Who Would Win? [Part 1]
Drawing inspiration (however belatedly) from the theme content of the April 2014 issue of Wargames Illustrated (Simon MacDowall's "Legion versus Phalanx" and Simon Miller's "We Need to Talk about Caesar" articles were of especial interest and were read/studied several times), I thought it might be entertaining to see what would happen if two great military men faced each other across my modest tabletop. The historical figures I had in mind were Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. It is, I readily stipulate, completely ahistorical and perhaps even bordering on the ridiculous to posit a clash between Roman legionary infantry and auxiliary units commanded by Caesar and Companion cavalry and pike phalanxes led by Alexander. Nevertheless, I believe such a counterfactual contest might make for an interesting - or at the very least, enjoyable - wargame. Having convinced myself (not all that difficult to do really), I proceeded to prepare the armies and terrain for this ahistorical adventure.
ORDERS OF BATTLE
The Macedonians were drafted from Page F (Antiquity section) of the Armati 2nd Edition rule book. Alexander would command an army three times the usual size. His core force of 6 units of phalanx, 3 units of Hypaspists, 3 units of Agrianians (skirmishers), and 3 units of Companions (heavy cavalry) would be reinforced by 300 points worth of bonus troops. Ten more cavalry units (5 light, 5 heavy) joined the nucleus of his army, 6 units of "hired" Greek heavy infantry and 6 more units of phalanx (1 being Hypaspists) were also present. As to light troops, there were 10 units of skirmishers (a mix of archers, javelins, and slingers) in addition to 9 units of light infantry (peltasts). The veteran formations in this army were 2 of the units of Companion cavalry and 1 unit of the Hypaspists.
Instead of using the Marian/Caesarian list on Page K (Age of Empires section) of the rule book, I decided to use Luxor's Late Republican Legions list. (This version was found on Warflute and the list was last updated 08 November 2006.) The veteran of the Gallic Wars and excursions to Britannia would have a core force containing 3 cohorts of elite legionary infantry, 9 foot units of regular legionaries, 3 units of light cavalry, and 3 units of javelin-armed skirmishers. Caesar's supporting formations were also drawn from an allowance of 300 bonus points. The following troops were purchased: 3 units of cohorts representing the vaunted 10th Legion (all of these formations were classed as veterans), 9 additional units of legionary foot, 2 units of German heavy cavalry, 5 units of allied heavy horse (not quite as good as the Germans), 1 more unit of light cavalry, 9 units of Gallic warbands, and 10 units of skirmishers carrying a mixture of missiles.
TERRAIN
As to the appearance of the battlefield for this very fictional engagement, I adapted the map of Chaeronea 338 BC found on page 68 of WARFARE IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD. I retained the acropolis (transformed into a collection of ruins with overgrown walkways and gardens), marshy ground, and series of hills (ridge line) along one long table edge but removed the 3 of the 4 identified water courses. I kept the river labeled as the Cephissus though it was not given a name for this scenario. The majority of the tabletop was left undecorated and was classified as open ground.
TINKERING
As for amendments to the written rules, these were - of course - many and varied, ranging from missile fire modifiers based on range, to interpenetration during movement, to the effects of the marshy ground, to adjustments to the distances units may breakthrough after a victorious melee and how far broken units will run away before being removed from the table. Special consideration was given to the two personalities on the model battlefield. Borrowing some ideas from Mr. David Kay's article on leadership (see pages 42-44 of the January-February 2015 SLINGSHOT) and taking full advantage of the 'blanket' permission given in the Armati rules on page 4 ("For scenario play, a General's abilities may vary."), I gave Alexander a melee modifier of plus 3, a morale modifier of plus 4, and a key unit value of 6. His Roman counterpart was not rated as highly. Caesar was granted a melee modifier of plus 2, a morale modifier of plus 3, and a key unit value of 4. The additional difference was this: Alexander's ratings would only apply when he was attached to a particular unit; Caesar's influence would extend 6 scale inches in all directions. Any friendly unit within this radius would benefit from the great man's charismatic leadership. Without going into too much detail on these subjective (and subject to revision) ratings, I think it may be agreed that Alexander was more rash when it came to engaging in combat and Caesar was more rational. The impact on morale and loss is, again, tied to the ideas produced after reading Mr. Kay's educational piece on commanders. (Sidebar: A search of the Internet turned up nothing in the way of blog reports or other entries on wargaming Alexander versus Caesar but did result in the discovery of the following forum discussion: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=62339. Interested readers are invited to review the electronic conversation. Rather coincident-ally, just a few days after I started this project, Mr. Justin Swanton wondered about the greatest general in antiquity. See the SOA General Discussion Board for "The Greatest General in Antiquity" - original post made on March 25, 2015.)
DEPLOYMENT
General deployment was determined by competitive dice rolls. Due to Alexander's superior key unit rating, the Macedonians were declared the attacker and won the privilege of setting up their formations after Caesar had completed his arrangements. As defender, Caesar elected to position his army just in front of the ridge line with the river and marshy ground on his right and the ruins of the acropolis on his left. Expecting the main thrust of the enemy to be launched against his right or center right, Caesar put most of his cavalry on the far right of his battle line. Light horsemen screened the heavier allied squadrons while the German cavalry were held in reserve. Three strong divisions of legionary infantry (each containing 6 units) were positioned in the center. Two of the divisions were arranged on the right of this sector, the second less than a move away from the front line force. The left flank (the one opposite the acropolis) contained the Gallic warbands (3 divisions of 3 units each) and the remaining allied heavy horse. A small force of elite legionary infantry was held in reserve on this side of the line. Skirmishers and light cavalry were spread across the broad front of this large army. As for Caesar and his vaunted 10th Legion, the great man and his veterans were arranged on a gentle hill overlooking the left center of the main legionary deployment.
Seeing that the Roman high command had placed the majority of their cavalry against his left, Alexander decided to reply in kind and deployed all of his Companions and allied heavy horse near the river. A small formation of light cavalry protected the extreme left of this powerful wing. Alexander would ride with a unit of his veteran Companions. The phalanx was arranged in 3 divisions (6 units, 3 units, and 3 units) in the center of the line and was screened by peltasts and a forward line of skirmishers. The Hypaspists were placed to the right of the phalanx and the Greek allied hoplites to the right of these valued and veteran troops. Again, light infantry and skirmishers screened these solid blocks of foot soldiers. A couple of units of Prodromoi and one more of Greek light horse completed the Macedonian deployment on the right flank.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE
Not surprisingly, the Gauls made a strong push against the Macedonian right flank. A majority of the warbands advanced on the waiting line of hoplites; the rest moved up in support. Allied cavalry joined in the local offense, trotting up the gentle hillside on the left of the acropolis ruins. Macedonian light cavalry and light infantry tried to contest this movement but could not stand up against the wave of warriors. One unit of peltasts did make a brief fight in the rough ground of the ruins but was quickly overwhelmed by the barbarians. When the wave of Gauls hit the wall of hoplite shields and spears, however, it was an entirely different story. Though one group of Greek heavy infantry was broken by the force (i.e. ferocity) of the initial attack, the rest of the hoplites held their ground. A back and forth battle developed. It did not go in favor of the Gauls. While they threw themselves again and again on the shields and spears of the enemy heavy infantry, the allied cavalry on the extreme left ran down some peltasts, some skirmishers, and then galloped into the right rear of the Macedonian line. Unfortunately, these squadrons went too far and had trouble rallying so that they could move against the exposed rear of the hoplite formation or continue and launch an attack on the rear ranks of Alexander's phalanx. What few Gauls survived the first clash withdrew to catch their collective breath and rally on supporting friends. The Greeks used the intermission to rest, reorganize, and reestablish a proper line of battle. With a great shout, the second wave of Gauls ran forward, brandishing long swords and spears. For a second time, they crashed into aligned shields and spear points. The melee was as hard fought as the first, but again, the Gauls could not pierce the ordered formation of heavy infantry spearmen protected by large round shields.
