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We read in reconstructions of battles that army A fought army B for perhaps hours.  For some people, this is envisaged as a continuous piece of action, with troops constantly engaged.  To others, there a phases of strenuous action punctuated either by contact breaks or less fully committed combat, like missile exchange.  This division can cause considerable passions.  But what do we know?  What do period sources (classical through medieval) tell us?  What about modern experience of human endurance? 

A few thoughts.

It may also be worth bearing in mind formation depths and tactical deployment, e.g. how easy is it to disengage two formations each sixteen deep, and are relief lines (as per the Roman system) of any use if both sides are to take breaks from the action?  There is also the matter that unless exhaustion or abstention is mutual and simultaneous, one side is going to be very much inclined to press its new-found advantage.

Further considerations involve the differing capabilities and fighting styles of infantry and cavalry.  Cavalry fights by their nature tend to be short, sharp and, if a swift decision is not reached, continue on a try-and-try-again basis.  Infantry tend to close and fight to a decision as opposed to bouncing in and out of contact unless a moving assailant is repeatedly repelled by a non-moving defender or both sides consist of skirmish-type troops.

Belief that fighting must have been intermittent seems to rest largely on the assumption that human endurance will not sustain more than a few minutes of combat at a time.  This leads to the question: what level and manner human endurance is relevant to the period and armies in question?  The near-exhaustion of frequently desk-bound re-enactors after a few minutes' exercise or the day-long running ability of the Zulu warrior?  Perhaps the entire spectrum between the two, as men and armies went to war in differing states of fitness.

Paragons of battle were, for much of their history, the Romans.  Of these, we are told by Josephus:

Quote"NOW here one cannot but admire at the precaution of the Romans, in providing themselves of such household servants, as might not only serve at other times for the common offices of life, but might also be of advantage to them in their wars. And, indeed, if any one does but attend to the other parts of their military discipline, he will be forced to confess that their obtaining so large a dominion hath been the acquisition of their valor, and not the bare gift of fortune; for they do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they then put their hands first into motion, while they avoided so to do in times of peace; but, as if their weapons did always cling to them, they have never any truce from warlike exercises; nor do they stay till times of war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises differ not at all from the real use of their arms, but every soldier is every day exercised, and that with great diligence, as if it were in time of war, which is the reason why they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; for neither can any disorder remove them from their usual regularity, nor can fear affright them out of it, nor can labor tire them; which firmness of conduct makes them always to overcome those that have not the same firmness; nor would he be mistaken that should call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their battles bloody exercises.[/i]" - Jewish War III.5.1

In other words, keep your men fit and they will bear the fatigue of battle for however long it takes.

They were not always quite so professionally dedicated, but from early times they did have a system for coping with the fatigue of battle.  In 487 BC, the Consul Gaius Aquillius Tuscus led an army against the Hernici.  Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes the battle.

Quote"Aquilius, one of the consuls, finding the army of the Hernicans waiting for him in the country of the Praenestines, encamped as near to them as he could, at a distance of a little more than two hundred stades from Rome. The second day after he had pitched his camp the Hernicans came out of their camp into the plain in order of battle and gave the signal for combat; whereupon Aquilius also marched out to meet them with his army duly drawn up and disposed in their several divisions. 2 When they drew near to one another, they uttered their war-cries and ran to the encounter; and first to engage were the light-armed men, who, fighting with javelins, arrows, and stones from their slings, gave one another many wounds. Next, horsemen clashed with horsemen, charging in troops, and infantry with infantry, fighting by cohorts. Then there was a glorious struggle as both armies fought stubbornly; and for a long time they stood firm, neither side yielding to the other the ground where they were posted. At length the Romans' line began to be in distress, this being the first occasion in a long time that they had been forced to engaged in war. 3 Aquilius, observing this, ordered that the troops which were still fresh and were being reserved for this very purpose should come up to reinforce the parts of the line that were in distress and that the men who were wounded and exhausted should retire to the rear. The Hernicans, learning that their troops were being shifted, imagined that the Romans were beginning flight; and encouraging one another and closing their ranks, they fell upon those parts of the enemy's army that were in motion, and the fresh troops of the Romans received their onset. Thus once more, as both sides fought stubbornly, there was a strenuous battle all over again; for the ranks of the Hernicans were also continually reinforced with fresh troops sent up by their generals to the parts of the line that were in distress. 4 At length, late in the afternoon, the consul, encouraging the horsemen now at least to acquit themselves as brave men, led the squadron in a charge at the enemy's right wing. This, after resisting them for a short time, fell back, and a great slaughter ensued. While the Hernicans' right wing was now in difficulties and no longer keeping its ranks, their left still held out and was superior to the Romans' right; but in a short time this too gave way." - Bibliotechia Historia VIII.5.1-4

The Romans won the battle.  A point worthy of note is that the Roman and Hernici infantry did not pause for a break when exhaustion set in, but the exhausted troops were replaced by subunits from the second line.

Continuous combat seems to have been the norm for the classical era.  At Leuctra in 371 BC, the Theban phalanx, fifty deep pushed their twelve-deep Spartan opponents all the way back to the latter's camp following a spirited fight over the body of Cleombrotus, the Spartan king, who fell early in the action.  Other hoplite fights give the impression of continuity throughout, as do Alexander's battles against the Persians, although the latter are often over rather sooner than their classical counterparts elsewhere, or at least seem to be.

Fast-forwarding beyond our period but to a more or less technologically comparable culture, prior to Shaka, the Bantu way of war involved primarily skirmishing and discontinuous combat.  Shaka revised the way it was done to emphasise close action and continuous combat, and this gave him a decisive edge over his tribal opponents.  He took care to toughen his warriors so they could endure the fatigue of travel and combat, unlike his opponents, who still fought battles in a come-as-you-are fashion.  His career is a possible microcosm of the developing art of war around the northern Mediterranean, in that tribal skirmishing of the Otzi variety was superseded by close combat of the Trojan War variety and durability gave fitter troops a combat edge, allowing them to turn the increasing fatigue of their foes into casualties and collapse, being able to press them when they sought to break off and discontinue action.

We should perhaps note the existence of differing styles of combat: the skirmishing of more primitive tribesmen, the hit-and-run style of Spanish tribes and the full-blooded charge of Galatians all permit or inhibit a greater or lesser degree of individual and group ability to duck out of combat when exhausted.  Loose groups can pull out for a breather when things get tiring; close formations cannot, or at least not easily.  Formation and combat style need to be considered when quoting examples or drawing conclusions, as not every example is universally applicable.

Lecture done. :)  Anyone for Agincourt?

I suspect also that (and this is probably implied by what Patrick posted) that it may also relate to psychological endurance, i.e. combat stress.  Modern writers do talk about the need for reserves without ever making clear if this is related to endurance.  Not a helpful answer but the best I have.

I think there is room for both interpretations. It seems to me Caesar supports the idea of lulls in combat at times. Ilerda, for example (Civil War, 1.45+), which is described as close combat including the exchanging of lines and relief of exhausted and wounded troops but seems to have been a mixture of melee and missile fire, ended by a charge from Caesar's men who, having spent all their missiles, draw swords, charge the enemy on the high ground, and push them back towards the town. 

In the battle against the Helvetii there appear to be periods without continuous hand-to-hand combat. The Romans throw pila, draw swords and charge, the Helvetii fall back, the Romans follow up but are outflanked, the Helvetii who were falling back now return with a charge (Gallic War, 1.24+).

The fight against the Nervii also implies periods of lower and higher intensity fighting (Gallic War 2.19+)

I'm sure there's more, but I don't have time to look at the moment.

Edit: sorry, those links didn't want to work! Hopefully you can navigate from this one: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Caesar/home.html

It might be to the point to examine the nature of infantry melee combat in the pre-gunpowder era. I suspect that combat was neither the all-out wild slash-and-jab sequence of Hollywood choreography nor a quick flurry followed by a mutual break for elevenses.

I see it more as a wary sparring, helped by the  file system of the infantry line. An infantryman leader in his file faces his opposite number in the enemy file. After some spear-jabbing or sword-probing one of the contestants feels himself overborne by the other. He recoils, and his file recoils with him. His opponent now has a problem. If he follows up against the retreating infantryman he will enter the enemy line and face hostile soldiers on three sides, rapidly getting himself killed. He has no choice but to say where he is until the infantryman comes back into the fray and resumes combat. The line itself supplies protection for its members.

If too many infantrymen of a line recoil in this manner then the file leaders who have not recoiled now will find themselves in an exposed position - and so they pull back. Thus the nature of line recoil is explained.

This process can go on for a long time, until one line recoils so much that its members sense they are as a whole overmatched by their adversaries, and in consequence break and run.

It's an interesting question (to which the only honest, intelligent answer is 'nobody knows', but that approach wouldn't make for a very interesting forum).

It's necessary to be clear which combat we are talking about, between which combatants. As Patrick says, cavalry and skirmish-type forces of all kinds (including, arguably, Romans) fought differently from heavy infantry, and their fights could go on a lot longer. The reasons for this include - different type of fighting (chiefly missiles, not hand to hand), and different ways of engaging (repeated charges and retreats, small units engaging individually rather than mass formations engaging all at once). This is low intensity combat, can go on a long time, and was often indecisive. Roman legions may also have fought this way (or at least, had the option to fight this way if required).

Then there is the high intensity combat between (usually) heavy infantry armed exclusively with melee weapons, which (I believe) lasted a lot less long, and while it could involve some ebb and flow, tended to produce a decisive result (the collapse and rout of one or the other side) relatively quickly.  I assume it's this type of combat that we are interested in here.

We could also throw in fights involving cover (buildings, walls, ships etc) which also go on a lot longer (the reason being, seemingly, that the losing side could retire to cover to rally and regroup - not possible in the open). Again I assume it's not this type of fighting we are interested in here.

I'm not aware of any hard evidence for the duration of the heavy infantry type of fighting (from any period, but certainly not pre-gunpowder). References to the fitness of combatants or to fights lasting 'a long time' aren't very helpful - since five minutes of high intensity fighting might seem a long time, and require the highest levels of fitness - that is the question.

Some other thoughts:

- what timings we have ('until sunset', 'less than an hour', 'several hours') are always for entire battles, not single engagements between heavy forces. It's an open question when battles 'started' and 'stopped', and how many individual engagements made up a battle (for Classical Greeks it might well have been just one - all units of a phalanx engaging simultaneously along the line - but this isn't the case for other armies and periods, or even all hoplite battles).

- I don't think we have a clear (accurate) picture of how mass formations fought (nor did they necessarily fight the same way all the time). I suspect (but can't prove) that the classic image of two lines standing toe to toe banging away at each other with swords (or spears) is basically wrong - or at least, is the exception not the rule. Though it could happen - but usually gets commented on when it does. I suspect that formation fights were usually more cagey but I don't have a clear model of the mechanisms involved (not being 100 percent convinced by the 'dynamic stand off' model though I think it has merit).

- aside from fatigue and endurance, we also have to consider combat lethality or effectiveness. How often would one combatant wound, disable or kill his opponent? How many 'hits per minute' was normal? If a combatant scored a lethal or disabling hit once per minute, then eight minutes would suffice to completely annihilate a typical heavy infantry formation - yet one hit per minute doesn't sound like very much (it only takes a second to score a hit). The winning side in hoplites battles typically suffered around 5% casualties - less than one hit for every two men in the front rank - so how long would a fight last in which less than half of the losing side's front rank scored any hits at all? What were they doing the rest of the time? (Nobody say 'pushing'...) Are parrying, shielding and armour that effective?


Digression -

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At Leuctra in 371 BC, the Theban phalanx ... pushed their ... Spartan opponents all the way back to the latter's camp

Have you got the reference for this Patrick? I can't see it in the accounts I've read. (I would assume Xen Hell 6.4.14, but that doesn't actually say that).

Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 24, 2016, 07:45:18 AM
I suspect that combat was neither the all-out wild slash-and-jab sequence of Holly combat choreography nor a quick flurry followed by a mutual break for elevenses.

Justin makes a very important point here: a large part of the non-continuous combat argument is that 'combat' is understood - or misunderstood - as an all-out high-energy exercise akin to fencing or boxing.

The reality is somewhat different.

Polybius II.33, Republican Romans against Insubrian Gauls.

"... When the Celts had rendered their swords useless by the first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans close with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which is their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point. The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because he left the lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to throw themselves into the river."

Worth noting: the Romans had no room for manoeuvre, and so could not even have relieved their first line.  The latter went up close and personal with the Gauls at the outset and stayed that way throughout the entire action.  The only exertion they undertook was more or less continual prodding of the opposition with sword points - hardly more strenuous than an afternoon of woodcutting, to which they would have been accustomed.

Just under a couple of centuries later, here are Caesar's legionaries and their opponents, the Nervii and friends (Gallic War II.19 and following).

"When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the works."

This enthusiastic dash suggests the Belgae were either relying upon their first impact to defeat their foes or had not thought about what would happen if it did not.  Leaving out Caesar's dashing back and forward to encourage his troops to ready themselves for action, we go straight into the action itself.

"The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them,) who were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were opposing them."

That did not last long, the Atrebates having obligingly exhausted themselves before the fighting started.  They paid for that mistake, and paid again when they attempted to renew the action after recovering from their initial repulse.

"In like manner, in another quarter two different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Viromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of the river."

Same thing, really: impetuous dash across the river and uphill, same result, except the Viromandui lasted linger when the action was renewed by the advancing Romans.

"But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body, with Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened toward that place; and part of them began to surround the legions on their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment."

This was to lead to the stand-up fight which characterised the memory of the whole battle.

"Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy [on the other hand] though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve which could be brought up, having therefore snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, and addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored, while every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked."

The use of swords implies close fighting.  Caesar encouraged the seventh legion to join up with the twelfth, which they achieved despite the Nervii pressure, and the unified wing held out until relieved by the arriving Roman baggage guard of two legions and the tenth legion from the victorious Roman left.

"By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leaned on their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though] armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valor blot the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen short between [the armies] ..."

The continual close-quarter nature of the combat is illustrated by the passages in bold: we may note in passing that the wounded 'fell exhausted' as opposed to being relieved, and when they got up again were still close enough tot he fighting to take part.  The Nervii stood on the corpses of their fellow-tribesmen, which indicates how little the fighting line had shifted.  No mention is made of rest breaks or disengagement: the last Nervii largely perish in a final exchange of missiles when the corpse piles become too high for close combat weapons to reach those standing on them.

Moving on to Argentoratum in AD 357, the close combat is similarly unremitting and continual.  Ammianus XVI.12.

"Then a cloud of hissing javelins flew hither and thither, the dust arose with steady motion on both sides and hid the view, so that weapon struck blindly on weapon and body against body. [44] But the savages, thrown into disorder by their violence and anger, flamed up like fire, and hacked with repeated strokes of their swords at the close-jointed array of shields, which protected our men like a tortoise-formation. [45] On learning this, the Batavians, with the Reges (a formidable band) came at the double quick to aid their comrades and (if fate would assist) to rescue them, girt about as they were, from the instant of dire need; and as their trumpets pealed savagely, they fought with all their powers."

And it continues.

"[46] But the Alamanni, who enter eagerly into wars, made all the greater effort, as if to destroy utterly everything in their way by a kind of fit of rage. Yet darts and javelins did not cease to fly, with showers of iron-tipped arrows, although at close quarters also blade clashed on blade and breastplates were cleft with the sword; the wounded too, before all their blood was shed, rose up to some more conspicuous deed of daring."

No rest-breaks here.

"[47] For in a way the combatants were evenly matched; the Alamanni were stronger and taller, our soldiers disciplined by long practice; they were savage and uncontrollable, our men quiet and wary, these relying on their courage, while the Germans presumed upon their huge size. [48] Yet frequently the Roman, seeming to have driven from his post [pulsus loco = knocked down in place] by the weight of armed men, rose up again; and the savage, with his legs giving way from fatigue, would drop on his bended left knee and even thus attack his foe, a proof of extreme resolution."

Again, as against the Nervii, even the wounded get up again and fight on - this temporary dropping out groundwards seems to be the only 'disengagement and rest' they ever get.  The Germans are also noted as fighting to exhaustion and not disengaging to take a break while doing so.

Chnodomar's solution is to commit his fresh elite formation as a tie-breaker.

"[49] And so there suddenly leaped forth a fiery band of nobles, among whom even the kings fought, and with the common soldiers following they burst in upon our lines before the rest; and opening up a path for themselves they got as far as the legion of the Primani, which was stationed in the centrea strong feature called praetorian camp; there our soldiers, closely packed and in fully-manned lines. stood their ground fast and firm, like towers, and renewed the battle with greater vigour; and being intent upon avoiding wounds, they protected themselves like murmillos, and with drawn swords pierced the enemy's sides, left bare by their frenzied rage. [50] But the enemy strove to lavish their lives for victory and kept trying to break the fabric of our line. But as they fell in uninterrupted succession, and the Romans now laid them low with greater confidence, fresh savages took the places of the slain; but when they heard the frequent groans of the dying, they were overcome with panic and lost their courage."

Continuous action here.  Note how the Romans stand behind their shields and just whittle the enemy numbers down with periodic sword thrusts. Eventually the combination of ongoing losses and fatigue coupled with lack of success wears away German morale and Chnodomar's army crumbles.

"[51] Worn out at last by so many calamities, and now being eager for flight alone, over various paths they made haste with all speed to get away, just as sailors and passengers hurry to be cast up on land out of the midst of the billows of a raging sea, no matter where the wind has carried them; and anyone there present will admit that it was a means of escape more prayed for than expected. [52] Moreover, the gracious will of an appeased deity was on our side, and our soldiers slashed the backs of the fugitives; when sometimes their swords were bent, and no weapons were at hand for dealing blows, they seized their javelins from the savages themselves and sank them into their vitals; and not one of those who dealt these wounds could with their blood glut his rage or satiate his right hand by continual slaughter, or take pity on a suppliant and leave him."

And that is what happens to opponents who try to break off an ongoing combat.  There are ways to disengage from an enemy line, but they require discipline and swift action, or an irresolute or defensively-minded opponent, as at Ilerda.

Quote from: Erpingham on August 23, 2016, 06:25:52 PM
We read in reconstructions of battles that army A fought army B for perhaps hours.  For some people, this is envisaged as a continuous piece of action, with troops constantly engaged.  To others, there a phases of strenuous action punctuated either by contact breaks or less fully committed combat, like missile exchange.  This division can cause considerable passions.  But what do we know?  What do period sources (classical through medieval) tell us?  What about modern experience of human endurance?

The Britons understood the phased method of combat, sadly, the same cannot be said for the Romans:

(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/85628566/phased%20combat.jpg)

Quote from: RichT on August 24, 2016, 10:31:20 AM
Then there is the high intensity combat between (usually) heavy infantry armed exclusively with melee weapons, which (I believe) lasted a lot less long, and while it could involve some ebb and flow, tended to produce a decisive result (the collapse and rout of one or the other side) relatively quickly.  I assume it's this type of combat that we are interested in here.

Although the length of time to obtain the result seems to have varied, it is this type of combat which appears to attract the intermittent activity school of thought.

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- aside from fatigue and endurance, we also have to consider combat lethality or effectiveness. How often would one combatant wound, disable or kill his opponent? How many 'hits per minute' was normal? If a combatant scored a lethal or disabling hit once per minute, then eight minutes would suffice to completely annihilate a typical heavy infantry formation - yet one hit per minute doesn't sound like very much (it only takes a second to score a hit). The winning side in hoplites battles typically suffered around 5% casualties - less than one hit for every two men in the front rank - so how long would a fight last in which less than half of the losing side's front rank scored any hits at all? What were they doing the rest of the time? (Nobody say 'pushing'...) Are parrying, shielding and armour that effective?

This is a good point, albeit when up against armoured infantry contact with shield or armour or a largely unproductive glancing strike partly on a limb will make up the vast majority of hits, with lethal or disabling strikes being the exception.  Even against the presumably unarmoured Insubres in Polybius II.33 it took the Romans a while to put down each individual Gaul through an accumulation of hits to the chest and face.

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Digression -

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At Leuctra in 371 BC, the Theban phalanx ... pushed their ... Spartan opponents all the way back to the latter's camp.

Have you got the reference for this Patrick? I can't see it in the accounts I've read. (I would assume Xen Hell 6.4.14, but that doesn't actually say that).

What it says is:

"But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the royal bodyguard, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure* of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being pushed back**, gave way. Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp they grounded their arms at the spot from which they had set forth. The camp, to be sure, was not on ground which was altogether level, but rather on the slope of a hill."

*ōthoumenoi

**ōthoumenon

He said 'pushed back' - he used the 'o'-word - smacked wrist, Xenophon! ;)

His account does not specify when or if, the Thebans stopped pushing, though the fact that the Spartans had a discussion about renewing the action in VI.4.15 indicates the Thebans were not in contact at that point, yet were close enough for the Spartans to be able to renew the action against them.  Best guess: Epaminondas halted his troops near the foot of the hill, not wishing to fight upslope.  And before anyone says Ah, but this means the Spartans were not actually pushed all the way back to their camp, we are not told that they were not.  On the basis of what Xenophon writes, the Thebans could have pushed the Spartans all the way to the trench surrounding their camp; only common sense tells us that Spartans would be unlikely to ground arms if their opponents were that close.  If it makes anyone feel better, I shall state that Xenophon's account suggests the Thebans pushed the Spartans back to a point sufficiently close to their camp that allowed the Spartans to contemplate renewing the action, although 'pushed them all the way back to their camp' seems to me good enough as a general summary, even if inadequate as a specific description, of the action.

Copying and pasting reams of Caesar's battle descriptions and saying 'look, no lulls!' is not a great use of time - obviously lulls aren't explicitly mentioned anywhere (else there would be nothing to discuss). The usual argument (which we heard when discussing the 'o' word) is that readers would have been familiar enough with the concept that lulls wouldn't need to be pointed out - they could just have assumed they happened.

But anyway, Caesar's battles don't read to me as if they went on for hours (except of course for the ones that he says did). Lulls are only necessary if we think fighting took a long time. If fights were short, then lulls would be unnecessary (from a human endurance point of view - but there's still the battlefield clock argument in the dynamic standoff model). My own belief has always been that fighting (high intensity, close quarters fighting) took a very short amount of time - five or ten minutes, maybe fifteen in exceptional cases - though this probably felt like an eternity to those involved.

Leuctra - maybe shouldn't continue this in this thread but just to clear up some things.

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He said 'pushed back' - he used the 'o'-word - smacked wrist, Xenophon! ;)

It's OK for Xenophon to use the 'o' word, since he knows what it means... :)

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His account does not specify when or if, the Thebans stopped pushing

Nor indeed when, or if, they started.  :o

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though the fact that the Spartans had a discussion about renewing the action in VI.4.15 indicates the Thebans were not in contact at that point, yet were close enough for the Spartans to be able to renew the action against them

Xen Hell 6.4.15: "The camp, to be sure, was not on ground which was altogether level, but rather on the slope of a hill. After the disaster some of the Lacedaemonians, thinking it unendurable, said that they ought to prevent the enemy from setting up their trophy and to try to recover the bodies of the dead, not by means of a truce, but by fighting."

So this tells us nothing at all about how close the Thebans were to the Spartans at the point of discussion - the proposal was to recover the bodies (and prevent the erection of the trophy) - which would presumably both have been where the fighting mostly took place.

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And before anyone says Ah, but this means the Spartans were not actually pushed all the way back to their camp, we are not told that they were not.

We are not told that there were not lulls in the fighting, either.  ::)

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If it makes anyone feel better, I shall state that Xenophon's account suggests the Thebans pushed the Spartans back to a point sufficiently close to their camp that allowed the Spartans to contemplate renewing the action, although 'pushed them all the way back to their camp' seems to me good enough as a general summary, even if inadequate as a specific description, of the action.

I don't feel bad in the first place, it was an honest mistake I'm sure.

There's also Diodorus' version of these events (Diod 15.56) "... but finally, as many fell and the commander who would have rallied them had died, the army turned and fled in utter rout. Epameinondas' corps pursued the fugitives, slew many who opposed them, and won for themselves a most glorious victory.... Following the battle they made a truce to allow for taking up the bodies of the dead and the departure of the Lacedaemonians to the Peloponnese."

Xenophon does say "Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp..."

It sounds to me as if the Spartans were routed in the fighting and fled back to their camp (at least some of them). There, according to Xenophon they discussed renewing the fight (but wiser heads presumably prevailed).

Not sure we're getting any further than the observation that when combat was continuous, it was continuous, but when it wasn't, it wasn't!

Quote from: RichT on August 24, 2016, 01:49:25 PM
But anyway, Caesar's battles don't read to me as if they went on for hours (except of course for the ones that he says did).

Quote from: Prufrock on August 24, 2016, 03:16:54 PM
Not sure we're getting any further than the observation that when combat was continuous, it was continuous, but when it wasn't, it wasn't!

Ummm ...  :-\

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Lulls are only necessary if we think fighting took a long time. If fights were short, then lulls would be unnecessary (from a human endurance point of view - but there's still the battlefield clock argument in the dynamic standoff model). My own belief has always been that fighting (high intensity, close quarters fighting) took a very short amount of time - five or ten minutes, maybe fifteen in exceptional cases - though this probably felt like an eternity to those involved.

In a clash where one side folds fairly quickly (various outflanked hoplite left wings, Romans at the Allia and of course the Atrebates at the Sambre) this would of course be true.  However there are quite a few accounts where the irresistible force meets the immovable object and, leaving aside cliche-like remarks that "the battle went on a long time with neither side gaining an advantage, with heavy losses on both sides," which seems to be a Diodorus stock phrase, we get basic questions of time and motion arithmetic, e.g. how long does it take for 50,000 or so Carthaginians to dispose of around 70,000 surrounded Romans at Cannae?  Rather more than fifteen minutes, one would presume.

I suggest that we would have to factor in that much of the soldier's combat activity was essentially defensiv, it being most men's objective to survive and perhaps kill an enemy than to take risks and get injured or worse. An interesting indicator  of this is the casualty levels of victorious  armies which are generally low percentages of the forces engaged . That, I suggest, tells us that killing during the phase when troops faced each other was relatively light. The side that was fittest and lasted longest would have a considerable advantage, let us remember the description of the battle of Caesar against the Suebi, where the Germans are so exhausted that all they can do is lock shields and await the Romans killing them.
There are some modern comparators that we might use.
In a game of rugby there is moderately intense action by the forwards for 80 minutes. This includes several grinding mutual pushes (scrums) . There are many periods of explosive action, but these are balanced by periods when the ball is elsewhere and a ten minipute break in the middle.
Boxers go for twelve or fifteen three  minute  rounds (or is it five) There is frequent physical contact and damaging blows and there are regular rests. At the end the bout one or both of the boxers is exhausted, yet they have taken a breather between each round.In an Association football match there is much less tiring contact, but generally, after 90 minutes, even superbly fit teams are making mistakes.  Of course none of our modern athletes is carrying a shield, sword, spear and the weight of his armour . 
So by analogy I would suggest that ancient warriors indulged in rapid bouts of energy sapping action, punctuated by rests that occurred when mutual exhaustion  sliwed the combatants to the point where attacking became too risky and both sides defaulted to defence and catching a breather. If one side was fitter than the other and perhaps better protected, they  would be able to sustain risky, but aggressive actions fir longer than the opponents and would start to kill more men. When the opponent notices this they step back to gain respite.  If they are very tired and the victors have the energy to follow up the retrograde motion would become a route. I envisage the whole unit, perhaps the whole battle line acting as one in this because the consequences of being isolated are likely to be deadly. If those near you fall back, you drop back with them.
The modern sporting examples do align with the concept of short  intense bursts of attack and defence , though that does rely on us seeing the periods of conflict as intensive as each warrior seeks to damage his opponent. We cannot be certain about all armies at all times, but rapid aggression does fit with the style of Romans who ran at their opponents, so eager for combat that they dropped their pila and fell on with their swords.

Quote from: RichT on August 24, 2016, 02:27:51 PM
Leuctra - maybe shouldn't continue this in this thread but just to clear up some things.

Yes, one point outstanding is the incompatibility of Xenophon's 'grounding arms' and discussing renewal of the action with Diodorus' 'utter rout'.

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There's also Diodorus' version of these events (Diod 15.56) "... but finally, as many fell and the commander who would have rallied them had died, the army turned and fled in utter rout. Epameinondas' corps pursued the fugitives, slew many who opposed them, and won for themselves a most glorious victory.... Following the battle they made a truce to allow for taking up the bodies of the dead and the departure of the Lacedaemonians to the Peloponnese."

Xenophon does say "Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp..."

It sounds to me as if the Spartans were routed in the fighting and fled back to their camp (at least some of them). There, according to Xenophon they discussed renewing the fight (but wiser heads presumably prevailed).

Diodorus' "the army turned and fled in utter rout" is a translation of egeneto pantelēs tropē tou stratopedou, which appears to mean the camp (presumably camp followers, primarily helots seeing their masters beaten for the first time) dissolved in utter rout, not the army.  While stratopedon can mean by extension an encamped army, is it at all usable for an unencamped one?

Quote from: aligern on August 24, 2016, 10:03:14 PM
I suggest that we would have to factor in that much of the soldier's combat activity was essentially defensive, it being most men's objective to survive and perhaps kill an enemy than to take risks and get injured or worse. An interesting indicator  of this is the casualty levels of victorious  armies which are generally low percentages of the forces engaged . That, I suggest, tells us that killing during the phase when troops faced each other was relatively light.

Concur.

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The side that was fittest and lasted longest would have a considerable advantage, let us remember the description of the battle of Caesar against the Suebi, where the Germans are so exhausted that all they can do is lock shields and await the Romans killing them.

And it is noteworthy that in Caesar's and Ammianus' descriptions of intense fighting, Romans collapse from wounds and barbarians from fatigue.

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There are some modern comparators that we might use.
In a game of rugby ...
Boxers ...
In an Association football match ...

I would suggest these are not comparators for heavy infantry fighting.  Football and rugby are akin to skirmishing; boxing to duelling.  The closest comparator to heavy infantry fights we get in our day and age are demonstrations, and even these are a long way off because of the inexperience and lack of organisation on one side and the inhibitions against lethality on the other.

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So by analogy I would suggest that ancient warriors indulged in rapid bouts of energy sapping action, punctuated by rests that occurred when mutual exhaustion  slowed the combatants to the point where attacking became too risky and both sides defaulted to defence and catching a breather.

If this were the case one would expect far more frequent references to such intervals in fighting in our sources, e.g. 'while both sides were in an interval of rest, Caesar/Hannibal/Alexander moved to the other wing to bring up reinforcements'.  I would suggest that action, while it might be rapid, was only energy-sapping for those untrained to fighting or who were fighting in a climate more enervating than that to which they were accustomed.

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If one side was fitter than the other and perhaps better protected, they  would be able to sustain risky, but aggressive actions fir longer than the opponents and would start to kill more men. When the opponent notices this they step back to gain respite.  If they are very tired and the victors have the energy to follow up the retrograde motion would become a route. I envisage the whole unit, perhaps the whole battle line acting as one in this because the consequences of being isolated are likely to be deadly. If those near you fall back, you drop back with them.

This disparity in fatigue levels, sometimes coupled with climate, was the Roman ace in the hole in several battles against barbarians, e.g. Vercellae.  As Plutarch notes (Caius Marius 26.4-5):

"The Romans were favoured in the struggle, Sulla says, by the heat, and by the sun, which shone in the faces of the Cimbri. For the Barbarians were well able to endure cold, and had been brought up in shady and chilly regions, as I have said.  They were therefore undone by the heat; they sweated profusely, breathed with difficulty, and were forced to hold their shields before their faces. For the battle was fought after the summer solstice, which falls, by Roman reckoning, three days before the new moon of the month now called August, but then Sextilis. [5] Moreover, the dust, by hiding the enemy, helped to encourage the Romans. For they could not see from afar the great numbers of the foe, but each one of them fell at a run upon the man just over against him, and fought him hand to hand, without having been terrified by the sight of the rest of the host. And their bodies were so inured to toil and so thoroughly trained that not a Roman was observed to sweat or pant, in spite of the great heat and the run with which they came to the encounter."

Endurance training matters.  Greeks did it.  Romans did it.  Macedonians probably did it.  Their opponents, as far as we can judge, usually did not (Carthaginians may be an exception).  While this was by no means the sole cause of Greek and Roman military superiority, it was on occasion an important one.

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e.g. how long does it take for 50,000 or so Carthaginians to dispose of around 70,000 surrounded Romans at Cannae?  Rather more than fifteen minutes, one would presume.

But this isn't exactly what we were talking about - slaughtering more or less demoralised and disorganised fugitives (or would be fugitives) is not the same as face to face high intensity combat. No doubt pursuits also could last a long time. But in this case there certainly wouldn't have been 50,000 Carthaginians standing face to face with and banging away at 70,000 Romans - quite a lot of people on both sides must have spent quite a lot of their time doing nothing - waiting their turn, milling about, trying to get away. This makes the combat discontinuous (even though something was no doubt always happening to someone somewhere).

Sports comparisons are useful up to a point - but again I would question hit rates. Boxers land more or less telling punches several times a minute. If boxers had weapons, fights would last a lot less long (or a lot longer, since they might avoid each other - but avoidance in mass formations is tricky without the lulls that the dynamic standoff proposes).

Given that Greek and Roman material is pretty much worked out and if there was decisive evidence it would have been found by now, what would be useful is comparative material from other periods - anything on the duration of combat or evidence for lulls and disengagements (by heavy infantry).

One example springs to my mind, from James II's account of Edgehill:

"The foot being thus engaged in such warm and close service, it were reasonable to imagine that one side should run and be disordered; but it happened otherwise, for each as if by mutual consent retired some few paces, and they stuck down their colours, continuing to fire at one another even till night"

(Quoted in Carlton, Going to the Wars p 117)

Though he thought this "a thing extraordinary" and that "the rawness and inexperience of both parties had not furnished them with skill to make the best use of their advantages."

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Diodorus' "the army turned and fled in utter rout" is a translation of egeneto panteles trope tou stratopedou, which appears to mean the camp (presumably camp followers, primarily helots seeing their masters beaten for the first time) dissolved in utter rout, not the army.  While stratopedon can mean by extension an encamped army, is it at all usable for an unencamped one?

Yes, usable, and no, needn't mean camp or camped. The sense of this passage requires the fighting forces:

Diod 15.56 "For as the corps of élite outdid them in feats of courage, and the valour and exhortations of Epameinondas contributed greatly to its prowess, the Lacedaemonians were with great difficulty forced back; at first, as they gave ground they would not break their formation, but finally, as many fell and the commander who would have rallied them had died, the army (stratopedon) turned and fled in utter rout. 3 Epameinondas' corps pursued the fugitives, slew many who opposed them, and won for themselves a most glorious victory."

And it's a common usage in Diodorus, e.g. looking no further than book 15:

Diod 15.52 "As the soldiers were marching out from the city it seemed to many that unfavourable omens appeared to the armament (stratopedon) ... but Epameinondas, deigning them no reply, led forth his army (stratopedon), thinking that considerations of nobility and regard for justice should be preferred as motives to the omens in question."

Diod 15.68 "He arrived in Corinth, added to his number Megarians, Pellenians, and also Corinthians, and so gathered a force (stratopedon) of ten thousand men."

Diod 15.71 "When they had now abandoned hope, Epameinondas, who was at that time serving as a private soldier, was appointed general by the men. Quickly selecting the light-armed men and cavalry, he took them with him, and, posting himself in the rear, with their aid checked the enemy pursuers and provided complete security for the heavy-armed men in the front ranks; and by wheeling about and offering battle and using masterly formations he saved the army (stratopedon)."

Diod 15.85 "Both sides eagerly drew together for the decisive conflict, their armies (stratopedon) in battle formation, while the soothsayers, having sacrificed on both sides, declared that victory was foreshadowed by the gods."

I don't see the rout as incompatible with some of the Spartans getting back to the camp and grounding arms. Xenophon's account, as is trivially obvious, belittles the Theban victory and glosses over the Spartan defeat, but the facts seem perfectly compatible (maybe some Spartans did consider a death or glory rematch - but as it didn't happen we can't infer much from it).

If you look at medieval examples, there are some problems.  One is the rarity of consistent estimates of the length of battles.  Even if we know how long a battle was it may not help.  The armies stood to when it got light but didn't start fighting for several hours.  After a period in the middle of the day when there was serious fighting, the remains of the two armies stood watching each other until late afternoon.  So the battle could be recorded as a couple of hours or dawn to dusk.

Another issue was a tendency to record things episodically rather than temporarily, leading to at best a non-linear narrative.  Some episodes happened at the same time to different people, some at different times.  So one reading looks non-continuous, another of continuous action across a field.

On a grand scale, fighting clearly did work in phases, as there was a tendency to deploy in depth and send troops in one division after another.  On the smaller scale of individual combats, it is harder to see, perhaps because fights were short enough not to need rests, perhaps because ebb and flow just wasn't recorded.

