The Empire is Dead thread, one of our most prolific ever, has mutated into a discussion of Chalons, which we may as well continue here.
Not the Chalons thread we've already got? (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=217.0).
Whilst awaiting a final decision, does anyone notice something curious about the placement of the Alans? Jordanes describes how untrustworthy Sangiban was, ready to surrender to Attila the moment he had a chance. He is placed by Aetius in the middle of the battleline:
| Now Theodorid with the Visigoths held the right wing and Aëtius with the Romans the left. They placed in the centre Sangiban (who, as said before, was in command of the Alani), thus contriving with military caution to surround by a host of faithful troops the man in whose loyalty they had little confidence. For one who has difficulties placed in the way of his flight readily submits to the necessity of fighting. |
As anyone who had done a little military history knows, if a contingent decides to quit the battlefield in the middle of a battle, nothing can stop it leaving - unless it has uncommitted loyal troops behind it. This is what cost Hasdrubal Dertosa. His centre, formed of Spanish troops, decamped the moment they were in spitting distance of the Romans, and there was nothing Hasdrubal could do about it since the rest of his army was already engaged. What would stop Sangiban doing the same? The only thing I can think of is a reserve force behind him. This is implied by Jordanes saying that he was surrounded 'by a host of faithful troops'.
Who were these faithful troops? When Attila has lost the fight for the ridge and decides to assault the Alans and Visigoths, he himself leads the Hunnic force that attacks the Alans. He succeeds at least in pushing them back whilst the Visigoths stand firm. This exposes his flank. The Visigoths however, are fully engaged in beating off a Hunnic/Ostrogothic attack. So where do they find enough strength to attack the Huns with such force that they nearly kill Attila himself? Detaching men already engaged in fighting a foe to attack another foe was not attempted in this period (in fact I can't think of any period in which it was attempted). And the man to command this
ad hoc redeployment - Theodoric - was already dead.
The only thing that makes sense to me is that the Visigoths had a reserve force behind the Alans, or possibly behind the main Visigothic line. This force, there to keep the Alans in the fight, saw its chance when the Huns' advance left their flank exposed, and charged in:
| (209) Here King Theodored, while riding by to encourage his army, was thrown from his horse and trampled under foot by his own men, thus ending his days at a ripe old age. But others say he was slain by the spear of Andag of the host of the Ostrogoths, who were then under the sway of Attila. This was what the soothsayers had told to Attila in prophecy, though he understood it of Aëtius. (210) Then the Visigoths, separating from the Alani, fell upon the horde of the Huns and nearly slew Attila. |
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 06, 2014, 09:52:12 PM
Not the Chalons thread we've already got? (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=217.0).
Good point - we have this one, that one and the Battle Day Chalons thread. Post here for now and we shall see about transferring it.
A thought about the following:
Adgrediamur igitur hostem alacres: audaciores sunt semper, qui inferunt bellum. Adunatas dispicite dissonas gentes: indicium pavoris est societate defendi. En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant. Nota vobis sunt quam sint levia Romanorum arma: primo etiam non dico vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt. - Jordanes, Getica XXXIX/204
( Let us then attack the foe eagerly; for they are ever the bolder who make the attack. Despise this union of discordant races! To defend oneself by alliance is proof of cowardice. See, even before our attack they are smitten with terror. They seek the heights, they seize the hills and,
repenting too late, clamor for protection against battle in the open fields. You know how slight a matter the Roman attack is. While they are still gathering in order and forming in one line with locked shields, they are checked, I will not say by the first wound, but even by the dust of battle.) - Mierow translation
Does anyone know if Jordanes was even aware of the Latin subjunctive? I think what he is trying to convey in
et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant is that
if the Romans were to come down into the plains/on to the level ground they
would soon repent of it and demand 'monitiones' - literally as written, this means 'warnings', but is universally and perhaps correctly assumed to be a Jordanic slip for 'munitiones', supports or fortifications. In other words, the Romans are on the heights, but
should they change their minds and come down onto the plain they
would soon regret it.
This would mean that the reference to " ... they sought refuge for their lives, whom but a little while before no earthen walls could withstand." refers to the siege at Orleans, noting that in
quibus paulo ante nullus poterat muralis agger obsistere agger muralis, a 'rampart of walls', is the subject of the sentence). A more accurate translation might be that it took a 'mural rampart' (i.e. walls) to withstand the Huns, hence:
"... they sought refuge for their lives, [these men] whom but a little while before needed walls in order to withstand them [or could only be withstood from behind walls]."
This, if interpreted correctly, would mean that no field defences were actually erected on the battlefield but that (if 'monitiones' meant fortifications rather than supports) Attila and his men were happy to agree that the Romans would want them if they were to come down onto the level ground.
Justin raises an interesting point when he suggests that:
Quote
the Visigoths had a reserve force behind the Alans, or possibly behind the main Visigothic line. This force, there to keep the Alans in the fight, saw its chance when the Huns' advance left their flank exposed, and charged in:
"
Then the Visigoths, separating from the Alani [dividentes se ab Alanis]
, fell upon the horde of the Huns and nearly slew Attila. But he prudently took flight and straightway shut himself and his companions within the barriers of the camp, which he had fortified with wagons." - Getica XL/210
'Fortified with wagons' is plaustris vallatum habebat, he had a fence of wagons.
We seem to have perhaps three contingents of Visigoths on the field: Thorismond on the left with Aetius, Theoderic on the right facing the Ostrogoths and this group deployed with the Alans which could 'separate from' the latter to deliver what seems to have been the decisive stroke of the battle.
The 'efflagitant' is in the indicative, which would, on the face of it, give the sense of the Romans here and now clamouring for fortifications on the level ground, 'clamouring' in the sense of frantically making them, which Attila interprets for his men as fear on the part of the Roman infantry.
It's the weekend, and I'm in a creative mood, so here is my suggested recreation of the battle. Anyone is welcome to shoot it down in flames (with reference to primary sources and archaeology of course >:( .... ;)).
1. Deployment.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/catalaunian%20fields/ch1.png)
2. Attila orders the Huns facing the Romans along with the Gepids to take the heights. They fail and are beaten back by the Romans and Auxilia under Aetius, and the Visigoths under Thorismud.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/catalaunian%20fields/ch2.png)
3. Whilst Attila harangues his men, the Roman infantry on the flat ground dig ramparts to blunt the anticipated Hunnic cavalry charge. The Alans and Visigoths move up to support the Romans.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/catalaunian%20fields/ch3.png)
4. Attila attacks the Alans and Visigoths under Theodoric. The Visigoths hold firm but the Huns drive the Alans back. The Visigothic reserve behind the Alans keeps step with their retreat, preventing them from breaking and running. The Roman fieldworks are outflanked the the Romans forced to give way. The Hunnic right wing moves up to pin the Romans, Auxilia and Visigoths, but does not engage them.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/catalaunian%20fields/ch4.png)
5. As the Alans continue to fall back, the commander of the Visigothic reserve realises he has a golden opportunity. He parts company with the Alans, gallops around to the exposed flank of the Hunnic centre and charges in, nearly killing Attila who is not far from that exposed flank. Attila retreats and game....I mean, battle, over.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/catalaunian%20fields/ch5.png)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 07, 2014, 06:48:25 PM
The 'efflagitant' is in the indicative, which would, on the face of it, give the sense of the Romans here and now clamouring for fortifications on the level ground, 'clamouring' in the sense of frantically making them, which Attila interprets for his men as fear on the part of the Roman infantry.
I had a look at the Getica (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Getica?qsrc=3044#The_late_Latin_of_Jordanes) entry in Wikipedia (for want of a better commentary) and it mentions there that Jordanes did use the indicative for the subjunctive, whether always or only on occasion not being clear:
Quote
Syntax. Case variability and loss of agreement in prepositional phrases (inter Danubium Margumque fluminibus), change of participial tense (egressi .. et transeuntes), loss of subjunctive in favor of indicative, loss of distinction between principal and subordinate clauses, confusion of subordinating conjunctions.
This would mean that at the time of Attila's speech the Romans were still on the ridge, but could descend whenever it suited them. Assuming 'monitiones' indicates fortifications, we may still observe that Attila expected Aetius' troops to want to create defences, and hence to be accustomed to and capable of doing so.
Interesting reference to Jordanes' Latin. Given that the subjunctive for Jordanes had gone west, this line could be understood in the sense: 'On the plains they
would - far too late - clamour for field defences.'
It's just the context that is a problem. Jordanes has Attila telling his men what the Romans
are doing that shows them to be not all that formidable:
| En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant.
Behold, before our attack they are already filled with fear: they seek the heights, they take the hills and, when it is too late, they clamour for defences in the fields. |
This gives the impression of what the Romans are actually doing, as opposed to what they might do in different circumstances.
Unfortunately the simplest way of reading that the Visigoths separate from the Alans is that they are in line with them and when the Alans are pushed back the Visigoths separate from them by going forward, driving back the Ostrogoths and attacking the Huns.
If the Visigoths have a reserve placed behind the Alans we might expect it to be mentioned when we are told that the Alans are placed in the middle in case they think of deserting.
How would the passage about the Romans read if what was being said referred to the Roman forces having hid in the cities whilst Attila tramped around Gaul taking cities, none of which (supposedly) had been able to resist his army.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 07, 2014, 08:19:08 PM
Unfortunately the simplest way of reading that the Visigoths separate from the Alans is that they are in line with them and when the Alans are pushed back the Visigoths separate from them by going forward, driving back the Ostrogoths and attacking the Huns.
This is possible. The Visigoths rout the Ostrogoths in short order, sending them packing, then turn and charge the Huns in the flank/rear who are still being held up by the Alans.
Jordanes' text is too vague to decide either way. He mentions that Theodoric is trampled by his own men whilst riding to and fro, encouraging his army:
| Hic Theodoridus rex dum adhortans discurrit exercitum, equo depulsus pedibusque suorum conculcatus vitam maturae senectutis conclusit.
This king Theodoric, riding to and fro encouraging his army, was thrown from his horse and trampled by the feet of his own men, ending a life in ripe old age. |
If one can deduce anything from this line, it is the sense that the Visigoths were locked in combat and not immediately carrying everything before them, requiring that the king go about bolstering the resolve of his men. The desperate fighting that Jordanes describes in the previous sentences suggests that the battle was - for some time at least - an indecisive affair. Would that leave the Visigoths time to send off the Ostrogoths and then turn on the Huns before they routed the Alans?
Quote from: aligern on February 07, 2014, 08:19:08 PMIf the Visigoths have a reserve placed behind the Alans we might expect it to be mentioned when we are told that the Alans are placed in the middle in case they think of deserting.
The point though is that nothing would have prevented the Alans from leaving the battlefield if there were no loyal troops behind them - plenty of examples of that from other battles. The text from Jordanes says that the Alans were surrounded by faithful troops:
| Dextrum itaque cornum cum Vesegothis Theoderidus tenebat, sinistrum Aetius cum Romanis, conlocantes in medio Sanguibanum, quem superius rettulimus praefuisse Alanis, providentes cautioni militari, ut eum, de cuius animo minus praesumebant, fidelium turba concluderent.
Now Theodorid with the Visigoths held the right wing and Aëtius with the Romans the left. They placed in the centre Sangiban (who, as said before, was in command of the Alani), thus contriving with military caution to surround by a host of faithful troops the man in whose loyalty they had little confidence. |
The verb
concludo means to shut up, enclose, confine, surround, encompass. The implication is that Sangiban had allied troops all around him, not just the sides but the rear too, leaving him no choice but to fight the Huns.
Quote from: aligern on February 07, 2014, 08:19:08 PMHow would the passage about the Romans read if what was being said referred to the Roman forces having hid in the cities whilst Attila tramped around Gaul taking cities, none of which (supposedly) had been able to resist his army.
I see the bit about the Romans and their field fortifications as happening then and there on the battlefield. Jordanes gives a nice parallel later with the Huns' own field defences, behind which they shelter, having a short time previously overcome those of their adversaries. It seems to make more sense in the context of the battle rather than referring to earlier, separate events.
For Thoderid to be trampled by his own men would imply that he is out in front of them . If we imagine the battle as being a bit like the scenes in LotR where the Rohirrim charge then there is a point at which, seeing the giant elephants advancing towards them, the King of Rohan, Theoden, makes a second exhortation to his men to turn their front and attack the pachyderms. Just such a victory to the front, then pause, speech and fresh attack would fit quite nicely.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 08, 2014, 08:38:41 AM
For Thoderid to be trampled by his own men would imply that he is out in front of them . If we imagine the battle as being a bit like the scenes in LotR where the Rohirrim charge then there is a point at which, seeing the giant elephants advancing towards them, the King of Rohan, Theoden, makes a second exhortation to his men to turn their front and attack the pachyderms. Just such a victory to the front, then pause, speech and fresh attack would fit quite nicely.
Roy
Could be. Jordanes wasn't there on a nice high vantage point with a video camera, so it is difficult to push his text too far. In the phrase:
Theodoridus rex dum adhortans discurrit exercitum the interesting word is 'discurrit'.
Discurro means 'to run in different directions', 'to run to and fro', 'to run about'. In this context it carries the idea of a mobile king moving around encouraging a static army, which makes sense if he runs around in the
rear. The idea then is that he exhorts his men from the back of the line. At a critical point the part of his army where he is is pushed back (cavalry warfare is very mobile) and the king falls from his horse, getting trampled by his men. In the confusion nobody notices - the Visigoths in falling back lose sight of the king's body. The Visigoths carry on fighting, eventually driving the Ostrogoths back. It seems difficult to conceive the king running around in
front of his army that had already engaged the enemy. Stopping in one place and pausing to give a speech during a momentary lull, yes. Moving backwards and forwards along the ranks, mmm.....
The cavalry warfare of the period is quite mobile Justin. People advance and retreat. Also the Visigoths fight two actions her so there is a forward and probably flanking movement here. I doubt that he was behind his men...not the Visigothic way.
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 07, 2014, 06:48:25 PM
It's the weekend, and I'm in a creative mood, so here is my suggested recreation of the battle. Anyone is welcome to shoot it down in flames (with reference to primary sources and archaeology of course >:( .... ;)).
1. Deployment.
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/catalaunian%20fields/ch1.png)
Rather than opening up with cannon from the six-o-clock position, a couple of thoughts about the Roman side of the deployment.
1) Should the Auxilia be a separate contingent?
2) Should the Roman line extend beyond the high ground?
1) My impression of a Late Roman deployment is that the auxilia and legiones would tend to go in front with archers and some reserve auxilia and/or legiones behind in a second line, or some variation on this theme. Judging by Argentoratum, our most detailed Late Roman lineup (in Ammianus XVI.12) even if a century earlier, the auxilia and legiones were not deployed side by side in separate contingents but as an integrated line.
It would also make more sense (at least to my eye) for the Roman infantry to stay on the high ground until everyone was committed and then begin their ponderous swing into the thick of the fray. Infantry tend to be left high and dry in a cavalry battle, and the Alans would be the obvious choice to handle the level ground next to the ridge.
2) The impression I get from Jordanes is that Aetius takes the high ground and Attila describes him as being there:
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 07, 2014, 08:04:36 PM
| En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant.
Behold, before our attack they are already filled with fear: they seek the heights, they take the hills and, when it is too late, they clamour for defences in the fields. |
Jordanes ignorance of or indifference to the subjunctive leaves one wondering if he has altered the sense of Cassiodorus - assuming he is using Cassiodorus' description - or struggling to express in Latin a concept that might have been a challenge for Old German and perhaps also for Hunnic.
That the Romans are on the heights (tumulos capiunt, they take the heights) seems certain: Attila disingenuously attributes Aetius' motive for taking the high ground to fear, whereas in fact it makes good tactical sense and this is simply sour grapes being presented as garnish because Attila did not manage to take them. The problem with taking Jordanes' 'in campos monitiones efflagitant' (on the plain they demand supports/defences) to mean Roman troops are on the level ground is that they cannot be in two places at the same time.
Assuming that some Romans were on the heights and some on the low ground is plausible, but that would suggest some Romans not being 'fearful' enough to take themselves off to the high ground in the first place, an inconsistency which would not be lost upon Attila's listeners.
One could hypothesise that Aetius, having taken the heights, had advanced his leading line onto level ground and that they were now clamouring for protection, though this seems strange conduct for troops that Jordanes has just referred to as being 'the flower of the Roman army'. For what it is worth, I take Attila's remark as a disparaging reference to the Roman custom of constructing a fortified camp instead of having a proper wagon laager as real men born in the saddle (despite the gynaecological impossibility) do with the aim of getting his men to commit to the fight in the remainder of the field and ignore rather than worry about the successful Romans and the defeated Gepids.
On another peripherally related point, does anyone have the impression that Aetius may have been short of cavalry? Jordanes' Attila refers to the line of shields denoting the presence of the Roman army but not to Roman cavalry, and if Thorismund was on the same wing as Aetius for reasons other than providing Aetius with a conveniently-reached hostage to encourage Theodred's good behaviour then one of those reasons would probably be to bulk up the left flank mounted contingent.
Then again, if the Alans were truly 'surrounded' by loyal troops, maybe this is what the Roman cavalry were doing. Speculation, certainly, but can we come to any conclusion about how much 'Roman' cavalry Aetius may have deployed?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 11:41:35 AM
Rather than opening up with cannon from the six-o-clock position, a couple of thoughts about the Roman side of the deployment.
1) Should the Auxilia be a separate contingent?
2) Should the Roman line extend beyond the high ground?
1) My impression of a Late Roman deployment is that the auxilia and legiones would tend to go in front with archers and some reserve auxilia and/or legiones behind in a second line, or some variation on this theme. Judging by Argentoratum, our most detailed Late Roman lineup (in Ammianus XVI.12) even if a century earlier, the auxilia and legiones were not deployed side by side in separate contingents but as an integrated line.
True. Take the Roman-Auxilia part of the deployment as merely an indication of where they were in relation to the rest of the army. Given the size of the forces involved (if we believe the recorded numbers), one imagines that there would be deployment in depth following the command limitations in deploying too wide. Hence more than one line. One can remark that command cohesion fell apart in any case as the battle progressed.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 11:41:35 AMIt would also make more sense (at least to my eye) for the Roman infantry to stay on the high ground until everyone was committed and then begin their ponderous swing into the thick of the fray. Infantry tend to be left high and dry in a cavalry battle, and the Alans would be the obvious choice to handle the level ground next to the ridge.
There doesn't seem to have been much swinging on the part of the Romans. They just advance to the ridge and then keep advancing until they reach Attila's camp, which Thorismud mistakenly enters.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 11:41:35 AMAssuming that some Romans were on the heights and some on the low ground is plausible, but that would suggest some Romans not being 'fearful' enough to take themselves off to the high ground in the first place, an inconsistency which would not be lost upon Attila's listeners.
Unless Attila is affirming that the Roman infantry will face the Huns in the open only when the terrain is in their favour, but will not dare to face them on level ground without digging earthenwork defences to bolster their inability to withstand a Hunnic cavalry charge.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 11:41:35 AMOne could hypothesise that Aetius, having taken the heights, had advanced his leading line onto level ground and that they were now clamouring for protection, though this seems strange conduct for troops that Jordanes has just referred to as being 'the flower of the Roman army'. For what it is worth, I take Attila's remark as a disparaging reference to the Roman custom of constructing a fortified camp instead of having a proper wagon laager as real men born in the saddle (despite the gynaecological impossibility) do with the aim of getting his men to commit to the fight in the remainder of the field and ignore rather than worry about the successful Romans and the defeated Gepids.
Jordanes'
en implies that Attila is referring to what the Romans are doing then and there in full view of his listeners. For me it rather forces the text to have the field defences refer to a fortified camp that the Romans made the day before and were quite happy to leave in order to confront the Huns.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 11:41:35 AMOn another peripherally related point, does anyone have the impression that Aetius may have been short of cavalry? Jordanes' Attila refers to the line of shields denoting the presence of the Roman army but not to Roman cavalry, and if Thorismund was on the same wing as Aetius for reasons other than providing Aetius with a conveniently-reached hostage to encourage Theodred's good behaviour then one of those reasons would probably be to bulk up the left flank mounted contingent.
Yes I did notice that. In the discussion on the late Roman army in Gaul, I think it was Jim who pointed out that it costs far less to create and equip one infantryman than one cavalryman. When not on campaign infantry are quite adequate for manning forts and towns. Cavalry are needed only for the actual battles which in fact are few and far between. This would explain why Aetius, rather strapped for resources, relied on barbarian cavalry for campaign work, calling out his infantry only in a supreme crisis.[/quote]
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 11:41:35 AMThen again, if the Alans were truly 'surrounded' by loyal troops, maybe this is what the Roman cavalry were doing. Speculation, certainly, but can we come to any conclusion about how much 'Roman' cavalry Aetius may have deployed?
It's possible that the troops at the rear were Roman mounted, though it seems neater to suppose they were the Visigoths who separated from the Alans and charged Attila. But we are speculating here.
On Aetius's lack of Roman cavalry, do any of the sources mention what cavalry units were extant in the course of the 5th century? There were the Taifali and the Sarmatians. Any others?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 08, 2014, 02:08:25 PM
Jordanes' en implies that Attila is referring to what the Romans are doing then and there in full view of his listeners. For me it rather forces the text to have the field defences refer to a fortified camp that the Romans made the day before and were quite happy to leave in order to confront the Huns.
My point is that Attila is not referring to anything that happened on that day, the previous day or at any other time, but was saying that
if the Romans leave their nice comfy hills then they will want to dig themselves in, and the ungrammatical Jordanes had no way to express this except through misapplication of the indicative. In this understanding the 'en' (lo!) refers only to the fact that the Romans have seized the heights. My reading of this is that Attila is trying to fool his troops into believing that the Romans are not a threat (notice that Attila's disparagement of them is not followed by an injunction to attack them) in order to encourage the Huns to get stuck into the Alans and (interestingly in view of what Jordanes says about Visigoths later separating from the Alans) Visigoths. In theory the Visigoths should have been fronted by the Ostrogoths, so this might be evidence of Visigoths present in the sector of the Alans.
Quote
On Aetius's lack of Roman cavalry, do any of the sources mention what cavalry units were extant in the course of the 5th century? There were the Taifali and the Sarmatians. Any others?
I am not aware of any mention, so anyone's guess is as good as mine. It is just that I would have expected Attila to put in a disparaging remark about the Roman cavalry had they been on view - then again, with the Roman infantry on a ridge the cavalry might simply have been out of sight behind them.
Taking another look at that line:
| En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant.
Behold, before our attack they are already filled with fear: they seek the heights, they take the hills and, when it is too late, they clamour for defences in the fields. |
The Romans don't actually
build the field defences, they just feel a sudden need for them when it is too late to make them. The sense of this is that the Roman infantry find themselves on the level ground - just where they don't want to be when confronted by Huns - and are desperate to do something about it.
How does one interpret this? I propose that once the fight for the high ground was concluded, it became necessary for the rest of the army to move up in support of the advanced Roman left flank. This left Roman infantry on the level ground next to the ridge. Attila attributes to them fear at being in a position where they are at a disadvantage against cavalry. Normally Roman foot would have dug field fortifications at deployment before the battle started and stayed behind them, as did Belisarius's men at Dara. This time, though, the advance has left them exposed, as Attila points out to his men, soft targets for a nice bit of envelopment once the Alans and Visigoths are dispatched.
Which still leaves open the question of why the nice soft targets are sedulously avoided instead of being gobbled up - it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree.
Does show a lack on initiative on the part of Attila if he let the Romans advance and dig field defences and just watched them
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 07:52:58 PM... it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree.
Oh, come on - we have no really reliable information about numbers at Chalons: we don't know how many men either side had. Anything we think we know about whether Attila had enough manpower to do anything is little more than guesswork.
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 08, 2014, 10:07:20 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 07:52:58 PM... it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree.
Oh, come on - we have no really reliable information about numbers at Chalons: we don't know how many men either side had. Anything we think we know about whether Attila had enough manpower to do anything is little more than guesswork.
We do not know the OBs of each side beyond the names of the contingents, true, but as Aetius had already by Jordanes' account repulsed the Hunnic wing (whether composed of Huns, Gepids or others) that sought to regain the heights, we can surmise that frontages were more or less matched, especially as neither side (in Jordanes' account) expressed concerns about being outnumbered or surrounded.
We can thus reasonably conclude that neither side had a massive numerical advantage nor a significantly shorter line, although Attila does seem to have considered himself at a disadvantage. While the
absolute numbers on each side are impossible to pin down, the
relative strengths seem comparable with perhaps an edge in favour of Aetius' coalition. Hence the operational courses of action available to a force with an opponent of similar strength would seem to be open to Attila, including holding with his left and centre while attacking on the right.
Not really. An unknown part of the Roman and Visigoth army had repulsed an unknown part of Attila's army - not necessarily a "Hunnic wing". We can't safely deduce anything from that about relative strengths.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 08, 2014, 07:52:58 PM
Which still leaves open the question of why the nice soft targets are sedulously avoided instead of being gobbled up - it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree.
Can we assume that the Roman infantry could repulse a frontal cavalry charge by the Huns but could not withstand being flanked by them? That means that Attila had to get rid of the Visigoths and Alans first before helping himself to the unprotected Roman line. Granted the Hunnic cavalry could melee, I don't think they had the weight of cataphracts, able to attack formed heavy infantry frontally.
With the conclusion that a slope stops cavalry from charging effectively, enabling infantry to withstand them even if flanked.
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 08, 2014, 11:30:25 PM
Not really. An unknown part of the Roman and Visigoth army had repulsed an unknown part of Attila's army - not necessarily a "Hunnic wing". We can't safely deduce anything from that about relative strengths.
But the lack of mention of one side being substantially outnumbered or 'outwinged' (in the charming 18th century term) deployment-wise means we can. More probably than not, anyway, assuming that Cassiodorus' descriptive skills were up to the basics and Jordanes' paraphrasing did not include significant omissions.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 09, 2014, 06:12:41 AM
Can we assume that the Roman infantry could repulse a frontal cavalry charge by the Huns but could not withstand being flanked by them?
This seems a reasonable assumption.
Quote
That means that Attila had to get rid of the Visigoths and Alans first before helping himself to the unprotected Roman line. Granted the Hunnic cavalry could melee, I don't think they had the weight of cataphracts, able to attack formed heavy infantry frontally.
Less sure about Attila having to get rid of the Alans and Visigoths first - if the Romans were on the flat and, in theory, vulnerable, the way to eat them up from the flanks would be to deprive them of their immediate cavalry supports - Aetius' mounted troops and Thorismund's contingent - rather than to launch the Hunnic army's main strength into an uncertain engagement against the Visigoths and Alans. Hence, to me at least, simply holding the Alans and Visigoths while concentrating on the Romans' cavalry support (perhaps this is what Jordanes meant by 'monitiones'?) would be the best and fastest way to render the Roman infantry vulnerable, especially as help would be unlikely to be provided by the allied centre, consisting as it did of the apparently reluctant Alans.
Quote
With the conclusion that a slope stops cavalry from charging effectively, enabling infantry to withstand them even if flanked.