On the Roman right flank, battle was quickly joined between opposing cavalry formations. Both sides committed their light horsemen. These squadrons were reinforced by heavy cavalry and the resulting melee was confused and prolonged. Alexander and his Companions avoided this action, aiming their horses at a gap between the right flank of the line of legionary infantry and the various units of allied and German horse in Rome's employ farther to the right. While the initial action continued - both sides fed more allied heavy cavalry into the swirling fight - the Germans wheeled in order to contest the advance of Alexander and his leading regiment of Companions. They did not time the move correctly, however, and had to settle for attacking some enemy heavy cavalry in the flank and rear. These squadrons (allied to the enemy) had foolishly elected to charge a line of legionary infantry from the front. The destruction of the enemy horse was the one bright spot for Caesar and his subordinates on this flank. Slowly but certainly, the tide of the main cavalry melee turned against the Romans. One by one, their units of allied heavy horse were engaged and broken by their enemy counterparts. A unit of valued German heavy cavalry took on a unit of Companions and was defeated for their efforts. The last unit of German horse found itself trapped between opposing lines of heavy infantry. Indeed, by finishing off 2 formations of enemy horse (these regiments were the ones who thought it would be good to attack Roman heavy infantry from the front), they left themselves open to the advance of a large Macedonian phalanx. With no room to maneuver, the German veterans perished on the end of serried ranks of pike points. As the cavalry contest in this sector of the field came to a conclusion, Alexander was able to wheel his veteran Companions and charge the exposed flank of a legionary line. As might be imagined/expected, the ensuing contest did not go at all well for the defending infantry. Alexander led by example, and his regiment chewed its way slowly into the now disordered ranks of the legionaries. Although his troopers were soon exhausted by the bloodletting, they kept at it, breaking one unit and moving on to the next in line. A separate unit of Companions followed this example, charging into the exposed flank of another line of legionary infantry. Similar results were produced.
As the Greeks held on the right and the cavalry seemed to ride over everything on the left, the three phalanxes advanced slowly across the plain. They were joined, on the right of the line, by a few units of Hypaspists. Instead of waiting for these formations, Caesar ordered the first two lines of legionary infantry forward. The infantry of both sides met somewhere in the middle of the field and from the start, things did not go at all well for the Roman rankers. On occasion, the legionary infantry were able to get past the leveled forest of pikes and make some inroads against the staggered phalanxes, but overall, the phalangites held firm, then advanced steadily and made the Romans pay the steepest price.
With the Gauls well and truly broken, with his right flank non-existent, with the phalanx proving more than a match for his experienced legionaries, and with Alexander and Companion cavalry cutting his way through a supporting line of heavy infantry, Caesar saw that, for this particular day, the writing was on the wall. He salvaged what he could of his once powerful and professional army and then, under the protection of small escort, left the field to the victorious Alexander.
EVALUATION
Instead of reviewing the merit(s) of the idea and my approach, instead of critiquing the drafted orders of battle, the recycled terrain (I have waged battle on this ground before), and the tinkering done with the purpose of building a "better" set of rules, I will simply offer that I quite enjoyed playing both Alexander and Caesar in this fictional contest. On review, it appears that I did a better job of it as Alexander. My plan was not very complicated. It depended quite a bit on the roll of the dice. In the guise of Caesar, it seems that my plan was also fairly simple. However, it was just not as good. Gauls against Greek hoplites? What was I thinking?! Not supporting my cavalry wing with at least some of the 10th Legion? Again, what was I thinking?! Adding insult to injury, it appeared (from very early on) that my famous luck had well and truly abandoned me.
Here's hoping that my luck returns when I face Alexander (myself) again in a Hail Caesar version of this counterfactual contest. Long term plans (projected completion date - late June 2015) call for a third iteration of this epic clash of historical personalities using Lorenzo Sartori's IMPETVS.
Its a mini battle day, 3 goes at the same counter factual using different rules.
Well, Polybius would agree with thus outcome.
Best and most cavalry should always win
Interesting battle that went pretty much as one would have expected. Alexander had superior troops in all departments, and Caesar would only have had a chance in favourable terrain that broke up the phalanx, as at Pydna or Cynoscephalae. A few elephants would also have come in handy for the Romans.
Gentlemen,
Thanks for taking the time to read and reply. Feedback is always appreciated.
Having just completed the HC trial (abbreviated experiment; Alexander's win marked with an asterisk) I am beginning to think or see this as more of an extension of the legion versus phalanx "problem" as opposed to a duel between commanders.
It's a bit difficult to picture Caesar employing elephants but I suppose, given the fiction of the experiment, I should not rule this out completely. Perhaps a refight (going back to the Armati rules) is warranted? As to the proposition that Alexander had superior troops in all departments, the PH units in the Macedonian list and the legion infantry in the Roman list all have a frontal fighting value of 7. So the infantry contest seems, literally, a roll of the dice. Alexander does have an advantage in horse. This is more abstracted in Armati than in HC. I am curious to see how it plays out in/with IMPETVS.
Chat on the rules forum of IMPETVS seems to suggest that Roman legionaries have an advantage over large units of Macedonian pikemen. I shall see how true this is. Narrative (or at least notification via link) pending.
Regards,
Chris
Certainly with Impetus I've used Roman Republicans in the traditional three lines against Macedonians and I've managed to beat the pikes. It is suitably tough to do.
Interestingly because you need to have at least some of the triarii held back as a third line to fill gaps (rather than out stiffening the flanks) the Macedonians don't suffer from being outflanked.
Where they do suffer is if they don't have enough pikes and some of their peltasts or similar end up facing Legionaries ;D
Jim
Quote from: Chris on April 03, 2015, 12:28:46 PMIt's a bit difficult to picture Caesar employing elephants ...
