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Acc'd wargamer received wisdom, Parthian armies sometimes included cataphract camels, and the WRG lists identify them as probably specifically Hatrene.

Now, I started looking around a bit on the 'Net, and the only primary source that seems to be getting cited is Herodian IV.14.3 and IV.15.2, the translations of which are rather disturbingly discordant - I can't seem to find the Greek original online - but the impression I get is that only the riders' were armoured. Below are three translations of IV.14.3, the first two credited to Loeb - don't ask me why they differ - and the third to Edward C. Echols:

Quote"Meanwhile Artabanus was upon them with his vast and powerful army composed of many cavalry and an enormous number of archers and cataphracts who fought on camels, jabbing with long spears."

QuoteMeanwhile Artabanus was upon them with his vast and powerful army composed of many cavalry and an enormous number of archers and armoured riders (kataphraktous), who fought from the backs of camels with long spears, avoiding close combat.

QuoteMacrinus thus received the office of emperor not so much because of the soldiers' affection and loyalty as from necessity and the urgency of the impending crisis.

While these events were taking place, Artabanus was marching toward the Romans with a huge army, including a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those mail-clad soldiers who hurl spears from dromedaries.

The first does call the riders "cataphracts", but the other two suggest that that's an unhelpful translation of kataphraktous (which just means "armoured", acc pl). Since the first says they jab with their spears and the third say they threw them, one suspects that the second, which just says they fought with them, is the most literal on that point.

For (the first half of) IV.15.2 the following are credited to respectively Loeb and Echols:

QuoteThe barbarians caused heavy casualties with their rain of arrows and with the long spears of the heavily-armed knights (kataphractōn) on horses and camels, as they wounded the Romans with downward thrusts.

QuoteThe barbarians inflicted many wounds upon the Romans from above, and did considerable damage by the showers of arrows and the long spears of the mail-clad dromedary riders.

Both give the impression only the riders are armoured - at the least, they don't explicitly mention camel (or horse) armour.


So, I guess my questions are, does anyone know of another source for Parthian or Hatrene cataphract camels, does anyone have access to the Greek, and does that give any greater reason for assuming armoured camels than the above translations?

The whole of the Echols translation is online here (http://www.livius.org/sources/content/herodian-s-roman-history/).

I think I have the Loeb Herodian volume at home, but I see that I wrote a while ago on dbmmlist:

Quote"kataphraktous te apo kamelon exothen makrois dorasin"; "armoured riders who fought from the backs of camels with enormous spears" in the Loeb, more literally "cataphracts who fought from camels", the word "riders" doesn't appear; and in the battle-scene "ton kataphrakton apo te hippon kai kamelon", "(of) the kataphracts on horses and camels".

I don't know of any other evidence - I think Herodian is the only source, and this the only occasion, for the camel-cataphracts. The idea that the "Parthian" camel-cataphracts at Nisibis might have been Hatrene was Nigel Tallis', I believe, based on the importance of camels in Hatrene art (as in this article (https://www.jstor.org/stable/4200455?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) for instance) though I don't think any are shown as armoured; and, I believe, by the idea that the then king of Hatra received some sort of additional title about this time that might be a Parthian reward for his help in this battle.

Thanks :)

So indeed armoured riders on unspecified camels (and horses).

Is exothen a form of our old favorite otheo "push", and is "jabbing" therefore closer to the mark than "hurl"?

Thrust or jab would be my guess, especially with "great" spears.

As to whether "kataphraktous" should be read as closer to "armoured men" or "cataphracts as a troop-type", I would incline to the latter, noting for instance usages like Arrian Taktika 4.1, where we are told that the "kataphraktos" has both horse and horseman covered in armour. But it is by no means explicit.

If cataphracts as a troop-type is meant, I find it surprising men on horses and men on camels are considered the same troop-type*.

The Greek Word Study Tool over at Perseus refuses to accept exothen as a form of any verb (it can apparently mean "from without" or "outsider"), but exotheo can mean "thrust out".


* It would however fit nicely with my old idea that DBMM Camelry (S) and Camelry (O) should be respectively Knights (I) and Cavalry (I) on camels, just as we have Light Horse (I) on camels.

That's a shame - I have some rather nice Navigator Miniatures 'camelphracts'...

When I did mine, I put armoured riders on unarmoured camels.

The colours work out well too.

And the armoured camels' occasionally turn up as part of a baggage train for various forces needing a camp.

I did, BTW, eventually find an online Greek version of Herodian (https://books.google.se/books?id=xNofAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false). Google was uncharacteristically unhelpful in locating it, despite that it's at Google Books! The relevant passages are at pp122-123.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 19, 2017, 10:26:36 AM
Both give the impression only the riders are armoured - at the least, they don't explicitly mention camel (or horse) armour.

But the fact that the translation describes only the riders as armoured and not the rider+camel package would imply, that if intentional, the translator believed or suspected that only the rider was armoured.

Whether that's justifiable from the Greek, I have no idea.

Back in the Jurassic period of ancient wargaming I seem to remember some statement to the effect that cataphract camels could only ever be EHCm and that SHCm are not possible due to the additional weight of armour needed to cover such a large beast. 

I am not sure of the maths behind this statement, having never tried to measure the outside surface area of a camel.  (They can be vicious brutes and all the one around here have MERS.) However, its load carrying capacity is approximately twice that of a pack horse.

It may be that  metal armour for a camel would be unfeasibly heavy, but I can't believe textile armour would.

Overheating may be more of a concern, but given that armoured elephants have been used that doesn't seem very likely either.

Whatever armour the camels had seems to have done little for them in sustained melee:

[4.15.4] On the first and second days the two armies fought from morning until evening, and when night put an end to the fighting, each side withdrew to its own camp, claiming the victory. On the third day they came again to the same field to do battle; then the barbarians, who were far superior in numbers, tried to surround and trap the Romans. The Romans, however, no longer arranged their divisions to obtain depth; instead, they broadened their front and blocked every attempt at encirclement.

[4.15.5] So great was the number of slaughtered men and animals that the entire plain was covered with the dead; bodies were piled up in huge mounds, and the dromedaries especially fell in heaps. As a result, the soldiers were hampered in their attacks; they could not see each other for the high and impassable wall of bodies between them. Prevented by this barrier from making contact, each side withdrew to its own camp.

The old wargames counter to a nomad army of having a line of troops all the way across the table seems to have worked for the Romans.  The fact that the dromedaries 'especially' fell in heaps suggests either they were unarmoured or that their armour had weaknesses which left them vulnerable compared to the horses of the Parthian cataphtacts.

The alternative explanation that the camels dropped from heatstroke is not implied by Herodian's text.  His account suggests the Romans were successful in close combat for other reasons.

[4.15.2] The barbarians inflicted many wounds upon the Romans from above, and did considerable damage by the showers of arrows and the long spears of the mail-clad dromedary riders. But when the fighting came to close quarters, the Romans easily defeated the barbarians; for when the swarms of Parthian cavalry and hordes of dromedary riders were mauling them, the Romans pretended to retreat and then they threw down caltrops and other keen-pointed iron devices. Covered by the sand, these were invisible to the horsemen and the dromedary riders and were fatal to the animals.

[4.15.3] The horses, and particularly the tender-footed dromedary, stepped on these devices and, falling, threw their riders. As long as they are mounted on horses and dromedary, the barbarians in those regions fight bravely, but if they dismount or are thrown, they are very easily captured; they cannot stand up to hand-to-hand fighting. And, if they find it necessary to flee or pursue, the long robes which hang loosely about their feet trip them up.

It is conceivable even likely, that these caltrops were the main cause of camel (and horse) losses, as once down even an armoured camel would be vulnerable.  Herodian seems to imply that the caltrops 'and other keen-pointed iron devices' were the main cause of Parthian losses; 'fatal to the animals' could mean indirectly rather than directly fatal, as instant death from stepping on a caltrop seems unlikely.  It does however seem to imply that the camels were armoured, on the basis that their point of vulnerability is the foot.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 20, 2017, 08:35:59 AM
It does however seem to imply that the camels were armoured, on the basis that their point of vulnerability is the foot.

That seems a stretch. Irrespective of camel armour or lack thereof, the caltrops had the major advantage of letting the Romans hurt the camels without being in range of the riders' long spears.

I can't parse exothen either - I would assume exotheo.

