A thread to look at the command capabilities and restrictions of Biblical, classical and mediaeval armies. What could commanders do with their troops, and how did they do it?
Pick a favourite era or army and add your thoughts. We can also look at some examples.
One of my favourites is the series of manoeuvres pulled off by Claudius Nero at the Metaurus in 207 BC during the 2nd Punic War. First of all he manages a forced march to take some of his legionaries with him, to reinforce the army facing Hasdrubal. Then he sneaks them into camp so that the Carthaginians don't realise he has arrived. During the battle itself he moves uncommitted infantry from the Roman right facing rough ground past the rear of the army to reinforce the left, which helps turn the flank of the entire Carthaginian army. A combination of strategic and tactical acumen, plus trickery, as well as the command control to get away with it. Moreover, he does all of this with infantry! One of the most underrated pieces of generalship, probably because he is eclipsed by his contemporaries Scipio and Hannibal.
Events like these seem very rare, and even then one usually thinks of cavalry commanders...
An interesting opening item by Paul as the original background to this thread was that army commanders - certainly in the classical Greek period - didn't have too much control over their troops once pointed in the right direction and battle had commenced.
To give this thread some initial context, in a follow up to a battle report I submitted, there was a good discussion as to the degree to which ancient generals could issue fresh orders, whether this had to go down a formal hierarchical command structure (that we might recognise in more modern times) or potentially had to give instructions direct to individual units.
"We" have moved the thread to here to allow the original thread to get back to its own purpose and look forward to an interesting discussion.
The important factor in making Claudius Nero's reallocation of troops possible was that Hasdrubal had posted the opposing Gauls in terrain the Romans found too daunting to attempt. Hence Nero's wing of the army was not in contact, and it seemed to have occurred to him that the Gauls would not be able to cross the terrain either if he did take his troops elsewhere (had he but known it, they were much the worse for wear from drink and practically immobile). Hence he was in the happy position of being able to issue orders as if in a pre-battle situation, with the sides not in contact. Better still, he thought of a very good place for his men to go.
Hence he in effect redeployed them for a march behind the active battlefield (where Hasdrubal's veteran troops were holding their own) and round to face the Carthaginian flank, then put them in order of battle, advanced, and Robertus was his uncle. He does not seem to have done much with them after that, but then he did not need to.
Another classic (and extremely rare) Roman improvisation on the battlefield was at Cynoscephalae: Philip V's left had collapsed under the assault of the Roman elephants (curiously, all Roman victories against Macedonian phalanxes seem to have involved elephants messing up a key part of the phalanx) and was being pursued by the hastati. An unnamed tribune (well, we are sure he had a name, but it has not been preserved) redirected the principes and triarii of one legion against the rear of Philip's successful right and brought off a classic victory.
In each case, an astute leader was able to get disengaged troops moving in a different direction with spectacular effect. This we can perhaps ascribe to a talented leader seeing an opportunity and making use of a capability that existed but was very rarely employed. This gives us two fundamental options when preparing rules for players:
1) Assume the player has a basically historical (and not particularly talented) set of subordinate leaders. He does his battle planning before the battle and can change little during it but can, if his army used reserves, keep a reserve under his own hand (direct command) and use it as he sees fit subject to staying broadly within that army's tactical procedures (e.g. no pike reserve units - everything we have indicates pikemen all went into the fighting line). If his army used charismatic leadership (e.g. Macedonian) he can take direct command of a wing and be creative with that.
2) Allow the purchase (extra points cost) of initiative-capable subordinates, who are able to issue fresh orders and/or generate extra movement capabilities for troops under their command.
These options need not be mutually exclusive. An initiative-capable subordinate could also reliably carry out an ambush, flank march or the other manoeuvres beloved of wargamers but not often used by historical generals. Ordinary subordinates might be assigned such battlefield tasks but with very little (15-20%?) chance of acting at the right time (failure = 1 turn delay, with the enemy apprised of the ambush) or of turning up at all.
The basic idea is that leadership rather than command and control was the big limiting factor if troops were well-trained and experienced; if troops were untrained and/or undisciplined then command and control became the limiting factor.
Thanks, Patrick, those are useful observations. I'm not familiar enough with the sources on the Metaurus to be able to go into any detail, but the mention of Cynoscephalae makes me wonder if it was the Triarii "reserve" that Nero shifted across the field at the Metaurus. I think you're right about the rough terrain being a factor - presumably Nero left enough force behind on the right to screen the opposition, allowing him to make his successful redeployment.
I suppose that a follow-up to all of this would be to ask how best to model such possibilities on the tabletop, bearing in mind limitations on leadership and/or command control. I know that many rulesets have a sort of engagement distance, i.e. units within a certain specified range of the enemy are considered to be involved, if not yet directly in melee as such. This in turn would mean that availability of some sort of reserve would then need to be specified, which does not necessarily mean that the capacity to take advantage of the asset also exists. Similar comments could be made about the difficulty of refocusing successful cavalry commands after they have defeated their initial opposition, exactly the sort of thing that failed to happen at Raphia and, perhaps, the Seleucid right at Magnesia.
Interesting thread, I think!
Good thoughts, Paul.
Nero took to the Metaurus a force of 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry - the pick of his army's troops. His whole army consisted of 40,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry (Livy XXVII.40) so looks like four legions at emergency establishment plus four alae of socii. Cavalry is about half the expected strength, not unusual for this stage of the war.
So what did he take? Evidently not a whole legion, but rather selected crack troops. Four legions fielded 2,400 triarii and their corresponding alae 4,000 extraordinarii. Together this makes 6,400 - which is a usefully close figure to Livy's 6,000 even if not conclusive proof. The Roman cavalry contingent at full strength would be 1,200 but if we take it as reduced strength (200 per legion) then it amounts to 800, while the allied cavalry would be 1,700. One third of 1,700 (the extraordinarii cavalry) would be 5-600 which, added to the Roman cavalry, gives 1,300-1,400. It looks as if he may have taken his triarii and extraordinarii north, with his Roman and extraordinarii cavalry.
In the battle, Polybius (XI.1) writes that Nero 'withdrew his men from the right wing' whereas Livy (XXVII.48) says that Nero 'detached several cohorts' from his force, so on balance it seems he did not send everyone and my guess is that he sent the extraordinarii, leaving the triarii to front the passive Gauls. Or I may be placing too much emphasis on Livy's use of 'cohortes' and Nero may have done it the other way round. Either way, a good leader with crack troops outside an enemy 'zone of influence' was able to implement a fresh set of orders.
On the tabletop, the key to getting the right mix in this instance may be to assign an 'initiative rating' to subordinate commanders (perhaps based on points value) and allow non-combat moves ('march moves' as they were called in WRG 7th) when outside an enemy 'zone of influence' (basically a buffer distance of about bowshot). If units are separated by difficult terrain, the 'zone of influence' may be decreased, perhaps in line with the terrain-imposed movement penalty (so a 240-yard distance becomes a 120-yard distance if the intervening terrain halves movement, for example), allowing initiative-capable sub-commanders to manoeuvre troops despite being within what would normally be 'influence' distance.
Reserves (for armies which kept them) would usually be lined up behind the front line, and perforce out of any opposing zone of influence (if they come within such a zone - even if friendly troops intervene - they cease to be 'reserves' and lose their notional movement options). Reserves under a C-in-C could act more or less as the C-in-C wished, subject to the limitations of the troop type, but what of reserves when the C-in-C is not commanding them but is instead leading one of the wings (or the centre) of the army? In these circumstances the reserves would either be under a sub-commander with initiative (in which case the player could use them imaginatively) or they would not, in which instance they could be used only to plug gaps or relieve forward units (unit type permitting).
I think an important part of this, particularly for infantry formations, is to have a 'manoeuvre mode' and a 'combat mode'. Reserves, or troops qualifying as reserves, would be considered as being able to use 'manoeuvre mode' and hence march in directions other than straight ahead. Troops with enemy to front within zone of influence distance would be limited to straight ahead or, if the right kind of mobile troops, straight ahead or directly astern. Exceptions might permit oblique movement for troop types of good quality who did so historically.
Cavalry commands, especially Hellenistic, might require a little fine-tuning for C-in-C or subordinate inclinations. Antiochus III seemed to have a trademark feature of leading his right-wing cavalry to sucess as the expense of losing control over the rest of the battlefield. Alexander never had this problem: even in mid-pursuit of Darius he could bring his cavalry back to a chosen sector of the battle in response to a call for help. This seems to be a personality-related thing where the army concerned is regular and well-trained: if the army is irregular and/or poorly-trained then the unit may tend to act impetuously or truculently and hence inflexibly regardless of what the commander may wish it to do.
