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Name
Caesar himself does not give a name for this battle. However his continuator, the anonymous author of the Alexandrian War (probably Aulus Hirtius), is a contemporary source for the name "Battle of Pharsalus" (42, "ex fuga Pharsalici proeli"). But other ancient writers place the battle at  Palaepharsalos, "Old Pharsalus", or refer to "Pharsalia", meaning the district of Pharsalus rather than the city itself.

Combatants
Caesarian Roman (C. Iulius Caesar) vs Pompeian, "Republican", or "Optimate" Roman (Cn. Pompeius Magnus)

Background
The climactic battle of the great Roman Civil War. Caesar had won control of Italy and pursued Pompey to Greece. After indecisive fighting around Dyrrachium on the Adriatic, both armies marched inland in search of supplies and met near Pharsalus in Thessaly.

Numbers reported
Caesar: 22,000 legionaries (plus camp-guard), 1,000 German and Gallic cavalry with supporting infantry, a few thousand (?) light infantry.
Pompey: 47,000 legionaries (45,000 plus 2,000 evocati veterans; plus camp-guard), 7,000 Roman and allied cavalry, numerous light infantry.

Sources
As befits such an important encounter there are several ancient accounts. The most detailed and important is the victorious commander Julius Caesar's Civil War, Book III. Other accounts include Appian's Civil Wars, Plutarch's Lives of both Caesar and Pompey (and a brief reference in the Life of Antony), Dio Cassius, and Lucan's epic poem Pharsalia. There are shorter accounts or anecdotes, some of them apparently taken from the main sources, in Fronto, Orosius, Frontinus, Polyaenus, and probably other writers.

Source account
Caesar, Civil War, III.84-99 (from the Loeb translation of 1914):

84: When he had arranged for his corn supply and had encouraged his soldiers and had allowed a sufficient time to elapse after the battles of Dyrrachium to admit of his feeling assured of the temper of his troops, Caesar thought it right to find out what purpose or what disposition for fighting Pompeius had. And so he led his army out of the camp and drew up his lines, first of all in a position favourable to himself and some little distance from the camp of Pompeius, but on subsequent days advancing away from his own camp and pushing his line up to the foot of the hills held by the Pompeians. This action made his army day by day more confident. But in the case of his cavalry he retained his previous custom which we have explained above: since they were many times inferior in number, he gave orders that lightly equipped youths from among the first-rank men (adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis), with arms selected with a view to fleetness (electis ad pernicitatem armis), should go into battle among the cavalry, so that by daily practice they might win experience in this kind of fighting also. The result of these measures was that one thousand horsemen, even in the more open ground, ventured, with the experience they had gained, to sustain the attack of seven thousand Pompeian horse, and were not greatly terrified by their multitude. For even on those days he fought a successful cavalry skirmish and killed among some others one of the two Allobrogians who, as we explained above, had deserted to Pompeius.

85: Pompeius, who had his camp on the hill, kept drawing up his line on the lowest spurs of the mountain, apparently always waiting to see whether Caesar would approach close up to the unfavourable ground. Caesar, thinking that Pompeius could by no means be enticed out to a battle, judged that his most convenient plan of campaign was to move his camp from that place, and to be always on the march, with the view of getting his supplies more conveniently by moving camp and visiting various places and at the same time of meeting with some opportunity of fighting on the route, and of wearing out the army of Pompeius, which was unaccustomed to hard work, by daily marches. After making these arrangements, when the signal for starting had now been given and the tents had been unstretched, it was noticed that a little while before, contrary to its daily custom, Pompeius' line had advanced somewhat further from the rampart, so that it seemed possible for a battle to be fought in no disadvantageous position. Then Caesar, addressing his men, when his force was just at the gates, said: "We must put off our march for the present and think of giving battle, as we have always demanded. Let us be prepared in heart for a conflict; we shall not easily hereafter find an opportunity." At once he leads out his troops in light order (expeditas).

86: Pompeius, too, as was found out afterwards, had determined, with the general encouragement of his men, to fight a pitched battle. For he had gone so far as to assert in the council of war on previous days that Caesar's army would be repulsed before the lines met. When several had expressed their surprise at this: "I know," said he, "that I am promising a thing almost incredible, but listen to the nature of my plan that you may go forth to battle with a stouter heart. I have induced my cavalry — and they have assured me that they will do it — as soon as the two armies have drawn nearer, to attack Caesar's right wing on his open flank, and by surrounding his column from the rear to drive his army in confused rout before a weapon is cast at the foe by us. So we shall finish the war without imperilling the legions and almost without a wound. And this is not difficult, considering that we are so strong in cavalry." At the same time he urged upon them that they should be strong in spirit for the coming day, and since they had now the opportunity for fighting which they had often demanded, they should not disappoint either his expectation or that of the rest.

87: Labienus followed him. [speech omitted]

88: Caesar, having approached the camp of Pompeius, observed that his [Pompey's] line was drawn up as follows: On the left wing were the two legions which had been handed over by Caesar at the beginning of the civil strife by decree of the senate, one of which was called the First, the other the Third. At that place was Pompeius himself. Scipio occupied the middle of the line with the Syrian legions. The Cilician legion, united with the Spanish cohorts, which, as we explained, had been brought over by Afranius, was stationed on the right wing. These legions Pompeius regarded as the strongest under his command. The rest he had interposed between the centre and the wings and had made up the number of one hundred and ten cohorts. These forces amounted to forty-five thousand men, and about two thousand "evocati" who had come to him from the "beneficiarii" of his former armies; and these he had distributed throughout the whole force. Seven remaining cohorts he had placed on garrison duty in the camp and the neighbouring forts. A stream with difficult banks protected his right wing; for which reason he had stationed his whole cavalry and all his archers and slingers opposite the enemy on the left wing.

89: Caesar, observing his previous custom, had posted his Tenth Legion on the right wing, and his Ninth on the left, though it had been seriously attenuated by the Dyrrachian battles. To this legion he added the Eighth, so that he almost made the two into one, having given orders that the one should support the other. He had eighty cohorts posted in his lines, making a total of twenty-two thousand men; two cohorts he had left as a protection for the camp. He had placed Antonius in command on the left wing, P. Sulla on the right, and Cn. Domitius in the centre. He himself confronted Pompeius. At the same time, having noticed the arrangements mentioned above, fearing lest his right wing should be surrounded by the multitude of cavalry, he hastily withdrew individual cohorts from the third line (ex tertia acie singulas cohortes detraxit) and out of these constructed a fourth line, stationing it opposite the cavalry, explaining what his object was and reminding them that the day's victory depended on the valour of these cohorts. At the same time he commanded the third line and the whole army not to join battle without orders from himself, saying that when he wished this to be done he would give the signal with a vexillum.

90: When, according to the custom of war, he was exhorting his army to battle, and setting forth his unbroken record of kindness to his men, he particularly reminded them that he could call his troops to witness with what zeal he had sought peace, what negotiations he had conducted through Vatinius in conferences and through Aulus Clodius with Scipio, how at Oricum he had urged Libo about the sending of envoys. He had never, he said, wished to squander the blood of his soldiers or to deprive the republic of either of its armies. After delivering this speech, the soldiers clamouring for action and burning with zeal for the fight, he gave the signal with a trumpet (tuba).

91: There was in Caesar's army an evocatus, C. Crastinus, who in the previous year had served under him as first centurion in the Tenth Legion, a man of remarkable valour. On the signal being given: "Follow me," said he, you who have been my comrades (manipulares), and give your inmperator your wonted loyal service. This one battle alone remains; when it is over he will recover his dignity and we our liberty." At the same time, looking at Caesar, he says: "To-day, General, I will give you occasion to thank me alive or dead." Having said this, he ran forward first from the right wing, and about one hundred and twenty picked men of the same cohort, serving as volunteers, followed him.

92: Between the two lines there was only as much space left as was necessary for the charge of each army. But Pompeius had previously ordered his men to await Caesar's attack without moving from their position, and to allow his line to fall into disorder. He is said to have done this on the advice of C. Triarius, in order that the first charge and impetus of the troops might be broken and their line spread out, and that so the Pompeians marshalled in their proper ranks might attack a scattered foe. He hoped, too, that the pila would fall with less effect if the men were kept in their place than if they themselves discharged their missiles (telis) and advanced; also that by having a double distance to run Caesar's soldiers would be breathless and overdone with fatigue. Now this seems to us to have been an irrational act on the part of Pompeius, because there is a certain keenness of spirit and impetuosity implanted by nature in all men which is kindled by the ardour of battle. This feeling it is the duty of commanders not to repress but to foster, nor was it without good reason that the custom was instituted of old that signals should sound in every direction and the whole body of men raise a shout, by which means they thought that the enemy were terrified and their own men stimulated.

93: But when our men on the giving of the signal, had run forward with javelins levelled (cum infestus pilis) and had observed that the Pompeians were not advancing against them, profiting by the experience they had gained in former battles, they spontaneously checked their speed and halted in about the middle of the space, so that they might not approach the foe with their vigour exhausted; and after a brief interval, again renewing their rapid advance, they discharged their pila and quickly drew their swords, according to Caesar's directions. Nor indeed did the Pompeians fail to meet the emergency. For they parried the shower of missiles (tela) and withstood the attack of the legions without breaking their ranks, and after discharging their javelins (pilis) had recourse to their swords. At the same time the horse on Pompeius' left wing, according to orders, charged in a body, and the whole multitude of archers poured forth. Our cavalry, failing to withstand their attack, gradually quitted their position and retired. Pompeius' cavalry pressed forward all the more eagerly, and deploying by squadrons began to surround our lines on their exposed flank. Caesar, observing it, gave the signal to his fourth line, which he had composed of six cohorts (quam instituerat sex cohortium; but the texts actually have "ex cohortium numero"). These advanced rapidly and with colours flying (infestisque signis)  attacked Pompeius' horse with such fury that not one of them stood his ground, and all, wheeling round, not only quitted the position but forthwith in hurried flight made for the highest hills. When these were dislodged all the archers and slingers, left defenceless, without support, were slain. With the same onslaught the cohorts surrounded the left wing, the Pompeians still fighting and continuing their resistance in their lines, and attacked them in the rear.