Again, eminently reasonable, as I am sure Duke William would have agreed at Hastings. Perhaps a good reason for Aetius to stay on the ridge until the main Hunnic contingents were committed elsewhere?
interesting, but a huge amount of interpretation there, building assumption on assumption:-)) The account looks much more. as though Attila. was going to match Aetius all along the line and try and break through in the centre where he was matching his best troops, the Hun cavalry, against the Alans who were of uncertain motivation.
That would have enabled him to swing right and left against the Visigoths and the Roman federates.
The advantage that the allies had gained through holding the Hill, was just that, the hill itself, as rising ground would take the sting out f a cavalry charge and give infantry confidence.
That's much more the sort of limited plan with the best troops under direct command that fits with Early Mediaeval armies.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 09, 2014, 12:57:19 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 08, 2014, 11:30:25 PM
Not really. An unknown part of the Roman and Visigoth army had repulsed an unknown part of Attila's army - not necessarily a "Hunnic wing". We can't safely deduce anything from that about relative strengths.
But the lack of mention of one side being substantially outnumbered or 'outwinged' (in the charming 18th century term) deployment-wise means we can. More probably than not, anyway, assuming that Cassiodorus' descriptive skills were up to the basics and Jordanes' paraphrasing did not include significant omissions.
So you've now dropped the idea that the fight for the hill tells us something about numbers, and fallen back on the narrative as a whole? OK, frontages seems to have been broadly equivalent. (But were depths, especially if the Alans needed a "reliable" second line behind them?) To go from that plausible (but, for at least the reasons you mention, hypothetical) deduction to "it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree" seems to me to be a large step too far.
But why? The Ostrogoths faced off the Visigoths, which was essentially going to happen no matter what anyone else did, and that pretty much covers the left flank. The Alans, whose enthusiasm seems to have been suspected by everyone involved, could have been held without much effort, possibly even with a skirmish screen if need be (risky, but if playing for dominion of the known world, risks can be taken). That the Hunnish right which was repulsed from the heights was substantial enough to deserve the apellation of a 'wing' we can adduce from Jordanes' description:
Attila suos diriget, qui cacumen montis invaderent, sed a Thorismundo et Aetio praevenitur, qui eluctati collis excelsa ut conscenderent, superiores effecti sunt, venientesque Hunnos montis benificio facile turbaverunt. - Getica XXXVIII/201
(Attila sent his men to take the summit of the mountain, but was outstripped by Thorismud and Aëtius, who in their effort to gain the top of the hill reached higher ground and through this advantage of position easily routed the Huns as they came up.)
Points to note are that a force (of 'suos', his men) was sent by Attila himself to gain the high ground, which implies a considerable force committed to an objective seen as important, and that when they were repulsed Attila felt he had to restore the fighting spirit of his troops by a speech
after the battle had begun. This points to a significant setback for a significant portion of the Hunnic army.
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 09, 2014, 04:24:02 PM
So you've now dropped the idea that the fight for the hill tells us something about numbers, and fallen back on the narrative as a whole?
Not sure I ever aired the idea that it
did tell us about numbers, only relative strengths/capabilities.
Quote
OK, frontages seems to have been broadly equivalent. (But were depths, especially if the Alans needed a "reliable" second line behind them?) To go from that plausible (but, for at least the reasons you mention, hypothetical) deduction to "it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree" seems to me to be a large step too far.
One wonders why 'a large step' and particularly why 'too far'. Attila's army seems to have drawn up facing the entire Romano-Alano-Gothic frontage, or as close to it as makes no odds, and do not seem to have stretched themselves in the process. That Aetius' coalition may have drawn up in greater depth along at least part of the front is indeed likely, particularly if the Alans were 'surrounded' using a second line of reliable troops. However this use of troops to buttress Alan fidelity would simply remove from the reckoning the surplus forces on Aetius' side without adding any corresponding offensive potential to the Alans, who would be less able to run off rather than more likely to attack (in the actual battle it would seem that the Huns took the attack to the Alans).
Hence it seems eminently reasonable to me that Attila could have committed significantly less force than he did against the Alans and not suffered for it, leaving him with more to use against the Romans.
This point originally grew from trying to interpret whether Jordanes' Attila speech was describing Romans deployed in the flat country who were clamouring for defences (or supports) or simply saying that
if they came down to flat country they
would be clamouring for defences/supports. The latter seems to me much more likely, as to have failed to attack an opponent whose morale was faltering and whose situation was disadvantageous would have marked Attila down as one of history's rather less capable generals.
That apart, I think we generally agree that for as long as the Romans held the heights (as opposed to venturing into the plain), they would be pretty much proof against anything Attila could throw at them.
A little information (albeit in panegyric form) on what Aetius brought with him from Italy.
In essence: Aetius arrived from Italy with a force of auxiliaries expecting to meet up with the Goths.
There is no mention of legions with him (although they are mentioned as being in Italy).
[Sidonius, Carmina 7.329]
"Aetius had scarce left the Alps, leading a thin, meagre force of auxiliaries without legionaries, vainly with ill-starred confidence expecting that the Gothic host would join his camp. But tidings came that struck the leader with dismay; in their own land were the Goths awaiting the Huns, a foe they now almost despised. Perplexed, he turned over every plan, and his mind was beset with surging cares. At length in his wavering heart was formed the fixed resolve to make appeal to a man of high estate ; and before an assemblage of all the nobles he thus began to plead : 'Avitus, saviour of the world, to whom it is no new glory to be besought by Aetius, thou didst wish it, and the enemy no longer does harm; thou wishest it, and he does good. All those thousands thou dost keep within bounds by thy nod; thine influence alone is a barrier-wall to the Gothic peoples; ever hostile to us, they grant peace to thee. Go, display the victorious eagles; bring it to pass, O noble hero, that the Huns, whose flight aforetime shook us, shall by a second defeat be made to do me service.' Thus he spake, and Avitus consenting changed his prayer into hope. Straightway he flies thence and rouses up the Gothic fury that was his willing slave. Rushing to enroll their names, the skin-clad warriors began to march behind the Roman trumpets; those barbarians feared the name of ' pay-docked soldiers,' [dirutus, 'bankrupt' or 'overthrown'] dreading the disgrace, not the loss. These men Avitus swept off to war, Avitus even thus early the world's hope, though now (or still) a plain citizen. Even so the bird of Phoebus, when bearing the cinnamon to his pyre on the Eryrthraean hill, rouses all the common multitude of birds; the obedient throng hies to him, and the air is too narrow to give their wings free play."
One needs to keep in mind that this is a panegyric. St Augustine, on the subject of panegyrics, said: "I lied, and was applauded by those who knew I lied." (somewhere in Confessions). In this passage, Sidonius is playing up the role of Avitus at Chalons, which consisted of persuading the Visigoths to join up with Aetius. To this effect he mentions that Aetius came from Italy with a few troops, and then conveniently omits the fact that Aetius also had the aid of Gallic Roman troops, a host of Auxilia, the Alans and other barbarians. You have to take him with a pinch of salt.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 09, 2014, 06:09:14 PM
One needs to keep in mind that this is a panegyric. St Augustine, on the subject of panegyrics, said: "I lied, and was applauded by those who knew I lied." (somewhere in Confessions). In this passage, Sidonius is playing up the role of Avitus at Chalons, which consisted of persuading the Visigoths to join up with Aetius. To this effect he mentions that Aetius came from Italy with a few troops, and then conveniently omits the fact that Aetius also had the aid of Gallic Roman troops, a host of Auxilia, the Alans and other barbarians. You have to take him with a pinch of salt.
Yes Justin. I am aware of all that.
Whilst Sidonius is bending facts there are facts there to be bent.
Don't be too hasty to dismiss this.
Taking another look at this passage:
| Adgrediamur igitur hostem alacres: audaciores sunt semper, qui inferunt bellum. Adunatas dispicite dissonas gentes: indicium pavoris est societate defendi. En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant. Nota vobis sunt quam sint levia Romanorum arma: primo etiam non dico vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt. - Jordanes, Getica XXXIX/204
Let us then attack the foe eagerly; for they are ever the bolder who make the attack. Despise this union of discordant races! To defend oneself by alliance is proof of fear. See, even before our attack they are smitten with terror. They seek the heights, they seize the hills and, when it is too late, clamor for defence works in the open fields. You know of how little consequence Roman arms are: they are weighed down, not even by the first wound, but by the dust itself, whilst they form up and join their battlelines and tortoises. |
The bit about seeking defence works on the level ground is applied to the allied army as a whole, not necessarily to the Roman infantry specifically, which Attila then goes on to talk about. One could assume that the only part of the army that would want field defences is the infantry, specifically the Romans and Auxilia. This leads to the reasonable conclusion that the Roman foot were on level ground, at least in part.
Notice how Attila urges his men to attack the Alans and Visigoths as a means of bringing down the Romans:
| Despise their battle line. Attack the Alani, smite the Visigoths! Seek swift victory in that spot where the battle rages. For when the sinews are cut the limbs soon relax, nor can a body stand when you have taken away the bones. |
The implication is that the Alans and Visigoths are giving vital support to the Romans. One could take it simply as a question of numbers: with the Visigoths and Alans gone, the Romans will be too few to withstand the Huns. But one could also take it in a more military sense: the Alans and Visigoths are covering the Roman right, which is in the plains, hence vulnerable to outflanking. Sweep the Alan-Visigothic support away and the Roman infantry will be outflanked and destroyed (implicitly leaving too few survivors on the ridge to have a chance against the victorious Hunnic host).
That is certainly one way of looking at it (in fact that is a rather good post). One does wonder, though, whether defeating the Visigoths and Alans would in itself gain the victory, with all else simply being mopping-up: if not, this argues for a rather more formidable Roman presence than is generally assumed.
In essence, we seem to have two overall options and several sub-options for interpreting this bit of Jordanes:
Option 1: the Indicative OptionOption 1a: the Romans have come down onto level ground, and are vulnerable and in need of defences, so Attila encourages his men to attack the Alans and Visigoths, presumably to give the Romans time to create defences, or
Option 1b: the Romans have come down onto level ground and are in need of supports: attacking the supports will leave the Romans out on a limb. (The question here is which Visigoths are to be attacked, as Theodoric is on the wrong side of the battlefield to support Aetius - under this interpretation Attila is presumably encouraging an attack on Thorismund, who is ensconced on the high ground.)
[Is this a fair representation of the implications?]
Option 2: the Subjunctive OptionOption 2a: the Romans are sitting pretty on the heights, and Attila wants to use the opportunity to crack the Alan and/or Visigoth line before the Romans can organise an attack, so speaks dismissively of the Romans, or
Option 2b: the Romans are sitting pretty on the heights, and Attila needs to boost his troops' morale and make the best of a bad job, so he disparages the Romans before sending his main strength against the Alans and Visigoths.
What is clear is that after the initial repulse from the high ground, Attila is not going to take on the Romans. Had they actually descended to the low ground, his rhetoric about them seems incompatible with his actions.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 09, 2014, 06:36:40 PM
The bit about seeking defence works on the level ground is applied to the allied army as a whole, not necessarily to the Roman infantry specifically, which Attila then goes on to talk about. One could assume that the only part of the army that would want field defences is the infantry, specifically the Romans and Auxilia. This leads to the reasonable conclusion that the Roman foot were on level ground, at least in part.
The assumption I agree with, but do not see how it leads to the conclusion unless one credits Jordanes with knowledge of the subjunctive and deliberate application of the indicative in this instance.
If Jordanes were capable of expressing the subjunctive in this case (he might have transcribed Cassiodorus), perhaps we should consider the possibility that:
et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitantshould be read as:
ut sera paenitudine in campos munitiones efflagitentTextual emendation is not something I advocate except where it seems inevitable, so this is just floated as a possibility.
Quote
Notice how Attila urges his men to attack the Alans and Visigoths as a means of bringing down the Romans:
| Despise their battle line. Attack the Alani, smite the Visigoths! Seek swift victory in that spot where the battle rages. For when the sinews are cut the limbs soon relax, nor can a body stand when you have taken away the bones. |
The implication is that the Alans and Visigoths are giving vital support to the Romans. One could take it simply as a question of numbers: with the Visigoths and Alans gone, the Romans will be too few to withstand the Huns. But one could also take it in a more military sense: the Alans and Visigoths are covering the Roman right, which is in the plains, hence vulnerable to outflanking. Sweep the Alan-Visigothic support away and the Roman infantry will be outflanked and destroyed (implicitly leaving too few survivors on the ridge to have a chance against the victorious Hunnic host).
To me, this looks valid as far as it goes, but the presumably easier course of knocking out the Alans and leaving the Visigoths locked in combat with the Ostrogoths would have the same effect of exposing the Roman right (albeit not the left) and potentially rear - and if the Alans could be routed, rounding on the Visigoths would be a better way to exploit the situation. Timing might also be tricky, as defeating the Alans and Visigoths could take most of the day, leaving the Romans able to get back to their camp as darkness closed in (pretty much what Attila did when things went against him). Naturally, if the Visigoths and Alans could be driven off the field and the Romans induced to fall back to their camp it would be a victory on points for Attila and thereafter very hard if not impossible for Aetius to hold the coalition together.
I would see this as Attila's overall intent: having given up on trying to beat the Romans in that sector of the field, he encourages his men to an all-out effort along the rest of the line in the hope of getting the Romans to retire once their allies started to crumble. However as evidence for the Romans being on level ground at the time he was speaking it seems to bear a curious contradiction: on the one hand, a Roman line is so feeble that even the weight of the dust it raises exhausts it, whereas on the other combat with it is implicitly to be avoided.
One might note that the central point Attila seems to be making is:
Nota vobis sunt quam sint levia Romanorum arma: primo etiam non dico vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt.(You know of how little consequence Roman arms are: they are weighed down, not even by the first wound, but by the dust itself, whilst they form up and join their battlelines and tortoises.)
It is as if he is reassuring his troops that they need not fear a Roman attack, implying that they were apprehensive on precisely this point. Had a Roman attack been developing as he spoke (I see no other reason for the Romans to leave their recently-captured heights) then just dismissing the threat with a few airy words and encouraging his men to concentrate on the
other sectors of the line seems to be just asking for trouble.
Quote from: rodge on February 09, 2014, 05:52:11 PM
A little information (albeit in panegyric form) on what Aetius brought with him from Italy.
In essence: Aetius arrived from Italy with a force of auxiliaries expecting to meet up with the Goths.
There is no mention of legions with him (although they are mentioned as being in Italy).
[Sidonius, Carmina 7.329]
"Aetius had scarce left the Alps, leading a thin, meagre force of auxiliaries without legionaries...
"vix liquerat Alpes Aetius, tenue et rarum sine milite ducens robur in auxiliis..." - literally, without
milites - soldiers rather than "legionaries". Quite what that means I am not sure - the point did crop up in the old thread.
Don't be too quick to rubbish panegyric Justin. Frequently they would be declaimed in front of the hero by the writer. It is OK to exaggerate and flatter a bit, but not to tell such biatant lies that ypu make the recipient look stupid. So we are not told that Avitus was at Chalons and thus very likely he was not. Its not a panegyric to Aetius and thus telling us that he came from Italy with a few federates only is most likely true.
Of course you could fly sky high with the idea that Sidonius deliberately ignores Aetius' large regular Roman army because he wants to enlarge Avitus' part in bringing the essential Visigothic. host to the battle:-))
For me the meaning of the speech that Attila puts into Attila's mouth is much more likely to mean that he despises the Roman army because it hides behind fortifications rather than fights in the open. That would refer to the recent campaign in Northern Gaul and , perhaps, look forward to the campaign in Italy where the Roman troops did not meet Attila in the field.
This is a battle of which we have no contemporary account. I admire your abilities in teasing out a theoretical course from Jordanes words, and as an interpretative exercise it is fun, but it is a leap too far.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 09, 2014, 08:30:36 PM
Don't be too quick to rubbish panegyric Justin. Frequently they would be declaimed in front of the hero by the writer. It is OK to exaggerate and flatter a bit, but not to tell such blatant lies that you make the recipient look stupid. So we are not told that Avitus was at Chalons and thus very likely he was not. Its not a panegyric to Aetius and thus telling us that he came from Italy with a few federates only is most likely true.
Avitus is termed 'saviour of the world' (!), which suggests a fairly high-flown rendering of events, though if we strip out the adjectives we may be able to extract a core likelihood, namely that Aetius, at least initially, brought a force of auxilia out of Italy to meet up with the Goths (and possibly with the Roman contingent in Gaul, but nobody says this). When the Goths declined the rendezvous, Aetius according to the panegyric relied exclusively on Avitus' powers of persuasion, and lo! the Goths appear in his train.
I have no evidence for the following so it is merely a surmise: following the Gothic decision to await the Huns within their own borders and the despatch of Avitus to try and talk them out of it, Aetius may well have called together further forces, stripping Italy and Gaul of their remaining mobile troops and whatever garrisons he could coax or cajole or order to join him. The resultant increase in the size and scope of his army might have been the deciding factor in the Visigoths' final decision to join his coalition.
Sidonius may thus have mentioned the initial contingent Aetius brought from Italy but passed over any subsequent reinforcement as not wholly relevant to the purpose of glorifying Avitus' diplomatic success.
Meanwhile, Gregory of Tours (II.7) has his own version of the battle.
"
Meanwhile Aetius and his allies the Goths and the Franks [sic]
had joined battle with Attila. When she saw that his army was being exterminated, Attila fled from the battlefield. Theodoric, the King of the Goths, was killed in this conflict. No one has any doubt that the army of the Huns was really routed by the prayers of the Bishop about whom I have told you; but it was the patrician Aetius, with the help of Thorismund, who gained the victory and destroyed the enemy."
If this is not just idle chatter on the part of Gregory, dare we link Gregory's mention of Aetius and Thorismund (note, not Theoderic) gaining the victory with Jordanes' mention of Visigoths 'separating from the Alans' and charging the Huns, putting Attila at risk? If so - and this is speculating - could Thorismund have been Aetius' tactical reserve on the coalition left wing? He could have supported the initial seizure of the heights, been sent to buttress the Alans (or at least 'police' their rear) and finally extracted his command to charge the Hunnic centre in flank or join such a charge led by Aetius.
Just a thought.
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 09, 2014, 08:05:39 PM
Quote from: rodge on February 09, 2014, 05:52:11 PM
A little information (albeit in panegyric form) on what Aetius brought with him from Italy.
In essence: Aetius arrived from Italy with a force of auxiliaries expecting to meet up with the Goths.
There is no mention of legions with him (although they are mentioned as being in Italy).
[Sidonius, Carmina 7.329]
"Aetius had scarce left the Alps, leading a thin, meagre force of auxiliaries without legionaries...
"vix liquerat Alpes Aetius, tenue et rarum sine milite ducens robur in auxiliis..." - literally, without milites - soldiers rather than "legionaries". Quite what that means I am not sure - the point did crop up in the old thread.
The Latin is a bit odd. Literally it means: "Aetius had scarcely left the Alps, leading a thin and meagre force without a soldier
in (the) Auxilia."
Not "ducens robur auxilium" - "leading a force
of Auxilia" as you would expect.
The best sense I can make of it is this: "Aetius had scarcely left the Alps, leading a thin and meagre force without a single soldier in the Auxilia." i.e. not only was Aetius force small, it also consisted of irregular and untrained Auxilia. The poor guy was really down on his luck, says Sidonius. Thank heavens for Avitus.
Actually Justin, that does make sense.
The Emperor/court/power brokers in Italy might well be very loathe to see Aetius lead a strong force into Gaul and leave Italy under-defended
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 10, 2014, 09:55:02 AM
Actually Justin, that does make sense.
The Emperor/court/power brokers in Italy might well be very loathe to see Aetius lead a strong force into Gaul and leave Italy under-defended
Jim
Which would go with the tension between the emperor and the MM which seems to have dominated events in this century. As I said earlier, I see this tension as the principal cause of the downfall of the empire in the west.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 09, 2014, 12:57:19 PM
Less sure about Attila having to get rid of the Alans and Visigoths first - if the Romans were on the flat and, in theory, vulnerable, the way to eat them up from the flanks would be to deprive them of their immediate cavalry supports - Aetius' mounted troops and Thorismund's contingent - rather than to launch the Hunnic army's main strength into an uncertain engagement against the Visigoths and Alans. Hence, to me at least, simply holding the Alans and Visigoths while concentrating on the Romans' cavalry support (perhaps this is what Jordanes meant by 'monitiones'?) would be the best and fastest way to render the Roman infantry vulnerable, especially as help would be unlikely to be provided by the allied centre, consisting as it did of the apparently reluctant Alans.
But it is too late for the Huns to redeploy. They are facing the Romans, Alans and part of the Visigoths on the allied right wing. The Gepids are facing Thorismud (which would explain how he managed to gain his part of the heights) and the Ostrogoths face the remaining part of the Visigoths on the allied right wing (which would partly explain why they were not given short shrift like the Alans). Attila's speech seems addressed to the Huns only, and their options are limited - attack the Romans again, or attack the Alans/Visigoths and outflank the Romans.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 09, 2014, 07:40:11 PM
I would see this as Attila's overall intent: having given up on trying to beat the Romans in that sector of the field, he encourages his men to an all-out effort along the rest of the line in the hope of getting the Romans to retire once their allies started to crumble. However as evidence for the Romans being on level ground at the time he was speaking it seems to bear a curious contradiction: on the one hand, a Roman line is so feeble that even the weight of the dust it raises exhausts it, whereas on the other combat with it is implicitly to be avoided.
One might note that the central point Attila seems to be making is:
Nota vobis sunt quam sint levia Romanorum arma: primo etiam non dico vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt.
(You know of how little consequence Roman arms are: they are weighed down, not even by the first wound, but by the dust itself, whilst they form up and join their battlelines and tortoises.)
It is as if he is reassuring his troops that they need not fear a Roman attack, implying that they were apprehensive on precisely this point. Had a Roman attack been developing as he spoke (I see no other reason for the Romans to leave their recently-captured heights) then just dismissing the threat with a few airy words and encouraging his men to concentrate on the other sectors of the line seems to be just asking for trouble.
One could also see this as an assurance by Attila that the Roman infantry are
slow: they are weighed down by their equipment, such that they will not be able to respond when the Huns attack on the left, in other words, Attila is telling his men not to worry about them - they will have plenty of time to engage and beat the Alans and Visigoths, after which enveloping and crushing the Roman infantry will be an easy task (as the Goths did at Adrianople).
All this translates into interesting precisions on troop types of this period. Visigothic cavalry can just about beat Ostrogothic and Gepid cavalry. Roman and Allied infantry can effortlessly beat Hunnic cavalry on a slope and just about withstand it frontally on open terrain (presuming part of the Roman line was on open terrain...) but cannot handle a flanking attack. Hunnic cavalry can beat any allied cavalry but not infantry. So...
Hunnic cavalry: Elite
Visigothic cavalry: Superior
Ostrogothic cavalry: Ordinary
Gepid cavalry: Ordinary
Alan cavalry: Ordinary
Roman and Allied infantry: Ordinary but with slightly superior basic factors against cavalry.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 10, 2014, 05:42:48 AM
The Latin is a bit odd. Literally it means: "Aetius had scarcely left the Alps, leading a thin and meagre force without a soldier in (the) Auxilia."
Not "ducens robur auxilium" - "leading a force of Auxilia" as you would expect.
The best sense I can make of it is this: "Aetius had scarcely left the Alps, leading a thin and meagre force without a single soldier in the Auxilia." i.e. not only was Aetius force small, it also consisted of irregular and untrained Auxilia. The poor guy was really down on his luck, says Sidonius. Thank heavens for Avitus.
Sidonius modestly addresses Avitus as 'Saviour of the World', but my impression is - and someone please correct me if this is wrong - that a 'miles' is a soldier who is a citizen of the Empire, whereas an 'auxiliaris' is a member of an auxilium, a regular soldier but theoretically a non-citizen until he finishes his term of service.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 10, 2014, 11:46:13 AM
One could also see this as an assurance by Attila that the Roman infantry are slow: they are weighed down by their equipment, such that they will not be able to respond when the Huns attack on the left, in other words, Attila is telling his men not to worry about them - they will have plenty of time to engage and beat the Alans and Visigoths, after which enveloping and crushing the Roman infantry will be an easy task (as the Goths did at Adrianople).
That certainly makes sense, and I think we can read him as emphasising the Romans' slowness rather than their vulnerability, reassuring his presumably shaken troops that despite their just-received repulse there will be no more to worry about in that sector for the immediate tactical future.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 10, 2014, 10:42:41 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 10, 2014, 09:55:02 AM
Actually Justin, that does make sense.
The Emperor/court/power brokers in Italy might well be very loathe to see Aetius lead a strong force into Gaul and leave Italy under-defended
Jim
Which would go with the tension between the emperor and the MM which seems to have dominated events in this century. As I said earlier, I see this tension as the principal cause of the downfall of the empire in the west.
This may well have been the case, with the Goths refusing to budge until a more significant Roman force was made available - despite Valentinian's wishes. The fielding of such a force following the incident prompting Sidonius' remarks would also accord with Valentinian suspecting Aetius of aiming at empire - especially if Aetius had kept the (presumed) extra troops in hand following Attila's defeat and not released them back to Italy.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 10, 2014, 11:46:13 AM
All this translates into interesting precisions on troop types of this period. Visigothic cavalry can just about beat Ostrogothic and Gepid cavalry. Roman and Allied infantry can effortlessly beat Hunnic cavalry on a slope and just about withstand it frontally on open terrain (presuming part of the Roman line was on open terrain...) but cannot handle a flanking attack. Hunnic cavalry can beat any allied cavalry but not infantry. So...
Hunnic cavalry: Elite
Visigothic cavalry: Superior
Ostrogothic cavalry: Ordinary
Gepid cavalry: Ordinary
Alan cavalry: Ordinary
Roman and Allied infantry: Ordinary but with slightly superior basic factors against cavalry.
Just one question: can Hunnic cavalry actually beat any allied cavalry? They seem to have had some success against the Alans but to have been defeated by Goths (and perhaps Romans in the initial clash) at Chalons. Following Attila's death the Gepids defeated the Huns at Nedao (Jordanes
Getica L/260-262).
To create the empire they did I'm working on the presumption they could beat without too much trouble any cavalry army in the area. To beat them would require a tactical or terrain advantage. Do we have any details of Nedao besides Jordanes' account? (which does not go into tactical specifics) Also keeping in mind that by Nedao the Huns were divided against themselves, each son of Attila clamouring for his portion of the empire without much display of solidarity between them:
| Finally, after many bitter conflicts, victory fell unexpectedly to the Gepidae. For the sword and conspiracy of Ardaric destroyed almost thirty thousand men, Huns as well as those of the other nations who brought them aid. In this battle fell Ellac, the elder son of Attila, whom his father is said to have loved so much more than all the rest that he preferred him to any child or even to all the children of his kingdom. But fortune was not in accord with his father's wish. For after slaying many of the foe, it appears that he met his death so bravely that if his father had lived, he would have rejoiced at his glorious end. When Ellac was slain, his remaining brothers were put to flight near the shore of the Sea of Pontus, where we have said the Goths first settled. Thus did the Huns give way, a race to which men thought the whole world must yield. So baneful a thing is division, that they who used to inspire terror when their strength was united, were overthrown separately. |
I'm not sure about this Patrick, "Sidonius modestly addresses Avitus as 'Saviour of the World', but my impression is - and someone please correct me if this is wrong - that a 'miles' is a soldier who is a citizen of the Empire, whereas an 'auxiliaris' is a member of an auxilium, a regular soldier but theoretically a non-citizen until he finishes his term of service."
