Another one I've always been curious about. Presuming that troops need to be in a line to fight effectively, with friends on either side of them, what about the troops on the very edges? If they are even slightly overlapped they are in big trouble. Would two opposing lines adjust their frontage to match each other exactly, or would the flanks hold back in a slightly convex bow to avoid the nasty surprise of discovering that the enemy is longer than they are? (I seem to remember this being done at Hastings)
Any examples from the sources that shed light on this problem?
blimey, talk about picking all the big ones to start off with...
consider the basics of tactics.
a refused flank is much safer than an advanced one.
supporting lines cover flanks
Cavalry cover flanks.
then look at some relevant examnples.
major battles from the renaissance are not too badly documented for this, the 18th century is quite relevant, since they formed a solid line of battle, and yet did not have to many flank attacks on their ends except at the more strategic level of Frederick's Oblique (which was about a concentrated attack point, rather than an exposed flank roll-up)
but mostly, look at the Napoleonics - with division sized attacks against army sized defensive lines.
Its not as easy to nip out of your own line to gobble up an exposed flank as we sometimes think it is, and units will only do it when they are sure they will not open their own flank at the same time - hence, supporting lines etc.
look at the master of this - Hannibal - and you get a good idea of the options for and against.
a lot depends on command and control, and a lot is misunderstood (I think) becuase our first models of combat all came from hoplite battles which were two lines of men from neighbouring cities meeting at equal and agreed places and times and fighting frontally.
that has coloured a lot of what most historians expected to find subsequently. Even the shieldwall, Hastings (able to anchor flanks on terrain) apart, I'm not at all sure that there is a safe comparison with equal and continuous lines as we understand them to be made there.
Overlapping shileds, sure - but one single line of battle?
not so much.
for a body of men to get between another body of men, and then turn in on its flank, it has to know that the turn will not expose itself to the same problem.
that alone makes the necessity for a single solid continuous line become unecessary.
and once you get your head around the idea that both sides are a series of groups of men a mutually supporting distance apart rather than a single line - and that both sides groups of men will need to pullback from the fight regularly for physical reasons, a lot more possibilities open up.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 20, 2012, 12:24:37 PM
Would two opposing lines adjust their frontage to match each other exactly...
Thucydides' classic passage on "rightward drift" (V.71) shows that even lines that did at the start match each other might not avoid the overlapping issue.
QuoteAll armies are alike in this: on going into action they get forced out rather on their right wing, and one and the other overlap with this their adversary's left; because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the better will he be protected. The man primarily responsible for this is the first upon the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes the rest follow him.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 20, 2012, 12:24:37 PM
Another one I've always been curious about. Presuming that troops need to be in a line to fight effectively, with friends on either side of them, what about the troops on the very edges? If they are even slightly overlapped they are in big trouble.
Overlapping in a real battle seems far more difficult in real life than on a wargames table - a quick pivot of the end element and you're in:) . Secondly, if you look at medieval battles (which I will 'cos you mentioned Hastings), there is a lot of effort put into having a battlefield where the enemy come at you from the front. The real danger is not a bit of argy-bargy on the ends but a sweeping move round your flank and behind you. You see this in late medieval battle plans where part of the force is sent to outflank (Somme Plan 1415, Burgundian Plan 1417) - some real life examples include Poitiers, Castagnaro and Othee. A third point is you can stretch the line to prevent your flank being turned only to find you weaken the centre for a break through, so there is a balance point. There is some Viking stuff about this (e.g. the legendary battle of Bravellir) but we also discussed examples of it in the thread on tactics of medieval men-at-arms.
There is also the matter of human orientation - it is much easier for the man on the end to line up against the opponent on the end than to, as it were, progress in vacuo. Psychologically, men want to look at their opponents, and this is easier if they are in front of them. This could well result in an army that deploys with wings overlapping its foe actually narrowing down to its opponent's frontage as it advances unless it has something else to orient itself on, e.g. large, spectacular banners or standards.
That said, if when the lines met one overlapped the other (as Duncan pointed out hoplite battles did this quite often) the overlapped line tended to lose (invariably lost in a hoplite battle unless 50 deep and commanded by Epaminondas). A variation on the theme showing just how vunerable 'gapped' lines are occurred at First Mantinea in 418 BC, when the Spartan commander tried to make some last-minute adjustments to his line and succeeded in extending it but not in filling the resultant gaps. The 'gapped' contingents were swarmed from three sides and went down like ninepins.
"As soon as they came to close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and bursting in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed breach in their line cut up and surrounded the Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there." - Thucydides V.72.3
Patrick
So the bottom line is: if there's something to cover the flanks, like cavalry or a second line, they're fine; if there isn't, they get chewed.
Which does make one wonder if linear formations had some drill or deployment that protected the flanks such as stationing a small guard unit just behind the flank. If overlapping in even a tiny way (shades of DBM) is so devastating then everyone is going to aim to do it, yet clearly we do not have lots of battles decided by one side having ten more men on a flank than the other.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on December 22, 2012, 10:08:04 AM
If overlapping in even a tiny way (shades of DBM) is so devastating then everyone is going to aim to do it, yet clearly we do not have lots of battles decided by one side having ten more men on a flank than the other.
Roy
While I can't say we've bottomed this one, I do think it is clear that small overlaps on the very edges of the line aren't battle winners. They may convey some small local advantage but the real dangerous flanking moves are by having either units who have no opponents to the front who can turn a line or detached flanking forces ditto.
Also, given that the average infantry deployment through much of pre-gunpowder history sdeems to work out at about ten deep, give or take a few men, I think the real damage done by an outflanker is when he starts wrapping round the rear. The reason is that if one has, say, ten men outflanking and they line up obediently against the ten men on the outside of the line and stab them in the dextral vulnerability zone, that is ten men gone down. This is going to take some time to make any impression on a defender deployed 1,000 men wide, though it would be very bad news for, say, a 100-man subunit, especially if it happened on both of the subunit's flanks.
Wrapping round the rear is far more dangerous. The rear ranks have to face about, removing impetus, support and morale from the front ranks. The unit is squeezed from front, flank and rear, the men becoming compressed together and unable to use shield or weapon effectively. The attackers can bite off a chunk, swallow it and, if nothing intervenes to stop them, move on to the next.
As Justin says, if you have flank cover this cannot happen. If not, a wrap around the rear creates real problems for the defender. A slow mastication up the flank alone is cost-effective but would take so long to have any serious effect that it is probably best considered as a casualty-increaser with respect to the main melee than as a decisive element on its own.
Getting down to the individual level, one would imagine that the file being flanked would turn to meet their attackers, with the exception of the chap squeezed in the corner who would perhaps try to adopt a half-way stance to face off against his foes to front and flank (I would not give much for his chances). The file just inward from the one flanked would be looking over their shoulders. Remaining files would probably carry on as usual after one glance towards the source of the noise.
If we work on the principle that soldiers would automatically face the most immediate threat, we shall probably not go far wrong. This will result in a flanked unit having its outermost men face their new opponents, and they will fight at something of a disadvantage, lacking impetus, supporting ranks and, in the case of the chap in the corner, an extra weapon and shield arm. When outflankers start pouring round the rear, the picture becomes much worse for the defenders. Even assuming everyone on the outside faces their immediate foe (the corner chaps having two) the unit starts to get compressed between the opponents to front and rear with weapon use starting to become impossible, the file on the flank cannot be supported, all of which means the unit becomes as helpless as sardines in a net.
At least that is how I see it.
Patrick
Yes, that is how I would see it as well. Just one thing about the sardine compression effect - surely the chaps in the front who are doing the fighting don't suffer from this? All that happens is that they cannot recoil. If they are fighting then their opponents will continue to give them a healthy space.
I suspect though that the inability to recoil will hamper their fighting technique - they cannot dodge blows, enabling their opponent to stick them the moment he has an opening.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 23, 2012, 07:54:53 AM
Yes, that is how I would see it as well. Just one thing about the sardine compression effect - surely the chaps in the front who are doing the fighting don't suffer from this?