94: At the same time Caesar ordered the third line, which had been undisturbed and up to that time had retained its position, to advance. So, as they had come up fresh and vigorous in place of the exhausted troops, while others were attacking in the rear, the Pompeians could not hold their ground and turned to flight in mass. Nor was Caesar wrong in thinking that the victory would originate with those cohorts which had been posted opposite the cavalry in the fourth line, as he had himself stated in exhorting his troops; for it was by them that the cavalry was first repulsed, by them that the archers and slingers were slaughtered, by them that the Pompeian force was surrounded on the left and the rout first started. But Pompeius, when he saw his cavalry beaten back and that part of his force in which he had most confidence panic-stricken, mistrusting the rest also, left the field and straightway rode off to the camp. To the centurions whom he had placed on duty at the praetorian gate he exclaimed in a loud voice that the troops might hear: "Protect the camp and defend it carefully if anything goes amiss. I am going round the other gates and encouraging the guards of the camp." Having said this, he betook himself to the general's headquarters, mistrusting his fortunes and yet waiting to see the issue.

95: When the Pompeians were driven in flight within the rampart, Caesar, thinking that no respite should be given them in their terror, urged his men to take advantage of the kindness of fortune and attack the camp. And though fatigued by the great heat, for the action had been prolonged till noon, they nevertheless obeyed his command, with a spirit ready for every toil. The camp was being zealously defended by the cohorts which had been left there on guard, and much more keenly still by the Thracians and barbarian auxiliaries (a Thracibus barbarisque auxiliis). For the soldiers who had fled from the battlefield panic-stricken in spirit and exhausted by fatigue, many of them having thrown away their arms and their military standards, were thinking more of further flight than of the defence of the camp. Nor could those who had planted themselves on the rampart stand up any longer against the multitude of javelins (telorum), but, worn out by wounds, quitted their position, and forthwith all, following the guidance of centurions and military tribunes, fled for refuge to some very lofty hills that stretched up to the camp.

96: [...]  When our men were now circulating within the rampart, Pompeius, procuring a horse and tearing off his insignia as Imperator, flung himself out of the camp by the decuman gate and, putting spurs to his horse, hurried straight off to Larisa. Nor did he halt there, but, coming across a few of his men in flight, with undiminished speed, not stopping his course at night, arrives at the sea with a retinue of thirty horsemen and embarks on board a corn-ship [...]

97: Caesar having got possession of the camp urgently demands of his men not to let slip an opportunity of completing their task through absorption in plunder. Having gained his object, he begins to surround the hill with earthworks. The Pompeians, as the hill had no water supply, distrusting the position, began to withdraw in mass by its ridges towards Larisa. Caesar, observing this, divided his forces and ordered a part of the legions to remain in Pompeius' camp, and sent back part to his own camp; four legions he took with him and began to advance against the Pompeians by a more convenient route, and when he had proceeded four miles drew up his line. On observing this the Pompeians halted on a certain hill. The foot of this was washed by the river. Caesar exhorted his troops, and then, although they were worn out by the continuous toil of a whole day, and night was now coming on, nevertheless cut off the river from the hill by a line of fortification, so that the Pompeians might be unable to get water at night. When this work was concluded the enemy sent a deputation and began to treat of surrender. A few men of the senatorial order who had joined them sought safety in flight at nightfall.

98: At early dawn Caesar ordered all those who had taken up their position on the hill to come down from the higher ground to the plain and to throw down their arms. [...] 

99: In this battle he lost not more than two hundred from the ranks, but about thirty brave centurions. Also Crastinus, whom we have mentioned above, was slain by a sword-stroke in his face while fighting with the utmost bravery. Nor did the remark which he had made when starting out for the fight prove false, for Caesar was of opinion that the valour of Crastinus in that battle had been most remarkable, and judged that he had rendered him a great service. Of the Pompeian army about fifteen thousand appeared to have fallen, but more than twenty-four thousand surrendered, for even the cohorts which had been on garrison duty in the forts surrendered to Sulla; many besides fled to the neighbouring communities. There were brought to Caesar from the battle one hundred and eighty military standards and nine eagles. L. Domitius in his flight from the camp to the mountain was slain by the cavalry, his strength having failed him from fatigue.

Commentary
The numbers I have cited above are those given by Caesar, with no consideration of what other sources may say. Some give figures of c.30,000 Caesarean infantry, which might argue for 8,000 or so light infantry on top of his figure of 22,000 legionaries; but other explanations are possible. Delbruck's argument for c.32,000 legionaries alone can be found here (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MP2k4rx-Q_UC&pg=PA544&lpg=PA544&dq=caesar+pharsalus+32,000&source=bl&ots=BngtsSvb_K&sig=mW88hPk_dclS3zh03tOdErly9ws&hl=en&sa=X&ei=x7hTVeaQNMXW7AbR3ICACQ&ved=0CEUQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=caesar%20pharsalus%2032%2C000&f=false).

There is some uncertainty in the text about the strength of Caesar's fourth line; the surviving text of Caesar does not give a number of cohorts, but it is explicitly given as six cohorts in other accounts. The text of the Civil War is usually restored to give that meaning, by changing "ex cohortium" to "sex cohortium" – see the discussion in more detail at http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1729.msg19623#msg19623

Available secondary articles
Modern accounts and analyses of Pharsalus are numerous; among them, the following modern(-ish) articles easily available on the web may be interesting:

•   B Perrin, "The Crastinus episode at Palaepharsalus", Transactions of the American Philological Association 15 (1884); free JSTOR download from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2935799   

•   B Perrin, "Pharsalia, Pharsalus, Palaepharsalus", The American Journal of Philology Vol. 6, No. 2 (1885); free JSTOR download from http://www.jstor.org/stable/287135

•   Arthur Searle, "Note on the Battle of Pharsalus", Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 18 (1907); free JSTOR download from http://www.jstor.org/stable/310555

•   T Rice Holmes, "The Battle-field of Old Pharsalus", The Classical Quarterly  Vol. 2 (1908); online at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/CQ/2/4/Battlefield_of_Old_Pharsalus*.html

•   J P Postgate, "The Site of the Battle of Pharsalia", Journal of Roman Studies Vol. 12 (1922); online at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/JRS/12/Site_of_Pharsalia*.html

•   William E. Gwatkin, Jr, "Some Reflections on the Battle of Pharsalus", Transactions of the American Philological Association 97 (1956); online at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/TAPA/87/Pharsalus*.html

Couple of things which struck me on re-reading

1)     But in the case of his cavalry he retained his previous custom which we have explained above: since they were many times inferior in number, he gave orders that lightly equipped youths from among the first-rank men (adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis), with arms selected with a view to fleetness (electis ad pernicitatem armis), should go into battle among the cavalry, so that by daily practice they might win experience in this kind of fighting also.

So these men were also drawn from the legions? In which case there might have been two cohorts 'equivalent' of these

2) Reading 88 where Pompey draws up his army. Both sides seem to have put their best legions on the open flank, and the rest of the line (with both armies) doesn't seem to be numbered legions but 'Cohorts'
Now it's possible that Caesar had forgotten the legions on his own side but that strikes me as unlikely. Was it that a lot of the newly raised legions deployed on both sides, perhaps especially Pompey's, were legions in name only, and that men had been raised as cohorts and the cohorts brought together as legions, and the legions were still unsure of themselves and their identity?

3) To sort of support this point, once his 'named' legions go down, Pompey abandons the field, the others might not have had the cohesion to cope with a setback and he knew it.

Jim

Quote from: Jim Webster on May 24, 2015, 06:42:52 PM
Couple of things which struck me on re-reading

1)     But in the case of his cavalry he retained his previous custom which we have explained above: since they were many times inferior in number, he gave orders that lightly equipped youths from among the first-rank men (adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis), with arms selected with a view to fleetness (electis ad pernicitatem armis), should go into battle among the cavalry, so that by daily practice they might win experience in this kind of fighting also.

So these men were also drawn from the legions? In which case there might have been two cohorts 'equivalent' of these

An uncertain number of Caesar's cavalry - 400 of his 1,000? - were his Germans. Would they have had their own supporting infantry with them already? If so he'd have needed to withdraw fewer men from the legions.

Tricky one.
Is Caesar upgrading the others to give them the advantage the Germans obviously had, or is it as much digging back into history to recover a tactic that worked well in the past. Or is it one, but sold as the other  8)

If the Germans had their own infantry with them, then they would technically come from the light infantry pool but as we haven't got a clue how many there were of them, a few hundred Germans is neither here nor there.

But I suppose there's at least a strong cohort's worth of infantry drawn from the legions to add to the cavalry.