Because it says 'cataphracts thrusting long spears from camels' I would vaguely incline towards armoured men rather than a cataphract troop type. Though from a practical standpoint, given the relative sizes of camel and rider, armouring the rider and not the camel would seem like a waste of effort. Maybe Herodian isn't using precise terminology anyway - maybe by 'cataphracts' he just has in mind 'hard charging mounted types', rather than anything specific about armour. He just says their long robes stopped them running away, not their armour. Who knows?

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 20, 2017, 09:41:22 AM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 20, 2017, 08:35:59 AM
It does however seem to imply that the camels were armoured, on the basis that their point of vulnerability is the foot.

That seems a stretch. Irrespective of camel armour or lack thereof, the caltrops had the major advantage of letting the Romans hurt the camels without being in range of the riders' long spears.

True, although one has to wonder how long unarmoured camels or, for that matter, horses, would survive within pilum range.

Quote from: RichT on January 20, 2017, 04:41:55 PM
Maybe Herodian isn't using precise terminology anyway - maybe by 'cataphracts' he just has in mind 'hard charging mounted types', rather than anything specific about armour. He just says their long robes stopped them running away, not their armour. Who knows?

He says the same of unarmoured Parthians in IV.11.6; these were nobles invited to a wedding by Caracalla (who had promised to marry the daughter of Artabanus IV) and treacherously attacked and massacred.  Do we conclude that Herodian's Parthians never wore armour or that they wore their robes whether armoured or not?

Incidentally, Herodian mentions: "Naturally they did not have their quivers and bows with them; what need for weapons at a wedding?"  Large spears are conspicuous by their omission.  In Alexander Severus' Persian campaign (the Sassanids having replaced the Parthians) one of the three Roman armies is pounced on by the Persians:

"The king attacked it unexpectedly with his entire force and trapped the Romans like fish in a net; firing their arrows from all sides at the encircled soldiers, the Persians massacred the whole army." - Herodian VI.5.9

Again, no spears, and the implication that everyone has a bow (cf. VI.5.4, "They use the bow and the horse in war, as the Romans do, but the barbarians are reared with these from childhood, and live by hunting; they never lay aside their quivers or dismount from their horses, but employ them constantly for war and the chase.")  Interesting is that Herodian's Romans also use the bow and horse in war, despite Alexander Severus' army apparently consisting mainly of shielded infantry.

What the above indicates (at least to me) is that one should perhaps be careful about taking Herodian's wording at face value.

Is it April already?

Or did Pat really doubt the literal truth of an ancient source?

Must be April.

Quote[4.15.5] So great was the number of slaughtered men and animals that the entire plain was covered with the dead; bodies were piled up in huge mounds, and the dromedaries especially fell in heaps. As a result, the soldiers were hampered in their attacks; they could not see each other for the high and impassable wall of bodies between them. Prevented by this barrier from making contact, each side withdrew to its own camp.

This, BTW, is just the sort of thing Keegan spends a chunk of The Face of Battle arguing is physically impossible, and it's at the very least implausible if you pause to think a bit about it - are we to assume, that before the wall rose to eye level, camel riders forced their mounts to climb it? Eye level for a man on a camel is something like three meters* (10') - just how ridiculously large a number of corpses of men and animals would be needed to create wall that high and impassable between two entire armies? The angle of repose for mangled flesh is not very high.

So count another point for being careful about taking Herodian at face value.

* Depends, of course, on the size of the camel, the size of the man, and not least on the type of saddle used.  At the time and place, I believe a central seat would have been used, which tends to maximize the height. My source here is Bulliet's The Camel and the Wheel.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 21, 2017, 09:45:56 AM
So count another point for being careful about taking Herodian at face value.

Indeed, although I would be inclined to say more a case of being careful about taking Herodian's wording at face value.  I suspect that 'could not see each other' may signify 'could not see the bits one wished to poke' as opposed to 'completely blanked off from view'.  'Huge mounds' and 'heaps' are reminiscent of Caesar's description of the closing stages of his battle against the Nervii, and like the Nervii, the Parthians in this battle were particularly determined, imagining they were fighting against the treacherous Caracalla, and this determination may have driven them to attack even when the bodies began piling up inconveniently high.

For what it is worth, German troops in the Rzhev salient in the winter of 1942-3 encountered the same problem, with walls of Soviet corpses piling up and obstructing their view of the battlefield.  It does happen, Keegan notwithstanding, but rarely, and to make it happen requires an attacker with much more determination than sense.

The "piles of bodies" formula is found all over our period of interest, though, as Patrick says, not commonly.  I'd probably rather accuse Herodian of exaggeration in this  and think that the bodies of the dead were so thick they were an impediment than they were a literal depth in metres.

For ancient sources generally message is more important than exactly recording what happened. Generally the author is not present at the battle, has access to reports from only one side and even those reports are likely to be biaed, or restricted to a particular physical viewpoint. Modern accounts are subject to the same pressures, but have the advantage that they are expected to be an accurate record and so many other sources exist that the worst excesses and elaborations would be picked out. At least today we have some elements of history that are designed to give the unvarnished truth such as 'Official' histories and unit histories . Of course they often contain elements of bias. Official histories feel the need to mention every unit, for fear of crusty colonels objecting and minimise events such as battalions fleeing or refusing to move. Unit histories extend that natural bias. So lets not expect Herodian to be telling whole truth and nothing but the truth. I don't always agree with the DBM(M) lists, but they do set a high standard in terms of tgere being evidence for a oarticular type , mostly ringmastered by Duncan, I believe. There are a lot of pressures on list editors, plenty of enthusiasts who want their favoourite force up armed and up armoured. There is also a pressure to have diversity and interesting types, especially if there are models for them already. Also there is a need not just to default to certainty with very high barriers to entry and thus very anodyne lists. Many years ago...before many here were born, Phil Barker suggested ( now that's a euphism) that Hellenistic armies and Late Roman aemies were very good because of they had many different types of troops and could deploy the right skillset into the appropriate situation. That has, probably happily, become wargame orthodoxy and is the case with most sets of rules...having a variety of troop types helps. However, we do often end up with 'kampfgruppe'  armies which have just enough of everything to be flexible. The sources generally do not give us a view of armies as having multiple troop types on the field and working them in combination. Whereas it is ever so useful to have a couple of turcopole units in a Crusader army or Psiloi in a Caesarian army  they often have no, or very limited impact on a chronicled battle line engagement. We include them because it is wargames orthodoxy that one needs these units of bows, javelins, LI, LHI, odd LC that can scout and skirmish.  They add tactical nuance and colour. Hence I say there is enough to justify a small number of cataphract camels, they look good and there are nice figures and I have painted a unit.......Bring em on

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2017, 10:06:13 AM
For what it is worth, German troops in the Rzhev salient in the winter of 1942-3 encountered the same problem, with walls of Soviet corpses piling up and obstructing their view of the battlefield.  It does happen, Keegan notwithstanding, but rarely, and to make it happen requires an attacker with much more determination than sense.

How high were those walls? I mean, obviously you can get a pile of corpses, but only so high and so steep. The particular case Keegan is arguing about are the main-height piles in some accounts of Agincourt.

There's a similar quote (by Ludendorff?) about WWI Germans sometimes having to clear away Russian corpses to free the field of fire for their machineguns - but presumably those machineguns were mounted pretty low to minimize their own exposture.

WW1 and WW2 examples are rather different, since eyelines were generally at or very near ground level (for infantry in trenches, foxholes etc).

Without wandering off into a discussion of literary tropes, piles of corpses, battles lasting the entire day (and the next day, and the next), barbarians who can't take cold steel etc etc are, to say the least, rather familiar from many ancient authors. If a Julius Caesar talks about a pile of corpses, it's worth trying to work out what he might mean. If a Herodian does, it might be worth just raising your eyebrows and moving on. 'Piles of corpses' probably just means 'a long hard fought battle'. It might be that 'cataphracts' also just means 'charging mounted types'. Ancient authors are as prone to inexactitude in military terminology as modern ones (how many times have you seen an APC, or an IFV, or even an armoured car, called a 'tank'?). But on the other hand, cataphract camels are at least as well attested as many other troop types so yes by all means, bring 'em on. Especially if they are already painted.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 21, 2017, 11:08:43 AM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 21, 2017, 10:06:13 AM
For what it is worth, German troops in the Rzhev salient in the winter of 1942-3 encountered the same problem, with walls of Soviet corpses piling up and obstructing their view of the battlefield.  It does happen, Keegan notwithstanding, but rarely, and to make it happen requires an attacker with much more determination than sense.