An interesting instance is the cavalry action at Zama: Laelius and Masinissa were both experienced and capable cavalry leaders with good cavalry contingents, but after their initial success were unable or unwilling to show up again until dangerously late in the battle. Rather than having an uncontrollable troops problem or a diff commanders problem I think what happened there was that the Carthaginian cavalry wings held together and conducted a 'fighting retreat' which occupied their more numerous opponents for some considerable time until they were able to break the Carthaginians. There may also have been the matter of the Carthaginian camp and some perhaps enticing booty, though one would have thought that Laelius at least would have been able to exercise enough authority to prevent delay through looting.
Again, the determining factor here seems to be the enemy 'zone of influence': redeployment was very limited or simply not done within it, but was possible outside it if an officer with sufficient wit and ability was in charge. There also arises the question of battlefield orientation: if it is not known what is transpiring on the rest of the battlefield, there is no impulse to change plans and detach units. Nero at the Metaurus was probably aware that the action on the left had stalemated - he could probably see the heights - and was very aware that there was nothing doing on his front, so the idea of helping out elsewhere crystallised, although a dumber general might have sat and watched for the whole day. Antiochus at Raphia and Magnesia was surprised to discover how the battle had come apart in his absence, and had he been aware that things were not going well he might have been able and willing to break off pursuit, return to the field and see what he could do. Even Alex at Gaugamela was happily pursuing until apprised that Parmenio was in a sticky situation - had Parmenio kept quiet Alex would not have turned back.
This suggests that a good view of events on the relevant part of the battlefield and/or a send-for-help provision from troubled subordinates may be the key elements in deciding if and when a successful cavalry wing reorients to sort out matters elsewhere. The view from the saddle may be a matter of radius/elevation/line-of-sight and I would suggest the send-for-help provision be linked to the ability of the sub-commander in question: a good general will realise sooner that he is in a sticky situation and will send for help in good time, whereas a poor one will tend not to realise the terminal nature of his problems until too late. Given one player handling the entire army, each general could have a 'help!' rating based on his initiative rating (or quality rating, or whatever) and if/when the player desires to redeploy his successful cavalry he makes a 'help' roll which, if failed, limits the cavalry wing in question to beating up visible opponents. If successful, cavalry not in an enemy zone of influence can get into 'movement mode' and travel elsewhere - with their leader. I would suggest the player can attempt a 'help' roll at any time, but be limited (perhaps by subordinate intiative ratings) in the number he can make over the whole battle.
As the zone of influence concept is likely to be central, indeed critical, to determining what a unit can and cannot do, training and commander permitting, we may wish to specify that a retiring or fleeing unit has a conditional zone of influence: it acts to keep pursuers heading directly forwards (or rather directly for said unit) unless a general with initiative is present, in which case the retiring/fleeing unit's zone of influence may be disregarded by friendly troops in his radius/under his command. Combine this with terrain modifiers to zones of influence (which can also allow careless troops to march past an enemy-held wood while in movement mode, which is not good news if the enemy pops out to attack them) and we may have the start of the basis of a system. Naturally, a unit in movement mode contacted by an enemy in combat mode will not fight well.
These are a few ideas to get us started; we shall see how concepts progress.
I alway thought that Sulla demonstrated some fairly handy Command and Control at Chaeronea 86 BC:
Plutarch 'Life of Sulla' 19.1
'Archelaüs now extended his right wing to envelop Sulla's line, whereupon Hortensius sent his cohorts against him on a quick run, intending to attack his flank. But Archelaüs wheeled swiftly against him his two thousand horsemen, and Hortensius, forced aside by superior numbers, was keeping close to the hills, separating himself little by little from the main line, and getting surrounded by the enemy.
When Sulla learned of this, he came swiftly to his aid from the right wing, which was not yet engaged. But Archelaüs, guessing the truth from the dust raised by Sulla's troops, gave Hortensius the go-by, and wheeling, set off for the right wing whence Sulla had come, thinking to surprise it without a commander. At the same time Murena also was attacked by Taxiles with his Bronze-shields, so that when shouts were borne to his ears from both places, and re-echoed by the surrounding hills, Sulla halted, and was at a loss to know in which of the two directions he ought to betake himself.
But having decided to resume his own post, he sent Hortensius with four cohorts to help Murena, while he himself, bidding the fifth cohort to follow, hastened to the right wing. This of itself had already engaged Archelaüs on equal terms, but when Sulla appeared, they drove the enemy back at all points, obtained the mastery, and pursued them to the river and Mount Acontium in a headlong flight. '
The "send for help" concept from a subordinate is an interesting idea and one I hadn't pondered on till now. My own rules allow for an army general to issue fresh instructions - based on his own knowledge (i.e. visible sight) - to a corps commander but hadn't thought about messages going back up the chain.
Most of the comments so far mention named individuals (apart from the unnamed Tribune) who seem to be commanding sections of an army. Does this imply that there was generally some structure of command? Collective nouns such as "battles", "wings" and "commands" spring to mind.
In my own rules armies are usually split into corps each of which has a commander who has one of 27 different personality types. The type of personality affects how he reacts depending upon his current situation. Whilst this doesn't permit to a great extent the "intelligent initiative" an army commander might hope for, it does encourage either wild excesses or cautious retreats (usually at the wrong moment).
The usual arrangement for a Biblical or classical army seems to have been centre and wings, with the centre in Biblical and wings in classical armies containing the bulk of the mobile troops.
Hence the standard classical arrangement would be: right wing, left wing, centre. The C-in-C would take one of these and his subordinates the other two. Below this there would not usually be anyone acting with independent initiative, though exceptions did occur.
Rodger's mention of Sulla at Chaeronea also reminds me of Caesar at Alesia and Dyrrhachium: he and Antony both had a habit of collecting a handful (sometimes quite a large handful) of cohorts and going with it to a looming crisis point, sometimes more than once in the same engagement. The Romans seem to have developed the cohort as a battlefield manoeuvre unit (individual maniples were a bit too small to pack much punch and a bit too numerous to start collecting and leading all over the field) but only a few commanders (essentially the very talented ones) seem to have made a habit of using them as 'fire brigades' in this fashion. Then again, it tends to be only the talented commanders whose battles arte described in any detail, so I do not know how far we can go with such an assumption. I would suggest: if in doubt, do not let run-of-the-mill commanders use initiative this way.
The 'commander personalities' in David's system are nice. In real life, a good C-in-C would tolerate such excursions a maximum of once before replacing the individual concerned. A bad C-in-C might not even realise his subordinate was doing anything counterproductive, so it might be an idea to require a good commander to have reliable subordinates (charging extra points accordingly) but allow a bad commander to have any sort of subordinate. I would suggest one centre commander, who in a classical army usually has most if not all of the infantry, and two wing commanders, who each take a wing of cavalry with perhaps some supporting light and/or fast-moving infantry.
Greek armies seem to have had one effective leader, the C-in-C, but the action sometimes (e.g. Delium in 424 BC) segregated into two or more almost independent struggles, usually victorious right making headway against defeated left. I cannot offhand think of any such segment exhibiting initiative by itself: clever alterations part-way through the battle seem to have been entirely due to the C-in-C.
All civilised armies exhibited organised subdivision and officers at several levels, but for the most part these seem to have confined their battlefield activities to making sure their units deployed in a straight line, advanced in parallel with their neighbours, charged together at the right time and/or halted when everyone else did. If one does not have such officers at each level of command one's army is going to be an uncontrollable mob. The impression I get is that the larger the army, the more effort officers at each level of command put into making the whole thing move homogenously, and the less they put into independent action.
Another point that recurs is that infantry, or at least non-skirmishing infantry, seems to have advanced and manoeuvred as a single entity when possible - a battleline. Furthermore, default speed of advance appears to have been about half that which would be possible - Late Roman armies in particular are noted as using a deliberate advance in slow time, which has the advantage that anyone encountering a patch of difficult terrain can filter through or round it and reassemble without losing cohesion or getting left behind. Not everyone did this: Caesar was surprised by the rapid advance of the Nervii and their allies at the Sambre in 57 BC - and again by Pharnaces' Pontic army at Zela ten years later. We may note, incidentally, that at the 9th and 10th legions formed the left, the 8th and 11th the centre and the 7th and 12th the right, but Caesar does not name commanders for any of these groupings. We might guess that he gave Antony the left and Labienus the centre, but he does not say so. That nobody was commanding the right is evident from Caesar's actions once he arrived there.
Biblical armies are probably outside the immediate scope of the discussion, but from what I can determine (and most of this is inference) they seem to have had the C-in-C in the centre, commanding the best troops (which includes the chariotry and its supporting infantry or cavalry, plus missile troops and royal guards) while the wings seem to have been mainly infantry and operated in support of the centre. Thutmose III, our most famous and extensively written about Biblical era campaigner, seems to have encouraged a collection of generals who in their memoirs mention 'accompanying His Majesty' on his campaigns, pointing to their subordinate role and perhaps pointedly omitting mention of independent action on their part while with His Majesty (although mention of saving His Majesty from the attentions of an elephant was deemed worth recording). Israelite kings had a general of the army (singular) and 'mighty men' who commanded thousands, but again it seems to have been the king who led the army and fought in the part that mattered, perforce the centre.