But I've been pondering the cohorts where legions aren't mentioned. Is this an artifact of our sources or is it a case that these were raised as cohorts, at some point amalgamated into legion but due to lack of time to build espirit d'corps, the legions had remained nominal. If so you could imagine that it would weaken the line, because cohorts in the second rank might not feel the same obligation to push forward to support the cohorts in the front rank. (for example)

It might make the 'legions' a bit more brittle than we'd otherwise expect

Jim

Quote from: Jim Webster on May 26, 2015, 10:27:31 AMBut I've been pondering the cohorts where legions aren't mentioned. Is this an artifact of our sources or is it a case that these were raised as cohorts, at some point amalgamated into legion but due to lack of time to build espirit d'corps, the legions had remained nominal. If so you could imagine that it would weaken the line, because cohorts in the second rank might not feel the same obligation to push forward to support the cohorts in the front rank. (for example)

It might make the 'legions' a bit more brittle than we'd otherwise expect

We do have Caesar speaking, for example, of 22 cohorts being raised in Cisalpine Gaul (BG VII.65), and the very likely suggestion has been made that it was these very cohorts (or some of them) who became Legio V Alauda; so yes, substantial forces were sometimes raised as "so many cohorts"; but in this case. the legion they eventually became was not noted for fragility.

Quote from: Jim Webster on May 26, 2015, 10:27:31 AM

But I've been pondering the cohorts where legions aren't mentioned. Is this an artifact of our sources or is it a case that these were raised as cohorts, at some point amalgamated into legion but due to lack of time to build espirit d'corps, the legions had remained nominal.

In addition the detail Duncan has mentioned, it would seem that in this period troops were raised as cohorts (cf.Civil War I.15, in which Vibullius Rufus "then proceeded to muster what cohorts he could from the levies ordered by Pompey" and Domitius "raised about twenty cohorts from Alba, the Marsi, the Paeligni and the surrounding districts".

Such cohorts might or might not subsequently be incorporated into legions: Domitius, besieged in Corfinium, wrote to Pompey to say that if not relieved, "he himself and more than thirty cohorts" would be in danger.  Not, we note three legions: I suspect that turning collections of cohorts into legions was the prerogative of the Senatus Populusque Romanus or a consul acting in their name, or even a provinical governor with authority - just minting an eagle and dropping it into the hands of a signifer would not be sufficient: there would also be tribunes and legates to be appointed, ceremonies undertaken and so on and so forth.

Anyone with good knowledge of Roman legal procedure might be able to give a better picture of what was involved in turning a collection of cohorts into actual legions.

Pompey's recruiting officers raised several legions in the east - these seem to have been proper legions in every respect except troop quality, being recently raised from basically unpromising material.  Caesar also had the odd freshly-raised legion,  but seems to have put such troops on garrison duty or detached service: in III.34 he reassembles a legion which had been guarding the coast sends Lucius Cassius Longinus with the newly-raised XXVII Legion and 200 cavalry into Thessaly, although he omits mention of how he fared: we learn from Cassius Dio (XLI.51.2) that Longinus was "disastrously defeated in Thessaly by Scipio and by Sadalus, a Thracian" - Calvinus, with the experienced XI and XII Legions, had done somewhat better, overcoming his opponent in a battle but having to draw off when Pompey's main force arrived (cf. Civil War III.36, which glosses over the reverse suffered by Longinus).

In Italy, Caesar often detaches cohorts from his existing legions to secure territory or to undertake a specific task, e.g. in I.12 Caesar sends Curio with three cohorts from Pisaurum and Ariminium to tackle five cohorts under Thermus at Iguvium.  The three cohorts appear to have been from the XIII Legion at Arimunium, and hence had the advantage of having served together and probably having stood in the same line of battle.  None of Thermus' five recently-raised cohorts had seen service or acted together, and Thermus declined to put matters to the test: he fled and his troops deserted and went home, which underlies that Pompey's levy and cause were not universally popular.

Source Ia:
Caesar, Civil War, III.4

This passage from earlier in Caesar's account, describing Pompey's army before the battles at Dyrrachium, throws more light on the composition of his light infantry and particularly his cavalry:

4: [Pompeius] had made up nine legions of Roman citizens: five from Italy, which he had conveyed across the sea; one of veterans from Cilicia, which, being formed out of two legions, he called Gemella ["the Twin Legion"]; one from Crete and Macedonia out of veteran troops which, when disbanded by their former commanders, had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, for the levying of which the consul Lentulus had arranged. Besides, he had distributed among the legions by way of supplement a large number of men from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus. With these he had mixed men who had served under Antonius. Besides these he was expecting two legions with Scipio from Syria. He had archers from Crete and Lacedaemon, from Pontus and Syria and the other states, to the number of three thousand; also two 600-strong cohorts of slingers, and seven thousand horsemen. Of these Deiotarus had brought six hundred Gauls, and Ariobarzanes five hundred from Cappadocia; Cotys had provided the same number from Thrace and had sent his son Sadalas; from Macedonia there were two hundred under the command of Rhascupolis, a man of marked valour. The young Pompeius had brought with his fleet five hundred of the Gabinian troops from Alexandria, Gauls and Germans, whom A. Gabinius had left there with King Ptolemy on garrison duty. He had collected eight hundred from his own slaves and from his list of herdsmen [ex servis suis pastorumque suorum numero]. Tarcondarius Castor and Domnilaus had provided three hundred from Gallograecia; of these the one had come with his men, the other had sent his son. From Syria two hundred had been sent by Antiochus of Commagene, on whom Pompeius bestowed large rewards, and among them many mounted archers. To these Pompeius had added Dardani and Bessi, partly mercenaries, partly secured by his authority or influence, also Macedonians, Thessalians, and men of other nations and states, and had thus filled up the number stated above.

Commentary

I think this is the most detailed list of Pompey's cavalry that we have, and even so the enumerated contingents only add up to 3,600 of his supposed total of 7,000. Appian's list of auxiliaries (Civil Wars II.71) adds some other nationalities without specifying whether they provided infantry or cavalry; nations such as the Armenians may perhaps account for some of the "missing" cavalry. So may the contingent of young Roman aristocrats implied in some accounts.

Deiotarus' "Galli" and Tarcondarius Castor's "Gallograeci" are both Galatians from Asia Minor, presumably not yet completely united despite the Senate having given Deiotarus the title of King. I wonder if Pompey's "slaves and herdsmen" might be a derogatory way of referring to his "clients" in general. Neither the Dardani nor the Bessi are famous as horsemen, the Bessi being best known for providing fierce mountain infantry, so  these may be additions to the list of Pompey's auxiliaries in general rather than specifically to his cavalry. (Caesar at III.95 mentions Thracians among Pompey's camp-guard at  Pharsalus, so that may perhaps be where these Thracian Bessi ended up).

Edit: There is an article on auxiliary troops in the late Republic at http://www.sfb600.uni-trier.de/filebase/A2/yoshimura.pdf (http://www.sfb600.uni-trier.de/filebase/A2/yoshimura.pdf) which might be useful; it contains a list of princes said in various sources to have assisted Pompey.

I have come to believe that the troops raised at the beginning of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey were hastily raised by cohorts not unlike regiments raised at the beginning of the American Civil War. The cohorts were rapidly raised and quickly sent to join their respective generals. Due to the circumstances, I doubt there was time to organize, train, and officially create legions from those cohorts.

As far as the legality of raising a legion, that's probably a gray area in Roman law. When Caesar became governor of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum he would have been invested by the Senate with imperium, the right to command troops, and auspicia, the right to consult the gods. These powers are granted to any governor to allow them to act on behalf of the state and the Senate. These powers probably gave some authority to Caesar to raise lesions as he did when he raised two new legions to face the Helvetii. I do remember reading somewhere that raising the two new lesions may have exceeded Caesar's authority as governor. But, I don't remember reading anywhere that the Senate ordered Caesar to disband his newly raise legions. He probably would ignored the order anyway and found some justification for his actions.

As far as raising legions and troops during the Civil War, Caesar been declared an outlaw and his legal powers revoked by the Senate. There again, I doubt that Caesar would've let the little problem of being declared an outlaw stand in the way of his raising and designating legions as he needed. After all, the die had been cast.

That's why I think the raising of independent cohorts was a matter of practicality rather than legality.

Source 2
Appian, The Civil Wars

II, 49: On the two commanders' forces, before the Dyrrachium fighting:
Caesar at that time had ten legions of infantry and 10,000 Keltic horse [Kelton hippeis murioi]. Pompey had five legions from Italy, with which he had crossed the Adriatic, and the cavalry belonging to them; also the two surviving legions that had served with Crassus in the Parthian war ... and a certain part of those who had made the incursion into Egypt with Gabinius, making altogether eleven legions of Italian troops and about 7000 horse. He had allies also from Ionia, Macedonia, Peloponnesus, and Boeotia, Cretan archers, Thracian slingers, and Pontic javelin-throwers. He had also some Keltic horse and others from eastern Galatia, together with Commageneans sent by Antiochus, Cilicians, Cappadocians, some from Lesser Armenia, and Pamphylians and Pisidians. Pompey did not intend to use all these for fighting. Some were employed in garrison duty, in building fortifications, and in other service for the Italian soldiers, so that none of the latter should be kept away from the battles. Such were Pompey's land forces.

II, 70-82: The Battle of Pharsalus
70: Since many writers differ as to Caesar's army, I shall follow the most credible Roman authorities, who give the most careful enumeration of the Italian soldiers, as the backbone of the army, but do not make much account of the allied forces or record them exactly, regarding them as mere foreigners and as contributing little to the issue of the day. The army, then, consisted of about 22,000 men and of these about 1000 were cavalry. Pompey had more than double that number, of whom about 7000 were cavalry. Some of the most trustworthy writers say that 70,000 Italian soldiers were engaged in this battle. Others give the smaller number, 60,000. Still others, grossly exaggerating, say 400,000. Of the whole number some say Pompey's forces were half as many again as Caesar's, others that they were two-thirds of the total number engaged. So much doubt is there as to the exact truth. However that may be, each of them placed his chief reliance on his Italian troops. In the way of allied forces Caesar had cavalry from both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, besides some light-armed Greeks ('Ellēnōn d'epeltazōn), consisting of Dolopians, Acarnanians, and Aetolians. Such were Caesar's allies. Pompey had a great number from all the eastern nations, part horse, part foot. From Greece he had Lacedaemonians marshalled by their own kings, and others from Peloponnesus and Boeotians with them. Athenians marched to his aid also, although proclamation had been made that they, being consecrated to the Thesmophoroi, should do no harm to the army of either party. Nevertheless, they wished to share in the glory of the war because this was a contest for the Roman leadership.