Remember after Caracalla everybody within the Empire was a citizen. Unless Auxilia were recruited entirely from outside the Empire then they would have been composed of citizens. I suspect that in two hundred years the link between citizenship and auxiliaris might have broken down.
Also "This may well have been the case, with the Goths refusing to budge until a more significant Roman force was made available - despite Valentinian's wishes. The fielding of such a force following the incident prompting Sidonius' remarks would also accord with Valentinian suspecting Aetius of aiming at empire - especially if Aetius had kept the (presumed) extra troops in hand following Attila's defeat and not released them back to Italy."
We've no evidence that Aetius got more Romans, there is speculation he found some in the north of Gaul, but frankly it is purely speculation, the auxiliaries he found there might merely have been Barbarians who had fought with the Romans before, and had since been settled on land before Aetius 'recalled them to the colours' or whatever the Roman equivalent of the phrase is.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 10, 2014, 03:15:28 PM
We've no evidence that Aetius got more Romans, there is speculation he found some in the north of Gaul, but frankly it is purely speculation, the auxiliaries he found there might merely have been Barbarians who had fought with the Romans before, and had since been settled on land before Aetius 'recalled them to the colours' or whatever the Roman equivalent of the phrase is.
Jim
Bear in mind that the 'Romans' who fought at Chalons were not the Auxilia, as Jordanes makes clear:
| dextram partem Hunni cum suis, sinistram Romani et Vesegothae cum auxiliariis occuparunt, relictoque de cacumine eius iugo certamen ineunt.
The Huns with their forces seized the right side, the Romans and the Visigoths with the Auxilia the left, and then began a struggle for the yet untaken crest. |
Notice how the taking of the heights to the discomfiture of the Huns involves primarily the Romans and Visigoths, and secondarily the Auxilia. The implication is that the Roman regular infantry (whose trained and professional nature is also clear from Attila's description of them) were more numerous than the Auxilia, i.e. they were a powerful and significant force, such that Attila did not contemplate attacking them directly again.
Hang on a minute, not so long ago the argument was that Attila was describing the Romans as weak and feeble and we were discussing whether they'd built field defences.
I may be losing the plot a bit because I had a nightmare of broadband problems for a fortnight :-(
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 10, 2014, 05:19:44 PM
Hang on a minute, not so long ago the argument was that Attila was describing the Romans as weak and feeble and we were discussing whether they'd built field defences.
I may be losing the plot a bit because I had a nightmare of broadband problems for a fortnight :-(
Jim
Bad luck with the broadband. Is the problem fixed?
My take is that the Huns had been shoved off the ridge by the Roman-Auxilia-Visigothic combination, proving that Roman infantry were better than Huns in a frontal fight, and Attila has to do some damage control with the morale of his men. He affirms that the Romans are only good if the terrain is in their favour or if they dig some protection for themselves on the flat ground. Remember, this is what Attila tells his men, not necessarily what Jordanes thinks. Attila had fought Roman armies before, and his last battle at the Utus against the Eastern Empire had cost him dear, even though technically it was a victory. He could not have thought Roman troops were easy meat.
It seems on a careful reading of the passage that the Romans did not actually build field defences at Chalons, since Attila describes them as only 'clamouring' for them. Roman foot evidently built such defences if they could as a standard counter to heavy cavalry. The Romans at Chalons may have been clamouring, but it is Attila who gives his own interpretation as to what they were shouting about (how could he have known? They were hardly chanting 'We-want-field-defences' in unison).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 09, 2014, 07:40:11 PM
Option 1: the Indicative Option
Option 1a: the Romans have come down onto level ground, and are vulnerable and in need of defences, so Attila encourages his men to attack the Alans and Visigoths, presumably to give the Romans time to create defences, or
Option 1b: the Romans have come down onto level ground and are in need of supports: attacking the supports will leave the Romans out on a limb. (The question here is which Visigoths are to be attacked, as Theodoric is on the wrong side of the battlefield to support Aetius - under this interpretation Attila is presumably encouraging an attack on Thorismund, who is ensconced on the high ground.)
[Is this a fair representation of the implications?]
Option 2: the Subjunctive Option
Option 2a: the Romans are sitting pretty on the heights, and Attila wants to use the opportunity to crack the Alan and/or Visigoth line before the Romans can organise an attack, so speaks dismissively of the Romans, or
Option 2b: the Romans are sitting pretty on the heights, and Attila needs to boost his troops' morale and make the best of a bad job, so he disparages the Romans before sending his main strength against the Alans and Visigoths.
What is clear is that after the initial repulse from the high ground, Attila is not going to take on the Romans. Had they actually descended to the low ground, his rhetoric about them seems incompatible with his actions.
There is Option 3: a part of the Roman-Auxilia line occupies the heights along with Thorismud's Visigoths, but part of it necessarily extends into the plain, as the heights simply weren't long enough to accommodate the entire line of Roman infantry. In other words, Aetius couldn't make the Roman line shorter and the Alan line longer to fit the confines of the ridge. Or possibly he wasn't thinking of the possibilities of the ridge when he initially deployed. He was not fully in control of the allied army. He was able to decide the relative positioning of the various contingents, but could not fine-tune things after that. The allied army had to match the frontage of the Huns. Once everyone had shuffed into place, it turned out that the Roman foot would extend beyond the right of the ridge should the left wing of the army succeed in taking it (remember that the allied army did not deploy on the ridge to begin with). Aetius just had to live with that and hope for the best.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 10, 2014, 05:44:24 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 10, 2014, 05:19:44 PM
Hang on a minute, not so long ago the argument was that Attila was describing the Romans as weak and feeble and we were discussing whether they'd built field defences.
I may be losing the plot a bit because I had a nightmare of broadband problems for a fortnight :-(
Jim
Bad luck with the broadband. Is the problem fixed?
My take is that the Huns had been shoved off the ridge by the Roman-Auxilia-Visigothic combination, proving that Roman infantry were better than Huns in a frontal fight, and Attila has to do some damage control with the morale of his men. He affirms that the Romans are only good if the terrain is in their favour or if they dig some protection for themselves on the flat ground. Remember, this is what Attila tells his men, not necessarily what Jordanes thinks. Attila had fought Roman armies before, and his last battle at the Utus against the Eastern Empire had cost him dear, even though technically it was a victory. He could not have thought Roman troops were easy meat.
It seems on a careful reading of the passage that the Romans did not actually build field defences at Chalons, since Attila describes them as only 'clamouring' for them. Roman foot evidently built such defences if they could as a standard counter to heavy cavalry. The Romans at Chalons may have been clamouring, but it is Attila who gives his own interpretation as to what they were shouting about (how could he have known? They were hardly chanting 'We-want-field-defences' in unison).
Using elderly router and system works.
I doubt very much the Romans had time to build field defences.
Another thing to remember is that the Huns might not have regarded themselves as heavy cavalry. I'm not saying that they insisted on skirmishing in open order, I'm perfectly happy with the fact they weren't glued to their bases and so could operate in any formation :-) ) But I wouldn't see them as the sort of cavalry which gave Roman infantry problems because they smashed into them and bowled them over. We're not talking Parthians or Sarmatians here.
My gut feeling is that Attila was concentrating his Huns on the Alans, who were probably similar cavalry over whom he hoped he had a morale advantage.
Any Roman infantry that were there, were to him were something his men on the wings could cope with. After all if the centre won, the wins would probably fall anyway.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 10, 2014, 05:19:44 PM
Hang on a minute, not so long ago the argument was that Attila was describing the Romans as weak and feeble and we were discussing whether they'd built field defences.
Description and reality may not be the same thing - we may note how Attila carefully avoided attacking the Romans he took such care to disparage. I think he was just vapouring to keep up his troops' courage.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 10, 2014, 05:55:11 PM
There is Option 3: a part of the Roman-Auxilia line occupies the heights along with Thorismud's Visigoths, but part of it necessarily extends into the plain, as the heights simply weren't long enough to accommodate the entire line of Roman infantry. In other words, Aetius couldn't make the Roman line shorter and the Alan line longer to fit the confines of the ridge. Or possibly he wasn't thinking of the possibilities of the ridge when he initially deployed. He was not fully in control of the allied army. He was able to decide the relative positioning of the various contingents, but could not fine-tune things after that. The allied army had to match the frontage of the Huns. Once everyone had shuffled into place, it turned out that the Roman foot would extend beyond the right of the ridge should the left wing of the army succeed in taking it (remember that the allied army did not deploy on the ridge to begin with). Aetius just had to live with that and hope for the best.
Agreed that Aetius could not make the Alan line longer than it was, but he could add cavalry rather than infantry to its terminus to cover any space between massed Alanity and the ridge.
Lining up troop formations with terrain features seems to have been practised by regular armies (and not only regulars) since time immemorial. I rather doubt that Aetius would fudge his dispositions because the ridge was too short - he would just shorten his infantry line to match, incidentally giving himself a flank-covering reserve.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 10, 2014, 06:12:10 PM
My gut feeling is that Attila was concentrating his Huns on the Alans, who were probably similar cavalry over whom he hoped he had a morale advantage.
Any Roman infantry that were there, were to him were something his men on the wings could cope with. After all if the centre won, the wings would probably fall anyway.
This does seem to be what his army did following his speech: never mind the Romans, let's bash the Alans! Drive them off and the wings of the coalition army have exploitable inner flanks.
Unfortunately for Attila it also worked the other way around: his successful centre acquired open flanks, too.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 10, 2014, 03:42:23 PM
Bear in mind that the 'Romans' who fought at Chalons were not the Auxilia, as Jordanes makes clear:
| dextram partem Hunni cum suis, sinistram Romani et Vesegothae cum auxiliariis occuparunt, relictoque de cacumine eius iugo certamen ineunt.
The Huns with their forces seized the right side, the Romans and the Visigoths with the Auxilia the left, and then began a struggle for the yet untaken crest. |
That would only be
necessarily true (and clear) if Jordanes were using "auxiliariis" in the formal sense of "regiments of Auxilia". Strictly, any non-Roman troops fighting for Rome, regular or irregular, paid or allied, could be "auxiliares" - "
auxiliares dicuntur in bello socii Romanorum exterarum nationum" (Festus). So it's not impossible that Jordanes could be contrasting Roman regulars (some of whom might be in units called auxilia) with non-Roman "auxiliariis" such as the Sarmatae, Saxones, etc etc who are broadly under Aetius', rather than Sangiban's or Theodoric's command. As so often we cannot be sure exactly what Jordanes thought he meant (let alone whether his usage matches Sidonius' usage of a similar word).
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 10, 2014, 08:39:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 10, 2014, 03:42:23 PM
Bear in mind that the 'Romans' who fought at Chalons were not the Auxilia, as Jordanes makes clear:
| dextram partem Hunni cum suis, sinistram Romani et Vesegothae cum auxiliariis occuparunt, relictoque de cacumine eius iugo certamen ineunt.
The Huns with their forces seized the right side, the Romans and the Visigoths with the Auxilia the left, and then began a struggle for the yet untaken crest. |
That would only be necessarily true (and clear) if Jordanes were using "auxiliariis" in the formal sense of "regiments of Auxilia". Strictly, any non-Roman troops fighting for Rome, regular or irregular, paid or allied, could be "auxiliares" - "auxiliares dicuntur in bello socii Romanorum exterarum nationum" (Festus). So it's not impossible that Jordanes could be contrasting Roman regulars (some of whom might be in units called auxilia) with non-Roman "auxiliariis" such as the Sarmatae, Saxones, etc etc who are broadly under Aetius', rather than Sangiban's or Theodoric's command. As so often we cannot be sure exactly what Jordanes thought he meant (let alone whether his usage matches Sidonius' usage of a similar word).
Jordanes does clarify what he means by 'Auxilia' two paragraphs previously:
| Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces), and some other Celtic or German tribes. |
In other words, a mix of fighting men ranging from former professional Roman soldiers all the way to barbarian warriors. My impression is that the Auxilia were not numerically predominant and the barbarians were only a component of them. Aetius's infantry in consequence was largely able to behave like a Roman army.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 10, 2014, 08:26:03 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 10, 2014, 06:12:10 PMMy gut feeling is that Attila was concentrating his Huns on the Alans, who were probably similar cavalry over whom he hoped he had a morale advantage.
Any Roman infantry that were there, were to him were something his men on the wings could cope with. After all if the centre won, the wings would probably fall anyway.
This does seem to be what his army did following his speech: never mind the Romans, let's bash the Alans! Drive them off and the wings of the coalition army have exploitable inner flanks.
Unfortunately for Attila it also worked the other way around: his successful centre acquired open flanks, too.
Yes. The weakness of Attila's plan was the Ostrogoths. It seems clear they could not keep pace with the Huns' attack on the Alans, getting held up by the Visigoths. Attila wanted to blow away the entire left half of the allied army, exposing only his own right flank which wasn't a problem since it fronted against Roman infantry who would not be able to attack it in time.
On the question of the 'heaviness' of Hunnic cavalry, Attila did feel his cavalry were weighty enough to frontally attack Roman infantry in the struggle to gain the heights, which suggests that Huns were rather like Belisarius's Clibinarii: able to skirmish or pack a powerful shock charge as needs dictated.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 11, 2014, 05:35:11 AM
On the question of the 'heaviness' of Hunnic cavalry, Attila did feel his cavalry were weighty enough to frontally attack Roman infantry in the struggle to gain the heights, which suggests that Huns were rather like Belisarius's Clibinarii: able to skirmish or pack a powerful shock charge as needs dictated.
What we have to remember is that Attila may not have known who his cavalry would be meeting when he sent them off to gain the heights. Even if he knew Aetius had stationed his Auxilia there, by the time the scouts who discovered this had got back to him with the information and he'd given the orders to move, hours could have passed.
Think of the battles that have gone wrong because generals didn't know what was happening just over the crest, Waterloo is just one example.
It might be that Attila had expected to get there first, but the infantry had started off sooner than he knew and beat him to the draw. If his men had got there first he might have been assuming that with missile fire they could slow the infantry until the Gepids and others who were on that flank could get there to hold the crest.
Jim
My impression also was that the Hunnic right was held principally by Gepids, who were considered good and effective melee cavalry. While the Hunnic cavalry did have close-combat capability, these selfsame Gepids seem to have proved better at it when fighting at Nedao.
On the subject of 'milites' and 'auxilia', Jim has pointed out that:
Quote
Remember after Caracalla everybody within the Empire was a citizen. Unless Auxilia were recruited entirely from outside the Empire then they would have been composed of citizens. I suspect that in two hundred years the link between citizenship and auxiliaris might have broken down.
This is a very good point. The 3rd century AD saw quite a mix-up with all facets of Roman life and administration, leaving us to wonder exactly what a Syrian archer, for example, would do for a military career. We do see Julian in Gaul sending off barbarian captives for military service in the eastern half of the Empire and there are
obiter dictu references to a 'castra peregrina' (camp for foreigners) at Rome (Ammianus XVI.12.60) and to Constantius' proposed arrangements with the Limigantes (XIX.11.7) in which they were to settle in Roman territory in return for providing recruits ('cohors augebat') - apparently a 'laeti' arrangement.
It looks as if what was happening was the creation of regular auxilia manned by non-citizen barbarians recruited from outside the empire and from
laeti or equivalents within the empire. Having become citizens as a result of their term of service, barbarians would then be able to hold Roman ranks (remember Julian making Nevitta the Frank a consul?) and, most significantly, military ranks - eventually up to the highest level. Because of the separation of civil and military powers, a barbarian-turned-citizen could have an exclusively military career, bypassing the
cursus honorum with its traditional training in Roman administration and values.
The increasing reluctance of Christianised citizens to perform military service would have brought these barbarian-manned regular auxilia into increasing prominence as the core and mainstay of the army, not least because they were easier to replace than trained legionaries.
As an aside I'm not sure that Christianity had too much relevance, we know from the events of Diocletian's reign that there were Christians very senior in the Military.
With regard to Christian recruits, most recruits towards the end seem to be rural conscripts, and Christianity was an urban religion with very little rural take up, in Gaul for example, they're still dealing with rural pagans in the 6th century
I suspect a far bigger problem when it came to getting recruits was a refusal of the powerful to lose their agricultural labourers
This is an aside from the main point of the discussion
With regard to Auxilia, do we actually know enough about the careers of these men, for the early empire with have quite good accounts of individual careers from grave monuments and similar.
We see in saints lives Roman officers appearing but we know from examples form Egypt that men joining the army legitimately often adopted a Roman name, even though we'd consider them Romans.
Jim
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 11, 2014, 04:21:18 AMJordanes does clarify what he means by 'Auxilia' two paragraphs previously:
| Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces), and some other Celtic or German tribes. |
In other words, a mix of fighting men ranging from former professional Roman soldiers all the way to barbarian warriors. My impression is that the Auxilia were not numerically predominant and the barbarians were only a component of them. Aetius's infantry in consequence was largely able to behave like a Roman army.
"
Hi enim adfuerunt auxiliares": so he's clarifying who are the
auxiliares, which may have nothing to do with the regiments of Auxilia. So yes, the "Romans" he mentions are not these barbarian and no-longer-Roman "auxiliares". Doesn't mean that they (or some of them) are not regular "auxilia" regiments.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 10, 2014, 08:14:17 PM
Description and reality may not be the same thing - we may note how Attila carefully avoided attacking the Romans he took such care to disparage. I think he was just vapouring to keep up his troops' courage.
I'd promised myself I'd just lurk on this one but this was a bit far. Have we any evidence that Attila's speech was delivered exactly as Jordanes described on which to attribute his motivations? I accept that I don't have the Latin skills of many people here (and from what I've read I doubt Jordanes did either :) ) but this does seem a very uncritical approach to a standard literary device. Not saying the speech doesn't contain valuable evidence about how Jordanes thought Attila approached the battle but verbatim
reportage?
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 11, 2014, 01:05:38 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 11, 2014, 04:21:18 AMJordanes does clarify what he means by 'Auxilia' two paragraphs previously:
| Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Romans soldiers and now the flower of the auxiliaries), and some other Celtic or German tribes. |
In other words, a mix of fighting men ranging from former professional Roman soldiers all the way to barbarian warriors. My impression is that the Auxilia were not numerically predominant and the barbarians were only a component of them. Aetius's infantry in consequence was largely able to behave like a Roman army.
"Hi enim adfuerunt auxiliares": so he's clarifying who are the auxiliares, which may have nothing to do with the regiments of Auxilia. So yes, the "Romans" he mentions are not these barbarian and no-longer-Roman "auxiliares". Doesn't mean that they (or some of them) are not regular "auxilia" regiments.
Oh, I see. The question is the difference between Auxilia and Auxiliares. Sidonius talks about Aetius leading a thin and meagre force without a soldier in the
Auxilia (not Auxiliaris), which seems to imply that Auxilia for him were not necessarily just trained troops.
Jordanes' idea of
Auxiliares seems to cover every imaginable type - Roman/romanised or not, trained or not - that were not part of the regular, paid army but were prepared to serve under a Roman general. Would our idea of regular 'Auxilia' for Jordanes have meant anything different from 'Romani'?
Quote from: Erpingham on February 11, 2014, 01:50:16 PM
Have we any evidence that Attila's speech was delivered exactly as Jordanes described on which to attribute his motivations? I accept that I don't have the Latin skills of many people here (and from what I've read I doubt Jordanes did either :) ) but this does seem a very uncritical approach to a standard literary device. Not saying the speech doesn't contain valuable evidence about how Jordanes thought Attila approached the battle but verbatim reportage?
The question is perhaps a little unfair: have we any evidence that Caesar's (or for that matter Churchill's pre-radio) speeches were delivered
exactly as described? They were recorded, certainly, but how far can we trust the records in the matter of exactitude? Perhaps we should ask instead whether it is reasonable to assume that Jordanes has conveyed a sufficiently faithful rendition of Attila's speech for us to draw such conclusions, and the answer here is that without independent confirmation we have no way of knowing.
What we can say is that if Jordanes has extracted from Cassiodorus (his source) an accurate rendition of Attila's speech and actions, then the seeming incompatibility between the two indicates that at least one was insincere, from which we can further surmise that it was intentionally so for the purpose of bringing about the other.
In other words, Attila's motivations can be judged on the (in)compatibility of speech and action without having to rely upon the precise accuracy of recorded detail.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 11, 2014, 03:36:59 PMWould our idea of regular 'Auxilia' for Jordanes have meant anything different from 'Romani'?
Depends if Jordanes or his sources still drew a distiinction between auxilia and legiones - the
Notitia did a couple of generations before.
Of course, if the Romani present were all cavalry, there could have been many auxiliares but no Auxilia (since the term seems to have long gone out of use for cavalry regiments).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 11, 2014, 04:09:42 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on February 11, 2014, 01:50:16 PM
Have we any evidence that Attila's speech was delivered exactly as Jordanes described on which to attribute his motivations? I accept that I don't have the Latin skills of many people here (and from what I've read I doubt Jordanes did either :) ) but this does seem a very uncritical approach to a standard literary device. Not saying the speech doesn't contain valuable evidence about how Jordanes thought Attila approached the battle but verbatim reportage?
The question is perhaps a little unfair: have we any evidence that Caesar's (or for that matter Churchill's pre-radio) speeches were delivered exactly as described? They were recorded, certainly, but how far can we trust the records in the matter of exactitude?
I don't think it is an unfair question. Leaving Churchill out of this (he carefully scripted his speeches and they were recorded verbatim in Hansard, so we can largely trust them), Caesar is a more interesting proposition. I could accept an argument that he scripted his speeches, kept the notes then carefully copied them out. I think it is more likely he had a good idea of the gist of what he said and wrote it up in suitably impressive prose, but we can't be sure. But Jordanes didn't hear Attila's speech and, correct me if I'm wrong, probably didn't know anyone who heard it. I would think from his dates that Cassiodorus might have met someone but it is unlikely. If it had been a prepared speech, one of Attila's secretaries might have kept a copy which survived to be seen and written down. But it isn't. It seems to be "on the hoof" (literally) in mid-battle. It is unlikely anyone took it down with stylus and tablet at the time. Which would lead me to think it is Jordanes summarising what he thought were Attila's views to explain the decisions he made in the battle, perhaps working from an equivalent passage in Cassiodorus. So our analyzing how exactly he said something is futile - we can't know - but as an example of how Jordanes thought the battle proceeded, perfectly acceptable evidence.
There is a widespread view amongst historians that many speeches attributed to generals are actually the work of the writer. A classic example of that is the speech Tacitus puts into the mouth of Calgacus
Whenever I consider the origin of this war and the necessities of our position, I have a sure confidence that this day, and this union of yours, will be the beginning of freedom to the whole of Britain. To all of us slavery is a thing unknown; there are no lands beyond us, and even the sea is not safe, menaced as we are by a Roman fleet. And thus in war and battle, in which the brave find glory, even the coward will find safety. Former contests, in which, with varying fortune, the Romans were resisted, still left in us a last hope of succour, inasmuch as being the most renowned nation of Britain, dwelling in the very heart of the country, and out of sight of the shores of the conquered, we could keep even our eyes unpolluted by the contagion of slavery. To us who dwell on the uttermost confines of the earth and of freedom, this remote sanctuary of Britain's glory has up to this time been a defence. Now, however, the furthest limits of Britain are thrown open, and the unknown always passes for the marvellous. But there are no tribes beyond us, nothing indeed but waves and rocks, and the yet more terrible Romans, from whose oppression escape is vainly sought by obedience and submission. Robbers of the world, having by their universal plunder exhausted the land, they rifle the deep. If the enemy be rich, they are rapacious; if he be poor, they lust for dominion; neither the east nor the west has been able to satisfy them. Alone among men they covet with equal eagerness poverty and riches. To robbery, slaughter, plunder, they give the lying name of empire; they make a solitude and call it peace"
As the wiki says, "Calgacus is not mentioned during or after the battle and he is not named as one of the hostages Agricola took with him after putting the Caledonians to flight. Both Calgacus and the speech may be figments of Tacitus's invention"
I think all we can say about the speech purportedly given by Attila is that it is what Jordanes, and perhaps Cassiodorus thought Attila would have said.
Given that even if Attila did say it, he wouldn't have said it in Latin, arguments based on latin technical terms probably have nothing of Attila in them :-)
Jim
Granted that the speech is words put in Attila's mouth (on the likelihood that Attila did say something, since Jordanes describes his speechmaking as being unusual), it does at least tell us interesting things about the allied army and its capabilities and dispositions - which we can presume Jordanes would have known about. Keeping in mind that Chalons had been a historic battle of which records besides those of Cassiodorus must have survived up to Jordanes. How many sources do we have for the Battle of Waterloo?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 11, 2014, 05:19:41 PM
Granted that the speech is words put in Attila's mouth (on the likelihood that Attila did say something, since Jordanes describes his speechmaking as being unusual), it does at least tell us interesting things about the allied army and its capabilities and dispositions - which we can presume Jordanes would have known about. Keeping in mind that Chalons had been a historic battle of which records besides those of Cassiodorus must have survived up to Jordanes. How many sources do we have for the Battle of Waterloo?
Hang on a minute, why should other records but those of Cassiodorus have survived? Remember that books were rare, copied by hand, and writing demanded personal wealth and leisure or a wealthy patron. It is possible that someone referred to the battle in a letter, but when you see collections of letters, I don't think we need be too optimistic.
As for official records, there might be some, but there's no reason to assume that Cassiodorus ever felt the need to access them. Most history was written for a purpose, Jordanes was to produce a history of the Goths which put them in a good light, Cassiodorus was probably doing something similar for Theodoric. They didn't see the need for a lot of detail which is why they didn't supply it. It's also why we have to be very careful about trying to extract detail for what might be merely sloppy use of synonyms.
As for Waterloo I refer you to The Gareth Glover Collection, Original Source Material from the Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815 http://www.garethglovercollection.com/waterlooarchivevol1.htm
To quote
"The hitherto unseen British material contained in Volume I includes: a series of letters written by senior officers on Wellingtons Staff to Sir Thomas Graham immediately following the battle: The letters of a member of the Wedgewood family in the Guards at Waterloo; The journal of Sergeant Johnston of the Scots Greys, detailing all his experiences, including a very rare transcript of his own court martial!; and the journal of an artillery officer supporting the sieges of the French fortresses by the Prussians after Waterloo; also letters from eminent surgeons including those of Hume, Davy and Haddy James, who served at Waterloo with their harrowing tales of the wounds suffered. Also the diary of Creevey's daughter in law, giving many more particulars than his own famous account.
In addition to these letters and journals, Vol I will include 21 original line drawings produced by Cavalie Mercer to accompany his famous book on his experiences at Waterloo but never previously published."