One of the clearest examples I'm aware of is the fact that an eye witness account of Nevilles Cross states that the English attacked the Scots shiltrons several times and were driven back before they finally beat them.

I don't think the importance of fatigue and endurance contributes much either - levels of fatigue vary according to the intensity of the activity as well as the endurance of the athletes/fighters. I can run for two hours quite effortlessly, but sprinting for one minute leaves me totally knackered. I recall TV reconstructions of fighting (probably featuring Mike Loades) in which vigorous one on one duelling exhausted the participants after three minutes.

It may be this is another hidden consensus - perhaps we all agree that face to face combat could be quite low intensity, with an emphasis on keeping formation, covering yourself (and neighbour) with your shield, and staying alive, rather than frantic slashing and bashing. As such this sounds like a sort of 'continuous lull', not different in any important way from the lulls of the dynamic standoff model, just carried out a little closer to the enemy.

Quote from: RichT on August 25, 2016, 04:58:46 PM
It may be this is another hidden consensus - perhaps we all agree that face to face combat could be quite low intensity, with an emphasis on keeping formation, covering yourself (and neighbour) with your shield, and staying alive, rather than frantic slashing and bashing. As such this sounds like a sort of 'continuous lull', not different in any important way from the lulls of the dynamic standoff model, just carried out a little closer to the enemy.

The problem with this approach being that as soon as you encounter someone who takes attacking really seriously (gaesati, berserkers, Caesar's legionaries facing Ariovistus' Germans) the hidden consensus shatters.  What mayt matter more is what you are trained or accustomed to do, and how energy efficient this is.

Gauls vs Romans, Dionysius XIV.17-19 (or 10, depending on layout).  Fatigue differential, at least for these chaps, really matters - and is accentuated by the energy-intensive abandon of Gallic strokes against the energy-efficient Roman technique.

"(17) Now the barbarians' manner of fighting, being in large measure that of wild beasts and frenzied, was an erratic procedure, quite lacking in military science. Thus, at one moment they would raise their swords aloft and smite after the manner of wild boars, throwing the whole weight of their bodies into the blow like hewers of wood or men digging with mattocks, and again they would deliver crosswise blows aimed at no target, as if they intended to cut to pieces the entire bodies of their adversaries, protective armour and all; then they would turn the edges of their swords away from the foe.  (18) On the other hand, the Romans' defence and counter-manoeuvring against the barbarians was steadfast and afforded great safety. For while their foes were still raising their swords aloft, they would duck under their arms, holding up their shields, and then, stooping and crouching low, they would render vain and useless the blows of the others, which were aimed too high, while for their own part, holding their swords straight out, they would strike their opponents in the groins, pierce their sides, and drive their blows through their breasts into their vitals. And if they saw any of them keeping these parts of their bodies protected, they would cut the tendons of their knees or ankles and topple them to the ground roaring and biting their shields and uttering cries resembling the howling of wild beasts.  (19) Not only did their strength desert many of the barbarians as their limbs failed them through weariness, but their weapons also were either blunted or broken or no longer serviceable. For besides the blood that flowed from their wounds, the sweat pouring out over their whole bodies would not let them either grasp their swords or hold their shields firmly, since their fingers slipped on the handles and no longer kept a firm hold. The Romans, however, being accustomed to many toils by reason of their unabating and continuous warfare, continued to meet every peril in noble fashion."

Note the reference to 'military science' (sophias tēs en hoplois), indicating that a fair amount of thought went into keeping men functional during ongoing combat, and energy efficiency seems to have been an important part.  The Romans appear to have adopted a belt-and-braces approach to the question of combat persistence, on the one hand carefully training their troops to keep their movements as energy-efficient as possible while also developing their endurance, and on the other having one, and later two, lines to take over if the combat was longer, more intense or more exhausting than the first line could manage.  The reason for putting the hastati in the first line would seem  to be that their age group had the best stamina.

Quote from: RichT on August 25, 2016, 04:58:46 PM
I can run for two hours quite effortlessly, but sprinting for one minute leaves me totally knackered.

This is because sprinting causes one to use anaerobic respiration.  Doing so in a fight is a short passport to collapse, and only the most panicked, excited and undisciplined of armed men 'go anaerobic' when fighting - plus the odd iaijutsu practitioner and, it must be noted, numerous easily-exhausted sportsmen.

Quote from: RichT on August 25, 2016, 12:13:39 PM

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Diodorus' "the army turned and fled in utter rout" is a translation of egeneto panteles trope tou stratopedou, which appears to mean the camp (presumably camp followers, primarily helots seeing their masters beaten for the first time) dissolved in utter rout, not the army.  While stratopedon can mean by extension an encamped army, is it at all usable for an unencamped one?

Yes, usable, and no, needn't mean camp or camped.

OK, settles that point, thanks.

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I don't see the rout as incompatible with some of the Spartans getting back to the camp and grounding arms. Xenophon's account, as is trivially obvious, belittles the Theban victory and glosses over the Spartan defeat, but the facts seem perfectly compatible (maybe some Spartans did consider a death or glory rematch - but as it didn't happen we can't infer much from it).

I think it is more the other way around.  Plutarch's Agesilaus infers that numerous Spartans ran and were condemned as cowards, hence Agesilaus opted to let the law sleep for a day'.  The problem here is the punishment Plutarch describes for the 'cowards'.

"For such men are not only debarred from every office, but intermarriage with any of them is a disgrace, and any one who meets them may strike them if he pleases. Moreover, they are obliged to go about unkempt and squalid, wearing cloaks that are patched with dyed stuffs, half of their beards shaven, and half left to grow." - Agesilaus 30.3

Xenophon's description is rather different:

"For in other states when a man proves a coward, the only consequence is that he is called a coward. He goes to the same market as the brave man, sits beside him, attends the same gymnasium, if he chooses. But in Lacedaemon everyone would be ashamed to have a coward with him at the mess or to be matched with him in a wrestling bout. [5] Often when sides are picked for a game of ball he is the odd man left out: in the chorus he is banished to the ignominious place; in the streets he is bound to make way; when he occupies a seat he must needs give it up, even to a junior; he must support his spinster relatives at home and must explain to them why they are old maids: he must make the best of a fireside without a wife, and yet pay forfeit for that: he may not stroll about with a cheerful countenance, nor behave as though he were a man of unsullied fame, or else he must submit to be beaten by his betters." - Constitution of the Lacedaemonians 9.4-5

Nothing is mentioned about half-shaven beards or patched cloaks.  Even in Xenophon's Agesilaus the 'let the laws sleep for a day' pronouncement is not recorded, although it would have been much to the credit of Xenophon's hero.  I begin to wonder if it, and the whole story of a Spartan rout at Leuctra, may be apocryphal.

There are other problems with any supposed Spartan rout at Leuctra.  How, if a rout occurred, did they bring back the body of Cleombrotus?  Why does Xenophon not mention a rout?  He quite freely describes Spartans routing after a long harassment by Iphicrates' peltasts near Lechaeum (Hellenica IV.5.17), having previously noted how the Spartans had chided their allies for being afraid of peltasts (idem IV.4.17), which demonstrates that he does not keep silent for fear of putting Spartans in a bad light.

It looks as if someone may have embellished the story of the Spartan fall-back to their camp under pressure and misrepresented it as a rout.

Quote from: Erpingham on August 25, 2016, 12:23:17 PM
One of the clearest examples I'm aware of is the fact that an eye witness account of Nevilles Cross states that the English attacked the Scots shiltrons several times and were driven back before they finally beat them.

This is one of the factors to consider: if a moving attacker is trying to defeat a non-moving defender (cf. Hastings), an ebb and flow is the natural course of the fighting.  Injudicious commitment of additional troops in confined surroundings, as at Crecy, Agincourt and Dupplin Moor, means that the leading portion of the mobile but disadvantaged attacker is trapped by its own reserves and unable to do anything significant except die in place.  Halidon Hill was just the one charge followed by collapse.  Poitiers saw each French battle try in turn as opposed to the whole army having repeated goes.  Verneuil saw the Scots fight and die in place without a break.

I'll venture one of those summary comments about the hidden consensus

People accept that discontinuity or continuity depends on the troop type we are dealing with.  Certain troops are more ebb and flow than others.  We have focussed on heavy infantry, which are not immediately identified with this idiom. Cavalry and skirmishy types are a different kettle of fish.

Endurance is important and seems to have two elements - training/experience and fighting style.  Steady, energy efficient combat style can be maintained longer than frenzied wild slashing. 

This does not, of course, answer the question whether fighting was continuous or not but does I hope help to focus on what areas we can accept and what areas need further exploration.

Leuctra

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I begin to wonder if it, and the whole story of a Spartan rout at Leuctra, may be apocryphal.

Even if we discount Diodorus 15.56 "at first, as they gave ground they would not break their formation, but finally, as many fell and the commander who would have rallied them had died, the army turned and fled in utter rout."

and Plutarch Pelopidas 23 "At this time, however, since the phalanx of Epaminondas bore down upon them alone and neglected the rest of their force, and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness, their courage and skill were so confounded that there was a flight and slaughter of the Spartans such as had never before been seen."

we still have Xenophon Hell 6.4 "Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated... The polemarchs, however, seeing that of the whole number of the Lacedaemonians almost a thousand had been killed; seeing, further, that among the Spartiatae themselves, of whom there were some seven hundred there, about four hundred had fallen; and perceiving that the allies were one and all without heart for fighting, while some of them were not even displeased at what had taken place.. all thought it best to recover the bodies of the dead by a truce, they finally sent a herald to ask for a truce. After this, then, the Thebans set up a trophy and gave back the bodies under a truce".

This is as clear and straightforward a description of the defeat of one hoplite army by another as you could hope to find. It compares closely with, to pick an example at random, Solygia:

Thuc 4.44 "After holding on for a long while without either giving way, the Athenians aided by their horse, of which the enemy had none, at length routed the Corinthians, who retired to the hill and halting remained quiet there, without coming down again. [2] It was in this rout of the right wing that they had the most killed, Lycophron their general being among the number. The rest of the army, broken and put to flight in this way without being seriously pursued or hurried, retired to the high ground and there took up its position. [3] The Athenians, finding that the enemy no longer offered to engage them, stripped his dead and took up their own and immediately set up a trophy."

But you propose to discount this straightforward understanding of Leuctra, presumably just so as to retain your strictly literal reading of the verb 'otheo' in this context. Well, fine. Nothing more to say.

Quote from: Erpingham on August 25, 2016, 09:49:41 PM
I'll venture one of those summary comments about the hidden consensus

People accept that discontinuity or continuity depends on the troop type we are dealing with.  Certain troops are more ebb and flow than others.  We have focussed on heavy infantry, which are not immediately identified with this idiom. Cavalry and skirmishy types are a different kettle of fish.

This is mainly because of the emergence among some classical scholars of the idea that heavy infantry fighting took place in spurts rather than as a continuous engagement, and it is this school of thought I particularly wished to address (and disprove).  Cavalry actions, as Philip Sabin observes in Lost Battles, tend to be faster in pace and tempo, and in reaching a result even if that result is a break-off rather than a decision.  Cavalry against infantry also act pretty much at their own pace and in their own time, and may need multiple attempts and/or a bit of help from their missile-armed friends.

The problem that has arisen (one may remember a few discussions on Ancmed of yore) is that there is an increasing tendency for some to model heavy infantry combat as if it were skirmisher combat, with subunits moving out to exchange missiles and dropping back as it suits them - does WMWW ring a bell? ;)  This approach presents a rather bizarre view of the way heavy infantry formations engaged, and has its roots in the idea that infantry lines of battle were very tentative in the way they closed and remained in contact - something I do not see as being borne out by historical accounts.

This particular aspect of the topic is heavily Romanocentric, for which my apologies, but unless we take seriously the implications in our sources that Roman infantry combat was protracted and up close and personal without letup whatever the hindrance (unless rain stopped play, as it did at Ilipa in 206 BC) we risk losing entirely our touch with reality when considering how such armies operated.

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Endurance is important and seems to have two elements - training/experience and fighting style.  Steady, energy efficient combat style can be maintained longer than frenzied wild slashing. 

This does not, of course, answer the question whether fighting was continuous or not but does I hope help to focus on what areas we can accept and what areas need further exploration.

All eminently reasonable.  Would it make sense to delve into a few source accounts of battles and comment upon what we think is revealed about the character of the fighting?

Quote from: RichT on August 26, 2016, 09:52:20 AM
Leuctra

This is as clear and straightforward a description of the defeat of one hoplite army by another as you could hope to find.

*Sigh* I am not disputing that the Spartans were defeated at Leuctra, merely questioning, by matching a reliable contemporary and soldierly source against the differing accounts of later compilers who lacked military experience, whether the later accounts had imbibed more flavour than accuracy and inserted a rout where there was in fact a protracted falling-back.  That is all.

Fair summary, Anthony.

The endurance thing doesn't seem to get us anywhere.

Patrick:

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[Using anaerobic respiration] in a fight is a short passport to collapse, and only the most panicked, excited and undisciplined of armed men 'go anaerobic' when fighting

And yet you have pasted a lot of quotes showing assorted barbarians doing just that. So if barbarians fought like this (and leaving aside the generalisations required) then fights among barbarians must have been of short duration (minutes?). If Romans had a more efficient style, then they could outlast barbarians, but what does that prove? It doesn't set any limits on the length of time fights actually took, nor tell us anything about whether or not fighting was continuous.

Arguments for discontinuous fighting rest on three pillars:

- endurance: 'battlefield clock' evidence suggests fights of an hour or more duration; we have reason to doubt whether anyone could fight for that long - inefficient barbarians certainly not, while for efficient Romans we have no data, but it still seems doubtful to many.

- casualties: assuming even minimal levels of lethality and competence, fights measured in hours must surely have caused much higher casualties than are actually recorded (for the victors, or the pre-rout losers).

- psychology: close quarters face to face combat is a psychologically demanding and unstable situation - it seems doubtful it could be sustained for hours.

Phil Sabin's dynamic standoff model therefore proposes that the default state is not close contact, but separation at a short distance  with flurries of combat from time to time and place to place. I sort of suggested a possible alternative consensus where the default state is close contact but with very tentative, low intensity combat. There's plenty of room for variation from time to time and case to case, some being more or less inclined to get stuck in and fight 'barbarian style' - but such fights when they occurred must have been of short duration. I also suggest that (for example) hoplites fought continuously and at high intensity, but for very short periods; while (for example) Romans fought intermittently with fallings back, missiles and discontinuous combat, over longer periods.

In order to 'disprove' the dynamic standoff model, you have to do more than quote some battle accounts and say 'look, no lulls' since we all know there are no explicit references to lulls (if there were we could all go and do something else more worthwhile). And you have to do more than quote acounts suggesting Romans fought more efficiently than barbarians, since that doesn't prove anything either way. You can copy and paste battle accounts all day but it won't do anything to address the underlying issues (which is why comparative material seems to offer some help).

FWIW I'm not totally convinced about dynamic standoff as I've said - but I'm also not at all convinced by hour long high intensity melees. I await hard evidence or strong rational arguments with interest (if little hope).

Sorry, but I do not accept the rejection of the modern sporting analogies. Boxers do not generally land several telling blows in a minute. If they do ths then the opponent will go down quite quickly. Head blows disorientate and lay the victim open to blows that are undefended and will cause concussion. Body blows leave an opponent breathless and again unable to respond. Most of the time blows are parried ir dodged, if only by leaning backwards so they land without much force. Two warriors fighting with sword and shield can fight longer, but they have to hold the shield and parry with it and wield a weapon. Watch one of those programmes where men who are OK hack at tree trunks with axes. They do need rests, but then they are back again. The rugby analogy is quite good because it is most unlike skirmushing...well for the pack anyway. Richard may have wafted around on a wing, but the pack have strenuous cobcerted pushing to do and spend a lot of time smacking into or being smacked into as they tackle or try to gain yards and get the opposing team to expend two men on them and thus create an overlap. Both these activities have rests of various lengths inserted into them, but still a time of 45 minutes to 90 minutes is enough for the highly trained athletes concerned.
I still see that actual fighting time will be limited and restricted and rests will be necessary. Think of Ariovistus'Germans against Caesar who became so exhausted that they were reduced to standing with overlapped. shields whilst the  legionaries had to pull the frnation apart to get at them.
Punctuated flurries gives us another mechanism  which works in that both sides must withdraw to rest and if the Romans are carrying out line relief they need a separation and tohave time to do this. When both sides withdraw those hat are fitter or advantaged by armour, morale, or being uphill will be first to move. That suggests that where a side is more reluctant to engage the new point of contact will move backwards for them each tome. That would explain some of the very long fall backs that occur in battles, even of pike formations. I just cannot conceive that close order infantry formations can move backwards whilst in contact for several hundred yards, those on the retrograde would be falling over. So the Helvetii recoil say ten or twenty yards, recuperate and then the Romans, who have also paused, come on again, taking the ground. The action is going to have to be interrupted by pauses, because even if it is of a more sparring, parrying and looking for openings nature, the men will become exhausted and they must not get to this state because then they are liable to make deadly mistakes.
Roy

Quote from: RichT on August 26, 2016, 11:20:32 AM
- casualties: assuming even minimal levels of lethality and competence, fights measured in hours must surely have caused much higher casualties than are actually recorded (for the victors, or the pre-rout losers).

An important observation IMHO - low lethality is inconsistent with long engagements.

Casualty data from sources could be converted into casualty per minute or casualty per square metre per minute, and I would suspect - having not done the work - that it suggests they weren't trying or they weren't trying for very long.

Quote from: aligern on August 24, 2016, 10:03:14 PM
I suggest that we would have to factor in that much of the soldier's combat activity was essentially defensive, it being most men's objective to survive and perhaps kill an enemy than to take risks and get injured or worse.

I think there is a problem with this logic. I don't think that the risk of death necessarily outweighs the risk of trying to successfully resolve combat in such a way that there is overwhelming tendency to passivity. Stay on the battlefield long enough and the probability of being a casualty rises toward 100%.

Quote from: RichT on August 26, 2016, 11:20:32 AM
Fair summary, Anthony.

The endurance thing doesn't seem to get us anywhere.

Patrick:

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[Using anaerobic respiration] in a fight is a short passport to collapse, and only the most panicked, excited and undisciplined of armed men 'go anaerobic' when fighting

And yet you have pasted a lot of quotes showing assorted barbarians doing just that. So if barbarians fought like this (and leaving aside the generalisations required) then fights among barbarians must have been of short duration (minutes?). If Romans had a more efficient style, then they could outlast barbarians, but what does that prove? It doesn't set any limits on the length of time fights actually took, nor tell us anything about whether or not fighting was continuous.

Au contraire, actually looking through the accounts quoted reveals some important details.

1) Casualties are not extracted - casualty extraction would be a priority during a lull or even a hypothetical low-intensity contact, not least for the casualties themselves.

2) Exhausted barbarians do not get a chance to stagger back and recover - they flop in place.  Ergo, the discontinuity in combat required for the 'dynamic standoff' model or the lack of serious pressure implied by the 'tentative low intensity' approach have to be lacking to deny them the chance to drop back rather than down and out.

3) The battle against the Insubres in Polybius II.33 specifies that the Romans lacked any room for manoeuvre, in particular their customary falling back manoeuvres.  Ergo, the hastati were in continuous combat from first to last.  The lack of breaks (and for that matter standoffishness) is evident from the fact they only had to get inside the sweep of Gallic swords once.

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Arguments for discontinuous fighting rest on three pillars:

- endurance: 'battlefield clock' evidence suggests fights of an hour or more duration; we have reason to doubt whether anyone could fight for that long - inefficient barbarians certainly not, while for efficient Romans we have no data, but it still seems doubtful to many.

- casualties: assuming even minimal levels of lethality and competence, fights measured in hours must surely have caused much higher casualties than are actually recorded (for the victors, or the pre-rout losers).

- psychology: close quarters face to face combat is a psychologically demanding and unstable situation - it seems doubtful it could be sustained for hours.

A fair summary.  Of these, only the second seems to have any real foundation in source material, so we may as well examine it here.

It is worth bearing in mind that casualties recorded for a classical battle usually involve only the dead.  For a winner or pre-rout loser, these will usually be a small percentage of the total - just how small this can be is illustrated when Josephus gives killed and wounded from a day-long fight at Jotapata:

"Now when the next day an assault was made by the Romans, the Jews at first staid out of the walls and opposed them, and met them, as having formed themselves a camp before the city walls. But when Vespasian had set against them the archers and slingers, and the whole multitude that could throw to a great distance, he permitted them to go to work, while he himself, with the footmen, got upon an acclivity, whence the city might easily be taken. Josephus was then in fear for the city, and leaped out, and all the Jewish multitude with him; these fell together upon the Romans in great numbers, and drove them away from the wall, and performed a great many glorious and bold actions. Yet did they suffer as much as they made the enemy suffer; for as despair of deliverance encouraged the Jews, so did a sense of shame equally encourage the Romans. These last had skill as well as strength; the other had only courage, which armed them, and made them fight furiously. And when the fight had lasted all day, it was put an end to by the coming on of the night. They had wounded a great many of the Romans, and killed of them thirteen men; of the Jews' side seventeen were slain, and six hundred wounded." - Jewish War III.7.5 (Whiston chapters)

Not every battle saw a dead-to-wounded ratio of 17:600, but it shows how small the total of dead can be even when both sides have trying quite hard for a whole day.  Conversely, other whole-day fights can result in heavy losses on both sides or the near-annihilation of one side.  The moral would seem to be that deaths are not necessarily an indicator of intensity of fighting.

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Phil Sabin's dynamic standoff model therefore proposes that the default state is not close contact, but separation at a short distance  with flurries of combat from time to time and place to place. I sort of suggested a possible alternative consensus where the default state is close contact but with very tentative, low intensity combat.

I would prefer to suggest close contact with non-tentative combat in which experienced warriors and soldiers would use superior skill and stamina to advantage, as this is what is suggested by our source accounts.

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There's plenty of room for variation from time to time and case to case, some being more or less inclined to get stuck in and fight 'barbarian style' - but such fights when they occurred must have been of short duration.

Unless reinforced by a continuing flow of rear-rankers or fresh formations.

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I also suggest that (for example) hoplites fought continuously and at high intensity, but for very short periods

Agree about high intensity, but periods seem to have been variable: short at First Mantinea, rather longer at Marathon or Delium, or for that matter Plataea or Athens' first battle near Syracuse.  Of course, one is left with just high-intensity combat all the way if one disregards the tendency to revert to a shoving match to force a decision. ;)

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while (for example) Romans fought intermittently with fallings back, missiles and discontinuous combat, over longer periods.

My reading of the sources is that each line fought continuously until wearied, then dropped back through the next line for relief, handing over in mid-fight.

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FWIW I'm not totally convinced about dynamic standoff as I've said - but I'm also not at all convinced by hour long high intensity melees. I await hard evidence or strong rational arguments with interest (if little hope).

Might I also encourage searching for such information oneself?

Quote from: aligern on August 26, 2016, 04:18:57 PM
I still see that actual fighting time will be limited and restricted and rests will be necessary. Think of Ariovistus' Germans against Caesar who became so exhausted that they were reduced to standing with overlapped. shields whilst the  legionaries had to pull the formation apart to get at them.

Which indicates that however necessary rest periods might have been, they did not get them.  We get these levels of exhaustion on the battlefield precisely because participants do not get a chance for discontinuity and rest.

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Punctuated flurries gives us another mechanism  which works in that both sides must withdraw to rest and if the Romans are carrying out line relief they need a separation and to have time to do this.

Actually no: the Roman line relief system was designed to execute reliefs in mid-combat.  Otherwise they would not even need a line relief system; they could just feed in fresh troops during the 'separation'.

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I just cannot conceive that close order infantry formations can move backwards whilst in contact for several hundred yards, those on the retrograde would be falling over.

And taking losses as a result, which would explain the high Spartan casualties at Leuctra, for example.

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So the Helvetii recoil say ten or twenty yards, recuperate and then the Romans, who have also paused, come on again, taking the ground. The action is going to have to be interrupted by pauses, because even if it is of a more sparring, parrying and looking for openings nature, the men will become exhausted and they must not get to this state because then they are liable to make deadly mistakes.

This is worth examining (see Gallic War I.25 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0001%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D25)).  Caesar took up a position on higher ground and sent away his army's horses, or at least those in his vicinity - not an action that suggested he envisaged a follow-up or a pursuit.  His men broke up the Helvetii attack, and:

"At length, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and, as there was in the neighborhood a mountain about a mile off, to betake themselves thither."

Caesar would have been diffident about pressing them, considering how he had deployed a somewhat nervous army in an uphill position, and slowness to follow up amply explains the Helvetii's ability to retreat back to their 'mountain' without the Romans exerting pressure.  (This is a change to what I had previously thought, derived from re-examining the material.)

A lack of any contact during the retreat, intermittent or otherwise, seems illustrated by:

"When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii who had betaken themselves to the mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle."

Hence the sequence is explained by: Helvetii attack defending Romans uphill and fail; Helvetii fall back without contact and Caesar belatedly follows up; Boii and Tulingi spring their attack; Helvetii close and re-engage; a long and vigorous fight is had by all.  Caesar himself:

"Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and wagons. For during the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh hour [i.e. 12 (noon) 1 P. M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till late in the night ..." - Gallic War I.26.1-3

I suggest the "no one could see an enemy with his back turned" might apply only to the renewed fight once the Boii and Tulingi had arrived and not to the retreat of the Helvetii to the mountain (which might save us from having to envisage the Helvetii walking backwards a mile or so).  This still leaves a long and unremitting midday-to-eventide struggle before a decision was reached.

Well I agree with you Roy (I think, since I'm not totally sure what you are saying). The boxer analogy as I took it was more about lethality than exhaustion - if boxers had swords (and shields) how long would bouts last? I don't think boxers with weapons could fight for hours, not (just) because they would be exhausted, but because if in all that time they hadn't landed a single telling blow, they weren't really trying.

I think we have two options:
- fights lasted a long time, but there were breaks for breathing, resting, relieving or whatever
- fights lasted a short time

I don't think anybody whose opinion matters believes that fights were long, vigorous and with high lethality.

My money is on the second option (short fights) if anyone cares. This fits with the sources, the psychology, the human endurance and the lethality. It has problems with the battlefield clock, but then maybe the battlefield clock needs adjusting. But it's a big complicated subject and like all big complicated subjects is not susceptible to short simple answers.

We might use a wargames analogue here.  When rules were based on strict time and ground scales, one could total the length of the game in minutes.  If take a real battle and consider how long it would last if everyone went at it full speed and with full lethality, it would be over much quicker than the recorded lengths.  The obvious conclusion is that battles were fought in a more measured way (or could be - there do seem to be some very quick battles).

I'm only vaguely familiar with the battle field clock concept, but some of the discontinuity must be down to the "phasing" of fights.  As I've said, this is easily seen in many medieval battles.  But it is clearly there in some of the Roman examples (even more so if you are in the camp that doesn't accept line relief happened in contact with the enemy).  Gaps between phases may have been short but they will have provided some of the required recuperation time.

In terms of the combats themselves, I do think sporting endurance examples do give us some pause for thought.  Boxers should give us some inkling of the "barbarians" perhaps and how long you can sustain full on violence before exhaustion sets in.  Though we should perhaps recall that bare-knuckle fights could last considerably longer.  I think I would agree with Patrick (it does happen) that pitch sports like rugby and football are more like a looser form of combat, as even for a rugby forward, a lot of the time, you are changing position with close action rucking, mauling, scrumming etc. interspersed.  That said, I can't think of any competitive sports which involved continuous close contact for extended periods. 

We should perhaps also remember that 'professional' soldiers from Romans to Knights of St John trained extensively to build up their endurance; Greeks popularised exercise as a form of recreation which also doubled as fitness training.  Such troops could keep it up for much longer than those who did not practise to build up endurance.

Quote from: RichT on August 26, 2016, 09:34:53 PM
I don't think anybody whose opinion matters believes that fights were long, vigorous and with high lethality.

Try Suetonius Paullinus' victory over the Iceni in AD 61.

"Thereupon the armies approached each other, the barbarians with much shouting mingled with menacing battle-songs, but the Romans silently and in order until they came within a javelin's throw of the enemy. 2 Then, while their foes were still advancing against them at a walk, the Romans rushed forward at a signal and charged them at full speed, and when the clash came, easily broke through the opposing ranks; but, as they were surrounded by the great numbers of the enemy, they had to be fighting everywhere at once. 3 Their struggle took many forms. Light-armed troops exchanged missiles with light-armed, heavy-armed were opposed to heavy-armed, cavalry clashed with cavalry, and against the chariots of the barbarians the Roman archers contended. The barbarians would assail the Romans with a rush of their chariots, knocking them helter-skelter, but, since they fought with breastplates, would themselves be repulsed by the arrows. Horseman would overthrow foot-soldiers and foot-soldiers strike down horseman; 4 a group of Romans, forming in close order, would advance to meet the chariots, and others would be scattered by them; a band of Britons would come to close quarters with the archers and rout them, while others were content to dodge their shafts at a distance; and all this was going on not at one spot only, but in all three divisions at once. 5 They contended for a long time, both parties being animated by the same zeal and daring. But finally, late in the day, the Romans prevailed; and they slew many in battle beside the wagons and the forest, and captured many alike." - Cassius Dio LXII.12.1-5

Dio is presenting as apparently simultaneous a number of things which would most probably have happened in sequence, but what stands out is that this was a long fight carried on with great keenness on both sides.  The disparity in training, equipment and techniques is reflected in the final casualties, which Tacitus gives as 400 dead and 400 wounded on the Roman side, and 80,000 dead for the Iceni.  One should point out that Tacitus' account of the action (Annals XIV.37) gives the impression the Britons broke early, with most of the time being dedicated to unremitting slaughter of the vanquished; either way, those 10,000 Romans, or rather the file leaders, seem to have been in protracted if one-sided action without a break for hours.

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My money is on the second option (short fights) if anyone cares. This fits with the sources, the psychology, the human endurance and the lethality. It has problems with the battlefield clock, but then maybe the battlefield clock needs adjusting. But it's a big complicated subject and like all big complicated subjects is not susceptible to short simple answers.

How does it fit with the sources?  The latter are quite emphatic that some fights were long and involved.  There were, indeed, many fights which were decided quite quickly, but this was by no means all of them.  The 'short fight' option is a short, simple answer for a big, complicated subject. :)

Quote from: Erpingham on August 27, 2016, 09:26:49 AM
We might use a wargames analogue here.  When rules were based on strict time and ground scales, one could total the length of the game in minutes.  If take a real battle and consider how long it would last if everyone went at it full speed and with full lethality, it would be over much quicker than the recorded lengths.  The obvious conclusion is that battles were fought in a more measured way (or could be - there do seem to be some very quick battles).

WRG rules showed this par excellence.  There were a number of reasons:
1) Wargamers tend not to form battlelines; armies do.  When you form a coherent battleline you do not get individual units picked off as so often happens on the tabletop.  Putting everyone shoulder-to-shoulder drops the casualty rate and the casualty total.
2) Wargamers tend to treat light infantry as a force to extend their frontage: real armies used them for a half-hour or so of warm-up skirmishing.  Once the real fighting began, the light infantry removed itself to the rear ranks or the rear of the army rather than waiting to be run down by something heavier.
3) Wargamers tend to deploy right across the tabletop, exposing the whole army to attrition.  Real armies deployed deeper and on a narrower frontage, restricting the 'killing interface'.
4) Wargamers tend to move at maximum speed whenever they can.  Real-life troops tended to move at half speed and only when they had to, except when in a real hurry or charging.
5) WRG casualty rates (treating troops rendered hors de combat as kills) are four times those of their historical counterparts.

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I'm only vaguely familiar with the battle field clock concept, but some of the discontinuity must be down to the "phasing" of fights.  As I've said, this is easily seen in many medieval battles.  But it is clearly there in some of the Roman examples (even more so if you are in the camp that doesn't accept line relief happened in contact with the enemy).  Gaps between phases may have been short but they will have provided some of the required recuperation time.

Command structure also builds in a 'phasing' element when each 'battle' or contingent is committed in turn.  Where all the commands are lined up together to begin with, as at Towton (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Towton) or Barnet (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Barnet), such 'phasing' is by no means obvious.  Barnet is considered to have lasted 2-3 hours; Towton 3-10 hours.

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That said, I can't think of any competitive sports which involved continuous close contact for extended periods. 

Well, there is Greco-Roman wrestling (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Roman_wrestling).  Although timing is now two three-minute periods, do check how long bouts lasted for in the early 20th century. ;)

QuoteCommand structure also builds in a 'phasing' element when each 'battle' or contingent is committed in turn.  Where all the commands are lined up together to begin with, as at Towton or Barnet, such 'phasing' is by no means obvious.  Barnet is considered to have lasted 2-3 hours; Towton 3-10 hours.

It is certainly easier to see if divisions/forces and clearly committed one after another.  Barnet is a problem, because of the fog, but clearly the two sides don't just engage and go head-to-head until one exhausts itself.  An entire wing breaks through and conducts a pursuit, rallies, return and ends up in a battle with archers of its own side (who can't therefore, have been in contact at this point).  At Towton, what are we counting as the battle?  Leaving aside that you wouldn't get ten hours of daylight on a snowy day in February in Yorkshire, the Yorkists didn't start on the field so had to deploy.  At some point the archers of all or part of the two armies shot at each other, seemingly for a short time and seemingly in advance of their main bodies (because the Yorkists can retreat out of sight and range).  After the two armies contact they seem to fight for some time before Yorkist reinforcements march up and enter the battle.  There then follows a long and bloody rout and pursuit.  So, several phases.  But we know virtually nothing about combat tactics of the WOTR.  We only know about the archer battle because someone thought the ruse was clever.  We do know that the weaponry of the close combat infantry would need a lot of effort to use effectively.  Could men really use pollaxes and bills to smash through armour continuously for hours?  Or did they spend times poking at each other with the pointy bit like re-enactors?  Or even draw back from time to time before falling on again?

Deep breath... one last try.

Patrick, channelling Cassius Dio:

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"They contended for a long time"

The whole point is that 'a long time' is an entirely subjective and relative term. Ten minutes can be 'a long time' for some activities. It may be that ten minutes was 'a long time' for hand to hand combat, or that three hours was. The sources alone do not tell us. I'll repeat that. The sources alone do not tell us.

The passage from Dio seems to me a quintessential description of discontinuous combat: "a group of Romans, forming in close order, would advance to meet the chariots, and others would be scattered by them; a band of Britons would come to close quarters with the archers and rout them, while others were content to dodge their shafts at a distance" etc etc. If you'd posted that to support the argument for discontinuous combat I might be convinced (but it anyway seems largely irrelevant to what we were talking about, which is close quarters hand to hand combat between formed heavy infantry).

Greco-Roman wrestling, like boxing, is largely beside the point, because they weren't trying to kill each other (at least, not trying seriously). And it's one on one, not in massed formation. And it might well have been discontinuous for all I know. In terms purely of stamina and endurance, it might have been possible to 'fight' for eight hours but we'd need more data on how these exceptional wrestling bouts were conducted to be sure of that. But I don't see how two formations of armed men can stand face to face fighting with attempted lethality with weapons for eight (or any number of) hours, whether Greco Roman wrestlers or any other sports people did or not, for the reasons given (i.e. lethality, hits per minute, casualties).

'Short fights' is not a short simple answer - you just haven't understood the question. As Anthony describes very well there are all sorts of timing issues in battles besides how long the opposing forces actually stood in contact bashing each other. For big, complicated, potentially long lasting battles to have had only short periods of actual combat seems counterintuitive - and yet we know with absolute certainty that this is how battles worked in more recent periods. Take Waterloo - 'starts' 11 am, 'finishes' 8 pm - given only a two hundred word description of Waterloo (equivalent to most ancient battle descriptions we have), how would we determine how long combat between infantry and infantry, or cavalry and infantry etc, actually took? Anyone who said "easy, 9 hours" would clearly be in error. Yet that is pretty much what you are doing with ancient battles.