As we've touched on previously in this forum, Polyaenus disagrees - see http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1098.msg12104#msg12104
Note also
Bellum Africanum 72, where Caesar ships coals to Newcastle, or rather elephants from Italy to Africa, to train his troops - firmer evidence that he at least had access to them.
True; if Caesar really wanted elephants, he could have them. The drawback is that they would be of the North African variety, which Polybius in particular considers unable to stand up to Indian elephants (which Alexander would have).
Quote from: Chris on April 03, 2015, 12:28:46 PM
As to the proposition that Alexander had superior troops in all departments, the PH units in the Macedonian list and the legion infantry in the Roman list all have a frontal fighting value of 7. So the infantry contest seems, literally, a roll of the dice.
On level ground the legionaries should have little chance against the phalanx. The latter should have major negative modifiers if it gets on rough or difficult terrain, more than the legionaries, which then gives them some hope.
Gents,
Fair points, all. It would seem then that an Armati rematch is in order. I shall give Caesar a number of smaller pachyderms and his more handsome and dashing opponent some of the Indian variety. As to the FV for the main troop types, I shall have to address and redress these . . . Lower the Roman HI to 6? Allow the Macedonians a plus 1 modifier on the first round of melee?
Interesting to see how the other two rule sets dealt with the issue of pikes versus pila. In IMPETVS, the legionaries had an advantage. With HC, the Clash values were the same, but the pike took away the charge bonus (if memory serves). Both sides, being heavy infantry, could "close ranks" and reduce casualties as well as ability to inflict damage.
Thanks for reading and commenting.
Chris
There have been several pike vs pilae discussions on the forum. The conclusion IIRC was that legions will always give way before a formed phalanx on good terrain - more a case of recoil than casualties. Anything that breaks up the phalanx - rocky outcrops, dense copses - makes it a sitting duck for Caesar's more manoeuvrable maniples, who can get at the flanks of the separated phalanx blocks and carve them up. If the phalanx is outflanked, as at Cynoscephalae, it is equally incapable of reacting, so when faced by Alexander on an open field Caesar must win the battle for the flanks. If he can't do that he must deploy at least some of his infantry on or before terrain adverse for the phalanx. Otherwise he doesn't have a snowball's.
I wholeheartedly agree Justin, that Caesar must win the battle fir the flanks, however, you do not cite the one battle where his flank was truly threatened by heavy cavalry...Pharsalus. There , as we all know, he withdrew cohorts from his main line to support his less numerous cavalry. We are left with conjecture as to whether Alexander's cavalry could charge down the legionaries. I suppose the best comparitor is the Parthian cataphracts against Crassus an d Anthony, though I would entertain doubts as to how exact the comparison would be. Sarmatians using a very xyston lije weapon and with a reputation fir charging, were not. expected to take out legionaries, essentially similar to Caesar's, as long as the legionaries were firmed and ready. I submit that Caesar having designated men to deal with the Macedonian cavalry, is going to have them properly formed and braced forbthe job.
I also expect that Caesar would have recruited up enough auxiliaries to deal with the anticipated enemy.nSo he would recruit more archers and slingers (we know he recruited archers in Gaul and light cohorts in Spain) and Gallic and German cavalry. Combine all these and Caesar holds the flanks.
We should also remember that he encountered a pike army at Zela and beat it. Maybe Pharnaces' men are not Alexander's so it would be a tougher fight, but I'd bet on a similar outcome.
One of the Romans' great advantages over the Macedonians is that they have the same type of soldier everywhere in the battle line. The legions will generally outflank the pikes against whom they wil fall back, meanwhile they will chew up the units of Galatians or petasts on the flank of the phalanx and as others have said, assault it in the flanks.
Alex is thus going to lose this battle. He has one hope and that is to ride at Caesar himself and kill him. The difficulty with applying this tactic against Caesar is that he has to get through a lot of Romans to do ut and could end up on a pyre hinself. Als Caesar is a very mobile commander, unlike Darius, and thus finding him might be rather difficult. Of course there is also the question as to how Caesar's army would react if he was killed. i rather think Romans would just get angrier and more vicious with you!
Lastly, if this is a war rather than a battle, Caesar can afford to lose an army and recruit another one or two. Inam not sure that Alexander can afford the attrition.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 09:07:13 AM
I wholeheartedly agree Justin, that Caesar must win the battle fir the flanks, however, you do not cite the one battle where his flank was truly threatened by heavy cavalry...Pharsalus. There , as we all know, he withdrew cohorts from his main line to support his less numerous cavalry. We are left with conjecture as to whether Alexander's cavalry could charge down the legionaries.
I'm sort of a fan of the KTB theory so would posit that the Companions and Sarissophoroi could cut through the legionaries without much difficulty unless Caesar was up on the tactic and had devised a countermeasure.
The first time Romans encountered cataphracts at Magnesia they didn't do very well, and the cataphracts' frontal smash into infantry was not (presumably) as effective as the kind of surgical operation performed by the Macedonian heavy horse.
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 09:07:13 AMI suppose the best comparitor is the Parthian cataphracts against Crassus an d Anthony, though I would entertain doubts as to how exact the comparison would be. Sarmatians using a very xyston lije weapon and with a reputation fir charging, were not. expected to take out legionaries, essentially similar to Caesar's, as long as the legionaries were firmed and ready. I submit that Caesar having designated men to deal with the Macedonian cavalry, is going to have them properly formed and braced forbthe job.
And armed. Preferably with pikes.
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 09:07:13 AMI also expect that Caesar would have recruited up enough auxiliaries to deal with the anticipated enemy.nSo he would recruit more archers and slingers (we know he recruited archers in Gaul and light cohorts in Spain) and Gallic and German cavalry. Combine all these and Caesar holds the flanks.
We should also remember that he encountered a pike army at Zela and beat it.
Who were not many (most of the army were not pikes), were charging uphill and were probably disordered crossing over the Roman fortifications.
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 09:07:13 AMOne of the Romans' great advantages over the Macedonians is that they have the same type of soldier everywhere in the battle line. The legions will generally outflank the pikes against whom they wil fall back,
Only if they can create a longer infantry line than the phalanx. That would mean having considerably more legionaries than Alexander had phalangites, as the 3-line Roman system, still in use under Caesar, had greater depth than the 16-man deep Macedonian phalanx. How many legionaries would Caesar have?
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 09:07:13 AMmeanwhile they will chew up the units of Galatians or petasts on the flank of the phalanx and as others have said, assault it in the flanks.
Alex is thus going to lose this battle. He has one hope and that is to ride at Caesar himself and kill him. The difficulty with applying this tactic against Caesar is that he has to get through a lot of Romans to do ut and could end up on a pyre hinself. Als Caesar is a very mobile commander, unlike Darius, and thus finding him might be rather difficult. Of course there is also the question as to how Caesar's army would react if he was killed. i rather think Romans would just get angrier and more vicious with you!