But they would suffer being pushed forward onto their opponents in an uncontrolled manner. This may be OK if they are winning, with the enemy yielding ground but if not - if they are held or being pushed back - it will be murder (possibly quite literally).
An army taken in the rear has a huge psycholological deficit. Onlty a small force appearing behind you could well destabilise a whole line as Totila does at the Po battle with just 300 men.
Also compression does have an effct on fighting ability. to cite another thread here on Roman fighting technique, there is a lot going on in the battle line with groups moving backwards and forwards and being able to retire and mutually rest or replace. Once physically compressed that cannot take place and the teamwork that is necessary for effective combat breaks down and then you start to lose the fight, heart and hope.
Roy
Plus the possibility of 'friendly stab' when men and weapons are squeezed together, as seems to have happened at Adrianople.
Around 1410, Christine de Pisan wrote
Two great evils .... can follow from a disordered formation:one is that enemies can easily break into it; the other is that the formations may be so compressed that they cannot fight. Thus it is important to keep the formation in ranks and tight and joined together like a wall
Five years later the French at Agincourt delivered a practical demonstration. The French main van had been halted by their English opponents. They may have recovered from this and gone on to win except for the fact that their main battle advanced straight into their rear. The front ranks, unable to advance or go back found them fighting in a pile of their own dead and wounded. At the same time, they were under attack from archers on the flanks, so their ranks were compressed laterally too. Soon men were unable to lift their weapons and were slaughtered where they stood. At the earlier battle of Roosebeke (1382), the Flemings were completely hemmed in by the French and suffered the same fate (this is probably the battle that de Pisans comment is most influenced by). At Roosebeke, when the piles of dead were picked apart, it was noted many had no wounds - they had been crushed to death.
This is what commanders were afraid of - that their army would deteriorate from a fighting force into a helpless mob, whose very numbers were a danger to itself.
I suspect that what happens at the flank of line would largely depend upon the type of troops being outflanked. For example, a group of skirmishers would probably react differently to a phalanx of spearmen. (Run away versus form square/schiltron.)
Some time ago it was argued in Slingshot that the Romans switched from hoplite type formations/fighting methods to the blade/pilum as a resulting of facing hordes of hairy barbarian type who regularly outflanked them, but I know of no rule set that reflects this.
Similarly, medieval knights did not seem to be too concerned about their flanks when charging into an enemy provided they have a safe haven of spearmen, etc, to rally behind afterwards.
Hope this helps...
Another factor we have not really considered is the movement dimension. On the tabletop, units teleport from one position to another with the aid of a tape measure, and bases can then trickle round a stationary flank. In real life one has two masses of men colliding with impetus, noise, dust and above all a somewhat fluid situation as lines heave back and forth, men shout, trumpets blow and everyone tries to keep focussed on a changing situation.
While the situation is dynamic - one or both sides are moving and everyone is still evaluating what is going on - soldiers are going to stay put rather than move out to a potential outflanking position (unless the manoeuvre has been re-planned, which is not easy unless you know just how wide your opponent's army will be, as Hannibal seems to have done at Cannae). Once things get stuck into a pattern (like the French at Agincourt, who provided the English with a large immobile column's open flanks) it becomes much easier for officers to order, and troops to perform without apprehension, effective flanking manoeuvres.
Hence in a situation like Hastings, with Normans surging forwards, a short but sharp melee at the shieldwall and then a flowing back of the repulsed attackers, there is not going to be the time nor the permanence of positional and psychological orientation for that base of Blades to swivel onto the flank of the Knights. However in a a hoplite battle, as soon as the lines have clashed the situation is no longer dynamically changing and the outflankers on the right know exactly what to do, having a tradition that has covered this situation many times before. As Nick points out, the troop type can make a significant difference.
The Romans can move around a lank because thy have small units wit commanders of those units who can take action with one initiative. Others, hoplites, Gauls etc do not have the substructure o break he line at a point and swing a unit around.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on June 06, 2013, 08:55:43 PM
The Romans can move around a lank because thy have small units wit commanders of those units who can take action with one initiative. Others, hoplites, Gauls etc do not have the substructure o break he line at a point and swing a unit around.
Roy
This is precisely my point. We all know (or at least assume) that this is what happened. However, the rules we use to recreate this on the wargaming table tend not to reflect this. Indeed, the only concession I can recall being made with respect to a target's flanks is in earlier (ie, up to ca 1992) rules where there was typically 1 figure overlap on a shielded flank and 3 figures on an unshielded one.
Surely we should be able to be more sophisticated than this?
Nick
I'm not sure i agree with you Nick, it depends on the rules.
the point is not individual men within a unit overlapping - and frankly, the evidence for anyone being prepared to step out of their ranks to be the overlapper is pretty dubious becuase of the personal risk to the man.
Its the unit itself overlapping that matters.
And then you are looking at larger units being pinned by these smaller units, while another smaller unit seeks a chance to come around the flank of the large unit.
I see that in quite a few rules - just not the ones which force frontages to conform on contact.
Quote from: Mark G on June 07, 2013, 04:05:51 PM
Its the unit itself overlapping that matters.
And then you are looking at larger units being pinned by these smaller units, while another smaller unit seeks a chance to come around the flank of the large unit.
As you say, this is the heart of the disagreement. I believe it is not only the unit doing the overlap that is important, but also that the unit being overlapped should also affect the outcome. The type of unit will affect their response.
Your example of small units pinning much larger ones (as favoured by quite a few players of WRG 7th and FoG to name but two examples) adds further weight to my argument. I mean, is a unit of mounted troops really going to be too concerned about a small group of any infantry type ambling around in their flank, rear, wherever, providing they are not already engaged with enemy to front or totally surrounded?
Indeed - how often do we hear of cavalry being outflanked by infantry? The reaction time of cavalry is far superior (as a rule) and if they notice infantry trying to trickle round their flank then the usual response would be to pull back a bit from whatever they are doing or thinking of doing and ride down the errant foot, or at least chase them back into position.
Actually there was one case when cavalry did get outflanked by infantry: Lucullus vs Tigranes at Tigranocerta, 69 BC: Lucullus sent his cavalry round Tigranes' right flank and the Armenian cataphracts obligingly redeployed to face them, whereupon Lucullus led a rapid advance by his infantry left, which was now perforce facing the flank of the cataphracts, and the latter broke and ran out of sheer surprise as much as anything else.
This was, of course, cheating, but it is worth noting that for it to work the cataphracts had to be pinned by a contingent faster/more lively/more reactive than themselves.
It may be that the concept of 'flexibility', 'reactivity' or whatever it eventually gets called - basically the ability of a unit to take action to nullify or ameliorate a threat to its flank - is worth building into rules to reflect what could and could not be done by certain types against certain types.
There seem to be three types of flanking being discussed at the moment
1. Overlap on the flank of an engaged unit
2. A unit being outflanked while pinned in combat to the front
3. A unit being outflanked while being pinned by threat to the front
I'd suggest 1 is a different thing for rules to capture - it is at a different level of tactics. I do remember the old 3:1 overlaps and in more recent times single element overlaps. But it seems to me that these were abstractions based on "it must have been a disadvantage that the ends of a unit were overlapped" without a clear rationale of what is being modelled. If A overlaps B, are we saying that the men on the ends of A will rush forward to attack on B's flank? Do that many extra A soldiers get into combat, or are we modelling a disruptive effect on B? Does the same thing happen in all situations or just where A and B are on the end of the line or meet one-on-one outside a formal battleline? The usual plea goes out for detailed examples.
Personally, I think it is an interesting question of how far the evidence will take us.
Well Nick, you have to get your head around the concept of non continuous melee before you can get anywhere with this.
if you cannot understand the concept of units breaking apart by mutual consent to rest before re engaging, then you are always going to see front lines meeting and then a lot of men hanging around with no one in front of them - and therefore assume that those men must want to put themselves in great danger in order to win the battle.