And all this is the subsidiary stuff, it's not the main accounts
Jim
Well, there you go. Letters and accounts would exist if literacy did, and literacy was a requisite among the officer class in the army, where messages and orders had to be communicated by writing.
Jordanes himself wrote his History of the Goths at Constantinople, hence he had access to the libraries of the city which must have given him material on Chalons besides what Cassiodorus supplied. He was writing a century after the events. There had been a continuity of culture, infrastructure and education in the Eastern Empire from 451 to 553 (i.e. contemporary accounts of the battle would have made their way to Constantinople and been preserved there). It is difficult to believe that he did not have access to any detailed account of Chalons besides the one Cassiodorus gave him. Where would have Cassiodorus have got his information from in that case?
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 11, 2014, 04:14:31 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 11, 2014, 03:36:59 PMWould our idea of regular 'Auxilia' for Jordanes have meant anything different from 'Romani'?
Depends if Jordanes or his sources still drew a distiinction between auxilia and legiones - the Notitia did a couple of generations before.
Of course, if the Romani present were all cavalry, there could have been many auxiliares but no Auxilia (since the term seems to have long gone out of use for cavalry regiments).
It seems the Romani present acted very much like infantry - forming battlelines and testudos. Jordanes was writing quite a long time after the Notitia, about 130 years, by which time the distinction between regular Auxilia and straight Roman infantry would probably have become blurred, particularly given the increasingly subordinate role of infantry in early Byzantine armies (but I say that off the cuff, I could well be wrong).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 11, 2014, 06:42:32 PM
Well, there you go. Letters and accounts would exist if literacy did, and literacy was a requisite among the officer class in the army, where messages and orders had to be communicated by writing.
The material from Waterloo features an enormous volume of correspondence particularly related to the actions of units in the battle, because Siborne carried out perhaps the first piece of research of its type. So it is a bad reference point for earlier times. Do we know Cassiodorus' sources, or whether Jordanes used other accounts, or did a major archive search? If not, we should proceed respectfully but with caution when interpreting details IMO.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 11, 2014, 04:33:28 PM
... It seems to be "on the hoof" (literally) in mid-battle. It is unlikely anyone took it down with stylus and tablet at the time. Which would lead me to think it is Jordanes summarising what he thought were Attila's views to explain the decisions he made in the battle, perhaps working from an equivalent passage in Cassiodorus. So our analyzing how exactly he said something is futile - we can't know - but as an example of how Jordanes thought the battle proceeded, perfectly acceptable evidence.
I shall accept that distinction (what choice have I?). ;) The contradiction between the implications of the speech - namely that Romans look like soft targets - and the insistence on attacking everyone
except the Romans is nevertheless interesting for students of real or imagined battlefield rhetoric.
Curiously enough, it is possible that Cassiodorus may have encountered someone who remembered the speech exactly. Much has been written on the word-perfect memories of illiterate peoples, who tend to pay close attention to what is actually said rather than interpreting it the way 'civilised' people do, and the large-scale enlistment of Huns in Roman service following the breakup of Attila's empire may have allowed a Roman (or Byzantine) historian to get the speech entire from a Chalons veteran.
The same process might account for many if not all of the speeches given by leaders facing a Roman army, at least where we have historians sufficiently conscientious to search out survivors (slaves?). It is reasonable to assume that nobody on the Roman side was listening (for example) to Calgacus at Mons Graupius even if they did understand Celtic, but many of the Celts would have found his speech memorable.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 11, 2014, 05:43:46 PM
Hang on a minute, why should other records but those of Cassiodorus have survived? Remember that books were rare, copied by hand, and writing demanded personal wealth and leisure or a wealthy patron. It is possible that someone referred to the battle in a letter, but when you see collections of letters, I don't think we need be too optimistic.
I think Justin's assumption may be justified.
Aetius would at the very least have reported to his nominal superior, Valentinian, and officers serving with him would have generated their own accounts, not least with an eye to promotion.
Incidentally, my impression is that books were 'rare' only by our standards: every nobleman of note seems still to have had his library, and every Greek apparently knew the Epic Cycle (twelve quasi-historical works from Cypria to Telegony of which only the Iliad and Odyssey survive intact). Literacy was 100% among the upper classes and seems to have been widespread among what we would consider the middle classes: even centurions, decurions and optiones needed to be literate to fulfil their duties. Granted that with the spreading shadow of the Dark Ages literacy was starting to diminish, but initially this seems to have been at least as much because any sort of interesting reading material was discouraged ('un-Christian') as because books were hard to copy or hard to get.
There is much doubt if Cassiodorus books were available to Jordanes for very long and it seems he added in lots of his own stuff. I am not sure what you think was available at Constantinople in the way of battle reports for a battle fought by the Western half of the Empire a century before. We do not as far as I know hear or see reference to a source from a participant . Did Aetius produce memoirs?? Did any Roman general but Caesar write his memoirs??? Very unlikely then that a fifth century general would do so.
We can deduce something about Roman battle reporting from the descriptions given by Procopius and Agathias bot writing in Constantinople in the 550s. Procopius has fair detail for battles that he was at but is quite sketchy when he was not present. Agathias gives accounts that appear to have detail, but actually are not very systematic. If literary folk of the sixth century were not terribly interested in the detail of battles it appears that they did not have detailed reports from the generals to draw upon, but rather broad brush descriptions, perhaps contained in letters to the court from generals. Interestingly we do not get mentions of the deployment of units which would be the basic building blocks of a modern battle description. One of the items we do receive is the description of heroic acts and it has been suggested that staff of the imperial treasury accompanied the army and paid out rewards to brave soldiers . The clerks then needed to account for their disbursements and so sent in descriptions of the incident to Costantinople. This has been suggested as the reason why battle descriptions are very sketchy, but then contain quite a bit of detail about the actions of one or more individuals. Then of course there are the tales of veterans which have their own bias.
As regards Chalons, any report from Aetius will have gone to Ravenna. It is possible that the archives survived, but then Cassiodorus had to find it and, if it was much the same as those from Justinian's generals it would have been pretty sketchy and it would only cover the Roman part in any detail. However, Aetius might have reported on the sort of thing that interested the court such as which allies had turned p and that might be because they received payment and thus there had to be accounts.
We do not have any accounts of heroic actions. Most likely, if they existed they were only of interest in Ravenna and, as they did not concern Goths they were not of interest to Cassiodorus.
A man who was twenty at the time of the battle would be 100 by the time Cassiodorus wrote. If Jordanes wrote when he was 40 then he could have heard from a father who was born up to sixty years before so word of mouth would have needed probably three generations of transfer. In one passage J refers to Gothic songs and there could have been a bardic tradition that reached back, but it would have been an OstroGothic tradition and actually that is not a particularly detailed section.
Given those modes of transference I think we can have confidence in the overall plan and layout of the battle, but not at all in details such as Attila's speech.
Roy
Hmmm To be present at Attila's speech Let us say the man is 30 so born in 420
Life A 420 to 470
Tells his son born in 445
Who tells his son born 470
Who lives to 520 in time to tell Cassiodorus.
At the extreme a man born in 430 could listen to the speech and live to be 70 in 500. However, in my experience 20 year olds don't remember much of that sort of stuff (Gothic nobles are not the sort of geeks who take notes on the leader's exhortations) and 70 would be fantastically old for a member of the Ostrogothic nobility given that they were to undergo a campaign in Italy, war against the Gepids (Nedao) war against the Rugi, war against the Sciri war against other Goths, war against the Sarmatians War against the Gepids (away match this time), war against Odovacar, all in the space of 25years.
So I think my calculation above is reasonable and that it is a three generation transmission line for an oral rendering of Attila's oratory.
Roy
Or to look at it another way ...
Life A is born in 420, fights at Chalons in 451, enters Roman service c.455-460 (after Nedao), gets fame/notoriety because he was THERE and can recite Attila's speech in full for the curious and the adoring, and it gets written down by an interested officer or even an interested priest - maybe even both.
Furthermore, a couple of other Hunnic chaps who fought at Chalons and heard Attila are in the same unit and can vouch for its accuracy.
Total temporal tradition: no more than ten years before pen or stylus hits recording medium.
To me this seems a not unlikely set of circumstances. If a culture sets great store by speeches, they will be remembered. (If it sets great store by actions, they will be remembered, too.)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 11, 2014, 06:42:32 PM
Well, there you go. Letters and accounts would exist if literacy did, and literacy was a requisite among the officer class in the army, where messages and orders had to be communicated by writing.
Jordanes himself wrote his History of the Goths at Constantinople, hence he had access to the libraries of the city which must have given him material on Chalons besides what Cassiodorus supplied. He was writing a century after the events. There had been a continuity of culture, infrastructure and education in the Eastern Empire from 451 to 553 (i.e. contemporary accounts of the battle would have made their way to Constantinople and been preserved there). It is difficult to believe that he did not have access to any detailed account of Chalons besides the one Cassiodorus gave him. Where would have Cassiodorus have got his information from in that case?
The big question is 'Where were these great libraries of documents?' We know the contemporary culture, infrastructure and education, (Crudely put, Education was beginning to shift from Homer to Christianity, certainly there was nothing you'd recognise as analytical history. We know what Roman archives were like, we have copies of annals where you tended to get a few lines for a year, they hadn't the same anally retentive love of squirreling away data that we have. Look at the efforts they made to keeping the Notitia up to date, it's in such a mess with duplicated units we cannot even work out what year various stuff was added.
There is no reason why any clerk in Constantinople should have filed an account of the battle of Chalons, if only because there is no reason why anyone should have sent him an account. The mere fact of the victory is all that is required.
As for Cassiodorus, he'll have had annals, which need have given little more information than we have. He could have had two or three sets, and there might be panegyrics that are lost to us, probably were. A few ecclesiastical histories and saints lives would give him a bit. Especially as there is a fair bit of tradition about which cities had bishops who turned back the Huns or stiffened the defenders resistance. There could well be Gothic oral history stories that came down as well. So he put in the information he had, and padded it out with a bit of scene setting, invented a few speeches that sounded convincing.
To expect more is to project back onto another culture something that the culture probably didn't see a need for
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 11, 2014, 10:58:58 PM
As for Cassiodorus, he'll have had annals, which need have given little more information than we have. He could have had two or three sets, and there might be panegyrics that are lost to us, probably were. A few ecclesiastical histories and saints lives would give him a bit. Especially as there is a fair bit of tradition about which cities had bishops who turned back the Huns or stiffened the defenders resistance. There could well be Gothic oral history stories that came down as well. So he put in the information he had, and padded it out with a bit of scene setting, invented a few speeches that sounded convincing.
Or he might have made a faithful attempt to pull together such actual information as there was on the subject. Either way, we are interpreting (guessing on the basis of our own thought-habits) rather than revealing.
To me, Attila's speech looks real simply because it does
not dovetail with the actions he subsequently undertook: an invented speech would be more in line with what happened next, emphasising the suitability of the
Alans as targets and then ordering a charge against them. The other point about this speech that makes me think it genuine is that it is out of the normal sequence: it is an in-battle (or
proelium interruptum speech) speech rather than a pre-battle speech, whereas an invented speech would stick with the expected convention of being delivered before the battle.
Jordanes tells us the result of the speech:
"
And although the situation was itself fearful, yet the presence of their king dispelled anxiety and hesitation." (Getica XL/207)
The indication that the Huns were, or felt, at a serious disadvantage this early in the battle is an unlikely feature for a made-up story.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 11, 2014, 10:58:58 PM
The big question is 'Where were these great libraries of documents?'
Constantinople, Alexandria and possibly Antioch, though I take Jim's point about the fading of literature and literary tastes as Christianity increasingly took over as the literary subject of choice (or rather necessity) and about the nature and lack of thoroughness of records. It would however be surprising if Aetius had not counted up the army with him (if only to ensure enough foodstuffs were on hand to prevent marauding) and had not at least drawn up a battle plan for the sake of letting his allies and officers know what was intended, and acquired information on the Hunnic strengths and dispositions from deserters and captives, together with his own observations. If he expected any sort of approbation he would have taken care to get this all down and in addition to sending a (perhaps concise) official report to Ravenna would have freely corresponded with his friends and associates. One might draw parallels with Marlborough if one felt the need.
So I can see there being documentation around for Cassiodorus to make a pretty good attempt at recreating the battle, or at least the important aspects of it, the real question being how much of the extant information he would have been able to track down. In this connection, we note that Jordanes leaves out the pre-battle clash between Franks and Gepids that Gregory notes: this indicates another extant stratum of information into which Gregory tapped, albeit possibly enhancing a skirmish into a full engagement between contingents. I would say that the information was there.
I think we differ in our belief in what documentation was available.
Why on earth would Aetius bother Ravenna with details of supplies, which if they had come through channels would have been through the Praetorian Prefect of the Gauls, certainly not from Ravenna.
Similarly what evidence have we that anybody bothered with this sort of detail, we have no surviving histories which quote it, or even refer to it.
What we do have is works like the Gallic Annals which are very sparse in detail, which indicates that the detail wasn't there.
As for Gregory, he might well have come across a monastic chronicle in Gaul which mentioned a skirmish that took place close to a sister house or to the home of their founder or some other person of importance to them. Such a comment would probably not make it into annals held in Italy.
But we have to be very careful we don't foist on them our own love of bureaucracy. Even in my Grandfather's day, the British government saw no need to record the firearms held privately by British citizens.
I don't think comparing Marlborough with Aetius serves any function, they operated at very different levels in very different environments, Marlborough certainly needed to leave a far more convincing paper trail to support his activities. He was dependent on votes in Parliament and suchlike. Aetius was in a position of power where the paper trail was irrelevant, to remove him you had to kill him, he was above the courts and bureaucracy.
An invented speech serves the purposes of the Author. Jordanes may merely have wished to portray the Romans in a bad light, thus throwing the Goths into high relief as their much needed saviors.
The fact that it is an in-battle speech makes it even more likely to be unrecorded. A prebattle speech might well have been worked on before hand, and there could even be clerks involved. In battle, one finds few persons taking shorthand, and, in reality, in the chaos of battle fewer people would even hear it.
Jordanes tells us what he expects the results would be, that it rallied them.
It might be that Jordanes heard that the men rallied and supplied a speech as a reason to explain the rallying
Jim
Aetius would not have bothered Ravenna with details of supplies, but the details would need to have been made available for the civil officials (literate, record-keeping men) responsible for getting them to the right place at the right time. They would almost certainly have insisted on having it in writing, particularly as this looks as if it was the largest assemblage of fighting manpower in Gaul in the whole of the 5th century AD.
In any event, one can expect unofficial sources in addition to official records: Ammianus (XVI.12.67) mentions that despite Constantius' attempts to suppress mention of Julian's victories in Gaul, 'fama' (report, mention, verbal and perhaps even written samizdat) ensured that the facts got around. This does not even consider Julian's own 'diary' or those of his staff as potential information sources.
And I trust that the earlier mention of potential Hunnic memories did not go unnoticed.
In some ways, for source material, bureaucracy and official reports were just the icing on the cake, even if the cake could be considered a bit stale by the time Cassiodorus got to it.
I think there are two issues here; how much material existed and how much Cassiodorus and Jordanes had access to. A lot of the documentation would have been ephemeral and not archived (a lot of the bureaucracy of the earlier Roman army is visible through documentation that was dumped but survived). The battle may have been mentioned in private correspondence but would this have been collected and archived?
The other point is how the histories were constructed. Do we know anything either of the source access or the compilation techniques used by either author?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 12, 2014, 05:56:38 PM
Aetius would not have bothered Ravenna with details of supplies, but the details would need to have been made available for the civil officials (literate, record-keeping men) responsible for getting them to the right place at the right time. They would almost certainly have insisted on having it in writing, particularly as this looks as if it was the largest assemblage of fighting manpower in Gaul in the whole of the 5th century AD.
But again, why bother Ravenna with these details? From what I can make out from Late Rome, the major problem an Emperor faced was actually learning what went on anyway. I recommend 'Corruption and the Decline of Rome' by Ramsay Macmullen
We know from Egypt that units kept some records, we know they did because we found the old ones, not in archives but in rubbish tips. Someone may well have kept records of the supplies to Aetius's forces, but twelve months later they could just as easily have been thrown out or over-written because they were utterly irrelevant. If Aetius was going to be tried for corruption, nobody actually needed evidence.
Similarly no one is going to turn to any Roman high official and demand that you got your orders in writing to cover your back when things when sour. Firstly it wouldn't work, Roman justice didn't operate like that, you'd survive things going sour not by having evidence but by having a protector, and insulting your potential protector is a bad way to start a process.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 12, 2014, 05:56:38 PM
In any event, one can expect unofficial sources in addition to official records: Ammianus (XVI.12.67) mentions that despite Constantius' attempts to suppress mention of Julian's victories in Gaul, 'fama' (report, mention, verbal and perhaps even written samizdat) ensured that the facts got around. This does not even consider Julian's own 'diary' or those of his staff as potential information sources.
perhaps even written?
perhaps not. The Great are going to know what is going on, trusted friends will carry messages which need not be in writing. The lesser mortals are just going to pass on gossip they've picked up from what someone overheard when they were waiting table. Just because people are literate, don't assume a literary culture. My father was literate, read a lot, wrote in a beautiful copperplate hand, and didn't pick up a pen from one years end to the next other than to sign his name. As one friend said, "His was a handwriting not spoiled by over use."
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 12, 2014, 05:56:38 PM
And I trust that the earlier mention of potential Hunnic memories did not go unnoticed.
Indeed they would have had an oral tradition, but given what happened to the Hunnic Empire (or protection racket) I wouldn't be hopeful that there was a lot of records or that they survived. They might have had a Jordanes, but who was his patron? Who was he writing for? Who was going to support him in literary idleness whilst he worked? I cannot imagine there would be much call for Hunnic histories in the courts of Ravenna or Constantinople.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 12, 2014, 05:56:38 PM
In some ways, for source material, bureaucracy and official reports were just the icing on the cake, even if the cake could be considered a bit stale by the time Cassiodorus got to it.
Remember we know how good their record keeping was, we have the Notitia which seems to have been sporadically updated and abandoned. The keeping of public records over long periods doesn't seem to have been a priority.
Jim
I've read through a few battles of the late empire. Many are indeed scant in detail (i.e. the primary sources we have mention little or nothing about the deployment and course of the battles themselves). Others have more detail - like Argentoratum - because someone on the spot gathered enough information from eyewitness accounts to make a reconstruction of the battle possible. The the constant though seems to be that if the writer of the time did not have plenty of data on the battle, he didn't make it up. We know that the best primary source for Argentoratum, Ammianus, had an eyewitness account written by Julian himself. From the Wiki article:
| By far the most detailed and reliable source for the battle, and Julian's Gallic campaign (355-60) generally, is the Res Gestae (Histories) of Ammianus Marcellinus, a contemporary historian. Ammianus was a Greek career soldier who joined the army before 350 and served until at least 363.[8] Enlisted as a protector (cadet senior officer), he served as a staff officer under magister equitum Ursicinus and then under Julian himself in the latter's Persian campaign. Although he was not present at Strasbourg, he had experience of the Gallic front as he was involved in the suppression of the revolt of Claudius Silvanus, the magister equitum (commander-in-chief) in Gaul (355).[9] However, his narrative reveals a passionate admiration of Julian and occasionally descends to the level of eulogy. Furthermore, as he was writing some 40 years after the event, it is likely that Ammianus relied heavily, if not exclusively, on Julian's own memoir of the Strasbourg campaign (which we know he published, but has been lost) |
There is sufficient detail in Jordanes' account of Chalons for it to be evident he was using a source that ultimately went back to one or more eyewitness accounts of the battle. In other words, if he was going to substantially make it up, I think it is clear enough, as Patrick pointed out, that he would have made up the details differently. Something like the following, assuming he knew only that Aetius, helped by a bunch of barbarians, notably the Visigoths whose king was killed, fought the Huns, who lost:
| And the numberless host of Huns poured into the empire, trampling the fair fields of Gaul until the redoutable general Aetius, like a saviour of the civilised world, gathered the Romans and barbarians and fought Attila in a sad and bloody hour [not necessarily by the Shrewsbury clock]. The Huns, ravening wolves, threw themselves upon the Roman and allied host. Attila himself met the king of the Visigoths, Theodoric, and the two fought nose to nose, giving and suffering dreadful wounds until the Visigothic king, his warlike valour finally overcome by the weakness of age, succumbed to his injuries and died. Then Aetius, heartening his men with renewed confidence, attacked the Hunnic horde again and yet again, and finally drove them back in defeat. Attila, his fury unabated, returned with his army back to Caucasia [or Armenia or Scythia if you like], contemplating a dreadful revenge that he would unleash on the war-weary empire in the following year. |
Lots of inspiring waffle with no real detail, and a little bit of creativity on how Theodoric died. Something that contemporary politicians are rather good at.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 12, 2014, 06:58:05 PM
But again, why bother Ravenna with these details?
Who said anything about bothering Ravenna? I just pointed out that such records
would exist somewhere. Life did exist outside the top imperial bureaucracy back then; I believe it still does even today. ;)
Quote
Just because people are literate, don't assume a literary culture.
But the Late Empire still had a literary culture. A fair bit was wasted in panegyrics, true, but the culture was still hanging on.
Quote
I cannot imagine there would be much call for Hunnic histories in the courts of Ravenna or Constantinople.
But 'I heard Attila speak' would be part of the corpus of surviving Hun tradition in the 450s-460s and a remembered verbatim record of his speech could easily have been told to an interested Roman listener. One would imagine that Aetius himself may even have obtained a record one way or another, given his past involvement with the Huns.
Aetius was dead three years after Chalons, admittedly that might have given him more time for reading but probably restricted his access to the market for books
Why should records exist somewhere? That is a very late 20th and 21st century attitude. Even now we don't keep records for long. HMRC can only go back twenty years, government even now regularly destroys records
So we cannot assume that there were army records, we have no evidence that they existed in any form of long term storage, merely that units regularly destroyed them.
And we've seen the results of the Empires literary culture, it produces Sidonius and Jordanes, both of whom are far more interested in literary style than in trivia like historical accuracy
Jim
Ithoht that might wow us all with a missing fragment of Priscus patrick and Justin, but apparently not.
I don't think anyone here is suggesting that Jordanes made up the description of the battle whole cloth. However, the picture he gives is defective in many parts and he supplies us with details that show either that he has a Gothic source or that he is doing his inventions in order to produce a Gothic history . Had he been following a full Roman source he would have had details about the Roman deployment about which we hear nothing.
If Cassiodorus had created a speech for Attila it would have been longer and in clearer Latin. Perhaps Jordanes read such a speech and half remembered it or took notes at the level that I took notes in lectures.
As a battle Chalons will have had story, myth and legend surrounding it. Thus it would not have been such a great effort for Jordanes to create a narrative out of the story of
the Franks versus the Gepids, the battle for the hill, the death of Thodered, the retreat of Attila to his camp with the pyre prepared. What we have here are not lije Roman sources, more likely they are from the songs of the Goths.
The question that I have posed twice without response is that of the second campaign of the Visigoths against Attila which is widely held to be a fabrication because there is not time for Attila to be in Italy and fight a separate campaign and it is mentioned nowhere else.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 12, 2014, 08:36:42 PM
The question that I have posed twice without response is that of the second campaign of the Visigoths against Attila which is widely held to be a fabrication because there is not time for Attila to be in Italy and fight a separate campaign and it is mentioned nowhere else.
Yes, that is curious. Jordanes relates (Book XLIII):
"
But as he was shrewd and crafty, he threatened in one direction and moved his army in another; for in the midst of these preparations he turned his face toward the Visigoths who had yet to feel his vengeance. (226) But here he had not the same success as against the Romans. Hastening back by a different way than before, he decided to reduce to his sway that part of the Alani which was settled across the river Loire, in order that by attacking them, and thus changing the aspect of the war, he might become a more terrible menace to the Visigoths. Accordingly he started from the provinces of Dacia and Pannonia, where the Huns were then dwelling with various subject peoples, and moved his array against the Alani. (227) But Thorismud, king of the Visigoths, with like quickness of thought perceived Attila's trick. By forced marches he came to the Alani before him, and was well prepared to check the advance of Attila when he came after him. They joined battle in almost the same way as before at the Catalaunian Plains, and Thorismud dashed his hopes of victory, for he routed him and drove him from the land without a triumph, compelling him to flee to his own country. Thus while Attila, the famous leader and lord of many victories, sought to blot out the fame of his destroyer and in this way to annul what he had suffered at the hands of the Visigoths, he met a second defeat and retreated ingloriously."
It does look a little inflated, but then we have the following sentence:
"(228)
Now after the bands of the Huns had been repulsed by the Alani, without any hurt to his own men, Thorismud departed for Tolosa."
Reading between the lines, or simply reading the last line, it was the
Alans who repulsed the Huns on this occasion - hardly a judgement particularly glorious for the Goths. The fact that the Alans rather than the Visigoths are credited with the repulse makes me think Jordanes might actually be telling the truth about the invasion, even if Thorismund's part looks overstated.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 12, 2014, 08:30:19 PM
Why should records exist somewhere? That is a very late 20th and 21st century attitude. Even now we don't keep records for long. HMRC can only go back twenty years, government even now regularly destroys records
So we cannot assume that there were army records, we have no evidence that they existed in any form of long term storage, merely that units regularly destroyed them.
So bags of time for interested parties to note down details and pass them on to other interested parties.
Quote
And we've seen the results of the Empires literary culture, it produces Sidonius and Jordanes, both of whom are far more interested in literary style than in trivia like historical accuracy
Ah - we
have a literary culture! :) It also produces Procopius and Agathias, who are more interested in historical accuracy than literary style (and even Sidonius seems able to give us occasional useful information when he can lay aside his poetical aspirations).
Quote from: aligern on February 12, 2014, 08:36:42 PM
I thought that you might wow us all with a missing fragment of Priscus, Patrick and Justin, but apparently not.
Sadly we have to make do with the existing part of Priscus, but from a historical source/record-keeping angle the following is of interest:
"
Having advanced a distance of seven days farther, we halted at a village; for as the rest of the route was the same for us and Attila, it behoved us to wait, so that he might go in front. Here we met with some of the "western Romans," who had also come on an embassy to Attila--the count Romulus, Promotus governor of Noricum, and Romanus a military captain. With them was Constantius whom Aetius had sent to Attila to be his secretary, and Tatulus, the father of Orestes; these two were not connected with the embassy, but were friends of the ambassadors. Constantius had known them of old in the Italies, and Orestes had married the daughter of Romulus."
We see quite a few people who could have provided information and memoirs, although in 451 the Romans would probably not have still been accompanying Attila - yet who knows? Constantius the secretary would have been reporting to Aetius on the quiet, if Aetius had any sense, and the rest could easily have kept Priscus-style diaries emphasising their main area of interest, notably Romanus the 'military captain' and Tatulus, father of future Magister Militum Orestes.
It can be dangerous to assume that records of a particular event
must have been lacking when a historian composed his contribution on the subject.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 13, 2014, 09:40:04 AM
It can be dangerous to assume that records of a particular event must have been lacking when a historian composed his contribution on the subject.
