Picking up from a diversion on the Killing and Being Killed thread. The debate about the real sizes of Achaemenid armies has lasted almost as long as the Achaemenid Empire itself. It would be interesting however to examine the practical challenges in gathering, moving and supplying an army of several million men using the infrastructure and technology of the time. A few problems that immediately come to mind are:
| 1. How to grow and store enough food to feed such an army for the campaigning season?
2. How to transport that food to where the army will need it?
3. Where does the manpower for such an army come from? This explores the population size of the Achaemenid Empire and whether so many men could be absent from their homes for an extended period of time.
4. How does this army move from one place to the next? This covers problems of length of the column, size of encampments, etc.
5. How would such an army deploy for battle? Obviously in great depth, which poses the question: why such huge numbers if most won't actually fight? Intimidation by warcry? I'm minded of Issus. |
My own off-the-cuff take:
1. Growing food for 3 - 4 years should do the trick. The biblical account of Egypt storing food during seven years of plenty to be distributed during seven years of famine is IMHO founded on something factual: if nothing else the practical possibility of keeping grain from spoiling for several years. I suspect putting it in large rooms then sealing the rooms completely would work. Remember the grain found in Egyptian tombs after thousands of years? It was still edible.
2. Ships to a large extent, and overland to a limited extent. Thus the contingents of the army come together only at the coast where huge ship-supplied grain silos are ready for it.
3. the Achaemenid Empire had about 50 million people. That's about 25 million men of whom about 1/3 to 1/2 were of military age, which give you about 8 million men from which to draw an army. No problem. Most of the men stay at home and keep things going.
4. Obviously not by conventional road or track (I believe this is the principle argument against huge Achaemenid armies). Question then is whether there is any historical evidence for the preparation of broad avenues along which the army, dozens of men wide, could march in a huge, loose crowdy column. Or at least no evidence against the theory.
5. I remember that quote from Napoleon: "Two armies are two bodies of men who meet and try to frighten each other." The morale element of a battle is paramount - sapping your enemy's will to fight. It's a bit like an elephant flapping his ears to make himself look even bigger. Bringing a huge army to the battlefield was the classic way of intimidating one's opponent to run before even making an attempt at battle. So the great majority of an Achaemenid army wasn't supposed to fight, just look scary from sheer size.
And now to the floor.
Just to note that as for 'othismos', this is a well trodden floor, and it might be worth collecting, linking to and reading existing long threads like this one:
http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1745.0
and posting only if you have something new to say, or some new evidence or argument to advance.
A few thoughts to start with.
The men mobilised for such a campaign are part of the general population which normally by and large feeds itself. The challenge for feeding them when they go on campaign is primarily about moving sufficient food close enough to where they will be campaigning before they start and then keeping the distribution going while the campaign lasts.
We are therefore looking at a transportation of surplus exercise, a storage situation and access facilities for loading and unloading sufficient quantities of material on an ongoing basis. I think Justin has civered the basics of storage.
Central to the whole arrangement is transport and the organisation of transport.
To provide 1.7 million (or rather 3.4 million if noncombatants are provided for) men with a daily choenix (roughly 2 lbs) of food each, which Herodotus considers the minimum requirement, requires moving about 6.8 million pounds or about 3,000 tons per day. This translates to unloading about sixty 50-ton ships on a daily basis, a figure well within the capacity of the coastal cities of the Persian Empire to provide and the average Greek beach to handle. At the other end of the pipeline, loading sixty 50-tonners daily should not tax the capability of a decent port.
So, as long as there are no storms and no hostile fleets interfering with the system, there should be no problem keeping Xerxes' army supplied.
Why mobilise so many when really only a fraction (essentially the 300,000 subsequently chosen by Mardonius) could be considered effective? There are a number of considerations here. One is that when the cat is away, the mice will play, so it helps to bring the mice along with you. Another, as Justin mentions, is sheer intimidation: the Ionian Revolt of 496 BC collapsed because many contingents simply drifted away when they learned of the size of the Persian army coming against them (a much smaller army than Xerxes deployed). The defenders of Thermopylae were seized with fear at the report of the size of Xerxes' army (Herodotus VII.207). Size mattered, and in some cases did the Persians' work for them. Then there was prestige: the larger the army, the greater the ruler's prestige, and prestige was what held a ruler's empire together, or at least kept the ruler in place at the top. It is noteworthy how when Xerxes' prestige crumbled, he became an assassination target. Prestige mattered.
We are of course already repeating our earlier arguments ::)
Just on the basic numbers. We can agree that 1kg of wheat would probably work as a minimum ration for a while. It would give about 3500 calories a day, on which we could assume the troops would survive as long as they are marching and not expecting to fight. This actually gives nearer to 70 ships if we take Patrick's figures. One question we might ask is how long is the supply cycle - load, sail, unload, sail back? This would give us some idea of the ships needed.
We should note that patrick's figures assume no horses or other animals in the army needing feeding. A horse needs about 1.7- 2.00% of its body weight in dry feed, according to the internet. Grazing possibilities should be assumed minimal.
Experts in geography can look at how much impact a need to move between suitable beaches would have on march rates. Other march rate questions would be the length of time taken for unloading, distribution, food preparation and watering each day. Obviously, the shorter the marches, the more supply would be required in total. The longer the campaign, the more effect sub-optimal diet will have on the capabilities of men and horses. Horses are very difficult to keep in condition on campaign. We should note too the length of the army, the effect of perhaps multiple supply points and fouling of water supplies.
And all that without even considering comparisons with other ancient armies or other eras.
Entirely without irony, let us not forget the sheer volume of shit produced by this size of force.
And move on to just re reading old posts and agreeing that no one has anything new to say on it and no one is likely to either because no one who takes it seriously has changed their mind since last time since no new research will be acceptable to one position whilst no new period sources have been discovered to challenge the other position.
It might be an idea to approach the subject from the angle of probability, i.e. we have the primary sources which all give the Persians huge numbers. Question then is to see if there is any insuperable obstacle to the Empire raising, supplying and moving armies of this size. If there are no insuperable obstacles then the burden of proof is on the other side: the sources can be assumed to be substantially correct unless proven otherwise.
Quote from: Mark G on April 11, 2018, 01:15:06 PM
Entirely without irony, let us not forget the sheer volume of shit produced by this size of force.
And move on to just re reading old posts and agreeing that no one has anything new to say on it and no one is likely to either because no one who takes it seriously has changed their mind since last time since no new research will be acceptable to one position whilst no new period sources have been discovered to challenge the other position.
:o
8)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:28:12 PM
It might be an idea to approach the subject from the angle of probability, i.e. we have the primary sources which all give the Persians huge numbers. Question then is to see if there is any insuperable obstacle to the Empire raising, supplying and moving armies of this size. If there are no insuperable obstacles then the burden of proof is on the other side: the sources can be assumed to be substantially correct unless proven otherwise.
Anything that is not impossible could happen. What happens most of the time is a tiny subset of this. It is best for those arguing for the outlier to make a case why, on this occassion, the nearly impossible is in fact the most likely case.
Quote from: Mark G on April 11, 2018, 01:15:06 PM
Entirely without irony, let us not forget the sheer volume of shit produced by this size of force.
If it can be proven that the entire army had to march along a single track or narrow road then we can automatically rule out several million men right away (the column would be ridiculously long). But if it marches along several wide, roughly-cleared avenues then poo is not a primary consideration. The avenues would hardly be roads - just passable ground. The voortrekkers went into the African hinterland in waggons and didn't use roads.
Quote from: Mark G on April 11, 2018, 01:15:06 PMAnd move on to just re reading old posts and agreeing that no one has anything new to say on it and no one is likely to either because no one who takes it seriously has changed their mind since last time since no new research will be acceptable to one position whilst no new period sources have been discovered to challenge the other position.
My take is to believe the primary sources if:
a) they agree or at least don't irreconcilably contradict each other
b) they accord with data from other sources like archaeology or at least are not contradicted by it
b) what they maintain is possible
My take on academics is a bit different. I will read and pay attention to them, but they live several thousand years after the events, in a world dramatically different from the period in question, and are not by training generals, economists, horsemen, merchants, seamen or waggoneers. They can't actually affirm what is or isn't possible* in these disciplines simply on their academic experience. I much prefer making sense of the primary sources (written by people much nearer the time in question and who often had some experience of at least one of these disciplines) than discounting them
en bloc.
* I'm impressed by the way Christopher Matthew rules out holding a sarissa overarm
a priori simply by affirming it's too heavy. How did Renaissance pikemen manage?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 11, 2018, 01:53:57 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:28:12 PM
It might be an idea to approach the subject from the angle of probability, i.e. we have the primary sources which all give the Persians huge numbers. Question then is to see if there is any insuperable obstacle to the Empire raising, supplying and moving armies of this size. If there are no insuperable obstacles then the burden of proof is on the other side: the sources can be assumed to be substantially correct unless proven otherwise.
Anything that is not impossible could happen. What happens most of the time is a tiny subset of this. It is best for those arguing for the outlier to make a case why, on this occassion, the nearly impossible is in fact the most likely case.
Nearly impossible?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:54:49 PM
If it can be proven that the entire army had to march along a single track or narrow road then we can automatically rule out several million men right away (the column would be ridiculously long). But if it marches along several wide, roughly-cleared avenues then poo is not a primary consideration.
Patrick's theory assumes that the whole army is next to the coast on a daily basis. Doesn't this preclude "numerous roughly cleared avenues"? Also, how long would each of the sub-columns be? There is a paper on 17th century armies which concludes that an army of 60,000 men and its baggage would stretch 198km in single file. I think it would need to be something like 15 wide for the front to be reaching the new camp as the back left the old one. You are talking of an army 60 times this size. Ok, not entirely compatable - the persians are carrying much less food with them because they are resupplying daily - but it does provide a sense of proportion.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:54:49 PM
If it can be proven that the entire army had to march along a single track or narrow road then we can automatically rule out several million men right away (the column would be ridiculously long).
There is of course one point, the bridge over the Hellespont, which the whole army (minus the European contingents picked up later)
must cross in one long column, ridiculously long or otherwise. There are two bridges, but Herodotos informs us that all the army crosses one bridge, the baggage train using the other one. It took seven days and nights. Unfortunately, IIRC he doesn't say how wide the bridges were. I leave it to others to make the assumptions and do the arithmetic as to how many men and horses could cross a reasonable-width bridge in the time allowed - I'm sure it's been worked out before.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 11, 2018, 02:18:23 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:54:49 PM
If it can be proven that the entire army had to march along a single track or narrow road then we can automatically rule out several million men right away (the column would be ridiculously long).
There is of course one point, the bridge over the Hellespont, which the whole army (minus the European contingents picked up later) must cross in one long column, ridiculously long or otherwise. There are two bridges, but Herodotos informs us that all the army crosses one bridge, the baggage train using the other one. It took seven days and nights. Unfortunately, IIRC he doesn't say how wide the bridges were. I leave it to others to make the assumptions and do the arithmetic as to how many men and horses could cross a reasonable-width bridge in the time allowed - I'm sure it's been worked out before.
Patrick did it somewhere: given the length of the boats and consequent width of the bridge and the time period, the Persians could operate at 25% efficiency and still get the entire army across with ease. I'll find the exact post.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:58:11 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 11, 2018, 01:53:57 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:28:12 PM
It might be an idea to approach the subject from the angle of probability, i.e. we have the primary sources which all give the Persians huge numbers. Question then is to see if there is any insuperable obstacle to the Empire raising, supplying and moving armies of this size. If there are no insuperable obstacles then the burden of proof is on the other side: the sources can be assumed to be substantially correct unless proven otherwise.
Anything that is not impossible could happen. What happens most of the time is a tiny subset of this. It is best for those arguing for the outlier to make a case why, on this occassion, the nearly impossible is in fact the most likely case.
Nearly impossible?
A rather obvious take on "If there are no insuperable obstacles", I think. Once you start talking about cases which aren't actually impossible, you can rapidly lose sight of the probable. In history, it seems to me, we are looking at "the balance of probability" not "beyond all doubt" most of the time.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 11, 2018, 02:26:41 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:58:11 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 11, 2018, 01:53:57 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:28:12 PM
It might be an idea to approach the subject from the angle of probability, i.e. we have the primary sources which all give the Persians huge numbers. Question then is to see if there is any insuperable obstacle to the Empire raising, supplying and moving armies of this size. If there are no insuperable obstacles then the burden of proof is on the other side: the sources can be assumed to be substantially correct unless proven otherwise.
Anything that is not impossible could happen. What happens most of the time is a tiny subset of this. It is best for those arguing for the outlier to make a case why, on this occassion, the nearly impossible is in fact the most likely case.
Nearly impossible?
A rather obvious take on "If there are no insuperable obstacles", I think. Once you start talking about cases which aren't actually impossible, you can rapidly lose sight of the probable. In history, it seems to me, we are looking at "the balance of probability" not "beyond all doubt" most of the time.
My point is assuming a near impossibility when grounds for one have not yet been established. It is impossible for a 3-million-man army to march along a single narrow road or track, and that to the best of my knowledge is the principle argument for discounting large Achaemenid armies. But very large groups of people like the Helvetii have migrated cross country without roads and lacking any sophisticated logistics system.
If the ground is reasonably flat (somewhat sloping is not a problem) and has been cleared of trees and undergrowth then one can march very wide. Assume an army of 3,5 million men split evenly between 3 avenues each 200 yards wide, with each man occupying a space of 2 x 2 yards, and you get 3 columns each 23.33 km or 15 miles long. This is hypothetical but doable. The columns don't necessarily all meet at the coast each evening but food can be sent to prearranged campsites beforehand. It would take careful planning and local knowledge of the terrain but it could be done without teetering on the edge of nearly impossible.
QuoteAssume an army of 3,5 million men split evenly between 3 avenues each 200 yards wide, with each man occupying a space of 2 x 2 yards, and you get 3 columns each 23.33 km or 15 miles long.
Without animals or baggage?
There isn't a great deal of point continuing because I suspect neither of us has the essential knowledge to either support or refute the theory. For example, what was the terrain like in Thrace/Northern Greece? Flat & open or wooded and hilly? Is it easy to find three campsites for 1 million people, animals and baggage with sufficient water every 10-15 miles in easy distance of beaches to allow the delivery of 3,500 tons of food and however many tons of fodder (about 10kg per horse)?
Google Earth is your friend. I did a virtual tour from the Dardanelles along the coast of Thrace and Macedonia as far as Kamena Vourla in Greece. It's only there that the first serious chokepoint appears, with mountains too high and steep to walk over. Along the Thracian and Macedonian coastline it's largely a breeze, with perhaps three chokepoints where the army would need to split and pass through several gaps in the hills. But nowhere was the traversable terrain less than 300m wide IMHO. I also checked the Drakensberg mountains as a reference where I've hiked. I honestly can't see the problem of a large army travelling in columns several hundred yards wide along the Aegean coastline with a couple of forays inland. You would need the clear the path of trees and undergrowth though (or even just undergrowth).
In the search for novelty, have we discussed this dissertation (http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/1740/00dissertation.pdf?)? Even if you don't agree with the author's conclusions, he does provide some interesting information.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 11, 2018, 02:16:21 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 01:54:49 PM
If it can be proven that the entire army had to march along a single track or narrow road then we can automatically rule out several million men right away (the column would be ridiculously long). But if it marches along several wide, roughly-cleared avenues then poo is not a primary consideration.
Patrick's theory assumes that the whole army is next to the coast on a daily basis. Doesn't this preclude "numerous roughly cleared avenues"? Also, how long would each of the sub-columns be? There is a paper on 17th century armies which concludes that an army of 60,000 men and its baggage would stretch 198km in single file. I think it would need to be something like 15 wide for the front to be reaching the new camp as the back left the old one. You are talking of an army 60 times this size. Ok, not entirely compatable - the persians are carrying much less food with them because they are resupplying daily - but it does provide a sense of proportion.
They would probably march about 100 men wide, hence needing a 300-600 yard front. Herodotus mentions that the Thracians out of awe refrained from farming the land Xerxes' army had used, which suggests it was quite a wide strip. One would not bother refraining from farming a swathe a mere 30 yards wide or so; well, one could, but it would just not be impressive enough to evoke a historic sense of awe.
We need to introduce another consideration, namely the army's own supply train and how much capacity it contained. Following Hannibal's camapgins in 217-216 BC in Polybius indicates that he resupplied his baggage train abotu once a week; this gives us a rule of thumb that a baggage train would carry about a week's supplies and that therefore Xerxes' army could go about a week without resupply. Looking at his advance to Thermopylae, he takes a detour inland through Macedon, and emerges on the coast near Thermopylae: duration, about a week, including a three-day stop to cut a way through a forest. So a one week capacity for the baggage train may be about right.
The question of fodder is one which Anthony is right to raise: would there be sufficient
in situ if the army kept moving, or if peoples along the route could be ordered to cut and stockpile it, or would it have to be fetched over from Asia? Jim might be able to help here with the keeping qualities of fodder and the challenge of moving it around. I am maybe a bit pessimistic and think the bring-in requirement would at least double the amount of shipping involved, and it is probably time to look at the capacity of the necesary shipping pipeline.
A shipping pipeline's capacity depends upon load carried over distance. Concerning the aforementioned grain-carriers, if we have sixty 50-tonners unloading on any given day we also have, or should have, sixty loading at the other end of the terminus. Crossing the Aegean would take how long? If three days, then we need a pipeline with five days' capacity, i.e. 5x60 = 300 ships. Double that, no, triple it to account for possible fodder required over and above locval availability and we need 900 ships to supply the army.
Xerxes had 3,000.
Anthony also raises the question of diet. Yes, two pounds of bread per day is not great for variety or overall nutrition, but this is a basic ration for a limited period (one campaign season) and if we add in the meat available from foundered baggage animals and from local hospitality in northern Greece then perhaps the men are not doing too badly. In any event it is not forever: at the end of the campaign they would be disbanded and go back to an even more boring diet back at home.
This raises the question of campaign length, an important consideration when stockpiling. Is there any reason to suppose Xerxes though he would be campaigning for more than 180 days from start to finish? He may even have been optimistic and thought everything would be over in 90 days. Let us say that he took the cautious option and stocked for 180: that makes about 540,000 tons of grain and whatever would have been deemed necessary for fodder.
540,000 tons sounds like a lot, but these days Kansas alone produces 10.8 million tons a year. What we are essentially looking at is whether the Persian Empire could move 135,000 tons of grain per year in preparation for this event. I do not see any problem: most movement would be done by water, in vessels of 50 or 100 ton capacity, requiring a maximum of 2,700 sailings over a year or 450 per safe-sailing month. Not, I would have thought, an insuperable burden for an Empire which can field 3,000 ships for the actual camapign. Even adding the same again for fodder leaves most of the ships free to do their thing suring the buildup period, i.e. a lot of slack capacity available.
So on the face of it, the logistics do not look too daunting.
Just sorting out the link for this dissertation (http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/1740/00dissertation.pdf?) for Anthony. (It needed an = between url and http.)