Now I'm still largely agnostic on this, though my hunch is short fights as I said; but to be convinced either by dynamic stand off or multi-hour melees I need to see some answers to the difficult questions, and those haven't been forthcoming. Just quoting an ancient battle account and emboldening the words 'a long time' doesn't cut it.

 had a look at bare knuckle fighting. The longest bout supposedly went on for more than six hours, but we do not know how much resting and breaking  off occurred. Looking at Irish traveller bare knuckle fights on Youtube  tyey seem quite shirt. On a cursry goance one dies seem to go on for 15 minutes of continuous movement, thgh actual hard hits are nt that frequent and at the end both men are dropping their guard through tiredness. That rather reinforces the view that fights are short because endurance is short and that long battles are created when there are several mutual retirements and reengagements. Such a process with one side taking the ground each tome, explains, for me, the retirement of the Gauls and Spaniards at Cannae. Clearly they do nit stand soludly in line and fight, so there has to be a push back mechanism. One that has them withdrawing whist fightin face a face with the Romans is not terribly satisfactory. A mechanism where they withdraw a few yards when tired and then the Romans advance from their own withdrawn position  is a satisfactory explanation. An explanation whereby there is only a short fight and during it the Gauls and Spaniards pull back from convex to concave and in the same short period the cavalry battles are fought,the Carthaginians surrounded and the Africans swing in on the flanks just does not seem credible.
Roy

Quote from: Erpingham on August 27, 2016, 01:12:49 PM
Barnet is a problem, because of the fog, but clearly the two sides don't just engage and go head-to-head until one exhausts itself.  An entire wing breaks through and conducts a pursuit, rallies, return and ends up in a battle with archers of its own side (who can't therefore, have been in contact at this point).

The remainder of both armies would still have been hard at it.

QuoteAt Towton, what are we counting as the battle?

Probably the three hours or so of modern estimates rather than Polydore Vergil's ten, which presumably encompassed the whole gamut from deployment to end of pursuit.

QuoteWe do know that the weaponry of the close combat infantry would need a lot of effort to use effectively.  Could men really use poleaxes and bills to smash through armour continuously for hours?  Or did they spend times poking at each other with the pointy bit like re-enactors?  Or even draw back from time to time before falling on again?

Probably something of each: when facing other pole-armed troops, they might just settle for poking and foyning if their hearts were not in it; how motivated were the Wars of the Roses rank-and-file?  English billmen did not hold back at Flodden, and presumably did not do so without a good reason.  That said, if up against a similarly-armed formation, did they face off and curse or charge and close?  If the latter, we could expect a short and dedicated period of weapon use just prior to contact, followed by a much longer period of face-to-face embarrassment with polearms sticking in the air unable to be used and both sides resorting to falchions and shoving to decide the issue.

When chopping helpless Lancastrians into the River Cock, our Yorkist billman could take his time and pick his blows, so like an experienced woodsman (which many probably were) he could last all afternoon.

Quote from: RichT on August 27, 2016, 05:32:51 PM
Now I'm still largely agnostic on this, though my hunch is short fights as I said; but to be convinced either by dynamic stand off or multi-hour melees I need to see some answers to the difficult questions, and those haven't been forthcoming. Just quoting an ancient battle account and emboldening the words 'a long time' doesn't cut it.

Seeing the multi-hour melees described as such would be enough for the unprejudiced observer, but it might be worth clarifying a few points.

1) What are the difficult questions?  (They may appear difficult to some but not others, but we might as well have them listed.)
2) How 'short' is short time-wise?  What sort of time period is envisaged for a) the whole action from deployment to conclusion of pursuit (if any), and how much of this is close-in fighting?  (Not trying to grind an axe here, just get a picture.)

Quote'Short fights' is not a short simple answer - you just haven't understood the question.

Or perhaps my respected interlocutor has answered the wrong question ...

QuoteTake Waterloo - 'starts' 11 am, 'finishes' 8 pm - given only a two hundred word description of Waterloo (equivalent to most ancient battle descriptions we have), how would we determine how long combat between infantry and infantry, or cavalry and infantry etc, actually took? Anyone who said "easy, 9 hours" would clearly be in error. Yet that is pretty much what you are doing with ancient battles.

That is because ancient battles differ considerably in style and substance from Waterloo: opponents do not 'come on in the same old style' and get 'beaten off in the same old style': they close and they stick.  Having swords and spears as primary armament rather than muskets has a lot to do with this - effective reach is 2-3 feet not 50+ yards.  Think about Paullinus' fight against the Iceni: how much room did either side have to 'stand off' when one was backed up against the end of a valley and the other against its own oncoming masses?

QuoteBut I don't see how two formations of armed men can stand face to face fighting with attempted lethality with weapons for eight (or any number of) hours, whether Greco Roman wrestlers or any other sports people did or not, for the reasons given (i.e. lethality, hits per minute, casualties).

Given the number of accounts we have with Romans dropping from blood loss as a result of wounds and then picking themselves up to fight again, plus the small number of dead-to-wounded where such numbers are mentioned for a non-losing side, I would suggest that lethality estimates are somewhat overrated.  As to why this may be there are reasons which can be offered, but the essence seems to be that lethality is not a constant and perhaps needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis rather than a steamroller application.

QuoteThe whole point is that 'a long time' is an entirely subjective and relative term.

Not when backed by diurnal phenomena (hour of day judged by position of sun in sky, approach of dusk etc.).  And while perception of time in combat is to a considerable degree subjective in an era without portable timepieces, 'a long time' is qualitatively different to 'a short time', and I would be interested to see any cases where such perceptions overlap.

Quote from: aligern on August 27, 2016, 07:35:23 PM
Had a look at bare knuckle fighting. The longest bout supposedly went on for more than six hours, but we do not know how much resting and breaking  off occurred. Looking at Irish traveller bare knuckle fights on Youtube  they seem quite shirt. On a cursory glance one does seem to go on for 15 minutes of continuous movement, though actual hard hits are not that frequent and at the end both men are dropping their guard through tiredness. That rather reinforces the view that fights are short because endurance is short and that long battles are created when there are several mutual retirements and reengagements.

If armies consisted of boxers (apart from the Boxer Rising, naturlich) this would be a point.

Quote
Such a process with one side taking the ground each time, explains, for me, the retirement of the Gauls and Spaniards at Cannae. Clearly they do not stand solidly in line and fight, so there has to be a push back mechanism.

Please explain why.

QuoteA mechanism where they withdraw a few yards when tired and then the Romans advance from their own withdrawn position  is a satisfactory explanation.

Not really, because they are now a few yards back, still with Romans pressing them and still tired.  Romans are not sportsmen who will obligingly let their opponents take a breather and pass round the half-time oranges. ;)

Quote
An explanation whereby there is only a short fight and during it the Gauls and Spaniards pull back from convex to concave and in the same short period the cavalry battles are fought,the Carthaginians surrounded and the Africans swing in on the flanks just does not seem credible.

True, particularly as our sources maintain that the Gallo-Spanish line cracked under pressure and ran.

The answer would seem to lie in Hannnibal's second line of Gauls, 16,000 strong and fresh; there were intended to halt the enthusiastic but disorganised Roman pursuers - and did.  At this juncture, the Africans closed in and crunched the wings while the Roman centre was trying to sort itself out but instead collected Hasdrubal's cavalry in its rear.

Re : length of battles.  I don't think the issue is the ancient and medieval people couldn't judge time, even in a stressful situation.  The problem is that participants in battles don't simply think a battle consists of hand-to-hand combat - if somebody is shooting at you intermittently you're in battle.  You may think you're in battle if your front line is engaged and you are awaiting the call to relieve them.  So, when the history of the battle is written, the accounts collected will suggest "a long time" quite truthfully, but won't necessarily mean intense, hand-to-hand combat was going on throughout.

Re : sports.  The only real advantage of this is to give us some parameters for endurance in a competitive environment (which, one might suggest, the battlefield is the ultimate expression of).  Different endurances for different things but high energy effort exhausts quickest, it seems.  Pace patrick, this does fit with a model of barbarians using high energy assaults and Romans having a more measured approach.  Contact sports add taking injuries in the course of the action into the mix.

QuoteNot really, because they are now a few yards back, still with Romans pressing them and still tired.  Romans are not sportsmen who will obligingly let their opponents take a breather and pass round the half-time oranges. ;)

Disregarding humourous asides, this is the crux of the dispute.  The discontinuous proponents do not believe that forces in combat, given room to operate, would physically be fighting all the time.  Continous combat advocate that once forces locked horns, there was no escape until one fled or died where it stood.  The closest the two sides seem to come is to suggest combat varied in intensity over time.  Presumably both sides are agreed that the most intensive fighting was on initial contact, in an effort by one side or both to break the opponent quickly.  Thereafter, we have an ebb and flow of either low intensity contact and/or short separation and calls by leaders (commanders sometimes, possibly low-level leaders more often) to renew high energy combat to try to break the enemy.  Is this the closest we can get to consensus?

It might help if we were to clarify a few points and quantify others.  The classical period was the apogee of the melee weapon battle: in most Greek and Republican Roman battles archers are very much an optional extra, and not present in quantity.  During the mediaeval period we can see more of a 'combined arms' approach rather than a 'supported predominant arm' approach.  There is also a tendency for the decisive action in earlier mediaeval battles to consist of either knights vs knights or knights vs spear/polearm footmen; the one will tend to be relatively quick in action and decision, the other intermittent.  The arm of decision in classical battles was usually the not-so-humble heavy infantryman, and his modus operandi is to fight in place for however long it takes because he does not really have a choice.

When we talk of a 'short' or 'long' battle, what do we mean in hours or minutes?
Regarding 'low intensity' fighting, does this mean tentative and reluctant weapon play or that troops have settled into an energy-efficient rhythm as opposed to the all-out impetus of the more enthusiastic and less clothed barbarian persuasion?
Similarly, what do we mean by 'intense hand-to-hand combat'?  More than one of us might be talking at cross-purposes over this ...

My impression is that the combat component of most classical period battles where one side had a clear advantage in leadership, technique or both were over in less than a couple of hours of actual fighting: Alexander's battles epitomised this, and we see the same when Lucullus meets Tigranes' Armenians and catches them wrong-footed.  The rest of the day is spent in pursuit or dealing with surrounded Greek mercenaries.  Pharsalus is an interesting case, because Caesar states that "the battle had lasted till noon," while from the fact that Caesar was breaking camp when he saw Pompey's army offering battle and had to deploy and advance to engage we can surmise that the battle started perhaps two hours before noon, three at the outside.

Pharsalus was a close and unremitting contest: during these two putative hours, two of Caesar's lines and all three of Pompey's became exhausted, or so Caesar tells us, noting that the Pompeians collapsed when he committed his fresh third line.  This gives us a very rough rule of thumb that a veteran Roman line will last about an hour and a variegated or undistinguished one perhaps two thirds of that. Unlike Greek hoplites, who apparently revert to shoving when weapon play ceases to satisfy, Roman combat technique seems to rely on weapon use throughout.

These I would consider 'short' battles; they appear to involve continuous combat without intermission or remission.  Would others consider them 'long'?

Quote from: Erpingham on August 28, 2016, 11:37:19 AM

Disregarding humourous asides, this is the crux of the dispute.  The discontinuous proponents do not believe that forces in combat, given room to operate, would physically be fighting all the time.  Continuous combat advocates that once forces locked horns, there was no escape until one fled or died where it stood.  The closest the two sides seem to come is to suggest combat varied in intensity over time.  Presumably both sides are agreed that the most intensive fighting was on initial contact, in an effort by one side or both to break the opponent quickly.

This would be a logical assumption or conclusion: the more tentative one is at initial contact, the more certain one is to lose.

Quote
Thereafter, we have an ebb and flow of either low intensity contact and/or short separation and calls by leaders (commanders sometimes, possibly low-level leaders more often) to renew high energy combat to try to break the enemy.  Is this the closest we can get to consensus?

Are we aiming at consensus, or are we trying to determine how certain nationalities and troop types fought?

QuoteAre we aiming at consensus, or are we trying to determine how certain nationalities and troop types fought?

The optimist in me likes to think we could do both but the realist says we'll do neither.  :)

I don't mean to distract from the main topic, but I think the question is somewhat related.
We are all familiar with the rout potentially producing more casualties than the battle itself.

But what is the earliest example of this we have from our classical period sources?

It just strikes me that knowing you have a high chance of being killed ingloriously in a rout, will change your incentives during a battle.
Some warfare might have a ritual component or at least is less existential.

Quote from: Dangun on August 29, 2016, 04:00:47 AM

We are all familiar with the rout potentially producing more casualties than the battle itself.

But what is the earliest example of this we have from our classical period sources?

Mass death in battle in the Med and Europe predates the classical era.  Egyptians delighted in piling up body parts of defeated enemies and counting them, as I believe did the Assyrians.  In Europe you have sites of Bronze Age fights like Tollense where there are hundreds of bodies.  Now, of course, dynamics may have been different and all these people died fighting toe-to-toe but I doubt it.  Certainly, they weren't fighting your classic New Guinea inter-tribal ritual warfare.

Quote from: Dangun on August 29, 2016, 04:00:47 AM
It just strikes me that knowing you have a high chance of being killed ingloriously in a rout, will change your incentives during a battle.

Judging by the number of times commanders of armies in do-or-die situations make speeches reminding their troops about this, it was not a particularly active thought process for the ordinary fighting man.  (What, rout, us?  No, we're going to get stuck in and enjoy ourselves for once instead of all that marching.)

As far as I can see, the major inhibitors to rout were 1) pride/esprit de corps and 2) orientation.  Routs happen when things inexplicably go wrong (if they explicably go wrong, one can pass it off with a comment about those good-for-nothing allies/mercenaries/subject troops and just carry on).  They also happen when your chaps start thinking of themselves as vulnerable individuals rather than part of an army that is either the best or is currently doing well against those who think they are.

Quote from: Erpingham on August 28, 2016, 09:20:27 PM

QuoteAre we aiming at consensus, or are we trying to determine how certain nationalities and troop types fought?

The optimist in me likes to think we could do both but the realist says we'll do neither.  :)

Can we at least try for how they fought; if we succeed or at least make progress there, then consensus should look after itself.  In any event, seeing accounts and analysis of troops in action is generally more interesting for the average reader. :)

Briefly returning to Towton and Barnet, what was English tactical procedure at the time?  My impression (from Towton) is that the action was opened by a continuous line of archers, who presumably then fell back behind a continuous line of billmen and left close action to the latter while the cavalry got on with their own thing.  If so, then when Oxford unknowingly approached Montagu's right rear, the latter's billmen would be fighting but his archers would be unengaged and hence able to deploy and shoot against the new arrivals.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 29, 2016, 09:00:30 AM

Quote from: Erpingham on August 28, 2016, 09:20:27 PM

QuoteAre we aiming at consensus, or are we trying to determine how certain nationalities and troop types fought?

The optimist in me likes to think we could do both but the realist says we'll do neither.  :)

Can we at least try for how they fought; if we succeed or at least make progress there, then consensus should look after itself.  In any event, seeing accounts and analysis of troops in action is generally more interesting for the average reader. :)

Though constantly going over the same old ground, re-iterating adversarial theories may, perhaps , turn off the average reader and make him/her reluctant to engage with the topic?

Quote

Briefly returning to Towton and Barnet, what was English tactical procedure at the time?  My impression (from Towton) is that the action was opened by a continuous line of archers, who presumably then fell back behind a continuous line of billmen and left close action to the latter while the cavalry got on with their own thing.  If so, then when Oxford unknowingly approached Montagu's right rear, the latter's billmen would be fighting but his archers would be unengaged and hence able to deploy and shoot against the new arrivals.

Actually, I think I'd largely agree.  It does appear that an initial archery exchange followed by melee was the norm but evidence is slight.  What archers did after that is unknown.  Filing back through or round their comrades and standing behind (or maybe sometimes on the flanks) makes sense.  Whether anybody attempted an archery exchange in thick fog is doubtful and the archers may have begun the battle behind the close combat troops in that case.  Oxford's returning troops may have bumped archers deployed to cover the flank of Montagu's battle when their comrades disappeared into the mist, leaving it rather exposed.

Quote from: Erpingham on August 29, 2016, 10:40:00 AM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 29, 2016, 09:00:30 AM

Can we at least try for how they fought; if we succeed or at least make progress there, then consensus should look after itself.  In any event, seeing accounts and analysis of troops in action is generally more interesting for the average reader. :)

Though constantly going over the same old ground, re-iterating adversarial theories may, perhaps , turn off the average reader and make him/her reluctant to engage with the topic?

Perhaps if we dispensed with the theory?  Looking at the accounts and asking what is going on there should take us some distance, at least.  After that we can offer surmises and see if they look tenable.

QuoteIt does appear that an initial archery exchange followed by melee was the norm but evidence is slight.  What archers did after that is unknown.  Filing back through or round their comrades and standing behind (or maybe sometimes on the flanks) makes sense.  Whether anybody attempted an archery exchange in thick fog is doubtful and the archers may have begun the battle behind the close combat troops in that case.  Oxford's returning troops may have bumped archers deployed to cover the flank of Montagu's battle when their comrades disappeared into the mist, leaving it rather exposed.

Good point about the mist at Barnet: unless both sides' archers had a good idea of the enemy's initial positions, it would have made sense not to waste time and arrows shooting at random and the archers may well have stayed out until Montagu's men reacted to Oxford's unexpected arrival.

Quote from: Erpingham on August 29, 2016, 08:40:54 AM
In Europe you have sites of Bronze Age fights like Tollense where there are hundreds of bodies.  Now, of course, dynamics may have been different and all these people died fighting toe-to-toe but I doubt it.  Certainly, they weren't fighting your classic New Guinea inter-tribal ritual warfare.

I'm not sure this is the complete picture, at least not for in-group battles...
If we go back to Krentz's "casualties in Hoplite Battles" its striking how low the caualties are - averaging 5% for the winners, and 14% for the losers. And the spread is really narrow - 2-10% for the winners and 3-20% for the losers. A clear winner (ratio of 3:1 casualties) but there doesn't appear to be any massacres that follow a rout. In fact, there doesn't seem to be any massacres at all.

And the narrative can be misleading, Xenophon describes the Battle of Coronea as an orgy of killing, "shield pressed upon shield they struggled, killed and were killed in turn," but yet Diodorus says only 350 Spartans died (2%) and 600 Boetians (3%).

Which finally brings my long-winded self back to the topic - the casualty data makes it look likes these weren't existential struggles. So for how long can they have really been fighting?

Again consider the Battle of Coronea, the casualty rates suggest that for frontage of 100 hoplites facing 100 hoplites produced only 5 casualties. 5/200? Doesn't that imply that it took very little time to achieve, or that something other than fighting is going on. Some tribal chest-thumping perhaps?

Please excuse me if Kerantz is out of date, this is not my period.

Glad to have you in the discussion, Nicholas.

Pursuit (the phase which traditionally inflicts most battle casualties) does not seem to have been a particular feature of hoplite battles, particularly where Spartans were involved (their attitude being 'let the cowards live - and breed - to make out work easier in future').  Cavalry was also an under-represented arm in hoplite warfare.  It is this tendency not to press a pursuit that makes me conclude that the unusually heavy Spartan casualties at Leuctra occurred mainly because the Spartans did not rout but were tumbled back, resisting, over a long distance.

There was one occasion when one hoplite army virtually annihilated another hoplite army: the final getaway attempt of the Athenians from Syracuse (Thucydides VII.79-85).  The Syracusans managed to catch the 10,000 or so Athenians moving in two separate bodies and surround both contingents, one of about 6,000 and one about 4,000.  The 6,000-strong contingent surrendered, but the 4,000-strong contingent tried to conduct a fighting retreat.  To cut a long story short, "a large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war" - Thucydides VII.85.4.  The rest were taken prisoner apart from a few who escaped individually.

Quote from: Dangun on August 29, 2016, 02:19:29 PM
Again consider the Battle of Coronea, the casualty rates suggest that for frontage of 100 hoplites facing 100 hoplites produced only 5 casualties. 5/200? Doesn't that imply that it took very little time to achieve, or that something other than fighting is going on. Some tribal chest-thumping perhaps?

Xenophon, our principal source, gives no casualty figures, so we are left with Diodorus XIV.84.2, which states "There fell of the Boeotians and their allies more than six hundred, but of the Lacedaemonians and their associates three hundred and fifty."  As usual, only the dead are listed, and the wounded - who could be many times the dead - are not noted.  Hence in looking at Krentz's listings (which should still be in date as his sources have not changed; his problem is that he does not look at actions in enough detail) we should remember that anything up to 90% of casualties (as opposed to lethalities) are not mentioned.

It is important to note that at Coronea the left wing of each army ran at or just before contact, so as far as that part went the action was of very brief duration, the main fight (and producer of casualties) being the subsequent contretemps (dare one say othismos?) between the Thebans and Spartans as Agesilaus sought to prove a point about who was superior rather than take the sensible course of using his troops' better discipline to win cheaply with a flank attack.  It is this portion of the action, by a minority of each army, which provided the majority of casualties on each side and percentages and loss rates should be adjusted with this in mind.

Mrs Erpingham here, making one of her occasional contributions.  One of the things worth remembering is that everything moved more slowly in the past.  You don't believe me - remember that it was thought within our lifetime that no man could run a mile in four minutes!!

Evidence from experimental archaeology and anthropological research - admittedly to do with agriculture - is that absolutely no bugger went at it like modern Olympic boxers, judoku, wrestlers or what have you.  People talked slowly. They walked slowly. The cadences of work songs, whether reaping or raising an anchor are slow. Old boys who still knew how to use a scythe moved with a regular and slow pace that at the end of the day cut more grass than Monty Don going at it like a bull at a gate. 

Mostly (and this evidence comes as much as a side effect as those awful tv shows that put a group of city slickers in a swamp as anything else) this is because people in the past didn't have access to enough calories to go at it like Kilkenny Cats. We know from Isandlwana that Cetshwayo instructed his impis to "move slowly". We know from Rorke's Drift that while some of the reason Dabulamanzi failed to take the station was a " short chamber Boxer Henry .45 miracle", part of it was that his impis hadn't eaten for two days.

People in the past had much more endurance than modern folks, but they didn't go at it fast.  It's outside living memory now just, but accounts suggest that labouring men could keep up a slow steady pace that would kill modern chaps, but like labourers these days (removals men are the ones I've worked with) they do it by working at a steady speed and taking regular breaks.

My guess is that both sides in a prolongued contest regularly fought each other to a standstill, drew off, then started again at the same slow, attritional pace. Occasionally, as with baresarks or Alexander's Forlorn Hopes, you got guys hyped up on something, who went at it like mad march hares - but if they didn't break through must have either had some method of retreat (which the baresarks had behing a shieldwall) or dropped in their tracks. The rest, particularly for men at arms/legionaries, must have been a slow plod, and a slow swing - like a woodsman - and some mechanism by which there were small breaks.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 29, 2016, 08:39:21 PM
Xenophon, our principal source, gives no casualty figures, so we are left with Diodorus XIV.84.2, which states "There fell of the Boeotians and their allies more than six hundred, but of the Lacedaemonians and their associates three hundred and fifty."  As usual, only the dead are listed, and the wounded - who could be many times the dead - are not noted.  Hence in looking at Krentz's listings (which should still be in date as his sources have not changed; his problem is that he does not look at actions in enough detail) we should remember that anything up to 90% of casualties (as opposed to lethalities) are not mentioned.

It is important to note that at Coronea the left wing of each army ran at or just before contact, so as far as that part went the action was of very brief duration, the main fight (and producer of casualties) being the subsequent contretemps (dare one say othismos?) between the Thebans and Spartans as Agesilaus sought to prove a point about who was superior rather than take the sensible course of using his troops' better discipline to win cheaply with a flank attack.  It is this portion of the action, by a minority of each army, which provided the majority of casualties on each side and percentages and loss rates should be adjusted with this in mind.

I am sure there are data and interpretation issues with any one of the battles surveyed by Kerantz, and probably issues with the whole endeavor - like how did the ancients define casualties or were they more likely to inflate combatants or casualties.

But... the casualty rates are SO low, I think it begs a high level explanation, rather than trying to unpick each datum.

Alternatively, I propose a thought experiment! If 100 hoplites faced another 100 hoplites, how long would it take them to produce 19 deaths/casualties? (5 for the winners and 14 for the losers as per the Kerantz data). I would have guessed less than 10 minutes or approximately 2 deaths per minute (1% casualties per minute).

It suggests to me that the low casualty rates support the idea of short engagement times (your idea, I believe Patrick :) ) and/or that in-group fighting was more ritualistic/less existential than we might assume.

So while hoplite vs hoplite is only a small subset, the low casualty rates, suggest to me that fighting could have easily been continuous because it could have also been very short in duration.

...and with some risk of dragging the thread into painfully familiar territories, short/low casualty engagement times might help us with othismos because we don't have to explain why a quarter of the hoplites weren't crushed/suffocated at the bottom of the scrum.

Hoplite warfare seems to be a very formalised affair (to some extent social ritual).  We should be wary of generalising from it.  Rout and pursuit seems to have been a much more serious killer in the Middle Ages, for example (more cavalry available may have been an element).

Hello Mrs E - it's a good point about endurance v performance - and why sport analogies may be less useful since all modern sports optimise for speed or performance over a fixed distance or duration, rather than endurance (only exceptions being various ultra marathons I suppose). Ancient combatants may well have optimised for endurance. But even so - regular breaks gets us back to discontinuous combat, while the tradition, whatever its worth, of 'barbarians' going at it hammer and tongs, plus the adversarial nature of combat (the pace is largely determined by the faster), plus the descriptions of what sounds like quite active fighting, mean I still can't envisage multi-hour melees.

yes, I've worked with the old men who did keep up their job for hours, but they worked slowly and methodically. When you're carrying twenty stone sacks up a ladder you don't rush it  8)

I think that most combat was fought by people who wanted to stay alive. So I would see the two lines standing close but not touching, then occasionally the line advancing with most men concentrating more on their shield than their spear.

Sometimes somebody would die, or be wounded and fall back leaving a gap, but the other side would be wary about stepping into it because you're likely to get stabbed in the flank because it's not covered.
The advantage of leaders and veterans who knew each other would be that they could step forward, because they knew their flanks would be covered.

Jim

I've been looking through the Irish accounts to get a "barbarian" perspective but they are not much direct help - even battles of unusually long duration (Clontarf, maybe Dysert O'Dea) are described in terms of continuous combat, though it's hard to see how the sheer level of activity described could have been kept up for any length of time. One passage that may indicate something more measured is in the Pharsalus account I wrote about in the most recent Slingshot: 
Of the borders of the battle on each side were then made serried edges in the likeness of a hacked tree; for wherever were the stubborn braves and the high-spirited soldiers and the champions of battle and the valorous heroes in the forefronts of the battalions, great breaches were broken and huge gaps were brought in the battalion in front of them, so that the forefronts of the battalions made for the hands of the other, as sea-promontories on the land or lands on sea. The braves then grew wearied of making those gaps at once in the breasts of the foreign battalions, so that the bulwark of shields was closed after them, that the line of the shield-backs might come again in the same order on the forefronts of the battalions.

So the mutual battle lines get broken up with multiple small salients and re-entrants, but eventually the tired and exposed men at the tip of each salient "rally back" behind the shieldwall - the implication is that both sides are doing this (with equally tired men, presumably) as there's no hint that one side is following up as the other retires. This would have the effect of creating a space (and probably a fairly local space, rather than one along the battle line as a whole) for men to take a breather. But that's implicit, not explicit.

Cheers
Mick 

We do have one source for how one particular army trained, or at least the training recommendations for that army based on previous experience, and this gives some insights into what was expected on the battlefield.  Enter Vegetius.

THE POST EXERCISE

We are informed by the writings of the ancients that, among their other exercises, they had that of the post. They gave their recruits round bucklers woven with willows, twice as heavy as those used on real service, and wooden swords double the weight of the common ones. They exercised them with these at the post both morning and afternoon.

This is an invention of the greatest use, not only to soldiers, but also to gladiators. No man of either profession ever distinguished himself in the circus or field of battle, who was not perfect in this kind of exercise. Every soldier, therefore, fixed a post firmly in the ground, about the height of six feet. Against this, as against a real enemy, the recruit was exercised with the above mentioned arms, as it were with the common shield and sword, sometimes aiming At the head or face, sometimes at the sides, at others endeavoring to strike at the thighs or legs. He was instructed in what manner to advance and retire, and in short how to take every advantage of his adversary; but was thus above all particularly cautioned not to lay himself open to his antagonist while aiming his stroke at him.

Note the apparent duration of the exercise: "morning and afternoon".  Did this involve breaks, apart from the customary midday meal?  Vegetius does not say.  One gets the impression that the goal was a combination of endurance and technique: an energy-efficient technique coupled with a high degree of endurance.

NOT TO CUT, BUT TO THRUST WITH THE SWORD

They were likewise taught not to cut but to thrust with their swords. For the Romans not only made a jest of those who fought with the edge of that weapon, but always found them an easy conquest. A stroke with the edges, though made with ever so much force, seldom kills, as the vital parts of the body are defended both by the bones and armor. On the contrary, a stab, though it penetrates but two inches, is generally fatal. Besides in the attitude of striking, it is impossible to avoid exposing the right arm and side; but on the other hand, the body is covered while a thrust is given, and the adversary receives the point before he sees the sword. This was the method of fighting principally used by the Romans, and their reason for exercising recruits with arms of such a weight at first was, that when they came to carry the common ones so much lighter, the greater difference might enable them to act with greater security and alacrity in time of action.

We may note the arms of double weight, intended to give the troops a margin of spare capability when they went into action.

THE DRILL CALLED ARMATURA

The new levies also should be taught by the masters at arms the system of drill called armatura, as it is still partly kept up among us. Experience even at this time convinces us that soldiers, perfect therein, are of the most service in engagements. And they afford certain proofs of the importance and effects of discipline in the difference we see between those properly trained in this branch of drill and the other troops. The old Romans were so conscious of its usefulness that they rewarded the masters at arms with a double allowance of provision. The soldiers who were backward in this drill were punished by having their allowance in barley. Nor did they receive it as usual, in wheat, until they had, in the presence of the prefect, tribunes, or other principal officers of the legion, showed sufficient proofs of their knowledge of every part of their study.

Unfortunately Vegetius does not tell us exactly what armatura was.  Looking elsewhere (specifically at the Roman Infantry Tactics Wikipedia article (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_infantry_tactics)), armatura is explained as "a term for sparring that was also used to describe the training similar one-on-one training [sic] of gladiators. Unlike earlier training, the wooden weapons used for armatura were the same weight as the weapons they emulated."

The key to armatura seems to be, apart from the use of service-weight practice weapons, the substitution of a one-on-one opponent for the wooden post.

Vegetius seems to be telling us that Romans soldiers were (at least before his time) trained to hone the economy of their technique and boost their endurance (he adds swimming, vaulting and marching with burdens as endurance-developing exercises).  We shall examine his observations on battle in another post but here is a preview:

Above all, a general must never attempt to alter his dispositions or break his order of battle during the time of action, for such an alteration would immediately occasion disorder and confusion which the enemy would not fail to improve to their advantage.

What does this tell us about the likelihood of mid-action breaks?

Well, if we are quoting training regimes, Here is the Norwegian Kings Mirror c.1250 on the subject of infantry combat

But if you are in a borough or some such place where horses cannot be
used for recreation, you should take up this form of amusement: go to your
chambers and put on heavy armor; next look up some fellow henchman (he
may be a native or an alien) who likes to drill with you and whom you know
to be well trained to fight behind a shield or a buckler. Always bring
heavy armor to this exercise, either chain-mail or a thick gambeson, and
carry a heavy sword and a weighty shield or buckler in your hand. In this
game you should strive to learn suitable thrusts and such counterstrokes
as are good, necessary, and convenient. Learn precisely how to cover yourself
with the shield, so that you may be able to guard well when you have to
deal with a foeman. If you feel that it is important to be well trained
in these activities, go through the exercise twice a day, if it is convenient;
but let no day pass, except holidays, without practicing this drill at
least once .....

But in ordinary warfare on the lawful
command of your chief, you need to shun manslaying no more than any other
deed which you know to be right and good. Show courage and bravery in battle;
fight with proper and effective blows, such as you have already learned,
as if in the best of humor, though filled with noble wrath. Never fight
with feigned strokes, needless thrusts, or uncertain shots like a frightened
man. Heed these things well that you may be able to match your opponent's
skill in fighting. Be resolute in combat but not hot-headed and least of
all boastful.

....If you are fighting on foot in a land battle and are placed at the point
of a wedge-shaped column, it is very important to watch the closed shield
line in the first onset, lest it become disarranged or broken. Take heed
never to bind the front edge of your shield under that of another. You
must also be specially careful, when in the battle line, never to throw
your spear, unless you have two, for in battle array on land one spear
is more effective than two swords.


We may detect perhaps the echo of Vegetius here but it isn't a copy in any way.  Train hard in full gear, use measured stokes, don't waste effort.  Note the importance of thrusting with the spear as against sword blows - a question of reach?  It all
seems measured and methodical.

QuoteAbove all, a general must never attempt to alter his dispositions or break his order of battle during the time of action, for such an alteration would immediately occasion disorder and confusion which the enemy would not fail to improve to their advantage.

What does this tell us about the likelihood of mid-action breaks?

Not a lot?  This is surely about high level decisions on troop disposition, not nitty-gritty low level combat. 

Quote from: Dangun on August 30, 2016, 02:06:58 AM
I am sure there are data and interpretation issues with any one of the battles surveyed by Kerantz, and probably issues with the whole endeavor - like how did the ancients define casualties or were they more likely to inflate combatants or casualties.

But... the casualty rates are SO low, I think it begs a high level explanation, rather than trying to unpick each datum.

I would give protection as a 'high-level explanation'.  Remember what Justin said about a hoplite being 95% protected from the front?  This would considerably lower the casualty rates in a basically frontal action.  Granted that later hoplites in felt caps and linen corselets had a lesser degree of protection, but they were still quite hard to kill.

Quote
It suggests to me that the low casualty rates support the idea of short engagement times (your idea, I believe Patrick :) ) and/or that in-group fighting was more ritualistic/less existential than we might assume.

Hoplite battles were often - but not always - over quite quickly, especially when each side broke the other's left at or before contact, like First Mantinea (418 BC).  Others (e.g. Delium in 424 BC) went on rather longer with the Theban right os ... oth ... er ... thrusting back the Athenian left while the Athenian right carved up the Thebans' allies.  One should be wary of automatically correlating low casualties with short engagement times: if an army runs at first contact, it can suffer heavily from pursuit even in a brief battle.

It may be illuminating to look at what happened at Sphacteria.  Here 400 Spartans were assailed with missiles by "... all the crews of rather more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of oars, with the arms they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty round Pylos, except the garrison on the fort."  The vastly superior Athenian force (c. 8,000 armed rowers and c.3,000 other troops) avoided close combat, dividing into 200-strong units which used harassment and skirmishing tactics for a whole day.

"For a long time, indeed for most of the day, both sides held out against all the torments of the battle, thirst, and sun, the one endeavoring to drive the enemy from the high ground, the other to maintain himself upon it." - Thucydides IV.35.4

The final score? 

"The number of the killed and prisoners taken in the island was as follows: four hundred and twenty heavy infantry had passed over; three hundred all but eight were taken alive to Athens; the rest were killed. About a hundred and twenty of the prisoners were Spartans. The Athenian loss was small, the battle not having been fought at close quarters." - idem 38.5

So an afternoon's shooting by several thousand men, albeit not all were shooting all the time, produced 98 dead Peloponnesians (another 30 were overrun when the Athenians landed).  This suggests that hoplite protection, even the attenuated version then in vogue, was quite effective and responsible for much casualty reduction.  A similar afternoon's harassment of a 600-strong Spartan mora by Iphicrates' 3,000 peltasts at Lechaeum in 390 BC resulted in a rout and 250 dead Spartans (Xenophon, Hellenica IV.5.11-17).  Hoplite melee was quite lethal by comparison, and we have no reason to suppose that combat was in any way tentative.

Hoplites famously went into action with commitment, being frequently described as doing so dromon, i.e. at the run, which rather excludes any possibility of tentativity (or tentativeness).  They did keep their battles fairly brief compared to most others, largely it would seem by the process of reverting to the shove (othismos) as a means of decision instead of spending the whole afternoon fighting in place until everyone dropped* or one side felt overmatched and left in a hurry.

*Except for one man on one side.  This was what was meant by a 'Cadmeian victory', after an early period engagement in which such mutual almost-annihilation is said to have happened.

Thucydides does describe one hoplite battle (Laodicium, 425 BC) of extended duration, but frustratingly does not provide details.

"During the winter following the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were kept quiet by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid. The victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings opposed to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. [2] After heavy loss on both sides the battle was undecided, and night interrupted the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night on the field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans with drew to Bucolion and set up theirs afterwards." - Thucydides IV.134

Moving on to the greater generality of infantry combat, I think what we are all finding is an emphasis on keeping it steady and effective, making one's energy last (and building up stamina and endurance in the first place), which is, as our esteemed Mrs Clipsom and Mr Webster observe, the way things were traditionally done.  Mr Clipsom's 'measured and methodical' summarises it perfectly.

What we are not finding is an emphasis on getting yourself and/or your troops out of combat for regular breaks/breathers to keep them fit for action.  An exception might be found among the 'barbarian fringes': Mick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

Such differences in fighting style are a good reason for treating each military system on a case-by-case basis, albeit there are some with useful similarities.

QuoteMick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

I think we should be careful not to see the attacks as just by individuals.  Individual assaults wouldn't produce the promontory effect - more like wedges or groups.  I think we are seeing the medieval tendency to focus on the hero and crediting him with all success of the men he led. 