Lastly, if this is a war rather than a battle, Caesar can afford to lose an army and recruit another one or two. Inam not sure that Alexander can afford the attrition.
Roy
True. Romans seemed always able to raise another army whereas Macedonia's resources seem to have been more limited. But I doubt Alexander would allow himself to be drawn into a battle where he did not have a distinct advantage over Caesar. His troops are already equipped to deal with an opponent like a Roman army - pikes beat pilae and swords, superior cavalry beats inferior cavalry. Alex's only disadvantage is the non-manoeuvrability of his infantry formations. Unlike the Romans, they cannot react quickly to an unexpected threat, but one would expect his genius to make sure no unexpected threats came his way.
My money's on Alex, any day. :)
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 09:07:13 AM
Lastly, if this is a war rather than a battle, Caesar can afford to lose an army and recruit another one or two. Inam not sure that Alexander can afford the attrition.
Roy
Slight quibble. Rome could recruit another army, I'm not sure whether Caesar could. His army was the armed wing of his political supporters, the next army he raised might not share their devotion to him.
As a political leader, Alexander was probably in a more robust situation, but Rome could out recruit Macedonia
Jim
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 09:07:13 AM
One of the Romans' great advantages over the Macedonians is that they have the same type of soldier everywhere in the battle line. The legions will generally outflank the pikes against whom they wil fall back, meanwhile they will chew up the units of Galatians or petasts on the flank of the phalanx and as others have said, assault it in the flanks.
Permit me to point out that Alexander never deployed peltasts, Galatians etc. on the flanks: his forward infantry line was always pure hypaspists and phalangites and, given that he usually deployed them eight deep and dense, he would be the one outflanking Caesar's infantry if the sides have anything like equal numbers.
He did however customarily have a
second line of peltasts, thureophoroi, etc. which served nicely to intercept anyone taking advantage of cracks in the phalanx - or at least did in theory: one is not sure if it worked at Issus, but it may have stopped the rot there; it definitely sorted out the Persian cavalry who poured through the gap at Gaugamela.
Hence even if Alex's phalanx started to develop gaps, this second line would sort out anyone who tried to take advantage of them. One may note that late Hellenistic armies went fort a single 10-deep phalanx instead of an 8-deep phalanx and presumably 8-deep second line: generations of never having to worry about gaps in the phalanx may have encouraged this development.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 06, 2015, 10:04:45 AM
Slight quibble. Rome could recruit another army, I'm not sure whether Caesar could. His army was the armed wing of his political supporters, the next army he raised might not share their devotion to him.
As a political leader, Alexander was probably in a more robust situation, but Rome could out recruit Macedonia
Good observation: one badly lost battle and Caesar will be city roadsweeper for life. Rome could indeed out-recruit Macedonia, though if we commit an Alex who is already in charge of the Persian Empire he could pull together quite a lot of pantodapoi and similar Hellenised Asiatic types.
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 09:07:13 AMI also expect that Caesar would have recruited up enough auxiliaries to deal with the anticipated enemy.nSo he would recruit more archers and slingers (we know he recruited archers in Gaul and light cohorts in Spain) and Gallic and German cavalry. Combine all these and Caesar holds the flanks.
But remember whom he is up against: Alexander will have recruited his own additional cavalry and missile troops to deal with Caesar's additional helpings of each.
QuoteWe should also remember that he encountered a pike army at Zela and beat it.
Pharnaces' close-fighting infantry were essentially imitation legionaries. The Pontic army had ceased to be pike-based before 75 BC.
Ah yes, Peltasts are used by later generals than Alex to protect the flanks, Caesar, however can easily raise 40,000 legionaries and so outflank the hypaspists who are doing the flank orotection job, or he can take the third line and put them out to the flank. Unlike the Macedonians Carsar's men are extrememely flexible in their organisation so he has no need to stick to fixed depths.
Unlike Caesar's Romans the Macedonians have a real oroblem if they default down to an eight deep formation because they are just not flexible. Their longer line becomes even more brittle and vulnerable to penetration whereas the Romans can front the pijes with a single line of cohorts that falls back if the Greeks advance and falls on them if the pijes split apart. So expect Caesar to have enough men and to be coming round the flanks.
Its the falling back that really does for the Macedonians because, unlike the unweildy Asiatic mass or the fixed hoplites ( though they coukd fall back) the Romans can give ground without losing cohesion.
As to Caesar lising an army and then ending as a street sweeper...well there are two Caesars. One in Gaul, the other in the Civil Wars. In Gaul you might be right, but then the Romans had a history of becoming more determined when defeated so he might have lost troops as he did to the Eburones and yet survived in command. Once the mighty Caesar was dictator you are most definitely wrong. He gad armies fighting in his cause simultaneously in the East, in Africa and in Spain. Caesar would just have gone and git another army.
Another area that the partisans of Alexander have forgotten here is the Romans' aggressive use of field firtifications a la Sulla when facing cavalry and aggressive positioning of forts as in Spain. Alexander would have found himself penned back by these fortifications and his room for manoeuvre drastically reduced.
Roy
Justin ' that would mean having considerably more legionaries than Alex had phalangites' . Crassus invades Parthia thit, I think, 40,000 legionaries I think Pompey heads for that many at Pharsalus. I doubt that raising the numbers is a problem to Caesar.
If we ran it as a wargame then the difficulty Alex has is that his phalanx is expensive, the hypaspists are expensive and the companion cavalry are expensive. So the Romans get a quantity advantage. Caesar cut his depth twice at Pharsalus so no problem with supplying troops to the wings to bolster the Roman cavalry.
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 04:40:59 PM
Justin ' that would mean having considerably more legionaries than Alex had phalangites' . Crassus invades Parthia thit, I think, 40,000 legionaries I think Pompey heads for that many at Pharsalus. I doubt that raising the numbers is a problem to Caesar.
If we ran it as a wargame then the difficulty Alex has is that his phalanx is expensive, the hypaspists are expensive and the companion cavalry are expensive. So the Romans get a quantity advantage. Caesar cut his depth twice at Pharsalus so no problem with supplying troops to the wings to bolster the Roman cavalry.
One can throw in quite a few ifs here.
If Alexander went to war with Rome he would know or find out the composition and fighting style of the Roman army. He would realise the need for enough of the only infantry sufficiently well armed to overcome the legions, namely pikemen. Presuming he had already conquered the Persian empire, he would have a vast manpower reserve to draw from, and would be able to raise and train any number of phalangites. Presuming Caesar had 40 000 legionaries at his disposal, he could deploy them in only two lines each 8 men deep for a frontage of 2500 yards. Alexander, deploying 16 men deep, or 8 deep on a compact frontage, would need the same number of phalangites to match Caesar's frontage. If Caesar stretches himself any thinner his line relief system will probably fall apart - the centre of the line will be sent packing before he has time to do anything to the Macedonian flanks.