Mark Kindrachuk and yours truly discussed Maurice's paper, on which this seems to be based, extensively in the Lost Battles Yahoo group a few years ago. What emerged was that Maurice was estimating routes and logistics based on the Gallipoli penisnula and its environs in AD 1920 (following much distortion and depletion of the environment during World War 1) and not the conditions of 480 BC, making his work interesting but of very limited usefulness (a bit like doing a terrain analysis of the suitability of Flanders for mediaeval mounted combat based on the existing terrain directly after Passchendaele).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 11:45:33 AM
1. Growing food for 3 - 4 years should do the trick. The biblical account of Egypt storing food during seven years of plenty to be distributed during seven years of famine is IMHO founded on something factual: if nothing else the practical possibility of keeping grain from spoiling for several years. I suspect putting it in large rooms then sealing the rooms completely would work. Remember the grain found in Egyptian tombs after thousands of years? It was still edible.
there are a lot of legends about Egyptian grain. Virtually none of them true
https://www.howplantswork.com/2009/12/28/plant-mythbusters-1-seeds-from-ancient-egyptian-tombs-that-germinate/
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 11, 2018, 10:32:36 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 11:45:33 AM
1. Growing food for 3 - 4 years should do the trick. The biblical account of Egypt storing food during seven years of plenty to be distributed during seven years of famine is IMHO founded on something factual: if nothing else the practical possibility of keeping grain from spoiling for several years. I suspect putting it in large rooms then sealing the rooms completely would work. Remember the grain found in Egyptian tombs after thousands of years? It was still edible.
there are a lot of legends about Egyptian grain. Virtually none of them true
https://www.howplantswork.com/2009/12/28/plant-mythbusters-1-seeds-from-ancient-egyptian-tombs-that-germinate/
Germinate, unlikely. Edible, yes.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 12, 2018, 06:48:34 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 11, 2018, 10:32:36 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 11:45:33 AM
1. Growing food for 3 - 4 years should do the trick. The biblical account of Egypt storing food during seven years of plenty to be distributed during seven years of famine is IMHO founded on something factual: if nothing else the practical possibility of keeping grain from spoiling for several years. I suspect putting it in large rooms then sealing the rooms completely would work. Remember the grain found in Egyptian tombs after thousands of years? It was still edible.
there are a lot of legends about Egyptian grain. Virtually none of them true
https://www.howplantswork.com/2009/12/28/plant-mythbusters-1-seeds-from-ancient-egyptian-tombs-that-germinate/
Germinate, unlikely. Edible, yes.
The egyptian storage techniques largely depended on extreme dryness and keeping out rodents and insect pests
If you can download it https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1439-0418.1985.tb02787.x could be interesting but all I can read is the abstract
The problem is, to feed armies of the Empire, unless you're campaigning in Egypt, you're going to have to transport it out of Egypt and store it for several years in Asia minor.
Given you're transporting it in small boats, the grain is going to become more moist. Given these ships seem to have rarely carried more than a couple of hundred tons at this time, everywhere is going to be close to the water.
Similarly in Asia Minor, getting it dry again given the rainfall and temperatures of the areas you were storing it was going to be difficult.
If you want to know the sort of things you have to do to store grain in Europe now
https://cereals.ahdb.org.uk/media/189349/g13_the_grain_storage_guide_-_2nd_edition.pdf
QuoteSo on the face of it, the logistics do not look too daunting.
I'm glad you think so. Most people who have considered the problem seem to have thought otherwise.
On the Maurice stuff, do you have evidence of this massive, terrain shattering effect on WWI in northern Greece? The Gallipoli penninsular was heavily fought over some years before the research but was the war as intensive as Flanders on that front? Also, it should be noted that total devastation even on the Western Front was fairly confined - I suspect that this argument is a red herring. More interesting would be climate and land use change since Xerxes invasion. This would have an effect on the water supply, the amount of forest cover etc.
I'm glad we have re-instated the baggage train. Living from day to day would have been rather precarious. Sealift command now has some chance of co-ordinating its efforts into a series of jumps which ships can be tasked to go to as they leave Greece (you can only redirect them at the loading or unloading end). However, a one-week supply needs a huge train.
Water supply will continue to be a huge problem, both in absolute terms and access without fouling.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 11:45:33 AM
Could the Persian Empire logistically support an army several million strong?
No. This was debunked in the early 20th century?
Thanks for that, Jim.
Sadly none of these studies seem to consider the keeping qualities of grain stored in sealed amphorae, which would have been the usual manner of transport.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 12, 2018, 09:29:05 AM
On the Maurice stuff, do you have evidence of this massive, terrain shattering effect on WWI in northern Greece? The Gallipoli peninsula was heavily fought over some years before the research but was the war as intensive as Flanders on that front?
Just take a look at the road net on the Gallipoli peninsula c.1920, which was a leftover from the network supplying Turkish forward positions and batteries in 1915-16. Compare it with the road net today (where coincidentally the main route seems to follow exactly that of Xerxes). Note the differences.
Northern Greece was not seriously affected by 'terrain shattering' in WW1 - the terrain fought over was mainly shatter-proof mountains - but the road net was temporarily changed as instead of comunicating between Bulgaria and Greece it was diverted to serve positions on the frontier. This would not have had the same degree or nature of effect on Maurice's perceptions and conclusions as did the Gallipoli road net and the submergence of the plain of Doriscus in the intervening centuries. Lacking a present-day Doriscus and its environs, historians have come up with weird and wonderful locations for Xerxes' army and its route.
Quote
Also, it should be noted that total devastation even on the Western Front was fairly confined - I suspect that this argument is a red herring. More interesting would be climate and land use change since Xerxes invasion. This would have an effect on the water supply, the amount of forest cover etc.
Both are significant, in that Maurice seems to have been misled into assuming that the routes followed by Turkish ammunition supply parties in AD1915-16 would have been the route followed by Xerxes' army in 480 BC. Land use change is a valid point, as I suspect the replacement of Biblical-classical agriculture by Ottoman neglect and the rising of the western and eastern Aegean coastlines plus the gradual submergence of the northern Aegean coastline will have worked changes, those imposed by nature being perhaps greater than those inflicted by man. The essential point is that Maurice was not working from a 480 BC environment and we therefore cannot use his conclusions as proof of Persian army size.
QuoteI'm glad we have re-instated the baggage train.
Not sure we ever lost it, particularly considering its size, which would make it rather hard to lose. ;) We were just taking the topic one aspect at a time.
QuoteSealift command now has some chance of co-ordinating its efforts into a series of jumps which ships can be tasked to go to as they leave Greece (you can only redirect them at the loading or unloading end).
It looks as if such 'jumps' were planned, given that when the army reached Thermopylae the fleet was waiting for them.
QuoteHowever, a one-week supply needs a huge train.
Water supply will continue to be a huge problem, both in absolute terms and access without fouling.
These are the next two considerations. Water is the major limiting factor, and it is interesting to see what Herodotus says about this.
"When he had arrived at Therma, Xerxes quartered his army there. Its encampment by the sea covered all the space from Therma and the Mygdonian country to the rivers Lydias and Haliacmon, which unite their waters in one stream and so make the border between the Bottiaean and the Macedonian territory. In this place the foreigners lay encamped; of the rivers just mentioned, the Cheidorus, which flows from the Crestonaean country, was the only one which could not suffice for the army's drinking but was completely drained by it." - Herodotus VII.127
Access without fouling is a matter of discipline and organisation, but even fouled water is better than no water. The encamped Persian army seems to have spread itself along rivers where possible, maximising access and minimising mutual interference.
"That is the number of Xerxes' whole force. No one, however, can say what the exact number of cooking women, and concubines, and eunuchs was, nor can one determine the number of the beasts of draught and burden, and the Indian dogs which accompanied the host; so many of them were there. It is accordingly not surprising to me that some of the streams of water ran dry." -
idem VII.187
So the army was large enough to deplete some of the smaller Greek rivers, not necessarily of every last drop, but to the point where the flow effectively stopped. Drinking rivers dry is not a regular occurrence.
The baggage train is harder to assess without a good idea of individual animal carrying capacity and food and water requirements (e.g. how much water does a camel need in northern Greece?). We can however make some very approximate estimates. The Wikipedia section on animal loads mentions 330-800 lbs for mules and c.660 lbs for camels. If we take c.500 lbs per animal we are probably on the safe side, although we should bear in mind bulk as well as weight.
Having earlier roughed out the total daily food requirement for Xerxes' army as around 3,000 tons, one week's supply would be around 21,000 tons. Allowing five animals to carry a ton, that makes 105,000 baggage animals to serve 3.4 million humans, 80,000 horses and themselves for the stated period of time. We should perhaps add meat on the hoof, assuming the issue of a meat ration once per week (no evidence for or against this, but let us add it in anyway). The Greek rule of thumb was that one ox serves 50 men, so to feed 1.7 million (the issue presumably being restricted to fighting men) it would take 34,000 oxen to provide the proposed weekly meat serving. These totals for animals are surprisingly modest, considering the army size (and if my assumptions and/or calculations are in error someone will doubtless point it out). Adding in a full fodder estimate triples the number of baggage animals to 315,000 or so, a massive train but not impractical for an army used to this sort of thing.
The logistics are actually looking remarkably practicable. Huge, requiring a lot of organisation and coordination, but practicable.
Quote from: Dangun on April 12, 2018, 09:30:31 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 11, 2018, 11:45:33 AM
Could the Persian Empire logistically support an army several million strong?
No. This was debunked in the early 20th century?
Not debunked; rather utterly mishandled by writers thinking in terms of 18th century supply depots. Hence we need a fresh look at the subject, going back to basics.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 12, 2018, 11:12:31 AM
Thanks for that, Jim.
Sadly none of these studies seem to consider the keeping qualities of grain stored in sealed amphorae, which would have been the usual manner of transport.
Not really, to quote The logistics of the roman army at war 264BC to AD 235
Under ancient conditionsm, grain could be stored in three ways, 1 piling it directly onto the floor, 2 confining it in bins or 3, stacking in bags or sacks. Heaping up the grain used all the space in the granary but made it difficult to rotate the old and new stock. If one stored frain in timber bins the loss of storage area is quite significant, around 30% and no evidence of such bins is found in excavated sites. Storing grain in sacks would have been the most practical and convenient method, particularly from the army's perspective. Although there is about a 15% loss of storage space if grain is stored in sacks, the turnover of stock is much easier. In addition the space between the sacks facilitates the dissipation of water vapour and heat and keeps the grain cooler and drier.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 11, 2018, 08:19:08 PMWhat emerged was that Maurice was estimating routes and logistics based on the Gallipoli penisnula and its environs in AD 1920 (following much distortion and depletion of the environment during World War 1) and not the conditions of 480 BC, making his work interesting but of very limited usefulness
I think this is a misrepresentation of Maurice (1930)'s argument, and I apologise if I have said this in another thread. But...
He gave a long list of reasons why the Herodotus number is not credible. A few of which are:
10. He discusses the area required for an army to camp, using modern examples, and compares it to the historical area available for the Persians to camp in.
11. He discusses the very interesting issue of water distribution - and camps are limited in size by the requirement of troops to be able to walk from the centre of the camp to a water source and back within a day, if the camp is to be sustainable
20. He discusses the volume of water required per day, again using modern examples, and the lack of sufficient sources
21. He discusses the available water sources and the feasible rates of water capture including the issues of waste and fouling
24. He discusses the longest stretches of the Persian march across which water must be carried, again limiting the size of an army (this is also discussed at length in the excellent Engels, 1976, re: Alexander)
25. Maurice discusses the bottle necks on route and the maximum width of the march column, and very interestingly the knock-on effects of pack animals checking up hill and the stress this puts on infrastructure
35 & 38. Maurice discusses the spacial problems of column length
40. Maurice discusses the timing issues, leaving and arriving, whilst also accomodating breaks of very large troop masses
42. Maurice discusses the limiting factor of bridge crossing speed
He also goes in to all sorts of details about port location, coastal access, defiles etc. etc.
Any one of his arguments can be disputed and his assessment of the route can be disputed. But his arguments are in aggregate extensive and I think reasonable in structure. Very few of his arguments are impacted by the changing vegetation of the region.
At the end of the day, to believe the Herodotus number, we are accepting as fact a troop mobilization so large that it would not be repeated for another 2400 years, and when it was in 1914, it made extensive use of rail, modern manufacturing and a smattering of combustion engines. Germany in 1914 was worried about "squeezing" 625,000 men through a 19km gap when entering Belgium.
I am happy to send anyone a PDF copy of Maurice (1930) if you like, its widely available, and off copyright.
Talking of pdfs, and remembering the need to introduce novelty, have we had this article (https://www.academia.edu/4251336/Achaemenid_arithmetic_numerical_problems_in_Persian_history) before? A warning though - it is scanned upside downand backwards. You will need to print and reassemble it.
Quote from: Dangun on April 12, 2018, 01:24:24 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 11, 2018, 08:19:08 PMWhat emerged was that Maurice was estimating routes and logistics based on the Gallipoli penisnula and its environs in AD 1920 (following much distortion and depletion of the environment during World War 1) and not the conditions of 480 BC, making his work interesting but of very limited usefulness
I think this is a misrepresentation of Maurice (1930)'s argument, and I apologise if I have said this in another thread. But...
He gave a long list of reasons why the Herodotus number is not credible. A few of which are:
10. He discusses the area required for an army to camp, using modern examples, and compares it to the historical area available for the Persians to camp in.
11. He discusses the very interesting issue of water distribution - and camps are limited in size by the requirement of troops to be able to walk from the centre of the camp to a water source and back within a day, if the camp is to be sustainable
20. He discusses the volume of water required per day, again using modern examples, and the lack of sufficient sources
21. He discusses the available water sources and the feasible rates of water capture including the issues of waste and fouling
24. He discusses the longest stretches of the Persian march across which water must be carried, again limiting the size of an army (this is also discussed at length in the excellent Engels, 1976, re: Alexander)
25. Maurice discusses the bottle necks on route and the maximum width of the march column, and very interestingly the knock-on effects of pack animals checking up hill and the stress this puts on infrastructure
35 & 38. Maurice discusses the spacial problems of column length
40. Maurice discusses the timing issues, leaving and arriving, whilst also accomodating breaks of very large troop masses
42. Maurice discusses the limiting factor of bridge crossing speed
He also goes in to all sorts of details about port location, coastal access, defiles etc. etc.
Any one of his arguments can be disputed and his assessment of the route can be disputed. But his arguments are in aggregate extensive and I think reasonable in structure. Very few of his arguments are impacted by the changing vegetation of the region.
At the end of the day, to believe the Herodotus number, we are accepting as fact a troop mobilization so large that it would not be repeated for another 2400 years, and when it was in 1914, it made extensive use of rail, the combustion engine, modern manufacturing and a smattering of combustion engines. Germany in 1914 was worried about "squeezing" 625,000 men through a 19km gap when entering Belgium.
I am happy to send anyone a PDF copy of Maurice (1930) if you like, its widely available, and off copyright.
I'd be interested. justinswanton@gmail.com
QuoteThe logistics are actually looking remarkably practicable. Huge, requiring a lot of organisation and coordination, but practicable.
I think this is one of those times Jim calls "hand wavium". Just because you can multiply up the figures doesn't make them practicable, it just makes them visualisable.
There are many practical issues with the idea of an army of 3.4 million men and 315,000 animals operating effectively in the campaign area. Aaron lists many of them, which can't really be just dismissed by the fact that the road grid was different in the 1920s.
I suspect we can't dismiss all the works on estimating the size of the Persian army done in the last 100 or so years as "mishandling" the evidence.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 12, 2018, 03:51:29 PM
QuoteThe logistics are actually looking remarkably practicable. Huge, requiring a lot of organisation and coordination, but practicable.
Just because you can multiply up the figures doesn't make them practicable, it just makes them visualisable.
Which brings us to the question of practicability. What actually makes large numbers impracticable?
QuoteThere are many practical issues with the idea of an army of 3.4 million men and 315,000 animals operating effectively in the campaign area. Aaron lists many of them, which can't really be just dismissed by the fact that the road grid was different in the 1920s.
Actually it is Nicholas, not Aaron, but I am sure he will forgive you. ;) I have a copy of Maurice's work buried somewhere in my files, and remember being less than impressed with his British Army staff calculations - as was T E Lawrence when some very similar staff figures were used to plan a raid by his Arab forces; he introduced modifications based on practical experience and slashed the logistical requirement to about a third of the calculated figure.
Maurice seems to assume that Xerxes' army had the establishment, scale of equipment and practices of a First World War army. This is not an encouraging starting-point, and his use of early 20th century road nets is less helpful still. The geographic changes since 480 BC will also have had an impact, though in which direction is not immediately evident, but what is evident is that part of Xerxes' route through the Thracian coastal plain has been lost to the sea, which renders inoperative many of Maurice's march and hydraulic calculations. I cannot claim to have correct figures myself, but we should be aware that Maurice's are in error by a couple of millennia.
QuoteI suspect we can't dismiss all the works on estimating the size of the Persian army done in the last 100 or so years as "mishandling" the evidence.
Perhaps not. But any based on an 18th century depot system and associated calculations can safely be disregarded.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 12, 2018, 03:23:58 PM
I'd be interested. justinswanton@gmail.com
Will send it tonight. Sadly can't send attachments from work.
Quote from: Dangun on April 13, 2018, 06:04:21 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 12, 2018, 03:23:58 PM
I'd be interested. justinswanton@gmail.com
Will send it tonight. Sadly can't send attachments from work.
I'd be interested as well, jwebster2@btconnect.com
But if it's out of copyright could you just attach the pdf to the thread?
Quote from: Dangun on April 12, 2018, 01:24:24 PM
I am happy to send anyone a PDF copy of Maurice (1930) if you like, its widely available, and off copyright.
I'd be happy for a copy too :)
andreasj at gmail dot com
Quote from: Erpingham on April 12, 2018, 02:43:08 PM
Talking of pdfs, and remembering the need to introduce novelty, have we had this article (https://www.academia.edu/4251336/Achaemenid_arithmetic_numerical_problems_in_Persian_history) before? A warning though - it is scanned upside downand backwards. You will need to print and reassemble it.
Many pdf readers can helpfully rotate the view for you :)
The point about road grids is I suspect a bit misleading. If a Persian army of 3,4 million men was going to march through Thrace and Macedonian and into Greece, it couldn't use roads. It had to march cross-country, in several columns a hundred or more abreast or one column several hundred abreast, if it was to move from campsite to campsite in a single day.
I don't see any real problem with this until one reaches serious mountains. If the Persians spent several years in preparation, going as far as to dig a canal so their fleet wouldn't have to risk a storm, then they would surely have been able to clear a broad, rough avenue - trees and undergrowth gone, rocky obstacles cleared away if they couldn't be gone around. Not real roads of course. My little virtual journey in Google Earth didn't reveal any serious obstacles to broad avenues before reaching Greece proper. Sure, there would have been a fair bit of hiking over hills without the benefit of beaten tracks (I've done it - not much fun) but nothing unduly onerous. The supply wagons would of course get the best ground going through chokepoints.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 13, 2018, 07:52:42 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 12, 2018, 02:43:08 PM
Talking of pdfs, and remembering the need to introduce novelty, have we had this article (https://www.academia.edu/4251336/Achaemenid_arithmetic_numerical_problems_in_Persian_history) before? A warning though - it is scanned upside downand backwards. You will need to print and reassemble it.
Many pdf readers can helpfully rotate the view for you :)
But strangely couldn't in this case. They also can't reverse the page order (unless you have the expensive paid-for ones)
As Justin indicates, back then armies did not march along roads for the simple reason there were no roads as we understand them except for the Royal Persian Highway, a comparatively narrow paved track used by galloping messengers. Armies used routes. This meant they travelled along a much wider frontage than Maurice's column of fours, and they often followed established transit lanes regularly tramped by merchants, livestock etc.
Choke points such as mountain passes were another matter. Assyrian procedure was to get the wheeled transport up the pass while the troops themselves scaled the more accessible parts of the mountains (a bit like Spartan armies habitually climbing Mount Cithaeron). I am not sure what approach the Achaemenids adopted but the Assyrian procedure was probably not unknown to them. Medes and Mesopotamians had been moving armies through mountainous areas more or less since Medes were invented.
This way of doing things would bring them past the chokepoint rather more rapidly than 20th century calculations, which assume everything tramps through the pass, will allow.
The degree of preparation for crossing such chokepoints is also significant. Most literature I have seen on the subject seems to assume that the Achaemenid army would be encountering new and unknown terrain and traversing it the hard way. In practice, the Persians had ample opportunity to spy out the land beforehand: remember all those ambassadors criss-crossing Greece demanding earth and water? (The Spartans put theirs into a well and told them to take as much as they liked.) They would have had ample opportunity to note routes, geography and potential holdups, and the transit of the Persian army from Doriscus to Thermopylae looks remarkably well planned, including felling their way through part of Macedonia and still arriving on time.