How high were those walls? I mean, obviously you can get a pile of corpses, but only so high and so steep. The particular case Keegan is arguing about are the main-height piles in some accounts of Agincourt.

There's a similar quote (by Ludendorff?) about WWI Germans sometimes having to clear away Russian corpses to free the field of fire for their machineguns - but presumably those machineguns were mounted pretty low to minimize their own exposure.

I am not sure if anyone bothered to measure the piles/walls of dead Russians; my guess is that they would not have reached man-high for the reason Richard gives.  I mentioned Rzhev mainly to demonstrate that walls of corpses tend to result from an attacker who combines great determination and tactical disadvantage with an almost total disregard for casualties, which is also consistent with the circumstances in which Herodian's wall of dead - whatever its actual height - would have been created.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 21, 2017, 10:49:42 AM
The "piles of bodies" formula is found all over our period of interest, though, as Patrick says, not commonly.  I'd probably rather accuse Herodian of exaggeration in this  and think that the bodies of the dead were so thick they were an impediment than they were a literal depth in metres.

This would be my own conclusion: that they were so high as to effectively prevent further interaction as opposed to completely cutting off sight.

Perhaps a better example than Rzhev would be the Battle of Dupplin Moor in AD 1331 in which a large Scottish army attacked along a narrow valley against a small English force holding the high ground at the end.  The Scots were slaughtered.  The Lanercost Chronicle states that "the pile of dead rising up from the ground was more than a spear's length in height," which gives us a measurement of sorts.

QuoteThe Lanercost Chronicle states that "the pile of dead rising up from the ground was more than a spear's length in height," which gives us a measurement of sorts.

Another exaggeration, I feel. A "spear's length" in the 14th century would probably be eight to ten feet, depending on what was meant by a spear.  Speaking of a similar phenomenon at Agincourt (the two battles are surprisingly similar), Keegan tackles this from an observational and practical point of view and concludes the dead probably lay no more than three deep at Agincourt.  As we are not talking of a wall building exercise but a natural stacking phenomenon, the width of the pile of dead would make the top well out of weapon reach long before it reached a spears depth, let alone envisaging Scots spearmen scambling up to the top of such an unstable structure just to add themselves to it.  Turning back to our original example, it is unlikely that our camel riders are going to scale a pile of dead camels to keep fighting, so the chances of the pile being more than one camel deep are slight.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 22, 2017, 10:24:15 AM
As we are not talking of a wall building exercise but a natural stacking phenomenon, the width of the pile of dead would make the top well out of weapon reach long before it reached a spears depth, let alone envisaging Scots spearmen scambling up to the top of such an unstable structure just to add themselves to it.

This description from here (http://skyelander.orgfree.com/dupplin.html) may explain the process:

"As the flanking columns hurried on they were met by withering fire from Balliol's archers and recoiled back upon their own lines and into the main body. The press became so thick that many died of heatstroke or suffocation and the living had scarcely room to lift their weapons. Within a few minutes the mound of Scottish dead was several feet high. The few survivors, one of which was the last standing Highland schiltron division, tried to turn and flee down the hill. One chronicler described the ensuing scene as resembling a burial heap, into which the English poured flight after flight of arrows. The panic-stricken Scots tried to escape by climbing over one another, making the press worse as the formations behind blocked them in. It continued, according to one chronicler, "until the Scottish army had turned into a writhing heap nearly fifteen feet high", on which the English soldiers stood grotesquely, jabbing with their spears and swords at any sign of life beneath them."

More of a desperate scramble than a natural stacking phenomenon, but for me a satisfactory explanation.  Regarding Agincourt, I think Keegan is under the implicit impression it took place on firm ground with no shoving and tripping among French formations rather than the actual muddy day with crowding Frenchmen piling into and onto one another.  Treat Keegan's conclusions with care and a pinch of salt, and look carefully for his implicit assumptions.

Quote
Turning back to our original example, it is unlikely that our camel riders are going to scale a pile of dead camels to keep fighting, so the chances of the pile being more than one camel deep are slight.

But are they?  Camel 1 treads on a caltrop, drops, sheds its rider and both are dispatched.  Camel 2 walks over camel 1, treads on a caltrop, drops, and falls next to camel 1.  Camel 3 is urged over camels 1 and 2, gets to the other side, steps on a caltrop, drops and ends up on camel 2 (because there is a shieldwall of Roman infantry in the other direction).  This sort of thing would be happening along the line, so although the corpses would not necessarily stack at the point of maximum width of a sideways-lying camel, one can envisage the Romans steadily backpedalling, sowing caltrops as they go, and camels piling up one or two deep ahead of them.

When the Romans run out of caltrops and stand fast, there will no longer be free space for the camels to drop on the ground (which they anyway will not do unless maimed by close-combat weapons now that the caltrops are exhausted), so they have to drop on Romans (difficult) or other dead/dying camels (easier) - the net result is a sort of ramp of dead camels, shallow at the arrival end but deepening at the combat end.  Eventually it starts to cut off the Roman view of their opponents (I assume Herodian was writing from a Roman point-of-view) and renders access impossible for the remaining Parthians.  Such a terminus would probably need to be only about four or five camels deep, assuming Macrinus' Roman infantry were about 5' 6" tall on average.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2017, 06:43:13 PMRegarding Agincourt, I think Keegan is under the implicit impression it took place on firm ground with no shoving and tripping among French formations rather than the actual muddy day with crowding Frenchmen piling into and onto one another.

Mud is supposed to make tall piles more likely? What?

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 22, 2017, 06:48:55 PM
Mud is supposed to make tall piles more likely? What?

Mud allows close-packed armoured men to fall down unintentionally, often as not on top of each other, and more to the point leaves them unable to get up again.  Add a steady supply of additional armoured men with nowhere to go but over the muddy and hence slippery bodies of their comrades, and a 'multiple pile-up' seems inevitable.

QuoteTreat Keegan's conclusions with care and a pinch of salt, and look carefully for his implicit assumptions.

Don't worry I do.  But taking as literal truth a pile of dead 15 ft high?  Needs a whole sack full.  As to urging camels up a slope of dead camels 4 deep.......

Hang on.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 20, 2017, 07:43:30 PM
What the above indicates (at least to me) is that one should perhaps be careful about taking Herodian's wording at face value.

So we are all agreed, aren't we? We are all treating Herodian's words with care and a pinch of salt, and looking carefully for his implicit assumptions. If not, we should be.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 22, 2017, 07:06:30 PM

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 22, 2017, 06:48:55 PM
Mud is supposed to make tall piles more likely? What?

Mud allows close-packed armoured men to fall down unintentionally, often as not on top of each other, and more to the point leaves them unable to get up again.  Add a steady supply of additional armoured men with nowhere to go but over the muddy and hence slippery bodies of their comrades, and a 'multiple pile-up' seems inevitable.

Mud is slippery, which militates against tall piles on at least three levels: it becomes hard to climb on top of a budding pile, if you do get on top you're more likely to slide off if you fall, and if you do manage to end up on the top the foundation is more likely to move laterally to make the top sink.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 22, 2017, 07:08:30 PM

QuoteTreat Keegan's conclusions with care and a pinch of salt, and look carefully for his implicit assumptions.

Don't worry I do.  But taking as literal truth a pile of dead 15 ft high?  Needs a whole sack full.  As to urging camels up a slope of dead camels 4 deep.......

The circumstances of these particular battles were special.  The heap of dead Scots at Dupplin Moor was measured (after a fashion), but one point to bear in mind is that they were attacking up a narrow valley.  They seem to have occupied the entire width of the valley, so the theoretical limit to the height of that particular deadpile is the height of the slopes on both sides of the valley.  This would also help to explain why spear-length-depth piles of bodies do not accumulate on just any battlefield.

Herodian's wall of dead fauna (and riders) served to prevent further interaction between the participants.  Whether this requires a depth of three camels, or five, at the sharp end, I have no idea.  But unless we consider the account fictitious (which I would not), it makes sense to accept the basic premise and then argue over the details.  My guess about how they ended up stacked may be wrong, but the effect was there.

Quote from: RichT on January 22, 2017, 07:18:37 PM
Hang on.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 20, 2017, 07:43:30 PM
What the above indicates (at least to me) is that one should perhaps be careful about taking Herodian's wording at face value.

So we are all agreed, aren't we? We are all treating Herodian's words with care and a pinch of salt, and looking carefully for his implicit assumptions. If not, we should be.