This tradition seems to be reflected in Persian (Achaemenid) armies, where the King-of-Kings was invariably in the middle of his army with his best troops, and apparently thought or felt that it would be in this sector that the battle would be decided. Cavalry were assigned to the flanks, often with a supporting infantry contingent, but the best troops were reserved for the centre and the King, including a mounted royal guard and His Majesty in a chariot. This I see as a vestige of the days when battles would be decided by a (supported) chariot clash in the centre of the lines - assuming both sides were drawn up for battle rather than one side sneakily hiding behind a city and attacking the other on the march!
Out of interest, David, what are the 27 commander/sub-commander personality types? It sounds as if you have put some work into this.
Patrick,
The 27 "personalities" are based around three characteristics each of which has three values, hence the 27 combinations. In thinking about the characteristics that may affect battlefield competence or activity, I concluded that these were: a degree of decisiveness; strength of leadership; and sense of loyalty. Fairly similar to other rule sets.
Decisiveness, I call "Boldness" and commanders are classified as: Rash, Reliable or Cautious
Leadership is rated as either: Strong; Adequate or Weak
Loyalty is classified as either: Loyal, Respectful or Dubious
Each commander's character can be diced for either at the start of each battle or (as I do) as the army is formed so personalities become long standing banes in their general's side.
Irregular and Barbarian commanders is diced for as a character and then the general can decide which command they are assigned to. This tries to reflect the appoint of friends in suitable places.
Regular commanders have the dice rolled for a command and then the general decides which dice applies to which characteristic. This tries to simulate some form of organised promotion avoiding the extremes.
You can of course vary this. For instance my Persian Xerxes rates loyalty very highly, so he is allowed to up the loyalty score by decreasing one of the others.
On the battlefield, their "personality" affects how the interpret the situation. The situation is defined by the same set of factors which give seven statii ranging from "excellent" to "dire". Then by using a matrix of 27 rows (one for each commander type) and 7 columns (one for each situation) I can determine how a commander will react. So for instance:
- If the situation is "excellent" then a rash/strong/loyal commander will order a general advance, whilst a reliable/adequate/respectful commander will follow orders, and a cautious/weak/dubious (think BlackAdder II) will initiate charges.
- If the situation is "dire" then those three commanders would hold position, withdraw and retreat respectively.
Of course the troops under their command might (and do) have other opinions.........
As corps commanders tend to get killed, I've had to create a mechanism for generating sub-ordinates on the fly, but that is probably too much detail for now.
That seems to be a worthwhile system. I would suggest that Republican Roman commanders usually be diced for just before a battle (simulating the unpredictability of the consular election process) and others treated pretty much as you mention, perhaps allowing players of armies that historically started out with several successful campaigns under their belt (e.g. Alexandrian Macedonian, Carthaginian led by Hannibal or Roman led by Caesar) to reroll egregious cases on the basis that they would mostly have been weeded out in earlier campaigning.
One historical quirk perhaps to consider is that if a commander had clear orders for a given situation he tended to follow those orders irrespective of his personality or inclinations. His particular personal proclivities tended to come to the fore in unexpected situations. Hence a tribune might carry on in reliable but undistinguished fashion through several campaigns until one day when he sees an inviting enemy flank and rear off to his legion's eight-o-clock position. Then he looks at his chart ... will he carry on stumping along following his hastati or will he seize the opportunity and the initiative with both hands and bring his principes and triarii down upon the unsuspecting enemy rear?
These are just thoughts. Carry on with the good work as you see fit.
Quote from: dwkay57 on March 24, 2013, 10:42:57 AM
The 27 "personalities" are based around three characteristics each of which has three values, hence the 27 combinations. In thinking about the characteristics that may affect battlefield competence or activity, I concluded that these were: a degree of decisiveness; strength of leadership; and sense of loyalty. Fairly similar to other rule sets.
Reading this, it reminds me of Tony Bath's Hyboria-inspired campaign rules (this is a good thing - fond memories). Sadly, I think it is a little too complex for my current tastes. But it does seem to lend itself to the creation of "artificial intellegence" in the other side of a solo game. Do you use it this way, David?
Anthony,
Yes I do use it in solo games and I do have a copy of Tony Bath's "Setting Up a War games campaign" on my bookshelf. I did re-read it for inspiration but couldn't figure out how the characteristics he suggests could be fitted in to tactical reaction. Any suggestions or ideas for those or other characteristics that might be suitable?
I've just checked the data sheet in the rules and about 47% of the 27 x 7 reactions result in "Follow Orders". So it sounds like I'm on the right lines.
On the general subject of command and control, we might also examine it from the ground up. The classic building block of classical armies was the file, an 8-16 man follow-my-leader subunit. If we look at Hellenistic armies (because they are easy and we have Asclepidotus' tactical manual http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Asclepiodotus/2*.html (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Asclepiodotus/2*.html)), a file (stoichein) consists of 16 men under a lochagos; paired with another such it becomes a double file (dilochia) of 32 men under a dilochites; two of these form a 64-man tetrarchy (tetrarchia) led by a tetrarch (tetrarches).
The 64-man tetrarchy is the basic subunit that builds up to a 128-man taxis; two taxeis form a 256-man syntagma or syntaxiarchia. The syntagma/syntaxiarchia is the basic field unit which adds a number of 'ektakoi', men outside the ranks, namely:
"... an army-herald, a signalman, a bugler, an aide, and a file-closer. The first was to pass on the command by a spoken order, the second by a signal, in case the order could not be heard because of the uproar, the third by the bugle, whenever the signal could not be seen for the dust; the aide was there to fetch whatever was needed, while the supernumerary file-closer was to bring up the straggler to his position in the company" - Asclepiodotus, Tactics, II.9
Exactly where the signalman would have to stand in order to be seen by the unit leaders, or someone who could inform the unit leaders, is an interesting question.
This file-closer is not to be confused with the ouragos who was the last man in each file and who was meant to keep the rear end of the file moving up behind the front end. The supernumerary file-closer was to catch and return to position any man who dropped out despite the best efforts of the ouragos at the end of each file.
From this we can conclude that a signal (advance, halt, retire) would be repeated along the line by the 'herald', signalman and/or bugler of each syntagma. The command organisation involved the files being led from the front, so the officer in charge of the syntagma is not in proximity to the signallers - from this we can deduce that he was not expected to issue commands except to his own unit, along a 16-man frontage. The signallers are there to repeat signals from the C-in-C or the sub-commander in charge of the phalanx.
From anecdotal evidence it would appear the Romans used a similar system, based on the buccina (military trumpet). One observes this to be not dissimilar in size to a Celtic war-horn, but cunningly bent for easy portability. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Buccina_1.png (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Buccina_1.png) Lacking a 'herald' would mean that detailed or unusual orders could not be conveyed, but the Romans relied on standardisation and perhaps if unusual orders were required the six tribunes assigned to a legion could undertake the necessary verbal exercise.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on March 25, 2013, 12:20:39 PM
From anecdotal evidence it would appear the Romans used a similar system, based on the buccina (military trumpet).
Taking our lead from Byzantine manuals, we could suggest that shouted words of command were also commonplace as in more modern armies.
As a generality I would suggest hat initiative was not encouraged by overall commanders and it is not today. What The general wants is for his sub generals to do their part well and to encourage their men to carry out appropriate drills. My reading of pretty well all of ancient warfare is that initiatives are taken by the general and any reserve is taken by him.
At the Sambre it is Caesar who goes to the confused legions and sorts them out. When at another battle young P Crassus exercises initiative Caeasr mentions it in a way that assumes that normally this would be bad, but the boy has done well. Poor young Publius got into the initiative thing, exercised it at Carrhae and OT himself and his cavalry killed by charging too far.
At Cynoscephalae it is a tribune? who takes the initiative. Do we even get to know his name?
Ancient society is very hierarchical, I don't believe that you get anywhere by showing yourself to be a clever clogs. You do get on by carrying out the boss's ideas brilliantly. Similarly when generals make their pre-battle speeches they ask for the traditional style of fighting to be carried out well.
Roy
Following on from Roy's comments, I contacted a former classmate who is just completing 30 years' service as a senior officer in the British Army. His response was quite interesting and I'll try to summarise it below.
The discussion between Mission Command and Directive Control continues with the former being preferred in the British Army. In Mission Command, subordinates can be allowed flexibility within parameters providing they fully understand their commander's intent and avoid limiting his freedom of manoeuvre. This not only gives officers the opportunity to react to unforeseen situations or to problems, but also offers opportunities for the intent to misunderstood.
By contrast the old Soviet armies relied entirely on Directive Control. This tended to reflect that they were a conscript army, with the training focus on obeying instructions and following drills. This required less investment with command exercised at a higher level. Most junior officers weren't even issued with maps which would certainly limit initiative.