I'm just in awe of the sanitary arrangements. On average an adult produces 2.2 lbs (0.998kg) of urine and 0.5 lbs (0.227 kg) of fecal matter a day. That's nearly a thousand tons of urine per million men and about 230 tons fecal matter.Then the livestock would produce more.
At the choke points (the bridge for example) everybody would have to follow much the same road
It apparently took the army seven days and seven nights to cross the bridge, so more normal choke points probably didn't have night marching so perhaps 14 days. But it means that each camp site and days march would get perhaps 14,000 tons of urine and 3200 tons of fecal matter.
Now some would be spread along the road, depending on how strong march discipline was.
But I'd guess that we'd probably still be able to detect the armies passing by the soil fertility 8)
After all they've found traces of Hannibal's army in a peat bog in the Alps.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 10:25:56 AM
I'm just in awe of the sanitary arrangements. On average an adult produces 2.2 lbs (0.998kg) of urine and 0.5 lbs (0.227 kg) of fecal matter a day. That's nearly a thousand tons of urine per million men and about 230 tons fecal matter.Then the livestock would produce more.
If the army is divided and laterally spread out so the column length(s) are no longer than those of a regularly sized army then the sanitation problems are no worse than for the 'regular' army.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 10:25:56 AMAt the choke points (the bridge for example) everybody would have to follow much the same road
It apparently took the army seven days and seven nights to cross the bridge, so more normal choke points probably didn't have night marching so perhaps 14 days. But it means that each camp site and days march would get perhaps 14,000 tons of urine and 3200 tons of fecal matter.
The bridge over the Hellespont was the only true single chokepoint of the entire expedition. Other chokepoints all the way to Greece proper were not formidable - they could be crossed by men on either side of the chokepoint pass whilst wagons passed through the middle, and the army could (and did) divide into several columns so only a fraction had to pass through any single chokepoint.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 10:25:56 AMNow some would be spread along the road, depending on how strong march discipline was.
But I'd guess that we'd probably still be able to detect the armies passing by the soil fertility 8)
After all they've found traces of Hannibal's army in a peat bog in the Alps.
Has anyone looked for traces of the Persian passage through Thrace and Macedonia?
We seem to be drifting into a "A Persian Army could traverse difficult terrain therefore it was 3,500,000 strong" argument. I don't think anyone denies the historicity of the army carrying out its march.
As to whether staff officers calculations are correct, we should perhaps recall they had moved horse-powered armies in the field and we have not. So, yes, they will fall into the trap of thinking that the way they were taught is the only way to do it. But to them, it wasn't just multiplying numbers on pieces of paper - they actually moved large bodies of soldiers. And suggesting TE Lawrence could move armies with 1/3 the supplies doesn't entirely help when the proposed army is ten to twenty times that which these dismissed professionals thought plausible.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 13, 2018, 10:42:57 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 10:25:56 AM
I'm just in awe of the sanitary arrangements. On average an adult produces 2.2 lbs (0.998kg) of urine and 0.5 lbs (0.227 kg) of fecal matter a day. That's nearly a thousand tons of urine per million men and about 230 tons fecal matter.Then the livestock would produce more.
If the army is divided and laterally spread out so the column length(s) are no longer than those of a regularly sized army then the sanitation problems are no worse than for the 'regular' army.
Perhaps then you can give us an example of a regular army that put 1.8 million men, plus perhaps two or three times that number of camp followers plus however many hundreds of thousands of head of livestock across a single bridge in a seven day period?
I am beginning to wonder if this is not a prolonged April fool.
We have parties who to profess to a faith position on the accuracy of ancient texts calling for evidential proof that the texts are right, and then dismissing any evidential proof that demonstrates doubt / proof of impossibility.
And the basis for the dismissal essentially boils down to a refusal to accept any evidence that is more recent than the ancient texts or is itself not an ancient text , or something modern that supports their faith position.
Deeply ironic.
No yellow image needed
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 12:25:05 PM
Perhaps then you can give us an example of a regular army that put 1.8 million men, plus perhaps two or three times that number of camp followers plus however many hundreds of thousands of head of livestock across a single bridge in a seven day period?
Two bridges, be fair - one for the 1.8 million men, the other for the camp followers, livestock, etc. 50% less impossible :)
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 13, 2018, 12:57:30 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 12:25:05 PM
Perhaps then you can give us an example of a regular army that put 1.8 million men, plus perhaps two or three times that number of camp followers plus however many hundreds of thousands of head of livestock across a single bridge in a seven day period?
Two bridges, be fair - one for the 1.8 million men, the other for the camp followers, livestock, etc. 50% less impossible :)
Having spent a lifetime working with livestock I suspect I'm one of the few society members who has had to deal with 230 tons fecal matter.
I remember explaining to somebody just how you had to use a tractor mounted stirrer to break the crust on a slurry pit and get it properly stirred up.
As I was telling him what sounds to listen out for, I realised I have an awfully specialist skill set, some of which is probably nontransferable :-[
I love the matter-of-fact tone of this
A 1,000 pound horse will defecate approximately four to thirteen times each day and produce approximately nine tons of manure per year. The 1,000 pound horse will produce, on the average, 37 pounds of feces and 2.4 gallons of urine daily, which totals about 50 pounds of raw waste per day in feces and urine combined.
These are modern US figures but I doubt horse biology has changed that much.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 01:47:44 PM
I love the matter-of-fact tone of this
A 1,000 pound horse will defecate approximately four to thirteen times each day and produce approximately nine tons of manure per year. The 1,000 pound horse will produce, on the average, 37 pounds of feces and 2.4 gallons of urine daily, which totals about 50 pounds of raw waste per day in feces and urine combined.
These are modern US figures but I doubt horse biology has changed that much.
Presumably Achaemenid horses were a bit smaller and produced a bit less waste. I find myself wondering if smaller horses makes for a better or worse carrying capacity / waste production ratio ...
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 13, 2018, 01:52:01 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 01:47:44 PM
I love the matter-of-fact tone of this
A 1,000 pound horse will defecate approximately four to thirteen times each day and produce approximately nine tons of manure per year. The 1,000 pound horse will produce, on the average, 37 pounds of feces and 2.4 gallons of urine daily, which totals about 50 pounds of raw waste per day in feces and urine combined.
These are modern US figures but I doubt horse biology has changed that much.
Presumably Achaemenid horses were a bit smaller and produced a bit less waste. I find myself wondering if smaller horses makes for a better or worse carrying capacity / waste production ratio ...
Not necessarily. According to modern figures on the internet, a 1000lb/450 kg horse would be between 14-15 hands. Not a big horse. But I don't know how big Persian cavalry horses were.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 02:16:42 PMAccording to modern figures on the internet, a 1000lb/450 kg horse would be between 14-15 hands. Not a big horse. But I don't know how big Persian cavalry horses were.
Estimates vary. One (https://www.academia.edu/3503343/M._Gabrielli_Le_cheval_dans_lempire_ach%C3%A9m%C3%A9nide_2006_Istanbul) is:
QuoteLes Néséens devaientmesurer au moins 148 cm pour un poids minimum de 380 kg.
The various non-Nisaeans in the force might be smaller.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 12:25:05 PM
Perhaps then you can give us an example of a regular army that put 1.8 million men, plus perhaps two or three times that number of camp followers plus however many hundreds of thousands of head of livestock across a single bridge in a seven day period?
According to this site (http://web.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/French_invasion_of_Russia), Napoleon managed to cross a force of 120,000 across the Nieman in a day. He had three bridges and they were shorter but probably narrower. Obviously, not strictly compatable but shows the scale of efficiency superiority the Persians need to have over more modern forces to sustain the "mega-army" thesis.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 02:47:14 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 12:25:05 PM
Perhaps then you can give us an example of a regular army that put 1.8 million men, plus perhaps two or three times that number of camp followers plus however many hundreds of thousands of head of livestock across a single bridge in a seven day period?
According to this site (http://web.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/French_invasion_of_Russia), Napoleon managed to cross a force of 120,000 across the Nieman in a day. He had three bridges and they were shorter but probably narrower. Obviously, not strictly compatable but shows the scale of efficiency superiority the Persians need to have over more modern forces to sustain the "mega-army" thesis.
The article doesn't actually state how long it took for the 120 000 men to cross the Niemen, just that they used three pontoon bridges and were reviewed by Napoleon as they crossed. That suggests that it was a daylight operation. If they were split into 3 groups each with 40 000 men and marched 4 men wide, and each man occupied an intermediate order space of 1 square yard, their columns would be 10 000 yards long which implies that marching at 4km/h they could clear the bridges in less than 3 hours.
So let's do some more sums. 40 000 men marching 4 wide cross a narrow bridge in 3 hours. Assume a bridge somewhat less wide than a trireme's length - say 30 yards. The men march in a column 30 men wide. Let's make it 20 men wide. 40 000 men will pass a given point on the bridge after half an hour. In a 24hr day 1 920 000 men will cross the bridge. In 7 days 13 440 000 will cross it. One can only conclude the Persians were remarkably inefficient about the exercise.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 09:22:52 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 13, 2018, 07:52:42 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 12, 2018, 02:43:08 PM
Talking of pdfs, and remembering the need to introduce novelty, have we had this article (https://www.academia.edu/4251336/Achaemenid_arithmetic_numerical_problems_in_Persian_history) before? A warning though - it is scanned upside downand backwards. You will need to print and reassemble it.
Many pdf readers can helpfully rotate the view for you :)
But strangely couldn't in this case. They also can't reverse the page order (unless you have the expensive paid-for ones)
Happily, my employers have blessed me with a pdf editor of such surpassing powers that I can rotate the pages even in this case. Anyone wanting a correctly oriented copy can drop me an email at the aforementioned address: andreasj at gmail dot com
(No promises re page order: the original file shows as in the right order to me, so I can't tell if whatever made them show up in the wrong one for you will be fixed in my file.)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 13, 2018, 03:27:06 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 02:47:14 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 12:25:05 PM
Perhaps then you can give us an example of a regular army that put 1.8 million men, plus perhaps two or three times that number of camp followers plus however many hundreds of thousands of head of livestock across a single bridge in a seven day period?
According to this site (http://web.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/French_invasion_of_Russia), Napoleon managed to cross a force of 120,000 across the Nieman in a day. He had three bridges and they were shorter but probably narrower. Obviously, not strictly compatable but shows the scale of efficiency superiority the Persians need to have over more modern forces to sustain the "mega-army" thesis.
The article doesn't actually state how long it took for the 120 000 men to cross the Niemen, just that they used three pontoon bridges and were reviewed by Napoleon as they crossed.
"The invasion commenced on June 24, 1812. ..... The center of mass of French forces focused on Kovno and the crossings were made by the French Guard, I, II, and III corps amounting to some 120,000 at this point of crossing alone. The actual crossings were made in the area of Alexioten where three pontoon bridges were constructed. The sites had been selected by Napoleon in person. Napoleon had a tent raised and he watched and reviewed troops as they crossed the Niemen."
"June 25 found Napoleon's group past the bridge head with Ney's command approaching the existing crossings at Alexioten."
Napoleon's group is the one that crossed at Alexioten. One day after starting, they are on the other side of the river. Ergo, it took them a day to form up, cross, reform and move out beyond the bridgehead. However, I know very little about Napoleonics and it may be that less than 120,000 crossed on that first day. I can't see it being more from the text given. It is possible they didn't get all their logistic train across, based on
"They were plagued from the outset as logistics trains simply could not keep up with the forced marches of the corps and rear formations always suffered the worst privations."
QuoteSo let's do some more sums.
We have a lot of sums but we tend to disagree whether they mean much. To me, the sums we have add up to the impossibility of taking Herodotus literally. To others, they show how plausible the literal interpretation is. Perhaps stepping back and placing the action in the continuum of known military capacity would be more fruitful? What sorts of sizes of expeditionary forces using naval logistics and similar technological level are we aware of?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 04:26:31 PM"The invasion commenced on June 24, 1812. ..... The center of mass of French forces focused on Kovno and the crossings were made by the French Guard, I, II, and III corps amounting to some 120,000 at this point of crossing alone. The actual crossings were made in the area of Alexioten where three pontoon bridges were constructed. The sites had been selected by Napoleon in person. Napoleon had a tent raised and he watched and reviewed troops as they crossed the Niemen."
If the invasion started on June 24th then one needs to factor in the time to construct the pontoon bridges as that would mean troops crossing over to the Russian side of the Niemen. The Nieman at the point of invasion is about 100m wide. Building three pontoon bridges capable of carrying not only men but also horses, cannons and wagons, would have taken some time. That leaves not so many daylight hours for the men to cross, and, looking the numbers (and numbers do mean something) the men needed only a few hours anyway.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 04:26:31 PMWe have a lot of sums but we tend to disagree whether they mean much. To me, the sums we have add up to the impossibility of taking Herodotus literally.
How so?
Quote
If the invasion started on June 24th then one needs to factor in the time to construct the pontoon bridges as that would mean troops crossing over to the Russian side of the Niemen. The Nieman at the point of invasion is about 100m wide. Building three pontoon bridges capable of carrying not only men but also horses, cannons and wagons, would have taken some time.
I have to confess I'd assumed the bridges were constructed prior to the start of the advance. To do otherwise would be a bit of an "It's a Knockout" sort of competition, wouldn't it?
Quote
That leaves not so many daylight hours for the men to cross, and, looking the numbers (and numbers do mean something) the men needed only a few hours anyway.
I think this reflects the difference between us. To me, if 100,000 took a day to cross a river, there was a practical reason for that. Plenty of opportunity for "Hurry up and wait" , for example, and many small things that add up to the friction of a military operation (yes, I know you don't believe in friction, but Clausewitz actually fought in this campaign). I don't think we are dealing with a three continuous streams of 37,000 close packed troops, so paper calculations of how long they would take to pass a bridge at a constant speed are a bit irrelevant to me.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 04:26:31 PMWe have a lot of sums but we tend to disagree whether they mean much. To me, the sums we have add up to the impossibility of taking Herodotus literally.
How so?
I'd be in danger of breaking the 1000 repeats rule :) Put simply, I put a much greater weight on the problems of logistics, particularly issues like "over the beach" supply with small ships, the small buffer that a maximum one week supply baggage train gives when operating at the end of a long nautical supply chain, the capacity of that supply chain to actually deliver given the technology and the variable weather, the viability of marching in dense blocks nose to tail for 15km a day through basically unprepared ground churned up and defecated on, whether they really could find fuel for and prepare food for that large a number, water management, feeding the animals and keeping them fit. There are other issues around failure to look at sources critically and the perspective of other examples in military history. Is that enough?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 05:22:13 PM
I'd be in danger of breaking the 1000 repeats rule :) Put simply, I put a much greater weight on the problems of logistics, particularly issues like "over the beach" supply with small ships, the small buffer than a maximum one week supply baggage train gives when operating at the end of a long nautical supply chain, the capacity of that supply chain to actually deliver given the technology and the variable weather, the viability of marching in dense blocks nose to tail for 15km a day through basically unprepared ground churned up and defecated on, whether they really could find fuel for and prepare food for that large a number, water management, feading the animals and keeping them fit. There are other issues around failure to look at sources critically and the perspective of other examples in military history. Is that enough?
it is for me :)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 05:22:13 PMPut simply, I put a much greater weight on the problems of logistics, particularly issues like "over the beach" supply with small ships, the small buffer that a maximum one week supply baggage train gives when operating at the end of a long nautical supply chain, the capacity of that supply chain to actually deliver given the technology and the variable weather, the viability of marching in dense blocks nose to tail for 15km a day through basically unprepared ground churned up and defecated on, whether they really could find fuel for and prepare food for that large a number, water management, feeding the animals and keeping them fit. There are other issues around failure to look at sources critically and the perspective of other examples in military history. Is that enough?
We can leave it at that if you wish. The numbers tell me that the logistical capacity was theoretically more than enough to support such an army. I would accept it was not enough only if some demonstrable causes impeding its operation could be proven to exist. The leeway for friction is certainly there: theoretically 800 ships were enough to get one kilogram of grain per day to each man, and Xerxes had 3000 ships. One day, possibly two days, would be enough to get the entire army across the Hellespont, and seven days are allotted to the operation. Friction is factored in. So one needs some other obstacle. Thus far the main potential obstacles brought forward are:
| 1. Not enough food or water. |
Not conclusively proven. All the concrete evidence thus far says there was enough of both. The fleet was large enough, the time to gather the food long enough. This leads to the next argument:
The entire economy of Antiquity was substantially built around growing, storing and moving grain. Grain is harvested only once a year, perhaps twice in some areas. Hence it has to last up to 12 months to the next harvest. It also has to be moved sometimes considerable distances to the larger urban areas and - this point is important - it has to last long enough to supply an army on campaign no matter how large or small that army is. If the Achaemenids could do it for 200 000 men they could do it for 2 000 000.
The most frequent objection in this thread (!). It forgets that 3 400 000 men and 80 000 horses
et al don't all march along the same three-yard-wide track.
| 4. Roads too few and narrow. |
Irrelevant if one posits the army didn't use roads.
Yep.
| 6. Lettered academics don't agree. |
Yep.
Yep (couldn't resist including this one. I did try).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 13, 2018, 05:52:36 PM
The entire economy of Antiquity was substantially built around growing, storing and moving grain. Grain is harvested only once a year, perhaps twice in some areas. Hence it has to last up to 12 months to the next harvest.
Storing grain for the rest of the year to the next harvest was possible with a little care.
The problem is people talking of stockpiling it for several years. That is an entirely different issue
This is symptomatic of the debate. Hard questions are answered with vague answers like "The most frequent objection in this thread (!). It forgets that 3 400 000 and 80 000 horses et al don't all march along the same three-yard-wide track."
Strangely enough I'd realised that, but given the terrain, and the choke points, for example the Bosporus, or when the army gathered at Thermopylae vague assertions that the army split into separate columns don't cut the mustard
QuoteThus far the main potential obstacles brought forward are:
You decided to ignore mine then ? :)
Trying to avoid tit for tat (what are we, diplomats?) but
Not enough food or water.It's not just about paper calculations of quantities, its about stuff like supply chains, distribution, water management, food preparation, transporting fodder (its very bulky for its weight). I won't repeat again.
Too much poo.Like a mighty army
Moves the Persian host;
Brothers, we are treading
Where the horse have trod.Apologies to Sabine Baring-Gould
Roads too few and narrow.Has anyone raised this?
Lettered academics don't agree.Nor do professional soldiers. If you think such persons are always wrong, this is fuel to your argument. If you think they usually have a point, it's evidence in the other direction. This is one of those meta-questions about how we view historical events on this forum, which is fundamental to many of our disputes.
Patrick said it.It's not Patrick saying it per se, more his approach to history is unorthodox and leads to clashes with the more orthodox majority. Again a meta-issue, not confined to this subject.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 05:22:13 PM
I'd be in danger of breaking the 1000 repeats rule :) Put simply, I put a much greater weight on the problems of logistics, particularly issues like "over the beach" supply with small ships, the small buffer that a maximum one week supply baggage train gives when operating at the end of a long nautical supply chain, the capacity of that supply chain to actually deliver given the technology and the variable weather, the viability of marching in dense blocks nose to tail for 15km a day through basically unprepared ground churned up and defecated on, whether they really could find fuel for and prepare food for that large a number, water management, feeding the animals and keeping them fit. There are other issues around failure to look at sources critically and the perspective of other examples in military history. Is that enough?
I shall watch for fascinating explanations along these lines of why Mogul armies were unable to operate in India. ;)
Before looking at Anthony's reservations, let us examine Xerxes' Hellespont crossing. The 'bridges' were triremes and pentekonters laid side to side with a roadway laid over them (it would realy help if people who want to discuss the matter actually read the source beforehand). A trireme was about 120 feet long, a pentekonter not much less. Of this, I estimate about 100 feet would be usable as roadway width, given the erection of a hoarding on each side of the road to avoid the animals being spooked by the unfamiliar sight of water everywhere.