Quote from: Erpingham on August 30, 2016, 01:48:41 PM

QuoteMick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

I think we should be careful not to see the attacks as just by individuals.  Individual assaults wouldn't produce the promontory effect - more like wedges or groups.  I think we are seeing the medieval tendency to focus on the hero and crediting him with all success of the men he led.

I suspect that the named individual was leading a group of followers who watched his back and flanks.

Jim

Quote from: Erpingham on August 30, 2016, 01:48:41 PM

QuoteMick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

I think we should be careful not to see the attacks as just by individuals.  Individual assaults wouldn't produce the promontory effect - more like wedges or groups.  I think we are seeing the medieval tendency to focus on the hero and crediting him with all success of the men he led. 

I agree. At this period individual "champions" are an anachronism, though of course a favourite topic for bards writing (and paid for) praise-poems. Medieval texts make it clear that chieftains and nobles fought surrounded by their immediate retainers so any "promontory effect" is achieved by a group. For example, At the very outset, Conor mac an togha of the thick spear and broad blade with two hundred men hurtled among them, maiming some, beheading others, (Battle of Corcomroe, 1317AD in The Triumphs of Turlough; the same passage contains several similar descriptions).

Cheers
Mick

Quote from: Jim Webster on August 30, 2016, 02:10:05 PM

Quote from: Erpingham on August 30, 2016, 01:48:41 PM

QuoteMick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

I think we should be careful not to see the attacks as just by individuals.  Individual assaults wouldn't produce the promontory effect - more like wedges or groups.  I think we are seeing the medieval tendency to focus on the hero and crediting him with all success of the men he led.

I suspect that the named individual was leading a group of followers who watched his back and flanks.

Jim

A bit like this - Egil at the Battle of Vinheath (aka Brunanburh)

Then did he keenly spur them on to the charge, himself foremost in the van. He had in his hand his sword Adder. Forward Egil pressed, and hewed on either hand of him, felling many men. Thorfid bore the standard close after him, behind the standard followed the rest. Right sharp was the conflict there. Egil went forward till he met earl Adils. Few blows did they exchange ere earl Adils fell, and many men around him. But after the earl's death his followers fled. Egil and his force pursued, and slew all whom they overtook; no need there to beg quarter.

All of which seems to leave us right where we started - if combat was long lasting (and we still don't know how long 'long' is - no source says, and nobody seems to have hazarded a guess - but I'm assuming at least one hour, possibly multiple hours) then this might have been possible if fighting was very tentative, the emphasis was on saving energy not killing the enemy, and most of the time nothing much really happened. Then whether two lines fought actively for a bit then pulled apart a few paces before having another go, or whether they stood face to face the whole time, but didn't actually hit each other (or even try to hit each other) very often, seems largely immaterial - this is the hidden consensus again, of combat being mostly inactivity (or not what we would think of as combat activity), whether at a distance of a few yards, or toe to toe. The toe to toe version though seems to me more unlikely given what we know from other periods about the instability and psychological stress of close combat. And neither seems wholly satisfactory.

Quote from: RichT on August 30, 2016, 07:14:35 PM
... we still don't know how long 'long' is - no source says, and nobody seems to have hazarded a guess ...

Define 'short'.  'Long' is longer than that. :)

Seriously, we have quite a few battles which are interrupted by the onset of darkness, and it is reasonable to assume that unless an approach march is mentioned (e.g. Argentoratum) the battle would have started in the morning after both sides had breakfasted and deployed, say 10am-ish by our reckoning.  This is the long side of 'long'.

Quote
then this might have been possible if fighting was very tentative, the emphasis was on saving energy not killing the enemy

There is an important difference between 'tentative', which essentially means hesitant, and being energy efficient, which the training texts tend to emphasise.  I would point out that it is not a case of 'saving energy not killing the enemy' but saving energy while killing the enemy.  This is what the whole Roman system was about.

Quote
... this is the hidden consensus again, of combat being mostly inactivity (or not what we would think of as combat activity), whether at a distance of a few yards, or toe to toe.

This kind of idea seems to creep in once a country has not fought a major war for at least a generation.  It is noticeably absent when the historians have themselves participated in such an event.

Quote
The toe to toe version though seems to me more unlikely given what we know from other periods about the instability and psychological stress of close combat. And neither seems wholly satisfactory.

One lesson of military history is that troops close to the enemy feel a need to attack, to prove themselves and get on with the action.  It is more stressful standing close to the enemy and doing nothing than it is piling into him and doing something.  Close combat in the classical period was the expected norm which everyone who was anyone trained for.  Men were expected to fight until they dropped, and in some cases would even get up for another go.  Yes, it was stressful and some people could not take it, but it was also exhilarating and probably the most exciting and rewarding activity available to man outside marriage or wargaming. ;)

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 30, 2016, 12:13:11 PM
One should be wary of automatically correlating low casualties with short engagement times: if an army runs at first contact, it can suffer heavily from pursuit even in a brief battle.

That is not what I am arguing.

In-so-far as we have any facts - the known fact, from the sources for hoplite vs hoplite (Kerantz data) - is low casualties. Frustratingly, as you say, we have very few facts bearing on engagement times.

I am not arguing that short engagements cannot produce high casualties.
(Although... and I am sure you will find this distracting, but the Kerantz data suggests we don't have any high casualty battles in the hoplite vs hoplite sample, so what are we talking about? Your point about the rout is not a relevant criticism of the Kerantz data, although it certainly explains why other battles were bloodier.)

I am arguing that low casualties can only be produced by short engagements. I think I am essentially agreeing with you? :)

And I go back to the thought experiment: if 100 hoplites faced another 100 hoplites, how long would it take them to produce 19 (10%) casualties?

Let's have some guesses.
10 minutes? 20 minutes? An hour?
An hour sounds hardly credible because it implies 1 casualty every 3 minutes. 200 hoplites pushing, stabbing, hacking, punching for 3 minutes and only 1 person dies. I find it hard to believe.

So I agree with you Patrick, I think battles were short.

QuoteSo I agree with you Patrick, I think battles were short.

Actually, I don't think Patrick said this.  I think he holds a similar position to others that some were short and some were long based on our sources.  While a short battle can be all "Wham, Bham, thank you mam", a longer battle must be something else.  What is that something else?  Is it spent largely in contact but fighting methodically/non-vigorously?  Is it spent only partly in contact but fighting harder when you are?  Some hybrid between?

Quote from: Dangun on August 31, 2016, 10:16:43 AM

I am arguing that low casualties can only be produced by short engagements. I think I am essentially agreeing with you? :)

Nearly, but not quite. :)  Low casualties can also be produced by spending a long time trying to make holes in well-protected opponents, which is what I am partially arguing in respect of hoplites - only partially, as there were cases when hoplites, caught from angles other than frontal, went down like ninepins, and when they went into what we might call othismos casualties would drop to practically nothing until the push was resolved.

Krentz' data is useful, but like all data a simplistic and unidirectional approach wastes most of what it can tell us.  I know that looking at the circumstances of each battle in turn can be really boring, but it is the only way to establish how the casualties came about, and to whom.

Take First Mantinea (418 BC).  Krentz comes up with the winners losing 3.3% of their force (300) and the losers 13.8% (1,100).  This allows the utterly misleading conclusion that on about a 1,000-man front (slightly more for the Spartans) each winning hoplite killed one opponent and each losing hoplite 0.3 of an opponent and the compilation of a lethality table based on this misrepresentation.  Statistics is something military historians need to avoid along with lies and damned lies, or better, to use very carefully and in the context of as full an understanding of the armies studied as possible.

The reality of the First Battle of Mantinea is that practically all the Spartan losses occurred in two contingents: the Sciritae and the Brasideans, each 600-700 strong, isolated on the Spartan left and facing a superior Argive right; the Argives' own left and centre collapsed or fled before they could inflict any meaningful casualties.  So what we really have is that 1,000 picked Argives plus maybe 2,000 less exalted hoplites (say 3,000 in all) downed 300 opponents in a few minutes and sent the remainder running back to their camp.  Given that only 1/8 of 3,000 would have been in contact, i.e. 375 or so, each average front-rank Argive finished off just under one Spartan in a few minutes - and would probably have done more if the remainder had not fled.

This of course was not the end of the battle: as the Argives returned from their successful encounter, the Spartans, who had seen off the rest of the Argive allies, slammed them in flank and helped to round off the day's lopsided casualty figures.

First Mantinea was a day of rapid encounters with flanking giving swift results.  Delium (424 BC) six years previously was more of a mixed battle.  Krentz, leaving aside Diodorus' dubious description, concentrates on Thucydides' account, which gives each side around 7,000 hoplites and gives a winner loss of 7% (500) and a loser loss of 14% (1,000).  What he does not note is that the winner's loss was concentrated mainly in a single contingent:

"The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each other." - Thucydides IV.96.3

The Boeotian left and centre were being thrust back and/or nibbled away, but meanwhile the 25-deep Theban right was advancing against their 8-deep Athenian opponents.

"... the right, where the Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them further and further back, though gradually at first." - idem, 4

This progress by shoving does not appear to have been productive of many casualties - yet.  Then things went seriously wrong for the Athenians, and they really had only themselves to blame.

"It so happened also that Pagondas [the Theban commander], seeing the distress of his left, had sent two squadrons of horse, where they could not be seen, round the hill, and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing of the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming against them. [6] At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic, and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole Athenian army took to flight." - idem, 5-6

Pursuit time!  Now the Thebans could settle down to some really serious killing, but ...

"Some [Athenians] made for Delium and the sea, some for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of safety, [8] pursued and cut down by the Boeotians, and in particular by the cavalry, composed partly of Boeotians and partly of Locrians, who had come up just as the rout began. Night however coming on to interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily than they would otherwise have done." - idem 7-8

Delium was another of these battles when night stopped play, or rather ameliorated the loser's casualty level.  The winner's score thus topped out at around a thousand, but could have been significantly higher with more daylight, given that for once a Greek army had a substantial pursuing force of cavalry.  The battle had begin 'late in the day' (IV.93.1) so was not an all-day affair, and our best clue to duration is that the Theban right had managed to shove back the Athenian left 'slowly at first' and was still going while the Athenian right and centre were emerging victorious over outflanked opponents of broadly similar depth, i.e. there had been no large-scale rapid breaking and running as at First Mantinea. 

Quote
And I go back to the thought experiment: if 100 hoplites faced another 100 hoplites, how long would it take them to produce 19 (10%) casualties?

As I hope to have explained, or at least expounded, there is more to it than that.  Ordered hoplites facing ordered hoplites will have hardly any losses because both sides are well protected and fresh, so while there will be a number of wounds inflicted and spears broken, any more than a handful of deaths would be unusual at this stage.  Our 100 hoplites will probably be deployed 10 x 10, so after a few minutes of ten men thrusting with hard but not frantic strokes, 10 files of 10 men will be pushing against the other 10 files of 10 men and even the frequency of wounding will drop, probably to near zero.  Finally, one side will - or at least should - prevail, and the other will be tumbled back, losing cohesion and formation, and the successful pushers will resume use of weapons against foes who are now off-balance and/or deprived of mutual support.  This is when the casualty count will begin to rise, and one-sidedly, too.  The loser will probably crack soon, losing most of his front rankers while the rest drop their shields and run away (the difference in load between them and shielded pursuers allowing them to get away without much of a pursuit).

Quote
Let's have some guesses.
10 minutes? 20 minutes? An hour?
An hour sounds hardly credible because it implies 1 casualty every 3 minutes. 200 hoplites pushing, stabbing, hacking, punching for 3 minutes and only 1 person dies. I find it hard to believe.

It is possible between opponents of comparable strength and skill, but as noted above if no clear results emerged from the initial weapon play (which we term doratismos as a convenient label) both hoplite formations would tend to go for a shoving match (which we likewise term othismos) to decide the issue.  This is one reason hoplite battles tended to be shorter than their Roman counterparts; Romans seemed happy to go on all day with their weapon play (might we call this perhaps xiphismos?), changing lines when exhaustion or lack of success rendered the fighting line ineffective.  Hoplites, by contrast, used the weight and cohesion of their formation as a means of producing a result, and although we have no good timekeeping to tell us exactly how long they would keep this up for, it did allow them to stay in contact for rather longer than the doratismos stage without suffering many casualties; those would come when one side was overborne.

Anyway, that is my current understanding.  It seems to fit the patterns we get from Greek battles generally and Thucydides' accounts in particular.  I hope it illustrates that there is - or certainly should be - much more to battle and army technique analysis than statistical analysis of and derivations from the losses on each side.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 31, 2016, 12:15:15 PM
Statistics is something military historians need to avoid along with lies and damned lies, or better, to use very carefully and in the context of as full an understanding of the armies studied as possible.

Methodologically, I disagree. Its rare, but we are incredibly lucky when we can generate statistics. Sure, interpretation is required, but far less than for literary analysis for example.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 31, 2016, 12:15:15 PM
Krentz' data is useful, but like all data a simplistic and unidirectional approach wastes most of what it can tell us.  I know that looking at the circumstances of each battle in turn can be really boring, but it is the only way to establish how the casualties came about, and to whom.

Its not that its boring. But unless you repeat the process for all of the battles and show there is something structurally wrong with Kerantz's data - all you have is anecdote. An exception is not convincing evidence. Sure reality admits exceptions, but a methodical and broad collection of data - like Kerantz - is far more persuasive.

Now I have not (and will not) repeat Kerantz's compilation to verify or refute, but that's what's required to convincingly show the conclusion is flawed.

Not a bad topic for a Slingshot article Patrick? :)

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 31, 2016, 12:15:15 PM
Finally, one side will - or at least should - prevail, and the other will be tumbled back, losing cohesion and formation, and the successful pushers will resume use of weapons against foes who are now off-balance and/or deprived of mutual support.  This is when the casualty count will begin to rise, and one-sidedly, too.

But this is exactly what Kerantz's source data says did not happen. The casualties were not one-sided. (Unless you've switched to non-Hoplite vs Hoplite.)

If you accept Kerantz data I think the implications are pretty clear.

I think its more interesting as to why some types of battles produce low casualties and no rout massacre e.g. hoplite vs hoplite (strongly suggesting short engagements) and some types of battles produce high casualties and rout massacres? If rout massacres are part of the prevailing culture, I am string motivated to fight longer.

I think you guys should introduce hanson, if you want to focus on hoplite battles.

He is pretty convincing that the entire ethos if hoplites warfare was to get it over with as quickly as possible.  That the objective was not to kill the enemy army. But rather to have them acknowledge your hegemony, which facilitated a short , sharp, low casualty battle.

And add in that the spartans notoriously did not pursue, which defacto encourages the other side to put up a show and then scarper in safety.

All of which seems to be generally true, until the Peloponnesian war changed the dynamic entirely and saw the end of hoplite ascendency.

Mark - yes and no.  It was night, not brevity and restraint, which put a stop the the Theban pursuit at Delium.  It was the inability of infantry with shields to catch infantry without shields that kept casualty rates down in an infantry pursuit.  I have seen no evidence of any tendency towards an "Oh, these are fellow Hellenes; we've won, let's go easy on them" attitude: quite the reverse.  Athens inflicted andropodismos - the slaughter of the entire male population - on the defeated Melians in 416 BC.  They almost did so to the Mytilenians (on Lesbos) in 427 BC (they reconsidered the following day and sent a reprieve).  The Spartans and Thebans slaughtered the entire garrison of Plataea when it surrendered in 427 BC.  Hence I think Hanson is quite wrong when he thinks the acknowledgement of hegemony was the principal aim: regrettably, blatant genocide was just as often on the agenda - and the 'democratic' cities were worst of all.  This is admittedly stating matters a bit starkly because not every victory was followed by some form of civil massacre; the mentions are in aid of making the basic point that Greeks were not particularly restrained or merciful with respect to other Greeks, so Hanson seems to be barking up the wrong tree with his short, sharp hegemony-focussed battle.

Hoplites incidentally remained in the ascendant well after the Peloponnesian War; in fact until the rise of Macedon in 356-336 BC.  This is why Darius III had so many hoplites in his armies: they were still the best available, at least outside Macedon.


Nicholas - I think you overrate statistics.  Statistics, properly handled, are useful for establishing apparent and sometimes real correlations: used for anything else they are a short road to overriding both observation and common sense.

Incidentally, I am referring to Peter Krentz, Casualties in Hoplite Battles.  Is this the 'Kerantz' you refer to, just to make sure we are talking about the same material?

Quote from: Dangun on August 31, 2016, 02:12:38 PM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 31, 2016, 12:15:15 PM
Statistics is something military historians need to avoid along with lies and damned lies, or better, to use very carefully and in the context of as full an understanding of the armies studied as possible.

Methodologically, I disagree. Its rare, but we are incredibly lucky when we can generate statistics. Sure, interpretation is required, but far less than for literary analysis for example.

This reminds me of something attributed to the Mullah Nasrudin.

"O people!  Do you want knowledge without difficulties, truth without falsehood, attainment without effort, progress without sacrifice?*"

Quote
Its not that its boring. But unless you repeat the process for all of the battles and show there is something structurally wrong with Kerantz's data - all you have is anecdote. An exception is not convincing evidence. Sure reality admits exceptions, but a methodical and broad collection of data - like Kerantz - is far more persuasive.

I think this misses the point: Krantz' data is hopelessly generalised, and fails to deal with how casualties were actually incurred.  It is not that 'his data' is 'structurally wrong' but rather that it fails to tell us anything useful or even usable about hoplite warfare.  He puts together the 'what' and completely fails to address the 'how' and 'why'. 

Quote

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 31, 2016, 12:15:15 PM
Finally, one side will - or at least should - prevail, and the other will be tumbled back, losing cohesion and formation, and the successful pushers will resume use of weapons against foes who are now off-balance and/or deprived of mutual support.  This is when the casualty count will begin to rise, and one-sidedly, too.

But this is exactly what Kerantz's source data says did not happen. The casualties were not one-sided.

They were pretty one-sided once an army started crumbling, and we were discussing 100 hoplites vs 100 hoplites at this particular juncture, not the vagaries of success and disaster when army meets army.

Quote
I think its more interesting as to why some types of battles produce low casualties and no rout massacre e.g. hoplite vs hoplite (strongly suggesting short engagements) ...

Or rather strongly suggesting an inability to mount an effective pursuit, as pursuit usually generates the marked inequality of casualties between winner and loser through producing the majority of casualties for the latter.  If we are to conclude anything from Krantz' 'data' it would seem to be that pursuit was rare and, when it occurred, incomplete.

I think we all agree that hoplite battles were generally shorter than Roman battles, and not just because armies in Greece were usually smaller.  Hoplites had a way of shortening battles, and it seems that the major contributors to this relative brevity were:

1) Habitual outflanking of the opponent's left (often on account of the right hand drift Thucydides describes in his account of First Mantinea).
2) Marked differences in troop quality at some points in the line (usually on or near the right).
3) The use of coordinated pressure to decide the action once it became apparent that weapon play by the front ranks could otherwise go on all day on account of no clear superiority having emerged.

Concerning exactly how long the face-to-face combat portion lasted, the major time contributor would be how long it took to establish a superiority in othismos, and also how long othismos continued to be contested by the losing side once a superiority had been established.  I know of no battles where 'the shove' resulted in neither side succeeding, but it would be interesting if there was one.  In any event, fit men evenly matched might keep this up for a considerable length of time, leading to an Epaminondas calling: "Give me one more step for victory!" or words to that effect.

*When everyone said 'Yes!' Nasrudin replied: "I only wanted to know. You may rely on me to tell you all about it if ever I discover any such thing."

Just an observation, but since we have done hoplite battles to death (I think we have at least three other threads on them) perhaps time to move on.  This will also stop my teeth grating as patrick reruns his othismos theory :)  Anywhere else with a good record of battles over various lengths between heavy infantry (preferably not Republican Rome)?

Pat, both of your examples if massacres are from the Peloponnesian period or later.

Yes agreed Anthony, hoplites are really a red herring in this context, the context of the thread being originally to discuss discontinuous combat ie (presumably) the dynamic standoff model of Roman (and their opponents) heavy infantry combat.

If all this is going to be is yet another thread where one person grinds on about the hoplite scrum theory ('othismos'), a 20th C invention for which there is no ancient evidence whatsoever (so there), then been there, done that, boring.

Peter Krentz's name seems to be causing a lot of difficulties. It is Krentz, not Kerantz, not Krantz.

My one observation about casualty statistics (and yes statistics are useful and widely used by historians - like any tool they must be used properly and can be abused, but getting an overall idea of average losses in battles is valuable) - is that the important figure is the losses suffered by the victor, rather than the loser (since it's not possible to separate out pursuit losses from combat losses for the loser). The finding from this is that losses are low which suggests (doesn't prove, isn't on its own conclusive evidence for, but suggests) short engagement times - I think everybody is in agreement on this for hoplite battles, so perhaps they can be laid to rest.

So for Roman battles, or others:

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Anywhere else with a good record of battles over various lengths between heavy infantry (preferably not Republican Rome)

Well no, the problem is AFAIK there is no record at all of the duration of combats, and only a few rather vague hints about the duration of battles - for which we need to avoid assuming that the duration of the battle and the duration of the heavy infantry combat are the same (which was the point of my Waterloo analogy of a few pages back).

Since the multi hour melee (genuine, actual fighting, in toe to toe combat, multi (more than two?) hour, melee, and leaving aside 'line relief', since non-Romans presumably didn't do it) is being proposed as a viable theory by Patrick, I would extend Nicholas' 100 hoplite thought experiment - imagine two 8 rank deep lines fighting each other, and causing, over the course of the combat, 50% casualties each (including killed and significantly wounded) - much higher casualties than are ever attested, but let's take a worst case, and assume there were lots of unrecorded wounded. Now if the battle lasted 1 hour 20 minutes (to keep the sums simple), then each file leader (whoever is file leader at the time) is scoring an effective hit (killing or wounding) once every 10 minutes. If the combat goes on longer, then hits are naturally less frequent - in a two hour melee, there would be one hit every 15 minutes, three hours, once every 22 minutes, and so on. Now while this sort of fighting would doubtless be very energy efficient, it bears no relation to any of the fighting I have ever seen or imagined (in combat sports, re-enactments, riots, TV and film reconstructions) and (more to the point) it doesn't sound at all like the descriptions of combat that exist, which all sound more violent, continuous, vigorous and dangerous than one hit every ten minutes or more would suggest. This is the fundamental problem (aside from any other considerations) I have with multi hour melees.

Yes, Mark, but so are Hanson's conclusions. :)

Anthony, please feel free to move the thread on as I have been rather hogging it so far.  The Late Roman Empire gives us a few potentially illuminating battles courtesy of Ammianus Marcellinus; Dark Ages warfare provides plentiful battles but very little description; what about the later Mediaeval era?

Before we move on, a last word (or exposition) from Vegetius, as promised.  This is from his Book III, about giving battle.  We can guess from the following how continuous combat was considered to be.

The wedge (cuneus) is a disposition of a body of infantry widening gradually towards the base and terminating in a point towards the front. It pierces the enemy's line by a multitude of darts directed to one particular place. The soldiers call it the swine's head (caput porcinum). To oppose this disposition, they make use of another called the pincers, resembling the letter V, composed of a body of men in close order. It receives the wedge, enclosing it on both sides, and thereby prevents it from penetrating the line.

Once a triangular shape has slotted into an opposing triangular hole, how easy or hard is it going to be to achieve some sort of separation for recuperative purposes?

The serra is another disposition formed of resolute soldiers drawn up in a straight line advanced into the front against the enemy, to repair any disorder. The globus is a body of men separated from the line, to hover on every side and attack the enemy wherever they find opportunity. And against this is to be detached a stronger and more numerous globus.


We note the implication that the serra is used for running repairs on the battleline.

Above all, a general must never attempt to alter his dispositions or break his order of battle during the time of action, for such an alteration would immediately Occasion disorder and confusion which the enemy would not fail to improve to their advantage.

Generals had a very hands-on role in Roman armies: decisions whether to press on or break off 'tactically' or otherwise modify the fighting tempo were the province of the general, not his subordinates, unless those subordinates were detached, e.g. with a globus watching for a chance to strike.

Quote from: RichT on September 01, 2016, 10:24:16 AM
My one observation about casualty statistics ... is that the important figure is the losses suffered by the victor, rather than the loser (since it's not possible to separate out pursuit losses from combat losses for the loser).

A good observation.  I really mean it.

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The finding from this is that losses are low which suggests (doesn't prove, isn't on its own conclusive evidence for, but suggests) short engagement times - I think everybody is in agreement on this for hoplite battles, so perhaps they can be laid to rest.

They do by and large give the impression of being brief compared to other cultures' combats, so yes.

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Well no, the problem is AFAIK there is no record at all of the duration of combats, and only a few rather vague hints about the duration of battles - for which we need to avoid assuming that the duration of the battle and the duration of the heavy infantry combat are the same (which was the point of my Waterloo analogy of a few pages back).

But in the classical period the duration of the heavy infantry combat was the majority of the duration of the battle.  Romans and their neighbours customarily opened with a period of skirmishing (Greeks and Macedonians apparently did not), but this just warmed everyone up for the main event.  Once the lines closed, they stayed closed, at least according to our sources, and this is a huge difference from Napoleonic warfare, which is why Waterloo goes out of the window as an analogy.  Hence the duration of the battle and the duration of the heavy infantry combat were pretty much the same, give or take the time consumed in pre-battle speeches and the initial skirmishing phase - plus the pursuit, if any.

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Since the multi hour melee (genuine, actual fighting, in toe to toe combat, multi (more than two?) hour, melee, and leaving aside 'line relief', since non-Romans presumably didn't do it) is being proposed as a viable theory by Patrick, I would extend Nicholas' 100 hoplite thought experiment - imagine two 8 rank deep lines fighting each other, and causing, over the course of the combat, 50% casualties each (including killed and significantly wounded) - much higher casualties than are ever attested, but let's take a worst case, and assume there were lots of unrecorded wounded. Now if the battle lasted 1 hour 20 minutes (to keep the sums simple), then each file leader (whoever is file leader at the time) is scoring an effective hit (killing or wounding) once every 10 minutes. If the combat goes on longer, then hits are naturally less frequent - in a two hour melee, there would be one hit every 15 minutes, three hours, once every 22 minutes, and so on. Now while this sort of fighting would doubtless be very energy efficient, it bears no relation to any of the fighting I have ever seen or imagined (in combat sports, re-enactments, riots, TV and film reconstructions) and (more to the point) it doesn't sound at all like the descriptions of combat that exist, which all sound more violent, continuous, vigorous and dangerous than one hit every ten minutes or more would suggest. This is the fundamental problem (aside from any other considerations) I have with multi hour melees.

Largely because my respected interlocutor turns a blind eye to the phalangitic press of files which takes over following the initial period of we-have-been-thrusting-away-for-some-minutes-and-getting-basically-nowhere, and for which there is plenty of evidence in our sources, even if Xenophon and Polybius refer specifically to file pressure or 'weight' only once each.

But I think we have agreed to move on from here.

Patrick:

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A good observation.  I really mean it.

Why, thank you :)

I don't think the Vegetius passages you quote provide any illumination at all, to be honest.

I disagree with everything else too.

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Once the lines closed, they stayed closed, at least according to our sources

Begs the question - this is precisely the point at issue.

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Hence the duration of the battle and the duration of the heavy infantry combat were pretty much the same, give or take the time consumed in pre-battle speeches and the initial skirmishing phase - plus the pursuit, if any.

But I put it to you that:

1) the deployment, the speeches, the advance, the skirmishing, the different elements of fighting, the collapse and the pursuit, if included in the duration of the battle (and we can't be certain which are or aren't included), could well make up a very, very large proportion (I would say, the vast majority) of the duration of the battle.

2) the assumption that all the heavy infantry closed and engaged at once, all along the line, as one humungous block, like on the battle diagrams we know and love, is just that, an assumption, without any really firm grounding, given the extremely brief descriptions of battles we have. There could well have been - and for Romans, with their small subunits, there must have been - all sorts of details going on below the level of the typical ancient account (which often amounts to little more than "side A with 40,000 men closed with side B with 35,000 men, they fought for some time, then side B broke and fled"). These are big armies, often with complicated internal structures, and a lot of details of what they did to each other must be lost in the brevity of the accounts that we have.

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Largely because my respected interlocutor turns a blind eye to the phalangitic press of files which takes over following the initial period of we-have-been-thrusting-away-for-some-minutes-and-getting-basically-nowhere, and for which there is plenty of evidence in our sources, even if Xenophon and Polybius refer specifically to file pressure or 'weight' only once each.

Well, no. But moving on - my reference to '8 deep' may have led you astray. My little example was intended to be about Romans or their enemies, not phalangitic files. So imagine them if you will armed (and fighting) with swords and big oblong shields throughout. My point stands - is the strike rate described at all plausible?

I agree that other examples from other periods would help enormously.

I've had a bit of a look through some accounts for medieval examples.  We are a bit limited by the fact that many battles were not just infantry fights in this period.  Here are a few examples which were (primarily - cavalry were involved at Rosebeke)

Battle of the Standard 1138 2 hours long
Battle of Neville's Cross 1346 3.5 hours long
Battle of Rosebeke 1382 1.5-2 hours long

Neville's cross is interesting, as I have suggested before, because it was a particularly long and exhausting battle in the eyes of the chroniclers.  In the words of the Anonimalle Chronicle, the two sides "fought strongly and relentlessly for a long time and two or three times rested by agreement and then fought again".  Several accounts mention the exhaustion and the need for breaks.

I've also had a glance at one or two saga accounts of battles (again usually all infantry affairs).  We have to be careful with these, as they represent history from heroic poetry perhaps padded with contemporary (13th century) military practice.  But if we look, say, at the account of Clontarf in Njal's saga in the light of the "Irish Pharsalus" account, we can see similarities, as attacks wax and wane.  A famous incident in the account is the "cursed banner" - two attacks break through to Earl Sigurd's banner and the standard bearer is killed both times.  Sigurd's men drive off the attacks but no-one will take the banner because it is cursed, so Sigurd takes it.  A third attack breaks through again, Sigurd is killed and this time his men rout.

Quote from: RichT on September 01, 2016, 12:57:29 PM
I disagree with everything else too.

Some people are just hard to please. ;)

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Once the lines closed, they stayed closed, at least according to our sources

Begs the question - this is precisely the point at issue.

So - would sir like to provide a few source quotes showing them periodically opening up again?

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But I put it to you that:

1) the deployment, the speeches, the advance, the skirmishing, the different elements of fighting, the collapse and the pursuit, if included in the duration of the battle (and we can't be certain which are or aren't included), could well make up a very, very large proportion (I would say, the vast majority) of the duration of the battle.

Which requires armies to be very patient for the pre-battle phase and very diffident about the actual fighting: much talk, little action and swift departure - a bit like a committee meeting.  Frankly, if actions were anything like this I would expect at least some hints in our sources.

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2) the assumption that all the heavy infantry closed and engaged at once, all along the line, as one humungous block, like on the battle diagrams we know and love, is just that, an assumption, without any really firm grounding, given the extremely brief descriptions of battles we have. There could well have been - and for Romans, with their small subunits, there must have been - all sorts of details going on below the level of the typical ancient account (which often amounts to little more than "side A with 40,000 men closed with side B with 35,000 men, they fought for some time, then side B broke and fled"). These are big armies, often with complicated internal structures, and a lot of details of what they did to each other must be lost in the brevity of the accounts that we have.

If this is a serious proposal that such armies historically closed partially and piecemeal, I am going to have to ask for some source evidence.

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But moving on - my reference to '8 deep' may have led you astray. My little example was intended to be about Romans or their enemies, not phalangitic files. So imagine them if you will armed (and fighting) with swords and big oblong shields throughout. My point stands - is the strike rate described at all plausible?

Caught me there. :)  However, when (or rather if, as I believe Anthony is not keen) we come to look at Republican Roman battles, we shall tend to find ourselves looking at somewhat different casualty totals and hence one would assume different loss rates.

Quote from: Erpingham on September 01, 2016, 05:56:38 PM
I've had a bit of a look through some accounts for medieval examples.  We are a bit limited by the fact that many battles were not just infantry fights in this period.  Here are a few examples which were (primarily - cavalry were involved at Rosebeke)

Battle of the Standard 1138 2 hours long
Battle of Neville's Cross 1346 3.5 hours long
Battle of Rosebeke 1382 1.5-2 hours long

Neville's cross is interesting, as I have suggested before, because it was a particularly long and exhausting battle in the eyes of the chroniclers.  In the words of the Anonimalle Chronicle, the two sides "fought strongly and relentlessly for a long time and two or three times rested by agreement and then fought again".  Several accounts mention the exhaustion and the need for breaks.

'Resting by agreement' at Neville's Cross is intriguing: given a 3.5 hour battle and 'two or three' breaks suggests that each session of fighting 'strongly and relentlessly' would have lasted - or perhaps averaged, as both sides would have become less fresh as the day wore on - about an hour.

This might be a handy rule of thumb for mediaeval infantry, which lacked Roman-style endurance training (or even Greek gymnastics) but had the underlying constant of stamina-demanding everyday rural activities - farming, for the most part.  We can hold the 'average hour' up against other mediaeval battle accounts and see how it looks.

That said, I am not sure how far the desire of both sides to stand on the defensive may have influenced their amenability to stop and chat about having an intermission, but it does at least give us some basic timing to try out for this particular culture and period.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 01, 2016, 07:49:31 PM

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Once the lines closed, they stayed closed, at least according to our sources

Begs the question - this is precisely the point at issue.

So - would sir like to provide a few source quotes showing them periodically opening up again?

Perhaps there is at least one:

Quote from: Appian, "Civil Wars" 3.68Thus urged on by animosity and ambition they assailed each other, considering this their own affair rather than that of their generals. Being veterans they raised no battle-cry, since they could not expect to terrify each other, nor in the engagement did they utter a sound, either as victors or vanquished. As there could be neither flanking nor charging amid marshes and ditches, they met together in close order, and since neither could dislodge the other they locked together with their swords as in a wrestling match. No blow missed its mark. There were wounds and slaughter but no cries, only groans; and when one fell he was instantly borne away and another took his place. They needed neither admonition nor encouragement, since experience made each one his own general. When they were overcome by fatigue they drew apart from each other for a brief space to take breath, as in gymnastic games, and then rushed again to the encounter. Amazement took possession of the new levies who had come up, as they beheld such deeds done with such precision and in such silence.

Well spotted, Duncan. :)  Any more?

I looked to see whether such behaviour was replicated in Appian's account of Pharsalus but found only this:

In the rest of the field killing and wounding of all kinds were going on, but no cry came from the scene of carnage, no lamentation from the wounded or the dying, only sighs and groans from those who were falling honorably in their tracks. The allies, who were looking at the battle as at a game, were astonished at the discipline of the combatants. So dumfounded were they that they did not dare attack Cæsar's tents, although they were guarded only by a few old men. Nor did they accomplish anything else, but stood in a kind of stupor.

[80] As Pompey's left wing began to give way his men even still retired step by step and in perfect order, but the allies who had not been in the fight, fled with headlong speed, shouting, "we are vanquished," dashed upon their own tents and fortifications as though they had been the enemy's, and pulled down and plundered whatever they could carry away in their flight. Now the rest of Pompey's legions, perceiving the disaster to the left wing, retired slowly at first, in good order, and still resisting as well as they could; but when the enemy, flushed with victory, pressed upon them they turned in flight.

Maybe praetorians did things differently ... the answer would, however, seem to be that in Appian Civil Wars 3.68, the Forum Gallorum grudge fight between two contingents of praetorians in a marsh, there was nobody in effective command on either side.  One can see the same kind of thing operating at Second Bedriacum in AD 69:

... the enemy's array was now less compact; for, as there was no one to command, it was now contracted, now extended, as the courage or fear of individual soldiers might prompt. - Tacitus, Histories III.25

Note the correlation between effective command and line integrity.  This kind of individual backing and filling is to be expected from leaderless troops (no overall commander, although centurions and perhaps tribunes would still be present), and is why the Romans stipulated that a man may not leave his place in the line of battle upon pain of death and why in Caesar and Ammianus men remain where they fall while in Appian's Forum Gallorum account we have them being "instantly borne away".

On the broader subject of mediaeval infantry combat, should we consider Dupplin Moor (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dupplin_Moor) and Agincourt (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Agincourt)?  Both of these funnelled one side into a killing ground operated by the other, feeding in men on a fairly continuous basis and considerably exercising the defenders.  But how intensively and for how long?

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 02, 2016, 11:41:34 AM
Well spotted, Duncan. :)  Any more?

Not sure. It would be worth going through all Goldsworthy, Sabin, Zhmodikov and Koon's references and checking them, but that's a large task. At one point I thought the "repeated charges" in Livy's version of Zama were conclusive - because someone has to back off without being immediately followed up to make a second charge possible - but it turns out to be a dodgy translation.