71: Besides the Greeks almost all the nations in the circle of the eastern sea sent aid to Pompey: Thracians and Hellespontines and Bithynians and Phrygians and Ionians, Lydians and Pamphylians and Pisidians and Paphlagonians, and Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, the nation of the Hebrews, and their neighbours the Arabs; Cyprians and Rhodians and Cretan slingers [or "and Rhodian and Cretan slingers": "... te kai Rhodioi kai Krētes sphendonētai"], and all the other islanders. Kings and princes were there leading their own troops: Deïotarus, the tetrarch of Galatia, and Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia. Taxiles commanded the Armenians from the hither side of the Euphrates; those from the other side were led by Megabates, the lieutenant of King Artapates. Some other small princes took part with Pompey in the action. It was said that sixty ships from Egypt were contributed to him by the sovereigns of that country, Cleopatra and her brother, who was still a boy. But these did not take part in the battle, nor did any other naval force, but they remained idle at Corcyra. Pompey seems to have acted very foolishly in this respect both in disregarding the fleet, in which he excelled so greatly that he could have deprived the enemy of all the supplies brought to them from abroad, and in risking a battle on land with men exulting in their recent labours, and thirsting like tigers for blood. Although he had been on his guard against them at Dyrrachium, a certain spell seems to have come over him, most opportunely for Caesar, with the result that Pompey's army became light-headed to a degree, taking entire charge of its commander, and rushing into action in a most unworkmanlike way.

72: [Pompey's speech]

73: [Caesar's speech]

74: [continued] "Nor is it difficult for hardy and veteran soldiers to overcome new recruits who are without experience in war, and who, moreover, like boys, spurn the rules of discipline and of obedience to their commander. ... I say these things of his Italian forces only. As for his allies, do not think about them, pay no attention to them, do not fight with them at all. They are Syrian, Phrygian, and Lydian slaves, always ready for flight or servitude. I know very well, and you will presently see, that Pompey himself will not entrust to them any place in the ranks of war. Give your attention to the Italians only, even though those allies come running around you like dogs trying to frighten you. When you have put the enemy to flight let us spare the Italians as being our own kindred, but slaughter the allies in order to strike terror into the others. Before all else, in order that I may know that you are mindful of your promise to choose victory or death, throw down the walls of your camp as you go out to battle and fill up the ditch, so that we may have no place of refuge if we do not conquer, and so that the enemy may see that we have no camp and know that we are compelled to encamp in theirs."

75: Nevertheless, after he had thus spoken Caesar detailed 2,000 of his oldest men to guard the tents. The rest, as they passed out, demolished their fortification in the profoundest silence and filled up the ditch with the debris. When Pompey saw this, although some of his friends thought that it was a preparation for flight, he knew it was an exhibition of daring, and groaned in spirit, to think that they were now coming to grips with wild beasts although they had on their side famine, the best tamer of wild beasts. But there was no drawing back now, when things were balanced on the razor's edge. Wherefore, leaving 4,000 of his Italian troops to guard his camp, Pompey drew up the remainder between the city of Pharsalus and the river Enipeus opposite the place where Caesar was marshalling his forces. Each of them ranged his Italians in front, divided into three lines with a moderate space between them, and placed his cavalry on the wings of each division. Archers and slingers were mingled among all. Thus were the Italian troops disposed, on which each commander placed his chief reliance. The allied forces were marshalled by themselves rather for show than for use. There was much jargon and confusion of tongues among Pompey's auxiliaries. Pompey stationed the Macedonians, Peloponnesians, Boeotians, and Athenians near the Italian legions, as he approved of their good order and quiet behaviour. The rest, as Caesar had anticipated, he ordered to lie in wait by tribes outside of the line of battle, and when the engagement should become close to surround the enemy, to pursue, to do what damage they could, and to plunder Caesar's camp, which was without defences.

76: The centre of Pompey's formation was commanded by his father-in‑law, Scipio, the left wing by Domitius, and the right by Lentulus. Afranius and Pompey guarded the camp. On Caesar's side the commanders were Sulla, Antony, and Domitius. Caesar took his place in the tenth legion, on the right wing, as was his custom. When the enemy saw this they transferred, to face that legion, the best of their horse, in order to surround it if they could, by their superiority of numbers. When Caesar perceived this movement he placed 3,000 of his bravest foot-soldiers in ambush and ordered them, when they should see the enemy trying to flank him, to rise, dart forward, and thrust their spears directly in the faces of the men because, as they were fresh and inexperienced and still in the bloom of youth, they would not endure injury to their faces. Thus they laid their plans against each other, and each commander passed through the ranks of his own troops, attending to what was needful, exhorting his men to courage, and giving them the watchword, which on Caesar's side was "Venus the Victorious," and on Pompey's "Hercules the Invincible."

77: When all was in readiness on both sides they waited for some time in profound silence, hesitating, looking steadfastly at each other, each expecting the other to begin the battle. [...]

78: When they were waiting and looking at each other the day was advancing. All the Italian troops stood motionless in their places, but when Pompey saw that his allied forces were falling into confusion by reason of the delay he feared lest the disorder should spread from them before the beginning of the battle. So he sounded the signal first and Caesar echoed it back. Straightway the trumpets, of which there were many distributed among the divisions of so great a host, aroused the soldiers with their inspiring blasts, and the standard-bearers and officers put themselves in motion and exhorted their men. They all advanced confidently to the encounter, but with stupor and the deepest silence, like men who had had experience in many similar engagements. And now, as they came nearer together, there was first a discharge of arrows and stones. Then, as the cavalry were a little in advance of the infantry, they charged each other. Those of Pompey prevailed and began to outflank the tenth legion. Caesar then gave the signal to the cohorts in ambush and these, starting up suddenly, advanced to meet the cavalry, and with spears (tois dorasin) elevated aimed at the faces of the riders, who could not endure the enemy's savagery, nor the blows on their mouths and eyes, but fled in disorder. Thereupon Caesar's men, who had just now been afraid of being surrounded, fell upon the flank of Pompey's infantry which was denuded of its cavalry supports.

79: When Pompey learned this he ordered his infantry not to advance farther, not to break the line of formation, and not to hurl the javelin, but to open their ranks, bring their spears to rest, and so ward off the onset of the enemy. Some persons praise this order of Pompey as the best in a case where one is attacked in flank, but Caesar criticises it in his letters. He says that the blows are delivered with more force, and that the spirits of the men are raised, by running, while those who stand still lose courage by reason of their immobility and become excellent targets for those charging against them. So, he says, it proved in this case, for the tenth legion, with Caesar himself, surrounded Pompey's left wing, now deprived of cavalry, and assailed it with javelins in flank, where it stood immovable; until, finally, the assailants threw it into disorder, routed it, and this was the beginning of the victory. In the rest of the field slaughter and wounding of all kinds were going on, but no cry came from the scene of carnage, no lamentation from the wounded or the dying, only sighs and groans from those who were falling honourably in their tracks. The allies, who were looking at the battle as at a spectacle, were astonished at the discipline of the combatants. So dumbfounded were they that they did not dare attack Caesar's tents, although they were guarded only by a few old men. Nor did they accomplish anything else, but stood in a kind of stupor.

80: As Pompey's left wing began to give way his men even still retired step by step and in perfect order, but the allies who had not been in the fight, fled with headlong speed, shouting, "We are vanquished," dashed upon their own tents and fortifications as though they had been the enemy's, and pulled down and plundered whatever they could carry away in their flight. Then the rest of Pompey's Italian legions, perceiving the disaster to the left wing, retired slowly at first, in good order, and still resisting as well as they could; but when the enemy, flushed with victory, pressed upon them they turned in flight. Thereupon Caesar, in order that they might not rally, and that this might be the end of the whole war and not of one battle merely, with greater prudence than he had ever shown before, sent heralds everywhere among the ranks to order the victors to spare their own countrymen and to smite only the auxiliaries. The heralds drew near to the retreating enemy and told them to stand still and fear not. As this proclamation was passed from man to man they halted, and the phrase "stand and fear not" began to be passed as a sort of watchword among Pompey's soldiers; for, being Italians, they were clad in the same style as Caesar's men and spoke the same language. Accordingly, the latter passed by them and fell upon the auxiliaries, who were not able to resist, and made a very great slaughter among them.

81: When Pompey saw the retreat of his men he became bereft of his senses and retired at a slow pace to his camp, and when he reached his tent he sat down speechless, resembling Ajax, the son of Telamon, who, they say, suffered in like manner in the midst of his enemies at Troy, being deprived of his senses by some god. Very few of the rest returned to the camp, for Caesar's proclamation caused them to remain unharmed, and as their enemies had passed beyond them they dispersed in groups. As the day was declining Caesar ran hither and thither among his troops and besought them to continue their exertions till they should capture Pompey's camp, telling them that if they allowed the enemy to rally they would be the victors for only a single day, whereas if they should take the enemy's camp they would finish the war with this one blow. He stretched out his hands to them and took the lead in person. Although they were weary in body, the words and example of their commander lightened their spirits. Their success so far, and the hope of capturing the enemy's camp and its contents, excited them; for in the midst of hope and prosperity men feel fatigue least. So they fell upon the camp and assaulted it with the utmost disdain for the defenders. When Pompey learned this he started up from his strange silence, exclaiming, "What! in our very camp?" Having spoken thus he changed his clothing, mounted a horse, and fled with four friends, and did not draw rein until he reached Larissa early the next morning. So Caesar established himself in Pompey's camp as he had promised to do when he was preparing for the battle, and ate Pompey's supper, and the whole army feasted at the enemy's expense.