100 feet of width allows about 16 men to cross abreast, assuming 6' per man. This may be an over-generous estimate, but it gives us a useful minimum for the number of men who can cross abreast.
Allow the column to move at 1.5 mph - half normal walking speed - to allow for gaps between units and an element of 'hurry up and wait'. Herodotus notes the army crossed continually day and night 'under the lash', which indicates measures having been taken to expedite travel. 1.5 mph may thus be a conservative estimate.
Given 6' depth per man on the march, 1,320 men x 16 abreast would pass a given point each hour, or 21,220 men. Say 20,00 because the Achamenids were fond of blocks of 10,000 men.
In 24 hours, 24x20,000 or 480,000 men, close to half a million, will have crossed.
The entire army of 1.7 million could thus be across in four days and nights. Herodotus has the crossing take seven days and nights. The Hellespont bridge starts to look like a very effective crossing whose potential was not fully exploited, in that in the time available another 1.3 million men could have crossed. In practice, the difference might be ascribable to making special preparations to lead across cavalry and chariot horses and periodically maintaining the earth-and-branches-over-timber crossing surface.
Now let us consider Anthony's other concerns.
Food and water.As Anthony points out, managing huge quantities of resources requires specialist skills. I would suggest that as the Achaemenid Empire existed at the terminus of an era in which according to al our primary sources huge armies were the norm and are recorded as campaigning sometimes for considerable distances, often through very unpromising terrain (e.g. Assyrian campaings against Urartu), that such skills not only existed but were part and parcel of Achamenid repertoire.
The biggest challenge would be watering enormous numbers of baggage animals at the end of each day. From earlier posts, it seems some people envisage a mad scramble by herds of bellowing creatures down riverbanks and into muddy water, perhaps dropping digestive products on the way. But why do things the hard way when the animals can be lined up and channels dug from the water source to the animals, an arrangement which also makes the animals easier to feed and incidentally leaves relatively tidy rows of fertiliser behind for the local farmers once the army leaves?
How matters are organised is a very important consideration. If men are camped along a river in depth and channels dug (in advance by pioneer forces if need be) for them, water distribution is much more efficient and hygienic than if everyone rushes to the river and stomps around filling their waterskins. By in effect creating a miniature hydraulic distribution system at every halt one can handle available water supplies much more efficiently than by leaving it to the men to sort themselves out. But how many studies have examined this aspect? As far as I know, none.
FuelProbably the least of the challenges. Manpower for woodcutting parties would be abundant, and northern Greece was fairly well wooded. Making sure the wood went where it was wanted when it was wanted would be the main concern, one readily obviated by having the woodcutters mainly work ahead of the army. The humans prepare their own food; the animals have theirs distributed, which probably involves the major work effort of the day. At least food for animals does not need to be cooked; humans cook their own food.
Supply chainThe major gripe here, judging by past coversations, would seem to be unloading over the beaches. I do not see this as a major difficulty except in inclement weather, in which event everything would come to a halt and the shipping would be endangered (as indeed happened). The Mediterranean is effectively tideless, which means a daylight-wide unloading 'window' as opposed to the few hours around high tide customary elsewhere. Mediterranean shipping, as used by the Achaemenids, was optimised for conditions, including unloading, in the Mediterranean. Hence their unloading (and loading) capacity was probably much higher then we envisage.
Having unloaded a ship, the resultant supplies are of little use unless picked up and distributed by a beach and land supply organisation. The principal emphasis here would be on restocking the baggage train, swifter and more efficient than attempting to distribute supplies directly to troops. Those concerned would have done this sort of thing before, or would be instructed by those who had.
The basic point about the Achaemenid system is that if they were doing these things, as seems likely, then examples from other periods in history can be at the very least misleading, e.g. beach unloading figures for World War 2 in Normandy and the Pacific are not comparable because of tides, enemy opposition, 'combat loading' of ships and inadequate measures for ship-to-shore transfer.
SourcesAll too easily nowadays sources are treated as optional extras (except when they are held to prove a point, at which point the most obscure reference is seized upon as certain). Instead of adopting the
idee fixe that
I think this therefore the source must be wrong, give the source a chance. Yes, the Achamenids did have problems - eventualy terminal - maintaining Xerxes' army. This in itself points to the army's extraordinary size, given the shipping resurces allocated to its support.
There is also Anthony's doubt that a large number of anything could be properly organised. Now it is not a complete answer to say that such numbers (of ships) would not have been brought along if they could not have been used effectively, because history is replete with large numbers of ineffectives appearing on battlefields, and an exemplar of this is the Achaemenid army. I would however point out that the Achaemenid Empire, like its predecessors, was highly organised and heavily bureaucratic, and if anyone could organise such numbers for effective use, they could.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 06:02:03 PM
Storing grain for the rest of the year to the next harvest was possible with a little care.
The problem is people talking of stockpiling it for several years. That is an entirely different issue
Well, someone must have managed it. When Jacob's family dropped into Egypt to stock up on grain, they were issued stocks which had been around for a number of years. :)
I mis spoke.
Some of this is beyond irony.
If you have a point to make, Mark, please make it.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 13, 2018, 05:52:36 PMWe can leave it at that if you wish. The numbers tell me that the logistical capacity was theoretically more than enough to support such an army. I would accept it was not enough only if some demonstrable causes impeding its operation could be proven to exist. The leeway for friction is certainly there: theoretically 800 ships were enough to get one kilogram of grain per day to each man, and Xerxes had 3000 ships.
You mean that Xerxes
is said to have had 3,000 ships
by the very same source that says he had 3,000,000 men, surely? What
independent evidence do we have on the shipping capacity of the eastern Mediterranean?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 13, 2018, 09:15:00 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 13, 2018, 06:02:03 PM
Storing grain for the rest of the year to the next harvest was possible with a little care.
The problem is people talking of stockpiling it for several years. That is an entirely different issue
Well, someone must have managed it. When Jacob's family dropped into Egypt to stock up on grain, they were issued stocks which had been around for a number of years. :)
It is, quite literally, simple maths that anybody who has ever worked a grain store can cope with.
We have 7 year surplus, let's assume 10%
So each year you eat 100 tons.
In year 1 you eat 100 tons, but have 10 left over.
In year 2, you eat 100 tons, including the 10 left over, so have 20 left over (all from year 2)
In year 3, you eat 100 tons, including the 20 left over, so have 30 left over
In year 4, you eat 100 tons, including the 30 left over, so have 40 left over
in year 5 you eat 100 tons, including the 40 left over, so have 50 left over
In year 6 you eat 100 tons, including the 50 left over, so have 60 left over
in year 7 you eat 100 tons, including the 60 left over, so have 70 left over.
Then you get the years of famine. Note that by this point you have no grain in your grain store more than 1 year old. But in the year of famine you harvest only 90 tons
So in year 1 you eat 100 tons, 70 of it from store, so have 60 left in store
in year 2 you eat 100 tons, 60 from store, so have 50 left in store
in year 3 you eat 100 tons, 50 from store, so have 40 left in store
in year 4 you eat 100 tons, 40 from store, so have 30 left in store
in year 5 you eat 100 tons, 30 from store, so have 20 left in store
in year 6 you eat 100 tons, 20 from store so have 10 left in store
in year 7 you eat 100 tons, 10 from store so the store is now empty
That is how grain storage works. You can carry your people through seven years bounty and seven years famine, but never once do you have grain more than a year old in your grain store.
There is no evidence anybody was issued stocks that had been around a number of years. Firstly you don't do it because it rots and gathers vermin, second you don't do it because a properly managed grain store doesn't need to do it
Quote from: Erpingham on April 13, 2018, 06:32:03 PM
QuoteThus far the main potential obstacles brought forward are:
You decided to ignore mine then ? :)
I'll look at yours in more detail, promise (going to bed now). In the meantime here is a pdf (https://www.dropbox.com/s/tv4chlw6qbuelhw/Persian%20route.pdf?dl=0) with a series of Google Maps images of the most likely route for the Persian army from the Dardanelles to Greece. The scale of each image is in the bottom right corner - I close in for a few screenshots to have a better look at difficult terrain. I see a couple of rough patches but no real chokepoints that would oblige everyone to pass through a narrow defile only a couple of dozen yards wide. Let me know what you think.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 13, 2018, 05:52:36 PM
Thus far the main potential obstacles brought forward are:
There are more...
Limitations of the land available to accommodate camp area
Not just the availability of water, but its capture
Practical limits to total camp area
Not just the availability of water but distribution post capture
Bottlenecks
Maximum length of march without resupply
Animals checking up hill
Spacial problems of column length - not just width
I understand the desire to rely on literary histories, but... what is being posited has never since been achieved in the history of warfare.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 13, 2018, 09:33:28 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 13, 2018, 05:52:36 PMWe can leave it at that if you wish. The numbers tell me that the logistical capacity was theoretically more than enough to support such an army. I would accept it was not enough only if some demonstrable causes impeding its operation could be proven to exist. The leeway for friction is certainly there: theoretically 800 ships were enough to get one kilogram of grain per day to each man, and Xerxes had 3000 ships.
You mean that Xerxes is said to have had 3,000 ships by the very same source that says he had 3,000,000 men, surely? What independent evidence do we have on the shipping capacity of the eastern Mediterranean?
One approach is to look at the scale of Mediterranean shipping during the Roman Empire. Rome needed 420 000 tonnes of grain brought by ship each year. If the average Roman merchant ship had a carrying capacity of 100 tons that means 4200 ship voyages to feed the city. But I don't know how many voyages each ship would make per year. This excludes other foods and goods brought to Rome and of course all commercial shipping to other cities around the Mediterranean littoral.
If we discount the figures given and choose, say 200 000 men plus 200 000 support personnel, then what do we make of the bridges over the Hellespont? Divide 200 000 by 7 days then 24 hours and 1190 men passed by any given point of the bridge each hour. Supposing the men moved in a column 20 men wide that means that a block of men 20 wide and 60 deep took an hour to cross that point. This would clearly make the seven days and seven nights a fabrication as one day would be enough to get the entire army across. I suppose one could discount the entire bridge account and assume the troops were ferried across. But once we've discounted this much, what can we then believe?
Quote from: Dangun on April 14, 2018, 04:09:36 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 13, 2018, 05:52:36 PM
Thus far the main potential obstacles brought forward are:
There are more...
Limitations of the land available to accommodate camp area
Not just the availability of water, but its capture
Practical limits to total camp area
Not just the availability of water but distribution post capture
Bottlenecks
Maximum length of march without resupply
Animals checking up hill
Spacial problems of column length - not just width
I understand the desire to rely on literary histories, but... what is being posited has never since been achieved in the history of warfare.
How big would the camp be? This estimate (http://www.bandaarcgeophysics.co.uk/arch/roman_marching_camps_uk.html#march_stats) of the numbers of men in Roman camps in Britain has an upper figure of 1189 men per hectare. That's 8.4 square metres per man, which leaves space for pack animals. 3 400 000 men using this yardstick gives you a camp of 2860 hectares, or 5,4 x 5,4 km. Supposing a river runs through the middle of the camp, it would take half an hour at the most to reach it from any point in the camp. If the camp were long and narrow, following the course of the river, one would reach it in much less time.
A camp arranged in a rough half-circle along the coast would occupy 8.5km of coastline and have a maximum depth of 4,3km. This is all just suggestive but does give an idea of the scales involved.
What would make a 3 1/2 million man army impossible would be chokepoints that forced all the men and animals to file through a narrow space without being able to pass over the higher ground on either side. I can't
a priori see any such chokepoints from my Google Maps tour but of course Google Maps isn't the same as being on the spot. Has anyone identified such chokepoints?
Sure, in the history of warfare since Persia such an exercise has not been achieved because it hasn't been attempted. The Greeks proved you don't need huge armies to win battles, and once Alexander hammered the lesson home quality took the place of quantity from then on.
As an exercise (and then I'm really leaving it at that) here is a proposed route for the Persian march, on the assumption that the army does about 20km a day and its camps measure about 6x6km. It seems doable.
(https://i.imgur.com/PXt7woF.jpg)
(https://i.imgur.com/R8HZbYZ.jpg)
(https://i.imgur.com/4bdtE9f.jpg)
Erratum: That alternative inland route in map 2 wouldn't work as it would take too many days to complete before reaching the sea again...I think.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 14, 2018, 06:23:54 AM
How big would the camp be? This estimate (http://www.bandaarcgeophysics.co.uk/arch/roman_marching_camps_uk.html#march_stats) of the numbers of men in Roman camps in Britain has an upper figure of 1189 men per hectare. That's 8.4 square metres per man, which leaves space for pack animals. 3 400 000 men using this yardstick gives you a camp of 2860 hectares, or 5,4 x 5,4 km. Supposing a river runs through the middle of the camp, it would take half an hour at the most to reach it from any point in the camp. If the camp were long and narrow, following the course of the river, one would reach it in much less time.
What would make a 3 1/2 million man army impossible would be chokepoints that forced all the men and animals to file through a narrow space without being able to pass over the higher ground on either side. I can't a priori see any such chokepoints from my Google Maps tour but of course Google Maps isn't the same as being on the spot. Has anyone identified such chokepoints?
Sure, in the history of warfare since Persia such an exercise has not been achieved because it hasn't been attempted. The Greeks proved you don't need huge armies to win battles, and once Alexander hammered the lesson home quality took the place of quantity from then on.
Firstly the Romans set a uniquely high standard for their camps, we know that from comments by people like Pyrrhus. By the time we get to the camps in Britain they were a professional army with several centuries of experience at building them. The idea that over three million Persian baggage personnel would keep to Roman levels of efficiency is a very large assumption indeed. We know of nobody else in this period who did, certainly not the Greeks.
But even with your super efficient camp pitching Persian army. If, as you say, they could make it long and thin to ensure that everybody was within a sensible distance of water (and with every contingent's baggage animals kept together at the downstream end) and this just meant the camp was 10.8km long
If they left the camp by the narrow end, that means that for some troops, over six miles of their daily march would be through the camp
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 07:17:39 AM
Firstly the Romans set a uniquely high standard for their camps, we know that from comments by people like Pyrrhus. By the time we get to the camps in Britain they were a professional army with several centuries of experience at building them. The idea that over three million Persian baggage personnel would keep to Roman levels of efficiency is a very large assumption indeed. We know of nobody else in this period who did, certainly not the Greeks.
One point to remember about Roman camps was their habit of leaving a belt of a couple of hundred yards around the perimeter unoccupied to prevent casualties from incoming enemy missiles. So in terms of efficiency of packing men into the available space they actually come out comparatively poorly and it is a fairly safe bet that practically anyone else with long experience of creating military encampments (the Achaemenids inherited what the Medes had learned from the Assyrians) would do better simply by forgoing this missile buffer zone.
QuoteBut even with your super efficient camp pitching Persian army. If, as you say, they could make it long and thin to ensure that everybody was within a sensible distance of water (and with every contingent's baggage animals kept together at the downstream end) and this just meant the camp was 10.8km long
If they left the camp by the narrow end, that means that for some troops, over six miles of their daily march would be through the camp
And why leave the camp 'by the narrow end'? Why not leave it by contingents all along its length, just as they arrived?
On grain storage
QuoteBut in the year of famine you harvest only 90 tons
This only works if your famine level of production is quite close to your abundance level of production. I appreciate the thinking, but if your abundance level is 150 tons and your famine level 50 tons then after a couple of years of the famine this approach is dead and so is half your population.
I think we have to face the possibility that Biblical and classical cultures could store grain better than we can. And I suspect the difference lies in the use of sealed amphorae for transport and various chemical methods of preservation.
"The ancient Egyptians first believed that supernatural powers can control pest species including insects, mice and rats, however subsequently they employed for this purpose washing by soda solution, application of animal fat and dung ash (papyrus Ebers, ˜1600 B. C.) as well as sulphur dust and sulphur dioxide (during the New Kingdom)." - source (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1439-0418.1985.tb02787.x)
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 13, 2018, 09:33:28 PM
You mean that Xerxes is said to have had 3,000 ships by the very same source that says he had 3,000,000 men, surely? What independent evidence do we have on the shipping capacity of the eastern Mediterranean?
I think the question should be: what independent evidence do we have
to justify any other conclusion? Otherwise we are just source-bashing for source-bashing's sake.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 07:43:57 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 07:17:39 AM
Firstly the Romans set a uniquely high standard for their camps, we know that from comments by people like Pyrrhus. By the time we get to the camps in Britain they were a professional army with several centuries of experience at building them. The idea that over three million Persian baggage personnel would keep to Roman levels of efficiency is a very large assumption indeed. We know of nobody else in this period who did, certainly not the Greeks.
One point to remember about Roman camps was their habit of leaving a belt of a couple of hundred yards around the perimeter unoccupied to prevent casualties from incoming enemy missiles. So in terms of efficiency of packing men into the available space they actually come out comparatively poorly and it is a fairly safe bet that practically anyone else with long experience of creating military encampments (the Achaemenids inherited what the Medes had learned from the Assyrians) would do better simply by forgoing this missile buffer zone.
right, so now we have the Achaemenids who are so slick and efficient we have them packing pack camels and porters more tightly and efficiently that the Romans could do with professional soldiers
All that happens when you pack troops more tightly is that it makes it awfully difficult to move about the camp or to leave it.
Anyway these fabulous Achaemenid camps? Is there any evidence for them? Any signs of them on the ground? What did Xenophon say about them in his Cyropedia, or his Anabasis because, after all, he lived in Persian camps for a spell. If they were miracles of order and densely packed humanity under Xerxes, how much better must they have been in Xenophon's day?
So it looks as if the super dense Achaemenid camp is another construct produced on no evidence which is necessary to allow armies the like of which have never been seen before or since to exist
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 07:43:57 AM
QuoteBut even with your super efficient camp pitching Persian army. If, as you say, they could make it long and thin to ensure that everybody was within a sensible distance of water (and with every contingent's baggage animals kept together at the downstream end) and this just meant the camp was 10.8km long
If they left the camp by the narrow end, that means that for some troops, over six miles of their daily march would be through the camp
And why leave the camp 'by the narrow end'? Why not leave it by contingents all along its length, just as they arrived?
Because Justin had it long and narrow to allow the army to have access to water. If you leave it all along its length then at least half the army is going to have to cross the river.
(Yes, I realise that half the army would have had to cross the river the previous evening with the obvious effects on drinking quality but I drew a veil over that, preferring to assume that the army was marching along the river, with half on either bank)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 07:43:57 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 07:17:39 AM
On grain storage
QuoteBut in the year of famine you harvest only 90 tons
This only works if your famine level of production is quite close to your abundance level of production. I appreciate the thinking, but if your abundance level is 150 tons and your famine level 50 tons then after a couple of years of the famine this approach is dead and so is half your population.
I think we have to face the possibility that Biblical and classical cultures could store grain better than we can. And I suspect the difference lies in the use of sealed amphorae for transport and various chemical methods of preservation.
"The ancient Egyptians first believed that supernatural powers can control pest species including insects, mice and rats, however subsequently they employed for this purpose washing by soda solution, application of animal fat and dung ash (papyrus Ebers, ˜1600 B. C.) as well as sulphur dust and sulphur dioxide (during the New Kingdom)." - source (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1439-0418.1985.tb02787.x)
I read the sources, it was a document I referred you to
Firstly please show me a country where people live a settled existence where they have that level of difference between famine and abundance? Inventing fantasy examples does not invalidate reality
Secondly, of course with settled agriculture your famine level is close to your abundance level. Areas which have settled agriculture tend to have a population which can be supported under normal circumstances.
But with agriculture, put the same crop in the same field with the same inputs in two consecutive years and there can be 10% difference in the yield, even now.
As for "I suspect the difference lies in the use of sealed amphorae for transport"
Do some homework. Produce some evidence. How about an excavated granary with a lot of broken or intact Amphorae which can be shown to have stored grain.