So for separations and rests mid battle, we have, spread across a wide period, Duncan's Forum Gallorum (App BC 3.68), Anthony's Neville's Cross, and my Edgehill, quoted earlier. It could be argued (and perhaps will be argued by our resident contrarian), that these are all special cases and not typical, which has a little virtue, though these are just what we've found in a casual search.

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given a 3.5 hour battle and 'two or three' breaks suggests that each session of fighting 'strongly and relentlessly' would have lasted - or perhaps averaged, as both sides would have become less fresh as the day wore on - about an hour.

Assuming that the 3.5 hours of the battle is wholly taken up by fighting, which is in dispute; and that the lulls themselves were much much shorter than the periods of fighting, which is in dispute.

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However, when (or rather if, as I believe Anthony is not keen) we come to look at Republican Roman battles, we shall tend to find ourselves looking at somewhat different casualty totals and hence one would assume different loss rates.

I don't think so - Philip Sabin (The Face of Roman Battle) finds that the victor's loss rates in Roman battles were generally similar to those in hoplite battles (about 5 percent). He proposes a similar thought experiment to mine:

"For example, even if we assume that just 5 per cent of the troops were in the front rank, and that they struck their adversaries only every five seconds, and that less than 1 per cent of these attacks caused death or mortal injury, each army would suffer 5 per cent fatalities every ten minutes."

I think this is a question which demands and deserves an answer - is it plausible to think either that armies that could inflict 5 percent casualties every ten minutes could remain in contact for hours? Or that men could remain in contact, fighting, for hours yet only cause casualties once every thirty minutes or more? Something is wrong somewhere, and the proposed lulls are a suggested solution to the problem. Just pretending the problem doesn't exist does not seem satisfactory.

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So - would sir like to provide a few source quotes showing them periodically opening up again?

Well I have said several times in this thread that lulls aren't explicitly mentioned, or else we wouldn't be having this discussion, would we? Or maybe we would, since they are explicitly mentioned on occasion (see Duncan's example), yet here we still are... But mostly, lulls are inferred.

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If this is a serious proposal that such armies historically closed partially and piecemeal, I am going to have to ask for some source evidence.

Really? Do you find it incredible that armies, especially Roman armies, of tens of thousands of men, formed in three lines and divided into independent sub units, closed partially and piecemeal? I'd have thought that was implicit in all battle accounts. As Duncan says, a proper answer needs a lengthy trawl through a lot of literature, which I'm not doing now, and in particular you really do have to read Koon on Livy before we can get any further on this (even if you disagree with his findings, he catalogues all Livy's battle vocabulary). But OK, I'll follow up a few of the references in Goldsworthy. As this will make for a long post, I'll split it, coming up.

Caesar BC 1.43-5 (Ilerda)
"In this hope, he drew out three legions, and having formed them in order of battle, commanded the first ranks [antesignani] of one of them to run before, and gain the place. Afranius perceiving his design, despatched the cohorts that were upon guard before the camp, a nearer way to the same eminence. The contest was sharply maintained on both sides: but Afranius's party, who first got possession of the post, obliged our men to give ground, and being reinforced by fresh supplies, put them at last to rout, and forced them to fly for shelter to the legions... The first ranks therefore being put into disorder, the legion in that wing gave ground, and retired to a neighbouring hill. Caesar, contrary to his expectation, finding the consternation like to spread through the whole army, encouraged his men, and led the ninth legion to their assistance. He soon put a stop to the vigorous and insulting pursuit of the enemy, obliged them to turn their backs, and pushed them to the very walls of Lerida. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, elated with success, and eager to repair the loss we had sustained, followed the runaways with so much heat that they were drawn into a place of disadvantage, and found themselves directly under the hill where the town stood, whence when they endeavoured to retire, the enemy again facing about, charged vigorously from the higher ground. The hill was rough, and steep on each side, extending only so far in breadth as was sufficient for drawing up three cohorts; but they could neither be reinforced in flank, nor sustained by the cavalry. The descent from the town was indeed something easier for about four hundred paces, which furnished our men with the means of extricating themselves from the danger into which their rashness had brought them. Here they bravely maintained the fight, though with great disadvantage to themselves, as well on account of the narrowness of the place, as because being posted at the foot of the hill, none of the enemy's darts fell in vain. Still however they supported themselves by their courage and patience, and were not disheartened by the many wounds they received. The enemy's forces increased every moment, fresh cohorts being sent from the camp through the town, who succeeded in the place of those that were fatigued. Caesar was likewise obliged to detach small parties to maintain the battle, and bring off such as were wounded. The fight had now lasted five hours without intermission, when our men, oppressed by the multitude of the enemy, and having spent all their darts, attacked the mountain sword in hand, and overthrowing such as opposed them, obliged the rest to betake themselves to flight. The pursuit was continued to the very walls of Lerida, and some out of fear took shelter in the town, which gave our men an opportunity of making good their retreat."

Commentary - OK, it's not a pitched battle as such, but it shows all the classic Roman elements of feeding in partial forces as required and relieving those engaged (where possible) - as piecemeal as can be. The fight lasting five hours should bring joy to some, but this isn't five hours of standing banging away with swords (explicitly not). In fact it reads very much as if the whole fight (at least the continuation of the fight in the narrows) was with missiles, and only at the very end, once their missiles were spent, did Caesar's men charge with the sword - at which Afranius' men immediately fled (having adopted the Lusitanian style of skirmish fighting). So we have a five hour fight in which forces engage piecemeal and there is very little hand to hand fighting.

Appian BC 3.68 (Forum Gallorum)
"Thus urged on by animosity and ambition they assailed each other, considering this their own affair rather than that of their generals. Being veterans they raised no battle-cry, since they could not expect to terrify each other, nor in the engagement did they utter a sound, either as victors or vanquished. As there could be neither flanking nor charging amid marshes and ditches, they met together in close order, and since neither could dislodge the other they locked together with their swords as in a wrestling match. No blow missed its mark. There were wounds and slaughter but no cries, only groans; and when one fell he was instantly borne away and another took his place. They needed neither admonition nor encouragement, since experience made each one his own general. When they were overcome by fatigue they drew apart from each other for a brief space to take breath, as in gymnastic games, and then rushed again to the encounter. Amazement took possession of the new levies who had come up, as they beheld such deeds done with such precision and in such silence."

Commentary - the break for a breather we have already noted. But note also the contrast with a 'normal' fight - because of the terrain, there could be no flanking or charging, and so they closed front to front and fought it out with swords. The implication being that in a normal battle, there would be flanking and charging instead.

Appian BC 4.128 (Philippi)
"The day was consumed in preparations till the ninth hour, at which time two eagles fell upon each other and fought in the space between the armies, amid the profoundest silence. When the one on the side of Brutus took flight his enemies raised a great shout and battle was joined. The onset was superb and terrible. They had little need of arrows, stones, or javelins, which are customary in war, for they did not resort to the usual manœuvres and tactics of battles, but, coming to close combat with naked swords, they slew and were slain, seeking to break each other's ranks. On the one side it was a fight for self-preservation rather than victory; on the other for victory and for the satisfaction of the general who had been forced to fight against his will. The slaughter and the groans were terrible. The bodies of the fallen were carried back and others stepped into their places from the rear ranks. The generals flew hither and thither overlooking everything, exciting the men by their ardor, exhorting the toilers to toil on, and relieving those who were exhausted so that there was always fresh courage at the front. Finally, the soldiers of Octavius, either from fear of famine, or by the good fortune of Octavius himself (for the soldiers of Brutus were not blameworthy), pushed back the enemy's line as though they were putting in motion a very heavy machine. The latter were driven back step by step, slowly at first and without loss of courage. Presently their ranks began to dissolve and they retreated more rapidly, and then the second and third ranks in the rear retreated with them, all mingled together in disorder, crowded by each other and by the enemy, who pressed upon them without ceasing until it became plainly a flight. The soldiers of Octavius, then especially mindful of the order they had received, seized the gates of the enemy's fortification, but at great risk to themselves because they were exposed to missiles from above and in front, but they prevented a great many of the enemy from gaining entrance. These fled, some to the sea, and some through the river Zygactes to the mountains."

Commentary - another argument from the negative, but here also the engagement is identified as unusual in being face to face without the 'usual manoeuvres and tactics'. The drive back step by step like a heavy machine, if it had involved hoplites rather than Romans, would have some people reaching for the 'o' key. 

These two accounts, incidentally, remind me of:

Plutarch Pyrrhus 21.6 (Battle of Asculum)
"The Romans, having no opportunity for sidelong shifts and counter-movements, as on the previous day, were obliged to engage on level ground and front to front; and being anxious to repulse the enemy's hoplites before their elephants came up, they fought fiercely with their swords against the Macedonian spears"

Josephus BJ 6.136-147
"However, the soldiers that were sent did not find the guards of the temple asleep, as they hoped to have done; but were obliged to fight with them immediately hand to hand, as they rushed with violence upon them with a great shout. Now as soon as the rest within the temple heard that shout of those that were upon the watch, they ran out in troops upon them. Then did the Romans receive the onset of those that came first upon them; but those that followed them fell upon their own troops, and many of them treated their own soldiers as if they had been enemies; for the great confused noise that was made on both sides hindered them from distinguishing one another's voices, as did the darkness of the night hinder them from the like distinction by the sight, besides that blindness which arose otherwise also from the passion and the fear they were in at the same time; for which reason it was all one to the soldiers who it was they struck at. However, this ignorance did less harm to the Romans than to the Jews, because they were joined together under their shields, and made their sallies more regularly than the others did, and each of them remembered their watch-word; while the Jews were perpetually dispersed abroad, and made their attacks and retreats at random, and so did frequently seem to one another to be enemies; for every one of them received those of their own men that came back in the dark as Romans, and made an assault upon them; so that more of them were wounded by their own men than by the enemy, till, upon the coming on of the day, the nature of the right was discerned by the eye afterward. Then did they stand in battle-array in distinct bodies, and cast their darts regularly, and regularly defended themselves; nor did either side yield or grow weary. The Romans contended with each other who should fight the most strenuously, both single men and entire regiments, as being under the eye of Titus; and every one concluded that this day would begin his promotion if he fought bravely. What were the great encouragements of the Jews to act vigorously were, their fear for themselves and for the temple, and the presence of their tyrant, who exhorted some, and beat and threatened others, to act courageously. Now, it so happened, that this fight was for the most part a stationary one, wherein the soldiers went on and came back in a short time, and suddenly; for there was no long space of ground for either of their flights or pursuits. But still there was a tumultuous noise among the Romans from the tower of Antonia, who loudly cried out upon all occasions to their own men to press on courageously, when they were too hard for the Jews, and to stay when they were retiring backward; so that here was a kind of theater of war; for what was done in this fight could not be concealed either from Titus, or from those that were about him. At length it appeared that this fight, which began at the ninth hour of the night, was not over till past the fifth hour of the day; and that, in the same place where the battle began, neither party could say they had made the other to retire; but both the armies left the victory almost in uncertainty between them"

Commentary - as a running fight in a fortification, also not a pitched battle, but again the references to the 'advances and retreats', especially in the daytime portion of the fight, are strongly suggestive of what the normal manner of fighting was. The duration of the fight is also noteworthy of course, but again, this is quite clearly not time spent in continuous contact.

That's enough I think - I'm not trying to establish a fully worked out thesis here which is obviously a lot more work, but I think it's plain that armies could and did engage piecemeal (which doesn't mean haphazardly, I just mean in small elements, not the whole lot at once), and that fighting did not typically or necessarily mean massive blocks standing face to face for hours on end banging away at each other. I think that everyone would agree with this - it seems uncontroversial and self evident. If everyone except one person agrees, then that is undoubtedly as close as we are ever going to get, so maybe we are done here?

Quote from: RichT on September 02, 2016, 12:30:37 PM
So for separations and rests mid battle, we have, spread across a wide period, Duncan's Forum Gallorum (App BC 3.68), Anthony's Neville's Cross, and my Edgehill, quoted earlier. It could be argued (and perhaps will be argued by our resident contrarian), that these are all special cases and not typical, which has a little virtue, though these are just what we've found in a casual search.

Were I to try and draw a straight line of military practice through an isolated engagement in 42 BC to another in AD 1346 and a further engagement in AD 1642, and pass it off as representing mainline classical practice, how credible would this seem and how long would it be before someone took me to task on it?

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However, when (or rather if, as I believe Anthony is not keen) we come to look at Republican Roman battles, we shall tend to find ourselves looking at somewhat different casualty totals and hence one would assume different loss rates.

I don't think so - Philip Sabin (The Face of Roman Battle) finds that the victor's loss rates in Roman battles were generally similar to those in hoplite battles (about 5 percent).

But losers' loss rates tended to be rather higher, as we saw at Forum Gallorum.

Antony and Pansa each lost about one-half of their men. The whole of Octavius' prætorian cohort perished. - Appian Civil Wars III.70

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He proposes a similar thought experiment to mine:

"For example, even if we assume that just 5 per cent of the troops were in the front rank, and that they struck their adversaries only every five seconds, and that less than 1 per cent of these attacks caused death or mortal injury, each army would suffer 5 per cent fatalities every ten minutes."

I think this is a question which demands and deserves an answer - is it plausible to think either that armies that could inflict 5 percent casualties every ten minutes could remain in contact for hours? Or that men could remain in contact, fighting, for hours yet only cause casualties once every thirty minutes or more? Something is wrong somewhere, and the proposed lulls are a suggested solution to the problem. Just pretending the problem doesn't exist does not seem satisfactory.

One might also puzzle over why on a Napoleonic battlefield (apologies for bringing in a different time era and military system) it took on average a soldier's weight in shot to kill each soldier when target practice tests established that around 50% of shots fired hit a company sized target at 160 yards (see here (http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/infantry_tactics_2.htm)).  The fact is we get these apparent anomalies and a serious historian simply accepts that these things happen.  In the case of Napoleonic armies we can surmise that the vast majority of troops habitually fired high because this is a frequently attested phenomenon; there is also the matter that 'company-sized targets' do not cater for depth and do not allow for multiple hits on front-rank individuals.  The consequence of people getting hold of this kind of information (e.g. that it took about 4,000 shots to cause each fatality at Vittoria in 1813) is that they start to believe that one could stand in front of a regiment of infantry at 50 yards and not be hit until the four thousandth round was fired.

In the case of classical armies, lulls are not an answer because they do not match other incidental details of battle narratives.  We do not have a clear answer why lethality should customarily be so low throughout history, but remarkably - almost incredibly - low lethality rates are endemic in warfare of just about any period (how many longbow arrows were shot per dead or incapacitated French knight? how many Lee-Enfield rounds were fired per German felled at Mons?) and particular tactical circumstances can have drastic effects on lethality.  If we seek explanations for ther classical results, I would look for them partly in equipment and mainly in technique, e.g. take away shields and see what happens; stop opponents dodging thrusts and see what happens.

I suspect the root of the matter may be a phemonenon noticed in WW2 air fighting: about 20% of the pilots score 80% of the skills, and furthermore about 2% of the pilots score around 50% of the kills.  One can train troops intensively and extensively, but until they themselves work out how to succeed they are going to use rote procedures rather than adapting their activities to their opponents.  Realistic training helps a lot, but it is still the few who acquire the lion's share of the kills - and the majority often fail to score at all in a particular engagement.

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If this is a serious proposal that such armies historically closed partially and piecemeal, I am going to have to ask for some source evidence.

Really? Do you find it incredible that armies, especially Roman armies, of tens of thousands of men, formed in three lines and divided into independent sub units, closed partially and piecemeal?

Yes, given the importance of line integrity and what happens to contingents which find themselves with gaps around them (the Thespians at Delium and the Sciritae at First Mantinea, to take two examples from the same culture and time period).  Romans were particular fans of order, and the division into subunits existed to keep formations together at the lowest level, not to keep them apart.  Try to move a crowd and then try to move a regular unit and the difference will be very apparent.

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I'd have thought that was implicit in all battle accounts.

But why?

Now let us look at a few more Roman battle narratives.

Thapsus, 45 BC
"The battle was long, severe, and doubtful in all parts of the field until toward evening, when victory declared itself on the side of Cæsar, who went straight on and captured Scipio's camp and did not desist, even in the night, from reaping the fruits of his victory until he had made a clean sweep." - Appian Civil Wars II.97

Well ... not a lot of detail but 'long, severe and doubtful in all parts of the field' suggests a certain continuity of fighting.  (Caesar's account is somewhat different, making the whole thing sound like a walkover, albeit one without breaks.)

Munda, 45 BC.
Caesar's army is 'seized by fear' and he only gets them moving with a show of heroics (he manages to avoid or parry 200 missiles aimed at him).
"Then each of the tribunes ran toward him and took position by his side, and the whole army rushed forward and fought the entire day, advancing and retreating by turns until, toward evening, Cæsar with difficulty won the victory." - Appian Civil Wars II.104

The 'whole army' rushed forward, not bits of it here and there.  It then 'fought the entire day' with alternate advances and retreats, indicating continued contact or something very similar to it throughout.

Caesar's - or rather Hirtius' - account of Munda shuffles the early difficulties into the pre-contact phase when Caesar's men were trying to get at their opponents; note this, as Caesar's men had to get up a steep hillside, which would make any sort of breakoff or lull highly problematic.  He then moves onto the action: both armies were equal in 'congressus' and 'clamor', the approach and the war-shout, but when the pila flew Caesar's men took trivial losses whereas a 'multitudo' of Pompey's fell.  This was followed by:

Our right wing, as we have explained, was held by the men of the Tenth legion; and despite their small numbers, their gallantry none the less enabled them by their exertions to inspire no little panic among their opponents. They proceeded, in fact, to exert strong pressure on the enemy, driving him back from his positions, with the result that he began to transfer a legion from his right, to give support and to prevent our men from outflanking him. As soon as this legion had been set in motion Caesar's cavalry began to exert pressure on the enemy left wing, so that, no matter how gallantly the enemy might fight, he was afforded no opportunity of reinforcing his line. And so, as the motley din — shouts, groans, the clash of swords — assailed their ears, it shackled the minds of the inexperienced with fear. Hereupon, as Ennius puts it, "foot forces against foot and weapons grind 'gainst weapons"; and in the teeth of very strong opposition our men began to drive the enemy back. The town, however, stood them in good stead. And so they were routed and put to flight on the very day of the Liberalia; nor would they have survived, had they not fled back to their original starting point. - Spanish War 31

The loser's dead were reckoned to be at least 30,000.  Hirtius gives Caesar's as 1,000 dead, 500 wounded: an unusually low ratio of wounded.

Munda was a long and savage fight with no intermissions noted - and it is hard to see, given the topography and the action, how any could have occurred.

That may be enough for the moment - I am not trying to establish a fully worked out thesis, but I think it is plain that armies did not engage piecemeal (in small elements), but rather the whole lot at once, apart from reserve lines; and that fighting typically meant massive blocks standing face to face for hours on end banging away at each other. I think that everyone would agree with this - it seems uncontroversial and self evident. If everyone except one person agrees, then that is undoubtedly as close as we are ever going to get, so maybe we are done here?

OK Patrick, fine by me. I will take imitation as the sincerest form of flattery.

I'm sure anyone reading all of this can make up their own minds also, and will probably decide that the case is unproven either way, which would be a very sensible conclusion. I certainly have more questions than answers (which I think is a good thing).

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The fact is we get these apparent anomalies and a serious historian simply accepts that these things happen.

;D ;D ;D ;D ;D

QuoteOn the broader subject of mediaeval infantry combat, should we consider Dupplin Moor and Agincourt?  Both of these funnelled one side into a killing ground operated by the other, feeding in men on a fairly continuous basis and considerably exercising the defenders.  But how intensively and for how long?

I've been unable to find a solid timescale for Dupplin, short of it starting in th morning and finishing in the afternoon.  Several sources give a length for Agincourt, mostly 2-3 hours but the shortest is 30 minutes  By comparison, Waurin (who was in the middle of the fight) said Verneuil lasted 45 minutes and the fighting was particularly fierce and evenly matched.

If you care to try your hand at swinging an axe, I have a pile of logs in the back yard that need chopping into firewood... As another modern recreation, there are numerous stories of hacking through the jungles of Vietnam or New Guinea during WWII with machetes - the hacker (no not that kind  ::) ) had to be changed out very frequently due to exhaustion.

You might also read some of the classical accounts of the Battle of Cannae (and others for that matter) where physical exhaustion played a role in moderating the carnage.

The examples of continuous combat are all easily explainable as punctuated combat. If the author lives and writes in a context in which fighting goes on for say fifteen minutes and then there is a break-off, a pause and then a resumption , it will not excite comment that this happens. Someone earlier mentioned that most ancient battle reports were contained within one or two hundred words and thus phases of a combat where nothing decisive, even actually nothing at all happens do not generate a comment,nespecially as the audience all know what happens in combat. The author's comments on a battle likely concentrate on the unusual, the different and the instructive, whether militarily, or on the moral point that the author wishes to get across.
We are using information on how long a fit human can sustain arm swinging and contact with a resistant object, my boxers, Dave's machete wielders, because it marks a fixed point. The concept that a man can only manage ten to fifteen minutes of intense activity, perhaps forty five minutes of activity with rests looks unarguable . It may well be that fighters could go on for hours if the rests were long enough and if bith sides are fatiguing at a similar rate and hence have mutually assured preservation.
Punctuated flurries and withdrawals happily explains how one force can push back another a considerable distance without the loser being rolled over backwards in the first few yards, it explains how a commander can ask for one more step and be heard because his men are not in a continuous pushing contest, but are in a mutual step back. A punctuated combat explains how Romans can take advantage of a pause to retire a line and replace it.  One struggles with how a commander  can send up the third line to support if ahead of them  is a continuous line of fighters engaged in uninterrupted combat with an enemy line , presumably movng backwards if their need for relief is obvious.  Surely  it makes more sense if they are disengaged at the point of relief. 
On casualty rates I did say at the beginning that most of a frontbrank soldiers efforts will go into defensive or cautious actions rather than risky attempts to kill an opponent.  It is in his interest to slash or thrust in a way that might get advantage, but will not over extend him, or unnecessarily exhaust him.  We have raised, several times the record that the winner in an ancient battle suffers very few casualties compared to the loser, even when the armies are similar in weaponry and tactics. Also, if battle normally resulted in the extinction of the front ranks then who would stand there?
A model of battle in which there are pauses for short withdrawal after short but intense activity would expkain well how both sides tire from pushing and fencing and casualties mount.  The  side that is less fit, less well equipped or has suffered more casualties because it suffered initial deaths and de-shielding from a volley of pila begins to notice that things are going against it whlst it is taking a short rest. Its officers  shout and cajole, the braver men step forward,they fight  for another period, but the situation does not improve, at the next step back these men are visibly more tired , the enemy wre encouraged, eventually they break and run and their  opponents  kill whom they catch. That explains well how combat that causes few casualties, but results in differential rates of physical and emotional exhaustion between the two sides results in a withdrawal and then rout in which the liser suffers a high casualty rate.
Roy

Quote from: Erpingham on September 02, 2016, 10:20:38 PM

QuoteOn the broader subject of mediaeval infantry combat, should we consider Dupplin Moor and Agincourt?  Both of these funnelled one side into a killing ground operated by the other, feeding in men on a fairly continuous basis and considerably exercising the defenders.  But how intensively and for how long?

I've been unable to find a solid timescale for Dupplin, short of it starting in the morning and finishing in the afternoon.  Several sources give a length for Agincourt, mostly 2-3 hours but the shortest is 30 minutes  By comparison, Waurin (who was in the middle of the fight) said Verneuil lasted 45 minutes and the fighting was particularly fierce and evenly matched.

Thanks, Anthony.  If we now examine the nature of the fighting, would either side at Dupplin or Agincourt have had a chance for breaks, given the apparently continual feeding in of additional troops by the attacker?  At Verneuil it looks as if the Scots fought without a break but Bedford's English who were fighting Narbonne's French gained a respite of sorts - if letting the French run and moving over to finish off the Scots can be considered a respite.  Regarding timing, does not Waurin give the action between Bedford's and Narbonne's wings as three quarters of an hour, indicating the fight against the Scots went on somewhat longer?

Quote from: Dave Beatty on September 03, 2016, 02:45:51 AM
You might also read some of the classical accounts of the Battle of Cannae (and others for that matter) where physical exhaustion played a role in moderating the carnage.

Our main sources for Cannae are Polybius III.15-6 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text;jsessionid=00C74DB95CD886BA46285A8A08630707?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D115) and Livy XXII.47-49.  The only references to physical exhaustion are in Livy, in XXII.47.9-10:

From this moment the Romans, who had gained one battle to no purpose, gave over the pursuit and slaughter of the Gauls and Spaniards and began a new fight with the Africans. In this they were at a twofold disadvantage: they were shut in, while their enemies ranged on every side of them; they were tired, and faced troops that were fresh and strong.

and in XXII.48.6:

Hasdrubal ... sent in the Spanish and Gallic cavalry to help the Africans, who were now almost exhausted, though more with slaying than with fighting.

The initial Roman exhaustion would have accelerated Roman casualties; the final African exhaustion does not appear to have reduced them.  We may note further that in response to the Roman attack on Hannibal's camp:

Hannibal, as a matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard in his camp; and as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their instructions, assaulted and tried to take those thus left by Hannibal. At first they held their own: but just as they were beginning to waver, Hannibal, who was by this time gaining a victory all along the line, came to their relief, and routing the Romans, shut them up in their own camp; killed two thousand of them; and took all the rest prisoners.

So Hannibal's men were not too exhausted to win a new fight and carry out a fresh pursuit.  That said, I think the troops Hannibal took to help his camp would have been the peltasts and slingers who had done the initial skirmishing and had been at a loose end since then, as everyone else was busy at the time.  They would thus have been fresher then most.

What stands out in Polybius' and Livy's narratives is that there were no 'rest breaks'.  We shall now examine whether this is an omission on account of familiarity.

Returning for a moment to Richard's listing of Ilerda, Forum Gallorum and the questionable inclusion of Titus' assault on the Jerusalem Temple.

Quote from: aligern on September 03, 2016, 08:35:45 AM
The examples of continuous combat are all easily explainable as punctuated combat. If the author lives and writes in a context in which fighting goes on for say fifteen minutes and then there is a break-off, a pause and then a resumption , it will not excite comment that this happens.

The question which arises is: if this is the case, then why does Caesar comment on it at Ilerda and Appian at Forum Gallorum?  If it were the familiar norm, why mention it at all?

Titus' assault: to use an action against Jews and claim it is typical of Roman fighting methods is inappropriate: Jews of the 1st century AD typically used hit-and-run tactics, e.g. during the retreat of Cestius Gallus in Josephus, Jewish War II.19.7-9 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0148%3Abook%3D2%3Awhiston+chapter%3D19%3Awhiston+section%3D7) (Whiston chapters).  So for that matter did Spanish tribes - and, by Caesar's time, Roman soldiers who had served for a long time in Spain (as encountered at Ilerda).  Such actions do not tell us much, if anything, about standard practice (except of course for Jewish and Spanish standard practice).

The concept that a man can only manage ten to fifteen minutes of intense activity, perhaps forty five minutes of activity with rests looks unarguable.

But this considers only the average unfit 20th century specimen.  There is also - particularly in view of earlier mention of the traditional pace of human activities - the matter of just how 'intense' this supposedly intense activity was.  The rhythm of life back then was slower and easier.  Classical societies encouraged, even taught, economical and energy-efficient fighting styles.  Roman soldiers and mediaeval knights engaged in protracted exercise sessions with double-weight weapons to build up their stamina.  The manpower came from an essentially healthy, generally well-fed stock accustomed to day long hard physical labour.  I do not think we can assign them limitations based on our own.  (They did have limitations, naturally, but we may need to reset our sights on what those were.)

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 03, 2016, 10:16:02 AM

I've been unable to find a solid timescale for Dupplin, short of it starting in the morning and finishing in the afternoon.  Several sources give a length for Agincourt, mostly 2-3 hours but the shortest is 30 minutes  By comparison, Waurin (who was in the middle of the fight) said Verneuil lasted 45 minutes and the fighting was particularly fierce and evenly matched.

Thanks, Anthony.  If we now examine the nature of the fighting, would either side at Dupplin or Agincourt have had a chance for breaks, given the apparently continual feeding in of additional troops by the attacker?  At Verneuil it looks as if the Scots fought without a break but Bedford's English who were fighting Narbonne's French gained a respite of sorts - if letting the French run and moving over to finish off the Scots can be considered a respite.  Regarding timing, does not Waurin give the action between Bedford's and Narbonne's wings as three quarters of an hour, indicating the fight against the Scots went on somewhat longer?

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The fighting at Agincourt and Dupplin was atypical, so we need to beware of using it as a model for all medieval combat.  In both battles, an attack on a narrow front was stopped then assaulted from the sides.  Withdrawal was impossible because a larger second force was fed into the melee from behind.  The two effects compressed the fighting lines meaning that they didn't have room to fight properly and many died by crush effects. In both cases, piles of bodies developed around the edges of the formation, which would suggest the lines were static.  For another battle with this effect, see Rosebeke (the compression here was caused by cavalry, with the blocking force again dismounted men-at-arms).  Othee also is said to exhibit this effect but I haven't looked at the original sources for that one (perhaps I should).

As to Waurin's timing, he is referring to the melee stage of the battle, after the cavalry charges and the archery exchange, before the rout.  He doesn't distinguish between the fight against the French and against the Scots in this timing.  He himself was probably fighting the French, which may have given rise to the confusion.

Regarding exhaustion, it is worth reading some of the exploits of that medieval superman, Don Pero Nino.  His biographer give a detailed description of his heroics at the siege of Pontevedra in 1397.  Fighting on foot (after an earlier interlude of fighting on horseback), Pero Nino led his men in a melee outside the castle.  The enemy then fell back and he pursued them to the bridge, where he took a cross bow hit.  He then assa  ulted the bridge, took another crossbow bolt in the face (which dazed him for a while) and forced his way across the steps of the bridge, taking sword blows to the helmet and a nasty shield blow to the face (nasty because the crossbow bolt was still lodged there).  Eventually exhaustion forced the two sides apart.  Pero Nino had been fighting for two hours. His biographer notes that normally Pero Nino was left unsatisfied with only an hour of fighting but his was glutted by this.  Leaving aside the heroic element in this (PN is brave, strong, wise, enormously skilled, shrugs off wounds (at one point he extracts an arrow from his leg and cauterises the wound)) there are some parameters here.  The two hour fight is not continuous but is considered one "bout" of combat.  PN is up for more combat after a mere hour but exhausted by two.  Though, as I've said, the man seems to have been extraordinary in his appetite for fighting and most men-at-arms were less fanatical. But we do know that other knights certainly trained for endurance.

I've now looked at Monstrelets description of Othee in 1408.  It isn't quite the same as the other three in that there is none of the description of death by crushing, the inability to use weapons and so on.  At Othee, the Liegous are taken in the rear by a Burgundian flanking force, so are trying to fight in two directions.  Monstrelet gives the length of the battle as "upwards of an hour", during half an hour of which, it was impossible to tell which side would win.

And, to finish up for now, Aljubarrota 1385.  Lasted by modern estimate not much more than an hour and included two separate phases of hand-to-hand combat.  The second of these was estimated by a chroniclers to have lasted 30 minutes.  Most participants only fought in one of these phases but the Portugese van fought both.  The gap between the two phases was probably only a few minutes - the castilian main division was advancing to the assistance of its van when the latter was overwhelmed.

Merci beaucoup.  It looks as if a tentative limit of about one hour for continuous mediaeval close combat may be a reasonable yardstick, Don Pero Nino excepted.  Is this your impression?

I do not propose Dupplin Moor and Agincourt as 'the norm'; I was just interested to see how long the defender could keep going with attackers piling in more or less continuously.

Things are starting to look relatively consistent: Aljubarotta has two half-hour bouts, the Portuguese van doing both with a short interval between; Othee 'upwards of one hour'; Verneuil approximately three quarters of an hour of unusually tough fighting.  The melee at Agincourt is provisionally reckoned as three hours (at least in the Wikipedia article; not sure about the Gesta Henrici), though the tightness and immobility of the attacking formation doubtless made things easier for the English, much as at Dupplin Moor.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 03, 2016, 09:10:03 PM
Merci beaucoup.  It looks as if a tentative limit of about one hour for continuous mediaeval close combat may be a reasonable yardstick, Don Pero Nino excepted.  Is this your impression?

From our limited sample, I'd say provisionally that 30-60 minutes combat would be a good baseline for a phase, or round or whatever term we want.  What being in combat meant in this context is still to be determined.  We know that the first onset was the fiercest and it was important to keep together and absorb this.  After that it seems to be slower, and only enlivened by a fresh force joining the fray (because they come in with initial aggression long siince drained from a standing melee).  Everything is tight packed yet attacks into an enemy mass, sometimes leading to being cut off and killed, obviously occured. 

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  The melee at Agincourt is provisionally reckoned as three hours (at least in the Wikipedia article; not sure about the Gesta Henrici), though the tightness and immobility of the attacking formation doubtless made things easier for the English, much as at Dupplin Moor.

Given other examples, I genuinely doubt that the decisive part of Agincourt took three hours.  There is beyond the 30-60 minutes stage the fact that many battles overall were longer (2-3 hours seems quite common but there were longer - Towton and harlaw were both all day battles, for example).  The example of Neville's Cross perhaps hints to a more formal break-and-renew pattern in these cases.

Then again, at Neville's Cross both sides were willing and able to call a halt to proceedings: this does not seem to have been in evidence at Dupplin Moor (or Agincourt).

I would suggest we have at least two patterns for mediaeval infantry fighting, or at least for the battles we have looked at: the voluntary engagement, which lasts 30-60 minutes and then either reaches a decision or peters out (but with a possible later retry) and the involuntary engagement, where attackers are coming in all the time and the defender gets rather more stretched.  It is interesting that despite the extended duration of such fights the defenders seem able to cope, albeit we do get the occasional person of rank suffocated in his armour.

Harlaw is interesting because deaths are given as 900 for MacDonald's attackers (said to be 10,000 or so) and 600 for Mar's defenders (said to be between 1,000 and 2,000) for what is pretty nearly an all-day fight (whether intermittent or continuous).  Both sides appear to have used tight formations and those at the sharp end appear to have worn decent armour.  Even so, both sides felt themselves too weak to renew the fight and Mar felt unable even to retreat, which hints at a very high proportion of wounded.

Dripping in a soupcon of theory for the moment, the idea of breaks in melee after every 15-20 minutes of fighting seems to have arisen from the idea that men could not sustain combat for longer and is underpinned by the belief that frequent intervals for self-revival reduce overall casualty figures.  I wonder at the logic here: as men become more fatigued, their fighting capability wanes, so if they carry on for an hour they are probably not achieving all that much during the last half hour unless their opponents are in a worse state, whereas if they took a break every so often they would be refreshed and their killing efficiency would, if anything, increase.  Hence they would make up for the lost time and there should be no discernible effect on overall loss rates.

QuoteHarlaw is interesting because deaths are given as 900 for MacDonald's attackers (said to be 10,000 or so) and 600 for Mar's defenders (said to be between 1,000 and 2,000) for what is pretty nearly an all-day fight (whether intermittent or continuous).  Both sides appear to have used tight formations and those at the sharp end appear to have worn decent armour.  Even so, both sides felt themselves too weak to renew the fight and Mar felt unable even to retreat, which hints at a very high proportion of wounded.

Yes, and the battle went down in memory as "Reid Harlaw" because it was so bloody.  As neither side broke, the casualty rates might be reflective of an even but steadily attritional fight - both sides seem to have lost under ten per cent.

The idea that breaks were necessary every fifteen minutes or so was based upon the need for recovery after intense physical activity.  I doubt anyone believes that troops could not maintain a more measured level of activity for longer, or that certain types of fighting, advancing with a levelled pike for example, are considerably less draining than fencing around with a sword and a heavy shield with a central grip, wearing a helmet and a mail shirt. The purpose of the breaks is that fighting continuously and exhausting yourself is very dangerous because the warrior is much more prone to make a fatal mistake when tired.
I don't buy the easy assumption that we can say that medieval combat lasted for an hour in which the same men traded blows all the time. A reenactor of considerable experience ,and a Society member, commented to me that troops work in small teams, the chap in full armour fights and then his seconds stand forward whilst he is pulled back to recuperate, breathe and process the lactic acid in his muscles, before he steps forward again.

While we have this thread open, is it worth looking at a) the Swiss, for a look at the cream of mediaeval close-combat infantry and b) the continuity and duration of cavalry fights (mediaeval and generally).  Received wisdom has it that cavalry vs cavalry fights were usually over fairly quickly compared to infantry vs infantry struggles, while cavalry vs infantry fights seem to have been broadly speaking of two varieties: the charge-and-kill (or try to) and the stand-off-and-shoot, the former havign discontinuity as its usual trademark and the latter usually being noted for its duration and continuity (cf. Caesar being surrounded by Numidians at Ruspina or Richard's army being assailed by Saracens at Arsuf, our upcoming Battle Day engagement).