Personally, I think this is nonsense. as men, they must rest. as units, they will agree to separate mutually to allow that rest to happen.
Therefore, those men who happen to find themselves without an opponent during a melee are going to be happy to be out of the risk for that flurry far more than they are going to be looking through all the dust and violence for a chance to turn someone's flank.
its different when an entire formation finds itself unengaged, then there is a chance for a local commander to look for an opportunity. but the most basic thing any fighting man is going to be aught, is to remain in the ranks. and that is going to stay with them.
it works the other way also - your unit makes its attack - there are men overlapping on the edges, that's not the concern, as the corner guys just remain that half step back again.
remember also, once you start to make your inward turn, you are now facing the side of the enemy - and your side is facing where you expect the rest of the enemy army to be. you have to be quite certain that there is no chance of anything coming up on you before you make that turn.
no individual is going to do that, especially in the middle of a line.
It is also a matter of fighting style. There are various advantages and disadvantages to beiing closed up as opposed to loosely ordered and vice versa. Closed up pike get two to three men fighting against a looser ordered Roman, but the Roman can dance in and out, parrying and seeking advantage, the pike are immobile. The soldiers also work together in their formations, they protect each other and seek to take out opponents by ganging up on them. So individual actions (pike have least chance of and Romans most) are actively dangerous to the formation as a. Whole if they b
Eak the pattern of team fighting. Hence the soldiers stay in line. Beyond that, to form to flank, there must be a commander who can order it and a unit that can perform the manoeuvre. Wheeling is quite hard on the parade ground, it must be even harder on a battlefield. As Mark says the unit that is wheeling will have to detach from units either side of it , march forward, wheel, potentially in front of an enemy reserve that it cannot see and then attack. If it falls into disorder and a rescuing cavalry unit appears, which it could do in seconds! Then those men are doomed.
For me the big risk in ancient warfare is falling into disorder because that will dramatically reduce fighting effectiveness. Even the Gauls and Germans form up close for mutual protection and assistance.
Thus I can see why the 'old' overlaps rule was a good one because having a longer line is a definite advantage. The men at the end of the overlapped line must hold back and that disrupts the formation of the men next to them and they are more likely to lose because of that. Overlapping is not a killer advantage on its own , whereas a full blown flank attack is a big advantage, but that is hard to bring off because a whole unit must get around the flank, most likely starting from some point behind the enemy flank and that is hard to arrange.
Roy
An example comes to me from my own rules.
I remember on one occasion a unit of Numidian light cavalry charging a unit of Republican Roman legionaries. I decided the Romans did not even need to bother to throw their pila to see off the Numidians (back in those days pila were one-shot weapons that needed to be re-supplied to use again) and much to my surprise the Romans were massacred. Afterwards I thought about it and rationalised it like this, the Romans were isolated and the Numidians (in real life) would have been able to envelop and surround the Romans. In game terms a unit is allowed to add up to three figures per flank in combat against a stationary enemy, so the Numidians effectively doubled the number of figures they had fighting.
But (in the Die is Cast) against an enemy who is themselves charging or in square, the overlap allowed is only one figure on each side. So a moving foe is hard to overlap.
I think what convinced me about the advantage of a longer line, is the battle of Zama where Scipio seeing that Hannibals line was longer than his own, formed all three lines of Roman heavy infantry to extend his own line. So there had to be some advantage in being able to overlap the enemy. But note at that point in the battle, the cavalry of both sides is off doing their own things.
But so long as the battleline is fairly continuous there are only two places that the enemy are going to be able to get that advantage.
Some little time ago the then Slingshot Editor (the redoubtable John Graham-Leigh) invited members to refight Alfred the Great's famous battle of Eddington 878 assuming equal forces of 5,000 warriors per side. Attached is something I scribbled at the time that may illustrate the difficulty in translating history onto the wargames table. Yes, I know that for most of you WRG 7th is not your favourite rule set, but you get much the same results under say, DBx, and it highlights the key issues of this discussion nicely.
Essentially the problem you face is that the Saxons and Vikings can match up fairly well frontally, but the Vikings form up in a shallower formation and, hence, always outflank their opponents, which is where all the decisive action ends up. The Vikings always have the advantage here and are therefore odds-on to win.
So there you have it. How would you craft the rules that save Alfred's cakes?
Quote from: NickHarbud on June 09, 2013, 03:44:59 PM
Essentially the problem you face is that the Saxons and Vikings can match up fairly well frontally, but the Vikings form up in a shallower formation and, hence, always outflank their opponents, which is where all the decisive action ends up. The Vikings always have the advantage here and are therefore odds-on to win.
Given parity in numbers and the fact that the two sides used similar battle formations, why should the Saxons form a shorter line? Is this a rules created problem? We know in early medieval warfare that armies worried about being outflanked might thin their line to widen their front but there is a trade off by making them prone to breakthrough. Indeed, medieval cavalry might close up tight confonted with a long line with the intention of smashing through the centre before the wings could envelop them. Similarly, the Scandinavian pigsnout formation as described by Saxo Grammaticus was for punching through the enemy, while echeloning back the remaining troops to prevent envelopment. So, using period tactics, I would suggest Alfred either conformed his line and trusted to being able to outfight his opponents or he echeloned back his forces on either flank and tried to settle the outcome in the centre, leading with his hearthtroop, before the Viking wings could overcome his wings.
Quote from: Erpingham on June 09, 2013, 04:12:37 PM
Given parity in numbers and the fact that the two sides used similar battle formations, why should the Saxons form a shorter line? Is this a rules created problem?
Hi Tony,
It is a rules problem in as much as most rule sets require spearmen to form in two element ranks whereas axemen form in one, so even assuming the same number of axemen as spearmen in an element (a fairly rash assumption) the axemen elements will always have a wider frontage than the spearmen.
Having said that, in real life one might expect that axemen would form in a shallower formation with greater individual frontage than a body of spearmen, so one cannot simply place all the blame with current rule writers.
What I am trying to illustrate here is a real battle which seemed to have at least one indisputably open flank and the difficulties faced by the close-order wargames player in trying to achieve a historical outcome. I do not have a solution to offer. All I suggest is that we need to think of some radical mechanisms to simulate what went on.
Quote from: NickHarbud on June 09, 2013, 05:50:58 PM
It is a rules problem in as much as most rule sets require spearmen to form in two element ranks whereas axemen form in one, so even assuming the same number of axemen as spearmen in an element (a fairly rash assumption) the axemen elements will always have a wider frontage than the spearmen.
This may be the problem. I wouldn't make as big of a distinction in armament - both sides would be spear-armed shieldwall infantry. So numbers of ranks etc. wouldn't be an issue.
In terms of deployment, it is an interesting question whether the Vikings would be so confident that they would draw up half the depth of the Saxons in the real battle for reasons already stated. We can also refer back to some of the earlier messages in this thread - how quickly could a big, hinged outflanking move deliver the critical advantage, compared with the speed your opponent could cave in your centre.
I have been to Edington, I configure it as an ambush with the Saxons coming down a wooded slope at the Danes!
Roy
OK my take on the battle. Considering how it plays under different rules systems. Under some rules heavy infantry would form up in slightly denser formation than the loose order but similarly armoured Vikings, giving slightly wider frontage to the Vikings. But I suggest that in Shieldwall the Vikings would have been (in real life) as densely packed as the Saxons.
But if you go for elements, you would get roughly the same number of elements with no difference of frontage for either side. So if the rules give an advantage for two ranks of spearmen, thats the only reason that the Saxon line would be shorter. However would the advantage of the supporting rank of spears outweigh the disadvantage of being out-flanked?
Under my rules there is little advantage to either side, the Saxons are armed with javelins (perhaps with swords as well) and hit the Vikings on a 4 or less (on a D12). Vikings with axes would be hitting on 5 or less. No advantage (in terms of fighting ability) for javelin armed troops to fight in a deeper formation, just a greater ability to take losses. If the Vikings were fighting uphill then the advantage would be with the Saxons.