It is equally dangerous to assume that the documentation was there. A secretary to a Hunnic king might just act as a trusted translator, and also a writer of letters for the king. He needn't be a writer of histories or collector of annals.
When you say "So bags of time for interested parties to note down details and pass them on to other interested parties"
What interested parties? Fifty years after Chalons, who cared? You have Goths who have a tame 'historian' write a history to show them in a good light, Chalon gets covered because he can put a good gloss on it. If you read Jordanes, the battle of Frigidus gets 'And since the Emperor knew they [The Goths] were faithful to him and his friends, he took from their number more than twenty thousand warriors to serve against the tyrant Eugenius who had slain Gratian and seized Gaul. After winning the victory over the usurper, he wreaked his vengeance upon him."
Hardly Procopius ;-)
Hadrianople gets the following "Here a grievous battle took place and the Goths prevailed. The Emperor himself was wounded and fled to a farm hear Hadrianople. The Goths, not knowing that an Emperor lay hidden in so poor a hut, set fire to it."
I'd suggest that there was probably some sort of records for both Frigidus and Hadrianople, but Jordanes doesn't use them, isn't interested in them.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 13, 2014, 10:17:25 AM
I'd suggest that there was probably some sort of records for both Frigidus and Hadrianople, but Jordanes doesn't use them, isn't interested in them.
True. He does seem to have been particularly interested in Chalons, and Priscus gives us another example of an unlikely but intriguing potential source for the Hunnic side of things:
"
As I waited and walked up and down in front of the enclosure which surrounded the house, a man, whom from his Scythian dress I took for a barbarian, came up and addressed me in Greek, with the word Xaire, "Hail!" I was surprised at a Scythian speaking Greek. For the subjects of the Huns, swept together from various lands, speak, besides their own barbarous tongues, either Hunnic or Gothic, or--as many as have commercial dealings with the western Romans--Latin; but none of them easily speak Greek, except captives from the Thracian or Illyrian sea-coast; and these last are easily known to any stranger by their torn garments and the squalor of their heads, as men who have met with a reverse. This man, on the contrary, resembled a well-to-do Scythian, being well dressed, and having his hair cut in a circle after Scythian fashion. Having returned his salutation, I asked him who he was and whence he had come into a foreign land and adopted Scythian life. When he asked me why I wanted to know, I told him that his Hellenic speech had prompted my curiosity. Then he smiled and said that he was born a Greek and had gone as a merchant to Viminacium, on the Danube, where he had stayed a long time, and married a very rich wife. But the city fell a prey to the barbarians, and he was stript of his prosperity, and on account of his riches was allotted to Onegesius in the division of the spoil, as it was the custom among the Scythians for the chiefs to reserve for themselves the rich prisoners. Having fought bravely against the Romans and the Acatiri, he had paid the spoils he won to his master, and so obtained freedom. He then married a barbarian wife and had children, and had the privilege of eating at the table of Onegesius.
He considered his new life among the Scythians better than his old life among the Romans, and the reasons he gave were as follows: "After war the Scythians live in inactivity, enjoying what they have got, and not at all, or very little, harassed. The Romans, on the other hand, are in the first place very liable to perish in war, as they have to rest their hopes of safety on others, and are not allowed, on account of their tyrants to use arms. And those who use them are injured by the cowardice of their generals, who cannot support the conduct of war. But the condition of the subjects in time of peace is far more grievous than the evils of war, for the exaction of the taxes is very severe, and unprincipled men inflict injuries on others, because the laws are practically not valid against all classes. A transgressor who belongs to the wealthy classes is not punished for his injustice, while a poor man, who does not understand business, undergoes the legal penalty, that is if he does not depart this life before the trial, so long is the course of lawsuits protracted, and so much money is expended on them. The climax of the misery is to have to pay in order to obtain justice. For no one will give a court to the injured man unless he pay a sum of money to the judge and the judge's clerks."
In reply to this attack on the Empire, I asked him to be good enough to listen with patience to the other side of the question. "The creators of the Roman republic," I said, "who were wise and good men, in order to prevent things from being done at haphazard made one class of men guardians of the laws, and appointed another class to the profession of arms, who were to have no other object than to be always ready for battle, and to go forth to war without dread, as though to their ordinary exercise having by practice exhausted all their fear beforehand. Others again were assigned to attend to the cultivation of the ground, to support both themselves and those who fight in their defence, by contributing the military corn-supply.... To those who protect the interests of the litigants a sum of money is paid by the latter, just as a payment is made by the farmers to the soldiers. Is it not fair to support him who assists and requite him for his kindness? The support of the horse benefits the horseman.... Those who spend money on a suit and lose it in the end cannot fairly put it down to anything but the injustice of their case. And as to the long time spent on lawsuits, that is due to concern for justice, that judges may not fail in passing correct judgments, by having to give sentence offhand; it is better that they should reflect, and conclude the case more tardily, than that by judging in a hurry they should both injure man and transgress against the Deity, the institutor of justice.... The Romans treat their servants better than the king of the Scythians treats his subjects. They deal with them as fathers or teachers, admonishing them to abstain from evil and follow the lines of conduct whey they have esteemed honourable; they reprove them for their errors like their own children. They are not allowed, like the Scythians, to inflict death on them. They have numerous ways of conferring freedom; they can manumit not only during life, but also by their wills, and the testamentary wishes of a Roman in regard to his property are law."
My interlocutor shed tears, and confessed that the laws and constitution of the Romans were fair, but deplored that the governors, not possessing the spirit of former generations, were ruining the State."
In addition to being a useful insight into 'Late Empire Disease', this shows us that potential information sources can be found in the most unlikely guises and places.
The tales of merchants and travellers are the basis of oral history (and according to the Byzantines, military intelligence)
Jordanes would have met plenty of Goths whose family legends included the great deeds of their Great Grandfathers or Grandfathers who fought at Chalon a century ago.
It's unlikely he met many Huns with family connections to the battle, the Hunnic Empire was gone, three or four years after Chalons.
Jim
I am with Jim on the both Cassodorus and Jordanes had opportunities to meet Goths whose fathers or grandfathers had been there or who could recite songs and tales handed own. that would account for the gaps in the story where a Roman source might have been useful to us. However, it is inherently unlikely that any of these sources would give much detail from a leaders speech. What we are receiving is probably halfway to the Nibelunglied or the fight at Finnsburgh.
Roy
Not that it matters. Whether Attila actually said what Jordanes says he said, or whether Attila just made some sort of speech with the content invented by Jordanes, or whether Attila made a speech of which the gist was known and Jordanes supplied some of the details, the result is the same: we acquire interesting facts about the initial hunnic attack, the superiority and something of the fighting techniques of formed Roman/Auxilia infantry, and Attila's response. What we can rule out is that what Attila said or Jordanes made him say was just made up without any basis in what actually happened. Bearing in mind that Jordanes was, if anything, pro Gothic, and it is the Romans who emerge as the best troops in this battle.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 13, 2014, 07:10:02 PM
What we can rule out is that what Attila said or Jordanes made him say was just made up without any basis in what actually happened. Bearing in mind that Jordanes was, if anything, pro Gothic, and it is the Romans who emerge as the best troops in this battle.
Well almost. It is possible that Jordanes knew nothing about the Roman infantry but assumed they were like the Roman infantry he knew - heavies who would form a shieldwall when faced by cavalry.
But it is probable that he was drawing on a source who was closer to the Western Roman army in both time and geography. If we are to credit him with having numerous Gothic sources, although it is generally accepted on his own admission that he principally used - and summarised - Cassiodorus, they would have ancestors who had seen a Roman army of the period in action.
I am intrigued by the (perhaps unintended) implication that a Western Roman army might not form shieldwall when faced by cavalry. How, then, one wonders, would they expect to repel them?
On the subject of the shieldwall, the original Latin literally says 'battlelines and testudos'.
I'd be interested to see the evidence that for Jordanes a 'testudo' meant a shieldwall. If we accept that the Hunnic cavalry were by and large bow-armed skirmishers, wouldn't a tortoise be a more appropriate formation? Carrhae and all that (even in the presence of cataphracts).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 13, 2014, 08:13:42 PM
But it is probable that he was drawing on a source who was closer to the Western Roman army in both time and geography. If we are to credit him with having numerous Gothic sources, although it is generally accepted on his own admission that he principally used - and summarised - Cassiodorus, they would have ancestors who had seen a Roman army of the period in action.
I am intrigued by the (perhaps unintended) implication that a Western Roman army might not form shieldwall when faced by cavalry. How, then, one wonders, would they expect to repel them?
He may just be drawing from what he'd seen of the infantry of the Goths or perhaps the infantry of Belisarius, after all, the later were Roman infantry
PS he may have written in Constantinople so he's have seen plenty of Roman Infantry
Jim
Jordanes is writing in Constantinople.
I fail to see how the Romans emerge as the best troops in the battle? Surely the victory is down to the Visigoths.....part of the reason why I do not believe in a Roman source.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 14, 2014, 12:20:53 AM
Jordanes is writing in Constantinople.
I fail to see how the Romans emerge as the best troops in the battle? Surely the victory is down to the Visigoths.....part of the reason why I do not believe in a Roman source.
Roy
The Romans are able to beat the Huns off the heights without difficulty, and for all Attila's bombast (whether actually said by him or said for him by Jordanes) he will not dare attack them directly again. The fight between the Huns and Visigoths and Alans, on the other hand, is a see-saw affair, not immediately concluded either way, and it is only when the Visigoths are able to attack the Huns in the flank - either by chasing off the Ostrogoths or by a reserve attacking Attila's exposed flank - that the battle goes against Attila. Notice that he is
not killed and that he is able to withdraw his forces in order, implying that even though flanked, the Huns can still engage the Visigoths sufficiently to be able to retreat without routing to their camp.
Actually you could equally say that the 'Roman' infantry huddled pathetically on the heights, and Attila could ignore them and the real battle was between the Huns, Ostrogoths, Alans and Visigoths
Once they'd got to the heights they didn't do anything
Very different from a Roman army at the Battle of Singara 344AD where the Romans advanced a hundred stades in full armour, driving the Sassanids before them, pinning them against their camp and then breaking into the camp.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 13, 2014, 08:45:14 PM
On the subject of the shieldwall, the original Latin literally says 'battlelines and testudos'.
I'd be interested to see the evidence that for Jordanes a 'testudo' meant a shieldwall. If we accept that the Hunnic cavalry were by and large bow-armed skirmishers, wouldn't a tortoise be a more appropriate formation? Carrhae and all that (even in the presence of cataphracts).
As it happens, having sounded the note of caution, I think it is quite likely that Jordanes (or his source) think of these are close-order Romans. As such, their response to cavalry attack may well be to go into a testudo (which, by this point seems to have meant locked shields in front,with ranks two and three holding shields overhead - so pretty shieldwall-like). But, as echoed by Jim, he may have in his head the Roman infantry of his own time, so we need to be cautious. We mustn't leap to conclude these are a particular type of infantry (legions, auxiliaries, heavily armoured etc or even particularly well drilled - as I've said on another thread, we have a sixth century account of Frankish infantry forming a similar formation).
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 14, 2014, 07:34:48 AM
Actually you could equally say that the 'Roman' infantry huddled pathetically on the heights, and Attila could ignore them and the real battle was between the Huns, Ostrogoths, Alans and Visigoths
Once they'd got to the heights they didn't do anything
Very different from a Roman army at the Battle of Singara 344AD where the Romans advanced a hundred stades in full armour, driving the Sassanids before them, pinning them against their camp and then breaking into the camp.
Not necessarily. Attila feels the need to depict the Romans as pathetic huddlers (and let us not forget that these 'pathetic huddlers' had beaten his right back from the ridge in the first place) because his troops are disheartened and nervous.
Now, if the Huns ignore the Romans and pile into the Alans and their supporting Visigoths (the bulk of the Visigoths seems to have been engaged by their Ostrogothic near-kindred), the Romans are being presented with an opportunity to flank the Hunnic attack. Jordanes implies this is what the Goths did, but both he and Gregory of Tours tacitly credit Aetius with the victory, notably when Attila makes his subsequent foray into the Empire
having learned of the death of Aetius. The demise of Theoderic apparently was not a factor in Attila's evaluation.
Reading between the lines, I sense a Roman flank attack on Attila's centre just as things were getting interesting. The Visigoths who 'separated from the Alans' and went in may have been part of this or may have been the buttressing force we have surmised from Jordanes' description of the Alans as 'surrounded' by reliable troops who discouraged retreat.
This prompts a hypothesis about Aetius' conduct of the battle. If he had disposed a Visigothic cavalry force behind the Alans' right and a Roman cavalry force behind the Alans' left to prevent premature egress from the battlefield, he might have arranged so that on a signal each force pulled to one side and let the Alans fall back, drawing the Huns after them, and then the Huns, who would have been following up the Alans, were hit in both flanks by the Romans and Visigoths. Such conduct of the battle would accord with Aetius' reputation as a masterly general, and would explain how the battle suddenly went sour for Attila, precipitating a Hunnic rout back to camp. Under this hypothesis, Jordanes, in keeping with his Getocentric focus, would have given us only the Visigothic side of the manoeuvre, leaving out the Roman part.
Hmmm, looks like the basis of a possible article here ...
Quote from: Erpingham on February 14, 2014, 08:03:28 AM
But, as echoed by Jim, he may have in his head the Roman infantry of his own time, so we need to be cautious. We mustn't leap to conclude these are a particular type of infantry (legions, auxiliaries, heavily armoured etc or even particularly well drilled - as I've said on another thread, we have a sixth century account of Frankish infantry forming a similar formation).
I had the impression that 'testudo' was no longer a formation practised by 6th century Eastern Empire (aka Byzantine) infantry (they may have used 'phoulkon' but I do not recall this term occurring in Procopius). The usual contemporary term (at least in Sidonius) for what seem to be regular infantry formations in the mid-late 5th century is 'agmen' - in earlier usage, understood as a column, but by the 5th century perhaps meaning a 'formation' in the sense of a 'unit'. Majorian's panegyrised success against Vandal raiders in Italy is attained with 'agmina vestra' - your units/formations. This was following his appointment as Magister Militum, so looks as if it is referring to regular units under his command.
Might it be possible to give the reference for 'Frankish infantry forming a similar formation'? The Latin would be worth a look - assuming it is Latin and not Procopius' description (in Greek) of the Franks at Casilinum.
Procopius does not , I think, describe the shield formation at Casilinum, it's a wedge.
Agathias writes about the Frankish shield wall at Rimini.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 14, 2014, 10:13:59 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 14, 2014, 07:34:48 AM
Actually you could equally say that the 'Roman' infantry huddled pathetically on the heights, and Attila could ignore them and the real battle was between the Huns, Ostrogoths, Alans and Visigoths
Once they'd got to the heights they didn't do anything
Very different from a Roman army at the Battle of Singara 344AD where the Romans advanced a hundred stades in full armour, driving the Sassanids before them, pinning them against their camp and then breaking into the camp.
Not necessarily. Attila feels the need to depict the Romans as pathetic huddlers (and let us not forget that these 'pathetic huddlers' had beaten his right back from the ridge in the first place) because his troops are disheartened and nervous.
Now, if the Huns ignore the Romans and pile into the Alans and their supporting Visigoths (the bulk of the Visigoths seems to have been engaged by their Ostrogothic near-kindred), the Romans are being presented with an opportunity to flank the Hunnic attack.
Why are you ignoring the Gepids? Was something said which discounted them which I missed?
I thought they were the ones the Romans had to deal with?
Jim
Testudo seems an odd formation if it refers to the anti-missile, shed like formation.
Whilst the Huns could use light cavalry bow tactics they were also capable of heavy cavalry tactics and were capable shifting between both styles.
Against heavy cavalry a classic 'shed' testudo formation would come off second best; the ability to present a hedge of spear points goes, as does the ability to discharge any missile weapons, as does the bracing required should a horse and rider make contact (for whatever reason) with the formation.
'Testudo' seems to be a fairly flexible term in the sources; it's more likely some kind of foulkon (fulcum) or closed up formation I think with braced spears; and that could easily be interpreted as a shield wall, i.e. a wall of shields.
Plutarch describe Mark Anthony's deployment against Parthian cavalry in 36BC:
'the legionnaires locked the light infantry within their ranks; some [legionaries] dropping down on one knee, positioned their scuta in frot of them while those behind (i.e. the 2nd rank] covered them with their shields, and others [3rd rank] likewise covered them. The appearance closely resembled a sloping roof...'
There are other examples in Arrian, Zosimus, Ammianus, Cassius Dio....
Who the men are behind this shield wall is however another question; trained but not necessarily elite.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 14, 2014, 08:03:28 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 13, 2014, 08:45:14 PM
On the subject of the shieldwall, the original Latin literally says 'battlelines and testudos'.
I'd be interested to see the evidence that for Jordanes a 'testudo' meant a shieldwall. If we accept that the Hunnic cavalry were by and large bow-armed skirmishers, wouldn't a tortoise be a more appropriate formation? Carrhae and all that (even in the presence of cataphracts).
As it happens, having sounded the note of caution, I think it is quite likely that Jordanes (or his source) think of these are close-order Romans. As such, their response to cavalry attack may well be to go into a testudo (which, by this point seems to have meant locked shields in front,with ranks two and three holding shields overhead - so pretty shieldwall-like). But, as echoed by Jim, he may have in his head the Roman infantry of his own time, so we need to be cautious. We mustn't leap to conclude these are a particular type of infantry (legions, auxiliaries, heavily armoured etc or even particularly well drilled - as I've said on another thread, we have a sixth century account of Frankish infantry forming a similar formation).
Given that the Roman foot know they are confronting a predominantly horse archer army, it would make sense for them to extend this formation by having ranks 3 to 8 hold their shields overhead and form a tortoise. So you have both a shieldwall and tortoise in one, which would be an effective counter to both hunnic shooting and charging.
But an examination of the use of 'testudo' by late Roman authors would be interesting.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 14, 2014, 10:48:09 AM
But an examination of the use of 'testudo' by late Roman authors would be interesting.
Try Rance Justin:
https://web.duke.edu/classics/grbs/FTexts/44/Rance2.pdf
Re reading jordanEs you might have to change that map of yours Justin. In 195 , unconfident of Sangiban's loyalty he and his tribe are placed ' in the midst of their auxiliaries.' Now, if that refers to the battle layout it will not be A Visigoth force behind Sangiban , but one or more of the auxilia listed at191.
Of course you will suggest t hat the surrounding by auxilia takes place at Orleans before Attila's arrival, but. the term is repeated at 197 and the Goths and Romans are supposed to be on either flank.
If Jordanes is so good , by the way how do you reconcile
that in jordanes Orleans is defended by Aetius and Theoderid who build earthworks.
That there is no mention of Attila retreating yet the battlefield is stated to be the catalaunian plaiNs
In the life of St Anianus the city has been besieged and penetrated by the time that Aetius and Theoderid arrive.
As to the alleged second advance of Attila into gaul to attack the Alans after his invasion of Italy where is the time for this. where any other corroboration.
Jordanes is shot through with inconsistencies which appear to be invisible to some.
roy
Quote from: aligern on February 14, 2014, 11:05:17 AM
Re reading jordanEs you might have to change that map of yours Justin. In 195 , unconfident of Sangiban's loyalty he and his tribe are placed ' in the midst of their auxiliaries.' Now, if that refers to the battle layout it will not be A Visigoth force behind Sangiban , but one or more of the auxilia listed at191.
Of course you will suggest t hat the surrounding by auxilia takes place at Orleans before Attila's arrival, but. the term is repeated at 197 and the Goths and Romans are supposed to be on either flank.
If Jordanes is so good , by the way how do you reconcile
that in jordanes Orleans is defended by Aetius and Theoderid who build earthworks.
That there is no mention of Attila retreating yet the battlefield is stated to be the catalaunian plaiNs
In the life of St Anianus the city has been besieged and penetrated by the time that Aetius and Theoderid arrive.
As to the alleged second advance of Attila into gaul to attack the Alans after his invasion of Italy where is the time for this. where any other corroboration.
Jordanes is shot through with inconsistencies which appear to be invisible to some.
roy
Can you steer me to an online text of Anianus? Ta.
No, Rodg might know!
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 14, 2014, 10:27:05 AM
Might it be possible to give the reference for 'Frankish infantry forming a similar formation'? The Latin would be worth a look - assuming it is Latin and not Procopius' description (in Greek) of the Franks at Casilinum.
I did quote this in the previous discussion
PHILIP RANCE 2 9 1
Agathias' account of a minor action near Rimini in late 553
between Narses' mounted retinue and some marauding Franks.
Faced with the Roman horsemen, the Franks
"all massed themselves together, both infantry and cavalry, and
deployed in a compact formation, which though not very deep ...
was nevertheless made strong by linking shields and drawing in
the flanks in good order ... Perfectly protected by their shields,
they stood immovable and unshaken, at no point breaking the
cohesion of their formation"
As you know, Agathius wrote in Greek, which the cut and paste won't handle. But is is on p.291 of Rance's paper which Rodge links to.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 14, 2014, 10:48:09 AM
But an examination of the use of 'testudo' by late Roman authors would be interesting.
If you look in the paper Rodger quotes, pp300-304 gives a number of examples.
Bacrach , in Early Carolingian Warfare makes much of Rimini as an example of the Franks operating a disciplined, Roman descended formation, but then he wants to see evidence of Roman continuity into Frankish practice. I would see the formation as a commonplace adopted by Romans, Earky Germans, Celts etc. it is a natural way to deal with the threat of missiles and of charging cavalry.
Roy
Reminds me of Caesar's account of some German/celtic formations with legionaries throwing themselves on the wall of shields to break through
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 14, 2014, 05:37:38 PM
Reminds me of Caesar's account of some German/celtic formations with legionaries throwing themselves on the wall of shields to break through
Jim
strangely enough Jim, this was a standard tactic of dark age reenactors to "break up" a shield wall....
Not something I'd like to do when the other side had both edged weapons and criminal intent ;-)
Jim
true! :) Although some of the shieldwall scraps I have been involved in have been pretty intense. The lack of edged weapons only partly diminishing the overall "feel" to a close up infantry encounter
Quote from: aligern on February 14, 2014, 03:04:04 PM
No, Rodg might know!
Roy
I don't know of this online.
You need:
Vita Aniani Episcopus Aurelianensis, ed. B. Krusch, MGHSRMiii: 104-117 (1896)I dont know if there is a later translation.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 14, 2014, 03:13:40 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 14, 2014, 10:27:05 AM
Might it be possible to give the reference for 'Frankish infantry forming a similar formation'? The Latin would be worth a look - assuming it is Latin and not Procopius' description (in Greek) of the Franks at Casilinum.
I did quote this in the previous discussion
PHILIP RANCE 2 9 1
Agathias' account of a minor action near Rimini in late 553
between Narses' mounted retinue and some marauding Franks.
Faced with the Roman horsemen, the Franks
"all massed themselves together, both infantry and cavalry, and
deployed in a compact formation, which though not very deep ...
was nevertheless made strong by linking shields and drawing in
the flanks in good order ... Perfectly protected by their shields,
they stood immovable and unshaken, at no point breaking the
cohesion of their formation"
As you know, Agathius wrote in Greek, which the cut and paste won't handle. But is is on p.291 of Rance's paper which Rodge links to.
Actually Agathias uses 'synaspismon' (literally translated as 'joining shields') which simply indicates the assumption of a very close formation. The arrow-proof protection given by the shields is entirely consistent with the use of a shieldwall, a fairly standard German tactic, without invoking a phoulkon or testudo. (Duke William met much the same sort of thing at Hastings.)
Quote from: aligern on February 14, 2014, 11:05:17 AM
Re reading jordanEs you might have to change that map of yours Justin. In 195 , unconfident of Sangiban's loyalty he and his tribe are placed ' in the midst of their auxiliaries.' Now, if that refers to the battle layout it will not be A Visigoth force behind Sangiban , but one or more of the auxilia listed at191.
This is where close attention to the original text is important.
Dextrum itaque cornum cum Vesegothis Theoderidus tenebat, sinistrum Aetius cum Romanis, conlocantes in medio Sanguibanum, quem superius rettulimus praefuisse Alanis, providentes cautioni militari, ut eum, de cuius animo minus praesumebant, fidelium turba concluderent. Facile namque adsumit pugnandi necessitatem, cui fugiendi inponitur difficultas.Now Theodorid with the Visigoths held the right wing and Aëtius with the Romans the left. They placed in the centre Sangiban (who, as said before, was in command of the Alani), thus contriving with military caution to surround by a host of faithful troops [fidelium turba]
the man in whose loyalty they had little confidence. For one who has difficulties placed in the way of his flight readily submits to the necessity of fighting.Sangiban being surrounded by 'auxiliaries' in 197 is a case of translator misapprehension.
Quote
If Jordanes is so good , by the way how do you reconcile
that in jordanes Orleans is defended by Aetius and Theoderid who build earthworks.
That there is no mention of Attila retreating yet the battlefield is stated to be the catalaunian plaiNs
In the life of St Anianus the city has been besieged and penetrated by the time that Aetius and Theoderid arrive.
That Jordanes should appear to omit Attila's retreat is unimportant: what matters is is description of the battle. In point of fact he does (195) note that Attila was "mediating flight" after he had been "taken aback by this event and lost confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict". Omitting the fact of retreat is not significant as it can be surmised from the battle being fought in the Catalaunian Plains rather than at Orleans.
Quote
Jordanes is shot through with inconsistencies which appear to be invisible to some.
But which can be evaluated by others. Perhaps if we were to look at specific inconsistencies we could tell whether they are real or artefacts of misapprehension through loose translation.
Quote from: rodge on February 14, 2014, 10:52:21 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 14, 2014, 10:48:09 AM
But an examination of the use of 'testudo' by late Roman authors would be interesting.
Try Rance Justin:
https://web.duke.edu/classics/grbs/FTexts/44/Rance2.pdf
Rance's statement that
Furthermore, those manuscripts of the Strategicon which preserve the Latin commands still in use at the time of writing indicate, despite varying degrees of textual corruption, that phoulkon is merely a Greek transliteration of the Latin fulcum. Although fulcum is nowhere attested, the word must have already enjoyed an "institutionalised" usage and, it may be assumed, was part of standard late Roman military vocabulary. is puzzling.
Phylax in Greek means 'guard', and
phylakein are 'guards' of any sort, including a covering force for foragers. A
phoulkon (or
phylkon: 'u' and 'y' are the same letter - upsilon - in Greek) can readily be understood etymologically as a formation for self-guarding: one does not need to invent a nonexistent Latin root for it.
I think Rance is on the wrong track here.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 14, 2014, 07:21:57 PM
That Jordanes should appear to omit Attila's retreat is unimportant: what matters is is description of the battle. In point of fact he does (195) note that Attila was "mediating flight" after he had been "taken aback by this event and lost confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict". Omitting the fact of retreat is not significant as it can be surmised from the battle being fought in the Catalaunian Plains rather than at Orleans.
Quote
Sorry but how did Jordanes know what Attila was 'meditating'?