Quote from: aligern on September 04, 2016, 08:25:55 PM
A reenactor of considerable experience ,and a Society member, commented to me that troops work in small teams, the chap in full armour fights and then his seconds stand forward whilst he is pulled back to recuperate, breathe and process the lactic acid in his muscles, before he steps forward again.

This is the key: there is a direct relationship between fatigue/exhaustion and lactic acid buildup (it is not the only cause, but for a well-fed person it is the big one).  If you manage to pace your activities so that you do not get a buildup of lactic acid - and men who train for much of the day with double weight weapons are at an advantage in this regard - you can go on for a lot longer than people think.

Short term it is a matter of lactic acid build up, but battle fatigue is far more than that. There is the tiring effect of stress and fear as the price of a mistake is your life, as is the price of failure by others along yourr line whose failure and rout might subject you to a nasty wound or death. The soldier is also trading blows which is why boxing and rugby are good analogies. Even if the blows land on armour or  shield , or if they miss, they exhaust the giver and the receiver. Whther the soldier is pushing in an othismmos or  dodging and seeking advantage there is a lot of straight physical effort.

As an example of intense effort by highly trained athletes we might choose the Boat Race. There the crews go all out from the start, though they are pacing themselves to the course. Physically they are almost certainly fitter than any ancient warrior because they have the benefit of being effectively professionals with scientific training methods, special diets, psychologists in attendance etc. At the end of the race the crews are exhausted, I doubt they would be able to go again if reqested.
The record for  the Boat Race is 16 minutes 19 seconds. 
Roy

QuoteI don't buy the easy assumption that we can say that medieval combat lasted for an hour in which the same men traded blows all the time.

A slight misunderstanding has crept in here.  30-60 mins is being suggested for a time until, without breaking off an resting, bodies of men seem to be able to function in combat.  The exact nature of combat has been left undefined and I for one wouldn't say that combat involved constant trading of blows.  You postulate that individuals fighting may have changed, with men falling back and others taking their place.  It is possible.  What certainly seems true is after the first few minutes, the initial fighters lose their initial speed and aggression as they tire.  The fighting then is probably lower intensity with occassional pushes at various places on the line, a battlecry and a surge, met if possible by some frantic energy, which either breaks through, is pushed back or cut off an liquidated.  Anyone who can bring in fresh men, particularly on the flanks or rear of the enemy, during this lower intensity phase is probably going to win.

Quote from: aligern on September 04, 2016, 08:52:46 PM
Short term it is a matter of lactic acid build up, but battle fatigue is far more than that. There is the tiring effect of stress and fear as the price of a mistake is your life, as is the price of failure by others along your line whose failure and rout might subject you to a nasty wound or death.

Consider also the acute psychological stress of disengaging - get this wrong just once, particularly with tired troops, and you have a rout on your hands - and then having to build up psychologically once more to re-commit yourself to this nasty and potentially lethal environment and you will see why just staying and carrying on fighting may be the least stressful and demanding option.

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The soldier is also trading blows which is why boxing and rugby are good analogies. Even if the blows land on armour or  shield , or if they miss, they exhaust the giver and the receiver.

Or rather they do not, especially if he is trained for this sort of thing by spending all day giving blows to a post or giving and receiving them while doing armatura.  Boxing and rugby also both involve a lot of moving around and a good deal of activity at a rapid tempo, whereas standing in line with comrades next to you and behind you and watching for a chance to land a blow on an opponent does not.  The real question is whether your blow, when delivered, will land on shield or armour or whether you will get that rare chance when your foe drops his guard and you can draw blood with your stroke.

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Whether the soldier is pushing in an othismos or dodging and seeking advantage there is a lot of straight physical effort.

Not as much as one might think, and in any event the key question is how well he can handle the effort involved.  One index of how physically and psychologically stressful troops find a situation is the amount they sweat.  Sweating, I am reliably informed, arises for four reasons: 1) temperature and humidity, 2) hard exercise 3) strong feelings and 4) hot and spicy foods.  We can eliminate 4) from the classical battlefield, leaving us with the first three as an index of how our troops are doing.  Here we have an illustration from Plutarch, taken from the battle of Vercellae (105 BC).  Marius and Catulus are fighting the Cimbri in sunny north Italy.

"The Romans were favoured in the struggle, Sulla says, by the heat, and by the sun, which shone in the faces of the Cimbri. For the Barbarians were well able to endure cold, and had been brought up in shady and chilly regions, as I have said.  They were therefore undone by the heat; they sweated profusely, breathed with difficulty, and were forced to hold their shields before their faces. For the battle was fought after the summer solstice, which falls, by Roman reckoning, three days before the new moon of the month now called August,  but then Sextilis. [5] Moreover, the dust, by hiding the enemy, helped to encourage the Romans. For they could not see from afar the great numbers of the foe, but each one of them fell at a run upon the man just over against him, and fought him hand to hand, without having been terrified by the sight of the rest of the host. And their bodies were so inured to toil and so thoroughly trained that not a Roman was observed to sweat or pant, in spite of the great heat and the run with which they came to the encounter. This is what Catulus himself is said to have written in extolling his soldiers." - Plutarch, Lives, Caius Marius 26.4-5

This tells us that what the Romans were doing was well within their ability to cope with 1) the heat, 2) the effort and 3) the stress (conveniently lessened by the restricted visibility).  The Cimbri were practically prostrated by 1) the heat, and even if 3) was not a factor, adding in 2) would soon render them quite exhausted.

One might thus expect them to make some serious provision for disengagement and relief of the almost-zonked, in the best tradition of theories of non-continuous fighting.  Yet what do we find?

"The greatest number and the best fighters of the enemy were cut to pieces on the spot; for to prevent their ranks from being broken, those who fought in front were bound fast to one another with long chains which were passed through their belts." - idem 27.1

It would be hard to envisage a clearer commitment to continuous combat.

I think you will find that the 'chained together' story is a myth. It may be some confusion with the chain sword belts that the Gauls used. Chaining the front ranks together would involve huge lengths of chain which there is no conceivable reason for the Gauls to have around. It would also be counter productive as a few casualties hanging on the chains would render the formation incapablebof movement and make it impossible for wounded Gauls to withdraw and be replaced.

I love the way you move from Romans training with a weighted  sword hitting a post to the Roman doing this 'all day'. Is there any evidence for that?  Or even any evidence that they did not take breaks in this all day exercise.
As to the danger and stress of breaking off combat, we have debated this before. The question was why did opposing forces not rush the Romans when they fell back to exchange lines and the answer is simple, bith sides are exhausted and bith sides can see this. Hence you can back iff in confidence that the oppisition are going to welcome a break in proceedings and not  pursue, but back off themselves.
Roy

One point to make about training is that nothing but the real thing prepares you for the real thing. Having done (in times past...) years of pre-season rugby training, you can be as fit and prepared as you like, but the stress and pressure of the real match situation will have you gasping and struggling to do what is required. You jog to line outs, you walk to scrums, you do what you can to conserve energy so that you can get to where you need to be and make the tackle you have to make, etc. Every season it's the same: no matter how good the prep it takes two or three games before you feel able to manage, but after that your base fitness takes over and you are fine.

I wonder if there is a similar acclimatization process for battle.

Good points, that suggests that being a veteran who s an enormous help, though it has been reported that novices are the most aggressive but have the least endurance, whilst veterans can be cagy and cautious, but husband their energy.
Roy

Quote from: Prufrock on September 05, 2016, 06:26:27 PM
One point to make about training is that nothing but the real thing prepares you for the real thing.

Not sure our sources agree on that one.

"And, indeed, if any one does but attend to the other parts of their military discipline, he will be forced to confess that their obtaining so large a dominion hath been the acquisition of their valor, and not the bare gift of fortune; for they do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they then put their hands first into motion, while they avoided so to do in times of peace; but, as if their weapons did always cling to them, they have never any truce from warlike exercises; nor do they stay till times of war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises differ not at all from the real use of their arms, but every soldier is every day exercised, and that with great diligence, as if it were in time of war, which is the reason why they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; for neither can any disorder remove them from their usual regularity, nor can fear affright them out of it, nor can labor tire them; which firmness of conduct makes them always to overcome those that have not the same firmness; nor would he be mistaken that should call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their battles bloody exercises." - Josephus, Jewish War III.5.1 (Whiston chapters)

There is the 'seeing the elephant' element about going into combat for the first time, but doing so in the company of battle-wise veterans makes it a lot easier.  The impression Josephus gives, however, is that Roman training was sufficiently realistic to prepare one for the real thing.

"Now they so manage their preparatory exercises of their weapons, that not the bodies of the soldiers only, but their souls may also become stronger: they are moreover hardened for war by fear; for their laws inflict capital punishments, not only for soldiers running away from the ranks, but for slothfulness and inactivity, though it be but in a lesser degree; as are their generals more severe than their laws, for they prevent any imputation of cruelty toward those under condemnation, by the great rewards they bestow on the valiant soldiers; and the readiness of obeying their commanders is so great, that it is very ornamental in peace; but when they come to a battle, the whole army is but one body, so well coupled together are their ranks, so sudden are their turnings about, so sharp their hearing as to what orders are given them, so quick their sight of the ensigns, and so nimble are their hands when they set to work; whereby it comes to pass that what they do is done quickly, and what they suffer they bear with the greatest patience." - idem III.5.7

Quote from: aligern on September 05, 2016, 04:55:37 PM
I think you will find that the 'chained together' story is a myth. It may be some confusion with the chain sword belts that the Gauls used. Chaining the front ranks together would involve huge lengths of chain which there is no conceivable reason for the Gauls to have around. It would also be counter productive as a few casualties hanging on the chains would render the formation incapable of movement and make it impossible for wounded Gauls to withdraw and be replaced.

Chain sword belts lent by non-front ranks might provide the required lengths of chain, or maybe the Cimbri just had a chain fetish.  As mentioned in other contexts, our sources give the impression that in battles wounded dropped in place and stayed there until the battle was over.

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I love the way you move from Romans training with a weighted  sword hitting a post to the Roman doing this 'all day'. Is there any evidence for that?  Or even any evidence that they did not take breaks in this all day exercise.

See Josephus above.  They are exercised to the extent that neither labour nor the fatigue of battles can tire them, however long that takes, with great diligence as if it were in time of war.  Exercises are bloodless battles.  Battles are sanguinary exercises.  There is no distinction between 'training' and the real thing except for the amount of blood being shed.

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As to the danger and stress of breaking off combat, we have debated this before.

And it is still just as dangerous.

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The question was why did opposing forces not rush the Romans when they fell back to exchange lines and the answer is simple, bith sides are exhausted and bith sides can see this. Hence you can back iff in confidence that the oppisition are going to welcome a break in proceedings and not  pursue, but back off themselves.

This would end the battle.  An exhausted foe who could still move would take advantage of the opportunity to head back to camp rather than "OK chaps, let's wait here for them to throw a fresh line against us and cut us to pieces."

Unfortunately, Patrick, your cites from Josephus prove nothing about the duration of combat,though they do support the argument that the Romans win because they can outlast opponents. Are we to believe that the legionaries really do exercise at arms every day?  and if they all exercise all day as was suggested earlier that's 4,000 posts to be set up somewhere.

If combat consisted of periods of intense activity interspersed with lulls then the legionaries just have to train to fight for a bit longer than that and to have a generally high level of overall fitness so that their  recovery period is short. No one doubts that, at their best (for there are examples of soft legions) the Romans are fitter and have better endurance than their opponents, but if all combat is in short bursts then endurance is relative.
Whlst we are looking at Plutarch's life of Gaius Marius,nhow about this from his battle against the Teutones:
'21 1 Accordingly, the Romans awaited the enemy's onset, then closed with them and checked their upward rush, and at last, crowding them back little by little, forced them into the plain. Here, while the Barbarians in front were at last forming in line on level ground, there was shouting and commotion in their rear. For Marcellus had watched his opportunity, and when the cries of battle were borne up over the hills he put his men upon the run and p521fell with loud shouts upon the enemy's rear, where he cut down the hindmost of them. 2 Those in the rear forced along those who were in front of them, and quickly plunged the whole army into confusion, and under this double attack they could not hold out long, but broke ranks and fled. The Romans pursued them and either slew or took alive over a hundred thousand of them, besides making themselves masters of the tents, waggons, and property, all of which, with the exception of what was pilfered, was given to Marius by vote of the soldiers. And though the gift that he received was so splendid, it was thought to be wholly unworthy of his services in the campaign, where the danger that threatened had been so great.'
Now Marius' troops are uphill, the Teutones run to attack them and cannot form an effective shieldwall because of the terrain. The Romans force them back down to the flat ground at the base of  the hill where the barbarians 'in front' attempt to form a line.  That suggests strongly that after the action on the hill, there is a lull in which the barbarians attempt to form in an ordered manner. That looks just like combat with a break and separation.

Quote from: aligern on September 05, 2016, 10:43:00 PM
Unfortunately, Patrick, your cites from Josephus prove nothing about the duration of combat,though they do support the argument that the Romans win because they can outlast opponents.

Josephus is highly specific (which is why that part was in bold): their military exercises differ not at all from the real use of their arms, but every soldier is every day exercised, and that with great diligence, as if it were in time of war, which is the reason why they bear the fatigue of battles so easily.  The battle lasts as long as it takes to defeat the foe, and as Josephus points out at that time the Romans were not often defeated (except by each other).  Given his insistence on the Romans being methodical rather than dashing, a slow, steady grind seems right up their street.

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Are we to believe that the legionaries really do exercise at arms every day?  and if they all exercise all day as was suggested earlier that's 4,000 posts to be set up somewhere.

Josephus says so - he was alive at the time and as a guest of the Flavians he saw it happening; not however at the post.  Vegetius puts recruits through the post exercise, not fully-trained legionaries, who would combine unit drills with armatura.  Recruits tended to come in rather smaller-than-legion-sized contingents.  Whether the Republican Romans dotted the Field of Mars with thousands of practice stakes is a subject which has as far as I know gone unrecorded, but it would be no harder to arrange than, say, crucifying 6,000 slaves along the Appian Way.

"THE POST EXERCISE

We are informed by the writings of the ancients that, among their other exercises, they had that of the post. They gave their recruits round bucklers woven with willows, twice as heavy as those used on real service, and wooden swords double the weight of the common ones. They exercised them with these at the post both morning and afternoon.

This is an invention of the greatest use, not only to soldiers, but also to gladiators. No man of either profession ever distinguished himself in the circus or field of battle, who was not perfect in this kind of exercise. Every soldier, therefore, fixed a post firmly in the ground, about the height of six feet. Against this, as against a real enemy, the recruit was exercised with the above mentioned arms, as it were with the common shield and sword, sometimes aiming At the head or face, sometimes at the sides, at others endeavoring to strike at the thighs or legs. He was instructed in what manner to advance and retire, and in short how to take every advantage of his adversary; but was thus above all particularly cautioned not to lay himself open to his antagonist while aiming his stroke at him." - Vegetius, De Re Militari I.10

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If combat consisted of periods of intense activity interspersed with lulls then the legionaries just have to train to fight for a bit longer than that and to have a generally high level of overall fitness so that their  recovery period is short. No one doubts that, at their best (for there are examples of soft legions) the Romans are fitter and have better endurance than their opponents, but if all combat is in short bursts then endurance is relative.

And if not, endurance is still relative.

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Whlst we are looking at Plutarch's life of Gaius Marius,nhow about this from his battle against the Teutones:
'21 1 Accordingly, the Romans awaited the enemy's onset, then closed with them and checked their upward rush, and at last, crowding them back little by little, forced them into the plain. Here, while the Barbarians in front were at last forming in line on level ground, there was shouting and commotion in their rear. For Marcellus had watched his opportunity, and when the cries of battle were borne up over the hills he put his men upon the run and p521fell with loud shouts upon the enemy's rear, where he cut down the hindmost of them. 2 Those in the rear forced along those who were in front of them, and quickly plunged the whole army into confusion, and under this double attack they could not hold out long, but broke ranks and fled. The Romans pursued them and either slew or took alive over a hundred thousand of them, besides making themselves masters of the tents, waggons, and property, all of which, with the exception of what was pilfered, was given to Marius by vote of the soldiers. And though the gift that he received was so splendid, it was thought to be wholly unworthy of his services in the campaign, where the danger that threatened had been so great.'
Now Marius' troops are uphill, the Teutones run to attack them and cannot form an effective shieldwall because of the terrain. The Romans force them back down to the flat ground at the base of  the hill where the barbarians 'in front' attempt to form a line.  That suggests strongly that after the action on the hill, there is a lull in which the barbarians attempt to form in an ordered manner. That looks just like combat with a break and separation.

One break and separation, perhaps, although Plutarch does not note it as such; the Romans chivvied the various groups of Teutones off the hill and the barbarians fell back to level ground, where they squidged into a line.  But was either side fatigued?  Nothing in the account suggests this.  What we are told is that the Romans awaited the enemy's onset, closed with them, checked their upward rush and then "at last, crowding them back little by little, forced them into the plain".  This looks entirely continuous; although the Teutones "in front were at last forming in line on level ground," this need not require separation, simply that the various groups falling back were consolidating into a single formation.  Indeed, it is hard to see where the subsequent "double attack" comes from if Marius was taking a break and only Marcellus was attacking at the time.

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As mentioned in other contexts, our sources give the impression that in battles wounded dropped in place and stayed there until the battle was over.

That depends what our sources are. As we've already seen in this thread:

Appian BC 3.68 "No blow missed its mark. There were wounds and slaughter but no cries, only groans; and when one fell he was instantly borne away and another took his place."

Appian BC 4.128 "The slaughter and the groans were terrible. The bodies of the fallen were carried back and others stepped into their places from the rear ranks."

Always assuming Appian has any credibility, of course.

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I love the way you move from Romans training with a weighted sword hitting a post to the Roman doing this 'all day'. Is there any evidence for that?  Or even any evidence that they did not take breaks in this all day exercise.

See Josephus above. They are exercised to the extent that neither labour nor the fatigue of battles can tire them, however long that takes, with great diligence as if it were in time of war.  Exercises are bloodless battles.  Battles are sanguinary exercises.  There is no distinction between 'training' and the real thing except for the amount of blood being shed.

Which is an entirely circular argument. Romans did as much training as the nature of fighting required (plus a bit, since they are supposed to be so good), but that doesn't tell us much about the nature of fighting (other than that it was best to train for it).

The 'all day' part came from Vegetius not Josephus, earlier in this thread:

Vegetius: "We are informed by the writings of the ancients that, among their other exercises, they had that of the post... They exercised them with these at the post both morning and afternoon." (1.11 - Eoque modo non tantum mane sed etiam post meridiem exercebantur ad palos)

Patrick:

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Note the apparent duration of the exercise: "morning and afternoon".  Did this involve breaks, apart from the customary midday meal?  Vegetius does not say.

So Patrick's interpretation of "morning and afternoon" is "all morning and all afternoon, with a break for lunch". My interpretation would be "twice a day, once in the morning, once in the afternoon (duaration of exercise unspecified)". The fun part about history is that the evidence can be interpreted in different ways.

Pharsalus provides an interesting case study.

Caesar BC 3.92 f. "Between the two armies, there was an interval sufficient for the onset: but Pompey had given his troops orders to keep their ground, that Caesar's army might have all that way to run. This he is said to have done by the advice of C. Triarius, that the enemy's ranks might be broken and themselves put out of breath, by having so far to run; of which disorder he hoped to make an advantage. He was besides of opinion, that our javelins would have less effect, by the troops continuing in their post, than if they sprung forward at the very time they were launched; and as the soldiers would have twice as far to run as usual, they must be weary and breathless by the time they came up with the first line.... Caesar's soldiers entirely defeated Pompey's hopes, by their good discipline and experience. For, perceiving the enemy did not stir, they halted, of their own accord, in the midst of their career; and having taken a moment's breath, put themselves, a second time, in motion; marched up in good order, flung their javelins, and then betook themselves to their swords."

We don't know how big the space between the armies was, but presumably not a vast distance, nor how fast Romans ran into battle, but running twice the normal distance was expected to produce tactically significant levels of tiredness, even for our superbly trained Roman supermen, a disadvantage avoided by resting a little. There is no quantitative data to be had from this, just an impression that tactically significant tiredness could arise fairly quickly. How does running for, say, a few minutes (guess maybe 100 metres in 30 seconds, a steady run, for maybe 500 metres), compare in causing tiredness to fighting with swords for hours? We wonders.

(Crossed posts, oh well)

The "wounded staying in place" is an interesting argument.  Two accounts of Hastings, for example, say the wounded remained in the shieldwall until the Saxon's pursued the fleeing Normans down hill.  What does this tell us though?  By consensus, we have agreed that cavalry/infantry battles were non-continuous.  Why had the wounded not collapsed before?  There are, in fact, two possible reasons.  First, these are just the wounded of the latest round.  Second (more interestingly) men stayed in place while they could offer resistance in defence but were in no fit state to chase the enemy down the hill.  Thinking the battle won, they collapsed in place.  Interestingly, Le Baker's version of Poitiers specifically mentions the taking of the wounded out of the line and placing them under bushes and hedges to the rear in a pause between phases of battle which again may hint that wounded stayed with their units until there was a break in combat.  After all, in a medieval battle, medical care seems not to have happened till after the battle back at camp.

Another possibly interesting point is Clifford Rogers, talking about the Hastings example, states that in fact this was a cliche originally derived from Lucan's Pharsalia.  I leave it to you classicists to find whether the original is at all relevant to discussions.

Quote from: Erpingham on September 06, 2016, 04:17:21 PMWhy had the wounded not collapsed before?  There are, in fact, two possible reasons.  First, these are just the wounded of the latest round.  Second (more interestingly) men stayed in place while they could offer resistance in defence but were in no fit state to chase the enemy down the hill.  Thinking the battle won, they collapsed in place. 

Third option: shieldwalls (and phalanxes?) in contact are too tightly-packed for wounded men to get easily to the rear. Appian's Roman formations aren't quite so closely jammed.

Quote from: RichT on September 06, 2016, 01:56:15 PM

Always assuming Appian has any credibility, of course.

Appian himself is running counter to what appears to be customary Roman practice.  As noted earlier, when Caesar's two legions on baggage guard arrived at the Sambre campsite and laid into the Nervii:

"By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leaned on their shields, and renewed the fight" - Caesar Gallic War II.27.1

He gives the impression that apart from 'leaning on their shields' they did not have to move to rejoin the fighting, and says nothing about them having been taken aside or away.

Ammianus about Argentoratum:

"Yet frequently the Roman, driven from his post (pulsus loco - may mean 'borne down in place') by the weight of armed men, rose up again; and the savage, with his legs giving way from fatigue, would drop on his bended left knee and even thus attack his foe, a proof of extreme resolution." - Rerum Gestarum XVI.12.48

Two things here: the Roman soldier, once again, only has to rise up to rejoin the fighting - and the barbarian drops in place from fatigue, with no apparent rest break taken.

QuotePharsalus provides an interesting case study.

... We don't know how big the space between the armies was, but presumably not a vast distance, nor how fast Romans ran into battle, but running twice the normal distance was expected to produce tactically significant levels of tiredness, even for our superbly trained Roman supermen, a disadvantage avoided by resting a little. There is no quantitative data to be had from this, just an impression that tactically significant tiredness could arise fairly quickly.

Pharsalus is an interesting case, because Triarius' cunning plan hopes to 'ut primus excursus visque militum infringeretur aciesque distenderetur', which means distort/disrupt the line of battle and vitiate the 'vis militum', which means the strength or force of the soldiers; it does not mean their breath.  The idea seems to be that they are keyed up for a simultaneous N paces run and volley followed by out swords and close with impact; by doubling the running distance to their release point (2N paces) the idea is to put them off their stroke and mess up the volley and incidentally disrupt the formation.

The translation is thus misleading (not to worry, happens to me too). ;)

Sorry Patrick, but your comments on Caesar and Ammianus on Argentoratum would seem to rely upon the exhausted combatants standing or kneeling within arms reach of one another so that they can resume combat without moving.  This doesn't look likely, because, to borrow your technique of romantic reconstruction, any man on either side who had the energy could just reach out and kill their exhausted opponents.  However, it is joyful to perceive that you do grasp that when tired by fighting the two sides can mutually agree to cease combat .

Perhaps you could accept that Caesar and Ammianus are simply being brief rather than describing in full the armies pulling back a little to recuperate.
Roy

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The translation is thus misleading (not to worry, happens to me too). ;)

Well it happens to the best of us, but not to me on this occasion I think. The first sentence you consider could indeed be interpreted as you interpret it, but two lines later Caesar says:

"simul fore ut duplicato cursu Caesaris milites exanimarentur et lassitudine conficerentur."

Which is quite clear. Here's an alternative translation (Loeb):

"He is said to have done this on the advice of G. Triarius, in order that the first charge and impetus of the troops might be broken and their line spread out, and that so the Pompeians marshalled in their proper ranks might attack a scattered foe. He hoped, too ... that by having a double distance to run Caesar's soldiers would be breathless and overdone with fatigue."

So a little bit more sophistry will be required to negate the second sentence. :)

The Sambre offers other snippets of evidence too:

"Their arrival wrought a great change in the situation. Even such of our troops as had fallen under stress of wounds propped themselves against their shields and renewed the fight ... The enemy, however, even when their hope of safety was at an end, displayed a prodigious courage. When their front ranks had fallen, the next stood on the prostrate forms and fought from them; when these were cast down, and the corpses were piled up in heaps, the survivors, standing as it were upon a mound, hurled missiles (tela) on our troops, or caught and returned our pila"

So even at the end of this putative static fight in which the lines separate so little that the fallen wounded just have to stand up again to resume fighting in place, there is an exchange of missiles.

The problem with these sorts of discussions is taking two scraps of information (Caesar at the Sambre, Ammianus 400 years later) and using them to talk about "customary Roman practice". Much more evidence must be collected before you can start talking about what is customary - and most of the hard work has been done by Goldsworthy, Koon, Zhmodikov and no doubt others. It really is worthwhile gaining some familiarity with the secondary literature, if only as a convenient route into the primary.

Quote from: RichT on September 07, 2016, 09:47:45 AM
The first sentence you consider could indeed be interpreted as you interpret it,

Translated rather than interpreted, my learned friend.

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but two lines later Caesar says:

"simul fore ut duplicato cursu Caesaris milites exanimarentur et lassitudine conficerentur."

Which is quite clear.

Actually not in the way my learned friend thinks, and it provides an insight into Caesar's men's combat techniques.

Examinarentur does indeed have the meaning of becoming breathless and/or to weaken, while lassitudine indicates faintness or weariness.  This suggests that by Caesar's time legionaries, or at least Caesar's legionaries, were putting a real sprint into their javelin hurling and actually getting into anaerobic respiration territory (Catulus' ran in at Vercellae, but either they were better trained than Caesar's or - much more likely - they had a more leisurely run-up), otherwise there would seem to be no point to giving them a free gift of twice the distance with which to add impetus to their missiles.  By coaxing Caesar's men to double their run, when their normal distance would just dip them into anaerobic respiration, their anaerobic demand would be more than doubled and (temporary) exhaustion - easily cured by a fifteen seconds' deep breathing, but Pompey was not planning to give them that recovery time - would have taken the edge off their volley and charge.

Caesar's men, however, were so used to their customary techniques that rather than go the extra twenty or so paces they sensed something was wrong, stopped, moved up and initiated the process at a more amenable distance.

So thanks, this adds a bit of insight into Caesar's men's techniques, and indicates why Triarius or whoever proposed what on the face of it looks to be a pointless and self-defeating measure: it would work only if Caesar's men were accustomed to a greatly accelerated run-up to add power to their javelin throw (this may help to explain why at Munda their pila volleys were so much more effective than those of their opponents).

I think we may have discovered something.  Of course the idea that Caesar's men would get 'fatigued' as opposed to temporarily out of breath from an anaerobic sprint from running a few dozen paces is total nonsense (at that rate the Pompeians would have been on their backs after five minutes at Ilerda), so I am surprised my learned friend ever countenanced such a thought.

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The Sambre offers other snippets of evidence too:

"Their arrival wrought a great change in the situation. Even such of our troops as had fallen under stress of wounds propped themselves against their shields and renewed the fight ... The enemy, however, even when their hope of safety was at an end, displayed a prodigious courage. When their front ranks had fallen, the next stood on the prostrate forms and fought from them; when these were cast down, and the corpses were piled up in heaps, the survivors, standing as it were upon a mound, hurled missiles (tela) on our troops, or caught and returned our pila"

So even at the end of this putative static fight in which the lines separate so little that the fallen wounded just have to stand up again to resume fighting in place, there is an exchange of missiles.

Any why was there an exchange of missiles?  Because "the corpses were piled up in heaps," and the heaps were too high for hand weapons to reach up or down to 'service' the foe.  Note that the surviving Nervii were atop the heaps, not behind them - I leave it to the imagination to reconstruct attempts at discontinuous combat up and down piles of corpses higher than a man can reach, and am surprised that my learned friend would even countenance such an idea.

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The problem with these sorts of discussions is taking two scraps of information (Caesar at the Sambre, Ammianus 400 years later) and using them to talk about "customary Roman practice". Much more evidence must be collected before you can start talking about what is customary - and most of the hard work has been done by Goldsworthy, Koon, Zhmodikov and no doubt others. It really is worthwhile gaining some familiarity with the secondary literature, if only as a convenient route into the primary.

The point about taking these two particular pieces (which are not scraps, but elements of detailed description) is that they demonstrate the same process in action four hundred years apart.  Are we really to believe that the Romans and their opponents gave up fighting in place after Caesar, only to return to it in the days of Constantius II?  If we had more sources of Caesar's and Ammianus' military credentials covering the interim then we could expect more such descriptions, and indeed more insights into Roman battle practice.  But whose descriptions does Koon derive his suppositions from?  Livy's. ::)

Quote from: aligern on September 07, 2016, 07:51:21 AM
Sorry Patrick, but your comments on Caesar and Ammianus on Argentoratum would seem to rely upon the exhausted combatants standing or kneeling within arms reach of one another so that they can resume combat without moving.  This doesn't look likely, because, to borrow your technique of romantic reconstruction, any man on either side who had the energy could just reach out and kill their exhausted opponents.

I am just pointing out what our respected military authorities say, men who were there and in the middle of the action, or were contemporaries of those who were.

For what it is worth, between concentrating on the man in front and the peripheral vision constraints imposed by helmets and/or warrior tresses and/or sweat in the eyes, front rankers may easily fail to see someone getting up within a couple of feet of them.

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However, it is joyful to perceive that you do grasp that when tired by fighting the two sides can mutually agree to cease combat .

This presumably refers to Neville's Cross.  If Sir wishes to push this any further than that particular battle he might be asked to provide evidence. :)

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Perhaps you could accept that Caesar and Ammianus are simply being brief rather than describing in full the armies pulling back a little to recuperate.

As they are in the middle of detailed battle descriptions, the answer is no.  I would anyway like to see how the Nervii could pull back from and return to a position atop a mound of corpses too high for hand weapons to reach.

It is quite 8interesting to see the discussion of how the Romans fought as interpreted by different people.  I am however begin to struggle with a problem I recall from the WMWW debate, which covered similar ground (and the same sources).  There is so much dodging, parrying, detailed debates about the meaning of sentences, that the position of the parties becomes obscure.  We all know the story of the blind men and the elephant - if we are constantly only aware of uncontextualised bits, the shape of the whole may elude us.

I think I have some idea of Rich's position from the secondary sources he quotes.  Roy clearly believes in quite short energetic burst of combat with mutual separations to a short distance (missile distance? spear-poking distance?) at intervals.  I'm less clear on Patrick's position.  Patrick clearly believes in the Romans using a steady technique to give longer endurance.  Wounded men continue to fight from the ground or leaning on shields.  There is ultimately line relief but this takes place during active hand-to-hand combat.  Barbarians are expected to conform to this combat style, even though they exhaust themselves, sweat and are dazzled by the sun.  Romans seem to sprint into combat, throwing pila as they come (does everyone throw both pila at this stage?). They then slow down and fight in a more measured way.   It is unclear what is happening at the micro level - are men exchanging places in the ranks?  What is the role of the small unit organisation of the Romans, if any, in combat?

Time perhaps for some line relief (whichever your favourite model) and a chance to present cohesive psitions?

 

Patrick:

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Translated rather than interpreted, my learned friend.

Ah, but I am sufficiently learned, my young (?) apprentice, to know that all translation is interpretation (yes, even when you do it). Some day you too may acquire this wisdom.

I invited some sophistry to apply to the sentence in Caesar, but you have exceeded my wildest expectations! Congratulations - I did not think I could be surprised any more.

As a small point of information, yes Koon's interest is chiefly in Livy, but he has interesting comparative chapters on Polybius and Caesar. Worth reading for anyone interested.

Good summary Anthony; we will always wander off into arguing over the meanings of single words (not least because it's useful to correct errors of fact and those inevitably tend to be at the small scale). For my part I don't have a cohesive position to present as I don't know how Roman infantry combat worked, and am not sure there is enough evidence to know for certain. I have been defending the dynamic standoff against importunate attacks, and I have my own hunches, but that's all. A clear statement of Patrick's interpretation, sweating, sprinting, fighting wounded, continuous combat, line relief, weary barbarians and all might be useful - ideally, Patrick, in your own words, not just a cut and paste of sources which we then have to fall to arguing over. Just so as we know where we stand, or kneel, or lie prostrate.

Quote from: RichT on September 01, 2016, 10:24:16 AM
Since the multi hour melee (genuine, actual fighting, in toe to toe combat, multi (more than two?) hour, melee, and leaving aside 'line relief', since non-Romans presumably didn't do it) is being proposed as a viable theory by Patrick, I would extend Nicholas' 100 hoplite thought experiment - imagine two 8 rank deep lines fighting each other, and causing, over the course of the combat, 50% casualties each (including killed and significantly wounded) - much higher casualties than are ever attested, but let's take a worst case, and assume there were lots of unrecorded wounded. Now if the battle lasted 1 hour 20 minutes (to keep the sums simple), then each file leader (whoever is file leader at the time) is scoring an effective hit (killing or wounding) once every 10 minutes. If the combat goes on longer, then hits are naturally less frequent - in a two hour melee, there would be one hit every 15 minutes, three hours, once every 22 minutes, and so on. Now while this sort of fighting would doubtless be very energy efficient, it bears no relation to any of the fighting I have ever seen or imagined (in combat sports, re-enactments, riots, TV and film reconstructions) and (more to the point) it doesn't sound at all like the descriptions of combat that exist, which all sound more violent, continuous, vigorous and dangerous than one hit every ten minutes or more would suggest. This is the fundamental problem (aside from any other considerations) I have with multi hour melees.

Sorry, very late... traveling in Korea and Japan.
But I had to say... well put, I feel this dissonance too.

Quote from: aligern on September 03, 2016, 08:35:45 AM
On casualty rates I did say at the beginning that most of a frontbrank soldiers efforts will go into defensive or cautious actions rather than risky attempts to kill an opponent.  It is in his interest to slash or thrust in a way that might get advantage, but will not over extend him, or unnecessarily exhaust him.  We have raised, several times the record that the winner in an ancient battle suffers very few casualties compared to the loser, even when the armies are similar in weaponry and tactics. Also, if battle normally resulted in the extinction of the front ranks then who would stand there?

May I ask, what is the source of this idea?
Its not unreasonable but is it logic or sourced?
It sounds a bit like "never get out of the trench". But the soldier knows that just being in the trench is a risk and it is "logical" to take a risk and attacking because that might get you out of the trench for good. There must be some probabilistic process going on in the soldiers head, unconsciously...

Quote from: RichT on September 07, 2016, 12:24:11 PM
Patrick:

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Translated rather than interpreted, my learned friend.

Ah, but I am sufficiently learned, my young (?) apprentice, to know that all translation is interpretation (yes, even when you do it). Some day you too may acquire this wisdom.

Actually that is not quite true: some translation is misunderstanding (occasionally even when I do it). ;)

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Good summary Anthony; we will always wander off into arguing over the meanings of single words (not least because it's useful to correct errors of fact and those inevitably tend to be at the small scale). For my part I don't have a cohesive position to present as I don't know how Roman infantry combat worked, and am not sure there is enough evidence to know for certain. I have been defending the dynamic standoff against importunate attacks, and I have my own hunches, but that's all. A clear statement of Patrick's interpretation, sweating, sprinting, fighting wounded, continuous combat, line relief, weary barbarians and all might be useful - ideally, Patrick, in your own words, not just a cut and paste of sources which we then have to fall to arguing over. Just so as we know where we stand, or kneel, or lie prostrate.

