validating the figure, but records this as being the common report.
"Passing ever these mountains, with the Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, [3] losing none of his army on the march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations, many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder; so that the whole is said [
legetai] to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty thousand. [4] Most of this was infantry, though there was about a third cavalry, furnished principally by the Odrysians themselves and next to them by the Getae. The most warlike of the infantry were the independent swordsmen who came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him being chiefly formidable by their numbers." - Thucydides II.98.2-4
The proportion of cavalry (1/3) is quite high, especially as Thucydides notes that the majority was furnished by the Odrysians and Getae. From Xenophon we know that cavalry were the favoured army of the Odrysians, and Thucydides further narrates that the most warlike infantry were not Odrysians but the 'makhairophoroi' (swordsmen or falx-men) from the region of Mount Rhodope. Fielding this army for battle could have been an interesting challenge.
Unlike Westlake, I would not read disbelief into the use of
legetai - Thucydides uses the word simply to report what was said, e.g. in II.18.5:
"Such were the feelings entertained towards Archidamus by his troops during the halt. He is said [legetai] to have held back in the belief that the Athenians, while their lands were still unravaged, would yield, and that the thought of allowing them to be devastated would be too much for them."
Thiis does not mean Thucydides necessarily disbelieved this motive attributed to Archidamus, or the figure for Sitalces' army; it was rumour, and he reported it as such.
It may be worth noting that the advice of Seuthes to abandon the campaign was not entirely disinterested.
"This Seuthes had been secretly gained by Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a rich dowry. [6] In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised." -
ibid. II.101.5-6
The Macedonians had fought an excellent campaign, avoiding open battle, engaging in effective harassment and suborning the chief advisor of the invading monarch with wealth and feminine pulchritude. This was combined strategy at its most effective.
Nice post Richard.
And if anyone wants a copy of Westlake's Legetai in Thucydides, I have a copy.
I think Westlake misses the point in this particular instance. As ever in history, we need to look at the context.
"It was thus a very powerful kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe between the Ionian gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom indeed no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course they are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and the arts of civilized life.
It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the field ... his army ... is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty thousand." - Thucydides II.97.5-98.
If anything, Thucydides' buildup and tone are endorsing, not doubting, the figure of 150,000.