I went to the trouble of finding you sources.
Please have the decency to return the compliment. I am not bothered about what you suspect. I would really like to see some form of evidence.
Otherwise your Persian grain amphorae merely join the super dense Achaemenid camp is yet another construct produced on no evidence which is necessary to allow armies the like of which have never been seen before or since to exist
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 07:43:57 AM
I think the question should be: what independent evidence do we have to justify any other conclusion? Otherwise we are just source-bashing for source-bashing's sake.
It's perfectly simple. To get the best from every source you have to test it. When we look at Herodotus we have to ask ourselves where he got the numbers and what the Numbers relate to.
Is it the calculated manpower of the Persian army? Was it a document he'd once seen. Was it the size of the army that actually travelled.
So being grown up about it, rather than merely accepting everything a source says, (otherwise we'd be accepting people with one large foot that they use as a parasol to keep the sun off) we try to assess the practicality of it
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 07:51:24 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 07:43:57 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 07:17:39 AM
Firstly the Romans set a uniquely high standard for their camps, we know that from comments by people like Pyrrhus. By the time we get to the camps in Britain they were a professional army with several centuries of experience at building them. The idea that over three million Persian baggage personnel would keep to Roman levels of efficiency is a very large assumption indeed. We know of nobody else in this period who did, certainly not the Greeks.
One point to remember about Roman camps was their habit of leaving a belt of a couple of hundred yards around the perimeter unoccupied to prevent casualties from incoming enemy missiles. So in terms of efficiency of packing men into the available space they actually come out comparatively poorly and it is a fairly safe bet that practically anyone else with long experience of creating military encampments (the Achaemenids inherited what the Medes had learned from the Assyrians) would do better simply by forgoing this missile buffer zone.
right, so now we have the Achaemenids who are so slick and efficient we have them packing pack camels and porters more tightly and efficiently that the Romans could do with professional soldiers
All that happens when you pack troops more tightly is that it makes it awfully difficult to move about the camp or to leave it.
Anyway these fabulous Achaemenid camps? Is there any evidence for them? Any signs of them on the ground? What did Xenophon say about them in his Cyropedia, or his Anabasis because, after all, he lived in Persian camps for a spell. If they were miracles of order and densely packed humanity under Xerxes, how much better must they have been in Xenophon's day?
So it looks as if the super dense Achaemenid camp is another construct produced on no evidence which is necessary to allow armies the like of which have never been seen before or since to exist
The camps wouldn't be especially dense and not super-organised in the Roman fashion inasmuch as the Romans made of their camp an entire fort. You really just need enough ground to pitch tents (which would be just big enough to accommodate lying bodies) and include the lifestock and wagons with passageways in between. 8,4 square metres per man including livestock seems manageable. One could also posit larger, looser camps and still remain within the bounds of practicality.
Any examples of real things for comparison?
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 13, 2018, 09:33:28 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 13, 2018, 05:52:36 PMWe can leave it at that if you wish. The numbers tell me that the logistical capacity was theoretically more than enough to support such an army. I would accept it was not enough only if some demonstrable causes impeding its operation could be proven to exist. The leeway for friction is certainly there: theoretically 800 ships were enough to get one kilogram of grain per day to each man, and Xerxes had 3000 ships.
You mean that Xerxes is said to have had 3,000 ships by the very same source that says he had 3,000,000 men, surely? What independent evidence do we have on the shipping capacity of the eastern Mediterranean?
Here's something: Caligula's ship-bridge across the Straits of Messena. That's a distance of 3 miles or about 5280 yards. A typical Roman merchant ship was about 16 yards wide. That gives you a ball-park figure of 330 ships. According to Lacius Curtius requisitioning the ships caused a severe famine in Italy, notably Rome, which implies that Caligula had expropriated the Carthage-to-Rome supply fleet, say 300-odd ships, having built the remainder.
If one supposes from this that the entire Roman Mediterranean merchant fleet numbered somewhere between 500 and 1000 ships of all sizes, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the regular Persian merchant fleet numbered more than a couple of hundred vessels. But with 4 years to prepare Xerxes had enough time to construct the extra ships he would need to supply a massive army.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 08:44:16 AM
Any examples of real things for comparison?
This? (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodstock) 400 000 people on 240 hectares for 3 days. 1667 people per hectare = 6 square metres per person. Everyone managed. :)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 14, 2018, 09:12:38 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 08:44:16 AM
Any examples of real things for comparison?
This? (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodstock) 400 000 people on 240 hectares for 3 days. 1667 people per hectare = 6 square metres per person. Everyone managed. :)
nobody is arguing that with post world war 2 technology you can get a lot of people into one place. Woodstock is hardly impressive, If you were to just look at the City of London (or the Square Mile) then the daytime population swells from around 12,000 permanent residents to around 400,000 each day.
But if woodstock is the only historical example you can find for 1.8 million soldiers and 3.6 or thereabouts million camp followers, I think you might as well give up
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 14, 2018, 09:06:12 AM
If one supposes from this that the entire Roman Mediterranean merchant fleet numbered somewhere between 500 and 1000 ships of all sizes, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the regular Persian merchant fleet numbered more than a couple of hundred vessels. But with 4 years to prepare Xerxes had enough time to construct the extra ships he would need to supply a massive army.
and is there any sort of evidence?
Does any of the historians mention building ships? After all they're quite good at talking about the building of warships etc. Building several thousand merchant vessels in a year or so is going to have a big enough impact to get people talking
I think we are getting to that point in the argument that usually happens. A whole host of practical issues are raised as to why 3.5 million people is an impossible number of people to move through this landscape with the level of technology available. Large numbers of paper calculations are then done to show that, if the army was super-efficient, it could be done. Super-efficient being at least an order of magnitude higher than any pre-mechanised army and several times more than 20th century armies.
Also, what is the obsession with these bridges? Can I see any reason to doubt they existed? No. Does their existence mean 3.5 million men crossed them? No. Could a much smaller, less efficient, army take seven days to cross? Yes.
I must admit, I think some of the other answers suggest a bit of fantasy is creeping in. Each day, the army would camp at a site with an irrigation system. Half the army will cross the river without it fouling the water? We are Ok with off loading across the beaches the level of supplies because the Romans could feed the population of Rome by sea? As if they didn't have a huge hard infrastructure to do it?
Are we going to make any further progress or is that going to take too fundamental a collective intellectual shift?
BTW, Loved the Woodstock example Justin. Instead of super efficient Persians, I've now got in my head a horde of hippies bearing down on Greece :)
One thing that isn't clear to me is why the Persians would have felt the need for such an extraordinarily large army.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 11:03:31 AM
One thing that isn't clear to me is why the Persians would have felt the need for such an extraordinarily large army.
Ah, Ian - this is the bit in QI where the screens flash and the buzzers go off! The simple answer is "shock and awe". By delivering a huge army to Greece, the locals will be so overwhelmed by the might of the Great King they will realise that resistance is futile. They will be even more impressed if it is full of exotic foreigners, showing how wide a territory the Great King already rules.
However, if one acknowledges the plausibility of this, the literalists pounce and say "told you so", slightly missing the fact that it doesn't require anything more than a very big army by local standards to achieve the effect. While it does probably move us away from minimalist revisions, and from a "useless mouths" parallel if they are there to pose rather than to fight, it really doesn't resolve the issue.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 14, 2018, 03:21:51 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 11:03:31 AM
One thing that isn't clear to me is why the Persians would have felt the need for such an extraordinarily large army.
Ah, Ian - this is the bit in QI where the screens flash and the buzzers go off! The simple answer is "shock and awe". By delivering a huge army to Greece, the locals will be so overwhelmed by the might of the Great King they will realise that resistance is futile. They will be even more impressed if it is full of exotic foreigners, showing how wide a territory the Great King already rules.
However, if one acknowledges the plausibility of this, the literalists pounce and say "told you so", slightly missing the fact that it doesn't require anything more than a very big army by local standards to achieve the effect. While it does probably move us away from minimalist revisions, and from a "useless mouths" parallel if they are there to pose rather than to fight, it really doesn't resolve the issue.
I make a point of only watching TV shows with spaceships, dinosaurs or Kelly Brook in so aren't aware of QI.
I do wonder about the advisability of taking ancient sources as completely reliable. For example, there is a source covering the Pontic Siege of Rhodes which mentions the goddess Isis getting involved in the fighting after the Pontics damaged one of her temples.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 04:28:22 PM
I make a point of only watching TV shows with spaceships, dinosaurs or Kelly Brook in so aren't aware of QI.
I rarely bother these days - bit samey, despite that greatest of Danes, Sandi Toksvig.
Quote
I do wonder about the advisability of taking ancient sources as completely reliable.
At the risk of launching us off at a tangent, our approach to written sources is fundamental to this and several other long running arguments. Sources aren't a natural phenomenon but a human artefact. They have a backstory, which includes who wrote them, where they got their information, who the audience was, what literary conventions were followed and what agenda (overt or covert) the author may have had. If we don't approach them critically (not necessarily sceptically or cynically), we risk misusing them. One of the bizarre effects we see from our own "sources first" movement is that their arguments can appear very naive to the more conventionally educated because they deliberately downplay academic critique or even an interdisciplinary approach. However, they aren't actually naive - they are the result of an independent scholarly approach, which I should respect even if I disagree with it. That's what keeps me sane in these epic attritional battles anyway :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 08:02:14 AM
Firstly please show me a country where people live a settled existence where they have that level of difference between famine and abundance? Inventing fantasy examples does not invalidate reality
The Soviet Union before and during collectivisation. And, to an extent, afterwards. Communist China during the Great Leap Forward (read
Mao's Great Famine by Frank Dikotter if you get the chance).
QuoteSecondly, of course with settled agriculture your famine level is close to your abundance level. Areas which have settled agriculture tend to have a population which can be supported under normal circumstances.
Even in the event of failure of your principal water supply? I think you may need to cast your evidential net more widely.
Quote
I went to the trouble of finding you sources.
Please have the decency to return the compliment. I am not bothered about what you suspect. I would really like to see some form of evidence.
Yes, you did, and thank you. Unfortunately none of the evidence you produced explains how or why Egypt survived a major (not marginal) famine for seven years or why or how the Achaemenid Empire would find it possible and worthwhile to stock up for years in preparation for a major campaign. I mentioned amphorae in connection with grain transport. Whether they were used for storage is conjectural, but it would be interesting to consider what effect this might have on the keeping qualities of their contents.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 08:06:14 AM
It's perfectly simple. To get the best from every source you have to test it. When we look at Herodotus we have to ask ourselves where he got the numbers and what the Numbers relate to.
Is it the calculated manpower of the Persian army? Was it a document he'd once seen. Was it the size of the army that actually travelled.
Which is what I am doing. Objections?
QuoteSo being grown up about it, rather than merely accepting everything a source says, (otherwise we'd be accepting people with one large foot that they use as a parasol to keep the sun off) we try to assess the practicality of it
Which is what I am doing. I agree about assessing the practicality; what I do not agree with is beginning with the
idee fixe that it is necessarily impossible. It might be possible or it might not, and we need to understand what the Achaemenid Empire could and, based on its other known and recorded activities, would, do. This seems to be somewhat different to what people tend, on the basis of a 20th century mentality, to believe.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 11:03:31 AM
One thing that isn't clear to me is why the Persians would have felt the need for such an extraordinarily large army.
Think like an Achaemenid. Read Herodotus Book VII (especially 103):
When he heard this, Xerxes smiled and said, "What a strange thing to say, Demaratus, that a thousand men would fight with so great an army! Come now, tell me this: you say that you were king of these men. Are you willing right now to fight with ten men? Yet if your state is entirely as you define it, you as their king should by right encounter twice as many according to your laws. If each of them is a match for ten men of my army, then it is plain to me that you must be a match for twenty; in this way you would prove that what you say is true. But if you Greeks who so exalt yourselves are just like you and the others who come to speak with me, and are also the same size, then beware lest the words you have spoken be only idle boasting. Let us look at it with all reasonableness: how could a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, if they are all equally free and not under the rule of one man, withstand so great an army as mine? If you Greeks are five thousand, we still would be more than a thousand to one. If they were under the rule of one man according to our custom, they might out of fear of him become better than they naturally are, and under compulsion of the lash they might go against greater numbers of inferior men; but if they are allowed to go free they would do neither. I myself think that even if they were equal in numbers it would be hard for the Greeks to fight just against the Persians. What you are talking about is found among us alone, and even then it is not common but rare; there are some among my Persian spearmen who will gladly fight with three Greeks at once. You have no knowledge of this and are spouting a lot of nonsense."
Observe carefully the mentality, perspective and thinking contained within that assertion. That pretty much answers the question.
The Achaemenids, broadly speaking, felt that success in battle depended upon two things: bravery and numbers. Persians had bravery. Persian armies had numbers. Put the two together and success was guaranteed. So they thought.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:26:24 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 08:02:14 AM
Firstly please show me a country where people live a settled existence where they have that level of difference between famine and abundance? Inventing fantasy examples does not invalidate reality
The Soviet Union before and during collectivisation. And, to an extent, afterwards. Communist China during the Great Leap Forward (read Mao's Great Famine by Frank Dikotter if you get the chance).
Neither count as living a settled existence, given that they were countries racked by war, and civil war.
After all Khrushchev admitted that the record harvests of the 1960s didn't equal the last prewar harvest of 1913
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:26:24 PM
QuoteSecondly, of course with settled agriculture your famine level is close to your abundance level. Areas which have settled agriculture tend to have a population which can be supported under normal circumstances.
Even in the event of failure of your principal water supply? I think you may need to cast your evidential net more widely.
Actually check on the figures, you'll find that a 10% drop in production causes a perfectly adequate famine. When combined with the inevitable private stockpiling to play the market
Again I refer you to The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic Study as a good starting point
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:26:24 PM
I mentioned amphorae in connection with grain transport. Whether they were used for storage is conjectural, but it would be interesting to consider what effect this might have on the keeping qualities of their contents.
Evidence would be nice, sources and stuff
Have you any evidence for amphorae being used to transport grain?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:26:24 PM
Which is what I am doing. I agree about assessing the practicality; what I do not agree with is beginning with the idee fixe that it is necessarily impossible. It might be possible or it might not, and we need to understand what the Achaemenid Empire could and, based on its other known and recorded activities, would, do. This seems to be somewhat different to what people tend, on the basis of a 20th century mentality, to believe.
I don't have an idee fixe, I just looked at the evidence and decided that on the basis of very basic factors such as the time taken to get people through choke points, the logistics of supplying that number of men on the move etc, that it was never going to happen.
I merely looked at the evidence, should anybody provide me with evidence to show how the Persians moved forces numbering five or six million men about on a regular basis I'd be interested to see it.
With the Persian campaigns against Egypt, where we have much more information, Greeks being present in the armies, the numbers are far more reasonable
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 14, 2018, 09:06:12 AM
Here's something: Caligula's ship-bridge across the Straits of Messena. That's a distance of 3 miles or about 5280 yards. A typical Roman merchant ship was about 16 yards wide. That gives you a ball-park figure of 330 ships. According to Lacius Curtius requisitioning the ships caused a severe famine in Italy, notably Rome, which implies that Caligula had expropriated the Carthage-to-Rome supply fleet, say 300-odd ships, having built the remainder.
If one supposes from this that the entire Roman Mediterranean merchant fleet numbered somewhere between 500 and 1000 ships of all sizes, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the regular Persian merchant fleet numbered more than a couple of hundred vessels. But with 4 years to prepare Xerxes had enough time to construct the extra ships he would need to supply a massive army.
Herodotos VII.1.2 does say that Xerxes requested the cities to provide more of, among other things, transport ships than in previous years.
Actually the Roman incident is a nice comparison. But on checking Herodotos VII.97, the 3,000 is the total of warships and horse-transports, not grain-ships - I'm not sure if Herodotos ever gives us a figures for those. So this may be a bit of a red herring, sorry.
Incidentally the most often-cited numerical analysis of Xerxes' supply requirements these days, more recent than Maurice, is probably T Cuyler Young, "480/479 BC - A Persian Perspective" (
Iranica Antiqua XV, 1980). Can't find it online, and I only have a few old handwritten notes. But Patrick, and probably Justin, would hate him. He argues that even Maurice's 200,000+ for the army is much too large to be supplied. At one point he calculates that if Xerxes' army were the size that Maurice calculated, the army would require 85 grain-ships in continuous shuttle duty. And he thinks that's unrealistically too many ships! Even I, instinctively sceptical of Herodotos' propaganda figures, think this may be harsh.
(He's talking about the period before Salamis, when the Persian army and fleet is in Attica. Assuming 134,000 men in the fleet, 210,000 in the army and 75,000 horses - which IIRC is Maurice's figures - he reckons they'd need 892 tons of grain a day. For the three weeks between occupying Athens and the battle of Salamis, that's 18,732 tons. Assuming grain is being brought from the nearest depot is at Therma, five days' sail from Athens, assume (he admits uncertainty here) an average capacity of 130 tons per ship, the Persians must offload 7 ships per day at Athens, so they'd need 7x5 ships travelling each way on any given day, 7 loading at Therma, and 7 unloading at Athens - total 84 ships. Which he thinks is too many, though he never says why it's too many.)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:34:19 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 11:03:31 AM
One thing that isn't clear to me is why the Persians would have felt the need for such an extraordinarily large army.
Think like an Achaemenid. Read Herodotus Book VII (especially 103):
When he heard this, Xerxes smiled and said, "What a strange thing to say, Demaratus, that a thousand men would fight with so great an army! Come now, tell me this: you say that you were king of these men. Are you willing right now to fight with ten men? Yet if your state is entirely as you define it, you as their king should by right encounter twice as many according to your laws. If each of them is a match for ten men of my army, then it is plain to me that you must be a match for twenty; in this way you would prove that what you say is true. But if you Greeks who so exalt yourselves are just like you and the others who come to speak with me, and are also the same size, then beware lest the words you have spoken be only idle boasting. Let us look at it with all reasonableness: how could a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, if they are all equally free and not under the rule of one man, withstand so great an army as mine? If you Greeks are five thousand, we still would be more than a thousand to one. If they were under the rule of one man according to our custom, they might out of fear of him become better than they naturally are, and under compulsion of the lash they might go against greater numbers of inferior men; but if they are allowed to go free they would do neither. I myself think that even if they were equal in numbers it would be hard for the Greeks to fight just against the Persians. What you are talking about is found among us alone, and even then it is not common but rare; there are some among my Persian spearmen who will gladly fight with three Greeks at once. You have no knowledge of this and are spouting a lot of nonsense."
Observe carefully the mentality, perspective and thinking contained within that assertion. That pretty much answers the question.
The Achaemenids, broadly speaking, felt that success in battle depended upon two things: bravery and numbers. Persians had bravery. Persian armies had numbers. Put the two together and success was guaranteed. So they thought.
Presumably that would apply to every other invasion they launched including the one that led to Marathon.?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:34:19 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 11:03:31 AM
One thing that isn't clear to me is why the Persians would have felt the need for such an extraordinarily large army.
Think like an Achaemenid. Read Herodotus Book VII (especially 103):
When he heard this, Xerxes smiled and said, "What a strange thing to say, Demaratus, that a thousand men would fight with so great an army! Come now, tell me this: you say that you were king of these men. Are you willing right now to fight with ten men? Yet if your state is entirely as you define it, you as their king should by right encounter twice as many according to your laws. If each of them is a match for ten men of my army, then it is plain to me that you must be a match for twenty; in this way you would prove that what you say is true. But if you Greeks who so exalt yourselves are just like you and the others who come to speak with me, and are also the same size, then beware lest the words you have spoken be only idle boasting. Let us look at it with all reasonableness: how could a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, if they are all equally free and not under the rule of one man, withstand so great an army as mine? If you Greeks are five thousand, we still would be more than a thousand to one. If they were under the rule of one man according to our custom, they might out of fear of him become better than they naturally are, and under compulsion of the lash they might go against greater numbers of inferior men; but if they are allowed to go free they would do neither. I myself think that even if they were equal in numbers it would be hard for the Greeks to fight just against the Persians. What you are talking about is found among us alone, and even then it is not common but rare; there are some among my Persian spearmen who will gladly fight with three Greeks at once. You have no knowledge of this and are spouting a lot of nonsense."