Would my learned friend like to begin with Early Republican (509-c.437 BC), Livian (c.437-311 BC), Polybian (c.311-c.107 BC), Marian (c.107-c.58 BC), Triumvirate period (58-31 BC), Early Imperial (31 BC-AD 196-ish) or one of the later periods?  There are some constants more or less throughout, but also a number of important detail differences.

To answer (or hint at answers) to Anthony's questions (sensible questions, Anthony):

Quote from: Erpingham on September 07, 2016, 11:34:30 AM
I'm less clear on Patrick's position.  Patrick clearly believes in the Romans using a steady technique to give longer endurance.  Wounded men continue to fight from the ground or leaning on shields.  There is ultimately line relief but this takes place during active hand-to-hand combat.  Barbarians are expected to conform to this combat style, even though they exhaust themselves, sweat and are dazzled by the sun. 

Barbarians seem happy to thrust themselves into combat, presumably trusting to individual skill and valour combined with deep formations.  They are of course better placed to take on Romans in temperate home climes rather than hundreds of miles from home in sunny Italy.  With some (e.g. the Gauls of northern Italy) the penny eventually drops and they confine themselves to ambushes in hilly or wooded terrain, a habit which is also beneficially employed by the Eburones when they wipe out one of Caesar's legions and of course by Arminius in AD 9 when he picks off not just one but three legions under Varus.

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Romans seem to sprint into combat, throwing pila as they come (does everyone throw both pila at this stage?).

If this means, does everyone in the unit (century or maniple) throw pila at this stage, the answer looks like yes.  Caesar in particular appears to treat the pila shower as a single simultaneous event along the length of the army, or at least its infantry component, followed by melee immediately thereafter.

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They then slow down and fight in a more measured way.   It is unclear what is happening at the micro level - are men exchanging places in the ranks?

Strange to say, apparently not.  One gets the impression that the man in front fights until he drops, then the next in file takes over.  This is less cruel than it seems because the chance of an armoured infantryman acquiring a fatal wound in frontal combat does not seem to have been that great: more often, men appear to have collapsed as a result of blood loss from minor wounds - in essence, they fainted and the next man took over.

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What is the role of the small unit organisation of the Romans, if any, in combat? 

Almost certainly two roles: cohesion and reaction capability.  Josephus comments on this:

"... and the readiness of obeying their commanders is so great, that it is very ornamental in peace; but when they come to a battle, the whole army is but one body, so well coupled together are their ranks, so sudden are their turnings about, so sharp their hearing as to what orders are given them, so quick their sight of the ensigns." - Jewish War III.5.7  (Oops, quoted something - sorry!)

The Spartans had a similar arrangement whereby, as Thucydides comments, much of the army consisted of 'officers under officers'.  This provided high levels of cohesion and discipline and the ability of the whole formation to react with rapidity and precision.  So, in a nutshell, I see the roles of centuries and files as taking cohesion and smoothness of operation right down to the 8-man level, a sort of organisational nanotechnology.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 07, 2016, 09:48:10 PM
Strange to say, apparently not.  One gets the impression that the man in front fights until he drops, then the next in file takes over. 

Interesting. But from where do we get this impression?
It simplifies the analysis, because estimating when one man drops is easier than for an organisation that is constantly refreshing and relieving.

QuoteTo answer (or hint at answers) to Anthony's questions (sensible questions, Anthony):

One does one's best :)

Quote from: Dangun on September 08, 2016, 05:06:47 AM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 07, 2016, 09:48:10 PM
Strange to say, apparently not.  One gets the impression that the man in front fights until he drops, then the next in file takes over. 

Interesting. But from where do we get this impression?

From the quotes earlier mentioned, particularly about men who had previously fallen (from fatigue, blood loss or both) getting up to rejoin the fighting and the fact that mounds of bodies managed to pile up during Caesar's fight against the Nervii.  Neither seems practicable if casualties were being withdrawn/removed or if men were falling back to take breaks and re-engaging on a new line.  There is also negative information - I have yet to find any reference (outside Appian) to casualties being extracted and replaced as a matter of course.

Such an arrangement does, as Nicholas points out, have the advantage of simplicity.  It also means that nobody is breaking ranks and hence unit cohesion, either hustling wounded/exhausted troops to the formation rear or abandoning places in their files to take casualties to a dressing station or equivalent.

The man in front fights until he drops?? Unbeleivable! Incroyable!  Once agan the examples given are  subject to other interpretations. For example, the whole of one unit could have been killed over several rounds of contact and then another unit comes  up to replace, or and more likely, the wounded have fallen back and filtered out leaving only the dead and the still fighting. So the Sambre, unfortunately, proves nothing.......except it may prove that Caesar was capable of writing that would have achieved him a position as an author at Marvel comics .  Its along the lines  of his , all the Nervii are wiped out, which oddly enough has them rebelling again next year.

Roy

QuoteFrom the quotes earlier mentioned, particularly about men who had previously fallen (from fatigue, blood loss or both) getting up to rejoin the fighting and the fact that mounds of bodies managed to pile up during Caesar's fight against the Nervii.  Neither seems practicable if casualties were being withdrawn/removed or if men were falling back to take breaks and re-engaging on a new line. 

I think I'd have two caveats here.  One is the "mounds of dead" description is also applied in medieval battles (most famously Agincourt) where we know that the units at the front were constrained in some way from withdrawing or operating flexibly (crushed together, unable to use weapons etc.).  The statement about all hope being gone suggests that may have been the case here and so the situation may not be normal.

Secondly, there is a difference between dead casualties and wounded casualties.  Just because bodies are piling up doesn't mean ambulatory wounded men are not exchanging places with unwounded comrades.  It seems, from evidence shared so far, wounded men stayed with their units.  We don't have the evidence that they stayed in the front rank. 

Agreed there's not good evidence (aside from the scattered cases eg Appian) for routine replacement of wounded, or tired, or generally fed up, men within a formation. On the other hand, while walking wounded might have kept fighting if they were able, if someone fell, fainted, or was otherwise hors de combat, it would be ludicrous to think that the man in the rank behind would just stand and do nothing,  rather than stepping forward and taking up the fight. I expect that in this as in all other periods, if a badly wounded man was able to get out of the way, or be dragged out of the way, he would - but how possible this would be depends on vexed questions like the intervals between files, the amount of pushing and shoving going on, etc, and no doubt varied widely from case to case.

This proves nothing about the continuity (or duration) of combat.

There is this too:

Caesar BG 3.4 "A short time only having elapsed, so that time was scarcely given for arranging and executing those things which they had determined on, the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our men] from all parts, and discharged stones and darts, upon our rampart. Our men at first, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did they cast any weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as any part of the camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard pressed, thither they ran, and brought assistance. But they were over-matched in this, that the enemy when wearied by the long continuance of the battle, went out of the action, and others with fresh strength came in their place; none of which things could be done by our men, owing to the smallness of their number; and not only was permission not given to the wearied [Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to the wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where he had been stationed, and recover."

But this is defence of a fortified camp, which might have had different rules from open battle (not least, its duration).

I suppose hat the difference between a siege and a battle in the open field is that between the opposing sides there is a wall or palisade that forms a boundary that cannot easily be crossed.mHence a proponentnof thebthoery that men stayed n pkace until death or flight relieved them might say that it becomes possible to manoeuvre in front of a fortification because the opponent cannot react aggressively. Believing as Zi do that there is more depth and complexity on an Ancient battlefield than some allow for, I would see the relief of tired troops indicate in Richard's pist as a drill normal to the battlefield. The line wall only forms a boundary and protection what goes on behind it is the normal rotation of units that would occur in the open field.
Roy

Quote from: Erpingham on September 08, 2016, 12:28:39 PM
I think I'd have two caveats here.  One is the "mounds of dead" description is also applied in medieval battles (most famously Agincourt) where we know that the units at the front were constrained in some way from withdrawing or operating flexibly (crushed together, unable to use weapons etc.).  The statement about all hope being gone suggests that may have been the case here and so the situation may not be normal.

Although the piles of bodies would have to be started long before 'all hope was gone' in order to reach the height they did.  Caesar's praise for the courage of the Nervii (Gallic War II.27) would ring hollow if their valour and tenacity had been solely the result of being poorly positioned - the implication is that there was a voluntary element.  That the Nervii were using their weapons freely right up to the last is evidenced by their  famous last stand atop the mounds of bodies.

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Secondly, there is a difference between dead casualties and wounded casualties.  Just because bodies are piling up doesn't mean ambulatory wounded men are not exchanging places with unwounded comrades.  It seems, from evidence shared so far, wounded men stayed with their units.  We don't have the evidence that they stayed in the front rank.

Or that they left it.  If they fought until they dropped, the new front ranker would of course step over them to deal with his opponent.  What we do know is that Romans were very averse to letting people leave their places on the battlefield (sons of consuls are on record as having been executed for leaving the ranks to duel and defeat an enemy champion), but they also had a Civic Crown awarded for saving a fellow citizen's life (the saved man recommended the award, which apparently made it quite rare), so one can hypothesise around that.  One would logically expect that a man with a disabling would would not be expected to stay in the front rank, but until we find a pertinent source statement this remains conjectural.

Quote from: RichT on September 08, 2016, 02:13:41 PM
This proves nothing about the continuity (or duration) of combat.

Which 'this' is my learned friend referring to?

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But this is defence of a fortified camp, which might have had different rules from open battle (not least, its duration).

One can surmise that in the defence of a fortified camp a reserve would ordinarily be kept and wearied/wounded defenders replaced with fresh ones if at all possible when under sustained assault.  Manning a rampart, a static obstacle with easy communications behind it, is indeed a different matter to holding steady a line of battle in the open.

Quote from: aligern on September 08, 2016, 05:10:24 PM
The line wall only forms a boundary and protection what goes on behind it is the normal rotation of units that would occur in the open field.

Perhaps Sir should start producing some examples of this purported 'rotation ... in the open field'.

As Anthony suggested earlier, this is an argument over the tiniest details of the internal anatomy of the creature in front of us, when we can't agree whether that creature is an elephant or a giraffe.

Reading something like Caesar's account of the Sambre (which is a poor example since it's not a formal pitched battle, but here we are) it is obvious to me that what is described is a fast moving, mobile running battle, with a mix of sword play, hurling missiles, attacks, retreats, engagements and disengagements,  small units acting independently, redeployments and all. It may be equally obvious to Patrick that it involved continuous unbroken battle lines standing in fixed positions hacking at each other for hours on end. It's pretty pointless quibbling over the details when there is such a fundamental divergence on the big picture.

To go from the sublime to the ridiculous, it's quite hard to form a mental picture or model of ancient battle, and this is somewhere where wargames should be able to help; ignoring all the minutiae of rules and factors and whatnot, they could give a feel for the dynamics of battle (this is Phil Sabin's hope). I haven't found toy soldier games help at all to be honest, but the other night I pulled out Sid Meier's Gettysburg again, and it struck me how good a feel for a how battle (might have) worked this gives - I don't know if it's accurate or not (not my period), but it feels entirely plausible, and the way units move, fight, cluster,  disperse, fall back, rush forward made me think of the fighting at the Sambre. Off topic, but I think there is scope for this sort of computer re-creation to provide insights that can't be achieved by quibbling over words or banging heads about fundamentally divergent mental models.

That sounds like a cue for Justin to re enter the fray.

Unfortunately wargames generally include mst of the more minor tactical aspects within the £granularity ' of the two battle lines. I recently plated a game that used the full three rank plus velites formation of a Roman legion. Normally all of this  detail is subsumed in the one or two ranks of Roman legionaries. Certainly in mst rules the Romans do not get down to the Triarii because these ceterans are eithe subsumed or put on the flanks or some other unique task. Even in the game I was playing the hastati, principes and triarii of each legion operated as seperate units,rather than a whole line of the army falling back to reveal a new line. Perhaps it is because working out all of the interactions of minor units, such as the fate of cohorts takes so much time and the rule writer wants to concentrate on grand tactical manoeuvre, breaking the cavalry on one wing and then outflanking the enemy, fir example.
Like Richard  rather despair of wargames telling us much about the minir tactical details. This is largely because the rule writer has to decide how combat works in order to replicate it with rules. Thus we are not likely to learn anything beyond what the author already imagined.
As an exampke. let us take the pilum. This could be
1) A deadly volley that kills many and cannot be defended against because when it pirces a shield its design allows it to penetrate through to the holders body.
2) A device for de shielding opponents prior to their being engaged with the sword that means that The thrower has the advantage in combat.
3) Merely a heavy javelin, The Romans have two each and one or both sides can spend a considerable time throwing them with not too devastating effect, before closing with swords.
All three situations have evidence to support them and rules can be written for all three, once that has been done, playing the game will not tell us which is the most likely way that the pilum was used, though some games will be quicker, some more devastating.

Quote from: RichT on September 09, 2016, 12:31:23 PM
Reading something like Caesar's account of the Sambre (which is a poor example since it's not a formal pitched battle, but here we are) it is obvious to me that what is described is a fast moving, mobile running battle, with a mix of sword play, hurling missiles, attacks, retreats, engagements and disengagements,  small units acting independently, redeployments and all. It may be equally obvious to Patrick that it involved continuous unbroken battle lines standing in fixed positions hacking at each other for hours on end. It's pretty pointless quibbling over the details when there is such a fundamental divergence on the big picture.

In addition, the Sambre was effectively three battles in one.

1) On the Roman left the Atrebates, who had pushed themselves too hard sprinting across the river and up the hill, were easily routed by the Romans and fled back down the hill with the Romans cutting them down.  Those who made it across the river rallied on the nearby steep slope while the Romans were crossing, but their heart was not in it and they were soon routed again, this time for good.

2) In the Roman centre (sorry this is all Romanocentric but so are our sources) the Viromandui advanced with more restraint and resisted with more effect, being driven into but not across the river - Caesar notes that the Romans were fighting on the riverbank itself, the Gauls perforce being in the water.  He does not return to this part of the field in his narrative.

3) The Roman right was pitted against the Nervii, who fought to the last and impressed even Caesar by their athleticism and stamina as well as their courage:

"... it ought not to be concluded, that men of such great courage had injudiciously dared to pass a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very disadvantageous place; since their greatness of spirit had rendered these actions easy, although in themselves very difficult." - Gallic War II.27

Another translation:

"Only heroes could have made light of crossing a wide river, clambering up the steep banks and launching themselves on such a difficult position."

So here we have three limbs of our pachyderm (or cameleopard): one which gives way rapidly, one which is lost to sight half-way through, and one which stands for the whole battle, albeit at the cost of amputation.  This is what makes it impossible to establish a general rule which fits every battle, because not only is every battle different but parts of the same battle can show very different characteristics.  What we do have are accounts of the Roman military system and what it trains for: we can see many manifestations of this, both in the observance and the breach, on campaign and on the battlefield.  I suggest we study the known classical descriptions of the system to find the intended norm.

And as Roy notes for the pilum, we have different engagements in which the weapon's lethality ranges from the marginal to the considerable.  All are correct: what matters as much as the weapon is its use, individually and collectively.

One thing I would not recommend is trying to superimpose engagement patterns from completely different centuries, cultures and military systems.  The American Civil War did not even properly match its own century - look at the contrasting battlefield approaches in the Crimean, Franco-Austrian (1859), Austro-Prusso-Danish (1864), Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian Wars - let alone provide any useful comparisons for the classical period.

Just to clarify that I think that pila generally do not cause large casualties, inded missile weapons do not cause massive casualties provided the opponents have sheilds and/or armour.  This is evidenced in that the victors in Roman versus Roman battles do not suffer large casualties, nor are the opponents in Roman versus say Carthaginian or Macedonian battles become destroyed in the missile phase. In those examples where ( in my belief untypically) Romans throw pila all day casuaties are obviously not huge.  In theory, if there are 1,200 velites  in  a legion with 7 javelins each, so that is 7000 javelins and a further 2,400 or 4,800 pila and yet We do not hear of opponents being destroyed by missiles.
German armies , following Tacitus, throw huge quantities of missiles (though they might not be the highest quality weapons) yet the Germans do not do huge damage to the Romans, or even other Germans.  The Parthians  spend all day with unlimited supplies of arrows shooting at legionaries, but the target units are not killed, they lose morale. Caesar's centurion has 100 arrows in his shield .
Generally, we might say that  neither missiles nor arme blanche weapons create great casualties until the opponent either runs away or is too crushed together to fight back effectively,the Cannae or Adrianople effect. We are not well informed as to what causes armies to break, though we have reams of speculation. That feeds through into our wargames as they generally elide from assuned cause to known effct. So unit A shoots at unit B , it causes casualties and as those mount unit B finally breaks. Unit X fights unit Y hand to hand and causes casualties which in the end break Y.  As a moderating device we throw dice which lessen or increase the killing effect, but it is kilks that determine the outcome. The units often have 'factors' such as armour or weapon type or skill level which the author makes more or less arbitrary judgements about, but which all effectively or lessen kills. Yet one thing we can be reasonably certain about is that units are not broken by kills, or rather not broken by kills alone.
Roy
Following Richard's point about how useful our modelling of battles goes and

QuoteUnit X fights unit Y hand to hand and causes casualties which in the end break Y.  As a moderating device we throw dice which lessen or increase the killing effect, but it is kilks that determine the outcome. The units often have 'factors' such as armour or weapon type or skill level which the author makes more or less arbitrary judgements about, but which all effectively or lessen kills. Yet one thing we can be reasonably certain about is that units are not broken by kills, or rather not broken by kills alone.

At the risk of drifting off topic, rules have been using casualties as a proxy for unit degradation since Kriegspiel.  The danger is really being too literal.  I think the charts in Early Modern rules like the WRG series gave a spurious feeling of exactitude, giving numbers of dead which had to be totalled into 20s to remove figures.  More modern rules, I think, do move more towards outcomes, using steps to represent not dead men but general reduction in will to combat, wrapping killed, wounded, exhausted, demoralised together in casualties.

To go back to the original suggestion of testing different ways to model combat by adjusting rules does rather require us to know enough in detail about combat to know which one comes closest.  As we spend a lot of our time wrangling about what combat was like in the ancient and medieval period, this is going to be hard.  I think it will be particularly hard to model a small group ebb and flow model for our Romans because it will need a much greater operational cohesion of battle lines than many rule sets can muster.

Quote from: RichT on September 09, 2016, 12:31:23 PM
the other night I pulled out Sid Meier's Gettysburg again, and it struck me how good a feel for a how battle (might have) worked this gives - I don't know if it's accurate or not (not my period), but it feels entirely plausible, and the way units move, fight, cluster,  disperse, fall back, rush forward made me think of the fighting at the Sambre. Off topic, but I think there is scope for this sort of computer re-creation to provide insights that can't be achieved by quibbling over words or banging heads about fundamentally divergent mental models.

But this is the problem, isn't it. If no one knows, if there is no agreement, no computer simulation can help. All it can do is demonstrate the assumptions that have gone into the model, much like this thread.

The sources show periods of missile exchange, charges, withdrawals, follow ups, last stands, leader speeches, reform, formation changes and various other phases of battle. Sometimes there was intense melee combat; at other times it was not so intense. Sometimes there was no melee combat at all.

The question 'was battle continuous?' Depends entirely on the definition of battle and continuity. Terms have not been defined, so the argument is all over the place, and we have got no further than 'sometimes' or 'it depends' as an answer.

If this turns up as a six page summary in Slingshot I'm cancelling my subscription.

Quote from: Prufrock on September 10, 2016, 06:47:57 PM

The question 'was battle continuous?' Depends entirely on the definition of battle and continuity. Terms have not been defined, so the argument is all over the place, and we have got no further than 'sometimes' or 'it depends' as an answer.

That is not really the central point, although it would have been nice if people had established some goal areas at the ends of the playing-field.  The more alert among us will have noticed that the actual point at issue is whether such combat as existed when two sides met on the battlefield was habitually, that is in the majority of cases and what we could consider the norm, punctuated by frequent and/or regular mutual disengagements and withdrawals for rest breaks or whether it was not.

What we seem to be getting is a lot of source accounts which do not mention any sort of break and a few which do, albeit even these have a hard time fitting the 15-20 minute bracket which I understand is considered by the proponents of discontinuous combat to be the maximum for which a man could possibly fight.  There seems to be at least a partial failure to appreciate that this depends heavily upon the man and the fight.

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If this turns up as a six page summary in Slingshot I'm cancelling my subscription.

To paraphrase Frederick the Great, you and I can desert together. ;)

Re the mechanism by which combat is resolved.
I distinctly remember that in WRG rules many years ago Phil Barker expressed that the view that following a bad dice throw something must have happened . on the field such as a general getting killed or a standard falling, that the use of a die to randomise elements of the morale  process included and allowed for such events. That is generally the view of rules writers.
Erpingham's point is, if I read aright, that casualties are not representing actual dead or incapacitated men, but rather the degradation of fighting ability. Thus a unit becomes  nearer dissolution, or at least disruption (by pushbacks and overlaps) and eventually dissolves.
What exercises my mind is whether we should be looking to replicate the actions that Ancient generals took and the standard operating methods that the troops used in order to generate the outcomes.
To an extent fighting methods are taken care of by the factors allocated for  attack and defence. Put a unt of Romans against a unt of Germans and they will go through various processes and the rule writer has to decide on how those are replicated, as I said, mostly by factors being allocated.There I suppose the best we can do is examine reported battles to verify the actual relative lethality of fighting styles. The other possibility is replicating the fighting styles in more detail on the tabletop, but would this create too many interactions and take up too much time.
Another area of decision that operates is those things that a general can arrange in order to advantage his men, such elements as being uphill, fighting over broken ground, or arrangng to clear the ground for your scythed chariots, or using pathways in marsh your chaps are familiar with, being motivated by an exhortation...that one more  step, arranging a flank attack, depriving the opponent of breakfast or lunch, sending in reinforcements.   These vary in effect, but I suspect they were important to generals desperate to get an edge and maybe we do not arrange to replicate them sufficiently Should a player be able to spend on increased weapon supplies? Should a rousing 'one more step' be on the shopping list? Should a a die roll determine whether you can catch the opponent before he has taken his meal?
The remaining area  is to look at what actually does cause units to break at a point where relatively few casualties have been caused, but fighting may well have gone on some time. The ancients were generlly of the opinion that battle was risky and often luck dependent. As said ealier, a standard bearer tripping up could be the event that tips the balance and that cannot be trained or prepared for. However, that is unusual, surely the determinant of which side routs should be something discernible and replicable. Here I would raise something which I recall 7th edition WRG attempted, which was to see the determinant as exhaustion or loss of cohesion and then reward generals who managed to arrange for their enemy to lose cohesion more rapidly than their troops. In such a mechanic there do not need to be a large number of 'kills' as these are only contributory to cohesion and most importantly the result of its loss....free hack here we come. In this model the job of the general (the player) is to arrange for the enemy to suffer the most disorganisation until a limit is reached. The limit itself could be dice moderated so that it was not completely predictable. combat would still contribute to disorganisation and still be variable, contributing a greater or lesser amount to degradation, but it would not be the only or greatest modifier. Troops would tire at different rates during combat...we. could always allow for break off, rest and recovery during the fight.
I do recognise that many sets of rules do try to take into account other factors, but are these factors matters of devising by the player? and are 'kills' too dominant.

Roy

Quote from: Prufrock on September 10, 2016, 06:47:57 PM
But this is the problem, isn't it. If no one knows, if there is no agreement, no computer simulation can help. All it can do is demonstrate the assumptions that have gone into the model, much like this thread.

Sure - a computer simulation can't tell you what actually happened. What it can do is tell you whether your conceptual model looks and feels plausible when you see it in action, and also whether, when given inputs as close as you can make them to what the sources describe, it produces outputs close enough to be satisfactory to what the sources describe.

I think those are worthwhile goals - otherwise we have conceptual models but no way of testing them other than by arguing over whose conceptual model is more closely based on the sources, which is a sterile, circular argument, as evidenced by this thread. Between Patrick's model of static immobile lines banging away at each other for hours, and the rest of the world's model of something more subtle and complex going on ( ;)), we have no way of judging which is better, in the absence of the sources clearly ruling out one or the other (which they don't, or this would all have been settled decades ago and we wouldn't be having this discussion). If we could see these models in action, play with them, adjust parameters, it might help. Or not, it's just a suggestion.

It has all been unfocused but I think we know that what we are talking about is the dynamic standoff model of Roman infantry combat, and it might have been better to stick to that more closely.

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If this turns up as a six page summary in Slingshot I'm cancelling my subscription.

How about a summary in six parts?

Re: Roy's thoughts - manual toy solider (or cardboard) wargames have too much abstraction (rightly, if they are to be games) to be useful as combat models (IMHO) - though they might (Lost Battles) be useful as battle models. Whether losses are tracked as cohesion, fatigue, or casualties doesn't really make much difference - different words for the same thing (in model terms, not in real life terms - ie gradual unit degradation). Agree very much about player choices - I would love to see wargames where players still had something to do, decisions to take, once units are in combat, rather than just rolling dice, adding factors or checking tables.

QuoteWhat we seem to be getting is a lot of source accounts which do not mention any sort of break and a few which do, albeit even these have a hard time fitting the 15-20 minute bracket which I understand is considered by the proponents of discontinuous combat to be the maximum for which a man could possibly fight.  There seems to be at least a partial failure to appreciate that this depends heavily upon the man and the fight.

These are probably a fundamental point of disagreement.   Firstly the two sides take the lack of direct evidence for breaks in different ways.  To the discontinuous cohorts, it is an absence of evidence.  To the continualists, it is evidence of absence.  More significant is the second point.  The discontinualists place the issue of human endurance centrally and assume that human endurance then can be compared to human endurance now.  Patrick (I can't speak for other continualists) holds modern comparisons of athletes endurance as invalid and that the endurance of ancient fighters was much greater.  This point, I think would undermine any attempts at computer simulation because the base assumptions would be so different. 

On Aaron's point of not defining our terms, I think he is right.  What to me is clear evidence of discontinuity, as battles have phases of activity, is not discontinuous to others, because continuity/discontinuity is only about low-level activity once units have contacted.  I'm not sure it would have made a difference to reaching conclusions however.  This is partly because we are taking on the whole ancient and medieval period (albeit usually concentrating on a particular time period at a time) which fails to allow for different practices in different cultures.  But to return to a point made several times by Richard in many different epic discussions like this - we can't reach a definitive conclusion because we don't have the evidence for one.  All we can do is attempt a reasonable theory.  And all these discussions can do is explore the field, throw up ideas and let members form their theories. 

Quote from: Erpingham on September 11, 2016, 09:55:03 AM
The discontinualists place the issue of human endurance centrally and assume that human endurance then can be compared to human endurance now.

Nicely encapsulated.  On the subject of human endurance generally, is anyone familiar with early 20th century shipbuilding and in particular how long riveters could or would keep up the process of hammering home one red-hot rivet after another with quick, precise strokes of a weighty hammer?

Take a look here (http://www.scotlandmag.com/magazine/issue44/12009231.html) and see how long you think they kept it up.

QuoteAll we can do is attempt a reasonable theory.  And all these discussions can do is explore the field, throw up ideas and let members form their theories.

They can also air evidence: not everything is pure theory.  On which point ...

Quote from: RichT on September 10, 2016, 07:41:36 PM
It has all been unfocused but I think we know that what we are talking about is the dynamic standoff model of Roman infantry combat, and it might have been better to stick to that more closely.

Better late than never.  Anyone care to outline the basics of this model and any source evidence they can find to support it?

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... a computer simulation can't tell you what actually happened. What it can do is tell you whether your conceptual model looks and feels plausible when you see it in action, and also whether, when given inputs as close as you can make them to what the sources describe, it produces outputs close enough to be satisfactory to what the sources describe.

Eminently sensible.

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Re: Roy's thoughts - manual toy solider (or cardboard) wargames have too much abstraction (rightly, if they are to be games) to be useful as combat models (IMHO) - though they might (Lost Battles) be useful as battle models. Whether losses are tracked as cohesion, fatigue, or casualties doesn't really make much difference - different words for the same thing (in model terms, not in real life terms - ie gradual unit degradation). Agree very much about player choices - I would love to see wargames where players still had something to do, decisions to take, once units are in combat, rather than just rolling dice, adding factors or checking tables.

Hear, hear.

QuoteThey can also air evidence: not everything is pure theory.

Explore the field/air the evidence - similar idea really.  Pure theory hasn't played a part on either side of this debate as far as I can see.  All parties are using their theories to explain the observed evidence.  What we could do with is more solid statement of these theories, which would reduce misunderstanding and allow us to see the elephant(s).

My grandfather worked as a riveter...I think he marked up plates. He certainly worked at Austinband Pickersgills in Sunderland.  He died before my time,though. There is quite a bit of rest built into the riveting process, because each rivet has to arrive and be fitted in the hole fresh from the furnace and then the man blocking the rivet takes position and the riveter uses the pneumatic hammer. So there is a little bit of recovery time built in and then a bit more as a new plate is moved into place. We might be better placed to look at how coal was cut at the face by hand or how loggers work,nthough for bith those jobs there are pauses, for the collier when enough is cut to fill a basket and for the lumberjack, when the log or trunk s cut through.
Of course rivets and trees do not hit back so the men concerned do hot have to bear blows as well as deliver them.
Roy

Except it did not work quite like that: the plates were already positioned and attached with a few bolts through holes near the corners by the time the riveters got to them.  Once the majority of the rivets were in place the bolts came out before the riveters reached that part of the plate.

Rivet arrival was quite rapid: they were thrown from the furnace (with tongs) and caught in something resembling a small one-handed coal bucket, from which they were promptly extracted (with tongs) and passed to the holder-upper, who thrust them through and held them there for the riveter (who took five years to train, about the length if time it took to build a battleship in the 1930s) to do his stuff - or their stuff, as they often worked in pairs to get a better shape on the rivet head.

Forgive the trip down memory lane.  We may agree that professions do not necessarily provide the best comparison with soldiering, so here is a little something from Ammianus.

First, a skirmish with the Persian van.

"Our soldiers, inflamed by this sight, since only a small stream separated them from the enemy, were in haste to attack them, but the emperor restrained them; however, a fierce fight took place not far from our very rampart between our outposts and those of the Persians, in which Machameus, general of one of our battalions, fell. His brother Maurus, later a general in Phoenicia, tried to protect him, and after cutting down the man who had killed his brother, he terrified all who came in his way, and although he was himself partly disabled by an arrow through his shoulder, by main strength he succeeded in bringing off Machameus, already pale with approaching death, from the fray.

And when, because of the almost unendurable heat and the repeated attacks, both sides were growing weary, finally the enemy's troops were utterly routed and fled in all directions. As we withdrew from the spot, the Saracens followed us for some distance but were forced to retreat through fear of our infantry; a little later they joined with the main body of the Persians and attacked with greater safety, hoping to carry off the Romans' baggage; but on seeing the emperor they returned to the cavalry held in reserve." - Rerum Gestarum XXV.1.2-3

We note the character of the fighting, with 'repeated attacks' and fierce local combats, both sides growing weary as a result.  A not dissimilar action took place the following day against the Roman rear.  The day after that, the main Persian army came up.  Now we shall see Ammianus describe a full-scale engagement, i.e. a battle.

"Although these sights caused no little fear, the emperor, guarded by troops of armed men and with his trustworthy generals, full of confidence, as the great and dangerous power of the enemy demanded, drew up his soldiers in the form of a crescent with curving wings to meet the enemy.

[17] And in order that the onset of the bowmen might not throw our ranks into confusion, he advanced at a swift pace, and so ruined the effectiveness of the arrows.  Then the usual signal for battle was given, and the Roman infantry in close order with mighty effort drove the serried ranks of the enemy before them.

[18] And in the heat of the combat that followed, the clash of shields, the shouts of the men, and the doleful sound of the whirring arrows continued without intermission. The plains were covered with blood and dead bodies, but the Persian losses were greater; for they often lacked endurance in battle and could with difficulty maintain a close contest man to man, since they were accustomed to fight bravely at long range, but if they perceived that their forces were giving way, as they retreated they would shoot their arrows back like a shower of rain and keep the enemy from a bold pursuit. So by the weight of great strength the Parthians were driven back, and when the signal for retreat was given in the usual manner, our soldiers, long wearied by the fiery course of the sun, returned to their tents, encouraged to dare greater deeds of valour in the future." - idem XXV.1.16-18

Here there is no break in the action, the army fighting as a coordinated whole and driving the foe off the field by 'the weight of great strength' (pondere magnarum virium).

The above two extracts demonstrate the difference in treatment between a skirmish - an intermittent action, one in which attacks are repeated and intervals in the combat are thus presumably present - and a general action (battle) in which no breaks in the continuity of the action are mentioned or even implied - quite the reverse, in fact: he specifically excludes any intermissions.

I think continuity may be too much for a single step.

Maybe we should start by collecting and identifying evidence for duration first.
(It seems safer to interpolate continuity from duration, than it does to extrapolate continuity from a model of practical endurance.)

Next I'd suggest that collecting evidence for casualties gives us casualties per unit of duration and some useful inferences concerning continuity.

Lastly (I guess there might be some miracle quotes on endurance out there, but short of finding them...), rather than leap to analogies like boxing or riveting, wouldn't it make more sense to use out of period data. While musketry sources might not do much for us, there is probably some useful stuff on duration, casualties, endurance and continuity lying in the out of period cavalry and melee descriptions.

Riveters took five years to train because the shipyards were riven with restrictive practice and you could only get the better jobs by awaiting your turn. The whole farrago fell apart when competitors entered the market with new techniques and no restrictive practices.
However, to Patrick's examples from Ammianus, the first does as Patrick  concedes sound susceptible to punctuated fighting, with repeated attacks.  However, as I said earlier I am very open to there being more happening on the battlefield than simply two lines meeting, with units moving,breinforcing, covering and replacing, so, as I think Patrick concedes, the nature of the combat might enforce breaks.
The second example is skewed because the Persians do not stand up to the Roman attack. The Romans are not exhausted becaipyse the Persians fall back and are such poor hand to hand fighters that they do not deter the Romans. Interestingly, though the Persians shoot as they retreat. Given that it would be exceedingly difficult to shoot at close range  at ranks of the enemy that were engaged with your own front ranks is it possible that the Persians are breaking off far enough back to engage in bowfire before the Romans come on again.
Of course there is the potential problem that the author's description is both linear and comprehensive so the battle is described as a unity whereas in reality there are different actions going on at the same time and the author is giving a partial and higlighted account with only elements of each action included to give colour to his main point, that Persians do not like true Roman cold steel. What happened to the Romans javelins ? What to the vaunted darts? Were they thrown or dropped? Are some of the Persians cavalry?    Ammianus description looks a bit like a raft of topoi...they came on in the same old way and we saw them off in the same old way😉
Roy

Fascinating though the riveting digression is (riveting, you might say), it is a red herring, as you are not comparing like with like. Methodically bashing a rivet is not the same as fighting someone who is simultaneously trying to kill you.

The last few posts show why this thread has gone nowhere and likely will go nowhere. We have collected some comparative durations (Medieval ones) - but the problem with them, as with ancient battles, is deciding what we are we measuring the duration of. That a battle might last hours does not prove that any individual man was standing fighting non stop for hours. We can't ever tell for sure, when a source says that the fighting continued for hours (or minutes or whatever it might be), whether this means there was fighting going on (somewhere) for hours, or whether every individual in the front rank was fighting for hours. The former seems obvious to me, both a priori and through comparison with other periods, but if someone is going to insist that it means continuous fighting for every individual, it is going to be hard to prove him wrong.

The most recent batch of Ammianus quotes are a case in point. For a start, the pitched battle, as Roy says, sounds to me like a perfect example of non-continuous combat - giving way, shooting, enemy prevented from pursuing. Then the emboldened sentence, "the clash of shields, the shouts of the men, and the doleful sound of the whirring arrows continued without intermission" just does not prove that every individual front rank man was doing all this continuously for any given length of time (let alone hours) - just that this was happening somewhere on the field all the time. Again, this is why these discussions make no progress and end up frustrating more than enlightening. We are reading the same texts and understanding them in completely different ways. The battle descriptions we have are extremely terse, high level overviews picking out a few key details of vast complex dynamic battles involving tens of thousands of men. Extracting a sentence from such a high level description and insisting it is a complete and detailed account of everything that happened in that battle seems to me self evidently daft - but again, I can't prove it in a way that would silence all contrary opinions.

To go back a moment to my modelling suggestion - if a dynamic model assumes formations (small units) stood in contact for hours fighting then there will be implications for how battles work - things like outflanking movements, use of reserves etc will be affected in ways that are not obvious just from sitting with furrowed brow imagining it all. Likewise if fights are short and units tire quickly. This is how such a model could help. Gettysburg, the game (and for an abundance of clarity, I'm not suggesting Gettysburg makes a good model of Roman combat) has an attritional combat model in which units degrade in combat over the course of about half an hour (all things being equal). This means that the side able to feed in reserves late in the fight will have a huge advantage, and that outflanking movements should have time to march, deploy and attack while front lines are engaged, but it is not certain - the front might give way first. Playing with the parameters of such a model and seeing how well they fit battle descriptions can be useful.