If however Alexander had only 12 000 phalangites/hypaspists at his disposal (i.e. before he completed his conquest of Persia), then the legions could overlap his phalanx and he would be obliged to pull off a tactical coup before his heavy infantry were outflanked and overwhelmed. Tactical coups were exactly the kind of thing Alex was used to doing, so everything would depend on how well Caesar knew Alex's tactical repertoire. Did he have an answer to the cavalry wedge? Could he protect himself from an attack on his person by Alex? Bearing in mind that Caesar has no quick way of winning the battle himself, since his main strength is in his infantry.
Which is why we should fight it on the table top! Pyrrhus was rated a good general and had great difficulty with Roman armies that were inferior to Caesar's or were at least led by lesser men than Divine Julius. I agree that Alexander is likely better than Pyrrhus, but that Caesar is way better than the consuls that opposed the Epirote.
The troublewith Alexander's tactic of killing the oppising general is that that mghtwell nt stop the Romans. If Alexander gets lucky Julius might get caught, but meanwhile the Macedonians get chopped into small pieces.
If I was playing Caesar I'd have a few cohorts of the tenth legion and some archers by me.
Roy
This is turning into more of a mobilisation contest than a comparison of generalship. Bear in mind that once Alexander has his empire his manpower base will considerably exceed that of first century BC Rome.
So rather than engage in mutual escalation, I think we need to firm up the forces for this decisive clash, bearing in mind that we need a manageable battle and the gods need to cheat a bit on the temporal front to bring these two together. The best way to do this would be to make it a surprise.
For example ...
Caesar thinks he is about to give battle to Pompey at Pharsalus. He has 22,000 legionaries in 80 cohorts, six of the best of which are kept back for his little surprise move. He also has 1,000 cavalry with 1,000 pillion-riding friends.
Alexander thinks he is approaching the Persian forces at the Granicus. Of his 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry he has the cavalry, the hypaspists, the Agrianes, the archers and the phalanx. This gives him about 12,000 heavy and 2,000 light infantry with his 5,000 cavalry. His Greek and Thracian infantry have not yet come up - if we want to be fussy about conferring equal numbers, we can allow 5,000 of them to turn up part-way through the fighting. If not, we can leave them out of this day's action.
Whose terrain do we use? Caesar is covering only one flank with cavalry, so we might as well use the Pharsalus terrain. Alex will realise he is in a strange location when his army mysteriously reappears on the lower slopes of the elevation that holds - or held - Pompey's camp, but there is no particular reason for him to redeploy.
Now for deployment and frontages: Caesar's 22,000 infantry, less his 3,000-man special strike force, leaves 19,000 infantry in three lines. As his units are understrength, he might not use the full depth for each line; furthermore he may well deploy 4-4-2, which in plain English means four cohorts in each legion's first and second lines but only two (half depth) in the third.
If he deploys his lines 8 deep - 8 deep - 4 deep (the third line at half depth because half strength - 2 cohorts) he would have an infantry frontage of 950 yards. This is sufficiently close to the 800 yards of a traditional double consular army to seem not unreasonable.
His cavalry, if deployed five deep (half the usual ten deep) would have a frontage of a further 400 yards.
Alexander would have his cavalry and accompanying missilemen on the right, 1,800 Companions plus Paeonians and the Prodromoi, say 2,700 cavalry, 500 archers and 1,000 Agrianes. The other 500 archers might be here or on the opposite flank. Assume a frontage of about 300 yards for these, the missile troops preceding and intermingling with the cavalry squadrons.
The hypaspists and phalangites would be 8 deep but dense (18" frontage per man). This would give them a frontage of 750 yards.
Parmenio's wing would have the Thessalians (1,800?) plus allied Greek and Thracian cavalry, say 2,300 cavalry, plus maybe 500 archers. Assume a frontage of about 250 yards.
Caesar's frontage comes to 1,300 yards. Alexander's works out at around 1,300 yards - a useful coincidence.
The battle will hinge on a number of points.
1) Can Alexander's cavalry ride through/ride down Antony's legionaries on Caesar's left? (Favoured opinion: yes - legionaries did not shine against lance-armed cavalry)
2) How will Caesar's legionaries under Gnaeus Domitius and Sulla cope with the hypaspists and phalagites? (Favoured opinion: badly - legionaries never broke a phalanx frontally without help)
3) Will Caesar's six-cohort ambush work against Parmenio's cavalry wing? (Favoured opinion: probably - Parmenio was cautious but also unimaginative)
So I think Alexander would win this one, despite pleas for help from Parmenio on the left ...
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 07:35:36 PM
Pyrrhus was rated a good general ...
I have increasing difficulty seeing why. Given his fairly consistent record of near-success, I think he was more respected for his knowledge of the military art than his application of it, and for his "daring and prowess" in combat rather than his ability to clear the field of the enemy. See Plutarch's
Pyrrhus chapter 7 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0060%3Achapter%3D7) for how he made his reputation. Also:
"
This conflict did not fill the Macedonians with wrath and hate towards Pyrrhus for their losses, rather it led those who beheld his exploits and engaged him in the battle to esteem him highly and admire his bravery and talk much about him. For they likened his aspect and his swiftness and all his motions to those of the great Alexander, and thought they saw in him shadows, as it were, and imitations of that leader's impetuosity and might in conflicts. The other kings, they said, represented Alexander with their purple robes, their body-guards, the inclination of their necks, and their louder tones in conversation; but Pyrrhus, and Pyrrhus alone, in arms and action.
[2] Of his knowledge and ability in the field of military tactics and leadership one may get proofs from the writings on these subjects which he left. It is said also that Antigonus, when asked who was the best general, replied, 'Pyrrhus, if he lives to be old.' "
He did not live to be old.
Lets disagree first on the mobilisation. You pick a battle (Pharsalus) in which Caesar has a much reduced army and is fighting a civil war. Its wrong to say that Alexander' s Empire has greater resources than the Roman Empire in 50 BC because, in the crucial area of heavy infantry Macedon's resources are less than those of the Romans...probably 20 per cent . In terms of good cavalry the Macedonians have the advantage in quality at the top end, but the Romans can probably deliver as many cavalry to the battlefield as Alexander and that will hold his strike orce in play. The real advantage that the Romans have is their infantry because, as said earlier, they are one of the few infantries that can fall back in front of the phalanx. That liberates the legions on the flank of the phalanx to fall upon it where it cannot turn and is likely decisive.
The point that Patrick and Justin have not dealt with is Caesar's potential use of field fortifications, a branch of the military art in which Rome far exceeded Macedon. Caesar can pick and choose his ground and not give battle unit it suits him. He won't be refighting Pharsalus, but a new battle with , potentially, the odds in his favour. Again,Ihe can use trenches as Sulla did, to hinder the ability of the Macedonian cavalry to stretch his front and turn a flank to create a gap.