What I wished to emphasise was that we should be careful about drawing conclusions from taking his wording too literally, e.g. that if he mentions cataphracts on horses and camels we should not conclude that he is specifically stating the mounts are unarmoured.  If he says a wall of bodies cut off view of the enemy, bear in mind he was writing from a Roman (and hence presumably an infantryman's) perspective as opposed to that of a Parthian cavalryman.  It halves the height.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 23, 2017, 05:44:32 AM
Mud is slippery, which militates against tall piles on at least three levels: it becomes hard to climb on top of a budding pile, if you do get on top you're more likely to slide off if you fall, and if you do manage to end up on the top the foundation is more likely to move laterally to make the top sink.

All of which is true in isolation, but when the pile is constantly being fed by an incoming torrent of armoured men under pressure the fact that casualties cannot be extracted will create a pile-up of greater proportions than one would expect in similar circumstances on firm ground.  We are considering a 'pile' perhaps 100 yards wide, so after a few bodies have slid out at the edges and ramped up, sliding off is no longer an option for the majority.  Climbing, or being thrust onto, such a pile is anyway much easier if one is getting a lot if involuntary help from one's friends pushing en masse from behind.

Just for a sense of perspective, 15ft is the height of a double-decker bus.  I have no issue with heaps of dead in these battlefields but lets try to keep a sense of proportion and imagine what we are dealing with and how it might have got there. 

To return to Herodian, what is motivating our camel cataphracts?  Even if it is possible to urge a camel to climb a pile of several dead camels 5-6ft high, why would they do so?  They are described as prodding with long spears, not desperately trying to come to hand strokes.

Yes, "taking his wording too literally" is exactly what goes on in this and so many other cases. It comes down to the same old philosophical (or historiographical) question as always - is a battle account in a writer such as Herodian a detailed, precise and complete description of all the tactical details of everything that took place everywhere across the battlefield? Or is it an impressionistic, anecdotal list of incidents that occurred, or something like what occurred, and which happen to have been passed on to our author? Or is it indeed largely a fabrication, designed to match the author's, and his readers', view of what a big battle should be like, or to make a dramatic read? I'm strongly inclined to the second possibility, with a dose of the third (and to be fair, elements of the first). 

Someone who was at the battle might have noted that there were so many dead camels that the armies were impeded from contacting each other. How many camels would this be? For close order infantry, keen to keep formation, and mounted troops, awkward on broken ground, a liberal scattering of camels would be more than enough - no need for them to be stacked on top of each other - not even a continous 1-deep carpet. Just lots - the sort an old soldier would describe (with some glee no doubt) as 'heaps of enemy dead'.  This then gets passed through a process of Chinese whispers to our source, who hears that heaps of dead camels impeded the armies, and suddenly we have a camel wall several feet high. We don't have to conclude that Herodian's account is totally untrue, simply that it isn't the whole story, or a particularly precise telling of the story. It's an impression of an incident passed on at second, third or however many hands. This is what history is.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2017, 01:09:26 PM
Just for a sense of perspective, 15ft is the height of a double-decker bus.  I have no issue with heaps of dead in these battlefields but lets try to keep a sense of proportion and imagine what we are dealing with and how it might have got there. 

I thought I had.

Quote
To return to Herodian, what is motivating our camel cataphracts?  Even if it is possible to urge a camel to climb a pile of several dead camels 5-6ft high, why would they do so?  They are described as prodding with long spears, not desperately trying to come to hand strokes.

Again, I had mentioned this, but perhaps it would be best to let Herodian tell the full story.  If detailed reading of history is not one's thing, the bare essence can be cleaned from the passages in bold.

"[4.10.1] [216] Not long after this, Caracalla, desirous of gaining the title Parthicus and of being able to report to the Romans that he had conquered all the Eastern barbarians, even though there was peace everywhere, devised the following plan. He wrote a letter to the king of Parthia (his name was Artabanus [IV]) and sent to him an embassy laden with gifts of expensive materials and fine workmanship.

[4.10.2] He wrote to the king that he wished to marry his daughter; that it was not fitting that he, emperor and son of an emperor, be the son-in-law of a lowly private citizen. His wish was to marry a princess, the daughter of a great king. He pointed out that the Roman and the Parthian empires were the largest in the world; if they were united by marriage, one empire without a rival would result when they were no longer divided by a river.

[4.10.3] The rest of the barbarian nations now not subject to their authority could easily be reduced, as they were governed by tribes and confederacies. Furthermore, the Roman infantry were invincible in close-quarter combat with spears, and the Parthians had a large force of highly skilled horse-archers.

[4.10.4] The two forces, he said, complemented each other; by waging war together, they could easily unite the entire inhabited world under a single crown. Since the Parthians produced spices and excellent textiles and the Romans metals and manufactured articles, these products would no longer be scarce and smuggled by merchants; rather, when there was one world under one supreme authority, both peoples would enjoy these goods and share them in common.

[4.10.5] At first the Parthian king did not approve of the proposals in Caracalla's letters, saying that it was not proper for a barbarian to marry a Roman. What accord could there be when they did not understand each other's language and differed so radically in diet and dress? Surely, the king said, there are many distinguished Romans, one of whose daughters he could marry, just as for him there were the Arsacids;note it was not fitting that either race be bastardized.

[4.11.1] [216] The Parthian's initial replies were of this type, and he declined Caracalla's offer of an alliance. But when the emperor persisted and with many gifts and oaths swore to his enthusiasm for the marriage and his good will toward the Parthians, Artabanus [IV] was won over; addressing Caracalla as his future son-in-law, he promised him his daughter in marriage. When the news was made public, the barbarians prepared for the reception of the emperor of the Romans and rejoiced in the hope of permanent peace.

[4.11.2] Having crossed the rivers unopposed, Caracalla entered the barbarians' land as if it were already his. Sacrifices were offered to him everywhere; the altars were decked with wreaths, and perfumes and every kind of incense were scattered in his path. Caracalla pretended to be delighted by the barbarians' attentions and continued his advance. He had now completed the greater part of his journey and was approaching the palace of Artabanus. The king did not wait to receive the emperor but came out to meet him in the plain before the city, welcoming his son-in-law, the bridegroom of his daughter.

[4.11.3] All the Parthians, crowned with the traditional flowers and wearing robes embroidered in gold and various colors, celebrated the occasion, dancing wildly to the music of flutes and the throbbing of drums. They take delight in such orgiastic dancing, especially when they are drunk.

[4.11.4] Abandoning their horses and laying aside their quivers and bows, the whole populace came together to drink and pour libations. A huge mob of barbarians gathered and stood about casually, wherever they happened to be, eager to see the bridegroom and expecting nothing out of the ordinary.

[4.11.5] Then the signal was given, and Caracalla ordered his army to attack and massacre the spectators. Astounded by this onslaught, the barbarians turned and fled, wounded and bleeding. Artabanus himself, snatched up and placed on a horse by some of his personal bodyguards, barely escaped with a few companions.

[4.11.6] The rest of the Parthians, lacking their indispensable horses, were cut down (for they had sent the horses out to graze and were standing about). They were unable to escape by running, either; their long, loose robes, hanging to their feet, tripped them up.

[4.11.7] Naturally they did not have their quivers and bows with them; what need for weapons at a wedding? After slaughtering a great number of the enemy and taking much booty and many prisoners, Caracalla marched away from the city unopposed. En route he burned the towns and villages and permitted his soldiers to carry off as much as they could of anything they wanted.

[4.11.8] Such was the nature of the disaster which the barbarians suffered when they were not anticipating anything of the kind. After harassing most of the Parthian empire, Caracalla, since his troops were weary by now of looting and killing, went off to Mesopotamia. From there he sent word to the Senate and the Roman people that the entire East was subdued and that all the kingdoms in that region had submitted to him.

[4.11.9] The senators were not unaware of what had actually happened (for it is impossible to conceal an emperor's acts); nevertheless, fear and the desire to flatter led them to vote the emperor all the triumphal honors. Thereafter, Caracalla spent some time in Mesopotamia, where he devoted himself to chariot-driving and to fighting all kinds of wild animals.

[4.12.1] [216/217] Caracalla had two generals in his army: [Marcus Oclatinius] Adventus, an old man, who had some skill in military matters but was a layman in other fields and unacquainted with civil administration; and [Marcus Opellius] Macrinus, experienced in public affairs and especially well trained in law. Caracalla often ridiculed Macrinus publicly, calling him a brave, self-styled warrior, and carrying his sarcasm to the point of shameful abuse.