I found this podcast which suggests that Alfreds army was 4,500 - 5,000 strong as opposed to Guthrums 3,500?
http://podbay.fm/show/463700741/e/1112860800
In his book Lost Battles, Phil Sabin makes the comment that massive combat bonuses for flank or rear attacks may be exaggerated (pages 54-55). As examples, Prof. Sabin mentions the battles of Ibera, where the Romans handled encirclements after routing their frontal opponents, and Telamon and Ruspina where troops fought for a long time despite having enemies to their front and rear.
Prof. Sabin does believe that certain types of any troops seem to be more vulnerable to attacks from other directions. He points out that the Spartans rolled up several hoplite units from their unshielded flank at 1st Mantinea, Nemea and 2nd Coronea. Prof. Sabin also mentions the emphasis that Polybius and Livy place on the vulnerability of phalangites to flank or rear attacks. He also feels this vulnerability to flank and rear attacks was probably also true for close-order archers if the enemy could evade the "beaten zone" of the arrows.
Prof. Sabin's conclusion is that attacks by heavy infantry on hoplites, phalangites and close order archers would seem to justify a modest combat bonus. In his game Lost Battles, a flank or rear attack rear attack on those types of units merits a +1 bonus of the die roll.
So the question is, do you agree with Prof. Sabin's analysis and if you do, do you think wargame rules need to be modified to reflect this reduce combat effect?
If you get into Prof Sabins earlier papers (pPlenty from me and Roy on this in the next two slingshots, I am afraid to say), he gets right into the detail of this, and concludes that it is the surprise which is the effect, not the flank itself.
I was reading Ross Cowan's osprey battle tactics over the weekend (by far a better book that the one on the republican battle tactics, which surprised me as I much prefer that period of Rome). Anyway, that has loads of examples of Romans (expecially Caesar) changing the battle line, simplex, duplex lines depending on the width of the enemy, of detaching the entire third line to face to flank, or forming orbis mid battle to counter encirclement etc.
In each of those, Caesar (etc) can see the threat coming, and has time to anticipate it and reconfigure the legions to face it.
That is the level of command and control that most ancient armies do not have - and we see the same thing with helenistic armies. if they have time to react to a threat to flank or rear, they do so quite happily. when an army does not have that - either because the threat emerges too swiftly (cavalry, ambush), or because they cannot communicate this to the threatened point - then the army falls apart.
Sabin has a term for this which escapes me, but is basically the necessity in any model of warfare of having a reason for the battle to be won.
Surprising new threats, loss of the general, total exhaustion - that pretty much sums up all ancient battles turning from a contest into a victory. hardly ever from simply being better at fighting frontally (e.g. Rome breaking straight through at the loss at trebia - a frontal victory on the table, but a lost battle)
If you can represent that on your table, the adaptability of an army or not to a new threat, you are on to a winner.
I have just been reading some books on Mongol battles. In those they use just about every trick you can think of to bring victory.
Some troops seem especially vulnerable to being attacked in the flank (I think particularly of phalangites). That can be provided for by having lighter troops or cavalry protecting the flanks.
So troops that require to maintain a particular formation (say phalanx or shieldwall) should be particularly degraded if attacked in the flank or rear (in a good set of rules).
I'm pretty sure that a forewarned phalanx of either description would be quite happy to have some rear ranks face backwards.
flanks, however...
This all seems to be pointing towards the effectiveness of flank attacks being in inverse proportion to troops' ability to react effectively to them.
In Gallic War II.25 the Nervii attack Caesar's right.
"Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy, though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis."
The Nervii are coming in "in front, and ... on both flanks" and we see 1) defenders pushed too closely together to fight effectively, 2) increased casualties, particularly among officers and 3) a significant drop in morale. These seem to be the effects of the Nervii's flank attacks, because the frontal attacks by the Atrebates and Viromandui against the Roman left and centre were repelled with relative ease.
Once Caesar managed to redispose his troops to counter the Nervii's flanking dispositions, matters stabilised and Roman superiority in equipment and training soon reasserted itself. Labienus sent the 10th legion to assist and the two legions with the baggage turned up, catching the Nervii in a nutcracker - and from then it was the Nervii who were flanked and without insight, command, training and discipline comparable to Caesar and his men they had no answer except to keep on fighting, so were piling up their corpses on the battlefield for the rest of the battle.
And indeed some other classic flank attacks,
Trasimene
Quote[22.5]In the universal panic, the consul displayed all the coolness that could be expected under the circumstances. The ranks were broken by each man turning towards the discordant shouts; he re-formed them as well as time and place allowed, and wherever he could be seen or heard, he encouraged his men and bade them stand and fight. "It is not by prayers or entreaties to the gods that you must make your way out," he said, "but by your strength and your courage. It is the sword that cuts a path through the middle of the enemy, and where there is less fear there is generally less danger." But such was the uproar and confusion that neither counsel nor command could be heard, and so far was the soldier from recognising his standard or his company or his place in the rank, that he had hardly sufficient presence of mind to get hold of his weapons and make them available for use, and some who found them a burden rather than a protection were overtaken by the enemy. In such a thick fog ears were of more use than eyes; the men turned their gaze in every direction as they heard the groans of the wounded and the blows on shield or breastplate, and the mingled shouts of triumph and cries of panic. Some who tried to fly ran into a dense body of combatants and could get no further; others who were returning to the fray were swept away by a rush of fugitives. At last, when ineffective charges had been made in every direction and they found themselves completely hemmed in, by the lake and the hills on either side, and by the enemy in front and rear, it became clear to every man that his only hope of safety lay in his own right hand and his sword. Then each began to depend upon himself for guidance and encouragement, and the fighting began afresh, not the orderly battle with its three divisions of principes, hastati, and triarii, where the fighting line is in front of the standards and the rest of the army behind, and where each soldier is in his own legion and cohort and maniple. Chance massed them together, each man took his place in front or rear as his courage prompted him, and such was the ardour of the combatants, so intent were they on the battle, that not a single man on the field was aware of the earthquake which levelled large portions of many towns in Italy, altered the course of swift streams, brought the sea up into the rivers, and occasioned enormous landslips amongst the mountains.
And Cannae
QuoteWithout a moment's pause they followed up their broken and hastily retreating foe till they took to headlong flight. Cutting their way through the mass of fugitives, who offered no resistance, they penetrated as far as the Africans who were stationed on both wings, somewhat further back than the Gauls and Spaniards who had formed the advanced centre. As the latter fell back the whole front became level, and as they continued to give ground it became concave and crescent-shaped, the Africans at either end forming the horns. As the Romans rushed on incautiously between them, they were enfiladed by the two wings, which extended and closed round them in the rear. On this, the Romans, who had fought one battle to no purpose, left the Gauls and Spaniards, whose rear they had been slaughtering, and commenced a fresh struggle with the Africans. The contest was a very one-sided one, for not only were they hemmed in on all sides, but wearied with the previous fighting they were meeting fresh and vigorous opponents.
Polybius 3:65
"The cavalry charged each other front to front, and for a long time maintained an equal contest ...
The Numidian horse, however, having outflanked the Romans, charged them on the rear: ...
while the front ranks originally engaged with the Carthaginians, after losing many of their men and inflicting a still greater loss on the enemy, finding themselves charged on the rear by the Numidians, broke into flight: most of them scattering in every direction, while some of them kept closely massed round the Consul. "
Polybius 11.1
"Meanwhile Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found himself unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the rough ground in front of him ...
He withdrew his men from the right wing, and marched them on the rear of the field of battle; and, after passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to this point the victory had been doubtful; for both sides fought with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike; for finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a crossfire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut down on the ground"
Livy 21.55
"and Mago and his Numidians, as soon as the Roman army had passed their ambuscade without observing it, started up in their rear, and caused the wildest panic and confusion."