Applying these ideas to Ancients might suggest that:
- For conscript armies with larger units then maybe the focus is to get them moving in the right direction and leave it at that.
- For smaller more professional units there might be more flexibility.
- Officers commanding something in the region of 1,000 to 3,000 men might be used to some degree of initiative given detached or garrison duties.
- And in line with Sun Tsu's teachings we might expect elite units deployed to outflank and outwit the enemy to have a higher level of freedom.
This leads me to still consider that there is a role to be played by a senior officer's characteristics, especially in poor circumstances where some may flee whilst others might stand fast. And also that the structure and culture of the army (how much does the general place under his direct control?) also plays a part and may require different control mechanics.
Quote from: dwkay57 on April 04, 2013, 07:38:16 PM
Applying these ideas to Ancients might suggest that:
- For conscript armies with larger units then maybe the focus is to get them moving in the right direction and leave it at that.
- For smaller more professional units there might be more flexibility.
- Officers commanding something in the region of 1,000 to 3,000 men might be used to some degree of initiative given detached or garrison duties.
- And in line with Sun Tsu's teachings we might expect elite units deployed to outflank and outwit the enemy to have a higher level of freedom.
This leads me to still consider that there is a role to be played by a senior officer's characteristics, especially in poor circumstances where some may flee whilst others might stand fast. And also that the structure and culture of the army (how much does the general place under his direct control?) also plays a part and may require different control mechanics.
This looks good to me. One of the striking features about Gaugamela is Alexander's cavalry boxing in and sorting out the 20,000-man Persian cavalry left using just three 300-man squadrons. Command superiority or what?
For senior officer characteristics, a good illustration is the campaign of AD62 (Romans against Parthians) in Tacitus, Annals XV.6-16. Each Roman commander has three legions and the same opponent (Parthians), but the different commander personalities result in very different outcomes!
Paetus, full of bluster (and himself), swaggers out against the Parthians, deploys a detachment and fails to support it, then, when it is wiped out, runs back to camp and sits there demoralised until the Parthians cajole him into abandoning the camp (and Armenia). Corbulo displays a master hand, thwarts the Parthian attempts to attack Syria, chivvies them out of Armenia and more or less restores the status quo.
I would suggest that Corbulo would have a high point value and allow a player to do more or less whatever his forces were capable of. Paetus would have a low point value and could only order an advance by no more than 3,000 troops or 20% of his force, whichever is less, with the rest of his army sitting tight until the 3,000 win or are routed/lost, at which point the entire army may advance if the detachment won or must withdraw if they lost. Or something like that.
In both the cases that Patrick cites it is the personality of the commander that matters. I am not quite sure whether this is because that is the didactic point that Taciitus is making or that his is a real story about command. One commander does it the proper Roman way and succeeds, whilst the other dithers and fails. Is that because the Roman army has a system of command that is totally dependent upon the general? I think it likely because that is essentially how command works until armies become too big for one man to control
Mission command looks a good definition but it is crucially dependent upon the subordinate having time and space without close supervision. Mostly this does not happen on an Ancient battlefield.
Caesar gives Labienus an ambush force to command and it fails, Sabin's and Cotta have independent command and that fails too, though not all generals fail in such circumstances. At Gaugamela Alexander most definitely does not give subordinates independent authority to take decisions as they have to pursue him around the field with messengers to access a reserve.
In modern warfare there are different conditions because a general officer might find that he is suddenly able to destroy a major part of the opposing army. However, when these situations occurred in the desert battles in 1941, the British commanders fail to grasp these opportunities and the Germans only do so because Rommel intervenes directly, flying around in his Feisler Storch to pitch in at the crucial point.
A prime example of Mission Command is Davout at Jena Auerstadt. He single handedly defeated most of the Prussian army with a corps and Napoleon distrusted him for ever after .
In Ancient warfare the C&C system means that there can only be one winner and leader. All look to the one general, only he can properly command and only he can ride alonein the triumphal chariot.
Roy
The Mission and Directive models are interesting but we have to use them carefully back in time. Both, for example, require a clearly understood hierarchy and chain of command, which may have been hazier at other times and places.
One thing we might consider is the importance of standard battle drills (what WRG used to call standing orders :) ). Familiarity with these and the limits of flexibility inherent in them will have helped armies to operate effectively with minimal micro management from commanders. Only where some tricksy ploy is being used do the troops have to be told what to do, or when the enemy does something surprising. How much do Roman commanders, for example, leave their legions to do their thing and only intervene at key points, perhaps with just a small command?
Most of the time, it would seem. Flaminius at Cynoscephalae finds out that Macedonian troops are pushing his skirmishers off the hills, so he draws up the army and sends it forward. He is with the left wing, which meets Philip and the right-wing phalanx coming downhill at full steam and quickly starts to collapse. Flaminius gives up on them and moves over to the right, where in his absence things have gone swimmingly, the Macedonians being a) unable to deploy and b) caught by the elephants (very nasty!) and hence routed before Flaminius even arrives. Just as he is patting himself on the back for this, a tribune with a superb view of the action downhill and over to the Macedonian right sees that the principes and triarii of his legion could do something much more constructive than just cheer on their pursuing hastati, and in an extremely rare exercise of Roman subordinate initiative does so. Flaminius gets the credit and we do not even know the tribune's name.
Caesar and Scipio are unusual in that they do things with their army the way wargamers would expect to be able to on the tabletop. Scipio at Ilipa and subsequently at Zama throws away the drill-book and deploys his principes and triarii on the wings of his hastati, just the way wargamers like to do but other Roman generals never did. Caesar at Bibracte (fighting the Helvetii) orders his third line to move as an entity against the suddenly-appearing Boii and Tulingi, and although at the Sambre (against the Nervii et al) he is pretty much limited to encouraging the troops and sorting out a bit of a mess on the right, at Pharsalus he devises a cunning plan with a cohort plucked from each legion and formed into a special anti-cavalry force which he keeps under his own hand and commits at the decisive moment. The rest of the battle he leaves to his subordinates.
One might venture that the legion had a default battle procedure which against most run-of-the-mill opponents was good enough in itself to win without the commander lifting a finger (just as well when one looks at the level of command occasionally thrown up by the senate). A good commander could improve upon this and a bad commander dishearten the men sufficiently to impair its functioning, but the main effect of the commander was to deliver the army in place, on time and in the right formation to do its stuff.
Regarding Paetus and Corbulo, one can see Paetus wearing away the fabric that held his legions together (indiscriminate leave grants, slack discipline, bombastic speeches but indecisive action, poor planning, hasty and ill-advised measures, and panic spreading from the top) while Corbulo builds up this fabric (wintering his men in tents, exercising them, devising and constructing effective fortifications and signal towers to bar the Euphrates, picking a fast-moving crack force to rescue Paetus) and then makes good and effective use of his troops. I am not sure if Tacitus intended the episode as an object lesson in command, but the different personalities, approaches and results with very similar forces did not escape him.
It would be interesting to know why Labienus fails to spring the trap. Was it:
a) He was more cautious than J Caesar and felt the circumstances weren't quite right
b) He lacked J Caesar's strength of leadership and couldn't get his troops to attack
c) He wasn't too loyal to J Caesar and didn't mind seeing him become a cropper
d) Something else?
Chapter 22 Caesar Gallic War 1
At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterward ascertained from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by the Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next hill: [and] draws them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had been ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned through spies, that the mountain was in possession of his own men, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck with fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp three miles from theirs.
So Caesar does not get to the Helvetian camp because his liaison officer Considius reports that the hill is in the posssesion of the Gauls, rather than Labienus.
Clearly one of the problems of delegating a force is co-ordination.
Not to mention identification, as at Gergovia.
One of the unanswered questions about Caesar's Gallic campaigns is the extent to which he used Gallic auxiliaries: we do know they made up the bulk of this cavalry, but how many Gallic infantry did he customarily employ? If Gauls were attached to Labienus then Considius might have jumped to conclusions if they were the first troops he could distinguish. That said, Caesar considers Considius to have 'reported what he had not seen'.
By Gergovia, Caesar is making explicit reference to Gauls (Aedui) as part of his army. The fact that a bare right shoulder was the recognition token for the Gauls on his side shows how far their combat costume had changed since the old birthday suit days.
QuoteOne of the unanswered questions about Caesar's Gallic campaigns is the extent to which he used Gallic auxiliaries: we do know they made up the bulk of this cavalry, but how many Gallic infantry did he customarily employ? If Gauls were attached to Labienus then Considius might have jumped to conclusions if they were the first troops he could distinguish.
Very good point, Patrick. I don't believe there are many (if any) overt references to auxiliaries, but reading between the lines we might suspect that some were employed. Those poor messengers that Q. Cicero sent out cannot have been the only people with a vested interest in Roman success.