Just a thought but what would be Herodotus' source for this quote from Xerxes?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 11:04:50 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:34:19 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 11:03:31 AM
One thing that isn't clear to me is why the Persians would have felt the need for such an extraordinarily large army.
Think like an Achaemenid. Read Herodotus Book VII (especially 103):
When he heard this, Xerxes smiled and said, "What a strange thing to say, Demaratus, that a thousand men would fight with so great an army! Come now, tell me this: you say that you were king of these men. Are you willing right now to fight with ten men? Yet if your state is entirely as you define it, you as their king should by right encounter twice as many according to your laws. If each of them is a match for ten men of my army, then it is plain to me that you must be a match for twenty; in this way you would prove that what you say is true. But if you Greeks who so exalt yourselves are just like you and the others who come to speak with me, and are also the same size, then beware lest the words you have spoken be only idle boasting. Let us look at it with all reasonableness: how could a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, if they are all equally free and not under the rule of one man, withstand so great an army as mine? If you Greeks are five thousand, we still would be more than a thousand to one. If they were under the rule of one man according to our custom, they might out of fear of him become better than they naturally are, and under compulsion of the lash they might go against greater numbers of inferior men; but if they are allowed to go free they would do neither. I myself think that even if they were equal in numbers it would be hard for the Greeks to fight just against the Persians. What you are talking about is found among us alone, and even then it is not common but rare; there are some among my Persian spearmen who will gladly fight with three Greeks at once. You have no knowledge of this and are spouting a lot of nonsense."
Observe carefully the mentality, perspective and thinking contained within that assertion. That pretty much answers the question.
The Achaemenids, broadly speaking, felt that success in battle depended upon two things: bravery and numbers. Persians had bravery. Persian armies had numbers. Put the two together and success was guaranteed. So they thought.
Presumably that would apply to every other invasion they launched including the one that led to Marathon.?
What is interesting is that the primary sources give huge figures for
all Persian armies, and not just Persian armies but also armies of other nations of the Fertile Crescent during that era. So it's not just one figure by one writer that is being discounted. If the sources are so unreliable as to make an army five or ten times larger than it really was, then they can't be trusted in anything else they assert. And that's the end of history.
Thus far in this thread I haven't seen any killer argument - backed up with proof - that demonstrates the impossibility of such an enormous army marching, camping and being fed and watered from the Hellespont to Greece.
Take imperial Rome. The city needed 420 000 tonnes of grain (https://www2.rgzm.de/navis/Themes/Commercio/CommerceEnglish.htm) brought by ship each year. If the average Roman merchant ship had a carrying capacity of 100 tons that means 4200 ship voyages to feed the city. It takes two days (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/TAPA/82/Speed_under_Sail_of_Ancient_Ships*.html) by sea from Carthage to Rome with a favourable wind and four days with an unfavourable one, so a round trip including loading time, repairs and so on probably took about 10 days. The Mediterranean was navigable for 8 months of the year so a ship could make the trip about 24 times at best which means at least 175 ships dedicated just to bringing grain to Rome, year after year. But the Roman Empire did it, free of charge. What is the big obstacle for the Persian Empire doing it as a once-off, with years of preparation beforehand?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Take imperial Rome. The city needed 420 000 tonnes of grain (https://www2.rgzm.de/navis/Themes/Commercio/CommerceEnglish.htm) brought by ship each year. If the average Roman merchant ship had a carrying capacity of 100 tons that means 4200 ship voyages to feed the city. It takes two days (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/TAPA/82/Speed_under_Sail_of_Ancient_Ships*.html) by sea from Carthage to Rome with a favourable wind and four days with an unfavourable one, so a round trip including loading time, repairs and so on probably took about 10 days. The Mediterranean was navigable for 8 months of the year so a ship could make the trip about 24 times at best which means at least 175 ships dedicated just to bringing grain to Rome, year after year. But the Roman Empire did it, free of charge. What is the big obstacle for the Persian Empire doing it as a once-off, with years of preparation beforehand?
strangely enough, the city of Rome didn't move about. It had taken centuries to get the infrastructure right
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 08:38:02 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Take imperial Rome. The city needed 420 000 tonnes of grain (https://www2.rgzm.de/navis/Themes/Commercio/CommerceEnglish.htm) brought by ship each year. If the average Roman merchant ship had a carrying capacity of 100 tons that means 4200 ship voyages to feed the city. It takes two days (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/TAPA/82/Speed_under_Sail_of_Ancient_Ships*.html) by sea from Carthage to Rome with a favourable wind and four days with an unfavourable one, so a round trip including loading time, repairs and so on probably took about 10 days. The Mediterranean was navigable for 8 months of the year so a ship could make the trip about 24 times at best which means at least 175 ships dedicated just to bringing grain to Rome, year after year. But the Roman Empire did it, free of charge. What is the big obstacle for the Persian Empire doing it as a once-off, with years of preparation beforehand?
strangely enough, the city of Rome didn't move about. It had taken centuries to get the infrastructure right
Are beaches an insuperable problem?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 08:48:39 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:26:24 PM
I mentioned amphorae in connection with grain transport. Whether they were used for storage is conjectural, but it would be interesting to consider what effect this might have on the keeping qualities of their contents.
Evidence would be nice, sources and stuff
Have you any evidence for amphorae being used to transport grain?
I'm not sure amphorae would actually be necessary. One needs to keep the grain dry below decks for a few days during the ship's passage across the Aegean. At the print shop where I work, the floor is regularly flooded after a heavy rain. Water and paper make a bad combination, so we keep all paper on palettes. Problem solved. It's enough to ensure the sacks don't touch the bottom or sides of the ship's hull. The Romans solved the problem putting an inner layer of planks over the ship's ribbing, on which the grain sacks were stored. One imagines the Persians had a similar solution.
(https://i.imgur.com/ScQYOxy.jpg)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
What is interesting is that the primary sources give huge figures for all Persian armies, and not just Persian armies but also armies of other nations of the Fertile Crescent during that era. So it's not just one figure by one writer that is being discounted. If the sources are so unreliable as to make an army five or ten times larger than it really was, then they can't be trusted in anything else they assert. And that's the end of history.
Not quite – there are numerous (;)) reasons why numbers can be wrong without meaning that the rest needs to be chucked out.
Peter Green (the historian, not the guitarist) in his
Greco-Persian Wars page 62 gives some of them for this particular instance (basically, Xerxes had every reason to exaggerate the numbers, while the Greeks after they won had no reason to revise them downwards, and that the numbers were for before the entrance into Europe).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Thus far in this thread I haven't seen any killer argument - backed up with proof - that demonstrates the impossibility of such an enormous army marching, camping and being fed and watered from the Hellespont to Greece.
You probably have, but choose not to see it as such :)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Take imperial Rome. The city needed 420 000 tonnes of grain (https://www2.rgzm.de/navis/Themes/Commercio/CommerceEnglish.htm) brought by ship each year. If the average Roman merchant ship had a carrying capacity of 100 tons that means 4200 ship voyages to feed the city. It takes two days (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/TAPA/82/Speed_under_Sail_of_Ancient_Ships*.html) by sea from Carthage to Rome with a favourable wind and four days with an unfavourable one, so a round trip including loading time, repairs and so on probably took about 10 days. The Mediterranean was navigable for 8 months of the year so a ship could make the trip about 24 times at best which means at least 175 ships dedicated just to bringing grain to Rome, year after year. But the Roman Empire did it, free of charge. What is the big obstacle for the Persian Empire doing it as a once-off, with years of preparation beforehand?
Notes to the
Landmark Herodotus (p.577) translating Herodotus' grain figures into modern quantities indicate the army required 4,700 tons per day (470,000 for 100 days; 1,715,500 for a year). These supplies are coming through beaches, in potentially unfriendly territory, and without dedicated unloading crews at the drop off point, and without troops in place to secure depots in advance (if advance depots is part of the argument) so it doesn't really compare to Imperial Rome's 420,000 tons coming through a purpose-built port with organized shipping and regular crews at both ends.
There is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
There are of course other objections too, but one that I don't think has been noted in this thread so far is the 'shock and awe factor' that 10 white horses, a chariot, 10 more white horses, 1000 picked cavalrymen, 1000 picked foot, and the 10,000 Immortals elicits in 7.40-41 & 7.55. If the army was really 1,700,000 strong, would so much be made of these comparatively small elite contingents?
No no Justin, you just cannot go equating all statements in an ancient source as having the same value.
If we took accounts of WW2 a contemporary souce of the Battle of Britain could give excellent information on the types and capabilities of the aircraft, worse qualuty of information on the numbers taking part, poor information on the effects of the bombing and even worse on the numbers shot down. The source of the information might be someone in the propaganda dept of one of the combatants, German, British or Italian and have an ulterior motive to increase or decrease numbers.
If 2000 years later someone was looking at the memoirs of an Italian pilot who took part, writing a report to his bosses and that was our only source then should the historians of the future just accept the numbers or that the CR42 was a good fighter because it had great visibility and a tight turning circle and coukd outfight a Gloster Gladiator. Of course someone could construct a logic that the Gladiator fought in the Battle of Britain because a few did, because the RAF clearly had them, because one was dug up in Iraq or Egypt and dated to 1941.
Ancient sources need to be looked at in their own context and understood for their own motivations. If later armies all seem to be smaller, far smaller and yet be the product of states that we know to have the economic power to support an army equal to any Persian then it is extremely unlikely that Persia deployed forces that were much greater in size. In theiry Rome in the Late Empure could provide 650, 000 troops ( I think that's Agathias) so why do they not put out armies of halh a million? Well they have frontiers to defend, internal security to attend to and the ligisics would have been a nightmare. Please don't give comparative numbers from the Bible....its just not that sort of historical document.
The Greeks had a very good motive for consistently exaggerating the size of Persian armies. As had Caesar for exaggerating the numbers of Gauls or Tacitus for bigging up the numbers of Ancient Brits. The Greeks were beating the Persians, but at the same time had a poor opinion of Persian organisation, motivation, equipment, morale...the lot. How could an army of such people be terrifying enough to be an heroic opponent...why, by giving them huge numbers of slave soldiers, formidable by their mere mass, despicable in equipment and freedom.
Such a huge army would just starve when the Greeks took control of the seas. It would be effectively immobilised by the problems of food distribution. The continuation of this argument relies, as Justin points out, on the difficulty of proving a negative......its more like religion than history. Can we prove that Moses didn't see a burning bush?? That pharaoh's was not drowned under the returning waves?
Ancient sources should be
QuoteIncidentally the most often-cited numerical analysis of Xerxes' supply requirements these days, more recent than Maurice, is probably T Cuyler Young, "480/479 BC - A Persian Perspective" (Iranica Antiqua XV, 1980).
Tuplin's paper, which I linked earlier, is ruthless in his critique of Young. He notes, for instance, that Young forgets the fodder requirements of his animals. Even so, he believes Young is too deterministic and believes Maurice's estimate better.
QuoteAre beaches an insuperable problem?
No, as long as the force is of a manageable size. However, feeding a army several times the population of Rome across an improvised beach landing on a hand-to-mouth basis while moving the entire supply operation every few days is a non-starter. Then there is the weather. You don't need a full on storm to disrupt a beach supply, just a heavy swell. Your ships can't be sure they beach and get off safely, so they will have to anchor and wait. Not all the beaches will be sheltered and, if the weather gets worse they may have to run for cover. Unlike Rome, you have no big granaries to buffer you against losing even a few days supply.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
What is interesting is that the primary sources give huge figures for all Persian armies, and not just Persian armies but also armies of other nations of the Fertile Crescent during that era. So it's not just one figure by one writer that is being discounted. If the sources are so unreliable as to make an army five or ten times larger than it really was, then they can't be trusted in anything else they assert. And that's the end of history.
Not quite – there are numerous (;)) reasons why numbers can be wrong without meaning that the rest needs to be chucked out.
Peter Green (the historian, not the guitarist) in his Greco-Persian Wars page 62 gives some of them for this particular instance (basically, Xerxes had every reason to exaggerate the numbers, while the Greeks after they won had no reason to revise them downwards, and that the numbers were for before the entrance into Europe).
Thinking about the propaganda angle, wouldn't the Greek writers have just as much reason to boast about beating a 200 000 man Persian army as beating a 3 400 000 man one? Propaganda works if it is believable to those for whom it is destined. People in that era would have known that the Persians could not possibly field armies of several million men if in fact they didn't. If 200 000 was in fact the upper limit for a Persian army then Herodotus' contemporaries would have laughed at his figures. Propaganda exercise flops.
As an example, if I told you that 80 Rhodesian soldiers utterly defeated an enemy camp of 5000 guerrillas all armed to the teeth with the latest in Russian and Chinese military hardware, killing over 1000 of them, would you think that a propaganda exercise
a la Herodotus?
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMQuote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Thus far in this thread I haven't seen any killer argument - backed up with proof - that demonstrates the impossibility of such an enormous army marching, camping and being fed and watered from the Hellespont to Greece.
You probably have, but choose not to see it as such :)
I'm all ears (or eyes in this case). :D
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMQuote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Take imperial Rome. The city needed 420 000 tonnes of grain (https://www2.rgzm.de/navis/Themes/Commercio/CommerceEnglish.htm) brought by ship each year. If the average Roman merchant ship had a carrying capacity of 100 tons that means 4200 ship voyages to feed the city. It takes two days (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/TAPA/82/Speed_under_Sail_of_Ancient_Ships*.html) by sea from Carthage to Rome with a favourable wind and four days with an unfavourable one, so a round trip including loading time, repairs and so on probably took about 10 days. The Mediterranean was navigable for 8 months of the year so a ship could make the trip about 24 times at best which means at least 175 ships dedicated just to bringing grain to Rome, year after year. But the Roman Empire did it, free of charge. What is the big obstacle for the Persian Empire doing it as a once-off, with years of preparation beforehand?
Notes to the Landmark Herodotus (p.577) translating Herodotus' grain figures into modern quantities indicate the army required 4,700 tons per day (470,000 for 100 days; 1,715,500 for a year). These supplies are coming through beaches, in potentially unfriendly territory, and without dedicated unloading crews at the drop off point, and without troops in place to secure depots in advance (if advance depots is part of the argument) so it doesn't really compare to Imperial Rome's 420,000 tons coming through a purpose-built port with organized shipping and regular crews at both ends.
One needs to look at this in terms of ships. 4700 tons per day means 47 ships with a carrying capacity of 100 tons or 16 ships with a carrying capacity of 300 tons. Choose a middle figure and say 30 ships that must offload each day or 3 ships an hour. Not actually such a big deal.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
Herodotus mentions the chokepoint being at Trachis, which is just before Thermopolae. It is there precisely that Xerxes' problems began, not during the trip from the Hellespont to Greece.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere are of course other objections too, but one that I don't think has been noted in this thread so far is the 'shock and awe factor' that 10 white horses, a chariot, 10 more white horses, 1000 picked cavalrymen, 1000 picked foot, and the 10,000 Immortals elicits in 7.40-41 & 7.55. If the army was really 1,700,000 strong, would so much be made of these comparatively small elite contingents?
Why mention 10 white horses for an army of 200 000 for that matter? The context of the passage is important. Pythius the Lydian had asked Xerxes to release one of his five sons from the army to stay with him at home. Xerxes, furious, has the son executed and "set one half of his body on the right side of the road and the other on the left, so that the army would pass between them." It is not stated how wide the 'road' is, nor if it is the entire army or just a contingent of it that passes by. The army is in three sections: hoi-polloi come first, then a gap, then the king with his elite troops, then a gap, then more hoi-polloi. The mention of the white horses etc. is clearly meant to underscore the magnificence of Xerxes.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 14, 2018, 08:48:39 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:26:24 PM
I mentioned amphorae in connection with grain transport. Whether they were used for storage is conjectural, but it would be interesting to consider what effect this might have on the keeping qualities of their contents.
Evidence would be nice, sources and stuff
Have you any evidence for amphorae being used to transport grain?
Justin has turned up something; I did a search for wrecks but it seems search engines have recently been reconfigured to avoid historical information in favour of contemporary advertising; Lucian in The Ship, or The Wishes (http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl4/wl407.htm) describes a Roman period grain ship (the
Isis) but not her cargo.
I say, though, what a size that ship was! 180 feet long, the man said, and something over a quarter of that in width; and from deck to keel, the maximum depth, through the hold, 44 feet. And then the height of the mast, with its huge yard; and what a forestay it takes to hold it! And the lofty stern with its gradual curve, and its gilded beak, balanced at the other end by the long rising sweep of the prow, and the figures of her name-goddess, Isis, on either side. As to the other ornamental details, the paintings and the scarlet topsail, I was more struck by the anchors, and the capstans and windlasses, and the stern cabins. The crew was like a small army. And they were saying she carried as much corn as would feed every soul in Attica for a year. And all depends for its safety on one little old atomy of a man, who controls that great rudder with a mere broomstick of a tiller!
So for the present I am left with: if you were moving grain during the Persian-Greek-Roman period, how would you get it on board, keep it dry during transit and unload it cleanly and expeditiously with a minimum of overall wastage? And I think: amphorae. They are waterproof (if you seal them), they are easy to load and stow, they should not shift around from waves lapping at the ship (you do have sand and shingle ballast in the hold, right?), they are rat-proof, and at the terminus you can unload them easily enough with just your crew and tackle if help is not forthcoming. If for some reason you have multiple destinations you can unload exactly as much as is needed at each destination. When it arrives, it is all date-stamped and certified for origin.
In fact, thinking about it, how can you
not transport it in amphorae?
This is also the conclusion of Wikipedia, sourcing Adkins, L.; Adkins, R.A. (1994).
Handbook to life in Ancient Rome. To quote:
"In the Bronze and Iron Ages amphorae spread around the ancient Mediterranean world, being used by the ancient Greeks and Romans as the principal means for transporting and storing grapes, olive oil, wine, oil, olives, grain, fish, and other commodities. They were produced on an industrial scale until approximately the 7th century AD. Wooden and skin containers seem to have supplanted amphorae thereafter."
I guess these gentlemen know their stuff. That is pretty much all I have been able to turn up so far.
Storage is the next question: Herodotus in III.6 mentions the Egyptians collecting all the wine-jars (amphorae) which arrive in their country and using them as the basis of a desert water supply scheme. He mentions no such arrangement for grain jars (amphorae), implying they continued in circulation. If one were stocking up for a campaign, it would make sense to keep the grain in its original amphorae, where you not only have the date and origin information on the seal but also need not bother about rodent infestation and can shift precise quantities without a lot of fuss and shovelling. This would mean that at the end of the campaign you are looking at a clean, empty floor in the storehouse and any bits of unlucky amphorae are probably on a windswept beach somewhere.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:41:30 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 08:38:02 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Take imperial Rome. The city needed 420 000 tonnes of grain (https://www2.rgzm.de/navis/Themes/Commercio/CommerceEnglish.htm) brought by ship each year. If the average Roman merchant ship had a carrying capacity of 100 tons that means 4200 ship voyages to feed the city. It takes two days (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/TAPA/82/Speed_under_Sail_of_Ancient_Ships*.html) by sea from Carthage to Rome with a favourable wind and four days with an unfavourable one, so a round trip including loading time, repairs and so on probably took about 10 days. The Mediterranean was navigable for 8 months of the year so a ship could make the trip about 24 times at best which means at least 175 ships dedicated just to bringing grain to Rome, year after year. But the Roman Empire did it, free of charge. What is the big obstacle for the Persian Empire doing it as a once-off, with years of preparation beforehand?
strangely enough, the city of Rome didn't move about. It had taken centuries to get the infrastructure right
Are beaches an insuperable problem?