22.48
"About five hundred Numidians, who, in addition to their customary arms and missiles, carried swords concealed under their corslets, pretended to desert. [3] Riding over from their own side, with their bucklers at their backs, they suddenly dismounted and threw down bucklers and javelins at the feet of their enemies. Being received into the midst of their ranks they were conducted to the rear and ordered to fall in behind. [4] And while the battle was getting under way at every point, they kept quite still; but no sooner were the minds and eyes of all absorbed in the struggle, than they snatched up the shields which lay strewn about everywhere amongst the heaps of slain, and assailing the Romans from behind and striking at their backs and hamstrings, effected a great slaughter and a terror and confusion that were even greater. [5] And now in one place there was a panic rout and in another an obstinate though hopeless struggle,1 "
25.34
"But the Numidian cavalry, whose notice the general had thought he had escaped, by outflanking them inspired great alarm, and in addition, when they had entered a fresh battle with the Numidians, a third enemy also arrived, the Carthaginian generals, who from the rear overtook them when already engaged. [10] And the Romans found themselves between two battles, uncertain against which enemy and in which direction they should choose to break through in a mass. "
27.1
"But Hannibal gave the order to his cavalry, that when the infantry lines should have concentrated the eyes and attention of the enemy upon the immediate conflict, they should turn the flanks and attack, some of them the enemy's camp, some the rear of the wavering troops. [9] ...
For when many of the Romans had fallen in the close contact of the lines during [11??] the infantry battle, while the ranks and standards nevertheless held their ground, the wild charge of the cavalry was heard in the rear, and at the same time the shouts of the enemy from the camp. This routed first the sixth legion, which was posted in the second line and was the first to be thrown into disorder by the Numidians; and then it routed the fifth legion and the men who were with the front-line standards. [12] Some scattered in flight, some were slain in the centre of the battle,"
30.35
"At the right moment Laelius and Masinissa, who had pursued the routed cavalry for a considerable distance, returned and dashed into the rear of the enemy's line. That charge of the cavalry finally worsted the enemy. [2] Many were overpowered [p. 499]and slain in the battle-line, many were scattered in 1 flight over the open plain all around, and as the cavalry were in complete possession, they perished everywhere"
Sabin, Mechanics of Battle
(some formatting oddities, but it should come out OK)
"I suspect that the explanation for the deadly effect of flank and rear attacks lies in a
combination of factors which I have already mentioned. For one thing, attacks from two or
more directions at once would catastrophically disrupt the cohesion of the affected formation,
making it impossible for the ranks and files to exert coordinated pressure in either direction,
and depriving them of the flexibility to withdraw to a comfortable 'safety distance' without
squeezing into a congested and helpless mass. ''
The importance of simultaneous pressure
from two directions in causing this disruption is shown by the fact that some Roman
legionaries escaped the consequences of encirclement at the Trebia and Lake Trasimene, and
actually won the battle of Ibera, when they were able to defeat their frontal opponents before
the flank and rear attacks could take full effect."'
In addition, onslaughts from flank or rear would have a pronounced moral impact, with the
attackers being encouraged and with the defenders being rudely surprised by the unexpected
direction of the attack, especially those in the new 'front line', who would not have prepared
themselves psychologically for this highly dangerous position.
I't is interesting that when
troops were properly prepared to fight enemies to both front and rear, as at Telamon and in
Caesar's battle against Labienus in Africa, they could do so much more effectively, moreover
usually, the onslaught would come as a nasty shock, and one can easily see the troops involved
panicking, trying to flee, and being cut down from behind as they ran."
Quote from: Erpingham
This may be the problem. I wouldn't make as big of a distinction in armament - both sides would be spear-armed shieldwall infantry. So numbers of ranks etc. wouldn't be an issue.
In terms of deployment, it is an interesting question whether the Vikings would be so confident that they would draw up half the depth of the Saxons in the real battle for reasons already stated. We can also refer back to some of the earlier messages in this thread - how quickly could a big, hinged outflanking move deliver the critical advantage, compared with the speed your opponent could cave in your centre.
Quote from: Justin Taylor
OK my take on the battle. Considering how it plays under different rules systems. Under some rules heavy infantry would form up in slightly denser formation than the loose order but similarly armoured Vikings, giving slightly wider frontage to the Vikings. But I suggest that in Shieldwall the Vikings would have been (in real life) as densely packed as the Saxons.
But if you go for elements, you would get roughly the same number of elements with no difference of frontage for either side. So if the rules give an advantage for two ranks of spearmen, thats the only reason that the Saxon line would be shorter. However would the advantage of the supporting rank of spears outweigh the disadvantage of being out-flanked?
Under my rules there is little advantage to either side, the Saxons are armed with javelins (perhaps with swords as well) and hit the Vikings on a 4 or less (on a D12). Vikings with axes would be hitting on 5 or less. No advantage (in terms of fighting ability) for javelin armed troops to fight in a deeper formation, just a greater ability to take losses. If the Vikings were fighting uphill then the advantage would be with the Saxons.
I found this podcast which suggests that Alfreds army was 4,500 - 5,000 strong as opposed to Guthrums 3,500?
Forgive me, but all this strikes me as trying to avoid the question of how we deal with flanks on a wargames table by arguing that either the element types are incorrect or the scenario is badly posed or that one side should form up in a less than optimal formation. I would really prefer to concentrate on the problem, but these arguments cannot go unanswered.
1. The element types are those defined by the authors for the rule sets quoted.
2. The scenario as posed generally produces balanced points armies. (Incidentally, Roy's suggestion of an ambush is appealing given what happened at Stamford Bridge. However, not only was the scenario posed differently, but such an ambush is difficult to recreate under the rules unless one assumes a night attack or something similar.)
3. No wargamer and by implication Viking or Saxon general, would be this stupid. Under the rules quoted, the spearmen have to be in two ranks to withstand the frontal attack of the foaming axemen. In real life, I doubt if even the most heroic, I-will-never-make-it-to-Valhalla-without-slaying-my-enemy-frontally head banger would pass up the opportunity of an enemy who cannot fight back.
Incidentally, thanks to the wonders of march moves, loose elements can wander around the open flank of a pinned element and be in contact within 2-3 moves.
Quote from: NickHarbud on June 10, 2013, 06:39:56 PM
Forgive me, but all this strikes me as trying to avoid the question of how we deal with flanks on a wargames table by arguing that either the element types are incorrect or the scenario is badly posed or that one side should form up in a less than optimal formation. I would really prefer to concentrate on the problem, but these arguments cannot go unanswered.
Apologies Nick, but your original question was about crafting rules to save Alfred's cakes. So the replies were rule based, not history based. In general terms, I'm sure there is plenty to be getting on with in the proceeding posts. In particular, the role of confusion and disorientation when troops are suddenly attacked from the "wrong" direction and whether certain troop types were more prone than others is a useful observation. It strikes me that a shieldwall, like a phalanx, is designed for action to the front and has poor awareness of what is going on other than straight ahead (and if you are in the middle not even that) so would be quite prone to be rolled up, which would explain the recorded concern about not having a line much shorter than the enemy.
Quote3. No wargamer and by implication Viking or Saxon general, would be this stupid. Under the rules quoted, the spearmen have to be in two ranks to withstand the frontal attack of the foaming axemen. In real life, I doubt if even the most heroic, I-will-never-make-it-to-Valhalla-without-slaying-my-enemy-frontally head banger would pass up the opportunity of an enemy who cannot fight back.
Simple the rules are wrong then ;) and I will explain. You have the historical situation where flank attacks or out-flanking have discomforted the enemy (sometimes resulting in victory, sometimes not). Thats history, it happened.
So the question is what do rules do about it? If the rules cannot simulate history, then they are not accurate are they?
Wargames rules do not have to simulate history of course, they could just be there to make a fun game. Points values, irrelevant to an historical battle - and for various reasons points values never work anyway, different terrain will see to that.