[4.12.2] When the emperor learned that Macrinus was overfond of food and scorned the coarse, rough fare which Caracalla the soldier enjoyed, he accused the general of cowardice and effeminacy, and continually threatened to murder him. Unable to endure these insults any longer, the angry Macrinus grew dangerous.

[4.12.3] This is the way the affair turned out; it was, at long last, time for Caracalla's life to come to an end. The emperor, always excessively curious, wished not only to know everything about the affairs of men but also to meddle in divine matters. Since he suspected everyone of plotting against him, he consulted all the oracles and summoned prophets, astrologers, and entrail-examiners from all over the world; no one who practiced the magic art of prophecy escaped him.

[4.12.4] But when he began to suspect that these men were not prophesying truthfully but were flattering him, Caracalla wrote a letter to Materianus, to whom he had entrusted control of affairs at Rome. This Materianus he considered the most trustworthy of his friends, the only one with whom he shared the imperial secrets. He ordered Materianus to locate all the most highly skilled prophets and to make use of their magic arts to discover whether anyone was plotting to seize the empire.

[4.12.5] Materianus obeyed the emperor's orders to the letter, and whether because the spirits actually revealed these things to him or because he was eager to remove Macrinus, he sent Caracalla a dispatch informing him that Macrinus was conspiring to seize control of the empire and must be eliminated.

[4.12.6] [Spring 217] Sealing this letter, he gave it routinely with the other dispatches to the couriers, who did not, of course, know what they were carrying. Completing the journey with their usual speed, the messengers approached Caracalla after he had already donned his racing uniform and was about to climb into the waiting chariot, and gave him the whole bundle of dispatches, including the letter concerning Macrinus.

[4.12.7] Caracalla, about to drive off, and intent upon the coming race, ordered Macrinus, who was standing nearby alone, to examine the dispatches and, if they contained anything urgent, to inform him. If, however, there was nothing pressing in them, he was to handle them himself in the usual manner, in his capacity as praetorian prefect. The emperor frequently ordered Macrinus to do this.

[4.12.8] After giving these directions, Caracalla turned to his race. Macrinus withdrew and opened the dispatches in private; when he found the one containing his own death sentence, he saw clearly the danger which threatened him. Knowing the emperor's nature, and realizing that the death sentence contained in the letter would give the emperor legitimate cause for putting him to death, Macrinus removed this letter from the pile and reported that the rest were of the routine sort.

[4.13.1] [Early April 217] The prefect, fearing that Materianus might send this information to the emperor a second time, decided to act now rather than wait and suffer the consequences. This is what he did. In Caracalla's bodyguard was a centurion named Martialis, who was always in the emperor's escort. A few days earlier, Caracalla had executed the centurion's brother on an unproved charge. Moreover, the emperor continually insulted the man, calling him cowardly, effeminate, and Macrinus' darling.

[4.13.2] Learning that Martialis was exceedingly grieved by his brother's death and could no longer endure the emperor's insults, Macrinus summoned the centurion (in whom he had confidence because the man had served him before, and had received many favors from him). The prefect persuaded Martialis to be on the watch for a suitable opportunity to carry out a plot against the emperor. Won over by Macrinus' promises, Martialis, since he hated the emperor and was eager to avenge his brother, gladly promised to do the deed when the proper occasion arose.

[4.13.3] [8 April 217] Not long after they made this agreement, it happened that Caracalla, who was spending the time at Carrhae in Mesopotamia, conceived a desire to leave the imperial quarters and visit the Temple of the Moon, for Selene is the goddess whom the natives particularly adore. The temple was located some distance from Carrhae, and the journey was a long one. Therefore, to avoid involving the entire army, Caracalla made the trip with a few horsemen, intending to sacrifice to the goddess and then return to the city.

[4.13.4] At the halfway point he stopped to relieve himself; ordering his escort to ride off, he went apart with a single attendant. All the horsemen turned aside and withdrew for some distance, respecting the emperor's modesty.

[4.13.5] But when Martialis, who was looking for just such an opportunity, saw Caracalla alone, he ran toward him as if the emperor had summoned him by a gesture to question him or receive some information. Standing over Caracalla after he had uncovered himself, Martialis stabbed the emperor from behind with a dagger he had concealed in his hand. The blow under the shoulder was fatal, and Caracalla died, unsuspecting and undefended.

[4.13.6] When the emperor fell, Martialis leaped upon his horse and fled. Those favorites of Caracalla, the German cavalry who served as his bodyguard, were closer to the scene than the rest, and hence were the first to realize what had happened. These horsemen set out in pursuit of Martialis and cut him down.

[4.13.7] When the rest of the army learned what had occurred, they hurried to the spot, and Macrinus was the first to arrive; standing over the body, he pretended to wail and lament for the emperor. The whole army was grieved and distressed by the affair; they felt they had lost a fellow soldier, a comrade-in-arms, rather than their emperor. And yet they never suspected that it was a plot of Macrinus; they believed that Martialis had done it because of his personal hatred for the emperor.

[4.13.8] Then the soldiers retired, each to his own tent. After burning the body on a pyre and placing the ashes in an urn, Macrinus sent it for burial to the emperor's mother in Antioch. As a result of these similar disasters which befell her two sons, Julia died, either by her own hand or by the emperor's order. Such was the fate suffered by Caracalla and his mother Julia, who lived in the manner I have described above. Caracalla had served as emperor without his father and brother for eleven years.

[4.14.1] [8 April 217] After Caracalla's death, the bewildered soldiers were at a loss as to what to do. For two days they were without an emperor while they looked for someone to fill the office. And now it was reported that Artabanus was approaching with a huge army, seeking a legitimate revenge for the Parthians whom Caracalla had murdered under a truce and in time of peace.

[4.14.2] The army first chose Adventus as their emperor because he was a military man and a praetorian prefect of considerable ability; he declined the honor, however, pleading his advanced age. [11 April 217] They then decided upon Macrinus, influenced by their tribunes, who were close friends of the general and were suspected of having been involved in the plot against Caracalla. Later, after Macrinus' death, these tribunes were punished, as we shall relate in the pages to follow.

[4.14.3] Macrinus thus received the office of emperor not so much because of the soldiers' affection and loyalty as from necessity and the urgency of the impending crisis.

While these events were taking place, Artabanus was marching toward the Romans with a huge army, including a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those mail-clad soldiers who hurl spears from dromedaries.

[4.14.4] When the approach of Artabanus was reported, Macrinus called the soldiers together and addressed them as follows: "That all of you regret the passing of such an emperor, or, more accurately, fellow soldier, is hardly surprising. But to endure misfortunes and disasters with equanimity is the part of intelligent men.

[4.14.5] Truly the memory of Caracalla is locked in our hearts, and to those who come after us will be handed down this memory, which will bring him everlasting fame for his great and noble deeds, his love and affection for you, and his labors and comradeship with you. But now it is time for us, since we have paid the last of the prescribed honors to the memory of the dead and have performed his funeral rites, to look to the present emergency.

[4.14.6] You see the barbarian with his whole Eastern horde already upon us, and Artabanus seems to have good reason for his enmity. We provoked him by breaking the treaty, and in a time of complete peace we started a war. Now the whole Roman empire depends upon our courage and loyalty. This is no quarrel about boundaries or river beds; everything is at stake in this dispute in which we face a mighty king fighting for his children and kinsmen who, he believes, have been murdered in violation of solemn oaths.

[4.14.7] Therefore let us take up our arms and our battle stations in the customary Roman good order. In the fighting, the undisciplined mob of barbarians, assembled only for temporary duty, may prove its own worst enemy. Our battle tactics and our stern discipline, together with our combat experience, will insure our safety and their destruction. Therefore, with hopes high, contest the issue as it is fitting and traditional for Romans to do.

[4.14.8] Thus will you repel the barbarians, and by winning a great and glorious reputation you will make it clear to the Romans and to all men - and you will likewise confirm that previous victory - that you did not deceive the barbarians by fraudulently and treacherously breaking your treaty with them, but that you conquered and won by force of arms."

After this speech the soldiers, recognizing the necessity of the matter, took up battle stations and remained under arms.