Galleys were designed to be pulled up onto them
Merchant ships weren't
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 09:11:40 AM
I'm not sure amphorae would actually be necessary. One needs to keep the grain dry below decks for a few days during the ship's passage across the Aegean. At the print shop where I work, the floor is regularly flooded after a heavy rain. Water and paper make a bad combination, so we keep all paper on palettes. Problem solved. It's enough to ensure the sacks don't touch the bottom or sides of the ship's hull. The Romans solved the problem putting an inner layer of planks over the ship's ribbing, on which the grain sacks were stored. One imagines the Persians had a similar solution.
The problem isn't so much wet (which obviously is to be avoided) as humidity. If the grain moisture rises from 14% to 15% you have serious problems.
Dry grain (14%) will absorb moisture out of the air
Sea air does have more moisture so the sea is a bigger risk
The importance of sacks in the advantage I gave was that it does give the air chance to circulate on dry days and hopefully bring the moisture down again
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 14, 2018, 11:04:50 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 14, 2018, 08:34:19 PM
The Achaemenids, broadly speaking, felt that success in battle depended upon two things: bravery and numbers. Persians had bravery. Persian armies had numbers. Put the two together and success was guaranteed. So they thought.
Presumably that would apply to every other invasion they launched including the one that led to Marathon.?
It did seem to be the prevailing mentality. The force which set out on the Marathon is noted as being a "numerous and well-appointed land army" (Herodotus VI.95) The force Darius led against the Scythians is recorded as being 700,000 men (Herodotus IV.87) and vast armies were an Achamenid trade mark until 334 BC when Memnon appears to have sent home the Achaemenid levies in his army prior to the Granicus. Darius III Codomannus debated whether to take the traditional huge host to Issus or follow Charidemus' scheme of relying solely on a force of 30,000 Greeks and the best 70,000 the Persian Empire could muster; in the end (and after executing Charidemus for bad manners) he opted for both. His swan song at Gaugamela saw the second largest recorded assemblage of Achamenid military manpower.
Xerxes' failure, however, did cause a rethink, which appears to have remained in limbo until after Cunaxa, when the quality and effectiveness of Greeks became apparent. Thereafter, Persian invasions of Egypt involved adding a cutting edge to the main army: 20,000 Greeks and 200,000 Asiatics (374-3 BC); 30,000 Greeks and 300,000 Asiatics (343 BC). Each of these still had the characteristic years' long preparation period beforehand.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 10:50:05 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:41:30 AM
Are beaches an insuperable problem?
Galleys were designed to be pulled up onto them
Merchant ships weren't
That was not the way you unloaded a classical merchant ship. You swung the cargo onto lighters which ferried it to shore. So no problem there (says the naval historian). ;)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 12:19:37 AM
Just a thought but what would be Herodotus' source for this quote from Xerxes?
Quite possibly Demaratus himself. Herodotus did quite a bit of travelling and interviewing, and I think Demaratus was one of his subjects. Demaratus might have inserted a bit of after-the-event improved repartee for his own contribution (or he might not), but I think he would have recounted Xerxes' remarks accurately enough. He had cause to remember them at the time.
Quote from: aligern on April 15, 2018, 09:45:51 AM
No no Justin, you just cannot go equating all statements in an ancient source as having the same value.
If we took accounts of WW2 a contemporary souce of the Battle of Britain could give excellent information on the types and capabilities of the aircraft, worse qualuty of information on the numbers taking part, poor information on the effects of the bombing and even worse on the numbers shot down. The source of the information might be someone in the propaganda dept of one of the combatants, German, British or Italian and have an ulterior motive to increase or decrease numbers.
Depending on who is doing the talking I agree that one can get wildly inaccurate accounts of what happened during the Battle of Britain. However...
Quote from: aligern on April 15, 2018, 09:45:51 AMIf 2000 years later someone was looking at the memoirs of an Italian pilot who took part, writing a report to his bosses and that was our only source then should the historians of the future just accept the numbers or that the CR42 was a good fighter because it had great visibility and a tight turning circle and coukd outfight a Gloster Gladiator. Of course someone could construct a logic that the Gladiator fought in the Battle of Britain because a few did, because the RAF clearly had them, because one was dug up in Iraq or Egypt and dated to 1941.
An Italian pilot, writing anecdotally about his experiences in England, is not on the same level as historians like Herodotus, Arrian, Polybios, Livy,
et al. who are trying to write history and hence to get their facts right. They are not bureaucrats in a dictatorship or functionaries in a Ministry of Propaganda. They would use a lot of sources and sift their reliability before committing pen to paper. Putting them on the same level as an anecdotal pilot unfairly diminishes their competence IMHO.
Quote from: aligern on April 15, 2018, 09:45:51 AMAncient sources need to be looked at in their own context and understood for their own motivations. If later armies all seem to be smaller, far smaller and yet be the product of states that we know to have the economic power to support an army equal to any Persian then it is extremely unlikely that Persia deployed forces that were much greater in size.
Unless the military doctrine of the Persians and their predecessors set a great store by size which the Greeks and their successors did not.
Quote from: aligern on April 15, 2018, 09:45:51 AMIn theiry Rome in the Late Empure could provide 650, 000 troops ( I think that's Agathias) so why do they not put out armies of halh a million? Well they have frontiers to defend, internal security to attend to and the ligisics would have been a nightmare.
Rome followed the same military tradition of Macedonia and to a lesser extent Greece of creating smaller but well-trained and well-armed armies rather than huge forces most of which were untrained and poorly-armed levies who where there just to impress the enemy without actually fighting him. Once Greece and Macedonia called Persia's bluff it was game over for big armies.
Quote from: aligern on April 15, 2018, 09:45:51 AMPlease don't give comparative numbers from the Bible....its just not that sort of historical document.
Although it's used as such. But fine, we'll leave it alone.
Quote from: aligern on April 15, 2018, 09:45:51 AMThe Greeks had a very good motive for consistently exaggerating the size of Persian armies. As had Caesar for exaggerating the numbers of Gauls or Tacitus for bigging up the numbers of Ancient Brits.
Or the Gauls and Britons had a military tradition of every able-bodied man going off to war when the need arose. Unlike the Romans they didn't have professional standing armies.
Quote from: aligern on April 15, 2018, 09:45:51 AMThe Greeks were beating the Persians, but at the same time had a poor opinion of Persian organisation, motivation, equipment, morale...the lot. How could an army of such people be terrifying enough to be an heroic opponent...why, by giving them huge numbers of slave soldiers, formidable by their mere mass, despicable in equipment and freedom.
Such a huge army would just starve when the Greeks took control of the seas.
It did starve, but it wasn't part of Xerxes' plans for the Greeks to take control of the seas.
Quote from: aligern on April 15, 2018, 09:45:51 AMIt would be effectively immobilised by the problems of food distribution.
How so?
If we insist on pursuing Roman parallels, this (https://www2.rgzm.de/navis/Themes/Commercio/CommerceEnglish.htm) is quite interesting. This reckons the Isis at 1200 tonnes (though I'm not sure that is capacity rather than displacement). Key things to remember is that these big ships didn't exist earlier and even to the Romans they were rare. They also needed deep water port facilities.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 10:55:57 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 10:50:05 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:41:30 AM
Are beaches an insuperable problem?
Galleys were designed to be pulled up onto them
Merchant ships weren't
That was not the way you unloaded a classical merchant ship. You swung the cargo onto lighters which ferried it to shore. So no problem there (says the naval historian). ;)
which was such an amazingly effective and efficient system that people abandoned the whole old fashioned idea of investing a lot of capital in harbour facilities and just unloaded across the beach
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 10:55:57 AM
That was not the way you unloaded a classical merchant ship. You swung the cargo onto lighters which ferried it to shore. So no problem there (says the naval historian). ;)
Are you sure about that? Lighters are usually associated with infrastructure of permanent ports.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AM
Peter Green (the historian, not the guitarist) in his Greco-Persian Wars page 62 gives some of them for this particular instance (basically, Xerxes had every reason to exaggerate the numbers, while the Greeks after they won had no reason to revise them downwards, and that the numbers were for before the entrance into Europe).
Just to play the man not the ball here, Phil Sabin was wholly unimpressed with Peter Green's conclusions about the Granicus. Are you sure you really want to rely on Peter Green for anything, particularly when the conclusions amount to little more than a recitation of Peter Green's opinions?
QuoteQuote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Thus far in this thread I haven't seen any killer argument - backed up with proof - that demonstrates the impossibility of such an enormous army marching, camping and being fed and watered from the Hellespont to Greece.
You probably have, but choose not to see it as such :)
Although to be fair Aaron does not point to anything that might be considered as such. ;)
Quote
Notes to the Landmark Herodotus (p.577) translating Herodotus' grain figures into modern quantities indicate the army required 4,700 tons per day (470,000 for 100 days; 1,715,500 for a year). These supplies are coming through beaches, in potentially unfriendly territory, and without dedicated unloading crews at the drop off point, and without troops in place to secure depots in advance (if advance depots is part of the argument) so it doesn't really compare to Imperial Rome's 420,000 tons coming through a purpose-built port with organized shipping and regular crews at both ends.
Couple of assumptions here:
1)
potentially unfriendly territoryPrior to Thermopylae, the only unfriendlies were the mauntain lions who attacked baggage animals (with a distinct preference for camels). The presence of a 1.7 million strong army had already made the relevant areas friendly; Thracians and Greeks were rushing to join Xerxes; local Greek cities were supplying his army (Herodotus VII.118-119).
2)
without troops in place to secure depots in advanceUp to Acanthus, the local populations secured 'depots'. At Thermopylae, the army and fleet looked after their own security.
3)
a purpose-built port with organized shipping and regular crews at both endsThe only real difference is the lack of a purpose-built port at one end. I hope nobody would be so uncharitable as to suggest that Phoenicians and the like were unpractised at unloading ships over beaches, because this is how they conducted most of their trade.
QuoteThere is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
Or, to give it its more commonly known name, Thermopylae. Once the Persians had cleared away the Greek defenders, they did not all go through it, but went round it, campaigning against the Phocians en route (Herodotus VIII.30-34).
QuoteThere are of course other objections too, but one that I don't think has been noted in this thread so far is the 'shock and awe factor' that 10 white horses, a chariot, 10 more white horses, 1000 picked cavalrymen, 1000 picked foot, and the 10,000 Immortals elicits in 7.40-41 & 7.55. If the army was really 1,700,000 strong, would so much be made of these comparatively small elite contingents?
Very much so, because they are the 'bravery' part of the Persian 'bravery and numbers' equation. In any event, in the passages quoted their effect is spectacular display; they do not seem to be shocking anyone, although they would be very useful for aweing the contingents from the further-flung reaches of the Empire.
QuoteJust to play the man not the ball here, Phil Sabin was wholly unimpressed with Peter Green's conclusions about the Granicus. Are you sure you really want to rely on Peter Green for anything, particularly when the conclusions amount to little more than a recitation of Peter Green's opinions?
So, just checking. Because Phil Sabin was unimpressed with Peter Green's views on a battle in another campaign altogether, his opinions about the grand strategy in another time and place can simply be dismissed?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 11:09:11 AM
Key things to remember is that these big ships didn't exist earlier ...
They were specialised for optimisation in a specific role, but arguing from form to function (or perhaps vice versa) there is no reason large grain ships could not have existed earlier, when bulk grain transportation at the behest of national and/or imperial authorities seems to have taken place.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 11:19:28 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 10:55:57 AM
That was not the way you unloaded a classical merchant ship. You swung the cargo onto lighters which ferried it to shore. So no problem there (says the naval historian). ;)
which was such an amazingly effective and efficient system that people abandoned the whole old fashioned idea of investing a lot of capital in harbour facilities and just unloaded across the beach
Much of Phoenician trade was conducted on the basis of transferring cargo to shore, waiting until the locals had piled up goods of sufficient value, then loading the pile of goods and going back home. This took place across beaches and without a port. The Vikings would later use a very similar system.
Military operations also took place where on occasion people had inconveniently omitted to build ports. Standard procedure for anyone with any sort of experience was: supplies into boats; boats onto shore; supplies out of boats; boats back to ship for next instalment.
This is of course very crew-intensive. Merchant crews much preferred letting someone else do much of the work in the comfort of a port. Ports are also very useful for overhauling ships; they are just not 100% vital for unloading supplies.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 11:22:49 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 10:55:57 AM
That was not the way you unloaded a classical merchant ship. You swung the cargo onto lighters which ferried it to shore. So no problem there (says the naval historian). ;)
Are you sure about that? Lighters are usually associated with infrastructure of permanent ports.
Which means that borrowing them for a campaign is no problem, as they are already in existence.
The question of weather is worth picking up. As has been mentioned (I believe by Anthony), even a light swell can interfere with unloading. Mediterranean weather, however, tended to be of two varieties - very good or very bad - with very little in between. Unless the weather was so bad as to imperil your ships, it tended to be good enough for unloading.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 11:36:43 AM
QuoteJust to play the man not the ball here, Phil Sabin was wholly unimpressed with Peter Green's conclusions about the Granicus. Are you sure you really want to rely on Peter Green for anything, particularly when the conclusions amount to little more than a recitation of Peter Green's opinions?
So, just checking. Because Phil Sabin was unimpressed with Peter Green's views on a battle in another campaign altogether, his opinions about the grand strategy in another time and place can simply be dismissed?
Isn't that the approach commonly advocated here regarding Herodotus? ;)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 11:19:28 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 10:55:57 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 10:50:05 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:41:30 AM
Are beaches an insuperable problem?
Galleys were designed to be pulled up onto them
Merchant ships weren't
That was not the way you unloaded a classical merchant ship. You swung the cargo onto lighters which ferried it to shore. So no problem there (says the naval historian). ;)
which was such an amazingly effective and efficient system that people abandoned the whole old fashioned idea of investing a lot of capital in harbour facilities and just unloaded across the beach
Harbours make unloading of cargo somewhat easier but more importantly they are a safe refuge for ships in bad weather, and no matter what the weather if a ship can make it to a harbour it can load/unload its cargo.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 11:00:37 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 12:19:37 AM
Just a thought but what would be Herodotus' source for this quote from Xerxes?
Quite possibly Demaratus himself. Herodotus did quite a bit of travelling and interviewing, and I think Demaratus was one of his subjects. Demaratus might have inserted a bit of after-the-event improved repartee for his own contribution (or he might not), but I think he would have recounted Xerxes' remarks accurately enough. He had cause to remember them at the time.
I tend to go with the idea that ancient historians are not equivalent to modern practitioners in terms of commitment to accuracy, attributing sources or even having a similar idea to what constitutes truth and that they were more than capable of creating speeches to more effectively convey a point to their audience. However, in this case I suspect that Herodotus would have attributed Demaratus if that is where he had got the quote from.
QuoteThey were specialised for optimisation in a specific role, but arguing from form to function (or perhaps vice versa) there is no reason large grain ships could not have existed earlier, when bulk grain transportation at the behest of national and/or imperial authorities seems to have taken place.
So, as we have no proof such large ships didn't exist before the Romans, we can assume whole fleets of them under the Persians? Still doesn't make them suitable for beach landings, though.
QuoteIsn't that the approach commonly advocated here regarding Herodotus? ;)
No, not seen any evidence of it. Most people just seem to want to use a critical approach on Herodotus' work, as opposed to an inerrancy approach.
[/quote]
Harbours make unloading of cargo somewhat easier but more importantly they are a safe refuge for ships in bad weather, and no matter what the weather if a ship can make it to a harbour it can load/unload its cargo.
[/quote]
Wouldn't the huge expansion of the Persian merchant marine necessary to support such a humongous army mean that a large number of extra sailors would need to be trained? as well as extra dock facilities etc.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 11:57:50 AM
Quote
Harbours make unloading of cargo somewhat easier but more importantly they are a safe refuge for ships in bad weather, and no matter what the weather if a ship can make it to a harbour it can load/unload its cargo.
Wouldn't the huge expansion of the Persian merchant marine necessary to support such a humongous army mean that a large number of extra sailors would need to be trained? as well as extra dock facilities etc.
Xerxes had four years to do that, and he dug a canal in the bargain.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 11:50:44 AM
QuoteThey were specialised for optimisation in a specific role, but arguing from form to function (or perhaps vice versa) there is no reason large grain ships could not have existed earlier, when bulk grain transportation at the behest of national and/or imperial authorities seems to have taken place.
So, as we have no proof such large ships didn't exist before the Romans, we can assume whole fleets of them under the Persians? Still doesn't make them suitable for beach landings, though.
Large ships would have helped but are they necessary? The numbers work using normal-sized merchant vessels.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 11:39:16 AM
I tend to go with the idea that ancient historians are not equivalent to modern practitioners in terms of commitment to accuracy, attributing sources or even having a similar idea to what constitutes truth and that they were more than capable of creating speeches to more effectively convey a point to their audience. However, in this case I suspect that Herodotus would have attributed Demaratus if that is where he had got the quote from.
I find it useful to be guided by Thucydides on the thinking behind speeches in classical histories
As to the various speeches made on the eve of the war, or in its course, I have found it difficult to retain a memory of the precise words which I had heard spoken; and so it was with those who brought me reports. But I have made the persons say what it seemed to me most opportune for them to say in view of each situation; at the same time, I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. So, we may have a memory of a real conversation here, which Herodotus has elaborated to indicate what he thought was the Persian mentality. Or it may just be a device to insert a commentary on Persian thinking based on his various sources, without an actual real conversation having taken place.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 12:02:45 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 11:57:50 AM
Quote
Harbours make unloading of cargo somewhat easier but more importantly they are a safe refuge for ships in bad weather, and no matter what the weather if a ship can make it to a harbour it can load/unload its cargo.
Wouldn't the huge expansion of the Persian merchant marine necessary to support such a humongous army mean that a large number of extra sailors would need to be trained? as well as extra dock facilities etc.
Xerxes had four years to do that, and he dug a canal in the bargain.
Just walk me through the process of how these extra sailors would be trained- are we looking at setting up a series of maritime training colleges or similar?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 12:04:59 PM
Large ships would have helped but are they necessary? The numbers work using normal-sized merchant vessels.
Patrick is the advocate of large ships, so he can answer that. But I agree, invoking them isn't necessary. In terms of numbers working, I'd remind everyone of the sage words of Duncan that just matching Herodotus' ship numbers to his army numbers isn't proof of anything, other than the fact Herodotus had the wit to ensure they were compatable.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 12:14:40 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 12:02:45 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 11:57:50 AM
Quote
Harbours make unloading of cargo somewhat easier but more importantly they are a safe refuge for ships in bad weather, and no matter what the weather if a ship can make it to a harbour it can load/unload its cargo.
Wouldn't the huge expansion of the Persian merchant marine necessary to support such a humongous army mean that a large number of extra sailors would need to be trained? as well as extra dock facilities etc.
Xerxes had four years to do that, and he dug a canal in the bargain.
Just walk me through the process of how these extra sailors would be trained- are we looking at setting up a series of maritime training colleges or similar?
1. Build new ships.
2. Move a few experienced crewmen to each of these new ships.
3. Add raw conscripts to the mix and let them learn on the job.
A bit like the Royal Navy in the 18th century. You were grabbed by a press-gang, tricked/forced into accepting His Majesty's shilling, and bingo! you were a sailor.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 12:27:10 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 12:05:31 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 11:39:16 AM
I tend to go with the idea that ancient historians are not equivalent to modern practitioners in terms of commitment to accuracy, attributing sources or even having a similar idea to what constitutes truth and that they were more than capable of creating speeches to more effectively convey a point to their audience. However, in this case I suspect that Herodotus would have attributed Demaratus if that is where he had got the quote from.
I find it useful to be guided by Thucydides on the thinking behind speeches in classical histories
As to the various speeches made on the eve of the war, or in its course, I have found it difficult to retain a memory of the precise words which I had heard spoken; and so it was with those who brought me reports. But I have made the persons say what it seemed to me most opportune for them to say in view of each situation; at the same time, I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.