There are various mechanisms of playing the situation (overlaps, reduction of combat effectiveness, disorder) but the important thing (in terms of history) is does it get you something like the historical battle.
Now from my own point of view once you have rules that you can play out a known battle and get close to what happened on the day. Then you can take those rules and play what-ifs, with a degree of confidence that that is what could have happened.
Actually the problem lies not in the rules but in the army lists. Up to WRG 5th Edition, Vikings were close formation types like the Saxons, and the two sides were much more evenly matched. For 6th Edition (and carrying on into 7th), Phil Barker was "persuaded by the arguments of others" to reclassify Vikings as loose formation troops, which has a number of effects under 7th Edition:
1) They have 3 figures per element rather than 4. Points values being more or less equal, they will always be able to flank a similar-sized force of Saxons.
2) Their impetuous charges are not only +2 instead of +1, they can be launched from 120 paces away before the Saxons (80 paces charge range) can hope to initiate a charge - they can only countercharge, and countercharges cannot be impetuous.
3) Combine the above with Viking huscarls in wedge, and the Vikings are almost impossible to stop.
Reclassify Vikings as close formation troops (MI and HI) and these problems disappear. Their axes still give them an advantage, but not terrifyingly so.
The only problem I see with the rules themselves is that 7th Edition is a big battle rules set - it does not shine with less than 10,000 men (200 figures) per side. Trying to fit a 5,000-man-per-side engagement into it is stretching it a little.
That said, one point that does seem to be emerging is that Alfred may well have had the numbers at Edington. Against an equal number of Vikings he will lose under almost any wargames system, especially uphill. I would suggest giving him an approximately 40% numerical advantage (increase his forces or slim down the Vikings) and seeing what happens. Even with 7th Edition there may not be a lists problem or a rules problem - rather just an OB problem.
Hope this gets us somewhere.
Patrick
[Edit: 'argiments' changed to 'arguments' - in case anyone was reaching for their dictionaries!]
And the requirement for the Saxons to fight two elements deep to be effective.
Numbers should not be a problem, simply multiply the number of elements.
If I remember correctly the Viking problem was akin to that of the deployment distance of Celta and goes back to an original piece of both wisdom and potential error in the erly WRG rule sets. As a reaction to the old Tony Bath rules which were based upon relationships between weapon ranges and movement quite arbitrarily decided the new school of thinking , in 1970, was that there should be a time/ground scale that was based upon researched distances of moves, ranges and deployments.
That led to debates about the size of bases for various units, but it commenced with a basic error, that was that Roman legionaries should be 'close order'. Thus Celts who were swinging long swords had to be in loose order because psiloi were in open order. The whole schema was flawed from the start because it was based upon the Roman legionary and should have started with the phalangite pikeman in close order. Here the rule writers, at least some of them, tried to backwards engineer a solution and create dense order . The trouble with that was that the figures that existed at the time could not be placed closer than the chosen close order.
The Viking problem, if memory serves, was because, having agreed to Celts ceding in 'loose' the argument that one needed space to swing an axe held sway. Of course it was all nonsense because you do not swing a Danish axe laterally, but vertically as is shown on the Bayeux tapestry. The romanticises and re enactors (all too often interchangeable terms :-)) held sway and created this problem whereby for equal points, the Vikings o'erlapped the Saxons and that in a rule set which rewarded the longer line.
As to Viking axemen fighting in less depth than Saxons well, we all know that s nonsense.
The DB relies of rules largely dealt with the nonsense of numbers on the base because we no longer counted the number of figures on the base, but used them as an indicator of fighting characteristics.
The problem that the then new rules concept brought in was that apparently small units from a Battlegroup could detach themselves and move round on the flank of an enemy in a devastating manoeuvre. Gamers being what they are they became adept at designing their battle groups so that the required types of units were in the appropriate types of unit were in the right place at the right time. Rule writers would, of course, point to the advantage that overlapping on the flank conferred in real life. However, as has been said before here, the Ancients may have had gaps between units in a line, but that conferred little or no advantage to the overlapper unless it was on the end of a battle line because the opponent just conformed. Only overlap at the end of the main line would really matter.
Roy
Thanks, Roy: it is always good to get the original reasons/assumptions behind a school of thought or at least rationale.
It looks as if getting the Vikings back to being close formation troops (and in a depth matching the Saxons) would remove the hanging flank problem. Then again, so would giving Alfred 140% of his original troop/points allowance.
Nik's original scenario was (in elements):
Saxons Vikings
12 Nobles Irr B HI JLS Sh 16 Huscarls Irr B LHI 2HCW Sh
12 Peasants Irr C MI JLS Sh 16 Bondi Irr C LMI JLS Sh
2 Scouts Irr C LI JLS Sh 2 Skirmish Irr C JLS Sh
Saxon elements have 4 figures, Vikings 3.
Now we redact the Vikings as close formation troops:
Saxons Vikings
12 Nobles Irr B HI JLS Sh 12 Huscarls Irr B HI 2HCW Sh
12 Peasants Irr C MI JLS Sh 12 Bondi Irr C MI JLS Sh
2 Scouts Irr C LI JLS Sh 2 Skirmish Irr C JLS Sh
The overlap problem disappears, but Alfred is still asking for trouble by attacking uphill (if he managed to attack downhill, no problem).
Finally, we look at increasing Alfred's forces (keeping the Vikings as loose formation troops):
Saxons Vikings
16 Nobles Irr B HI JLS Sh 16 Huscarls Irr B LHI 2HCW Sh
16 Peasants Irr C MI JLS Sh 16 Bondi Irr C LMI JLS Sh
3 Scouts Irr C LI JLS Sh 2 Skirmish Irr C JLS Sh
Again, the overlapping problem disappears.
If we now reconfigure the Vikings as close formation troops, Alfred can outflank them and win the battle with relative ease, as he seem to have done historically.
One further thought.
Quote from: aligern on June 12, 2013, 09:23:57 AM
The problem that the then new rules concept brought in was that apparently small units from a Battlegroup could detach themselves and move round on the flank of an enemy in a devastating manoeuvre. Gamers being what they are they became adept at designing their battle groups so that the required types of units were in the appropriate types of unit were in the right place at the right time. Rule writers would, of course, point to the advantage that overlapping on the flank conferred in real life. However, as has been said before here, the Ancients may have had gaps between units in a line, but that conferred little or no advantage to the overlapper unless it was on the end of a battle line because the opponent just conformed. Only overlap at the end of the main line would really matter.
Actually a mid-line overlap proved devastating at Delium and First Mantinea. The wargamers' trick of having a unit specially configured to whip round into an open flank has a good historical precedent in the contingent of swordsmen which accompanied each Spanish tercio - an era where armies did fight with gaps between units.
My own conclusion is that an uncountered flank attack was devastating, albeit in slow motion: one that could be countered effectively (including by getting out of the way before it got started) was much less effective. I would suggest that one needs to make a distinction between the two.
As I said earlier, I have been to Edington , it is not an uphill battle for Alfred. Either it is on the plateau above Edington in which case it would be a fair and open battle or it is an ambush at the bottom of the slope from the plateau , which makes a lot of sense.
Our problem with the battle descriptions of the period is that they are very conventionalised, elements like being in dense formation being perhaps heroicisations , a sort of our lads were code formed, stoutly resisting.
It occurs to me that Edington could be confused with Asdown here?
Roy
Quote from: aligern on June 12, 2013, 09:23:57 AM
If I remember correctly the Viking problem was akin to that of the deployment distance of Celta and goes back to an original piece of both wisdom and potential error in the erly WRG rule sets. As a reaction to the old Tony Bath rules which were based upon relationships between weapon ranges and movement quite arbitrarily decided the new school of thinking , in 1970, was that there should be a time/ground scale that was based upon researched distances of moves, ranges and deployments.