One thing we can be sure of it that there is no way that Attila is ever going to tell anyone publically that he has lost confidence in his own troops. Certainly not in the middle of a battle, otherwise things are going to hell in a hand cart.
Jordanes may well think that Attila was meditating that, he might even be right, but we have to separate his opinion (which need be no better informed than ours) from any facts he might mention
Jim
Quote from: aligern on February 14, 2014, 11:05:17 AM
Re reading jordanEs you might have to change that map of yours Justin. In 195 , unconfident of Sangiban's loyalty he and his tribe are placed ' in the midst of their auxiliaries.' Now, if that refers to the battle layout it will not be A Visigoth force behind Sangiban , but one or more of the auxilia listed at191.
Of course you will suggest t hat the surrounding by auxilia takes place at Orleans before Attila's arrival, but. the term is repeated at 197 and the Goths and Romans are supposed to be on either flank.
If Jordanes is so good , by the way how do you reconcile
that in jordanes Orleans is defended by Aetius and Theoderid who build earthworks.
That there is no mention of Attila retreating yet the battlefield is stated to be the catalaunian plaiNs
In the life of St Anianus the city has been besieged and penetrated by the time that Aetius and Theoderid arrive.
As to the alleged second advance of Attila into gaul to attack the Alans after his invasion of Italy where is the time for this. where any other corroboration.
Jordanes is shot through with inconsistencies which appear to be invisible to some.
roy
Without the
Vita Anianis text in Latin I can't comment on whether it contradicts Jordanes or not.
One thing to note about Jordanes' account:
| Quod ubi Theodoridus et Aetius agnoverunt, magnis aggeribus eandem urbem ante adventum Attilae struunt, suspectumque custodiunt Sangibanum et inter suos anxiliares medium statuunt cum propria gente. Igitur Attila rex Hunnorum tali perculsus eventu diffidens suis copiis metuit inire conflictum.
When Theodored and Aëtius learned of this, they cast up great earthworks around that city before Attila's arrival and kept watch over the suspected Sangiban, placing him with his tribe in the midst of their auxiliaries. Then Attila, king of the Huns, was beaten [rather than dismayed] by this event and lost confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict. |
Perculsus has a primary sense of 'beat', 'strike down', 'smite', 'overthrow', with a secondary meaning of 'dismay'. Hence one can see this passage as affirming that Attila was beaten
physically at Orleans by the earthenworks of Aetius and Theodoric, defended by Alans stiffened by the Auxilia. Notice that there is no indication that the main armies of Aetius and Theodoric have yet arrived at this point.
Conflictum has the root sense of 'a striking together,' 'a collision'. Hence what Attila fears is not the initiation of hostilities, which had already begun, but the decisive engagement between his and the allied armies. Orleans showed him that he was up against something tougher than he had originally imagined.
It sometimes helps to look at the original Latin, which is why I wish I had spent more time on Greek.
Quote from: rodge on February 14, 2014, 06:46:47 PM
Quote from: aligern on February 14, 2014, 03:04:04 PM
No, Rodg might know!
Roy
I don't know of this online.
You need:
Vita Aniani Episcopus Aurelianensis, ed. B. Krusch, MGHSRMiii: 104-117 (1896)
I dont know if there is a later translation.
The
MGH text is itself available online - contents page here, I hope (http://www.dmgh.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb00000754_00007.html?sortIndex=010%3A020%3A0007%3A010%3A00%3A00&sort=score&order=desc&context=vita+aniani&divisionTitle_str=&hl=false&fulltext=vita+aniani)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 14, 2014, 07:21:57 PM
Actually Agathias uses 'synaspismon' (literally translated as 'joining shields') which simply indicates the assumption of a very close formation. The arrow-proof protection given by the shields is entirely consistent with the use of a shieldwall, a fairly standard German tactic, without invoking a phoulkon or testudo. (Duke William met much the same sort of thing at Hastings.)
But isn't Rance's point that these are related - the foulkon relates to the testudo and the concept of a shieldwall. Testudo has lost its earlier meaning of a completely enclosed formation to mean something that has similar properties of overlapping shields and overhead cover, which the foulkon also has. I'm sure I don't have to tell you that a few hundred after Chalons, testudo was being used to mean shieldwall. Which brings us back to a point that has been made several times - translating Jordanes as if he uses military words in a strict technical sense may be suspect. I don't have the language skills of many here but I do know latin is evolving at the time he wrote.
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 14, 2014, 08:18:57 PM
Quote from: rodge on February 14, 2014, 06:46:47 PM
Quote from: aligern on February 14, 2014, 03:04:04 PM
No, Rodg might know!
Roy
I don't know of this online.
You need:
Vita Aniani Episcopus Aurelianensis, ed. B. Krusch, MGHSRMiii: 104-117 (1896)
I dont know if there is a later translation.
The MGH text is itself available online - contents page here, I hope (http://www.dmgh.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb00000754_00007.html?sortIndex=010%3A020%3A0007%3A010%3A00%3A00&sort=score&order=desc&context=vita+aniani&divisionTitle_str=&hl=false&fulltext=vita+aniani)
Still couldn't find the text. Roy mentioned that Ananius affirmed Attila had reached Orleans before the arrival of Aetius and Theodoric's armies, which is the same thing Jordanes is saying, so no matter.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 14, 2014, 08:21:52 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 14, 2014, 07:21:57 PM
Actually Agathias uses 'synaspismon' (literally translated as 'joining shields') which simply indicates the assumption of a very close formation. The arrow-proof protection given by the shields is entirely consistent with the use of a shieldwall, a fairly standard German tactic, without invoking a phoulkon or testudo. (Duke William met much the same sort of thing at Hastings.)
But isn't Rance's point that these are related - the foulkon relates to the testudo and the concept of a shieldwall. Testudo has lost its earlier meaning of a completely enclosed formation to mean something that has similar properties of overlapping shields and overhead cover, which the foulkon also has. I'm sure I don't have to tell you that a few hundred after Chalons, testudo was being used to mean shieldwall. Which brings us back to a point that has been made several times - translating Jordanes as if he uses military words in a strict technical sense may be suspect. I don't have the language skills of many here but I do know latin is evolving at the time he wrote.
Rance does make the point that writers like Ammianus describe this arrowproof shieldwall formation as being '
like a testudo', '
in the form of a testudo' (p302). The conclusion is that the formation existed but did not have its own term - at least not for a writer like Ammianus - until one was created later on and given as current usage by Maurice in 590.
Taking another look at the passage:
| Nota vobis sunt quam sint levia Romanorum arma: primo etiam non dico vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt. |
dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt seems awkward to me. Literally it means: 'whilst they come together in order and join up their battleline(s)
and by testudo.'
One could perhaps paraphrase the passage thus:
'You know how little a matter Roman arms are: they are weighed down, I say not by the first wound, but by the dust itself, whilst they arrange themselves in order and join up their battleline(s) - by testudo too!'
In other words Attila is emphasising how slow the Roman arms and formations make them, allowing the Huns to ignore them for the present and concentrate on the Visigoths and Alans.
Justin, the life of Anianus suggests that Attila gets to Orleans first and has almost , or actually broken in before The Goths and Aetius arrive. Jordanes has Aetius and Theoderid arriving first and building great earthworks before Attila's arrival and surrounding Sangiban with auxilia. That is rather different from arriving at the climax of a siege where the good bishop has been praying for their arrival for days.
It is possible to wriggle on this point, but in the end the question is whether Jordanes is right or wrong, or more crucially, that there is doubt as to his account .
Similarly with his allegation of a second Hun invasion with a battle in Gaul which is dubious in terms of time and without support.
Similarly, why does Jordanes not mention Avitus role in getting Gothic hel?
The importance of the doubts about Jordanes account is that you are relying upon minute interpretations of his words, which is great fun, but is a step too far in sweating the sources.
IMHO
Roy
Oh and I suspect testudo was never clearly defined and did not originally mean just a formation with shields all around and above. Roman drill masters could easily have differentiated between formations by ordering either line or a cohort column first and then shoutin Ad testudinem or whatever and thus achieving either the wargamer's idea of a testudo or a line with shields grounded , at 45% and horizontal.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 15, 2014, 09:57:45 AM
Oh and I suspect testudo was never clearly defined and did not originally mean just a formation with shields all around and above. Roman drill masters could easily have differentiated between formations by ordering either line or a cohort column first and then shoutin Ad testudinem or whatever and thus achieving either the wargamer's idea of a testudo or a line with shields grounded , at 45% and horizontal.
Roy
Rance does say as much.
Quote from: aligern on February 15, 2014, 09:57:45 AMJustin, the life of Anianus suggests that Attila gets to Orleans first and has almost , or actually broken in before The Goths and Aetius arrive. Jordanes has Aetius and Theoderid arriving first and building great earthworks before Attila's arrival and surrounding Sangiban with auxilia. That is rather different from arriving at the climax of a siege where the good bishop has been praying for their arrival for days.
The interesting fact about Jordanes' account of events at Orleans is the earthworks. One builds earthworks around a city to withstand a siege, and one withstands a siege only if one's own forces are numerically inferior and unable to face the enemy in open battle. In other words, if Aetius and Theodoric's armies had already reached Orleans before Attila, why bother with earthworks? Why not just give battle to Attila then and there? For me the earthworks implies that Aetius wanted to hold Orleans, but did not yet have the Visigoths and his own forces on hand. It is the most natural interpretation of the text.
Quote from: aligern on February 15, 2014, 09:57:45 AMSimilarly with his allegation of a second Hun invasion with a battle in Gaul which is dubious in terms of time and without support.
The second Hunnic invasion seems at least possible, and the fact that only one source mentions it does not automatically mean that source is wrong.
Quote from: aligern on February 15, 2014, 09:57:45 AMSimilarly, why does Jordanes not mention Avitus role in getting Gothic help?
Because in his context it is a relatively unimportant detail. The only reason we know about it is because Sidonius describes it in his panegyric to the same Avitus.
Don't get me wrong - I don't automatically accept every detail of Jordanes' history, but I prefer the approach of doing everything possible to make sense of a source, only discarding it if it is clearly proven false.
Quote from: aligern on February 15, 2014, 09:57:45 AM
Oh and I suspect testudo was never clearly defined and did not originally mean just a formation with shields all around and above. Roman drill masters could easily have differentiated between formations by ordering either line or a cohort column first and then shoutin Ad testudinem or whatever and thus achieving either the wargamer's idea of a testudo or a line with shields grounded , at 45% and horizontal.
Roy
Actually, I thought it was defined and mean tortoise :-)
This makes sense of the comments Justin made "Rance does make the point that writers like Ammianus describe this arrowproof shieldwall formation as being 'like a testudo', 'in the form of a testudo' (p302). The conclusion is that the formation existed but did not have its own term - at least not for a writer like Ammianus - until one was created later on and given as current usage by Maurice in 590."
Yes, the shieldwall wasn't 'a testudo', it was 'like a tortoise'
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 15, 2014, 10:22:26 AM
Quote from: aligern on February 15, 2014, 09:57:45 AM
Oh and I suspect testudo was never clearly defined and did not originally mean just a formation with shields all around and above. Roman drill masters could easily have differentiated between formations by ordering either line or a cohort column first and then shoutin Ad testudinem or whatever and thus achieving either the wargamer's idea of a testudo or a line with shields grounded , at 45% and horizontal.
Roy
Rance does say as much.
That is how I read it. He alludes to, but doesn't really resolve, the question of whether the late testudo/foulkon formation is a result of barbarisation i.e. that the late Roman army is absorbing the native tactics of the barbarian troops filling its ranks. However, this thesis does rather assume that shieldwall forming is the natural style of these barbarians. The alternative is that shieldwalling is something that is brought out from late Roman tactics. But the development of shieldwall tactics maybe a separate thread.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 15, 2014, 11:00:27 AM
That is how I read it. He alludes to, but doesn't really resolve, the question of whether the late testudo/foulkon formation is a result of barbarisation i.e. that the late Roman army is absorbing the native tactics of the barbarian troops filling its ranks. However, this thesis does rather assume that shieldwall forming is the natural style of these barbarians. The alternative is that shieldwalling is something that is brought out from late Roman tactics. But the development of shieldwall tactics maybe a separate thread.
Actually he is against the idea of a fulcron coming from barbarian tactics. His point is that this kind of multi-layered shieldwall existed for a long time in the Roman army. It required considerable discipline and training to create and maintain, something the barbarians didn't have.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 15, 2014, 11:16:32 AM
Actually he is against the idea of a fulcron coming from barbarian tactics. His point is that this kind of multi-layered shieldwall existed for a long time in the Roman army. It required considerable discipline and training to create and maintain, something the barbarians didn't have.
Indeed Rance is against the barbarian root for the shield wall. Hence I quoted Plutarch on Mark Anthony a while back....
I disagree that it takes 'considerable discipline and training to create and maintain' Justin. It takes training and discipline but it is not the mark of troops that 'considerable discipline and training to create and maintain' could suggest (if indeed that is what you are suggesting i.e. top notch/elite soldiers?).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 15, 2014, 11:16:32 AM
Actually he is against the idea of a fulcron coming from barbarian tactics. His point is that this kind of multi-layered shieldwall existed for a long time in the Roman army. It required considerable discipline and training to create and maintain, something the barbarians didn't have.
Indeed, that is his view and he makes a reasonable case for it. But he doesn't go into the question in great depth, in my view. As to the degree of discipline and training needed,
Then King Harald arranged his army, and made the line of battle
long, but not deep. He bent both wings of it back, so that they
met together; and formed a wide ring equally thick all round,
shield to shield, both in the front and rear ranks. The king
himself and his retinue were within the circle; and there was the
banner, and a body of chosen men. Earl Toste, with his retinue,
was at another place, and had a different banner. The army was
arranged in this way, because the king knew that horsemen were
accustomed to ride forwards with great vigour, but to turn back
immediately. Now the king ordered that his own and the earl's
attendants should ride forwards where it was most required. "And
our bowmen," said he, "shall be near to us; and they who stand in
the first rank shall set the spear-shaft on the ground, and the
spear-point against the horseman's breast, if he rides at them;
and those who stand in the second rank shall set the spear-point
against the horse's breast."
I don't think Early Medieval Scandinavian armies were particularly drilled or well-trained but this looks quite similar to the descriptions of Byzantine infantry tactics Rance gives to me. So, lets not assume that something "testudo-like" needs a lot of drilled regulars, just some organisation and control (I point again to the Franks at Rimini).
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 14, 2014, 07:54:33 PM
Sorry but how did Jordanes know what Attila was 'meditating'?
An interesting question, suggesting a source close to the top.
Quote
One thing we can be sure of it that there is no way that Attila is ever going to tell anyone publicly that he has lost confidence in his own troops. Certainly not in the middle of a battle, otherwise things are going to hell in a hand cart.
And he did not - he disparaged the Romans and led his men in against the Alans. He still got thrashed.
Quote
Jordanes may well think that Attila was meditating that, he might even be right, but we have to separate his opinion (which need be no better informed than ours) from any facts he might mention
It is possible that this was a fact rather than a Jordanes opinion - had he been a high-calibre historian, he might have mentioned his source and not left us guessing.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 15, 2014, 07:25:01 AM
Still couldn't find the text. Roy mentioned that Anianus affirmed Attila had reached Orleans before the arrival of Aetius and Theodoric's armies, which is the same thing Jordanes is saying, so no matter.
Indeed. And if one attempts to invoke this proctologically-pronounced priest as evidence of Jordanes' unreliability because of a difference in the telling, why should the converse argument not apply? Why should it not be Jordanes showing Anianus to be unreliable? Better to pay attention to what we can extract from sources than to pronounce them unreliable when they do not fit preconceived notions.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 15, 2014, 10:22:26 AM
The interesting fact about Jordanes' account of events at Orleans is the earthworks. One builds earthworks around a city to withstand a siege, and one withstands a siege only if one's own forces are numerically inferior and unable to face the enemy in open battle. In other words, if Aetius and Theodoric's armies had already reached Orleans before Attila, why bother with earthworks? Why not just give battle to Attila then and there? For me the earthworks implies that Aetius wanted to hold Orleans, but did not yet have the Visigoths and his own forces on hand. It is the most natural interpretation of the text.
Gregory of Tours (II.7) notes:
"
Soon afterwards the rumour reached Rome that Aetius was in great danger with the troops of the enemy all around him."
This suggests that Aetius had been first into the field and had thrown himself into Orleans, erecting defences or a camp - either the town walls were ruinous or his force encamped outside the town. It is certainly consistent with Aetius being present before the Visigoths arrived.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 15, 2014, 11:00:27 AM
He alludes to, but doesn't really resolve, the question of whether the late testudo/foulkon formation is a result of barbarisation i.e. that the late Roman army is absorbing the native tactics of the barbarian troops filling its ranks. However, this thesis does rather assume that shieldwall forming is the natural style of these barbarians. The alternative is that shieldwalling is something that is brought out from late Roman tactics.
But the development of shieldwall tactics maybe a separate thread.
Might be an idea ...
Quote from: Erpingham on February 15, 2014, 11:34:50 AM
I don't think Early Medieval Scandinavian armies were particularly drilled or well-trained but this looks quite similar to the descriptions of Byzantine infantry tactics Rance gives to me. So, lets not assume that something "testudo-like" needs a lot of drilled regulars, just some organisation and control (I point again to the Franks at Rimini).
One might also point out that the English formation at Hastings and the Frankish formation at Rimini were static affairs, but the Roman 'testudo-like' formation was traditionally mobile: this is where the training and discipline come in.
Had Harold's men had the training and discipline to maintain a 'testudo-like' formation when mobile, the advance of the English right at Hastings might have had a very different outcome.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 11:51:16 AM
One might also point out that the English formation at Hastings and the Frankish formation at Rimini were static affairs, but the Roman 'testudo-like' formation was traditionally mobile: this is where the training and discipline come in.
After the heights were taken did the Romans move again Patrick? Or did they adopt a static defensive formation?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 11:51:16 AM
Had Harold's men had the training and discipline to maintain a 'testudo-like' formation when mobile, the advance of the English right at Hastings might have had a very different outcome.
A tad harsh. You yourself are an advocate of the fact that Greek and Roman troops usually opened up to advance, so why should Early Medieval infantry do otherwise? The problem of the English right seems to have been a disorderly advance, not the quality of their shieldwall (although the two are interconnected). But that is for a Hastings thread :)
Quote from: rodge on February 15, 2014, 11:55:41 AM
After the heights were taken did the Romans move again Patrick? Or did they adopt a static defensive formation?
This we are not told: Jordanes seems to focus on the Gothic participation without telling us what Aetius was doing on his side of the field. The only criterion we have is the sudden collapse of the Hunnic centre at the time of the Visigoth attack (when they 'separated from' the Alans) - this seems more compatible with simultaneous assaults on the flanks of the Hunnic centre by Romans and Goths than with a single attack by Goths alone.
It may also be noteworthy that Aetius was the opponent Attila subsequently feared, and rejoiced at the news of this death. It is hard to see why unless Aetius had played a direct and significant part in the Huns' defeat.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 15, 2014, 12:14:40 PM
You yourself are an advocate of the fact that Greek and Roman troops usually opened up to advance, so why should Early Medieval infantry do otherwise?
But the whole point of a
testudo was that it could advance
without opening up.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 12:48:26 PM
It may also be noteworthy that Aetius was the opponent Attila subsequently feared, and rejoiced at the news of this death. It is hard to see why unless Aetius had played a direct and significant part in the Huns' defeat.
He did, he brought together the grand alliance that defeated Attila. We also have to remember that because of Aetius's hunnic contacts, it might be that Attila feared him as someone who could undermine him politically at home.
It doesn't tell us that he feared Aetius because at one battle he'd moved troops in a certain direction.
Similar with Attila meditating. Who on earth was this source close to the top? Remember that Attila was dead four years after this battle, and on his deathbed he had things on his mind other than confessing his personal weakness.
Frankly rather than postulate a source for which there is no evidence, I think it makes far more sense to assume that Jordanes 'made it up'.
If we're being kind to him we can say that it was Jordanes attempting to see into Attila's mind based on the evidence he had. After all, various Gothic folk tales and family stories could well have mentioned how Attila 'damned near wet himself' when he saw the Visigothic array (or until the Ostrogoths sacrificed themselves heroically to save his bacon, depending on which family story it was)
It is possible that it was a fact, but there is no evidence that Jordanes could have known this fact, and judging by the rest of his work his job was to produce a history of the Goths in the old style, he had no interest in writing what we could describe as history
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 12:48:26 PM
But the whole point of a testudo was that it could advance without opening up.
The traditional one yes. But the "testudo-like" formations of the late army? I thought Rance's argument are that these are much more static defensive formations?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 12:48:26 PM
Quote from: rodge on February 15, 2014, 11:55:41 AM
After the heights were taken did the Romans move again Patrick? Or did they adopt a static defensive formation?
This we are not told: Jordanes seems to focus on the Gothic participation without telling us what Aetius was doing on his side of the field. The only criterion we have is the sudden collapse of the Hunnic centre at the time of the Visigoth attack (when they 'separated from' the Alans) - this seems more compatible with simultaneous assaults on the flanks of the Hunnic centre by Romans and Goths than with a single attack by Goths alone.
My reading of the situation is that the Romans take the ridge and stay there in a defensive 'locked shield' formation.
A quote from Patrick:
This suggests that Aetius had been first into the field and had thrown himself into Orleans, erecting defences or a camp - either the town walls were ruinous or his force encamped outside the town. It is certainly consistent with Aetius being present before the Visigoths arrived.'
Jordanes says that Aetius and Theoderid arrive at Orleans and build earthworks before Attila arrives. Anianus Vita says that Attila arrives and besieges the city before Aetius and Thederid arrive. The two accounts acre not compatible.
Megthodologically it is acceptable to work on the basis that , if two accounts are equal in value. then a rendering which makes sense of both is generally best. In this case the Vita has the advantage of being compiled 1000 miles closer than Jordanes and by having an institutionally continuous relationship with the saint. So Jordanes should be the junior account here. His story of earthworks is likely a fabrication (couldn't resist that one).
Also, may I suggest Justin that believing a source unless it is disproved isj not a good way of working. Some Indian sources have people fighting from flying machines. Now that cannot be disproved, it is just at the far end of a doctrine thay accept the unlikely.
Whether there were Roman regular infantry at Chalons we do not know. It is quite possible that there were some, or some cavalry units deployed on Aetius left, with the auxilia contingents that Jordanes describes and with Thorismud. As Jordanes refers directly at 211 to Thorismud having repulsed the enemy from the hill comes at night to Attila's camp whilst in the dark we should assume that Thorismud and Aetius have been fighting actively and aggressively against the Gepids who should have fronted against them. The battle is won by the Visigoths on the right flank who defeat the Ostrogoths and then turn on Attila nearly catching him. The likelihood that Thorismud is crossing the battlefield from left to right when he encounters the Hun camp. This argues that the Gepids have been driven off, but also that Theoderid cannot have been in the centre behind the Gepids.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 15, 2014, 03:40:43 PM
Megthodologically it is acceptable to work on the basis that , if two accounts are equal in value. then a rendering which makes sense of both is generally best. In this case the Vita has the advantage of being compiled 1000 miles closer than Jordanes and by having an institutionally continuous relationship with the saint. So Jordanes should be the junior account here. His story of earthworks is likely a fabrication (couldn't resist that one).
Also, may I suggest Justin that believing a source unless it is disproved isj not a good way of working. Some Indian sources have people fighting from flying machines. Now that cannot be disproved, it is just at the far end of a doctrine thay accept the unlikely.
If one works from the premise that Jordanes probably made up the earthworks at Orleans and mistakenly put Aetius and Theodoric's armies there before Attila's arrival, then suddenly one is left knowing very little about the battle itself. The reasoning will go like this:
"Given that Jordanes has many Auxilia present at the battle (largely a fabrication since several of the Auxilia are not named in any other source) one can assume that for Jordanes this was an important battle in which relatively large numbers took part (though large numbers may mean as little as 20 000 men or less per side). Placing Sangiban and the Alans in the middle of the allied line is probably an extrapolation from his earlier willingness to surrender to Attila, and cannot be taken literally. Having Thorismud fight with Aetius may be merely a device by which Jordanes shows the important role of the Visigoths in this battle - something that with his pro-Visigothic attitude he is likely to do. Attila's speech is of course entirely invented, and the mention of a hill may be another device by which Jordanes shows the inferiority of the 'Romans' (presuming there were any actual Roman troops at Chalons which is unlikely, given that Jordanes describes only Auxilia which probably refers only to barbarian foederati) compared to the Visigoths, who defeat Attila on level ground.
"In conclusion, we can be certain only that there was a battle in Gaul between a Hunnic army under Attila and a barbarian coalition under the nominal leadership of Aetius. Attila lost this battle and retired from Gaul. To conclude more would be to place an overly literal confidence in Jordanes as a source." ;)
That's a good starting point Justin
The next stage is to see what agreement we get from any other texts which confirm any of the details.
Jim
Orleans sources I know of other than Jordanes:
GoT HF II.VII
And Attila king of the Huns went forth from Metz and when he had crushed many cities of the Gauls he attacked Orleans and strove to take it by the mighty hammering of battering rams. Now at that time the most blessed Annianus was bishop in the city just mentioned, a man of unequalled wisdom and praiseworthy holiness, whose miracles are faithfully remembered among us. And when the people, on being shut in, cried to their bishop, and asked what they were to do, trusting in God he advised all to prostrate themselves in prayer, and with tears to implore the ever present aid of God in their necessities. Then when they prayed as he had directed, the bishop said: "Look from the wall of the city to sec whether God's mercy yet comes to your aid." For he hoped that by God's mercy Ætius was coming, to whom he had recourse before at Arles when he was anxious about the future. But when they looked from the wall, they saw no one. And he said: "Pray faithfully, for God will free you this day." When they had prayed he said: "Look again." And when they looked they saw no one to bring aid. He said to them a third time: "If you pray faithfully, God comes swiftly." And they besought God's mercy with weeping and loud cries. When this prayer also was finished they looked from the wall a third time at the old man's command, and saw afar off a cloud as it were arising from the earth. When they reported this the bishop said: "It is the aid of the Lord." Meanwhile, when the walls were now trembling from the hammering of the rams and were just about to fall, behold, Ætius came, and Theodore, king of the Goths and Thorismodus his son hastened to the city with their armies, and drove the enemy forth and defeated him.
Wall, no earthworks, Huns siege and attack in full swing, Aetius and the Goths arrive.
Sidonius VIII.XV
To the Lord Bishop Prosper c.478
You wished me to celebrate the glory of the holy Annianus, the greatest and most perfect of prelates, equal to Lupus, and no unworthy rival of Germanus; you would fain see graven on the hearts of all the faithful the memory of a character so fine, so eminent, so richly endowed with so many virtues and so many merits, to which I myself should like to add this, that he made way for such a successor as yourself. You exacted a promise from me at the same time that I would hand down for the benefit of those who come after us the history of the war with Attila, with the whole tale of the siege and assault of Orleans when the city was attacked and breached, but never laid in ruins, and the bishop's celebrated prophecy was divinely answered from above.
No mention of earthworks, just that the city walls are breached. No mention of the relieving force. (Shame he never wrote that book....)