Regarding the episode under discussion, Caesar makes Considius out to be a regular Thersites in the aftermath, which reinforces the essential responsibility of the comander, who it seems must be prepared to delegate blame as assiduously as he cultivates praise.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 10, 2013, 05:25:08 PM
Regarding the episode under discussion, Caesar makes Considius out to be a regular Thersites in the aftermath, which reinforces the essential responsibility of the comander, who it seems must be prepared to delegate blame as assiduously as he cultivates praise.
Beautifully put, Aaron. I am reminded of the judgement of Hugh Bichenoe on the Penobscot expedition of 1779 (a bit outside our period), commenting to the effect that for the rebel politicians involved in the affair (which included most of the commanders involved on the rebel side):
"It mattered not who won or lost, but how they placed the blame!"
The Aedui are serving as allies and would appear to be wearing trousers, no shirt and a cloak. The rather crude identification method implies that it is an unusual situation.
If Caesar did have Gallic foot auxiliaries then we would expect them to be mentioned. In Civil War he hires archers from the Gallic Ruteni...who get mentioned. Similarly other auxiliaries are named. Caesar does give an army list for each battle, probably because that would be poor style, but mentioning the auxiliaries in passing or when recruited serves the purpose of glorifying Rome by noting which people's followed its standards.
So Gallic infantry auxilia units... Unlikely.
Roy
Caesar does state that in his campaign against the Belgae:
"... a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him ... " (Gallic War II.17.1)
Some of them 'went by night to the Nervii' (nocte ad Nervios pervenerunt) and told them Caesar's marching arrangements, implying they had an eye for military matters.
Would these people all be camp followers and noncombatants? Caesar does not mention them directly taking part in the subsequent battle, but we do have here a significant number of Gauls with Caesar's army as of 57 BC. Might this have something to do with Caesar's tendency to write 'ten cohorts' rather than, say, 'a legion' on certain occasions - because several of those cohorts were composed of Gauls and Julius did not want the Senate to realise quite how much force he was amassing under his own banner?
Sabinus' legion in V.24.4 consists of 'a legion ... 'and five cohorts' [et cohortes V] - five cohorts from where? Caesar does not say.
All of this suggests low-profile Gallic auxiliaries to me.
The reason I wonder about this is because everywhere else the Romans appear to have made as much use of allies and auxiliaries as possible, and it would be unusual for Gaul to be the exception.
Good point about the Belgae! However, they might well be cavalry. I am just surprised that, if Caesar had cohorts of spear armed foot auxiliaries that they are not mentioned as doing something, being left back at camp or given a task. Spanish auxiliaries are mentioned in Civil War.
Roy
In Book III.20&ff, Crassus takes a single legion off to subdue the whole of Aquitania:
"Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries and cavalry [auxiliis equitatuque comparato], and having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, that border on these regions, he led his army into the territories of the Sotiates." (Gallic War III.20.2)
Here 'auxiliaries and cavalry' are explicitly recruited, and in III.24 he deploys in two lines 'with the auxiliaries in the centre', and in III.25 the auxiliaries keep the legionaries supplied with stones and missiles as they shoot up Gallic camp defences.
Did Caesar overlook a resource that was apparent and available to Crassus?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 12, 2013, 05:46:01 PM
Sabinus' legion in V.24.4 consists of 'a legion ... 'and five cohorts' [et cohortes V] - five cohorts from where? Caesar does not say.
All of this suggests low-profile Gallic auxiliaries to me.
One thing to bear in mind, though, is that "Gallic auxiliary cohorts" may not necessarily be wild tribesmen: Caesar also recruits cohorts in the existing Province of Transalpine Gaul, from Gallic tribes who've been Roman provincials for two generations or so. Some of these cohorts, it seems, became the "vernacular legion" V Alaudae - but probably only after a few years in service. When Caesar confronted his first emergency, the migration of the Helvetii in 58, he "ordered as many troops as possible to be raised in the Province" (BG I.7). In 52, during the great Gallic rising, the rebels threatened the old Transalpine Province of Gaul, and we hear of a "garrison" (
praesidia) of 22 cohorts raised from the Province itself by Lucius Caesar (BG VII.65).
So how Gallic, and how Roman, were such militia cohorts when first raised?
Interesting discussion on Caesar's Gallic auxiliaries (or non auxiliaries), but a little off thread perhaps.
Coming back to the original discussion, have we learnt anything that we are now applying to our wargames?
Personally:
- I've restructured some of my armies (Greek) so that the army commander has more troops under his direct control.
- Commanders now can't send messages or instructions when their division is engaged in melee.
That would make sense, David.
Do you find any anomalies arising because of the hex grid? One feature of hex-grid wargames is that the 'grain' - the orientation of the hexes to the flow of play - can make a big difference to the game. Earlier games tended to have play 'down the rows' to permit straight-line advances, but this ran into the problem that one could find three hexes of opponents concentrating on one hex of friendly troops. Later games usually opted to have play 'through the corners', which permits armies to function in straight lines and encourages single-hex vs single-hex combat except on open flanks, but meant that armies had to advance zig-zag fashion.
The latter can actually be turned to advantage with Greek armies, as requiring them to shift right (or right more often than left) during an advance can replicate Thucydides' famous right-hand drift if this is relevant at the scale being used.
Quote from: dwkay57 on April 14, 2013, 10:12:48 AM
- Commanders now can't send messages or instructions when their division is engaged in melee.
I think this last is a question of abstraction/simplification. We had examples of messages being sent to Alexander by divisions in combat above. However, I'd suggest (mainly from my reading of medieval command and control) that it depends on a number of things e.g.
1. Situational awareness - how well is the divisional commander aware of what's going on (both in his own part of the battle and the rest of it?) This is in part going to reflect on the skills of the commander, part on his physical situation.
2. Personal involvement - how personally engaged is the commander. If he's fighting in the front rank, sword in hand, he may have little time to be thinking about messages, but if he's sitting on his horse at the back it might be easier
For simplicity, I think I would do the same as you. However, if you wanted added complexity, dicing to send and receive messages based on factors like the above may be the way to go.
To answer to Patrick's question about anomalies arising from the use of hexes, I think it is "not that I've spotted". This could be partly because my opposing sides have tended to be roughly even in terms of divisions (one division occupies one hex) if not in manpower or fighting power. It has only been on the flanks where I can recall any evidence of ganging up.
It may also be that my armies are largely based on close order infantry which tends to place a focus on maintaining a cohesive battle line so gaps haven't really opened up.
I use the faces for direction which seems to work well and have built in a couple of rules to prevent units in a hex from lapping round in melee if that exposes their rear to enemy in an adjacent hex (following the discussion of offset units and gaps in lines in Slingshot a while back) and also to limit the opportunities for a flank or rear charge unless the attackers are really behind their opposition front and not just offset to it.
Not too sure if this makes sense but can explain further if needed.
Seems fine to me - the basic question was whether a change of 'grain' would benefit the system, but there is no need to fix what is not broken. :)
I agree with you David. Flank and Rear attacks are all too easy because we know that there is nothing behind the enemy line or over the next rise. It must actually have been very difficult to get a unit to turn and present its own flank or even rear to a potential enemy who might have a reserve or a camp guard that could intervene.
Roy
I've noted that my army commanders have a tendency to die off in battle. This may be just my rules or that their bodyguards are the only high quality troops in their army they tend to be used offensively (probably at the wrong time). The loss of their army commander tends to reduce the morale of the troops under his command, but recent comments to my posted battle reports suggest there may be cases where this might be the reverse.
At present commanders' characteristics affect their reaction to circumstances and have an influencing effect on their troops morale. Is there any case for introducing another characteristic - potentially called "inspirational" - that would influence troops enthusiasm in battle (i.e. actually make them fight better or worse)? If so how would you classify the gradings in that characteristic and what would their effect be? And how would the loss of the commander affect troops?
At present I have a "loyalty" characteristic for commanders but this reflects the degree of support for the next person up the chain of command (e.g. the commander of my Persian Immortals is very loyal towards Xerxes) but their isn't anything similar to represent a link between troops and their commander except for a general morale classification.
Quote from: dwkay57 on April 27, 2013, 09:17:21 AM
I've noted that my army commanders have a tendency to die off in battle.
We are recreating a period where commanders were expected to get "hands-on" in combat and where the number becoming casualties (killed, wounded,captured) was high. It is, though, a question of looking at at what stage of a fight are casualties happening. Most leader casualties probably come from when the fight has turned against. If you are losing a high proportion leading successful combats, you may need to tweak a bit.
On the subject of what morale effect the loss of a leader should have, there is much more to be said. At some points in a battle, it may be catastrophic, at others much less noticeable. We can see in the Medieval period a distinct tactic to aim an attack at the enemy standard, which will signify the enemy commander's position. Is this a heroic mode of warfare, a tactic aimed at breaking enemy morale or a tactic aimed at removing leadership so that the enemy army doesn't operate effectively? The loss of a commander within the context of the battle as a whole is worth more detailed consideration, to clarify how to model the effect.