That led to debates about the size of bases for various units, but it commenced with a basic error, that was that Roman legionaries should be 'close order'. Thus Celts who were swinging long swords had to be in loose order because psiloi were in open order. The whole schema was flawed from the start because it was based upon the Roman legionary and should have started with the phalangite pikeman in close order. Here the rule writers, at least some of them, tried to backwards engineer a solution and create dense order . The trouble with that was that the figures that existed at the time could not be placed closer than the chosen close order.
The Viking problem, if memory serves, was because, having agreed to Celts ceding in 'loose' the argument that one needed space to swing an axe held sway. Of course it was all nonsense because you do not swing a Danish axe laterally, but vertically as is shown on the Bayeux tapestry. The romanticises and re enactors (all too often interchangeable terms :-)) held sway and created this problem whereby for equal points, the Vikings o'erlapped the Saxons and that in a rule set which rewarded the longer line.
As to Viking axemen fighting in less depth than Saxons well, we all know that s nonsense.
Thanks Roy,
Reconsidering the current troop classification is, I believe, progress in dealing with a number of the current flank-effect anomalies. This would presumably result in early hoplite-style Romans being close order and later blade/pilum types being loose(r)? If so, we could deal sensibly with the different reactions of spears versus swordsmen/warbands to being outflanked.
Just for the sake of completeness, have I understood correctly that blade/pilum Romans should be looser order than Vikings?
Quote from: aligern on June 12, 2013, 02:56:57 PM
As I said earlier, I have been to Edington , it is not an uphill battle for Alfred. Either it is on the plateau above Edington in which case it would be a fair and open battle or it is an ambush at the bottom of the slope from the plateau , which makes a lot of sense.
This makes excellent sense given that Guthrum arrived from retired to Chippenham, which is north-west of the battlefield - and the hill is to the south-east of Edington. The received wisdom seems to be that Alfred advanced via Bratton and met the Danes in an east-west facing engagement with the hill benefitting the Vikings if anybody (cf. Nick's scenario), but it would have been tactically much more sensible to take position on the hill even if this involved a bit of extra marching.
The Edington that I visited has an escarpment that runs north to south. The way from Chippenham runs either along the top of the escarpment or along the bottom. If the Danes are marching along the top Alfred can stop them on flat terrain if along the bottom he can ambush them from the wooded escarpment. One of the scenarios for the battle has the Danes retreating to a 'work' that would provide all round defence, but be quite constricted. It did not impress me. If the battle is on the top of the escarpment then one flank of both armies is secure. A's left, G's right.
Nick, yes I think your configuration of Roman legionaries is correct, in terms of dense,close and loose the late Republican ones are loose. They can, of course, close up, it is an easy drill.
Roy
It might help to understand Edington if we think about why it was fought . Guthrum had defeated Alfred and wintered in Chippenham. Alfred fled into Somerset and hid out in Athelney, surrounded by marshes and with only his hearth troop. In the spring Alfred moves into Wiltshire and gathers his levies. He marches from the assembly point towards Chippenham. Guthrie then marches out of the town the few miles to Edington where Alfred awaits him. As I said, there are two clear routes. Neither involves Alfred fighting uphill. It is possible that Guthrum arrives near Alfred and sits on a hill, but do our sources mention this? Alfred's army is likely the larger because he has the levies of Wiltshire, Somerset and Dorset whereas Chippenham is not a particularly large place.
Rou
All of which seems to rescue WRG 7th from the appearance of being unrealistic/flawed/up the creek. Alfred probably has the numbers, so no outflanking problem. Danes fight in close formation so no loose formation impetuosity problem. What we get is a hard-fought shieldwall-type battle (perhaps 3-4 bases deep) which the Saxons should gradually win by attrition and a bit of nibbling on the flanks.
Quote from: aligern on June 12, 2013, 09:25:20 PM
Nick, yes I think your configuration of Roman legionaries is correct, in terms of dense, close and loose the late Republican ones are loose. They can, of course, close up, it is an easy drill.
Roy
This looks like a potentially fruitful separate discussion topic: How Loose Were Early Legionaries? ;) I would suggest that if they opened up it would be for manoeuvre and they would close up to fight - maybe not too unlike Vikings?
careful Pat, we know where this started out in 2011. it is a snake with no end to its tail.
I suspect that the key to fighting the Vikings is that they are mostly seansoned warriors organised into boat's crews of say 30 men and then by jarl contingents (Guthrum is going to have even tougher types). The Saxons will have some good men, but rather more levies who are not as practised as the Vikings. Where the Saxons have advantage is in numbers, where the Vikings benefit is in cohesion and possibly in level of armouring.
I also, as some of you will have heard before, think that the Vikings have more bows integrated into their units. This is because bows are a ship board weapon. My contention is that the Danes have more missile capability and hat this is what drives Alfred at Ashdown to attack uphill before his brother,the king, arrives because the English army, though greater in numbers, is losing the missile exchange and he must close before morale becomes degraded.
Seventh edition would cope really well with this, indeed conceptually it was WRG's finest hour.
Roy
In terms of WRG 7th, I played it once and never again.
In terms of translating battles to games, we had the same problem in Warhammer Ancient Battles, the lists said that the Vikings classified as light infantry (because they were said to be more mobile) and could not form shieldwall. The Saxons however were close order infantry and could form shieldwall. Result (in WAB) Saxons beat the Vikings more often than not, simply as a result of a list writer saying, it shall be this way.
Obviously Vikings did use the shieldwall but I think they (at least the raiders amongst them) would cheerfully run as a loose order 'mob' - ideal for attacking the flank of engaged enemy. But did they have a flank to go round?
PS in WAB2 lists Vikings can now adopt the Shieldwall formation (and move whilst in it).
Quote from: Mark G on June 13, 2013, 02:18:14 PM
careful Pat, we know where this started out in 2011. it is a snake with no end to its tail.
Ah, those were the days! ;)
Concerning Roy's points about Saxon and Viking armies, is it worth someone starting a thread on this? Assuming we have people who would be interested in such a discussion ...
Yes, start a thread, let a thousand flowers bloom!
Roy
New thread duly started, Roy - see the forum for Rules Systems Discussions.
Paul
if I had to lead a phalanx I would make my men stretch the line in the last moment so to overlap the enemy line. Simple and effective. Battle is won, Job is done, go back home to make some cute preteen child play the "make me happy so I can teach you everything" game. Well am I an ancient Greek or not? Joking.
Good thing you are not then, i say, sine a thin phalanx that wide would be breakable by your wall wagon idea
Quote from: andrew881runner on August 27, 2014, 12:33:28 AM
if I had to lead a phalanx I would make my men stretch the line in the last moment so to overlap the enemy line. Simple and effective. Battle is won, Job is done, go back home to make some cute preteen child play the "make me happy so I can teach you everything" game. Well am I an ancient Greek or not? Joking.
Invariably, the problem is can you complete your envelopment before the deeper enemy rips through your centre? As a phalanx was not particularly manoueverable, it is highly likely your centre would go before you could effectively use your flankers.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 27, 2014, 08:19:37 AM
Quote from: andrew881runner on August 27, 2014, 12:33:28 AM
if I had to lead a phalanx I would make my men stretch the line in the last moment so to overlap the enemy line. Simple and effective. Battle is won, Job is done, go back home to make some cute preteen child play the "make me happy so I can teach you everything" game. Well am I an ancient Greek or not? Joking.
Invariably, the problem is can you complete your envelopment before the deeper enemy rips through your centre? As a phalanx was not particularly manoueverable, it is highly likely your centre would go before you could effectively use your flankers.
your center will be the same. You simply have to take some men on the flanks and send them stretching the line so to overlap the sides and maybe even the back of enemy lines. Enemy feeling surrounded will surrender quickly. Given that typical phalanx was 12 men deep, you could simply take those some 4 or 6 men in the back of the flanks and send them doing the job. Enemy possibly could do same. So lines would be constantly stretching as far as they find that the other line is bigger than theirs. Is this what maybe happened? Like the sub commanders as the phalanx advances notice that other phalanx is larger so they stretch the line to try to overcame, enemies commander do the same... in this idea both lines would adapt to be more or less the same (even if the purpose would be to try to overlap the enemy lines), in a flexible and changing way. So the static idea of phalanx could be wrong. And Hence the men in black rows would be a bit more useful, than being back pressing the guys in front, since they could provide a tactical reserve for this purpose. My personal idea.