82: The losses of Italians on each side — for there was no report of the losses of auxiliaries, either because of their multitude or because they were despised — were as follows: in Caesar's army, thirty centurions and 200 legionaries, or, as some authorities have it, 1200; on Pompey's side ten senators, among whom was Lucius Domitius, the same who had been sent to succeed Caesar himself in Gaul, and about forty distinguished knights. Some exaggerating writers put the loss in the remainder of his forces at 25,000, but Asinius Pollio, who was one of Caesar's officers in this battle, records the number of dead Pompeians found as 6000.

Such was the result of the famous battle of Pharsalus. Caesar himself carries off the palm for first and second place by common consent, and with him the tenth legion. The third place is taken by the centurion Crassinius, whom Caesar asked at the beginning of the battle what result he anticipated, and who responded proudly, "We shall conquer, O Caesar, and you will thank me either living or dead." The whole army testifies that he darted through the ranks like one possessed and did many brilliant deeds. When sought for he was found among the dead, and Caesar bestowed military honours on his body and buried it, and erected a special tomb for him near the common burial-place of the others.

Commentary
Appian looks to have used Caesar's own account as a source, since the 22,000 Caesarians of II.70 match Caesar's own figures, and the suggestion that Pompey had twice as many men matches Caesar's figure of 45,000 Pompeians. Appian does seem to have misread Caesar when he suggests that the 1,000 Caesarian horse were included in the figure of 22,000; Caesar says they are additional. (The 10,000 Gallic cavalry of II.49 must be a simple mistake.)

However Appian clearly had other sources as well, who give him the divergent troop numbers he mentions, some quite close to Caesar's figures, but at least one exaggerating to almost Herodotean proportions. At II.82 he mentions one such source, Asinius Pollio.

Appian identifies Caesar's light infantry - "'Ellēnōn d'epeltazōn", "of Greeks serving as peltasts" - though without giving us a number for them, whereas Caesar sees no need to list any such auxiliaries. They were western Greeks, probably recruited locally during the Dyrrachium phase of the campaign or on the march into Thessaly.

Appian's information on Pompey's auxiliaries more or less matches up to what Caesar tells us, though he adds some more nationalities, such as the Armenians. Pompey's "Cretan slingers" at II.71 are a bit of a surprise, but since II.49 gives the more expected Cretan archers (as indeed does Caesar III.4), it seems more likely that Appian's text (or his source) originally listed Rhodian slingers and Cretan archers. (At II.49 he has Thracian slingers, but since Caesar tells us that Pompey had two cohorts of slingers, that need not be a problem.)

Note that Appian gives numbers of men in some cases where Caesar gives numbers of cohorts: Caesar's two-cohort camp-guard becomes 2,000 men; Pompey's seven cohorts become 4,000; Caesar's six(?) cohorts of the fourth line become 3,000 men. We do not know where Appian got these numbers, but clearly he 's not just using a simple multiplier of x men per cohort.

Appian's account of the course of the battle broadly follows Caesar's. He gives the credit for the initial outflanking of the Pompeian line to the Tenth legion, where Caesar himself lays more stress on the fourth line turning on the infantry after defeating the cavalry.

Duncan, thanks for the tip on Appian.

Have you ever run across any details on the eastern forces at Pharsalus? I presume the "Syrian legions" were the troops who survived Carrhae mentioned by Dio in Roman History 40.27 and I see the wiki entry on Syria (Roman province) states three legions.

Specifically, anyone have any idea what type of "Hebrew" forces were at Pharsalus?

I don't recall any information on the Eastern auxiliaries that isn't in Caesar or Appian - except that Lucan in the Pharsalia mentions Arab, Mede and Ituraean archers in Pompey's army. The auxiliaries whom Appian calls to Hebraion genos - which is a bit unusual, I think, Ioudaioi is more common - were presumably from the Kingdom of Judaea, which was then ruled by Antipater (Herod the Great's father) as a client of Pompey. Not long after Pharsalus, he shifted his allegiance to Caesar and contributed 3,000 infantry called hoplitai by Josephus to Mithridates of Pergamon's army that rescued Caesar in Egypt. Given that Alexander Jannaeus' "hundred-killers" fighting Ptolemy Lathyrus about 100 BC are said (again by Josephus) to have bronze-faced thyreoi - and this is the chronologically closest description of Judaean military equipment that I know of - then I reckon the Jewish infantry at Pharsalus are most likely to have been either thyreophoroi or, perhaps less likely, "armed in Roman style".

Not read it yet myself (this week has been manic  :'( ) but Steven James has done something on Pharsalus

https://independent.academia.edu/StevenJames1   

Steven is as usual interesting and innovative, but a bit too formulaic for my tastes.  For example,

Quote
Caesar's auxiliary infantry are listed as being Dolopians, Acarnanians, and Aetolians. With the ratio of
legionaries to auxiliary infantry at 3:1, Caesar's 27,000 legionaries would be accompanied by 9,000 auxiliary infantry.

I don't think that Steven demonstrates in this paper that 1 auxiliary to 3 legionaries was a standard figure at this period; I assume he has done so elsewhere. Even if that is the case, he seems to be taking for granted that actual armies always follow standard regulations. If the Aitolians (etc) had turned up with 10,000 auxiliary infantry, do we think Caesar would have turned some of them away? If on the other hand those states had not offered as many men as were required for the "standard" proportion, how would we know?

Quote
Therefore, Caesar's seven legions at full strength were assigned 1,200 auxiliary infantry (600 archers and 600 slingers)

I don't think the suggestion that these auxiliaries were archers and slingers fits very well with the verb Appian uses - "epeltazōn", literally "being with peltai", or "being peltasts". It's true that Appian does say that:

QuoteArchers and slingers were mingled among all.

implying that both sides had such psiloi mixed with their legionaries; but this is explicitly contradicted by Caesar's statement that Pompey had "all his archers and slingers" with the cavalry "on the left wing", so not much weight can be given to it.

However, there are some useful thoughts in there about the legionary strengths. And Steven also raises a real issue about Pompey's cavalry numbers: Caesar says he had 7,000, but only lists 3,600. I've suggested above that perhaps some of the other nationalities listed by Appian may have provided cavalrymen not included in Caesar's list. Steven suggests that perhaps:

Quotethe missing 3,000 cavalrymen are part of the 5,000 auxiliary infantry that are reported to be stationed behind the cavalry

If he's saying that some of the "cavalry" were in fact serving as infantry, then that sort of fits with another possibility I've been thinking about - that perhaps Caesar simply exaggerated the number of Pompey's horsemen?

Quote from: Duncan Head on December 28, 2015, 11:09:14 PM
Steven is as usual interesting and innovative, but a bit too formulaic for my tastes. 

That puts it very nicely.  Steven is very methodical but seems to assume that Caesar's legions - apart from the IX, which he has at exactly half-strength - would all be at full theoretical TO&E strengths despite having campaigned across the length and breadth of Greece, suffered attrition at Dyrrhachium and generally been understrength when originally loaded to cross over into Greece.

Steven remains convinced that the authorised legion strength more or less from when legions were first invented was 3,600 legionary heavy infantry plus 1,200 integral skirmish types provided by allies - not just Italian allies, but also Numidians, Cretans etc.  Inconsistency with Polybius' or Livy's organisation does not seem to worry him, but the big problem with his proposed organisation is that it becomes very difficult to reconcile with recorded cohort strengths and the Roman order of battle.

Quote
Steven suggests that perhaps:

Quotethe missing 3,000 cavalrymen are part of the 5,000 auxiliary infantry that are reported to be stationed behind the cavalry

If he's saying that some of the "cavalry" were in fact serving as infantry, then that sort of fits with another possibility I've been thinking about - that perhaps Caesar simply exaggerated the number of Pompey's horsemen?

I have wondered about this, although if Caesar were consciously exaggerating, he might be expected to inflate the sizes of the contingents he does detail in order to arrive at his figure of 7,000 cavalry rather than leaving a large and suspicious blank.  One may note that he omits the foot auxiliaries recorded by Appian, which suggests that over-representing or even fully representing Pompey's forces was not necessarily on his mind. 

My own reading of Caeasar's partial arithmetic is that he has listed the Pompeian non-legionary cavalry - if Pompey had 300 cavalry integral to each legion as per tradition, the resultant 3,300 cavalry from 11 legions would pretty much make up the 3,400-trooper shortfall.

To be fair to Steve he has taken men from the IX to bring other legions up to strength. But the problem we have is that we're not sure how accurate the figures for army strength are. If ancient authors have given us their figures based on what they thought full strength units were, then if we use their figures we will discover that they produce full strength units.
We also have the issue of casualties before the battle. Writing afterwards Caesar had reason to exaggerate previous losses. First it would make his victory more glorious, both by shrinking the size of his army, and also exaggerating enemy losses on the field to his losses on the field.

Looking at the Cavalry, was there legionary cavalry in this period? Caesar doesn't appear to have had any otherwise with about 8 legions with 300 per legion that's 2,400 cavalry that doesn't get a mention

With the auxiliaries, I agree that I see no reason why an ally should send exactly enough to fit in with Roman formations. But looking at the way Steve has arranged things, it does leave both armies with a 'dump' to put in 'spare' auxiliaries who aren't needed within the formal formations.

Quote from: Jim Webster on December 29, 2015, 06:19:41 PMLooking at the Cavalry, was there legionary cavalry in this period?