LHF V
...It was at this time that the Huns crossed the Rhine. They burned Metz, they destroyed Trier, penetrated the area around Tongres, and came up to Orleans. At this time the holy Anianus, a man celebrated for his virtue, was bishop of Orleans. With the help of the Lord and through the prayers of the holy Anianus, Aetius, the Patrician of the Romans and Thorismund, the king of the Goths, came to Orleans, The Huns and their king Attila were driven from the city and soundly defeated.
No earthworks, Huns at the city; reads like Aetius and the Goths turn up after the Huns and drive them off but I suppose it could be read that Aetius and the Goths are at the city and drive off the Huns?
Life Of Genevieve 12
...And when the Huns besieged the city of Orleans, the latter [Anianus] by his prayers assisted the Patrician Aetius and his Goths in keeping it from destruction,
No earthworks and can be read anyway your fancy takes you.
I don't have the 'Vita Aniani' and, like Justin, cannot find the text in the link Duncan posted.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 15, 2014, 12:57:36 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 12:48:26 PM
It may also be noteworthy that Aetius was the opponent Attila subsequently feared, and rejoiced at the news of this death. It is hard to see why unless Aetius had played a direct and significant part in the Huns' defeat.
He did, he brought together the grand alliance that defeated Attila. We also have to remember that because of Aetius's hunnic contacts, it might be that Attila feared him as someone who could undermine him politically at home.
It doesn't tell us that he feared Aetius because at one battle he'd moved troops in a certain direction.
Actually one could equally say that it was the emperor Valentinian who brought together the grand alliance, but nobody feared Valentinian as a military commander (although I believe there was some rejoicing over this death).
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Similar with Attila meditating. Who on earth was this source close to the top? Remember that Attila was dead four years after this battle, and on his deathbed he had things on his mind other than confessing his personal weakness.
He would have discussed matters with his chief shaman and/or officers at the time of the campaign, not on his deathbed.
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Frankly rather than postulate a source for which there is no evidence, I think it makes far more sense to assume that Jordanes 'made it up'.
Not at all: if we adopt this standard for unscourced statements by historians, we are left with very little of history and no skill at understanding it.
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It is possible that it was a fact, but there is no evidence that Jordanes could have known this fact, and judging by the rest of his work his job was to produce a history of the Goths in the old style, he had no interest in writing what we could describe as history
There were many ways he could have known it, some of which I have mentioned earlier in the thread; we just do not know which may have been applicable.
Quote from: aligern on February 15, 2014, 03:40:43 PM
Also, may I suggest Justin that believing a source unless it is disproved isj not a good way of working. Some Indian sources have people fighting from flying machines. Now that cannot be disproved, it is just at the far end of a doctrine thay accept the unlikely.
Actually it is quite true; the
vimanas are historically-based and their distant relatives, the
vailx, were still around as of World War 2. But that is another story.
Taking a source as valid unless disproved is the most effective way of working, even if it may not be to everyone's taste. One finds out far more that way.
Quote
The battle is won by the Visigoths on the right flank who defeat the Ostrogoths and then turn on Attila nearly catching him. The likelihood that Thorismud is crossing the battlefield from left to right when he encounters the Hun camp. This argues that the Gepids have been driven off, but also that Theoderid cannot have been in the centre behind the Gepids.
Here of course we are taking Jordanes at face value ... valid until disproved. ;)
Quote from: rodge on February 15, 2014, 05:46:21 PM
Orleans sources I know of other than Jordanes:
GoT HF II.VII
And Attila king of the Huns went forth from Metz and when he had crushed many cities of the Gauls he attacked Orleans and strove to take it by the mighty hammering of battering rams. Now at that time the most blessed Annianus was bishop in the city just mentioned, a man of unequalled wisdom and praiseworthy holiness, whose miracles are faithfully remembered among us. And when the people, on being shut in, cried to their bishop, and asked what they were to do, trusting in God he advised all to prostrate themselves in prayer, and with tears to implore the ever present aid of God in their necessities. Then when they prayed as he had directed, the bishop said: "Look from the wall of the city to sec whether God's mercy yet comes to your aid." For he hoped that by God's mercy Ætius was coming, to whom he had recourse before at Arles when he was anxious about the future. But when they looked from the wall, they saw no one. And he said: "Pray faithfully, for God will free you this day." When they had prayed he said: "Look again." And when they looked they saw no one to bring aid. He said to them a third time: "If you pray faithfully, God comes swiftly." And they besought God's mercy with weeping and loud cries. When this prayer also was finished they looked from the wall a third time at the old man's command, and saw afar off a cloud as it were arising from the earth. When they reported this the bishop said: "It is the aid of the Lord." Meanwhile, when the walls were now trembling from the hammering of the rams and were just about to fall, behold, Ætius came, and Theodore, king of the Goths and Thorismodus his son hastened to the city with their armies, and drove the enemy forth and defeated him.
Wall, no earthworks, Huns siege and attack in full swing, Aetius and the Goths arrive.
Sidonius VIII.XV
To the Lord Bishop Prosper c.478
You wished me to celebrate the glory of the holy Annianus, the greatest and most perfect of prelates, equal to Lupus, and no unworthy rival of Germanus; you would fain see graven on the hearts of all the faithful the memory of a character so fine, so eminent, so richly endowed with so many virtues and so many merits, to which I myself should like to add this, that he made way for such a successor as yourself. You exacted a promise from me at the same time that I would hand down for the benefit of those who come after us the history of the war with Attila, with the whole tale of the siege and assault of Orleans when the city was attacked and breached, but never laid in ruins, and the bishop's celebrated prophecy was divinely answered from above.
No mention of earthworks, just that the city walls are breached. No mention of the relieving force. (Shame he never wrote that book....)
LHF V
...It was at this time that the Huns crossed the Rhine. They burned Metz, they destroyed Trier, penetrated the area around Tongres, and came up to Orleans. At this time the holy Anianus, a man celebrated for his virtue, was bishop of Orleans. With the help of the Lord and through the prayers of the holy Anianus, Aetius, the Patrician of the Romans and Thorismund, the king of the Goths, came to Orleans, The Huns and their king Attila were driven from the city and soundly defeated.
No earthworks, Huns at the city; reads like Aetius and the Goths turn up after the Huns and drive them off but I suppose it could be read that Aetius and the Goths are at the city and drive off the Huns?
Life Of Genevieve 12
...And when the Huns besieged the city of Orleans, the latter [Anianus] by his prayers assisted the Patrician Aetius and his Goths in keeping it from destruction,
No earthworks and can be read anyway your fancy takes you.
I don't have the 'Vita Aniani' and, like Justin, cannot find the text in the link Duncan posted.
Some good detective work there, Rodger.
This suggests it is time to go back to the Latin text of Jordanes and see how the 'earthworks' are actually described in the original.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 06:32:26 PM
Here of course we are taking Jordanes at face value ... valid until disproved. ;)
Beware that, it is awfully difficult to disprove that the Emperor Valens was burned to death as a direct judgement of God
Jim
How do we know that Attila discussed events with his shaman?
My reading of Priscus is that Attila was a little like Wellington at Waterloo who , when asked by his number two what the plan was in case Wellington was killed. Wellington just Harrumphed.
My reading of Priscus is that Attila was not Mr Chatty he probably listened to views from his subreguli, but he most likely did not go in for much post match analysis.
I do not recall that Caesar did much description of councils of war, though doubtless Patrick can tell us and Alexander did not take his generals too seriously. One wonders if the mysteries of command were kept to the commander, or if in a patriarchal society the whole tenor of social interaction was that the paterfamilias just decided, commanded and that was it. Don't think I will try that on the memsahb tonight, though.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 06:32:26 PM
Taking a source as valid unless disproved is the most effective way of working, even if it may not be to everyone's taste. One finds out far more that way.
Well, no. We haven't found out more or less. We have what some would feel is a spurious sense of certainty. If we have an unverified source, we should assess what it says against our contextual evidence to reach a judgement how much we should qualify what it says. So, looking at speeches put in the mouth of generals, we have to think whether the author can possibly have a verbatim account of what was said. If not, might he have a some key "soundbites" which he has padded out? If not, is he using the speech to bring together evidence of what he thinks the general would have said? If not, has he just made something up, or copied a model, in order to fulfil a stylistic need for the key characters to express themselves and reveal their characters? Where on this line is Jordanes likely to be?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 06:34:31 PM
This suggests it is time to go back to the Latin text of Jordanes and see how the 'earthworks' are actually described in the original.
Jordanes writes:
Quod ubi Theodoridus et Aetius agnoverunt, magnis aggeribus eandem urbem ante adventum Attilae struunt,(Which when Theoderic and Artius learned, with great 'aggeribus' they built or joined the city before Attila's arrival.)
Two points to consider:
1) Agger - usually a ditch and/or ramp. This is undoubtedly the source of the translator's 'earthworks'. Actually it has a wider range of meanings, including:
The pile formed by masses of rubbish, stone, earth, brushwood, etc., collected together; acc. to its destination, a dam, dike, mole, pier; a hillock, mound, wall, bulwark, rampart, etc.; esp. freq. in the histt. of artificial elevations for military purposes: tertium militare sepimentum est fossa et terreus agger, a clay or mud wall, Varr. R. R. 1, 14, 2: aggeribus niveis (with snow-drifts) informis Terra, Verg. G. 3, 354: "atque ipsis proelia miscent Aggeribus murorum, pleon. for muris," id. A. 10, 24; cf. id. ib. 10, 144: "ut cocto tolleret aggere opus, of the walls of Babylon," Prop. 4, 10, 22.—A dike of earth for the protection of a harbor (Ital. molo), Vitr. 5, 12, 122; Ov. M. 14, 445; 15, 690.—A causeway through a swamp: "aggeres umido paludum et fallacibus campis imponere," Tac.A mound erected before the walls of a besieged city, for the purpose of sustaining the battering engines, and which was gradually advanced to the town;The mound raised for the protection of a camp before the trench (fossa), and from earth dug from it, which was secured by a stockade (vallum), consisting of sharpened stakes (valli)A military or public road, commonly graded by embankments of earth (in the class. per. only in Verg. and Tac., and always in connection with viae, agger alone belonging only to later Lat.)So this could mean anything from mounds of earth being built to breaches being repaired to roads being (re?)made.
2) Struo - the root of our word 'construction' - to build in a number of ways. Usually 'erect', 'fabricate', 'construct', also 'join up', 'heap up', 'accumulate' and/or 'prepare'.
It has numerous possible meanings:
To make by joining together; to build, erect, fabricate, make, form, constructTo get ready, prepare, Tac. A. 15, 37 et saep.In general, to join together, compound, compose:To prepare something detrimental; to cause, occasion; to devise, contrive, instigate, etc.To order, arrange, dispose, regulate:To fit out, provide with (late Lat.):It looks as if the often-proposed 'surround with' may not the the right choice. The essential meaning depends upon exactly what Jordanes meant by 'agger', and judging by the other sources Rodger has extracted information from it seems not to mean 'earthworks', unless they were being used to fill breaches.
It may just mean they camped before the walls and fortified their camp, joining it to the walls. There again it might mean they did refortify the town or at least strengthen the weak spots
Jim
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 08:00:08 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 06:34:31 PM
This suggests it is time to go back to the Latin text of Jordanes and see how the 'earthworks' are actually described in the original.
Jordanes writes:
Quod ubi Theodoridus et Aetius agnoverunt, magnis aggeribus eandem urbem ante adventum Attilae struunt,
(Which when Theoderic and Artius learned, with great 'aggeribus' they built or joined the city before Attila's arrival.)
Two points to consider:
1) Agger - usually a ditch and/or ramp. This is undoubtedly the source of the translator's 'earthworks'. Actually it has a wider range of meanings, including:
The pile formed by masses of rubbish, stone, earth, brushwood, etc., collected together; acc. to its destination, a dam, dike, mole, pier; a hillock, mound, wall, bulwark, rampart, etc.; esp. freq. in the histt. of artificial elevations for military purposes: tertium militare sepimentum est fossa et terreus agger, a clay or mud wall, Varr. R. R. 1, 14, 2: aggeribus niveis (with snow-drifts) informis Terra, Verg. G. 3, 354: "atque ipsis proelia miscent Aggeribus murorum, pleon. for muris," id. A. 10, 24; cf. id. ib. 10, 144: "ut cocto tolleret aggere opus, of the walls of Babylon," Prop. 4, 10, 22.—A dike of earth for the protection of a harbor (Ital. molo), Vitr. 5, 12, 122; Ov. M. 14, 445; 15, 690.—A causeway through a swamp: "aggeres umido paludum et fallacibus campis imponere," Tac.
A mound erected before the walls of a besieged city, for the purpose of sustaining the battering engines, and which was gradually advanced to the town;
The mound raised for the protection of a camp before the trench (fossa), and from earth dug from it, which was secured by a stockade (vallum), consisting of sharpened stakes (valli)
A military or public road, commonly graded by embankments of earth (in the class. per. only in Verg. and Tac., and always in connection with viae, agger alone belonging only to later Lat.)
So this could mean anything from mounds of earth being built to breaches being repaired to roads being (re?)made.
2) Struo - the root of our word 'construction' - to build in a number of ways. Usually 'erect', 'fabricate', 'construct', also 'join up', 'heap up', 'accumulate' and/or 'prepare'.
It has numerous possible meanings:
To make by joining together; to build, erect, fabricate, make, form, construct
To get ready, prepare, Tac. A. 15, 37 et saep.
In general, to join together, compound, compose:
To prepare something detrimental; to cause, occasion; to devise, contrive, instigate, etc.
To order, arrange, dispose, regulate:
To fit out, provide with (late Lat.):
It looks as if the often-proposed 'surround with' may not the the right choice. The essential meaning depends upon exactly what Jordanes meant by 'agger', and judging by the other sources Rodger has extracted information from it seems not to mean 'earthworks', unless they were being used to fill breaches.
Very thorough, Patrick. I had just come up with substantially the same myself. Exactly what the 'aggeres' were and how their construction related to Orleans is not clear. Given Rodge's sources it seems that a hasty repair of the breaches in the town walls with piles of earth or stones is the best sense.
This might allow us to reconcile the various sources by concluding that Aetius, with or without Theoderic, had filled up the breaches and/or weak points in Orleans' walls with temporary works prior to Attila's arrival; Attila had a go at these hurriedly-reinforced points while the Visigothic main strength and perhaps Aetius' outlying allies were still approaching, might even have penetrated at one or two points and perhaps even been stopped by countervallation, then up came the full Visigothic forces and Roman reinforcements at which point Attila decided to pull back.
If the above is a tenable reconstruction, it might explain Jordanes' (XL/210) "quibus paulo ante nullus poterat muralis agger obsistere" (who a little while before the 'agger muralis' could not withstand). The 'agger muralis', or 'agger of the wall(s)' would seem to refer to the hastily rebuilt bit(s) of the walls of Orleans, the piles of earth and stones strengthening weak spots which we seem to be coinciding towards as our interpretation and which would have been the obvious spots for Attila's forces to attack.
Quote from: Erpingham on February 15, 2014, 07:26:54 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 06:32:26 PM
Taking a source as valid unless disproved is the most effective way of working, even if it may not be to everyone's taste. One finds out far more that way.
Well, no. We haven't found out more or less. We have what some would feel is a spurious sense of certainty. If we have an unverified source, we should assess what it says against our contextual evidence to reach a judgement how much we should qualify what it says.
Yes, this is a good and sensible procedure. My emphasis is on taking the source as a starting point as opposed to taking a starting-point which discards the source.
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So, looking at speeches put in the mouth of generals, we have to think whether the author can possibly have a verbatim account of what was said. If not, might he have a some key "soundbites" which he has padded out? If not, is he using the speech to bring together evidence of what he thinks the general would have said? If not, has he just made something up, or copied a model, in order to fulfil a stylistic need for the key characters to express themselves and reveal their characters? Where on this line is Jordanes likely to be?
To assess this we would have to look at how often Jordanes puts speeches into his work, and in what contexts. The only other speech I have seen him give in the context of the Chalons campaign is when Valentinian's ambassador is addressing the Goths:
"
Then the Emperor Valentinian sent an embassy to the Visigoths and their king Theodorid, with this message: (187) "Bravest of nations, it is the part of prudence for us to unite against the lord of the earth who wishes to enslave the whole world; who requires no just cause for battle, but supposes whatever he does is right. He measures his ambition by his might. License satisfies his pride. Despising law and right, he shows himself an enemy to Nature herself. And thus he, who clearly is the common foe of each, deserves the hatred of all. (188) Pray remember--what you surely cannot forget--that the Huns do not overthrow nations by means of war, where there is an equal chance, but assail them by treachery, which is a greater cause for anxiety. To say nothing about ourselves, can you suffer such insolence to go unpunished? Since you are mighty in arms, give heed to your own danger and join hands with us in common. Bear aid also to the Empire, of which you hold a part. If you would learn how such an alliance should be sought and welcomed by us, look into the plans of the foe."
(189) By these and like arguments the ambassadors of Valentinian prevailed upon King Theodorid. He answered them, saying: "Romans, you have attained your desire; you have made Attila our foe also. We will pursue him wherever he summons us, and though he is puffed up by his victories over divers races, yet the Goths know how to fight this haughty foe. I call no war dangerous save one whose cause is weak; for he fears no ill on whom Majesty has smiled." (190) The nobles shouted assent to the reply and the multitude gladly followed." - Getica XXXVI/186-190
Valentinian's message would, or at least should, have been retained in state archives, and was perhaps copied by sundry other persons, e.g. the ambassador who gave it, his scribe, perhaps a scribe who recorded it for King Theodoric and conceivably at least one bureaucrat creating a copy for the Eastern Empire. The Gothic reply - brief and to the point - could have similarly been recorded. Now these speeches may or may not in reality have been preserved, but they and the speech of Attila are the only speeches Jordanes records in connection with this campaign (unless I have missed one) and even Theodoric, although noted as addressing and encouraging his troops, does not get a pre-battle or in-battle speech, whereas being a Gothic king in a history of Goths he should be the prime candidate to have one compiled for him by Jordanes.
Hence the only speeches other than Attila's are two from the same occasion which, being official business, would have a strong probability of being genuine and drawn from surviving material. Besides these, Jordanes gives no other speeches apart from Attila's, which suggests that Jordanes, if consistent in his standards, was as confident about having Attila's real words as he was about Valentinian's. The fact that he did
not make up a speech for Theoderic would seem very significant in this context.
One point to note is that Jordanes adds:
"By these and like arguments the ambassadors of Valentinian prevailed upon King Theodorid."
This indicates that what Jordanes has given us is an extract from or precis of Valentinian's message, and perhaps the gist rather than the full content of the Gothic reply. He might be doing the same with Attila's speech, but we may observe that:
1) he seems to provide a speech only when he has genuine material from which to work, from which we can surmise that
2) he may precis but does not stray from his source material when introducing speeches.
One may wish to validate or contest this conclusion by looking at speeches he introduces elsewhere in his work.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2014, 09:49:31 PM
Valentinian's message would, or at least should, have been retained in state archives, and was perhaps copied by sundry other persons, e.g. the ambassador who gave it, his scribe, perhaps a scribe who recorded it for King Theodoric and conceivably at least one bureaucrat creating a copy for the Eastern Empire. The Gothic reply - brief and to the point - could have similarly been recorded. Now these speeches may or may not in reality have been preserved, but they and the speech of Attila are the only speeches Jordanes records in connection with this campaign (unless I have missed one) and even Theodoric, although noted as addressing and encouraging his troops, does not get a pre-battle or in-battle speech, whereas being a Gothic king in a history of Goths he should be the prime candidate to have one compiled for him by Jordanes.
It's late at night, but from memory, surely it wasn't anybody from Valentinian who swayed the Visigoths, but a Gallic nobleman sent by Aetius?
Jim
That depends on whom we believe Jim. according to Jordanes it is an embassy from Valentinian, according to Sidonius it is IIRC two visits from Avitus, Gallic nobleman , friend of Aetius and future short lived puppet emperor. In Sidonius the embassy is sent by Aetius, not Valentinian.
I checked Hodgkin (italy and her invaders vol II) and he has a bit. more of Anianus. According to Hodgkin Anianus goes to Aetius at Arles and presses upon him that the city can only last out until the 24th of June. He then returns to Orleans to sustain the inhabitants. Now, if Anianus visits Aetius in Arles and by the end of the siege Aetius arrives as Attila is breaking in it is ever so unlikely that Aetius and Theoderid can have been there earlier, rebuilt the fortifications and surrounded Sangiban with auxilia.
Roy
That's what I was driving at Roy, if Jordanes is to be relied upon for his speeches because of his report of the speech of Valentinian's ambassador and the Gothic reply, then if Sidonius is correct (an eyewitness, friend of Avitus and contemporary of the events) Valentinian's embassy, if it happened, was a failure, so the speech, or at least the Gothic reply, was a pure invention
Jim
You are all reading a lot into one source. Remember, we know that Jordanes wrote the book very, very, quickly; at his own villa; without any references beyond his own library.
He didn't use any official documents.
Also..
Quod ubi Theodoridus et Aetius agnoverunt, magnis aggeribus eandem urbem ante adventum Attilae struunt
When Theoderic and Artius learned this, they repaired the city with earthen banks before Attila's arrival.
I would probably actually suggest:
When Theoderic and Artius learned this, they strengthened the city with earthen banks before Attila's arrival.
Regards,
Tom..
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 16, 2014, 07:30:04 AM
That's what I was driving at Roy, if Jordanes is to be relied upon for his speeches because of his report of the speech of Valentinian's ambassador and the Gothic reply, then if Sidonius is correct (an eyewitness, friend of Avitus and contemporary of the events) Valentinian's embassy, if it happened, was a failure, so the speech, or at least the Gothic reply, was a pure invention
Not necessarily. Note Jordanes' text.
"
Then the Emperor Valentinian sent an embassy to the Visigoths and their king Theodorid, with this message: (187) "Bravest of nations, it is the part of prudence for us to unite against the lord of the earth who wishes to enslave the whole world; who requires no just cause for battle, but supposes whatever he does is right. He measures his ambition by his might. License satisfies his pride. Despising law and right, he shows himself an enemy to Nature herself. And thus he, who clearly is the common foe of each, deserves the hatred of all. (188) Pray remember--what you surely cannot forget--that the Huns do not overthrow nations by means of war, where there is an equal chance, but assail them by treachery, which is a greater cause for anxiety. To say nothing about ourselves, can you suffer such insolence to go unpunished? Since you are mighty in arms, give heed to your own danger and join hands with us in common. Bear aid also to the Empire, of which you hold a part. If you would learn how such an alliance should be sought and welcomed by us, look into the plans of the foe."
(189) By these and like arguments the ambassadors of Valentinian prevailed upon King Theodorid."
Valentinian sends a message, which Jordanes may be giving us verbatim. He also adds that the 'ambassadors' of Valentinian used 'these and like arguments', which leaves room for both an ambassador or ambassadors from Ravenna and Avitus himself to exercise their own persuasion, expanding upon Valentinian's basic message. Aetius may well have asked Avitus to go along and add his influence to the attempts at persuasion, as Sidonius indicates in his panegyric (Carmina VII). It may even have been Avitus' influence that clinched the matter - a point the official ambassador may have neglected to mention when reporting back to Ravenna.
Quote from: tadamson on February 16, 2014, 10:19:02 AM
You are all reading a lot into one source. Remember, we know that Jordanes wrote the book very, very, quickly; at his own villa; without any references beyond his own library.
He didn't use any official documents.
But he did draw upon Cassiodorus, who had been the chief official at Ravenna under the Ostrogoths and who used official documents all his working life.
Justin, can i recommend you read speidal on the Germans.
This testudio here, as rance does convince, is a 3 man shield wall. It has nothing except a similar name, in one source, to compare with the post carrhae useage of a siege formation in the open field from hundeds of years before.
Shieldwalls were a standard Germanic tactic of ancient provenance.
By the time of this battle every man recruited would know it well. The only real wrinkle is the third row of top shields. The ground and middle shields are very standard operational procedure.
Also, your Hastings example is highly debatable, as has been mentioned before- the disorderly charge theory is only one valid interpretation of that event.
Spiedal is a fascinating read, give it a look as soon as you can
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 16, 2014, 10:28:16 AM
Quote from: tadamson on February 16, 2014, 10:19:02 AM
You are all reading a lot into one source. Remember, we know that Jordanes wrote the book very, very, quickly; at his own villa; without any references beyond his own library.
He didn't use any official documents.
But he did draw upon Cassiodorus, who had been the chief official at Ravenna under the Ostrogoths and who used official documents all his working life.
The problem here is that an argument was put forward that the speech that Jordanes puts into Attila's mouth was good because Jordanes only has three speeches and the other two are correct.
We now discover that Jordanes contradicts an eyewitness who knew the person who actually talked the Visigoths into joining in. So whilst the message attributed to Valentinian might be lifted from official records, the reply was entirely fabricated because the Visigoths turned down Valentinian's offer (if it was actually made, it might well have been)
So so far we have Jordanes who might have copied one official document but did fabricate one speech.
As for drawing in Cassiodorus, his history is the history of a man who's predecessor has just died in Jail, and who had to flatter the Goths. So he may well have produced the flattering message that Valentinian is supposed to have sent. Given that he was born thirty years after the event and lived in an Italy that was sundered from Gaul, he may well never have heard Sidonius's side of the story, or may well have ignored it because it didn't suit his purpose.
But the problem with Jordanes is that when comparing him to Sidonius who was there is that Jordanes 'might' have found a message, or Cassiodorus 'might' have bothered to check the archives. Indeed it assumes that there are still archives to check nearly a century after the event, and a somewhat busy century as well. Whilst one can see the Goths wanting to keep the land registers and the tax records, archived speeches from the throne, formal salutations by the senate and suchlike would have no value and were just wasting space.
I'm afraid in this that I think Sidonius trumps Jordanes, who has been shown to fabricate one speech (The Gothic reply), may have either fabricated the second speech or accepted Cassiodorus's fabrication, and there is no evidence to show how Attila's speech could have been recorded, transmitted or handed down to the literary record.
Attila gave an ad hoc speech in the middle of the battle. Quite possibly.
The fighting is going on, he's in the middle of his warriors and the midden is about to hit the windmill, so one grabs a pen, ink and piece of parchment (or perhaps makes notes on the back of his hand)
Either that or one of the survivors, one of a beaten army, falls back to the camp and as all prepare to flee our rare and literate hun (or illiterate hun who's found a secretary) goes to the trouble of having recorded the speech of a defeated general who might be dead tomorrow (as might the secretary and his informant.)
Three years later, the hunnic empire is no more, any archives are scattered and irrelevant, and Attila is dead.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 16, 2014, 11:38:43 AM
I'm afraid in this that I think Sidonius trumps Jordanes, who has been shown to fabricate one speech (The Gothic reply), may have either fabricated the second speech or accepted Cassiodorus's fabrication, and there is no evidence to show how Attila's speech could have been recorded, transmitted or handed down to the literary record.