In general the loss of the commander is a huge blow. I suspect that it is because only he can give ordersand there is no pre agreed devolution of command unless you are rRepublican Romans with two consuls on the field. In most mediaeval battles, when led by the king, a chain of command could be taken as indicating who would be king if the king fell, or perhaps who would be regent. That's not such a problem if the king and his heir are on the field and the succession is already regulated, but at Hastings, for example, the loss of William would have left no clear leader and I doubt that he was interested in creating a succession crisis by elevating someone, even Odo.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 27, 2013, 01:31:10 PM
at Hastings, for example, the loss of William would have left no clear leader and I doubt that he was interested in creating a succession crisis by elevating someone, even Odo.
Roy
Hastings is a good example of how the loss of leaders effects morale. The rumour of the death of William causes panic, and he has to show himself to restore calm. As you point out, leadership succession may have been an issue, as may the fact that William
was the cause - without him, what were they doing there? And maybe, as William had made much of the divine sanction of his campaign, a fear that God had changed sides? However, Harold apparently becomes a casualty (is seriously wounded) without having a huge effect - the English fail slowly, not in a surge of panic. What seems to happen is that they lose all their leaders and suffer really heavy casualties so at the end of the day, they have no will to combat left. Yet they don't rout (or not all of them) - hasty Norman pursuit comes across some troops at least still prepared to turn and fight a rearguard action.
I wonder if Harold's banner does not fall?? Running from a mounted opponent might be a very bad idea, even if you were on a hill so the guys around Harold may have kept his standard flying til the end. Of course if he was wounded in an ocular fashion first command and control might have gone , but technically he was still there??
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 27, 2013, 05:58:28 PM
I wonder if Harold's banner does not fall??
Roy
Possible. If he is shot, we can assume his comitatus/familia/hearthmen close round him. With the standard still flying, they keep the truth from the army? But the general point is how do we model this stuff - a panic caused by a rumour on one side, no immediate effect when commander is disabled on the other. Do we represent this by a random chance, or is there something more about the state of the armies morale when the incident happens that we need to account for?
I think that there is a comparison between Napoleonic wars command and ancients.
Similar technology and notice how the abilities of the man on the spot matter, because of the difficultly of communication with people not so far away.
Then you have the ability of the troops; Persian levies vs Roman legionaries. So training makes a difference, to either a Spartan or a Macedonian.
Quote from: aligern on April 27, 2013, 01:31:10 PM
In general the loss of the commander is a huge blow. I suspect that it is because only he can give orders and there is no pre-agreed devolution of command unless you are Republican Romans with two consuls on the field. In most mediaeval battles, when led by the king, a chain of command could be taken as indicating who would be king if the king fell, or perhaps who would be regent. That's not such a problem if the king and his heir are on the field and the succession is already regulated, but at Hastings, for example, the loss of William would have left no clear leader and I doubt that he was interested in creating a succession crisis by elevating someone, even Odo.
Roy
This seems to vary with culture: at Chalons, the loss of the Visigothic king seems to have mattered not one jot, and his heir did not even know he was the new king until the day ended. Similarly, in Greek hoplite battles generals fell even when leading victorious armies (Epaminondas at Second Mantinea) and their men carried on to victory.
In fact, I find it hard to point to any hoplite engagement where the death or incapacitation of the C-in-C actually affected the outcome of the action.
Conversely, at Heraclea and Hastings, one side only has to think something has happened to their C-in-C and their morale plummets. There do seem to be important cultural factors at work here, most notably the king being on the battlefield. I would suggest that the loss of a royal general (other than a Spartan; they kept a 'spare' king at home just in case) or prestigious barbarian chieftain would have a deleterious morale effect but the loss of an appointed 'regular' C-in-C would not.
Note that in civil war actions, e.g. Marius v. Sulla or Caesar vs Pompey, where the head of a faction is C-in-C his death could have a significant impact - although funnily enough it never happened between Republican Romans. Even Cassius at Philippi survived the battle, albeit not his own post-mortem analysis of it.
Perversely, the Romans had a way of turning the equation around -
devotio. If things were not going well, an eligible consul would dedicate himself and the opposing side to the infernal gods and rush among the enemy ranks to be slain. The gods would then give the Romans the victory, or at least strike the enemy with a morale disadvantage equivalent to losing
their own C-in-C. (The question that naturally arises is if
devotio was really so effective, and consuls consistently virtuously self-sacrificing, why did the Romans ever get beaten?)
Going back to Anthony's question about how we "model" the loss in our games, my mechanism works on the basis that if the commander's unit is 5% or less of its initial strength or the Division it is part of is broken then the rest of the army treats that as the commander being lost. This seems to match the "is he dead or not?" confusion but perhaps I ought to up the limit to 10% as a more accurate reflection?
The discussion would seem to suggest that the impact of a lost commander depends on the type of army, culture and existing organised hierarchy. I haven't played with any other rules since WRG 6th, do any of the newer ones reflect such differences?
I suspect not, but am prepared to be corrected on this point.
Philip Sabin's
Lost Battles does proportion the effect of leader loss to the leader's effectiveness, so losing an Uninspired Commander has zero effect on army morale, whereas losing a Brilliant Leader permanently drops army morale besides removing the Brilliant General benefit for troops he is with and adjacent to. Thus an army with a useless C-in-C can lose him and not notice it, but a top-rated general biting the dust will have a significant negative impact whether or not his is the C-in-C.
This I think is along the right track though not quite all the way. The relative immunity of hoplite armies to leader loss does not seem to have been looked into previously in
Lost Battles or anywhere else, at least in anything I have seen. Maybe it will in future.
For Greek hoplite and Thessalian armies, I suggest making the Thessalians vulnerable to leader loss - if the Tagus falls, their command structure goes flat and nobody really has much of a reason to be on the field any longer. The Greek armies, on the other hand, should not even test for or be otherwise influenced by loss of a leader, even the C-in-C, except that if he goes down then nobody will be giving out fresh orders so the troops would just carry on with their last orders or do what comes naturally. Default hoplite behaviour in the absence of a living commander seemed to be:
- keep fighting, or
- pursue routers for a short while (Spartans not at all if the routers are broken beyond rallying) then drift back to camp in something resembling formation but needing to pull itself together if attacked (Spartans march back in proper battle formation), or
- strip the bodies and raise a trophy (assuming nothing else is happening on the battlefield).
Troops who have not yet made contact when the C-in-C dies may just halt if belonging to an allied contingent (Sparta's Peloponnesian troops at Leuctra hung back from the fight when Cleombrotus went under - the Spartans counterattacked to recover his body and then fell back off the field under increasing Theban pressure, whereupon the allies left too).
I have not done a formal count, but my impression is that more Greek hoplite commanders died during pursuits than on the field. Not having a horse would tend to accentuate this. I would thus suggest that killing an opposing hoplite general (especially the C-in-C) is a victory point bonus or tie-breaker in the final analysis of who won rather than an event that affects unit or army morale on the field.
Interesting stuff on hoplites, Patrick. I wonder how it compares to other times/places? Are Successors prone to similar patterns or has the nature of war/leadership changed?
Picking out one point about when leaders become casualties, an impression I have of medieval battles is few leaders were lost in their moment of triumph. Most seem to have been killed, captured, disabled as things went pear-shaped and either things disintegrated round them or they did something desperate to restore a losing situation (Richard IIIat Bosworth is the obvious but no means only one). So whatever their loss of leader impact, it added to an already bad situation.
The only one that springs to mind of a leader killed early and its effect is the death of Ridolfo Gonzaga at Fornovo. The battle was still very much in the balance at the point he went down. The morale effect was negligible (it was an allied army and none of its commanders were figures of devotion) but it did stop the reserve division being summoned (they had orders only to engage if ordered by Ridolfo Gonzaga, to avoid them being committed piecemeal), which effectively prevented the Italian plan from succeeding.
Successors are almost the complete opposite to hoplite armies in this respect: if the general goes down, the battle is lost. There are good reasons for this: the general is usually the king, and the army is loyal to (and paid by) the king, not the state. Hoplite armies are state armies; Successor armies tend to be personal armies, or at least armies who look to the king, not the state, for inspiration because to a great extent l'etat c'est moi.
This holds up to and including the battle of Raphia (217 BC) where Antiochus III's battle plan is to kill Ptolemy IV. It is also a principal feature of the long-running Seleucid wars of succession (c.160-85 BC), beside which the Wars of the Roses look like a Sunday picnic: the aim of the battle is to kill either the incumbent or the pretender.
One gains the impression that even when a general rather than the monarch was leading a Successor army, his demise considerably affected his side's performance. It is not too easy to quantify this: the Maccabean Revolt provides quite a few instances of generals biting the dust along with their defeated forces, but it is not always clear whether this is coincidence or cause and effect.