Alexander is easily conceptualised :o as a military genius because he was universally victorious through being aggressive, but he generally fought weaker opponents. The Persians were numerous but disorganised, the Greeks lacked a unified command and Alexander's father had designed the Macedonian army to beat Greeks. The Indians have a record of losing pretty consistently to invaders from the North West, be they Alexander,, the Greek Successor Staes, Parthia, the Saka, the Kushans etc. Alexander beats all these opponents through guile and agression, but with Rome he would meet an immovable object against an ordinary Roman general, more than his match if he met Caesar who is also inventive.
So in my putative reconstruction Caesar forms in two lines a total of 12 deep with say 24,000 men . That gives him a frontage of 2000 yards . He then has a third line of 4000 men to stiffen the flank(s) .
One immense advantage that Rome has the ability of the legions facing the phalanx to fall back in front of it and hence the possibility of allowing the phalanx to move firward until it cracks. If necessary Caesar could retreat into rough ground, allow the phalanx to. crack up and then insert cohorts into the gaps. I doubt that Aleander's force can cope with this. It is Polybius who describes this fatal weakness of the phalanx and I submit he knew rather better than we do how the different systems performed. His assessment of the phalanx is that it will always fail because of its inherent weaknesses against a Roman system.
Roy
I tend to think that the big Macedonian advantage was using combined arms against opponents who isolated each troop type they had from each other.
The romans by Caesars time did not have that problem, and a much better ability to mobilise new armies quickly
The Romans of Caesar's time also had the ability to mobilise new generals rapidly. Given that the Parthians had Roman allies and Roman infantry in their army, I suspect Alexander could have guarded the flanks of his phalanx with legionaries 8)
Jim
Then, Jim, to be fair to both they can each design the perfect army and bring it to the battle. So both can have cataphracts and horse archers and pikes or legionaries.
Mind you I bet Caesar would not be choosing any pikemen.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 07, 2015, 09:56:35 AM
Then, Jim, to be fair to both they can each design the perfect army and bring it to the battle. So both can have cataphracts and horse archers and pikes or legionaries.
Mind you I bet Caesar would not be choosing any pikemen.
Roy
Be a beggar if they both turned up with Parthian armies then, on the grounds that they managed to defeat both pike armies AND legionary armies ;D
Jim
Quote from: aligern on April 06, 2015, 10:04:24 PM
Lets disagree first on the mobilisation. You pick a battle (Pharsalus) in which Caesar has a much reduced army and is fighting a civil war. Its wrong to say that Alexander' s Empire has greater resources than the Roman Empire in 50 BC because, in the crucial area of heavy infantry Macedon's resources are less than those of the Romans...probably 20 per cent . In terms of good cavalry the Macedonians have the advantage in quality at the top end, but the Romans can probably deliver as many cavalry to the battlefield as Alexander and that will hold his strike orce in play.
Taking the armies from Pharsalus and the Granicus is a way of giving each side a similar 'points value' so the main variable is the skill of the C-in-C. The point is to avoid precisely this auction of imagination in favour of one's preferred candidate.
If we are to instead take each general at the height of his power and resources, I think we would have to look at cavalry mobilisation figures for the respective empires. If Alex wanted to maximise cavalry, he would have no trouble matching the 40,000 or so fielded by Darius at Gaugamela - of these, perhaps 10,000 would be Macedonian, Thracian, Thessalian and Greek and the rest Persian, Bactrian and Scythian.
If I remember correctly, the Roman Republic never massed more than around 7,000 cavalry on any given battlefield. Caesar might be able to improve considerably on this by drawing upon the resources of Gaul and Numidia, but what would his upper limit be? We start having to look at logistical organisation, a department in which Alexander's empire would have superiority on account of its higher population, superior concentration of major cities, Persian administrative arrangements and superior maritime resources.
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The real advantage that the Romans have is their infantry because, as said earlier, they are one of the few infantries that can fall back in front of the phalanx. That liberates the legions on the flank of the phalanx to fall upon it where it cannot turn and is likely decisive.
Not really - at Cynoscephalae and Pydna they do not 'fall back'; they are bundled back involuntarily. This can have only one ending unless the phalanx is attacked by someone else from somewhere else, which Alexander would take care not to allow.
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The point that Patrick and Justin have not dealt with is Caesar's potential use of field fortifications, a branch of the military art in which Rome far exceeded Macedon. Caesar can pick and choose his ground and not give battle unit it suits him. He won't be refighting Pharsalus, but a new battle with , potentially, the odds in his favour. Again,Ihe can use trenches as Sulla did, to hinder the ability of the Macedonian cavalry to stretch his front and turn a flank to create a gap.
But how much of an advantage would this confer? Caesar in Spain showed how to deal with field fortifications: you just cut off the enemy's supplies and avoid battle. I cannot see this being an insuperable problem for Alexander. If Caesar has tucked himself into a handy corner so that his supplies are somehow inviolate, Alexander gets to play with his artillery. :)
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Alexander is easily conceptualised :o as a military genius because he was universally victorious through being aggressive, but he generally fought weaker opponents. The Persians were numerous but disorganised, the Greeks lacked a unified command and Alexander's father had designed the Macedonian army to beat Greeks. The Indians have a record of losing pretty consistently to invaders from the North West, be they Alexander,, the Greek Successor Staes, Parthia, the Saka, the Kushans etc. Alexander beats all these opponents through guile and agression, but with Rome he would meet an immovable object against an ordinary Roman general, more than his match if he met Caesar who is also inventive.
This seems to me to be a declaration of faith rather than fact. Alexander won consistently and economically because he made very sure that he knew how his opponents functioned and what their weaknesses were. Had he come up against the Romans, one can be sure that Polybius' famous observation about cavalry would have partly altered to:
"
It was to cavalry that *Macedon* owed its victories and Rome its defeats."
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So in my putative reconstruction Caesar forms in two lines a total of 12 deep with say 24,000 men . That gives him a frontage of 2000 yards . He then has a third line of 4000 men to stiffen the flank(s) .
Alexander, with a smile, would field a Hydaspes-type deployment, lop off one of the over-extended Roman flanks and roll up the rest of the line.
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One immense advantage that Rome has the ability of the legions facing the phalanx to fall back in front of it and hence the possibility of allowing the phalanx to move firward until it cracks.
Alas no, as mentioned.
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If necessary Caesar could retreat into rough ground, allow the phalanx to. crack up and then insert cohorts into the gaps. I doubt that Aleander's force can cope with this.
This is a sensible recourse to avoid defeat, although Alexander would have more sense than to commit a phalanx on rough ground.
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It is Polybius who describes this fatal weakness of the phalanx and I submit he knew rather better than we do how the different systems performed. His assessment of the phalanx is that it will always fail because of its inherent weaknesses against a Roman system.
But he also points out that on level ground the legion has no chance, and he specifically does not mention it as having the ability to disorganise a phalanx by falling back, or even being able to fall back intact, for that matter. His main point is that the Roman system keeps a lot of troops 'in reserve' to take advantage of developments whereas the Macedonian system of his day (as opposed to Alexander's) put all its eggs in one phalangite-line basket.