Jordanes has not 'fabricated' the Gothic reply. He may well have omitted the initial Gothic reaction and entered only the official response at the end of discussions, but what he has entered chimes perfectly with the actions of the Goths pursuant to the discussions so it is a bit of a stretch to call it 'fabricated'. The whole summary could have been taken from an ambassador's report still extant in Ravenna. Cassiodorus indeed made a point of flattering Goths - but only Ostrogoths, who were on the 'wrong side' at Chalons. They get no special treatment in Jordanes' account and far less would we expect Cassiodorus to have any reason to bend facts concerning Visigoths.
Quote
Attila gave an ad hoc speech in the middle of the battle. Quite possibly.
The fighting is going on, he's in the middle of his warriors and the midden is about to hit the windmill, so one grabs a pen, ink and piece of parchment (or perhaps makes notes on the back of his hand)
Either that or one of the survivors, one of a beaten army, falls back to the camp and as all prepare to flee our rare and literate hun (or illiterate hun who's found a secretary) goes to the trouble of having recorded the speech of a defeated general who might be dead tomorrow (as might the secretary and his informant.)
His relatives and his house-troops or equivalent plus any staff he retained would all have cause to remember what he said. We know that Hernac, his youngest son and his kinsmen Emnetzur and Ultzindur survived the battle and the latter two settled within the Empire.
Quote
Three years later, the hunnic empire is no more, any archives are scattered and irrelevant, and Attila is dead.
And all the sources of information for Attila's speech are settling in Roman territory.
If Jordanes fabricates speeches as part of his stock in trade, why does he not do at least one for at least one Goth at Chalons?
Why doesn't Jordanes produce a Gothic speech?
He invented the Gothic speech for the Emperor's Ambassador, so he's set out their stall, he doesn't need a battlefield one for drama
As for the speech it isn't a stretch to call it fabricated if it chimes perfectly. If I look at a historical situation, for example, We have Wellington at Waterloo. I know that he was present at the battle, that he was present at the point of the final attack, and I decide he will inspire his men with a speech which not only describes the French but also points out the Prussians are coming and that Boney is going to be exiled to a different, smaller, island this time, it's still fabricated, even if it does chime perfectly.
His section describing the ambassador and the reply directly contradicts what we know from another source which was closer to the time and place.
Jordanes was a generation later that Cassiodorus, the Ostrogoths no longer needed flattering, he wrote in Constantiople, their Kingdom was over.
As for Attila's speech, if his house troops did remember his words it'd be something along the lines of 'gods but he got that one wrong.'
I see no reason why any of these people should have recorded it, and frankly given in the middle of a battle with everything that was going on, I'm not convinced that all that many people heard it. In reality he might have rallied men by grabbing a standard and riding forward holding it. He might have shouted something at the same time, but the idea that everything went quiet as he delivered his address doesn't sit well with me.
Jim
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 16, 2014, 04:49:55 PM
Why doesn't Jordanes produce a Gothic speech?
He invented the Gothic speech for the Emperor's Ambassador, so he's set out their stall, he doesn't need a battlefield one for drama
But then why does he need one for Attila?
Quote
As for the speech it isn't a stretch to call it fabricated if it chimes perfectly. If I look at a historical situation, for example, We have Wellington at Waterloo. I know that he was present at the battle, that he was present at the point of the final attack, and I decide he will inspire his men with a speech which not only describes the French but also points out the Prussians are coming and that Boney is going to be exiled to a different, smaller, island this time, it's still fabricated, even if it does chime perfectly.
But under this criterion one risks labelling any speech as fabricated if it accords with subsequent events.
Quote
His section describing the ambassador and the reply directly contradicts what we know from another source which was closer to the time and place.
No it does not - it reports events differently, with different emphasis. Where does Sidonius affirm that Valentinian did
not send an embassy? We might also remember that Sidonius' account is contained within a panegyric, whereas Jordanes' is not.
Quote
Jordanes was a generation later that Cassiodorus, the Ostrogoths no longer needed flattering, he wrote in Constantiople, their Kingdom was over.
So the earlier implication that anything taken from Cassiodorus is unreliable because Cassiodorus was a Goth-flatterer no longer applies? Just checking. :)
Quote
As for Attila's speech, if his house troops did remember his words it'd be something along the lines of 'gods but he got that one wrong.'
All the more reason to remember it. Please bear in mind that these people would not have an interpretative memory but one that recalled what was said as it was said - projecting our own thought habits on to them is misleading.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 16, 2014, 04:49:55 PM
As for Attila's speech, if his house troops did remember his words it'd be something along the lines of 'gods but he got that one wrong.'
I see no reason why any of these people should have recorded it, and frankly given in the middle of a battle with everything that was going on, I'm not convinced that all that many people heard it. In reality he might have rallied men by grabbing a standard and riding forward holding it. He might have shouted something at the same time, but the idea that everything went quiet as he delivered his address doesn't sit well with me.
Jim
Bear in mind that the battle had reached a pause at this stage. The Visigoths and Alans weren't moving. The Romans and Auxilia had taken the ridge and were redressing their ranks there without advancing. The Huns on the right flank had fallen back to their main lines. Attila's own men - who were able to hear his speech - had not moved yet. Everything was for the moment quiet and still, and he was perfectly capable of making a short speech before the next act. Since a battle speech was unheard-of from him, all the more reason for his hearers to remember it afterwards.
Attila positions his army. Which probably takes an hour or two he sends a force to dispute the ridge and no doubt is waiting with his commanders for the outcome. They are with him in case orders change and also because they cannot do any defecting whilst they and their heirs are in his presence. When the action on the ridge goes wrong he does a bit of motivating and repurposing and then dismisses them to their commands. the question is really whether we can so dissect a speech with a most likely oral transmission statement down to the words that are used,testudo for example?
Oral memory would very likely transmit the gist of a speech , the attack along the line or hold off against the Romans , hit hard on the Alans parts, but the actual words and terms would need a written transmission. I cannot see that route being practicable.
it is reasonably well known that people remember only 15 -20% of what they hear. It is relatively unlikely that Attila made a powerpoint presentation and handed the deck out afterwards so we should expect only the broad brush portrait of events and perhaps a specific order to the group to whom the carrier of the tradition belonged to survive. Hence the vector is probably not a Gepid, but maybe a Hun or an Ostrogoth?
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 16, 2014, 10:00:00 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 16, 2014, 04:49:55 PM
As for Attila's speech, if his house troops did remember his words it'd be something along the lines of 'gods but he got that one wrong.'
I see no reason why any of these people should have recorded it, and frankly given in the middle of a battle with everything that was going on, I'm not convinced that all that many people heard it. In reality he might have rallied men by grabbing a standard and riding forward holding it. He might have shouted something at the same time, but the idea that everything went quiet as he delivered his address doesn't sit well with me.
Jim
Bear in mind that the battle had reached a pause at this stage. The Visigoths and Alans weren't moving. The Romans and Auxilia had taken the ridge and were redressing their ranks there without advancing. The Huns on the right flank had fallen back to their main lines. Attila's own men - who were able to hear his speech - had not moved yet. Everything was for the moment quiet and still, and he was perfectly capable of making a short speech before the next act. Since a battle speech was unheard-of from him, all the more reason for his hearers to remember it afterwards.
Actually if you believe Jordanes he says the whole army had fallen back, and that he's telling them in his speech to smite the Visigoths, which must mean the Ostrogoths are supposed to be listening to it as well because according to Jordanes the Visigoths didn't fight the Huns until they defeated the Ostrogoths and then fell upon the huns
So Attila had a hell of a voice to be heard over that distance. Perhaps the Gepids missed out on hearing him but he was apparently heard over two thirds of the battle field
Jim
Quote from: aligern on February 16, 2014, 10:19:56 PM
it is reasonably well known that people remember only 15 -20% of what they hear. It is relatively unlikely that Attila made a powerpoint presentation and handed the deck out afterwards so we should expect only the broad brush portrait of events and perhaps a specific order to the group to whom the carrier of the tradition belonged to survive. Hence the vector is probably not a Gepid, but maybe a Hun or an Ostrogoth?
Roy
People nowadays remember only 15-20% of what they hear, but people from non-literate societies are different: they remember 95-100% of what they hear. This emerged during studies of Sioux oral history (by Eleanor Hinman), and I quote an example of Sioux warriors narrating fights from about sixty years previously.
"
They seldom disagreed, and when they did it was over some minute detail ... One such disagreement, for example, involved the Second Arrow Creek Fight, which took place around 1870. In a sketch of the battle Bad Heart Bull had numbered the warriors who counted first, second, third and fourth coup on a fallen Crow. He Dog disagreed with the order in which Bad Heart Bull had placed the fortunate Oglala coup counters, saying that the man listed as third was really second." - Stephen Ambrose,
Crazy Horse and Custer, p.123-4.
One contributory factor to good memory in illiterate societies is social prestige: get it wrong and there are a lot of people with good memories around to remind one of the fact. Another, especially in illiterate tribal societies with strong leadership, is that verbal transmission of messages must be 100% accurate - verbatim memorisation is not only routine but essential.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 16, 2014, 10:52:30 PM
Actually if you believe Jordanes he says the whole army had fallen back, and that he's telling them in his speech to smite the Visigoths, which must mean the Ostrogoths are supposed to be listening to it as well ...
Not necessarily. If a Visigothic contingent was propping up the Alans, as has been surmised and suggested earlier, an attack against the allied centre - primarily Alans - would include this Visigothic contingent. These would be the Visigoths whom Jordanes has 'separating themselves from the Alans' later in the action.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 17, 2014, 12:01:32 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 16, 2014, 10:52:30 PM
Actually if you believe Jordanes he says the whole army had fallen back, and that he's telling them in his speech to smite the Visigoths, which must mean the Ostrogoths are supposed to be listening to it as well ...
Not necessarily. If a Visigothic contingent was propping up the Alans, as has been surmised and suggested earlier, an attack against the allied centre - primarily Alans - would include this Visigothic contingent. These would be the Visigoths whom Jordanes has 'separating themselves from the Alans' later in the action.
But I don't believe it. There is no evidence for it, it's not mentioned in any of the sources and the battle can take place perfectly well without this surmise. Jordanes may merely mean that by placing the Alans in the centre they were surrounded by reliable troops. From what I can make out, it's a lot easier for troops on the wings to quietly ride off.
The surmise that there is a second line isn't supported by any evidence, just reading far more onto Jordanes that Jordanes may have intended.
The whole 'This is an authentic speech from Attila's lips' argument demands far too much surmise, 'perhaps' and 'maybe' to be at all convincing. I'm perfectly happy to believe it's what Jordanes believed Attila would have said. Actually I'm perfectly happy to believe it's what Cassiodorus wrote because it fits nicely with the writer who had to glorify the Goths and who's predecessor had been executed, probably for being assumed to be conspiring with Constantinople and for being too pro-Roman.
Jim
Well Jordanes says eatlier that the auxilia are surrounding the Alans so , if we follow Jordanes internal logic the Visigoths are most unlikely to be behind the Alans. Furthermore, I made in the original thread and Justin and I have made a good case for Thorismud starting out on the allied left. I then showed that it makes most sense of Thorismud's journey to find his father bringing him up against Attila's camp if he is on the left at the end of the battle and crosses back to the right. If you are basing your case on Jordanes' accuracy then that positioning of Thorismud must be accepted, because he does not mention the Visigoths being detached from the left to go to the centre. Thorismud is on the ledt because the Roman contingent is small and they must front up against the Gepids.
As to this business of memory Patrick, I would accept that memorialisation is better if the story is repeated often and thus reinforced. Of course, false memories can be created, repeated and reinforced too! the extent to which your Sioux remember their, or their comrades actions will be very different from the remembrance of a leader's orration.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on February 17, 2014, 08:50:05 AM
Well Jordanes says earlier that the auxilia are surrounding the Alans so , if we follow Jordanes internal logic the Visigoths are most unlikely to be behind the Alans.
But in my copy (Mierow, 1915) "When Theodorid and Aetius learned of this, they cast up great earthworks around that city before Attila's arrival and kept watch over the suspected Sangiban, placing him with his tribe in the midst of their auxiliaries."
This isn't at the battle itself, indeed it is an unknown length of time before it (depending on where we think the battle was fought and how long Attila had been retiring.)
In the battle itself "They placed in the centre Sangiban...thus contriving with military caution to surround by a host of faithful troops the man in whose loyalty they had little confidence."
This may merely mean that the Alans, being in the middle, couldn't just fade away to one side. Jordanes cannot literally mean surround, because that would mean that there were allied troops in front of the Alans as well.
Also, let's just look at the whole Sangiban issue, there is no evidence in the account that the Alans didn't fight well. As far as I know there's no evidence from other sources that the Alans were about to change sides. We have to beware of Jordanes or Cassiodorus painting the Alans as potential traitors to throw the Goths into high relief as valiant allies (of the Romans or the Huns, whoever's side they were on.)
In the great heap of memoirs and histories that were obviously being written about this battle, it's just a shame that nobody's 'History of the Alani' has come down to us :-)
Quote from: aligern on February 17, 2014, 08:50:05 AM
As to this business of memory Patrick, I would accept that memorialisation is better if the story is repeated often and thus reinforced. Of course, false memories can be created, repeated and reinforced too! the extent to which your Sioux remember their, or their comrades actions will be very different from the remembrance of a leader's oration.
Roy
Memory is good, but after a century transmission gets tricky. An example of this is from my own experience.
I once sat and listened to an old man (He probably wasn't my age now!) tell of his time in the First World War, and he mentioned hiding in a knocked out tank to avoid shelling. He didn't describe the tank, I didn't ask for details, but at the age of six I knew what a tank was because I'd seen them. Without reading (not an option in the oral culture) I would have passed on to my children and putative grandchildren this story, but if asked about the tank, I would have described a Centurion to them, not a Mark IV, because it was the Centurion I saw in my minds eye when the old man told the tale.
But perhaps my putative hearers didn't ask for a description of the tank, as there's no books with pictures of the Mark IV in, then they might picture the old man hiding in a Challenger 2 or even a Scimitar.
Now we have enough Memorials (Kendal has a good one) to show infantrymen in WW1 kit, so as I grew older I'm likely to notice that soldiers no longer wear what my Grandfather wore, but if we assume our pre-literate society doesn't travel all that much, it's perfectly possible for someone to model their picture of (for example) the Machine gun corps, from the memorial to them near Hyde park corner. Their memorial shows (from memory) two beautifully modelled Vickers machineguns, a pile of gas capes, and the man himself, stark naked with a double handed sword.
I suppose it did at least make it easier to wash the mud off :-)
Jim
Jim, I don't see that Aetius or Theoderid make it to Orleans before Attila arrives. Thus the surrounding occurs at the battle. Remember that Jordanes does not describe Attila falling back from Orleans, so his timing is nit sequential. I suggest that your suggestion that 'surrounding' means that the auxilia are all around The Alans is stretching the point too far. He could be surrounded on three sides. If they were all around him at the siege he could not fight there!
As to why put troops behind the Alans, well why would they just drift to the side? There is a logic to say that they would go straight back. There just is not a logic to saying that Thorismud was there. The simplest choice of back up troops are those already so delegated if it was done at Orleans or those delegated on the battlefield, that is the auxilia.
I recall that there was bad blood between the Goths and the Alans and that next year Thorismud launches an expedition against them. Hence I see ho need to doubt Jordanes that the Alans are thought to be negotiating with Attila. The problem for your. argument there is that there is no souce that is contradicting Jordanes about Sangiban.
Roy
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 17, 2014, 07:47:16 AM
But I don't believe it.
[yoda mode]
That is why you fail. ;)
[/yoda mode]
Pease let us keep this civil!!
Roy
Or at any rate military.
Jim, is this attempted impugning of Jordanes' veracity rooted in a desire to damnify any possible references to Roman regularity in the 5th century AD? The poor fellow has been accused of outright invention and practically writing the story from scratch - he may not be a Procopius-class historian, but I wonder why he is being treated so severely.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 17, 2014, 11:07:59 AM
Or at any rate military.
Jim, is this attempted impugning of Jordanes' veracity rooted in a desire to damnify any possible references to Roman regularity in the 5th century AD? The poor fellow has been accused of outright invention and practically writing the story from scratch - he may not be a Procopius-class historian, but I wonder why he is being treated so severely.
Don't want to put head in lion's mouth but IMO the issue is a completely different view of how to critically analyse the text. Jim has a minimalist approach - that not all of this is going to be true so which bits do we trust - and Patrick has a maximalist view - every word is true, how do we interpret them. So you are going to find each other's views frustrating because the other doesn't seem to "get" where you are coming from. You also have different views of how late antique history was done. To Patrick, Jordanes spent hours in archives, reading official reports, critically appraised published sources (e.g. Cassiodorus) and even tracked down Hunnic veterans for eye witness testimony. To Jim, he had a glance at Cassiodorus and wrote a precis while sitting in his villa. If we are going for yoda-like statements, I advise seeking the middle ground.
Quote from: aligern on February 17, 2014, 10:31:42 AM
Jim, I don't see that Aetius or Theoderid make it to Orleans before Attila arrives. Thus the surrounding occurs at the battle. Remember that Jordanes does not describe Attila falling back from Orleans, so his timing is nit sequential. I suggest that your suggestion that 'surrounding' means that the auxilia are all around The Alans is stretching the point too far. He could be surrounded on three sides. If they were all around him at the siege he could not fight there!
As to why put troops behind the Alans, well why would they just drift to the side? There is a logic to say that they would go straight back. There just is not a logic to saying that Thorismud was there. The simplest choice of back up troops are those already so delegated if it was done at Orleans or those delegated on the battlefield, that is the auxilia.
I recall that there was bad blood between the Goths and the Alans and that next year Thorismud launches an expedition against them. Hence I see ho need to doubt Jordanes that the Alans are thought to be negotiating with Attila. The problem for your. argument there is that there is no souce that is contradicting Jordanes about Sangiban.
Roy
The seige section comes in XXXVII, the surrounding in battle occurs in XXXVIII. Sitting with the book in my lap they do seem very separate
Jordanes in XXXVII says "But before we set forth the order of the battle itself, it seems needful to relate what had already happened in the course of the campaign, for it was not only a famous struggle, but one that was complicated and confused. [You ain't just whistling dixie there boy]
Well then, Sangiban, king of the Alani, smitten with fear of what might come to pass, had promised to surrender to Attila, and to give into his keeping Aureliani, a city of Gaul wherein he then dwelt. When Theodorid and Aetius learned of this, they cast up great eathworks around that city before Attila's arrival and kept watch over the suspected Sangiban, placing him with his tribe in the midst of their auxiliaries. Then Attila, king of the Huns, was taken aback by this even and lost confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict."
So Jordanes specifically has the allies arrive before Attila
Jim
Quote from: Erpingham on February 17, 2014, 11:24:23 AM
Don't want to put head in lion's mouth but IMO the issue is a completely different view of how to critically analyse the text. Jim has a minimalist approach - that not all of this is going to be true so which bits do we trust - and Patrick has a maximalist view - every word is true, how do we interpret them. So you are going to find each other's views frustrating because the other doesn't seem to "get" where you are coming from. You also have different views of how late antique history was done. To Patrick, Jordanes spent hours in archives, reading official reports, critically appraised published sources (e.g. Cassiodorus) and even tracked down Hunnic veterans for eye witness testimony. To Jim, he had a glance at Cassiodorus and wrote a precis while sitting in his villa. If we are going for yoda-like statements, I advise seeking the middle ground.
Essentially true, though I think it was not Jordanes who spent hours in archives, but Cassiodorus, who anyway did that sort of thing as part of his job. The observation that Patrick finds Jordanes innocent until proven guilty and Jim seems to find him guilty until proven innocent does ring true - and Patrick does balk at the idea of wholesale invention because if Jordanes were a notable inventor we should have some spectacular inventions enhancing the Goths at every turn during the campaign. This we do not see - the Goths are content to be led along by the Romans and although Thorismund puts in a good tactical performance Aetius looms large as 'an older man and of more mature wisdom'). What we do get is a very Goth-centred account, and the trick is to try and work out what else is going on in addition to the view from the Gothic seat in the stalls.
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 17, 2014, 11:55:53 AMThe seige section comes in XXXVII, the surrounding in battle occurs in XXXVIII. Sitting with the book in my lap they do seem very separate
Jordanes in XXXVII says "But before we set forth the order of the battle itself, it seems needful to relate what had already happened in the course of the campaign, for it was not only a famous struggle, but one that was complicated and confused. [You ain't just whistling dixie there boy]
Well then, Sangiban, king of the Alani, smitten with fear of what might come to pass, had promised to surrender to Attila, and to give into his keeping Aureliani, a city of Gaul wherein he then dwelt. When Theodorid and Aetius learned of this, they cast up great eathworks around that city before Attila's arrival and kept watch over the suspected Sangiban, placing him with his tribe in the midst of their auxiliaries. Then Attila, king of the Huns, was taken aback by this even and lost confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict."
So Jordanes specifically has the allies arrive before Attila
Jim
Not the allies. The Auxiliaries. Nothing in this passage conclusively proves that Jordanes thought Aetius and Theodorid were present before the arrival of Attila at Orleans in person with their core armies. In fact, a close look at the passage suggests otherwise: they surround Sangiban with their
Auxiliaries, not their main troops, which suggests their main troops are elsewhere. And where the main troops are there the generals are too. So far Jordanes is showing consistency.
There is nothing in the paragraph that conclusively proves anything. However the auxiliaries are mentioned elsewhere, 'Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones 'and some other Celtic or German Tribes'
They have no named commander [We are very short of names for Roman officers serving under Aetius in Gaul generally, not just in Jordanes] and nothing in common other than they were willing to obey Aetius. I suppose it's entirely possible that they were told to 'toddle over there, dig in and defy Attila until the rest of us get there.
Jim
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 15, 2014, 07:25:01 AMStill couldn't find the text.
It's not difficult. Try here (http://www.dmgh.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb00000750_00116.html?sortIndex=010%3A020%3A0003%3A010%3A00%3A00&sort=score&order=desc&context=vita+aniani&hl=false&fulltext=vita+aniani).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 17, 2014, 04:19:04 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on February 17, 2014, 11:55:53 AMJordanes in XXXVII says "... Sangiban, king of the Alani, smitten with fear of what might come to pass, had promised to surrender to Attila, and to give into his keeping Aureliani, a city of Gaul wherein he then dwelt. When Theodorid and Aetius learned of this, they cast up great eathworks around that city before Attila's arrival and kept watch over the suspected Sangiban, placing him with his tribe in the midst of their auxiliaries. Then Attila, king of the Huns, was taken aback by this even and lost confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict."
So Jordanes specifically has the allies arrive before Attila
Not the allies. The Auxiliaries. Nothing in this passage conclusively proves that Jordanes thought Aetius and Theodorid were present before the arrival of Attila at Orleans in person with their core armies. In fact, a close look at the passage suggests otherwise: they surround Sangiban with their Auxiliaries, not their main troops, which suggests their main troops are elsewhere. And where the main troops are there the generals are too. So far Jordanes is showing consistency.
But according to Jordanes it is Aetius and Theodorid themselves, not their auxiliaries or anyone else, who are specifically responsible for having Orleans fortified; which strongly implies that (he thought) they were there. That the auxiliaries were surrounding the Alans does not imply at all that the main forces were elsewhere, merely that they had other responsibilities - digging the earthworks, perhaps, or covering the labourers who were doing the actual digging, or perhaps forming up on the flanks of the Alans and their watchdogs, just as they later did in the battle.
Or that the Life of St Anianus is right and that Aetius is at Arles leaving the defence of Orleans to Sangiban and the good bishop.
If Aetius and Theoderid are there at Orleans then how come the story in Gregory and in the Vita is of waiting for the Allies to turn up and of Attila almost breaking in?
As i have said several times, the Vita is geographically close and originally probably closer in time than Jordanes and its story , with respect to Orleans, is to be preferred.
Roy
Personally I'd say the Vita has the edge on the siege of Orleans and Sidonius has the edge on the negotiations with the Visigoths.
Jordanes actually describes the campaign with the words "for it was not only a famous struggle but one that was complicated and confused."
In this I entirely agree with him, and I suspect he tried to pick a path through the confusion without really knowing what went on
Jim
Quote from: aligern on February 17, 2014, 08:20:15 PM
Or that the Life of St Anianus is right and that Aetius is at Arles leaving the defence of Orleans to Sangiban and the good bishop.
If Aetius and Theoderid are there at Orleans then how come the story in Gregory and in the Vita is of waiting for the Allies to turn up and of Attila almost breaking in?
I wasn't actually saying that Aetius was there: merely, in response to Justin, that Jordanes' wording implies that Jordanes thought that Aetius was there.
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 17, 2014, 08:59:33 PM
Quote from: aligern on February 17, 2014, 08:20:15 PM
Or that the Life of St Anianus is right and that Aetius is at Arles leaving the defence of Orleans to Sangiban and the good bishop.
If Aetius and Theoderid are there at Orleans then how come the story in Gregory and in the Vita is of waiting for the Allies to turn up and of Attila almost breaking in?
I wasn't actually saying that Aetius was there: merely, in response to Justin, that Jordanes' wording implies that Jordanes thought that Aetius was there.
That's how I read Jordanes as well.
Actually the Vita contradicts Jordanes on another point. Jordanes states that the allies were worried that the Alans might hand the city over to Attila. Hence they sent troops (or turned up themselves) to fortify the city and stop the Alans just handing it over to the Huns.
As it is, with the Vita everyone seems happy enough with Sangiban in charge, indeed he obviously does fight as the Huns have to break in rather than just take over.
I've suggested before that there is limited evidence for Sangiban's supposed wish to throw in his lot with Attila.
Jim
I used to think that positioning the Alans in the centre was a bad place to put someone who might be of doubtful loyalty, but then someone pointed out that it is what Narses does with the Lombards at Taginae and for similar reasons.
The Goths and the Alans do not get on, as far as we know that is genuine. Sangiban must have felt out on a limb and if the Allies won he might face a growing Goth power. Hence the Visigoths probably already distrusted him and he might have had much to hope from a Hunnic victory. however, as you say his actual performance cannot have been a problem because it would have been remarked upon.
Roy
One suspects that Sangiban did indeed feel out on a limb without much hope whoever won. Making himself valuable to the likely winner would have had some appeal as a means of keeping his people off the bottom of the heap.
Gregory of Tours places Aetius in danger, surrounded by enemies, even if only by rumour - this would be consistent with Aetius being present at Orleans when Attila was threatening it.
The most logical deployment at Chalons would have Goths on the right, Romans on the left, Alans in the centre, a screen of Roman cavalry behind the left half of the Alans and a screen of Gothic cavalry behind the right half of same. Once the Huns engaged the Alans (removing the possibility of an Alanic defection) these contingents could have been signalled to withdraw and reassemble behind their own main bodies, allowing the Alans to be pushed back and the Huns to advance into a double envelopment, or at least double flank attack. I remain convinced that the Romans did launch their own attack against the corresponding flank of the thus exposed Hunnic centre because of Jordanes' mention of Aetius becoming separated from his own troops in the dark near the Gothic camp, which is entirely consistent with his having been involved in a cavalry pursuit.