[4.15.1] [Summer 217] Artabanus [IV] appeared at sunrise with his vast army. When they had saluted the sun, as was their custom, the barbarians, with a deafening cheer, charged the Roman line, firing their arrows and whipping on their horses. The Romans had arranged their divisions carefully to insure a stable front; the cavalry and the Moorish javelin men were stationed on the wings, and the open spaces were filled with light-armed and mobile troops that could move rapidly from one place to another. And so the Romans received the charge of the Parthians and joined battle.

[4.15.2] The barbarians inflicted many wounds upon the Romans from above, and did considerable damage by the showers of arrows and the long spears of the mail-clad dromedary riders. But when the fighting came to close quarters, the Romans easily defeated the barbarians; for when the swarms of Parthian cavalry and hordes of dromedary riders were mauling them, the Romans pretended to retreat and then they threw down caltrops and other keen-pointed iron devices. Covered by the sand, these were invisible to the horsemen and the dromedary riders and were fatal to the animals.

[4.15.3] The horses, and particularly the tender-footed dromedary, stepped on these devices and, falling, threw their riders. As long as they are mounted on horses and dromedary, the barbarians in those regions fight bravely, but if they dismount or are thrown, they are very easily captured; they cannot stand up to hand-to-hand fighting. And, if they find it necessary to flee or pursue, the long robes which hang loosely about their feet trip them up.

[4.15.4] On the first and second days the two armies fought from morning until evening, and when night put an end to the fighting, each side withdrew to its own camp, claiming the victory. On the third day they came again to the same field to do battle; then the barbarians, who were far superior in numbers, tried to surround and trap the Romans. The Romans, however, no longer arranged their divisions to obtain depth; instead, they broadened their front and blocked every attempt at encirclement.

[4.15.5] So great was the number of slaughtered men and animals that the entire plain was covered with the dead; bodies were piled up in huge mounds, and the dromedaries especially fell in heaps. As a result, the soldiers were hampered in their attacks; they could not see each other for the high and impassable wall of bodies between them. Prevented by this barrier from making contact, each side withdrew to its own camp.

[4.15.6] Macrinus knew that Artabanus was making so strong a stand and battling so fiercely only because he thought that he was fighting Caracalla; the barbarian always tires of battle quickly and loses heart unless he is immediately victorious.

[4.15.7] But on this occasion the Parthians resolutely stood their ground and renewed the struggle after they had carried off their dead and buried them, for they were unaware that the cause of their hatred was dead. Macrinus therefore sent an embassy to the Parthian king with a letter telling him that the emperor who had wronged him by breaking his treaties and violating his oaths was dead and had paid a richly deserved penalty for his crimes. Now the Romans, to whom the empire really belonged, had entrusted to Macrinus the management of their realm.

[4.15.8] He told Artabanus that he did not approve of Caracalla's actions and promised to restore all the money he had lost. Macrinus offered friendship to Artabanus instead of hostility and assured him that he would confirm peace between them by oaths and treaties. When he learned this and was informed by envoys of Caracalla's death, Artabanus believed that the treaty breaker had suffered a suitable punishment; as his own army was riddled with wounds, the king signed a treaty of peace with Macrinus, content to recover the captives and stolen money without further bloodshed.

[4.15.9] The Parthian then returned to his own country, and Macrinus led his army out of Mesopotamia and hurried on to Antioch."

Caracalla's treachery would have incensed anyone who was not a devoted Machiavel, particularly a 'barbarian' with strong ideas of honour.  Every Parthian of rank present would have had slaughtered kin to avenge, and an abiding rage to quench in Roman blood - if they could just get close enough to draw that blood.  I am not surprised they drove themselves to the uttermost.

We may note, incidentally, that they had three days of fighting in which to pile up corpses, not just one.

Quote from: RichT on January 23, 2017, 04:22:21 PM
Yes, "taking his wording too literally" is exactly what goes on in this and so many other cases. It comes down to the same old philosophical (or historiographical) question as always - is a battle account in a writer such as Herodian a detailed, precise and complete description of all the tactical details of everything that took place everywhere across the battlefield? Or is it an impressionistic, anecdotal list of incidents that occurred, or something like what occurred, and which happen to have been passed on to our author? Or is it indeed largely a fabrication, designed to match the author's, and his readers', view of what a big battle should be like, or to make a dramatic read? I'm strongly inclined to the second possibility, with a dose of the third (and to be fair, elements of the first).

Richard, seriously, either read history or give it up.  Do not try to remake it - that is my job.  ;D

Quote
Someone who was at the battle might have noted that there were so many dead camels that the armies were impeded from contacting each other. How many camels would this be? For close order infantry, keen to keep formation, and mounted troops, awkward on broken ground, a liberal scattering of camels would be more than enough - no need for them to be stacked on top of each other - not even a continous 1-deep carpet. Just lots - the sort an old soldier would describe (with some glee no doubt) as 'heaps of enemy dead'.  This then gets passed through a process of Chinese whispers to our source, who hears that heaps of dead camels impeded the armies, and suddenly we have a camel wall several feet high. We don't have to conclude that Herodian's account is totally untrue, simply that it isn't the whole story, or a particularly precise telling of the story. It's an impression of an incident passed on at second, third or however many hands. This is what history is.

This kind of agenda-driven speculation is just what we need to avoid when evaluating an incident in a source.  If anyone starts using it as a consistent starting-point, then it can be argued that a battle in which each side suffers a couple of hundred casualties gets pumped up into one which leaves the ground strewn with 10,000 dead Carthaginians and 50,000 dead Romans, the tale having much improved in the telling between the time of the battle and the century or so later when the history was published.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 24, 2017, 04:48:15 PM

Quote from: Erpingham on January 23, 2017, 01:09:26 PM
Just for a sense of perspective, 15ft is the height of a double-decker bus.  I have no issue with heaps of dead in these battlefields but lets try to keep a sense of proportion and imagine what we are dealing with and how it might have got there. 

I thought I had.

And there was I thinking you were on a flight of fancy :)

QuoteCaracalla's treachery would have incensed anyone who was not a devoted Machiavel, particularly a 'barbarian' with strong ideas of honour.  Every Parthian of rank present would have had slaughtered kin to avenge, and an abiding rage to quench in Roman blood - if they could just get close enough to draw that blood.  I am not surprised they drove themselves to the uttermost.

Isn't this a bit romantic?  There seems to be a lack of any fanaticism in the descriptions, which seems to suggest a three day long inconclusive action, with the Parthians mainly shooting arrows. Where they do close to poke long spears at the Romans, the latter are mainly out of reach behind a screen of caltrops.  I'm not seeing a description of the camel cataphracts as hard charging shock troops who might force their way over a pile of dead camels. 

Quote
This kind of agenda-driven speculation

I am mildly curious, very mildly, as to what you think the 'agenda' is in this case. But please don't bother telling me, because come to think of it I really don't care what you think.  :)

This has left cataphract camels some way behind. But the 'heaps of dead' topic could conceivably make an interesting thread of its own - examples in ancient and medieval battles, comparative examples in other periods, physical realities and limitations, literary tropes or battlefield reality, and so on. If anyone wants to, that might be worth starting. Otherwise, enough of this nonsense.

Regarding the original topic, my take away is this: granting that Herodian can be trusted, we're looking at "heavy camelry", with armoured riders who are willing to engage in hand to hand with steady enemy, but we can't tell for sure if they were cataphract in the sense of having armoured mounts. For wargaming, that's a practical problem if the rules you're using forces you come down on the one side or the other on that question.

Another practical issue is that Herodian gives no indication of proportions - how many should lists allow? Do they loom large in his account because they were a big chunk of the army, because they're exotic, or because his informant happened to be in the path of a camel attack?

He gives the impression that there were enough of them to close off effective access for both sides; whether this was on one major sector of the battlefield (the centre, where we would expect the Roman infantry) or across the entire length is less clear.  My best guess is that the first two days of fighting would have mainly piled the casualties in the centre, where the legionaries (and caltrops) would have been, and this may have been contributory to the Parthian decision to extend the frontage of the fighting on day 3.

Proportions
Herodian has Artabanus field "a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those mail-clad soldiers who hurl [sic] spears from dromedaries," which was "far superior in numbers" to the Romans.  At least some of these archers were mounted, and he gives the impression that the greater part of the lancers were camel-mounted.  Earlier, Herodian refers to the Parthians having "a large force of highly skilled horse-archers."

Regarding the proportion of camels, do we conclude that Herodian had a camel obsession or that camelry provided the majority of cataphracts?  His account suggests the camelry suffered the majority of the casualties and left many more of its representatives on the field.  I see this proportion-wise as suggesting that camelry provided the major portion of cataphracts.  I would guess this would be somewhere between 60% and 75% of the cataphracted total.