As pointed out earlier, Alexander customarily maintained a second line of more flexible troops which could deal with opponents who sought to exploit any gaps that did develop in the phalanx for any reason.
It is all a bit too deterministic, pat.
Alexander gets to act dynamically, Caesar stands there and lets him do it.
Personally, I don't rate Caesar highly, and am baffled by folk who do, but one thing I certainly would credit him with is an ability to react quickly and decisively to a new threat.
In a straight fight, I would expect him to pull out of level ground, and then tempt Alex to come in at him.
And I would expect Alex to fall for it.
True, Mark, we do need to give Caesar his due - he was usually good at reacting to being surprised (cynics say he needed to be, the number of times he was surprised).
If Caesar adopted an extended line deployment as Roy proposed (which I do not see Julius doing, personally) then we would leave himself vulnerable to a dynamic approach by Alexander which switched to envelop and crush one wing. This is one reason why wide frontages were not particularly popular in the classical period: if your opponent could manoeuvre at all well, you would leave yourself open to this kind of thing.
Caesar might try to tempt Alex on to difficult terrain, but I do not see Alex falling for that one: on the first day at Gaugamela, he marched to give battle, saw the way the Persians were drawn up, cancelled the battle and spent the day reconnoitring the Persian positions. The following day he gave battle - with a plan that collapsed the Persian army like a pricked balloon by taking advantage of the ramifications of its deployment.
So if JC set up with difficult terrain behind so he could fall back onto it, I would expect Alex to punch through both Roman wings with his cavalry followed by his second-line troops (good rough terrain types like peltasts for the most part) and gift-wrap the Romans while his phalanx was still advancing. Caesar would then have to cut his way through to the difficult terrain under pressure and surrounded - and Alexander's army was a far more potent opponent than the Numidians at Ruspina, whom Caesar did manage to break free of when surrounded.
Part of the problem is that the Roman military system as under Caesar while good enough to beat almost anyone else, does not seem quite up to handling a Macedonian (or Macedonian Imperial) army in its prime. What would have been interesting is to see how Caesar would have handled the Parthians had he lived - I have a few ideas about that, which may or may not be what he had in mind.
Mark is absolutely right Patrick, your infatuation with Alexander leads you to ignore the other side on the field. If Caesar extends then Alexander withdraws a flank a la Hydaspes then Alex is not facing Indians with a clunky command system, the Roman flank will be round on his flank quicker than you can say Hephaistion and certainly quicker than I can spell it!
Roman armies deploy active and mobile reserves which I do not think Alexander does, so any penetration will be met by fresh troops.
Caesar beats Pompey who is well regarded, who does Alexander beat who has an army or a general to be feared.
Alexander gets strategically surprised by Darius at Issus so please let us not fall into the trap of believing that Caesar is the only one that takes risks. Of course Caesar's risky behaviour may be in conscious imitation of Alexander (pace Lendon Soldiers and Ghosts) .
Against Parthians I'd expect Caesar to take advice and stick to the high ground, then march down Tigris or Euphrates building forts as he went. At the same time, if politically possible he would organise an Armenian penetration from the North to split the Parthian forces.
Even Crassus would have survived with most of his army intact if his nerve had not failed him.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 07, 2015, 06:13:49 PM
Mark is absolutely right Patrick, your infatuation with Alexander leads you to ignore the other side on the field. If Caesar extends then Alexander withdraws a flank a la Hydaspes then Alex is not facing Indians with a clunky command system, the Roman flank will be round on his flank quicker than you can say Hephaistion and certainly quicker than I can spell it!
This is why at the Hydaspes and at our hypothetical Pharsalus-with-extensions Alex has a detached cavalry wing. Any Roman force moving to flank Alex gets flanked by Task Force Coenus. ;)
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Roman armies deploy active and mobile reserves which I do not think Alexander does, so any penetration will be met by fresh troops.
This depends on what is meant by 'active and mobile reserves'. Roman armies habitually drew up in three lines and engaged with one, which gave them adequate - and under Caesar usually more than adequate - flexibility to respond against opponents who moved
at an infantry pace. Alexander however was a genius at timing and had a substantial very high quality cavalry force, which made fighting against him a very tricky exercise (as Bessus' cavalry wing found out at Gaugamela). An over-extended Roman wing could easily be 'punched out' before it could be relieved by troops from elsewhere along the front, especially if we consider the generally lacklustre showing of Roman infantry against lance-armed cavalry, even Seleucids and Parthians, who lacked something of the quality and skill of Alexander's Companions.
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Caesar beats Pompey who is well regarded, who does Alexander beat who has an army or a general to be feared.
Caesar also beats Labienus, who is also well-regarded, not least by Caesar. Then again, beating Pompey was well within Sertorius' capabilities even with a non-Roman army (albeit reformed along Roman lines), as he proved at the Sucro (Pompey was doubly fortunate in that his expensively-attired mount diverted his pursuers from himself while Metellus rescued Pompey's army). Sertorius, while very good, is not considered to be in quite the same league as Caesar or Hannibal - or Scipio Africanus - let alone Alexander, but he beat Pompey during the latter's prime, not his dotage.
As for Alexander,
1) Memnon of Rhodes was considered the premier Greek general of his era, and Alexander defeated him quite handily at the Granicus.
2) Even Darius himself had a high military reputation - at least prior to Issus.
3) Porus was considered eminent among Indian kings.
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Alexander gets strategically surprised by Darius at Issus so please let us not fall into the trap of believing that Caesar is the only one that takes risks. Of course Caesar's risky behaviour may be in conscious imitation of Alexander (pace Lendon Soldiers and Ghosts) .
Alexander was not taking risks at Issus: the 'strategic surprise' was because he had been led to believe there was only one pass through the Taurus range (which he firmly controlled) when in fact there were two. He seems always to have double-checked his intelligence after that (or been more fortunate with his guides).
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Against Parthians I'd expect Caesar to take advice and stick to the high ground, then march down Tigris or Euphrates building forts as he went. At the same time, if politically possible he would organise an Armenian penetration from the North to split the Parthian forces.
Even Crassus would have survived with most of his army intact if his nerve had not failed him.
This is true, and Mark Antony managed a creditable fighting retreat with the odd success along the way. But Caesar would be playing for keeps, and I think that in addition to taking the Armenia route into Media (and avoiding Mesopotamia entirely) he would be laying the groundwork among the principal Persian families for permanent removal of the Parthians. One may note how he very consciously used Gauls against Gauls, posing as a liberator until he had enough control to put the lot under his thumb (although the resultant revolt by Vercingetorix pretty nearly ended Caesar's career) - I am sure he would have tried to pose as a liberator of the Persians from the Parthians, drawing on Persian manpower and trying to foment revolts in the hope of galling the Parthians to attack him in a situation unfavourable to themselves. I feel he would have made extensive use of caltrops and similar anti-cavalry methods to prepare the battlefield beforehand if it came to a battle - these Great Captains rarely 'fought fair'.