The general belief is that no, there weren't. Caesar never mentions them in either the Gallic or Civil campaigns, and McCall's Cavalry of the Roman Republic sees the last mention of citizen cavalry well before the "Marian reform".

True: then again, we do not get a TO&E for the 'Marian' legion until the early Empire, by which time the legion had 120 integral cavalry and not one trooper more, with any additional cavalry being supplied in the form of separate 512-man alae.  We can of course attempt to retrofit this arrangement into Caesar's period, and assume that his 1,000 Gallic and German cavalry at Pharsalus comprised two such alae, but attempting to shoehorn Pompey's contingents into the system - with the possible exception of his Roman cavalry from Egypt - does not work.

Caesar gives us a few clues in Civil War III.34:

QuoteCaesar having joined Antony's army, and recalled the legion he had left at Oricum to guard the sea-coast, judged it necessary to advance farther into the country, and possess himself of the more distant provinces. At the same time,deputies arrived from Thessaly and Aetolia with assurances of submission from all the states in those parts, provided he would send troops to defend them. Accordingly he despatched L. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, called the twenty-seventh, and two hundred horse, into Thessaly; and C. Calvissius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and some cavalry [pauicisque equitibus = and a few cavalry], into Aetolia; charging them in a particular manner, as those provinces lay the nearest to his camp, that they would take care to furnish him with corn. He likewise ordered Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with the eleventh and twelfth legions, and five hundred horse, to march into Macedonia: for Menedemus, the principal man of that country, having come ambassador to Caesar, had assured him of the affection of the province.

We observe that 700+ cavalry are thus allocated to three and a half legions, with 200-250 cavalry per legion.  While Caesar does not tell us whether they came out of his original 1,000 or were additional to these, what he is telling us is that it still seems to have been customary to send 200-300 cavalry with a legion.

For this reason, I am inclined to suppose that Pompey had recruited approximately 300 cavalry for each of his approximate legions; if so, it neatly makes up 3,300 of the 3,400-horseman deficiency in Caesar's account, as mentioned.  Whether the cavalry were ever actually bundled with the legions as opposed to simply recruited to make up the right numbers seems to me to be a moot point.  Assuming this is what Pompey did, of course: it remains a hypothesis at present.

I suspect that legionary cavalry allocation and Roman cavalry organisation generally were somewhat in flux, particularly as the ongoing Civil War meant that protagonists would to a considerable extent have been governed by what they could get as opposed to what they may have wanted to raise and/or organise.

Interesting your having Caesar allocate a number of allied cavalry per legion is very similar to what Steve has come up with having commanders allocate a number of allied light infantry per legion

Indeed.  The difference seems to be, as far as I can extract from Polybius' Book VI organisation and Caesar's Gallic War II.7.1, II.10.1, II.19.4 and VII.40.5, that while cavalry was allocated on a temporary or enduring basis to legions, missile troops such as Cretans and Numidians were not, but were directly under the C-in-C, often employed as an adjunct to the combined cavalry.  Integral skirmishing capability for the legion was provided by its velites (up to the Marian reforms) and thereafter by integral ferentarii, artillery and/or lanciarii, as far as we (that is, I) can judge.

The early Imperial period saw the Cretans, Numidians etc. being fielded as auxiliary cohorts, which was probably the formalisation of what may then have been the de facto situation.

The problem with Steven's analysis is that he appears to leave out the velites entirely when considering the Polybian legion, and to assume that the various archers and slingers at Pharsalus were an integral part of the legionary strength and organisation as opposed to being allied or co-opted contingents in separate units.  In essence he is substituting them for velites.

I think his basic premise - that Roman Republican organisation was founded on Pythagorean numerical principles - may have validity, but unfortunately his approach seems to centre on crunching the numbers rather than substantiating them, and in the process deciding that Polybius completely misunderstood the Roman legion.  If we have to discard Polybius in order for Steven's system to work, then one or the other must be wrong, and we do not seem to have independent evidence of Polybius' description of the legion of his day being incorrect.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 29, 2015, 08:09:41 PM
True: then again, we do not get a TO&E for the 'Marian' legion until the early Empire, by which time the legion had 120 integral cavalry and not one trooper more

Though Ilkka Syvanne argues for 512 cavalry per Imperial legion  :)

Do his arguments look reasonable (not having seen them)?

I've only noticed it in glancing through the book, haven't read it yet. I do recall he rejects Josephus' 120 as this is merely described as the number of horsemen accompanying a legion on the march, which, I S suggests, need not be the whole strength, others being part of the army's advance guard, flank pickets, etc. But I simply don't agree with his understanding of the Greek. In B.J. 3.120, "eipeto d'auto to idion tou taymatos ippikon: idioi gar hekastou taymatos eikosi pros tois hekaton hippeis" does seem to me to mean, as in the translation at Perseus, that there were 120 cavalry who belonged to each legion.

Quote from: Duncan Head on December 30, 2015, 10:44:10 PM

... I simply don't agree with his understanding of the Greek. In B.J. 3.120, "eipeto d'auto to idion tou taymatos ippikon: idioi gar hekastou taymatos eikosi pros tois hekaton hippeis" does seem to me to mean, as in the translation at Perseus, that there were 120 cavalry who belonged to each legion.

Yes, Josephus' use of idion/idioi does look as if he is specifying the legion's 120-strong 'tagma' of cavalry as an integral entitiy from an organisational standpoint.  Given that he is describing, in some detail, a Roman force on the march, were there additional outriders of specifically legionary cavalry, I for one would have expected him to mention them.

And would a legion actually need more than 120 cavalry to do its messaging and escorting if it could also when needed be accompanied by an ala of 'real' cavalry, perhaps as part of a larger force?  I suspect Ilkka is off on another of his flights of fancy here, but await your judgement when you do get around to reading through the relevant bit.

As a final thought, I do not recall any excavations of Roman marching camps giving rise to suggestions that Josephus under-represented the legion's cavalry component.

Right, having now got to that bit in the book, Syvanne says (p.8 )

QuoteAccording to John Lydus (De Magistr. I.16), when Marius formed his legions the legions consisted of 6,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, and this seems to have been the model according to which Augustus formed his imperial legions. ... In most cases, the figure of 600 horsemen probably included the servants attached to the cavalry. My educated guess is that the regular fighting (paper) strength of the cavalry detachment was an ala of 512 horsemen plus the supernumerarii and servants(5).

(Fn.5: The usual mistake is to assign legions only 120 (=128) horsemen on the basis of Josephus' statement that 120 horsemen accompanied each legion in the marching formation in 67 AD. In truth, Josephus does not really say anything about the size of the actual cavalry component of each legion, but refers only to the horsemen accompanying each legion in the marching formation. Josephus does state that there were other horsemen in the front and rear and it is easy to see that when one includes these in the numbers the likely strength of the legionary cavalry was still the traditional 512 horsemen. I have discussed these things in three research papers, which will be published later.)

However, it is possible that there were actually three different types of cavalry units attached to the legion in the third century. Ps.-Hyginus (5.30) doesn't include any equites legionis for the three legions, but mentions 1,600 vexillari legionum. This figure is consistent with the 500-man turmae of mounted archers, 500-man vexillationes, and 600-man alae mentioned by John Lydus (De Magistr. I.46). Hence the possibility that the legion could have included three different types of cavalry detachments. The only real anomaly is Vegetius who claims that each legion was accompanied by an even greater number of horsemen...

The relevance for the Pharsalus discussion is of course the suggestion that Marius' legions had an integral 600-man cavalry component, which presumably means that the legions at Pharsalus would have (or at least, according to a paper organisation that may or may not have fully applied during civil war, should have) a similar component. But relying on John Lydus, really?

Ioannes Lydus, or John the Lydian, wrote De Magistratibus Populi Romani in Greek (the original title is Peri Archon tes Romaion Politeias) in the 6th century. There is a French translation available at http://bcs.fltr.ucl.ac.be/Lydus/LydTrI.html; the Greek original in a pdf of a 19th-century edition is available from http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/04z/z_0490-0578__Joannes_Lydus_Laurentius__De_Magistratibus_Populi_Romani_%28CSHB_%29__GR.pdf.html I know of no English version.

At I.16, Lydus says that Romulus added 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from the Sabines to his original Roman force of the same strength,

Quote... so there were 6,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. This number was kept up later by Marius, when he created the so-called legions (which means "picked troops").

At I.46, we are told that the soldiers were organised into units, at a date in the 4th century BC:

Quote
so there were units of 300 men with shields (aspidiotai) called "cohorts", alae (that is, ilai) of 600 horsemen, vexillations of 500 horsemen, turmae of 500 mounted archers (that's in the French edition; Niebuhr's 19th-century text has just "vexillations of 500  mounted archers". But the longer version fits the following list) and legions formed of 6,000 infantry and the cavalry cited above.

The subdivisions of the legion are:
alae of 600 cavalry
vexillationes of 500 cavalry
turmae of 500 horse-archers
legiones of  6000 infantry
...

Lydus clearly has some dodgy ideas about chronology, and some of his unit strengths look so unlikely - cohorts of 300 infantry? would a unit of 500 horsemen ever be called a turma? - that it does not seem safe to accept any of them.

And with that finally completed, I can return to New Year's Eve. Happy New Year, all.

Incidentally here (http://americansocietyofarmscollectors.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Roman-Legionary-horsemen-arms-armor-and-tactical-role-B060_Pavkovic.pdf) is a thesis on the Roman legionary cavalry which just about sums up the "orthodox" view - he seems to take the number of 120 more or less for granted.

From what he says about Inchtuthil, the fortress archaeology does not seem to provide a clear answer as to the numbers of horsemen catered for in legionary camps - though it does look as if you might have trouble fitting 500 in.