Attempting to focus these various impressions, I would suggest the Parthian army has a fighting core of perhaps 1/3 close-combat troops, with 2/3 mounted and foot archers (the latter could proceed initially ahead of and subsequently behind the shock troops and from there shoot indirectly to support attacks, which would be consistent with the 'showers of arrows' mentioned by Herodian).  Instinct at least suggests the shock troops' mounts would not be unarmoured in a culture to which archery was a way of life and whose opponents could be expected to develop a considerable volume of missiles.

Size
The Roman army of this period seems to have had eight or so legions available for service in a Parthian war, which we would use as a starting-point for Macrinus' army and let him field c.40,000 legionaries.  The usual rule-of-thumb is one auxiliary per legionary, for another 40,000 troops; plus cavalry amounting to perhaps 1/3 of the infantry, so maybe 25,000 cavalry.  We might pare this down for earlier attrition, but not by much, as Caracalla's campaign of looting and slaughter was effectively unopposed.  We might scale it down, but Caracalla appears to me to be the kind of emperor who would want to field a grand army rather than a routine expedition.

If we have Macrinus fielding c.105,000 men - these started out as Caracalla's army, and would have been brought well up to strength and perhaps even overstrength for the campaign - the Parthians must have more.  The question is: how much more?  Herodian has them as "far superior in numbers", which suggests something in the region of 2:1 or 3:1 rather than just 150% or so.

I would suggest tentatively assigning the Parthians double the Roman numbers.  This gives c.210,000 Parthians, consistent with an all-out effort against a hated opponent, and of those 200,000 we get c.70,000 close-fighting troops and c.140,000 archers.  Very crudely, we might have 1/3 cataphracts (camel and horse-mounted), 1/3 mounted archers and 1/3 foot archers, or something like that.

2mm starts to look like a useful scale - but I would not like to have to start painting that lot!

Frontage
Battle frontage for eight legions would normally be 1,600 yards (just under a mile, or about 1.5 km) with auxiliary and cavalry frontage in addition.  However Herodian indicates the Romans deployed in depth and shifted their auxilia around in support of their legions, so the overall frontage might have been about the same as for the legions alone.  When the Parthians tried to expand on the third day, the Romans were well able to counter their efforts.  To effectively block off a 1,600-yard frontage with dead camels/horses and riders would require, assuming a saturation blockage of six camels and four horses per yard of frontage in a tapering mound, only 4,800 horse corpses and 9,600 dead camels, which is well within the figure of 70,000 suggested above.

The numerical estimates above are based on the assumption that Caracalla would have brought together eight legions and proportionate auxiliaries, and that Macrinus would have been able to field essentially the same troops.  If the Roman army was in fact smaller, the Parthian army would reduce in proportion.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 24, 2017, 07:56:31 PM

QuoteCaracalla's treachery would have incensed anyone who was not a devoted Machiavel, particularly a 'barbarian' with strong ideas of honour.  Every Parthian of rank present would have had slaughtered kin to avenge, and an abiding rage to quench in Roman blood - if they could just get close enough to draw that blood.  I am not surprised they drove themselves to the uttermost.

Isn't this a bit romantic?  There seems to be a lack of any fanaticism in the descriptions, which seems to suggest a three day long inconclusive action, with the Parthians mainly shooting arrows. Where they do close to poke long spears at the Romans, the latter are mainly out of reach behind a screen of caltrops.  I'm not seeing a description of the camel cataphracts as hard charging shock troops who might force their way over a pile of dead camels.

The Romans are not 'out of reach behind a screen of caltrops', rather:

[4.15.2] The barbarians inflicted many wounds upon the Romans from above, and did considerable damage by the showers of arrows and the long spears of the mail-clad dromedary riders. But when the fighting came to close quarters, the Romans easily defeated the barbarians; for when the swarms of Parthian cavalry and hordes of dromedary riders were mauling them, the Romans pretended to retreat and then they threw down caltrops and other keen-pointed iron devices. Covered by the sand, these were invisible to the horsemen and the dromedary riders and were fatal to the animals.

Did the Parthians stand off and poke?  No ...

[4.15.3] The horses, and particularly the tender-footed dromedary, stepped on these devices and, falling, threw their riders.

The Parthian attacks were definitely pressed home, otherwise they would not have managed to lose many animals (and, indirectly, riders) to the caltrops.  There also seems to be nothing half-hearted about the following:

[4.15.6] Macrinus knew that Artabanus was making so strong a stand and battling so fiercely only because he thought that he was fighting Caracalla; the barbarian always tires of battle quickly and loses heart unless he is immediately victorious.

The action (near Nisbis, AD 217) lasted three days because two large armies met on a narrow frontage with stereotyped tactics, which created a battle of attrition.  Herodian admittedly does not fill his sentences with descriptions of sanguinary injuries or wild-eyed shrieking warriors or men fighting on when impaled or with bits lopped off, but must we conclude that the absence of such phrasing necessarily means a tame affair on the battlefield?

QuoteHerodian admittedly does not fill his sentences with descriptions of sanguinary injuries or wild-eyed shrieking warriors or men fighting on when impaled or with bits lopped off, but must we conclude that the absence of such phrasing necessarily means a tame affair on the battlefield?

I'm no expert on Herodian but, from the passage quoted, he seems a fond of his cliches or topoi.  It is surprising if he wanted to describe frenzied fighting, he didn't roll out a few more set phrases.  It is rather difficult to see this as a full blooded set to, given it happens over three days and then everyone goes home.  But in many ways, this is a deviation on the main subject.  Perhaps more important is the impression of the tactics of the camel cataphracts.  yes, I overstated the case about them only poking at the Romans.  But how do we see what they do?  They don't charge and impact, because they are hampered by the caltrops.  They either hurl or push with their long spears, again fitting with struggling to make a solid contact.  This doesn't mean of course they wouldn't in other circumstances be impact troops - medieval men-at-arms were known to throw lances and hand weapons at forces they could break and they were we know normally hard charging types.

I had a look at Herodian's other battle descriptions, disappointingly few though they are.  Unlike Diodorus and Appian, he is not given to the limbs-flying-around school of narrative, but can summon up buckets of blood when the mood takes him.

[3.4.4] The armies of Severus and Niger not only met at that historic spot but the outcome of the battle was the same. The armies pitched camp opposite each other toward evening, and spent a sleepless night, anxious and afraid. [31 March 194] With each of the generals urging his men on, the armies advanced to the attack at sunrise, fighting with savage fury, as if this were destined to be the final and decisive battle and Fortune would there choose one of them as emperor.

[3.4.5] After the battle had continued for a long time with terrible slaughter, and the rivers which flowed through the plain were pouring more blood than water into the sea, the rout of the forces of the East began. Driving Niger's battered troops before them, the Illyrians forced some of the fugitives into the sea; pursuing the rest as they rushed to the ridges, they slaughtered the fugitives, as well as a large number of men from the nearby towns and farms who had gathered to watch the battle from a safe vantage point.

That said, his style seems rather dry for such a gore-fest, and the whole demeanour of his history seems to be of a scholar who must note regrettable details rather than a hack-writer who sees another excuse for describing a maelstrom of bloodletting.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 25, 2017, 10:24:47 PM
I'm no expert on Herodian but, from the passage quoted, he seems a fond of his cliches or topoi.  It is surprising if he wanted to describe frenzied fighting, he didn't roll out a few more set phrases.

He seems to slip through battle descriptions as swiftly as possible: definitely no Froissart or Le Baker.  His account of Lugdunum in AD 197 shows exactly where his priorities lie:

[3.7.2] When the army of Severus came to Gaul, a few minor skirmishes occurred here and there, but the final battle was fought near the large and prosperous city of Lugdunum. [19 February 197] Albinus shut himself up in that city, remaining behind when he sent the army out to do battle. A major engagement developed, and for a long time each side's chances of victory were equal, for in courage and ruthlessness the soldiers from Britain were in no way inferior to the soldiers from Illyria. When these two magnificent armies were locked in combat, it was no easy matter to put either one to flight.

[3.7.3] As some contemporary historians recorded -saying it not to curry favor but in the interests of accuracy- the division of the army stationed opposite the sector where Severus and his command were fighting proved far superior; the emperor slipped from his horse and fled, managing to escape by throwing off the imperial cloak. But while the soldiers from Britain were pursuing the Illyrians, chanting paeans of praise as if they were already victorious, they say that Laetus, one of Severus' generals, appeared with the troops under his command fresh and not yet committed in the battle.