So why would he not do this against Alexander? He might well, but Alexander would not be caught - any more than he was by Darius' preparations at Gaugamela. On the political angle, his Persians were intermarried with his Macedonians, so had a stake in the status quo that Caesar would find hard to better. Conversely, Alexander could easily pose as the liberator of Rome - or of various peoples under the Roman thumb. Caesar might wake up one day to find his Gauls had all left to re-enlist under Alexander as Galatians. :)
And what pray are Caesar's cavalry doing whist Coenus is suppisedly flanking the legionaries who are flanking the phalanx? Just watching? No, they will be engaging the Macedonians.
I don't know where you get this putative lacklustre performance of Roman infantry againstlance armed cavalry. Properly formed up they do just fine. At Carrhae cataphracts do not charge through them, at Pharsalus, intermingled with the Caesarian cavalry they drive off Hellenistic cavalry.
The answer is for several groups to try this one on the tabletop.
Quote from: aligern on April 07, 2015, 11:00:59 PM
The answer is for several groups to try this one on the tabletop.
I would be interested in reading about how these experiments turned out.
At the accepted risk of starting a related topic (probably best reserved for another thread), I wonder if others have toyed with the idea of pitting historical personalities against each other who did not actually meet on the field of battle.
It's not historical, of course, but it might prove entertaining and interesting.
Chris
The problem with settling it on various tabletops is that the rules of each will largely determine the winner before it starts, and will certainly remove any strategic manoevers leading up to the battle.
Not to mention, inappropriately levelling the field to an even points system that completely misses the point of roman command and control and mobilisation advantages.
But I would emphasise again, Caesar has nothing to gain by fighting on a field that enabled cavalry manoeuvres.
He has nothing to gain on a field that enables the phalanx to operate optimally.
And he gas nothing to gain from fighting on a field that leaves his flanks open to envelopment.
Most importantly, he has nothing to fear from a defeat. Tine is always on romes side because Rome dies not care if the entire army dies and the general is killed
Alex, on the other hand, is entirely dependent on killing the enemy king to legitimise his claim, and his army is dependent on the regular supply of booty to keep it in the field.
There is a reason why he uses blitz tactics and keros rushing after the next end point.
and a reason why Caesar is happy to take his time establishing political control over gaul.
Alex must kill Caesar, and he must do it quickly.
Caesar can march Alex around for months before he needs even think about committing to battle.
Caesar wins in the same way that the Russians always win, by trading space for time
Quote from: aligern on April 07, 2015, 11:00:59 PM
The answer is for several groups to try this one on the tabletop.
Absolutely
And the winner will be the one who smuggles the most points onto the table under the nose of the umpire, because he's the one who has captured the spirit of these two men
Jim
Quote from: aligern on April 07, 2015, 11:00:59 PM
And what pray are Caesar's cavalry doing whist Coenus is suppisedly flanking the legionaries who are flanking the phalanx? Just watching? No, they will be engaging the Macedonians.
But which Macedonians? Remember how at Gaugamela Alexander's cavalry wing of about 3,500 managed to keep a Persian wing of 20,000 cavalry amused, engaged and eventually defeated them using less than half their numbers (3,500 less Alex's approximately 1,800 Macedonians). Given the generally unenterprising conduct of Roman cavalry (albeit admitting their command and control would be superior to Persians) I do not see Alexander's disengaged cavalry wing having any trouble with Caesar's 1,000 double-mounted cavalry, even assuming Caesar had them on that flank rather than on the one Alex would be attacking.
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I don't know where you get this putative lacklustre performance of Roman infantry againstlance armed cavalry.
"
For Antiochus, on his right flank, since he saw that there were no auxiliaries there except four troops of cavalry, because of the Romans' confidence in the river, and that these, while they were maintaining contact with their neighbours, were leaving the bank unguarded, made an attack upon them with the auxiliaries and the armoured cavalry [cataphracto equitatu]; [8] nor did he charge from the front alone, but encircling them from the river was already pressing on from the flank, until first the cavalry fled and then the infantry who were nearest were driven headlong towards the camp." - Livy XXXVII.42.7-8
"
Then, as the enemy got to work, their light, cavalry rode round on the flanks of the Romans and shot them with arrows, while the mail-clad horsemen in front, plying their long spears, kept driving them together into a narrow space, [2] except those who, to escape death from the arrows, made bold to rush desperately upon their foes. These did little damage, but met with a speedy death from great and fatal wounds, since the spear which the Parthians thrust into the horses was heavy with steel, and often had impetus enough to pierce through two men at once." - Plutarch, Crassus 27.1-3
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Properly formed up they do just fine. At Carrhae cataphracts do not charge through them, at Pharsalus, intermingled with the Caesarian cavalry they drive off Hellenistic cavalry.
And at Magnesia they crumple before them. Incidentally, are we really justified in calling Pompey's predominantly raw cavalry at Pharsalus 'Hellenistic'? As far as I can see, the only remotely Hellenistic cavalry he had were a few hundred Macedonians, who had cashed in their lances for javelin and shield some generations ago. I would also question the 'intermingled' bit: in my understanding, Caesar's cohorts hit the Pompeian cavalry as they were about to change direction to catch Caesar's Tenth Legion in flank, thus catching the cavalry when they were lacking impetus and changing formation. Good timing and good technique did the rest.
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The answer is for several groups to try this one on the tabletop.
As others have pointed out, this will mainly reflect the rules set used as written rather than the armies and commanders in question.
Quote from: Mark G on April 08, 2015, 07:35:25 AM
Alex, on the other hand, is entirely dependent on killing the enemy king to legitimise his claim, and his army is dependent on the regular supply of booty to keep it in the field.
There is a reason why he uses blitz tactics and keros rushing after the next end point.
and a reason why Caesar is happy to take his time establishing political control over gaul.
Alex must kill Caesar, and he must do it quickly.
Caesar can march Alex around for months before he needs even think about committing to battle.
Caesar wins in the same way that the Russians always win, by trading space for time
I am not sure that Alex would be fighting to establish a claim as 'King of Rome', although Caesar would - a point that eventually got him killed. Perhaps the battleground affording most scope would be to give each man his holdings at the height of their power, Alex moving west having survived his trip to Babylon and Caesar about to move east having survived the Ides of March (this also gives Caesar a more anti-Parthian type of army if he likes). Draw a line through Illyria and the Adriatic and down past Brundisium to the African coast near Tripoli: everything west of this line is Caesar's as it was in 44 BC and everything east of it (as far as the Indus) is Alexander's as it was in 323 BC.
That would make an interesting campaign for the two presumed greatest generals of antiquity. I have thoughts about co-opting the
Imperium Romanum II boardgame for the purpose ... all we need now is for Alex and Julius to put in an appearance.