Hence my own reading is that a hoplite army is in the field for its polis, and if one more citizen goes down that is regrettable but not catastrophic. He can be replaced, albeit not during the battle. If a Hellenistic monarch goes down, the national troops have lost their symbol and the mercenaries their paymaster, all of which is bad news. This is a simplistic 'analysis', but one which I believe contains a root of truth.
not just successors either, since it was both the Persian plan when fighting Alexander - and how many generals died trying at Grannicus - and also Alexander's plan at Gaugamela.
but the grannicus shows the key point - the Persians threw loads of satraps and generals into combat with Alexander, but he did not return the compliment until the 'final battle' at Grannicus.
So we should be differentiating between sovereign generals and war leaders.
the interesting point would be someone like Caesar in Gaul - had he been killed at pretty much any point in the Gallic wars, would the Senate have allowed someone else to carry on ? or would they have said, 'well, that was his plan, its not ours, they have no gold mines, who cares'?
One of the things I liked about FoG was having two different types of leader - but perhaps we could also add a sovereign/ non sovereign status over that too.
Personally, I would only allow body guard type units to be fielded with a sovereign general - such as Agema, Praetorians, Immortals, etc.
possibly even field them at the same cost as normal troops - but the cost is, you automatically lose the battle if the sovereign is killed - and some of those sovereigns must lead from the front of that unit too.
I think that there are hero generals. Richard the Lionheart was clearly one who would inspire a unit, so was Alexander and so Caesar.
One art of generalship is to make your men more than men. You try and set up all the advantages, your men are well fed, not tired, well equipped with lots of ammunition . You place them uphill, (none of that Chinese nonsense about men uphill seeing too much) You support them with reserves and arrange an ambush of the enemy, you give a great speech, but sometimes the general just has to lead. At that point you are either Russell Crowe in Gladiator or you are not and the generals that are heroic and charismatic make their men more than men. Would I rather be fighting for Darius in his chariot or following Alexander on his charger?
Roy
One other point. Sometimes generals dismount to be with their men. This has a tremendously heartening effect because the soldiery fear that they will be abandoned by the toffs on horseback who can outdistance pursuit. Dismounting and being with the lads claerly stiffens morale for more than the unit involved.
Quote from: aligern on May 03, 2013, 10:19:51 AM
One other point. Sometimes generals dismount to be with their men. This has a tremendously heartening effect because the soldiery fear that they will be abandoned by the toffs on horseback who can outdistance pursuit. Dismounting and being with the lads claerly stiffens morale for more than the unit involved.
Though how heroic this was depends on the result. According to history, Edward IV is lauded as a hero general, on foot with his men, poleaxe in hand. On the other hand, James IV is an inept general , on foot with his men, pike in hand. The difference? James IV lost.
good point anthony.
Hero leaders and manager-generals works well for me as the definition, but I do suggest there is still something special when the general is also sovereign.
were I to write a set of rules, I would have both types of general, with pros and cons.
But I would also have an option to upgrade to sovereign, which comes with an elite unit not otherwise available that makes a real difference to your army - but with the proviso that if the king dies, you lose the game no matter what.
Quote from: Mark G on May 03, 2013, 10:57:46 AMBut I would also have an option to upgrade to sovereign, which comes with an elite unit not otherwise available that makes a real difference to your army - but with the proviso that if the king dies, you lose the game no matter what.
Does having the crown prince immediately available act as an insurance policy - thinking of Theodoric and Thorismund at Mauriacus? Though there is always the "not the c-in-c" clause when you have multiple kings present! And (stepping out of period here) did Gustav Adolf lose the game at Lutzen?
It rather depends on the legitimacy of the crown prince at the time in the eyes of the army.
Lutzen is actually a good example of the 'no matter what' clause, since the protestants overall suffered badly despite winning the field that day, because GA died.
Just for info.. as mentioned by Patrick, Philip Sabin's Lost Battles has two types of general.
Leaders who lead a unit of the army (often a guard unit) and Commanders who have a more roving mode of operation. Roman and Carthaginian generals tend to be commanders; while Hellenistic generals tend to be leaders. Leaders can provide more of a boost to combat, but only by putting themselves in harms way.
There are also 4 levels of quality (uninspired, average, inspired, brilliant) with quality rating depending on performance on the day/experience (Alexander the Great and Caesar change between battles).
Plus a category of Timid to capture Leaders who tended not to lead by example (Darius, Tigranes)
Like troop quality, the improvement offered by a higher quality general tends to better fit an exponential curve rather than a linear curve.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 03, 2013, 12:14:36 PM
Does having the crown prince immediately available act as an insurance policy
It's a bit variable. Edward III sent his son off to "win his spurs". On the other side of the field when John the Blind is killed, his son rounds up the remaining Bohemian contingent and departs post haste to claim his crown. 10 years later, King John II causes chaos by trying to get his own son out of harms way - a large part of the army "escorts him from the field", the French are stuffed, John is captured. So a bit of a mixed bag.
Quote from: aligern on May 03, 2013, 10:19:51 AM
I think that there are hero generals. Richard the Lionheart was clearly one who would inspire a unit, so was Alexander and so Caesar.
Yet, I would submit that Richard was also a thinking general, who arguably exercised both directive and mission command as the situation required. The march to and subsequent battle at Arsuf is a useful discussion point - and indeed shall be at one of the sessions in honour of Bernard Bachrach this Thursday at K'zoo.
I will be arguing that analysis of the personalities who led the charge of the hospitallers indicates Richard operated a degree of decentralized command through, at least one, veteran subordinate stationed at a critical point. In this case Baldwin de Carron. Thursday will be a brief intro due to time constraints, but if anyone is around for the VI Military Orders conference this September, you can suffer the full four part harmony ;)
On the leaders v commanders, we quite often find High Medieval generals where they need to be. Out front for the pre battle mass etc., and then with a (mounted) reserve until they feel the requirement to 'intervene'. Of course there are variations and exceptions, but despite being represented as the first man ashore at Jaffa, Richard quickly returned to his more usual spot, with the reserve in over watch, thereafter.
Regards,
"sessions in honour of Bernard Bachrach this Thursday at K'zoo"
Could you expand a little more on this?
Sure Mark,
As you probably know, the International Congress on Medieval Studies is held each May at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo.
This year there will be two sessions in honour Bernard Bachrach (Thursday 9th May).
Studies in Medieval Military History in Honor of Bernard S. Bachrach I:
Contrary Winds: Theories of History and the Limits of Sachkritik, Stephen Morillo, Wabash College
The Military Obligations of the Danish Church in the High Middle Ages, Niels Lund, Københavns Univ.
The Battle of Arsuf, 7 September 1191, Benjamin Z. Kedar, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem
Response to Kedar, "The Battle of Arsuf, 7 September 1191",Stephen Bennett, Queen Mary, Univ. of London
Studies in Medieval Military History in Honor of Bernard S. Bachrach II
The Roman Frontier along the Upper Danube in Late Antiquity, Andreas Schwarcz, Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, Univ. Wien
Anthropogenic Land Cover Change: Its Relevance for Medieval Military History, Charles Bowlus, Univ. of Arkansas–Fayetteville
The Hundred Years War as a Siege War, Kelly DeVries, Loyola Univ. Maryland
Benie Kedar very kindly gave me five minutes of his slot to disagree with him - a true gentleman :)
I believe that these papers will eventually be printed as a festschrift, so will be available in due course.
Quote from: janner on May 07, 2013, 10:10:30 AM
Response to Kedar, "The Battle of Arsuf, 7 September 1191",Stephen Bennett, Queen Mary, Univ. of London
Benie Kedar very kindly gave me five minutes of his slot to disagree with him - a true gentleman :)
Might one who has no chance of appearing at Kalamazoo tentatively enquire about the basis of this learned disagreement?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2013, 01:52:18 PM
Might one who has no chance of appearing at Kalamazoo tentatively enquire about the basis of this learned disagreement?
From his immense local and historical knowledge, Prof Kedar believes Richard had a specific location in mind for the battle with Saladin.
I will argue that, whilst his focus was maintaining the column's cohesion, Richard was also alive to seizing a fleeting opportunity to give Saladin a bloody nose. Hence we have an experienced household knight, Baldwin de Carron, collocated with the Hospitallers. Moreover, the charge was described as being initiated by the marshal, i.e. the chap who arguably should lead a military order attack, and Richard's Johnny on the spot, Baldwin. All sounds suspiciously close to a commander employing delegated command to me.
So, they are not necessarily wholly opposing positions and I am very much looking forward to hearing his paper, as well as the others.
Traditionally, the attack by Richard's rearguard at Acre, followed by the whole army joining in, has been seen as fortuitous. I would however be very open to any suggestion that it was in fact intentional, and just awaiting the right opportunity.
It would be nice to know how your suggestion is received. :)
Reading through this thread (hello again, everyone, been a while) I pick up as a constant the fact that an army could act all together only under prearranged orders (like Hannibal's battles) but if a general wanted to change anything in mid-battle he had to go to the area where the improvisation was to be made.