[3.7.4] The historians accuse Laetus of watching the progress of the battle and deliberately waiting, holding his troops out of the fighting and appearing only after he was informed that Severus had been beaten. The aftermath of the affair substantiates the charge that Laetus coveted the empire himself. Later, when Severus had set everything straight and was living an orderly life, he gave generous rewards to the rest of his commanders, but Laetus alone he put to death, as seems reasonable under the circumstances, considering the general's past performances.

[3.7.5] All this happened at a much later date, however. On this occasion, when Laetus appeared with fresh troops, as has been related above, Severus' soldiers, taking heart, wrapped the emperor in the imperial cloak again and mounted him on his horse.

[3.7.6] But Albinus' soldiers, thinking that the victory was theirs, now found themselves in disorder when this powerful and as yet uncommitted army suddenly attacked; after a brief resistance they broke and ran. When the rout became general, Severus' soldiers pursued and slaughtered the fugitives until they drove them into Lugdunum. Each contemporary historian has recorded to suit his own purpose the actual number of those killed and captured on each side.

Note the asides about 'contemporary historians'.  The central feature, however, is Laetus and his equivocal conduct in quest of his own purple wardrobe: this trivium consumes about half the account of the battle.  The Wikipedia article on Herodian suggests he may have been an apparitor, a scribe or attendant to the emperor, and this seems to suit his concise delivery and hard-to-categorise perspective.  It would also accord with the rationale that Laetus must have been aiming at empire because Severus subsequently had him killed, which to us might look less like reason and more like Severus' cruelty or paranoia.

Quote
Perhaps more important is the impression of the tactics of the camel cataphracts.  yes, I overstated the case about them only poking at the Romans.  But how do we see what they do?  They don't charge and impact, because they are hampered by the caltrops.

It looks as if they do charge, but, because of the caltrops, do not impact.  And that is the whole point of caltrops.  Herodian does point out how these were concealed by the sand in which they were dropped, so a tentative attacker would uncover a few the hard way, pull back and then rely on missiles.  The Parthians appear to have gone in hard, found caltrops all over the place, dropped all over the place, and been 'tidied up' by the Romans.  It is hard to see significant numbers of animals going down to caltrops except as the result of some really determinedly-delivered charges: they just would not achieve the penetration of the caltrop field otherwise.  At least, that is how I see it.

Quote
They either hurl or push with their long spears, again fitting with struggling to make a solid contact.

As considered earlier in the thread, this may be a translation issue as opposed to tactical tentativity.  Or it may be the actions of men whose mounts are collapsing beneath them and rather spoiling an otherwise decent charge.

QuoteIt looks as if they do charge, but, because of the caltrops, do not impact.

Sort of what I had concluded - tentative poking/hurling would not necessarily be their normal MO, just what they were forced to do by the caltrop situation. 

Given this seems to be the only appearance of camel cataphracts in the historical record, it is hard to say what they would normally have done.

Are there any other examples of close-combat camel troops from their period and area who they might be a development of?  If so, do we know what they did?

Quote from: Erpingham on January 26, 2017, 11:47:37 AM
Given this seems to be the only appearance of camel cataphracts in the historical record, it is hard to say what they would normally have done.

Are there any other examples of close-combat camel troops from their period and area who they might be a development of?  If so, do we know what they did?

This is the only known case of 'camelphracts' being fielded on the battlefield by the Parthians, and the combination of a period of second-rate and/or fragmentary historians with long periods of apparent peace or relative inactivity on Rome's eastern frontier mean that for this period (3rd century AD) we really have nothing with which to compare.  The Romans and some of their eastern clients retained dromedarii in limited numbers, though these were usually for scouting and relied on archery.

The Wikipedia article on camel cavalry (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camel_cavalry) mentions in its exiguous Muslim Conquests section:

"The camel was used in this way by many civilizations, especially in Arabia and North Africa. Both camel and rider were sometimes armored like the contemporary late Roman cataphracts."

These 'contemporary late Roman cataphracts' would be Maurikian Byzantines; in WRG parlance EHC rather than SHC.  Maurikians appear to have used shock combat (in conjunction with a lot of missiles) as their principal tactical procedure.  These Islamic camel lancers are probably the closest equivalent in the general geographical area.  Depending on just how equivalent they were, they might also add weight to the idea that the Parthians' camels would also have been armoured.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 26, 2017, 10:13:38 PM
The Wikipedia article on camel cavalry (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camel_cavalry) mentions in its exiguous Muslim Conquests section:

"The camel was used in this way by many civilizations, especially in Arabia and North Africa. Both camel and rider were sometimes armored like the contemporary late Roman cataphracts."

The only source cited in that section is The Sealed Nectar, an apparently hagiographic biography of Muhammad, and near as I can find from the Google Books version it doesn't have a word to say about armoured camels. They don't seem to be mentioned as battle mounts at all, although they're clearly used for off-battlefield transportation of fighters. Most mentions are of them as pack animals or booty, or simply as a measure of value.

I'd concur that camels are mainly for transport and incidentally for providing a barrier to mounted assault when tethered. There is a depiction of a camel mounted warrior, which I recall as being on a ceiling at At Palermo, either palace or Monreale  cathedral. There are extant 'camel swords' with long blades so chaps on camels were clearly expected to reach standing opponents with a deadly weapon.
Then there are the mentions of them as gimmick weapons by the Persians against the Lydians and the Arabs ( dressing them as elephants). As Patrick says they appear to be mainly used for patrolling desert roads or guarding caravans.  As relative height is a definite advantage in warfare there must be some reason for there  not normally  being squadrons of camels in ancient armies...perhaps because camels are not easy to train into the disciplined group manoeuvres of cavalry.
Roy

One may recall in passing the camelry fielded by the Seleucids at Mahnesia, which was deployed with the scythed chariots and left when they did.  From the close association of the two arms, either a shock role or a follow-up role seems indicated for the camelry.  However neither of our extant sources was considerate enough to specify whether the camels were armoured (the default assumption is that they were not).

I think Roy is right about the difficulty of training camels to execute disciplined group manoeuvres, although Lawrence of Arabia led at least one charge of camel-mounted Arabs against Turkish cavalry, and noted that on impact, camels bowled over Turkish horses (which were apparently 'used to' camels, for what good it did them).  I therefore suggest the following as a hypothesis.

Certain later Parthian monarchs, having noted the potential effectiveness of camels as a horse-toppling mount for warriors armed with long weapons, attempted to breed war camels, which would be trained as mounts for shock troops more or less from birth.  These became sufficiently effective and useful to at first supplement, and then substantially replace, horses as the primary mount of the cataphract arm.  The long peace with, or at least lack of serious campaigning against, Rome since Trajan's time allowed the new arm to develop.  The Romans were not wholly ignorant of the development, and planned their own countermeasures, which became apparent in the Battle of Nisbis (AD 217).  This inflicted a reverse on the 'camelphract' arm, an event which also presumably encouraged the ongoing Sassanid rising.   Three major Sassanid-Parthian battles later, the 'camelphracts' and Parthian Empire were no more.

Primary mount of the cataphract arm?

Could I interest you in a new bridge across the forth?  I can offer a good price for cash payment!

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on January 27, 2017, 05:57:58 AM

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on January 26, 2017, 10:13:38 PM
The Wikipedia article on camel cavalry (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camel_cavalry) mentions in its exiguous Muslim Conquests section:

"The camel was used in this way by many civilizations, especially in Arabia and North Africa. Both camel and rider were sometimes armored like the contemporary late Roman cataphracts."

The only source cited in that section is The Sealed Nectar, an apparently hagiographic biography of Muhammad, and near as I can find from the Google Books version it doesn't have a word to say about armoured camels. They don't seem to be mentioned as battle mounts at all, although they're clearly used for off-battlefield transportation of fighters. Most mentions are of them as pack animals or booty, or simply as a measure of value.

Quite so. For example the Arabs of the conquest period despite access to significant numbers of camels and vast experience in training and using them, relied on their (initially limited) horses for mounted combat troops.

I think that wiki bit can be filed under "alternative facts"   :P

I had a look at what the internet offers under 'armoured camels', and there are few topics with less information or even misinformation available.

But there was something on Turkish camel-wrestling (I kid you not). ;)