Edit: Sorry,wrong link - same author and subject, different paper. I was looking for the U of Hawaii PhD dissertation "The Legionary Horsemen: an essay on the equites legionis and equites promoti". Can't find that online any more.

Thanks, Duncan: it seems reasonably safe to assume that Josephus may have been a better source than Lydus, not least because he was a contemporary, and that Lydus' cohort/ala strengths are to say the least questionable, at least when trying to infer what a 1st century BC (or AD) legion may have fielded.

Curiously enough, Polybius XI.23.1, with its three-maniple 'koortis', suggests a cohort of about 300 men (the three maniples presumably being 2x120 and 1x60), but this is a singular instance which is at variance with later cohort strengths, e.g. in Vegetius.  I also suspect that the troops in 'cohorts' at Ilipa were not legionaries as such but rather extraordinarii, and three maniples of 120 would give a 'koortis' of 360, while three such 'cohorts' would add up to 1,080 men, which is close enough to the 1,000-ish extraordinarii we would expect from a 5,000-ish man Italian allied infantry formation of the Punic Wars.  Lydus might conceivably have picked this up from somewhere and mistaken it for the norm - at least, that is my conjecture.


We can probably stick with the traditional Josephus-noted figure of 120 cavalry for the Early Imperial legion, whether they were messengers, scouts, bodyguards for the legate or all three.  Exactly how much cavalry would have been allocated/assigned to a 1st century BC legion is another question, and it is noteworthy that Caesar tends to use cavalry as a separate arm.  In the 54 BC rebellion none of the overwintering legions appear to have any cavalry whatsoever, and Caesar is in the habit of drawing on the Gallic tribes for his cavalry.  However the cavalry/infantry ratio, where he mentions this, might allow some provisional conclusions.

In BG V.2.4 Caesar takes four legions 'expeditis' and 800 cavalry on his punitive expedition against the Treveri.  This is 200 cavalry per legion, one of our traditional Livian/Polybian allocations, or at least ratios.  In I.15.1 4,000 cavalry raised from Narbonensis and Gallic allies accompany his five legions (at least in I.10.3 he has five), which is about 800 cavalry per legion, and the same number are raised or gathered prior to the second invasion of Britain, but Caesar leaves 2,000 with Labienus' three legions while taking 2,000 with his five, thus providing 400 cavalry per legion for his invasion force.  In short, where Caesar is concerned there seems to be no fixed legionary cavalry allowance, but from incidental mentions in the Gallic War and Civil War, it looks as if he tends to allocate at least 200 cavalry per legion, or at least keep cavalry amounting to at least this total, and sometimes considerably more than that.


I would suggest this reflects standard 1st century BC Roman practice.  Unfortunately there is not a lot of additional material on this point: Sallust tends to avoid mentioning army strengths, although he does note in Jugurtha 96 that while Marius was besieging a hill stronghold on the Mauretanian border Sulla arrived with a large body of cavalry raised from Latins and allies.  This is in addition to the cavalry Marius has in Jugurthan War 91, with which he captures Capsa in a coup de main.  It might be possible to infer from this that Marius already had an allocation of legionary cavalry and Sulla's contingent was a bonus, and draw a thin and shaky thread across to 48 BC and suggest that Pompey's legions each had a cavalry contingent assigned and the extraneous contingents named by Caesar formed a similar 'bonus cavalry group'.  This in turn would suggest that the reason Caesar does not detail c.3,400 of the c.7,000 Pompeian cavalry at Pharsalus is because they were legionary cavalry, or at least cavalry attached to legions at the rate of 300 per legion.  Scipio in Civil War III.31.3 raises 'legions and cavalry' in Syria, but I do not recall Syrians (as opposed to Commagenians) featuring among the named Pompeian cavalry contingents, which might be an indication that at least some of Pompey's cavalry were integral legion contingents in the old style.

Anyway, the thought is there for those who may wish to make use of it.

I cannot see why Caesar would miss mentioning legionary cavalry. After all, given that he didn't have any, it's another example of how his understrength legions managed against the odds.
Also as he was supposed to be sparing Italians but not allies, you'd have thought he'd have mentioned how he managed to spare them

I don't say there wasn't 'legionary' cavalry on the Pompeian side, it's just that using them to fill a 'gap' doesn't provide me with convincing evidence for their existence.

Firstly where is Pompey going to get enough wealthy Italians to fill their ranks, and if he used allies as he did with the light infantry, they'd have been mentioned along with the infantry

Jim

Quote from: Jim Webster on January 01, 2016, 09:42:37 PM
Firstly where is Pompey going to get enough wealthy Italians to fill their ranks

We did discuss in the other thread - http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1729.0 - that the stabbing-in-the-faces anecdote might imply that some of the cavalry were Roman aristocrats. It doesn't give us any idea of numbers, but they might make up some of  the shortfall.

While the cavalry being raised in Syria as per Civil War III.31.3 are unlikely to consist of Roman aristocrats, they are by no means the majority and Pompey was followed to Greece by quite a swarm of senatorial types.  One might expect the latter's extended families to bring along numerous equites of their acquaintance.

Quote from: Jim Webster on January 01, 2016, 09:42:37 PM
I cannot see why Caesar would miss mentioning legionary cavalry.

Perhaps because they would have been taken for granted by his contemporary readership/audience, whereas Pompey's mounted ex-slaves, Thracian cavalry and Commagenian horse archers would not?  It may be that a contemporary Roman would see it as: oh, he had the opposing legionary cavalry to cope with, but in addition there are all these barbarians.

Besides, it might just not have suited Caesar's image to state: oh, by the way, lots of the best and brightest of the Roman nobility were lined up against me, serving with Pompey's legionary cavalry.  I encouraged my legionaries to give them gruesome facial mutilations just to show what I thought of these scions of Rome.  Some things are best left unsaid for a contemporary audience.

What I meant about Caesar not mentioning Legionary cavalry is that if they were normal, why didn't he mention the fact that he didn't have any?
Even if only on the lines of, 'In my army well born young men are happy to fight in the ranks with the rest of the Romans, rather than pratting about on horses so they can run away more easily with the orientals'

Jim

Quote from: Duncan Head on January 01, 2016, 11:08:47 PM
We did discuss in the other thread - http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1729.0 - that the stabbing-in-the-faces anecdote might imply that some of the cavalry were Roman aristocrats. It doesn't give us any idea of numbers, but they might make up some of  the shortfall.

Tangentially, the weird thing about said anecdote is the implicit assumption that people who aren't vain young aristocrats wouldn't flinch from a stab to the face. Presumably it must've originated as some sort of macabre joke.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 02, 2016, 10:28:15 PM

Quote from: Duncan Head on January 01, 2016, 11:08:47 PM
We did discuss in the other thread - http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1729.0 - that the stabbing-in-the-faces anecdote might imply that some of the cavalry were Roman aristocrats. It doesn't give us any idea of numbers, but they might make up some of  the shortfall.

Tangentially, the weird thing about said anecdote is the implicit assumption that people who aren't vain young aristocrats wouldn't flinch from a stab to the face. Presumably it must've originated as some sort of macabre joke.

perhaps with a suggestion that they were a lot of 'pretty boys'?

Quote from: Jim Webster on January 02, 2016, 01:07:29 PM
What I meant about Caesar not mentioning Legionary cavalry is that if they were normal, why didn't he mention the fact that he didn't have any?
Even if only on the lines of, 'In my army well born young men are happy to fight in the ranks with the rest of the Romans, rather than pratting about on horses so they can run away more easily with the orientals'

Well ... would it be worth his drawing people's attention to the following:

1) Embarrassingly few equites-rank citizens showed up on my side so I would have been stuffed trying to make units out of the few I had (my being the main man of the Populares tends to put off men of social rank more akin to the Optimates).

2) In Gaul I concluded that Roman cavalry is not worth its weight in horsemeat and I actually much prefer Gauls and Germans.

3) I also concluded that the time-honoured system of having 200-300 cavalry assigned to each legion is grossly inefficient and prefer to keep my cavalry as a C-in-C's plaything, although when sending out legions on detachment I give them the requisite cavalry allowance because they do need some (as I learned in Britain in 55 BC).

Granted that "Look at me, I won even without legionary cavalry!" would be another point of self-glorification, but having already stated that he had a mere 1,000 cavalry to face Pompey's 7,000 he probably felt he did not need to spell things out further.  That at least would be my interpretation of his handling of this particular point.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 02, 2016, 10:28:15 PM

Quote from: Duncan Head on January 01, 2016, 11:08:47 PM
We did discuss in the other thread - http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1729.0 - that the stabbing-in-the-faces anecdote might imply that some of the cavalry were Roman aristocrats. It doesn't give us any idea of numbers, but they might make up some of  the shortfall.

Tangentially, the weird thing about said anecdote is the implicit assumption that people who aren't vain young aristocrats wouldn't flinch from a stab to the face. Presumably it must've originated as some sort of macabre joke.

It probably originated in Caesar's reading of Alexander's battles and campaigns, because Alex encouraged his Companions to aim for the face.  My thinking is that Caesar saw the value of this approach as a means of taking the opponent's attention off what he was doing, but also probably knew from experience that veterans in Roman helmets do not necessarily duck or dodge a blow to the face - by way of illustration, his favourite centurion Crastinus took a sword-stroke through the mouth, one which proved fatal.  He may also have known from experience (remembering his bisexual reputation) that good-looking young men of high birth were quite vain about their looks and, if inexperienced in war, would also tend to focus on what the foe could do unto them rather than what they could do to the foe.

So as a battlefield technique used against young aristocratic opponents, stabbing at the face would be quite effective at putting the foe off his stroke and making him wish to be elsewhere.  Tough-as-old-boots legionaries would be less impressed and probably quite prepared to accept a whack on the cheek-piece and another facial scar as the price of killing an opponent.