On the goals of this discussion - I think we have two (not mutually exclusive) camps of discontinuous combat:

- the 'dynamic standoff' model which is an account of low level interactions, which assumes a default state of close proximity but not contact (except missiles) interspersed with flurries of hand to hand combat which, if not decisive, revert back to the default state as the combatants back off.

- the 'battles are more complicated than you think' model, which is at a somewhat higher level and assumes that simple battle accounts obscure lots of detailed small unit interactions which take time and involve varying amounts of contact, resulting in combat that is discontinuous for small units while appearing continuous on the larger scale (of whole battlelines).  I think this is where I stand.

Against this, one continuous model:

- the 'multi hour hack' model - if a battle acount says the armies were engaged for hours, it means that all units were constantly engaged in one go all along the line all the time, solid block v. solid block, immobile.

Are those fair?

For a full account of the dynamic standoff and arguments for it, read Philip Sabin's 'The Face of Roman Battle' (Journal of Roman Studies 90 (2000) pp 1-17) and, in an earlier version, published in Slingshot - if you've got the 50 years DVD, you've got the earlier article. I can give a summary of the argument here if anyone would like it.

Quote from: Dangun on September 12, 2016, 12:03:07 AM
I think continuity may be too much for a single step.

Maybe we should start by collecting and identifying evidence for duration first.
(It seems safer to interpolate continuity from duration, than it does to extrapolate continuity from a model of practical endurance.)

This was my first thought, too, but I had naively assumed that nobody would see fit to assume that duration of itself necessitated a discontinuity 'which is not described in the sources'.

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Next I'd suggest that collecting evidence for casualties gives us casualties per unit of duration and some useful inferences concerning continuity.

Winners' casualties might have this effect, although I am not sure we can count on a direct relationship and there is bound to be someone who questions the figures.  It may be an interesting route to attempt, given the number of men on each side actually in contact with the enemy (as opposed to, say, elephants) and a comparison of battles between similar opponents.  One problem with classical casualty records is they tend as a rule to give only the dead; the few mentions of wounded show massive variability, from 50% of deaths (Caesar at Munda) to 10,000% of deaths (Josephus at Jotapata, with one hundred wounded for every death).  Without knowing the number of wounded, calculating how many blows were landed - or rather how many were effective against an opponent with a particular type and level of protection - will be a somewhat uncertain exercise.  (I once had peripheral involvement with a study on British armour losses in the Western Desert in WW2 - it was impeccably statistically based and totally and utterly misleading, as was amply demonstrated when an attempt was made to apply it to the Battle of Medenine.  Different techniques can make a huge difference to outcome.)

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Lastly (I guess there might be some miracle quotes on endurance out there, but short of finding them...), rather than leap to analogies like boxing or riveting, wouldn't it make more sense to use out of period data. While musketry sources might not do much for us, there is probably some useful stuff on duration, casualties, endurance and continuity lying in the out of period cavalry and melee descriptions.

Perhaps, although even in 1815 few accounts are by watch-holders noting exact timings.  We can see that default infantry practice (as noted by Clausewitz in vom Krieg) is for two lines to halt and blaze away at each other with decreasing effect at short ranges until they run out of ammunition (at which point, particularly in the American Civil war, they sometimes start throwing stones) and this goes on indefinitely but once again without clear timing – apart from how long it would take to exhaust a unit's ammunition supply (which was often more than an individual's official allowance, cf. The French grenadier who told Napoleon "My hands have fired 120 cartridges this day").  So I get the feeling there will be the same old special pleading for alleged unmentioned discontinuity.

Quote from: aligern on September 12, 2016, 08:26:51 AM
Riveters took five years to train because the shipyards were riven with restrictive practice and you could only get the better jobs by awaiting your turn. The whole farrago fell apart when competitors entered the market with new techniques and no restrictive practices.

While sadly true of later years, this was not the case in the early 1900s when British shipyards were the best and most efficient in the world.

Richard Hough in The Big Battleship gives this description of riveting teams in action:

"As always, it was the riveters – the infantry of the working force – who were most in evidence and the creators of the most noise.  They were everywhere, hard up against the plating interminably riveting steel to steel.  Below them in little conspiratorial groups were the rivet-heaters, stirring their fires with bellows, turning to a glowing scarlet their lengths of steel, and then tossing them with invariable accuracy and speed up to the rivet-catchers above, who caught them in tins for rapid insertion and hammering.  It was a marvellous non-stop performance.  To anyone who paused on the yard and watched this process – or a dozen more of like skill – the deftness and rhythm had a spell-binding fascination."

This description of continuous moderate-tempo activity struck me as the kind of thing we should expect in a long-drawn-out classical infantry fight.  Roy rightly points out that rivets do not fight back, but the degree and duration of human effort involved, and the tempo, look about right to me for what we would expect from a sustained infantry fight between protected units.  This removes one of the principal props of the discontinuous combat theory, namely that the human frame is allegedly incapable of significant sustained effort.  The other main prop, lethality rates, has some rather more involved explanations which I shall enter into another time.

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However, to Patrick's examples from Ammianus, the first does as Patrick  concedes sound susceptible to punctuated fighting, with repeated attacks.

This is because it is the Persian van trying its luck in a series of short assaults and skirmishes.  The point is that where discontinuous battle exists (essentially a skirmish between parts of the armies) Ammianus describes it as such.  Where it is not discontinuous he describes it as continuous, much to Richard's annoyance. ;-)

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The second example is skewed because the Persians do not stand up to the Roman attack.

That is a classic, Roy: the example is skewed because one side wins.  ;D

Seriously, and Richard also please take note, Ammianus is describing what the whole army is doing and doing together: it is drawn up in a noticeable formation (a crescent), it advances at an unusually rapid pace, the signal for battle is given – there is useful detail here, which Richard seems to have missed – and "the Roman infantry in close order with mighty effort drove the serried ranks of the enemy before them".

We then look for any indication that battle was discontinuous, that there were ebbs, flows, reliefs or renewed or repeated attacks.  There are none: "the clash of shields, the shouts of the men, and the doleful sound of the whirring arrows continued without intermission."  No amount of special pleading will get out of that, sorry.  To suggest that parts of the line took turns to generate noise and activity when we have been told the whole army advanced and engaged as one makes no sense.

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Interestingly, though the Persians shoot as they retreat. Given that it would be exceedingly difficult to shoot at close range  at ranks of the enemy that were engaged with your own front ranks is it possible that the Persians are breaking off far enough back to engage in bowfire before the Romans come on again.

Yes, although not 'before the Romans come on again', but because this is the end of the battle; the Persians have had enough and are leaving the field Parthian-style: we note the very next thing to happen is that the Roman recall is sounded and the Romans retire back to their tents, battle over.

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Of course there is the potential problem that the author's description is both linear and comprehensive so the battle is described as a unity whereas in reality there are different actions going on at the same time ...

This is in danger of becoming a topos: we cannot accept any account displaying continuity because there must have been discontinuities.  This, it seems to me, is not a viewpoint so much as an a priori obsession.  So, as nobody should have their beliefs go unheard, I ask: what originally brought about this way of looking at classical combat?

Quote from: RichT on September 12, 2016, 09:44:39 AM
On the goals of this discussion - I think we have two (not mutually exclusive) camps of discontinuous combat:

- the 'dynamic standoff' model which is an account of low level interactions, which assumes a default state of close proximity but not contact (except missiles) interspersed with flurries of hand to hand combat which, if not decisive, revert back to the default state as the combatants back off.

- the 'battles are more complicated than you think' model, which is at a somewhat higher level and assumes that simple battle accounts obscure lots of detailed small unit interactions which take time and involve varying amounts of contact, resulting in combat that is discontinuous for small units while appearing continuous on the larger scale (of whole battlelines).  I think this is where I stand.

Some actual evidence for this view would be nice.  Of course it may be hard to come by if the central thrust of the thesis is that this evidence is always omitted from battle descriptions ...

Let me give you a bit of help.  Try Dionysius of Halicarnassus VIII.65.2-3.

And then there is the problem that, as expressed in the classic maxim: "In war, only what is simple can work."  Patterns of subunits flowing in and out of contact are fine for skirmishing but will receive a bloody nose against a solid battleline.

Quote
Against this, one continuous model:

- the 'multi hour hack' model - if a battle acount says the armies were engaged for hours, it means that all units were constantly engaged in one go all along the line all the time, solid block v. solid block, immobile.

Are those fair?

Not really: if a battle account by an author with a military background* says armies were engaged for hours, it means the fighting lines were engaged for this length of time.  Some actions moved over the ground, some did not.  Some had ebbs and flows while remaining in contact; some had temporary collapses which broke contact and were rallied before resuming contact.  Some armies had reserves and/or reserve lines to commit; others did not (or relied on depth).  And some armies – particularly the Republican and Early Imperial Roman – were specifically configured for long-drawn-out affairs.

*Descriptions by men of letters tend to involve a lot of 'the fighting went on a long time with heavy losses to both sides' - while this is indicative of what was expected, it tends to appear in situations where the opposite is indicated, e.g. in Diodorus' account of Alexander's fight with Darius' bodyguards at Issus, so the reliability of such statements is uncertain, nice though it would be to be able to use them.

Quote
For a full account of the dynamic standoff and arguments for it, read Philip Sabin's 'The Face of Roman Battle' (Journal of Roman Studies 90 (2000) pp 1-17) and, in an earlier version, published in Slingshot - if you've got the 50 years DVD, you've got the earlier article. I can give a summary of the argument here if anyone would like it.

It might be an idea for those who have not read it or about it.  I would be more interested in any actual evidence in support of it.  I think that for any viewpoint, approach or theory to have any validity it does need some source evidence, even if indirect, and not be contrary to the prevailing trend of our sources.  So - please bring on the supporting evidence.

The problem with the duration model is it only takes us so far.  We have already done it for some medieval battles.  But the estimates are often for the battle as a whole, which tells us little about continuity or otherwise.  Overall, discontinuity is a better fit but how does that compare to Romans or Greeks or "barbarians"?

Likewise, we looked at combat statistics from hoplite battles but, leaving aside discussions of accuracy, they told us little about the nature of combat except winners lost relatively few men killed.  Unfortunately, this fact was interpreted by the different camps in different ways, because of the different combat models used.  In other words, didn't help much.

I think it will be difficult to move on without a clearer exposition of Patrick's "continuous combat" theory.  It seems, from hints within the debate it may be quite an extreme interpretation (e.g. once men entered combat, they continued to hack away until they were cut down or bled to death).  But other points, there seems to be an acknowledgement that just receiving missiles from horse archers might count as continuous combat.  As I said, it would be good to be clearer.

Addendum : Having read Patrick's two comments written as I was writing this, it is very clear that there is a massive difference in interpretation of the Persian battlepiece, depending what the initial theory of combat is.  This is an exercise in interpretation not observation.

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This is an exercise in interpretation not observation.

Indeed - that is the whole problem (well it isn't a problem in itself, it is a problem if people fail to recognise the difference). So round and round we go, Patrick insisting we present 'evidence' for alternative models, while interpreting texts to suit his own theories without even recognising that is what he is doing. This is how all these discussions end up.

Patrick - I'm happy to summarise Sabin's argument, but not to look up every one of his references for you. Sabin's article is fully annotated with appropriate sources, several of which I've quoted in this thread (not coincidentally, that's where I got them from). Go ahead and read the article yourself.

Rope a dope technique.
This was Muhammad Ali's way of dealing with George Foreman. Ali sat back on the ropes protecting himself and letting Foreman tire himself out. Bear to n mind that Foreman is a superbly trained athlete and gets a rest in between each round. Eventually Foreman tires sufficiently for Ali to be able to deal him decisive blows. Note too that Ali gets Foreman angry at the beginning in an an attempt to get Foreman to be more aggressive and exoend more energy.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rope-a-dope

To me this seems like a good analogy for Roman combat against less disciplined, less hardened and less trained barbarians. If the continuity school were broadly correct then Foreman should not have tired significantly. He has only fought a few rounds, takes interstitial rests, is not getting much back in the way of punches from Ali, yet he becomes tired enough to give the edge to the other fighter.
One big demerit of the 'continuity' case is that, given that we are talking about several thousand men in contact both sides could become so exhausted that there would be no decision.

Quote from: Erpingham on September 13, 2016, 12:04:11 PM
The problem with the duration model is it only takes us so far.  We have already done it for some medieval battles.  But the estimates are often for the battle as a whole, which tells us little about continuity or otherwise.  Overall, discontinuity is a better fit but how does that compare to Romans or Greeks or "barbarians"?

Quite.  We also note that the mediaeval 'discontinuity', where recorded, seems to suggest bouts of 30-60 minutes during which both sides were harming or in a position to harm each other as opposed to the 15-20 minute sessions favoured by the adherents of discontinuity.  One dissonant element about attempting to compare mediaeval practice with classical is that mediaeval armies were only rarely predominantly melee infantry; more often they were combined arms armies with significant mounted and missile components, so as m'lud Erpingham has previously mentioned, mediaeval 'combat', particularly where English armies are involved, will include a 'showering with missiles' element which is often an inseparable part of the casualty-trading and exhaustion-inducing process, whereas with classical armies this process is predominantly and often almost exclusively infantry melee.

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I think it will be difficult to move on without a clearer exposition of Patrick's "continuous combat" theory.

Patrick does not have a 'continuous combat' theory.  He merely notes that discontinuous combat is not supported by our sources.  This of course does not leave much by way of alternative options, particularly the way our sources read.

Quote
  It seems, from hints within the debate it may be quite an extreme interpretation (e.g. once men entered combat, they continued to hack away until they were cut down or bled to death).  But other points, there seems to be an acknowledgement that just receiving missiles from horse archers might count as continuous combat.  As I said, it would be good to be clearer.

The point at issue is whether - not to mention how - troops would bounce out of action for a rest 2-3 times an hour without the opponent taking advantage of the process, and why such a process does not feature in our sources.

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Addendum : Having read Patrick's two comments written as I was writing this, it is very clear that there is a massive difference in interpretation of the Persian battlepiece, depending what the initial theory of combat is.  This is an exercise in interpretation not observation.

Then please give us the benefit of observation: what do the accounts (one skirmish, one open battle) say to your good self?

Quote from: RichT on September 13, 2016, 01:53:37 PM
So round and round we go, Patrick insisting we present 'evidence' for alternative models, while interpreting texts to suit his own theories without even recognising that is what he is doing. This is how all these discussions end up.

My learned friend writes as if I am the only one injecting any element of interpretation.  And we still lack evidence (as opposed to arguments) for 'alternative models'.

Quote
Patrick - I'm happy to summarise Sabin's argument, but not to look up every one of his references for you. Sabin's article is fully annotated with appropriate sources, several of which I've quoted in this thread (not coincidentally, that's where I got them from). Go ahead and read the article yourself.

From this, I take it my learned friend has no supporting evidence to add either for the 'discontinuity' approach or his own preference for a small unit complexity approach (if I have that aright).  If conversely he has any, he should feel free to air it.

Phil Sabin does reiterate his discontinuity arguments in his book Lost Battles, and they are no more convincing there, at least to me.

Quote from: aligern on September 13, 2016, 08:41:11 PM
Rope a dope technique.
This was Muhammad Ali's way of dealing with George Foreman. Ali sat back on the ropes protecting himself and letting Foreman tire himself out ...

If we are back to boxing as a measure of human endurance, try these.
1) Longest bare-knuckle fight (http://www.historychannel.com.au/this-day-in-history/longest-modern-boxing-match/?utm_source=inshorts&utm_medium=inshorts_full_article&utm_campaign=inshorts_full_article) in America
2) Longest gloved boxing match (http://mentalfloss.com/article/63631/boxing-match-lasted-7-hours) in America
3) Longest bare knuckle fights (http://webcasty.com/2013/longest-bare-knuckle-boxing-matches-fights/) worldwide

And, out of interest, regarding a man who was probably a better boxer than Cassius Clay:
Joe Gans. (http://www.npr.org/2012/06/16/155116391/rediscovering-a-forgotten-boxers-longest-fight)

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One big demerit of the 'continuity' case is that, given that we are talking about several thousand men in contact both sides could become so exhausted that there would be no decision.

And this seems to be exactly what happened in Dionysius VIII.63.2

"It seems that even before their expedition the Volscians and the Aequians had led an army against the Roman territory, having resolved not to let the opportunity slip, but to attack their adversaries while they seemed to be sit panic-stricken; for they thought that in their fear they would surrender of their own accord. But quarrelling among themselves over the command, they rushed to arms, and falling upon one another, fought without keeping their ranks or receiving orders, but in confusion and disorder, so that many were killed on both sides; and if the sun had not set in time to prevent it, all their forces would have been utterly destroyed. But yielding reluctantly to the night which put an end to the quarrel, they separated and retired to their own camps; and rousing their forces at dawn, both sides returned home."

Good quote Patrick, and I find it comfortingly supportive of punctuated flurries of combat. The Volscians and their opponents go at it without organisation and exhaust themselves so no one is a winner.  Makes the point beautifully.


Roy

QuotePatrick does not have a 'continuous combat' theory.

Perhaps if I call it a model?  For example, I don't think all advocates of continuous combat would say that the man at the front of the file was pinned in place till he was killed or died through blood loss - some might see a rotation of ranks as necessary.  Then there is what counts as combat - you have allowed not just physically striking with weapons but also shooting missiles or engaging in a scrum-like pushing match.  So you have a model which forms the lens through which you view the evidence.  This is perfectly normal intellectual behaviour.

If we go back to the well worn line about Romans and Persians (on which you invited my observations)

First, the author (Ammianus?) makes it clear this fight forces the Persians to behave abnormally.  They are cavalry and normally move in and out of combat shooting.

Second, we don't seem to have a duration of combat, although the Romans endure better.

Third the highlighted line

QuoteAnd in the heat of the combat that followed, the clash of shields, the shouts of the men, and the doleful sound of the whirring arrows continued without intermission.

There is nothing in the English translation that implies that all people on the field did all of these things simultaneously.  It's evocative but (I think) echos classical descriptions in its styling.  Also it doesn't tell us everything. If we insist on being literal, the Romans use no weapons except shields and arrows (assuming they are Roman arrows).  I don't believe that - I think that they used the spears, swords, pilum-type weapons and even darts which they were apparently issued.  So, if the author was more interested in giving an evocation of hard fighting (which I think he does very well) rather than a precise description of low-level tactics of Roman infantry, I can't see how we can claim that there is anything probative in the passage about discontinuous or discontinuous combat.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Prize_Ring_Rules
The notes at the front explain how the boxers not only only get 30 second rests, but go down from a weak blow in order  to get another 30 second breather and a drink.
That introduces another limiting factor to ancient combat, how was refreshment organised? Intense physical activity in armour on a hot day would demand rehydration. Have we any indication how this was accomplished?
Roy

One of the better passages in a good pot boiler novel on the siege of Malta, featured the armoured Christian defenders rotating back from the immediate breech to refresh themselves with bread soaked in wine passed around in buckets by the non fighting monks. ( the religion, Tim willocks).

Albeit modern fiction, and a siege defence of a narrow breech, the passage worked very well .

(an entertain summer read, BTW, but the follow up on the Bartholomew massacre is rubbish.  Maybe part three will redeem the trillogy it it makes it to print)

Looking at The Battle of Maldon
The armies advance to battle and commence fighting. Then there are several advances and stepping forwards by Vikings to fight against Byrrhtnoth. Of course there s is a poem, but if it dies give a good approximation to combat then there is clearly enough separation for warriors to have to advance to recomjence combat. An alternative would be that both sides advance to witni a few yards and then halt with individuals advancing to combat and then dying or falling back. That would accord rather well with punctuated flurries, with the modification that combat was not actually joined along the whole line initially, but can't mmenced with flurries. I would find that difficult to square with Roman accounts where a mass coordinated throw of pila and then sword fighting along the line looks to be what is described.


Roy

Maldon does seem to fit a suggested early medieval pattern of lines in close proximity, either at short missile range or spear-poking range, and sallies into the enemy line.  Whether this pattern can be extrapolated to other periods is of course harder to judge.   

Quote from: Erpingham on September 15, 2016, 10:20:02 AM...(a) pattern of lines in close proximity, either at short missile range or spear-poking range, and sallies into the enemy line.

Which could be described either as "continuous" or as "intermittent" combat, depending whether one stresses the continuing spear-chucking or the intermittent sallies.

It would have to be a very low rate of continuous spear chucking or soon all the spears would be gone.
Roy

Quote from: Duncan Head on September 15, 2016, 10:24:56 AM

Quote from: Erpingham on September 15, 2016, 10:20:02 AM...(a) pattern of lines in close proximity, either at short missile range or spear-poking range, and sallies into the enemy line.

Which could be described either as "continuous" or as "intermittent" combat, depending whether one stresses the continuing spear-chucking or the intermittent sallies.

Absolutely :) I think, if you were in it, it would feel quite continuous, albeit varying in pace.  A warrior in the line would be under continuous threat of violence. To an outside observer, though, the ebb and flow might be noticeable (the shoreline with promontories image in the Irish Pharsalus, for example).

Quote from: aligern on September 14, 2016, 02:46:33 PM
Good quote Patrick, and I find it comfortingly supportive of punctuated flurries of combat. The Volscians and their opponents go at it without organisation and exhaust themselves so no one is a winner.  Makes the point beautifully.

Yes, but which point, given that organising an intermission without getting the would-be departees massacred when both armies are unorganised is conceptually even more challenging than when they are acting as entities?

Quote from: Erpingham on September 14, 2016, 02:58:09 PM

QuotePatrick does not have a 'continuous combat' theory.

Perhaps if I call it a model?  For example, I don't think all advocates of continuous combat would say that the man at the front of the file was pinned in place till he was killed or died through blood loss - some might see a rotation of ranks as necessary.  Then there is what counts as combat - you have allowed not just physically striking with weapons but also shooting missiles or engaging in a scrum-like pushing match.  So you have a model which forms the lens through which you view the evidence.  This is perfectly normal intellectual behaviour.

With all due respect, it sounds more like a priori self-inflicted distortion to me.  Better in my view to air as much evidence as we can find and see where it points.

Here is an interesting action: First Philippi, Romans against Romans.  (Cassius Dio XLVII.44)

"For a long time there was pushing of shield against shield and thrusting with the sword, as they were at first cautiously looking for a chance to wound others without being wounded themselves, since they were as eager to save themselves as to slay their antagonists ..."

This may be a key to low casualty counts in extended actions.  Where we have two sides using an identical combat technique and hence knowing how to avoid being hurt, things could stay indecisive and relatively bloodless for quite a while.

What happens next is interesting.  For many participants, battle is not so much a procedural as an emotive experience, and emotion starts to take over.

"... but later, when their ardour increased and their rage was inflamed, they rushed together recklessly and paid no more attention to their own safety, but in their eagerness to destroy their adversaries would even throw away their own lives. Some cast away their shields and seizing hold of the foes facing them choked them by means of their helmets while they struck them in the back, or else tore away their armour and smote them on the breast. Others seized hold of the swords of their opponents, who were thus as good as unarmed, and then ran their own into their bodies; and some exposed a part of their own bodies to be wounded and thus gained a freer use of the rest."

This, as can be imagined, drove up the casualty rates on both sides.  It also raises questions as to exactly how one is going to get these emotively-soused individuals to back off and rest even when they get tired.

"Some clutched their opponents in an embrace that prevented either one from striking and perished through the commingling of their swords and bodies. Some died of a single blow, others of many, and they neither were conscious of their wounds, since death forestalled their suffering, nor lamented their end, since they never reached the point of grieving. One who killed another thought in the excessive joy of the moment that he could never die; and whoever fell lost consciousness and had no knowledge of his state."

So - did they get tired, give it up and break off for elevenses, or at least a quick bit of rehydration?  Apparently not.

"Both sides remained precisely where they were at the beginning and neither side retired or pursued, but there, just as they were, they wounded and were wounded, slew and were slain, until late in the day."

What kind of 'model' do we draw from this?

QuoteWith all due respect, it sounds more like a priori self-inflicted distortion to me.

Also with greatest respect, it is better to acknowledge one's a priori assumptions rather than apply them unacknowledged.

Quote from: aligern on September 15, 2016, 10:42:43 AM
It would have to be a very low rate of continuous spear chucking or soon all the spears would be gone.
Roy

although the other side would be re-supplying you  ;)

I think that you'd reach a low level of throwing as spears were thrown back, with the level of throwing dropping off as spears were damaged or lost in other ways

QuoteWhat kind of 'model' do we draw from this?

Bit of a purple passage, isn't it?  Anyway, trying to strip it back a bit, we seem to start with a tentative combat.  At some later stage, pumped up troops enter combat.  It is unclear from the passage whether these are fresh troops - the implication seems to be they are the same ones, now wound up to berserker style fury.   It is unclear from the quote at which point in the battle the "berserker" attack happened, how widespread it was or how long it took.  It seems to have been completely ineffective, as the armies stayed in the same positions (unless the tale goes on to state that the frenzied attack broke the stalemate, when we would know when it happened).

As usual we lack the internal evidence to know whether this is a continuous or discontinuous action.  The fact that troops start cautiously but then charge later into contact means not everyone was in contact continuously, but we already noted that continuous hacking is not everyone's definition of continuous action.  The frenzied nature of the attack would fit a short, high energy onset.  This then seems to subside to low intensity action and stalemate.

Quote
What kind of 'model' do we draw from this?

We draw different models, it seems.

"For a long time there was pushing of shield against shield and thrusting with the sword, as they were at first cautiously looking..."

You presumably interpret "they" in this case to mean "all of the Romans on both sides" - though perhaps you also understand "all the front rankers" or possibly "all the front rankers of all the cohorts in the first line" (which therefore remained in contact through the entire battle - what did the other lines do? Or were there no other lines? How would you interpret the role of rear ranks and initially unengaged cohorts, given that Cassius Dio says nothing about them? Were there none?) Others might interpret it to mean "those who were engaged at any particular time"

Quote
battle is not so much a procedural as an emotive experience, and emotion starts to take over

This is based on your mental model of combat? Or is it your intepretation of the following passage? How does 'emotion taking over' square with other aspects of your model, such as the methodical, energy-preserving method of combat? Presumably the 'later' at which this inefficient form of fighting began was only shortly before the 'late in the day' at which the battle ended? i.e. in your model, several hours of calm methodical prodding, followed by a few minutes of emotion, perhaps?

Quote
It also raises questions as to exactly how one is going to get these emotively-soused individuals to back off and rest even when they get tired.

Perhaps before they got soused, while they are still in the methodical phase? How are these soused individuals replaced in the Roman line relief manoeuvre? Or should we undertand that you interpret this battle as being different from other Roman battles so that your "battle is not so much a procedural as an emotive experience, and emotion starts to take over" is not, despite your words, an attempt at generalisation - you just mean "this battle was not so much procedural..."?

"when their ardour increased and their rage was inflamed, they rushed together recklessly"

Are "they" (whoever "they" are, see above) not already "together"? How do they "rush together" again? You perhaps interpret this to mean that they pressed even more closely together, intermingled perhaps?

Quote
This, as can be imagined, drove up the casualty rates on both sides

Is this a quote from Dio? Or is it your interpretation?

"Some clutched their opponents in an embrace... Some... One... whoever..."

You presumably interpret this to account for all Romans present (or just all those in the front rank, or all those who were fighting at the start of the battle?), and these sentences cover the experience of all of them (even though none of them survive); nobody was present who did not do one of the things Dio describes, and/or nothing Dio does not describe was done by any of those present - in your interpretation?

"Both sides remained precisely where they were at the beginning and neither side retired or pursued, but there, just as they were, they wounded and were wounded, slew and were slain, until late in the day."

You interpret, presumably, 'both sides' to mean 'every individual on both sides' (rather than, for example, 'both armies').

Quote
given that organising an intermission without getting the would-be departees massacred when both armies are unorganised is conceptually even more challenging than when they are acting as entities?

This is a quote from which source? Livy? Caesar? Cassius Dio? Or is it derived form your mental model?

(Cross posted with Anthony's more succinct version of the same points!)

'But later, when their ardour increased, ......they. rushed together recklessly.  ' I do think that this deserves highlighting. If thes Romans are face a face , in contact, pushing on shields then how do they rush together? Isn't it more likely that they have a period of pushing and grappling,then greak off, recuperate anfpd then get worked up to charge in again?
Mind you, its Cassius Dio isn't it. He is the equivalent of taking Battle Picture Library as indicative of infantry tactics in WW2.  ' Watch out Sarge, get the Bren on that Hun!'
Roy

It's worth mentioning that "they rushed together recklessly", while a fair translation, can't be probed too deeply -
ὁμόσε τε ἀπερισκέπτως χωροῦντες - coming forward together thoughtlessly - is open to all sorts of interpretations.

Also that "For a long time there was pushing of shield against shield and thrusting with the sword," is our old chum othismos - "There was much othismos and much xiphismos" - also that 'For a long time' isn't in the Greek - the translator presumably understands it from 'much'.

Othismos tends to come in quantities of 'much':

Herodotus 7.225 There was much othismos between the Persians and Lacedaemonians over Leonidas' body
Herodotus 7.78 Among the generals at Salamis there was much othismos of words
Herodotus 9.26 During the drawing up of battle formation there arose much othismos of words
Thucydides 4.96.2 But the rest closed, and there was much othismos of shields
Xenophon Anabasis 5.2.17: There was much othismos about the gates
Plutarch Agesilaus 18 The first impact, it is true, did not meet with much resistance, nor was there much othismos, but the Thebans speedily routed the Orchomenians
Plutarch Marcellus 26 Hannibal ordered his elephants to be stationed in the van, and to be driven against the ranks of the Romans. Much othismos and much confusion at once arose among their foremost lines
Cassius Dio 47.44 There was much othismos and much xiphismos
Procopius 1.7.27 But with much othismos upon it, the ramp suddenly fell in
Procopius 6.27.10 So a fierce battle took place with much othismos
Procopius 7.5.11 But since the barbarians defended themselves vigorously, much othismos took place
Procopius 7.22.5 When these two forces engaged in battle, much othismos ensued
Procopius 8.11.44 For at the tops of the ladders much othismos took place
Procopius 8.11.54 This proposal, however, was not accepted by them, and once more fierce fighting commenced, involving much othismos

Totally irrelevant, just fun facts. Hurrying on...

Running the risk of sidetracking us again ....

QuoteAlso that "For a long time there was pushing of shield against shield and thrusting with the sword," is our old chum othismos - "There was much othismos and much xiphismos" - also that 'For a long time' isn't in the Greek - the translator presumably understands it from 'much'.

Just curious, does the translator assume the words "shield against shield" from othismos?

He does, yes:
Literally: "They used much othismos and much xiphismos"
Translation (Loeb): "For a long time there was pushing of shield against shield and thrusting with the sword"
Lessons: obvious.

Thanks.  I wonder if xiphismos is there because these are Romans and he is emphasising they are stuck in and going at it with swords, rather than pilum-skirmishing?  But perhaps, given the tone, he is just being emphatic, using two words for close melee rather than a boring single one.

Maybe - 'xiphismos' is an exceedingly rare word - just two occurrences so far as Perseus knows, this and a sword dance of some sort in Athenaeus. It sounds like a Roman version of 'othismos and doratismos' for Greeks - except as we have seen elsewhere, 'doratismos' is just as rare as 'xiphismos' (but broadly speaking I expect that is still the intention).

I believe it just means 'melee' without much in the way of technical implications, and in contrast with the grappling and wrestling once they get all emotional. Literary battle descriptions generally involve these sorts of shorthand descriptions. "There was a lively firefight before they were driven off at the point of the bayonet" - greater than zero informational content, but not a detailed account of tactics or the mechanics of combat either.

Fair enough.  Essentially "much close fighting" but in a more literary way.  Nice to know we can translate it as competitive sword dancing though :)

Something for Richard:

"When they engaged, there was a great slaughter of the Romans, who were unable to keep their ranks. For they were forced back by the Tyrrhenians, who not only had the terrain as an ally, but were also helped by the vigorous pressure of those who stood behind them, their army being drawn up with deep files. When the most prominent centurions had fallen, the rest of the Roman army gave way and fled to the camp; and the enemy pursued them, took away their standards, seized their wounded, and got possession of their dead."  - Dionysius of Halicarnassus IX.23.7

And now, courtesy of Livy, a yardstick for the title subject of the thread.

"Contenebra held out for a few days, but the continuous fighting, without respite either day or night, overcame them. [10] The Roman army had been divided into six corps [partes divisus], of which each in its turn went into battle for six hours [senis horis = six hours each]; while the townsmen were so few that the same men were exposed to an attack that was constantly renewed [semper = always, continuous, perpetual], until at last they gave way and afforded the Romans an opening to enter the City." - Livy VI.4.9-10

Since this was the first time the Romans had used this technique to take a city, their deciding upon six hours as the active period for each contingent (as opposed to, say, twenty minutes or two hours) must have come from some other aspect of warfare, as they were not given to plucking numbers from thin air and hoping for the best.

Ergo, this is an indication that Romans as of 388 BC had a rule of thumb that a force could engage in combat - without intermission, as any gap would rather destroy the whole point of swarming an opponent until he collapsed - for six hours before starting to become ineffectual.

This gives us a working answer for close combat duration where Roman armies are concerned: up to six hours.  This could be expected to include at least one line relief if operating according to standard procedure, but what is interesting is that the defenders of Contenebra were able to sustain combat - apparently close combat rather than just an exchange of missiles - for a period well in excess of six hours.


On the subject of who did what at the man-to-man level, we have this, from Rome against the Volsci in 385 BC:

"The hostile multitude, relying on numbers only and measuring both armies with their eyes, recklessly began the fight and as recklessly gave it up; [2] their boldness went no further than the battle-cry, the discharge of missiles, and the first fury of the onset; the play of swords, when foot met foot, and the glance of the foeman that darted out the fire of his spirit, they could not abide. [3] Their front was first driven in and communicated its disorder to the supports; the horsemen, too, inspired a terror of their own; next the ranks were broken at many points, and all was in commotion, and the line resembled a surging wave. Then, as soon as each began to see that with the fall of those in front his own turn to be killed would soon be coming, they turned and fled. [4] The Romans pressed on after them, and as long as they retained their arms and withdrew in masses, it was the infantry's task to pursue them; but when the enemy were seen to be throwing away their weapons on every hand and their army to be dispersed in flight over the fields; then the cavalry squadrons were let loose, with orders not to stop to kill single fugitives and afford meanwhile an opportunity to the main body of escaping; [5] it was sufficient if by darting missiles at them to alarm them, and by riding across their path, they should hold the column in check, till the infantry could overtake the enemy and utterly destroy them. [6] Flight and pursuit continued until nightfall." - Livy VI.13.1-6

This passage (apart from showing the Volsci as something less than Italy's best) appears to confirm that it was the done thing to let the man in front of you fall and then take up combat yourself, as opposed to attempting relief of the man ahead if he got into difficulties.


In 343 BC, the Romans met the Samnites in battle for the first time.  This was practically an all-day fight: the consul hung out the signal for battle, formed his army harangued his troops and from then on it was combat all the way.

"The battle had now lasted a considerable time; there was dreadful slaughter about the standards of the Samnites, but as yet no retreating anywhere, so determined were they to be overcome by naught but death. [14] And so the Romans, who saw that their strength was fast ebbing away in weariness and that little daylight yet remained, were filled with rage, and hurled themselves against the enemy. [15] Then for the first time were there signs of giving way and the beginning of a rout; then were the Samnites captured or slain; nor would many have survived, if night had not ended what was now a victory rather than a battle. [16] The Romans admitted that never had they fought with a more stubborn adversary." - Livy VII.33.13-16

While 'a considerable time' is not quantified, it is from perhaps mid-morning until close enough to nightfall that the Samnite collapse does not turn into a full rout and pursuit before night stops play.  That the Romans found their strength to be 'fast ebbing away in weariness' suggests they had gone over their own approved six-hour limit.  'Perhaps mid-morning' as a starting-point is because the consul tried his cavalry first: when the Samnites proved to be unimpressed, he joined the legions, exhorted them to strike down every man they encountered, and ...

"No sooner had he said these words, than the horsemen, by the consul's order, drew off towards the wings and left the legions room to attack the centre. [12] The consul was the very foremost in the charge, and slew the man he chanced to meet with. Kindled by this sight, the Romans on the right and on the left pushed forward, every man of them, and fought a memorable combat; the Samnites stood manfully at bay, but they took more strokes than they delivered." - idem 33.11-12

So this was a genuine close-quarters engagement as opposed to some kind of drawn-out missile skirmish.

We thus have a working figure for Roman engagements: six hours as a recommended maximum.  Longer than this is possible, but unusual (and the troops feel it); shorter is quite possible, especially if the foe lacks staying-power.  We can now check the six-hour rule as a working maximum against other Roman battles.