In game terms this would seem to translate as follows:
The General moves and commands freely under the player's control. He has a limited direct command range of units (say 6'').
Subcommanders can move under prearranged orders (advance, hold, wheel right, wheel left, etc.). They may execute several orders one after the other. The timing of the execution of these orders is under the control of the player unless the general is too far away from the commander (say beyond 24''). The general can move into direct command range of a subcommander (6'') and issue one new order which replaces all the rest that subcommander had. If the subcommander is to do anything after the order is executed the general must come by and issue another order.
Subcommanders without orders or out of the 24'' range of the general may only attack enemy in charge range, or turn to face an enemy unit within charge range, or some similar combat move. No grand tactical manoeuvering. One can distinguish between timid subcommanders (will not charge), capable subcommanders (will charge or not charge at the player's discretion) and reckless subcommanders (will charge any enemy within range).
An exceptional commander within the general's 24'' may move freely under the player's control. This simulates the entreprising tribune at Cynoscephalae. It is very rare though.
Does that cover all the bases? ;)
On the subject of orders, it occurred to me that there are really only 2 kinds:
1. where to move to
2. who to attack
With this in mind, I'm trying out a mechanism for Optio (my own little system) in which each subcommander has a standard - basically a small piece of cardboard measuring 10x30mm, glued to a toothpick or length of wire which is inserted into a hole in the general's base. The one side of the standard is subdivided into 5 rectangles. The player writes a maximum of 5 orders onto the standard which is then inserted into its subcommander's base. The written side of the standard is turned to face the owning player at all times and the orders remain hidden from his opponent.
Movement orders
The battlefield is divided into squares, rather like Lost Battles. The squares are numbered like a chessboard: a,b,c,d,e, etc. for the rows, and 1,2,3,4,5, etc. for the columns. A move order would be written 'a5', 'c2', or whatever. It would oblige the subcommander to move his own base into that square - his command will of course follow along though it does not all have to end up in that square.
Attack orders
Every enemy unit is designated with a shorthand symbol, eg. 'HC' for Heavy Cavalry, 'Le' for legion, 'Ar' for archer, 'Au' for Auxilia, and so on. The order obliges the commander to attack the nearest enemy bases of that kind.
I've attached a pdf to illustrate what I mean.
Justin, are your "commanders" unit leaders or leaders of a group of units (i.e. sub-generals)? And have you built in any mechanisms for them deciding a target in B2 looks a better bet than B5?
At the moment, I'm pondering over how to classify senior officers along the lines of royal/appointed - hero/manager - leader/commander concepts in some consistent manner and then figure out how this might affect the actions of the men under their command both whilst alive and when lost.
Given that I already grade them for boldness, leadership strength and loyalty (upwards), I was looking for something was complementary but added another dimension and had a different effect (e.g. the loss of a "royal" senior officer would reduce the command morale by 1 but the loss of an "appointed" senior officer wouldn't have any effect. At present the only differential is that allied commands are less bothered about the loss of senior officers in the principal army.
They command groups of units, David.
In Optio an army is structured as follows:
1. Bases are grouped into command groups (CGs). A command group can be composed of one or more bases. Four bases is standard for infantry and two for cavalry. A command group is the smallest unit that can move tactically across the battlefield (a bit like FoG). When charging or evading, however, bases move individually (rather like DBM). This of course can fragment a command group, obliging the individual bases to come back together before the command group can move normally again.
2. Command groups are lumped into commands. Each command is under a commander. The number of commanders varies from army to army. The CGs of a command must be within in range of the commander (about 6") in order to move tactically, though individual bases of a CG may charge enemy even though out of command range.
3. In some cases CGs are grouped into subcommands. A subcommand is composed of several CGs but moves as a single unit. An example is a Republican legion. It is composed of 1 CG of 3 Velites bases, 1 CG of 3 Hastati, 1 CG of 3 Principes and 1 CG of 2 Triarii. After skirmishing the Velites will fall back and fuse with the other 3 CGs, making 4 Hastati, 4 Principes and 3 Triarii bases. The legion's command groups deploy in lines, one adjacent to and directly behind the other, and the entire legion moves around the battlefield as a block.
I haven't worked the commander's personalities too much, other than classifying them as timid, capable and reckless when out of the general's command range, and allowing some exceptional commanders initiative to do tactical manoeuvres of their own.
Dividing the battlefield into squares and making move orders simply an injunction for the commander to move his base into that square allows for a certain leeway in interpreting the orders. The commander must carry out his orders, but as the situation develops so the manner in which he carries it out can change - moving most of his command to the right or left of his position, for example. The commander can choose not to follow his orders only if they are impossible or he has moved out of the general's extreme command range (provisionally 24").
It sounds like your command and structure concepts are similar to mine Justin, although we may have started from different perspectives and priorities.
I'd be interested to know how you structure your army's command. Care to elaborate?
Justin, I did bore for England in Slingshot 282 (May 2012 - Very Very Little Wars article), but briefly: battles are fought between Sides; Sides are made up of 1 or more Armies; an Army consists of 1 or more Corps; a Corps is commanded by a "personality" and consists of 1 more Divisions; and a Division is much like your command group and consists of one or more units moving in company (i.e. staying in the same hex) and fighting in support of each other. There are some battle write ups in the battle report forum (under the heading Little Battles).
Beautiful terrain, David! Tell me, is there a command range for your generals/commanders? (sorry, haven't got the relevant Slingshot issue) If so, what happens to units outside the command range?
The terrain is the Hexon range from Kallistra. Each tile is about 100mm across. Visual range is 4 hexes with movement at 1 hex for foot divisions, 2 for mounted divisions.
Corps commanders are issued orders at the start of a battle (which are recorded) and according to their character and taking into account what they can see they may or may not (see earlier discussions in this thread) continue with their orders or do something else. Their orders can be changed by their CinC but there is a delay (dependent on distance) before they can be acted upon.
Divisions don't normally get separate orders but move in company and support other divisions in their corps with the assumption that tactical orders are shouted across or delivered by local messengers. If they do go off on a special mission then they must have orders to do so and will suffer a morale reduction for being more than 2 hexes from any other division in their corps. This encourages the keeping of commands together and using small good quality corps for flank marches etc. where reliability may be key.
In terms of influence, commanders can boost "come on lads charge!" or degrade "Don't charge but stand on the hill!" the morale of their own division and any division in their command in adjacent hex. The amount of influence depends upon one of their characteristics. The only other morale influence at present is their demise which is consistently negative. Based on recent items in this thread, I'm thinking about introducing a fourth characteristic along the lines of: "Royal/Appointed/Elected/Warlord" but can't decide how that would influence either fighting tenacity or general morale, except in altering the impact of their demise.
So in summary to answer Justin's question: troops are assumed to follow orders unless their local divisional morale gets too good or too poor; commanders also follow orders unless their reaction, affected by their character, to their surroundings give them cause to change their interpretation.
A fascinating study comes from Joshua's conquest of Ai and Bethel found in Joshua 8. A Hebrew ambush was sprung on a visual command from Joshua (raising his javelin - 8:18) and a burning village was the signal for a feigned retreat to turn to the attack (8:21).
And its Hellenic equivalent:
"When Chabrias was advancing against a hostile city, he landed a body of peltasts by night; and at the break of day he entered the harbour, and pretended to disembark his troops at some distance from the city. The citizens sallied out, to contest his landing; but then the peltasts emerged from their ambush and fell upon the enemy's rear. After killing some of them, they re-embarked with a considerable number of prisoners." - Polyaenus, Stratagems III.8.9
Pre-programmed ambushes were employed by quite a few noted Greek generals.
"When Demosthenes was commanding the Acarnanians and Amphilochians against the Peloponnesians, he encamped in front of the enemy, with a large torrent parting the camps. He observed that the enemy greatly outnumbered him, and expected that they would try to surround him. He concealed a body of hoplites, along with three hundred of the allies, in a hollow place, which was suitable for ambushes. He ordered them, if the enemy tried to surround him, to sally forth and attack them in the rear. The Peloponnesians, as he expected, extended their line in an attempt to surround him; but the men sallied forth from their ambush, fell upon their rear, and easily obtained the victory." - idem 1.2
"After acquiring a large quantity of spoils at Epidaurus, Iphicrates retreated to his ships, but he was pursued by the Laconian governor of the region, who took up a position on a hill, in order to intercept him. Iphicrates drew up his hoplites before his baggage, and attached to them in various places the light-armed troops and other weaker forces, to increase their numbers; then he concealed himself with the rest of his army, a small distance away. When the hoplites advanced against the Laconian governor, he left the hill to attack them. Iphicrates, with the other part of his army, wheeled about and took possession of the hill; then he fell on the rear of the enemy and completely defeated them. " - idem 9.48
Justin's system of orders might be a way to operate such cunning plans without recourse to an umpire.