Source 3
Frontinus, Stratagems II.3.22

In the battle against Caesar at Old Pharsalus, Gnaeus Pompey drew up three lines of battle, each one ten men deep, stationing on the wings and in the centre the legions upon whose prowess he could most safely rely, and filling the spaces between these with raw recruits. On the right flank he placed six hundred horsemen, along the Enipeus River, which with its channel and deposits had made the locality impassable; the rest of the cavalry he stationed on the left, together with the auxiliary troops, that from this quarter he might envelop the troops of Caesar.

Against these dispositions, Gaius Caesar also drew up a triple line, placing his legions in front and resting his left flank on marshes in order to avoid envelopment. On the right he placed his cavalry, among whom he distributed the fleetest of his foot-soldiers, men trained in cavalry fighting. Then he held in reserve six cohorts for emergencies, placing them obliquely on the right, from which quarter he was expecting an attack of the enemy's cavalry. No circumstance contributed more than this to Caesar's victory on that day; for as soon as Pompey's cavalry poured forth, these cohorts routed it by an unexpected onset, and delivered it up to the rest of the troops for slaughter.

Commentary
This brief account is notable for a few points.

First, note the name for the battle: "at Old Pharsalus", Palaepharsali.

Second, while Caesar says that Pompey put all his cavalry on his left, and Appian gives us the literary convention that there were cavalry "on the wings of each division", Frontinus specifies 600 cavalry on Pompey's right, which was covered by the "channel and deposits" of the river Enipeus, and all the rest on the open left. It seems unlikely that these 600 had much to do on that flank. He goes on to mention marshes covering Caesar's left, probably the same as the river's "deposits" mentioned earlier.

Third, Frontinus specifies the depth of Pompey's legionary lines as ten ranks. This appears to be deeper than usual Roman formations, and is no doubt explained by his great numerical advantage in infantry.

This allows us a tentative check of Pompey's infantry frontage: 45,000/30 = 1,500 men and hence 1,500 yards.  Each of his eleven legions would cover 1,500/11 = c.136 yards rather than the usual 200.

Caesar would have matched frontages as best he could; given that he had the equivalent of seven understrength legions, each would presumably cover the customary 200 yards for a 1,400-yard frontage, while (my assumption) the double-sized first cohort of the X Legion, about 480-500 men strong including Crastinus and his 120, would cover the remaining 100 yards.  This would tie in with Caesar having six cohorts rather than seven in his surprise anti-cavalry force in the 'fourth line'.

Seven legions averaging c.3,150 men per legion but each deducting a c.500-man double cohort would have a depth of c.2,650/200 or about thirteen men.  This suggests five or six men in each of the first two lines and not very many at all in the third.  Caesar has Pompey's weary infantry fold when Caesar's third line starts to advance, but unless it was directly backed by the Dolopians, Acarnanians, and Ætolians Appian ascribes to Caesar (Civil Wars II.70) it would have been a very insubstantial line indeed.

My best guess is that the first and second lines in Caesar's army would each have been five deep.  This would allow the third line to be three deep, and if there were some Greek allies in unspecified numbers lined up behind them it would have enhanced their appearance or at least apparent depth.  If not, three deep is still just enough for a credible Roman veteran infantry line: Scipio's triarii at Ilipa may have fought at this depth.

Source 4
Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (Lucan) Bellum Civile or Pharsalia, Book VII, starting line 214. Based on the 1905 Ridley  translation at the Perseus project, with some minor alterations to make the vocabulary closer to the Latin (pilum restored for spear, cohort for company, etc):

Lines 214-232: The Pompeian deployment
Reflected from their arms, th' opposing sun
Filled all the slope with radiance as they marched
In ordered ranks to that ill-fated fight,
And stood arranged for battle. On the left
Thou, Lentulus, hadst charge; two legions there,
The fourth, and bravest of them all, the first:
While on the right, Domitius, ever staunch,
Though fates be adverse, stood: in middle line
The hardy soldiers from Cilician lands,
In Scipio's care; their chief in Libyan days,
To-day their comrade.  By Enipeus' pools
And by the rivulets, the mountain cohort (montana cohors)
Of Cappadocia, and loose of rein
Your cavalry (eques), Pontus: on the firmer ground
Galatia's tetrarchs and the greater kings;
And all the purple-robed, the slaves of Rome.
Numidian hordes were there from Libyan shores,
There Creta's host and Ituraeans found
Full space to wing their arrows; there the tribes
From brave Iberia clashed their shields (cetras), and there
Gaul stood arrayed against her ancient foe.

Commentary
Lucan gives Lentulus legions I and IV on the left of Pompey's line, whereas Caear himself says that the legions on the left were I and III. In addition he puts the legion from Cilicia in the centre, whereas Caesar puts it on the right.

Lucan locates Pontic cavalry and a cohort of Cappadocian infantry by the marshy bank of the Enipeus, on the Pompeian right. As seen above, Frontinus says there were 600 horse on this flank, and this reference could identify those horsemen. Oddly, though, Caesar himself lists Cappadocian cavalry and Pontic infantry (archers) among Pompey's forces, not vice versa as here. The Pharsalia is not a contemporary source, but it's 1st century AD so not all that much later – I don't see any compelling reason to reject Lucan's identifications, though some sort of confusion between the "Greater Cappadocian" kingdom and its neighbour "Pontic Cappadocia" cannot entirely be ruled out.

The Ituraeans may be the "archers from Syria", or some of them, in Caesar's own list of Pompey's auxiliaries. Two years after Pharsalus, Caesar himself was using "sagittariis ... Ityreis, Syris et cuiusque generis" in Africa – quite possibly some of the very same men who had served Pompey.

Note also the mention of Numidians and Iberian Spanish with caetra  bucklers somewhere with Pompey's other auxiliaries: such troops could have arrived with the Roman cohorts that Afranius brought over from Spain. Either nation could have provided cavalry or light infantry.

Lines 460-475: Caesar advances
With swift advance
They seize the space that yet delays the fates
Till short the span dividing. Then they gaze
For one short moment where may fall the pilum,
What hand may deal their death, what monstrous task
Soon shall be theirs; and all in arms they see,
In reach of stroke, their brothers and their sires
With front opposing; yet to yield their ground
It pleased them not. But all the host was dumb
With horror; cold upon each loving heart,
Awe-struck, the life-blood pressed; and all the cohorts held
With arms outstretched their pila for a time,
Poised yet unthrown. Now may th' avenging gods
Allot thee, Crastinus, not such a death
As all men else do suffer! In the tomb
May'st thou have feeling and remembrance still!
For thine the hand that first flung forth the dart,
Which stained with Roman blood Thessalia's earth.
Madman! To speed thy lance when Caesar's self
Still held his hand!

Commentary
Lucan suggests that the Caesarian army advanced, but that the Roman troops were reluctant to spill their fellow-citizens' blood until Crastinus, the centurion whose deeds are mentioned in Caesar's own account, struck the first blow.

Lines 475-505: The infantry lines clash
Then from the clarions broke
The strident summons, and the trumpets blared
Responsive signal.
....
Unnumbered missiles they hurl, with prayers diverse;
Some hope to wound: others, in secret, yearn
For hands still innocent. Chance rules supreme,
And wayward Fortune upon whom she wills
Makes fall the guilt. Yet, for the hatred bred
By civil war suffices spear nor lance,
Urged on their flight afar: the hand must grip
The sword and drive it to the foeman's heart.
But while Pompeius' ranks, shield wedged to shield,
Were ranged in dense array, and scarce had space
To draw the blade, came rushing at the charge
Full on the central column Caesar's host,
Mad for the battle. Man nor arms could stay
The crash of onset, and the furious sword
Clove through the stubborn panoply to the flesh,
There only stayed. One army struck-their foes
Struck not in answer; Magnus' swords were cold,
But Caesar's reeked with slaughter and with guilt.
Nor Fortune lingered, but decreed the doom
Which swept the ruins of a world away.

Commentary
Lucan's implication that the Caesarians struck and their opponents were cut down without replying is hardly plausible, but his sympathies are clear!

Lines 506-520: The Pompeian auxiliaries attack
Soon as withdrawn from all the spacious plain,
Pompeius' horse was ranged upon the flanks;
Passed through the outer maniples, the lighter armed
Of all the nations joined the central strife,
With divers weapons armed, but all for blood
Of Rome athirst: then blazing torches flew,
Arrows and stones, and ponderous sling-bullets
Molten by speed of passage through the air.
There Ituraean archers, Medes and Arabs
Winged forth their shafts unaimed, till all the sky
Grew dark with missiles hurled; and from the night
Brooding above, Death struck his victims down.
Guiltless such blow, while all the crime was heaped
Upon the Roman pilum.

Commentary
Medes and Arabs join the Ituraeans in the list of Pompey's missile-armed auxiliaries but their shooting is depicted as less decisive than the weapons of Roman infantry.

Lines 521-535: Caesar's decisive blow
In line oblique
Behind the standards Caesar in reserve
Had placed some cohorts, in fear
The foremost ranks might waver. These at his word,
No cornu sounding, break upon the ranks
Of Magnus' horsemen where they rode at large
Flanking the battle. They, unshamed of fear
And careless of the fray, when first a steed
Pierced through by iron spurned with sounding hoof
The temples of his rider, turned the rein,
And through their comrades spurring from the field
In panic, proved that not with warring Rome
Barbarians may grapple. Then arose
Immeasurable carnage: here the sword,
There stood the victim, and the victor's arm
Wearied of slaughter.

Commentary
The defeated cavalry are depicted as foreigners, Pompey's Italian herdsmen and any other Roman cavalry being ignored.

Lucan goes on (not quoted here) to mourn the great shedding of Roman blood.