I'm sure I've seen Greeks described as thinning the centre to match an enemy frontage, but never to overlapbone, so the risk must be too great for the reward
Quote from: Mark G on August 27, 2014, 09:02:11 AM
I'm sure I've seen Greeks described as thinning the centre to match an enemy frontage, but never to overlapbone, so the risk must be too great for the reward
well if a phalanx overlapped the other it would have almost immediate victory since a phalanx is made to fight in front not in the sides. So trying would be worth the risk of having a line a bit thinner (which would make a sensible difference during hot ysmos, which I suppose could not happen on frequently because casualties would have been much higher - imagine of pushing the shield against An enemy shield... you could simply stab him since he is so close why pushing?- or in the remote case all guys in the first 5/6 men were heavily wounded or killed so that back 6 guys are needed).
If it were that obvious, why do the reports we have of lines being thinned only talk of doing so to match an enemy frontage?
Are there any examples of a line being thinned to overlap an enemy?
Quote from: Mark G on August 27, 2014, 12:13:08 PM
If it were that obvious, why do the reports we have of lines being thinned only talk of doing so to match an enemy frontage?
Are there any examples of a line being thinned to overlap an enemy?
The one obvious example is Leuctra, where Cleombrotus tried to extend his line to wrap round the flank of Epaminondas' 50-deep Theban column. That did not go well.
"
In the battle, while Epaminondas was drawing his phalanx obliquely towards the left, in order that the right wing of the Spartans might be separated as far as possible from the rest of the Greeks, and that he might thrust back Cleombrotus by a fierce charge in column with all his men-at-arms, the enemy understood what he was doing and began to change their formation; [2] they were opening up their right wing and making an encircling movement, in order to surround Epaminondas and envelop him with their numbers. But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his position, and with his band of three hundred on the run, came up before Cleombrotus had either extended his wing or brought it back again into its old position and closed up his line of battle, so that the Lacedaemonians were not standing in array, but moving confusedly about among each other when his onset reached them." - Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas 23.1-2
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 27, 2014, 12:52:58 PM
Quote from: Mark G on August 27, 2014, 12:13:08 PM
If it were that obvious, why do the reports we have of lines being thinned only talk of doing so to match an enemy frontage?
Are there any examples of a line being thinned to overlap an enemy?
The one obvious example is Leuctra, where Cleombrotus tried to extend his line to wrap round the flank of Epaminondas' 50-deep Theban column. That did not go well.
"In the battle, while Epaminondas was drawing his phalanx obliquely towards the left, in order that the right wing of the Spartans might be separated as far as possible from the rest of the Greeks, and that he might thrust back Cleombrotus by a fierce charge in column with all his men-at-arms, the enemy understood what he was doing and began to change their formation; [2] they were opening up their right wing and making an encircling movement, in order to surround Epaminondas and envelop him with their numbers. But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his position, and with his band of three hundred on the run, came up before Cleombrotus had either extended his wing or brought it back again into its old position and closed up his line of battle, so that the Lacedaemonians were not standing in array, but moving confusedly about among each other when his onset reached them." - Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas 23.1-2
well I imagined Spartans were able to March in column and reform in phalanx formation soon. I even read about some of their manoeuvres like changing direction and they should be quite fast. Maybe Spartans were not so perfect... [emoji1]
That was the one i was thinking of.
Hardly a. Sucesd, as you say
Leuctra was indeed a significant Spartan failure. Part of the problem was that Pelopidas and the Theban Sacred Band seem to have hit the Spartans just as they were in the process of extending, which rather spoiled Cleombrotus' plan. Not only was the extending manoeuvre stopped before it really began, but the Spartans were caught with some of their troops facing the wrong way, which did nothing for their ability to resist the Theban deep column when that hit them shortly afterwards.
They did pull themselves together, recovered Cleombrotus' body when he fell, and fought the Thebans almost to a standstill, but Epaminondas' call for 'one more step' was obeyed by the Thebans and gave them the victory, forcing the Spartans back to camp with significant losses.
"And yet the Spartans, who were of all men past masters in the art of war, trained and accustomed themselves to nothing so much as not to straggle or get into confusion upon a change of formation, but to take anyone without exception as neighbour in rank or in file, and wheresoever danger actually threatened, to seize that point and form in close array and fight as well as ever.
[4] At this time, however, since the phalanx of Epaminondas bore down upon them alone and neglected the rest of their force, and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness, their courage and skill were so confounded that there was a flight and slaughter of the Spartans such as had never before been seen." - Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas, 23.3-4
Xenophon gives a slightly fuller account, which ascribes the disruption more to the Theban cavalry than to Pelopidas and the Sacred Band.
"Now when Cleombrotus began to lead his army against the enemy, in the first place, before the troops under him so much as perceived that he was advancing, the horsemen had already joined battle and those of the Lacedaemonians had speedily been worsted; then in their flight they had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the Thebans were now charging upon them. Nevertheless, the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be known from this clear indication: they would not have been able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time." - Xenophon, Hellenica VI.4.13
This initial recovery and success were followed by a collapse as the Theban pressure finally took effect.
"But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the royal bodyguard, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being pushed back, gave way. Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp they grounded their arms at the spot from which they had set forth. The camp, to be sure, was not on ground which was altogether level, but rather on the slope of a hill." - ibid VI.4.14
Had the Spartan cavalry been better than the Theban, the manoeuvre might have worked. In the event it did not, and deliberate thinning of the line to outflank an opponent seems to have fallen into disfavour as a tactic.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 27, 2014, 11:09:02 PM
Had the Spartan cavalry been better than the Theban, the manoeuvre might have worked. In the event it did not, and deliberate thinning of the line to outflank an opponent seems to have fallen into disfavour as a tactic.
Emphasis on "might". Plutarch and Xenophon both remark on the speed of the Theban onset as a factor, so the Spartans may have struggled to complete the manoeuver in time regardless of the cavalry contribution. I think it does show that we can wonder why ancient commanders didn't do something which seems to us obvious but may have been far less obvious then. If the Spartans, who were better than the average hoplite at drill, got caught changing formation, commanders of less disciplined and drilled troops would certainly have thought twice about it.
This was not the first time that a Spartan commander had mis-timed a manoeuvre, caught out by the unexpectedly rapid onset of an opponent. At Mantinea in 418 BC Agis tried to extend his line to diminish the Argive/Mantinean overlap of his left wing.
"On the present occasion the Mantineans reached with their wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans still farther beyond the Athenians, as their army was the largest. [3] Agis, afraid of his left being surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans outflanked it too far, ordered the Sciritae and Brasideans to move out from their place in the ranks and make the line even with the Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristocles to fill up the gap thus formed, by throwing themselves into it with two companies taken from the right wing; thinking that his right would still be strong enough and to spare, and that the line fronting the Mantineans would gain in solidity." - Thucydides V.71
Alas for Agis: like Cleombrotus at Leuctra, he seems to have based his timing on Spartan rates of movement, which were more sedate than those of their opponents.
"However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset, and at short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta, as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed before the Sciritae （whom Agis on seeing that the two companies did not move over ordered to return to their place） had time to fill up the breach in question." - idem
Order, counter-order, disorder. The Spartan left (including the Sciritae) was demolished in short order, a classic instance of what happens when a line with gaps meets one without, although the Spartans won on their right and prevailed in the centre, winning the battle overall. Had Agis left well alone and not tried to implement his last-minute line extension, his victory would have been unblemished.
It does add a lot of doubt to the practicality of theories about roman posterior centuries forming out beside the prior ventures to creates continuous line of battle .