So, we may have a memory of a real conversation here, which Herodotus has elaborated to indicate what he thought was the Persian mentality. Or it may just be a device to insert a commentary on Persian thinking based on his various sources, without an actual real conversation having taken place.
Not quite. Thucydides says a real conversation
did take place, but he can't remember the exact words nor can those who report to him. Both however know the gist of the speech, so he gives it and fleshes it out with the kind of things the speaker would have said on the occasion. That's not fabrication
a nihilo.
Notice above all that he
admits what he has done. In other words he gives the reader an exact gauge by which to judge the accuracy of the reported speeches. Hardly the approach of a propagandist.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 12:22:29 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 12:14:40 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 12:02:45 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 11:57:50 AM
Quote
Harbours make unloading of cargo somewhat easier but more importantly they are a safe refuge for ships in bad weather, and no matter what the weather if a ship can make it to a harbour it can load/unload its cargo.
Wouldn't the huge expansion of the Persian merchant marine necessary to support such a humongous army mean that a large number of extra sailors would need to be trained? as well as extra dock facilities etc.
Xerxes had four years to do that, and he dug a canal in the bargain.
Just walk me through the process of how these extra sailors would be trained- are we looking at setting up a series of maritime training colleges or similar?
1. Build new ships.
2. Move a few experienced crewmen to each of these new ships.
3. Add raw conscripts to the mix and let them learn on the job.
A bit like the Royal Navy in the 18th century. You were grabbed by a press-gang, tricked/forced into accepting His Majesty's shilling, and bingo! you were a sailor.
[/quote
Leaving aside the obvious that you would have crippled your merchant marine by making it dependent on improperly manned merchant ships you have the other issue that merchant ships in the ancient world were privately owned; not at all equivalent to the Royal Navy of the C18th.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 12:34:33 PM
Not quite. Thucydides says a real conversation did take place, but he can't remember the exact words nor can those who report to him. Both however know the gist of the speech, so he gives it and fleshes it out with the kind of things the speaker would have said on the occasion. That's not fabrication a nihilo.
Fair point - it depends on that phrase translated "at the same time" I suppose. Perhaps I was being too colloquial.
Quote
Notice above all that he admits what he has done. In other words he gives the reader an exact gauge by which to judge the accuracy of the reported speeches. Hardly the approach of a propagandist.
Has anyone accused Thucydides of propangandism? I haven't. But it is a useful passage from a person from a similar time showing that writers were not simple primitives - they deliberately applied craft to their writing. A good reason to apply a critical approach, IMO.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 11:37:02 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 11:09:11 AM
Key things to remember is that these big ships didn't exist earlier ...
They were specialised for optimisation in a specific role, but arguing from form to function (or perhaps vice versa) there is no reason large grain ships could not have existed earlier, when bulk grain transportation at the behest of national and/or imperial authorities seems to have taken place.
These large grain ships were amazingly seaworthy vessels because we've found none of them wrecked. Not only that but no Greek author ever mentions them.
Yet the really large Roman merchant ships were mentioned by contemporaries and found at the bottom of the sea.
So I'm pretty happy with the idea that in this case, a total lack of evidence shows that nobody bothered building them
We should not become too enamoured of historians as 'truth tellers' even nowadays. As I said earlier, we have to look at sources for what they meant in terms of the writer's purposes at he time. Herodotus has been accused of being the father of lies. Now he may be less of that than some have alleged, but he certainly retold many tales and had purposes that were not just a matter of retelling fact. Modern historians can have just as much bias, they are more likely to avoid fantasy simply because we have so much more available information these days.
As to the numbers argument , are we to believe that Xerxes stripped his empire of troops and the rich, temples and traders of all protection. Let's guess that he could march with 50% of the military potential . For comparison it s likely that Rome could put about 25% of its military in the field, on campaign in Dacia or Persia, At 50% going on the Greek expedition gives Persia a huge military of 2 million fighting men. It is very unlikely that these were raised on the basis of every free adult male being conscripted because much of the empire was not tribal, it was a sophisticated society with labour specialisation and also supported many useless mouths such as priests and administrators as well as soldiers and policemen, merchants, craftsmen , the rich , bureaucrats and so on. Is there any evidence that the Persian empire had huge garrisons and camps? Is there any information on army size that is not a natter of a Greek author repeating a topos on the numbers of Orientals?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 10:30:12 AM
Thinking about the propaganda angle, wouldn't the Greek writers have just as much reason to boast about beating a 200 000 man Persian army as beating a 3 400 000 man one? Propaganda works if it is believable to those for whom it is destined. People in that era would have known that the Persians could not possibly field armies of several million men if in fact they didn't. If 200 000 was in fact the upper limit for a Persian army then Herodotus' contemporaries would have laughed at his figures. Propaganda exercise flops.
I would suggest reading Peter Green himself (p62, but a couple of pages either side will give better context) rather than attacking a straw propagandist!
https://books.google.co.jp/books/about/The_Greco_Persian_Wars.html?id=mMpagtpnxHIC&redir_esc=y
Quote
As an example, if I told you that 80 Rhodesian soldiers utterly defeated an enemy camp of 5000 guerrillas all armed to the teeth with the latest in Russian and Chinese military hardware, killing over 1000 of them, would you think that a propaganda exercise a la Herodotus?
Wait – you want me to put modern Rhodesians into service in support or your argument, but you dismiss Maurice and Young? ;)
Quote
One needs to look at this in terms of ships. 4700 tons per day means 47 ships with a carrying capacity of 100 tons or 16 ships with a carrying capacity of 300 tons. Choose a middle figure and say 30 ships that must offload each day or 3 ships an hour. Not actually such a big deal.
I would suggest that you are being unrealistic.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
Herodotus mentions the chokepoint being at Trachis, which is just before Thermopolae. It is there precisely that Xerxes' problems began, not during the trip from the Hellespont to Greece.
Good, so you do agree that chokepoints are an issue.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere are of course other objections too, but one that I don't think has been noted in this thread so far is the 'shock and awe factor' that 10 white horses, a chariot, 10 more white horses, 1000 picked cavalrymen, 1000 picked foot, and the 10,000 Immortals elicits in 7.40-41 & 7.55. If the army was really 1,700,000 strong, would so much be made of these comparatively small elite contingents?
Why mention 10 white horses for an army of 200 000 for that matter? The context of the passage is important. Pythius the Lydian had asked Xerxes to release one of his five sons from the army to stay with him at home. Xerxes, furious, has the son executed and "set one half of his body on the right side of the road and the other on the left, so that the army would pass between them." It is not stated how wide the 'road' is, nor if it is the entire army or just a contingent of it that passes by. The army is in three sections: hoi-polloi come first, then a gap, then the king with his elite troops, then a gap, then more hoi-polloi. The mention of the white horses etc. is clearly meant to underscore the magnificence of Xerxes.
Yes, the context is important. The entire army as it was constituted at that stage is marching through (if we are to credit 7.39 & 7.41), yet those were the units mentioned. If the army were 50,000-80,000 strong, then perhaps that would make sense; if the army were 1,000,000 or larger, we might expect to be impressed by mention of contingents from various exotic places, and in larger numbers.
But this is minor by comparison to the logistical problems posed by moving, feeding and providing water for such a massive army.
You will believe what you want to believe of course, and nothing anyone here says will change your mind, but you are not convincing anyone either, so it's at a bit of an impasse.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
Herodotus mentions the chokepoint being at Trachis, which is just before Thermopolae. It is there precisely that Xerxes' problems began, not during the trip from the Hellespont to Greece.
Good, so you do agree that chokepoints are an issue.
What I took away from Maurice was that the whole stretch from before the Bridge until after you get to the river after the Gallipoli peninsular was that the whole thing was a choke point. Pretty much the whole army has to follow the same road. When he talks of pack animals in single file marching alongside infantry you realise how choked the area is.
QuoteYou will believe what you want to believe of course, and nothing anyone here says will change your mind, but you are not convincing anyone either, so it's at a bit of an impasse.
You have to treat it like WWI Aaron. Man the fire step and keep the MGs supplied with ammunition and water. Eventually they falter and you can stand down but you know that sometime soon they'll charge across that same shell-blasted terrain and it will all begin again :)
Trying a slight indirect approach but has anyone looked at campaigns with more generally agreed figures in the pre-industrial age for context? I must confess, I'm a bit stuck because my main knowledge is of medieval armies and they were doubtless much smaller than those of the great empires of the past. From what I've read, they seem to talk of forces in the low 6 figures.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 03:30:51 PM
QuoteYou will believe what you want to believe of course, and nothing anyone here says will change your mind, but you are not convincing anyone either, so it's at a bit of an impasse.
You have to treat it like WWI Aaron. Man the fire step and keep the MGs supplied with ammunition and water. Eventually they falter and you can stand down but you know that sometime soon they'll charge across that same shell-blasted terrain and it will all begin again :)
Trying a slight indirect approach but has anyone looked at campaigns with more generally agreed figures in the pre-industrial age for context? I must confess, I'm a bit stuck because my main knowledge is of medieval armies and they were doubtless much smaller than those of the great empires of the past. From what I've read, they seem to talk of forces in the low 6 figures.
what has intrigued me is that the larger the number of Greeks involved in Persian armies, the smaller the armies got.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 03:40:21 PM
what has intrigued me is that the larger the number of Greeks involved in Persian armies, the smaller the armies got.
Well, that if nothing else makes sense: since relatively few Greeks could beat millions of Asiatics, it stands to reason that increasing numbers of the former in Achaemenid armies should lead to a disproportionate reduction in the numbers of the latter needed.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 03:04:55 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
Herodotus mentions the chokepoint being at Trachis, which is just before Thermopolae. It is there precisely that Xerxes' problems began, not during the trip from the Hellespont to Greece.
Good, so you do agree that chokepoints are an issue.
What I took away from Maurice was that the whole stretch from before the Bridge until after you get to the river after the Gallipoli peninsular was that the whole thing was a choke point. Pretty much the whole army has to follow the same road. When he talks of pack animals in single file marching alongside infantry you realise how choked the area is.
Some examples of the Gallipoli countryside here (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.2623554,26.3748761,3a,75y,39.89h,86.27t/data=!3m8!1e1!3m6!1sAF1QipN4s4hZ1VCsc15_X70_zQUOILog54nNbDv05KV_!2e10!3e11!6shttps:%2F%2Flh5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1QipN4s4hZ1VCsc15_X70_zQUOILog54nNbDv05KV_%3Dw203-h100-k-no-pi-0-ya70.50001-ro-0-fo100!7i3584!8i1792?hl=en) and here (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.3755851,26.6240586,3a,75y,256.34h,85.53t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sUlxGW0KBIj1eMhZkKYTCGw!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en).
The western edge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.3855479,26.3553958,863a,35y,70.25h,76.65t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) of the peninsula mountainous and steep but the eastern edge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.2023216,26.3726103,1938a,35y,36.25h,73.44t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) (street view here (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.2317307,26.43195,3a,60y,350.63h,86.86t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1s8k85S9qk4wppK4hPVMLSpw!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en)) is flat enough - at least, I can't see any real problems crossing it once you clear a path through the trees.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 15, 2018, 03:53:53 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 03:40:21 PM
what has intrigued me is that the larger the number of Greeks involved in Persian armies, the smaller the armies got.
Well, that if nothing else makes sense: since relatively few Greeks could beat millions of Asiatics, it stands to reason that increasing numbers of the former in Achaemenid armies should lead to a disproportionate reduction in the numbers of the latter needed.
That works, but the cynic might also comment it presents more naysayers who would mock the reporter when they got home. Especially as in some of the campaigns there were Greeks on both sides
actually it would be interesting to re-read the accounts of the Persian attempts to invade Egypt when the Greeks were involved
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 03:55:18 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 03:04:55 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
Herodotus mentions the chokepoint being at Trachis, which is just before Thermopolae. It is there precisely that Xerxes' problems began, not during the trip from the Hellespont to Greece.
Good, so you do agree that chokepoints are an issue.
What I took away from Maurice was that the whole stretch from before the Bridge until after you get to the river after the Gallipoli peninsular was that the whole thing was a choke point. Pretty much the whole army has to follow the same road. When he talks of pack animals in single file marching alongside infantry you realise how choked the area is.
Some examples of the Gallipoli countryside here (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.2623554,26.3748761,3a,75y,39.89h,86.27t/data=!3m8!1e1!3m6!1sAF1QipN4s4hZ1VCsc15_X70_zQUOILog54nNbDv05KV_!2e10!3e11!6shttps:%2F%2Flh5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1QipN4s4hZ1VCsc15_X70_zQUOILog54nNbDv05KV_%3Dw203-h100-k-no-pi-0-ya70.50001-ro-0-fo100!7i3584!8i1792?hl=en) and here (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.3755851,26.6240586,3a,75y,256.34h,85.53t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sUlxGW0KBIj1eMhZkKYTCGw!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en).
The western edge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.3855479,26.3553958,863a,35y,70.25h,76.65t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) of the peninsula mountainous and steep but the eastern edge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.2023216,26.3726103,1938a,35y,36.25h,73.44t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) (street view here (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@40.2317307,26.43195,3a,60y,350.63h,86.86t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1s8k85S9qk4wppK4hPVMLSpw!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en)) is flat enough - at least, I can't see any real problems crossing it once you clear a path through the trees.
Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France, and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 11:23:13 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AM
Peter Green (the historian, not the guitarist) in his Greco-Persian Wars page 62 gives some of them for this particular instance (basically, Xerxes had every reason to exaggerate the numbers, while the Greeks after they won had no reason to revise them downwards, and that the numbers were for before the entrance into Europe).
Just to play the man not the ball here, Phil Sabin was wholly unimpressed with Peter Green's conclusions about the Granicus. Are you sure you really want to rely on Peter Green for anything, particularly when the conclusions amount to little more than a recitation of Peter Green's opinions?
Well, anyone can have a bad idea day! Generally, I think Peter Green is pretty good, but you need be critical as well, of course. With regards to our topic, he neatly summarizes the main objections to large numbers, so that's why I would refer skeptical people to his reasoning rather than anything I could say.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 11:23:13 AM
QuoteQuote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Thus far in this thread I haven't seen any killer argument - backed up with proof - that demonstrates the impossibility of such an enormous army marching, camping and being fed and watered from the Hellespont to Greece.
You probably have, but choose not to see it as such :)
Although to be fair Aaron does not point to anything that might be considered as such. ;)
Thank you, Patrick! Shall we call this the Methuselah proof? ;)
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AM
Notes to the Landmark Herodotus (p.577) translating Herodotus' grain figures into modern quantities indicate the army required 4,700 tons per day (470,000 for 100 days; 1,715,500 for a year). These supplies are coming through beaches, in potentially unfriendly territory, and without dedicated unloading crews at the drop off point, and without troops in place to secure depots in advance (if advance depots is part of the argument) so it doesn't really compare to Imperial Rome's 420,000 tons coming through a purpose-built port with organized shipping and regular crews at both ends.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 11:23:13 AM
Couple of assumptions here:
1) potentially unfriendly territory
Prior to Thermopylae, the only unfriendlies were the mauntain lions who attacked baggage animals (with a distinct preference for camels). The presence of a 1.7 million strong army had already made the relevant areas friendly; Thracians and Greeks were rushing to join Xerxes; local Greek cities were supplying his army (Herodotus VII.118-119).
2) without troops in place to secure depots in advance
Up to Acanthus, the local populations secured 'depots'. At Thermopylae, the army and fleet looked after their own security.
3) a purpose-built port with organized shipping and regular crews at both ends
The only real difference is the lack of a purpose-built port at one end. I hope nobody would be so uncharitable as to suggest that Phoenicians and the like were unpractised at unloading ships over beaches, because this is how they conducted most of their trade.
The Thessalians at least were a medizing 'work in progress', so they weren't going to have four year grain stockpiles built up there. Other areas also by the looks of it, but more noticeable once into Greece itself. At Thermopylae there are four days of waiting, three days of fighting, and a lot of supplies needed to cope with that. Perhaps they could skimp on rations temporarily, but not on water, and the terrain was not going to get much better thereafter either. A good planner would perhaps want a smaller force at this point?
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AM
There is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 11:23:13 AM
Or, to give it its more commonly known name, Thermopylae. Once the Persians had cleared away the Greek defenders, they did not all go through it, but went round it, campaigning against the Phocians en route (Herodotus VIII.30-34).
Acccording to the Landmark H there are points before and after Thermopylae, but no matter where they are, the effect would be the same in that it would take a very long whack of time to feed 1.7M fighting men plus horses, 3.5M hangers on, food on the hoof, and carts through narrow gaps. H doesn't mention an alternative route that I can see (but that's no guarantee – I might've missed it!), but if there were, where would you see the move into Phocian territory occurring, and would it be much more easily manageable?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 11:23:13 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AM
There are of course other objections too, but one that I don't think has been noted in this thread so far is the 'shock and awe factor' that 10 white horses, a chariot, 10 more white horses, 1000 picked cavalrymen, 1000 picked foot, and the 10,000 Immortals elicits in 7.40-41 & 7.55. If the army was really 1,700,000 strong, would so much be made of these comparatively small elite contingents?
Very much so, because they are the 'bravery' part of the Persian 'bravery and numbers' equation. In any event, in the passages quoted their effect is spectacular display; they do not seem to be shocking anyone, although they would be very useful for aweing the contingents from the further-flung reaches of the Empire.
That's one way to look at it, but it doesn't make sense to me: if numbers are important enough that 1.7M fighting men (and a fleet on top of that) are considered necessary, then why are those numbers not being emphasized here? If you've got them, why not flaunt them more obviously?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 04:09:27 PM
Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France, and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these
I've been to Gallipoli, but only as a visitor, so stick with Maurice!
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 04:24:27 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 04:09:27 PM
Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France, and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these
I've been to Gallipoli, but only as a visitor, so stick with Maurice!
To be fair my Grandfather didn't spend long there. Just one damn big hill after another ::)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 04:09:27 PM
Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France, and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these
I've read Maurice and on several crucial points he is wildly out. He affirms the Scamander outputted 50 000 gallons per hour at its lowest ebb, about the time Xerxes' army arrived. I've read a study on the Climate Change Impacts On Streamflow of Karamenderes (Scamander) River (http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/268566) and the minimum output of the river was at least fifty times that, most likely more since the flow of the Scamander has been decreasing in modern times. He also puts the throne of Xerxes in the wrong place - there's no hill on the site he marks on his map but there is one further south which gives a fine view of the plain below and the Hellespont. He also maintains that a British force of 72 000 men with 22 000 animals camped as close together as possible and occupied an area of 20 square miles. That's 45 square kilometers or 625 square metres per man excluding the animals. Let's give the beasties 16 square metres each. That leaves 620 square metres per man. To put it colloquially, what was Maurice smoking?
I've been told I won't change my mind no matter how many facts are pushed my way. I will, if they're facts. Is anyone interested in me doing a more detailed analysis of Maurice from the angle of getting facts right? Or do we leave this as kettle and pot?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 12:14:40 PM
Just walk me through the process of how these extra sailors would be trained- are we looking at setting up a series of maritime training colleges or similar?
First point: I am not sure there would have been any need for expansion; the Achaemenids could simply have requisitioned the services (and crews) of existing vessels.
Second point: if a need for extra vessels had been identified, the cities building them would be responsible for providing the crews, which they would do from the available pool of men who were currently between ships and as many younger citizens as they could find currently unattached. They would effectively train on the job in the year or years before the campaign was launched. The job? Probably moving extra grain to the store cities which would be supplying the campaign ...
In this context, it may be worth noting that Phoenician merchant ships had a straight post at stem and stern, to which a carved wooden bird's head would be attached in time of war. My impression is that requisitioning (or volunteering) for war was pretty standard and merchant vessels were even built with the change of role in mind.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 06:11:54 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 04:09:27 PM
Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France, and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these
I've read Maurice and on several crucial points he is wildly out. He affirms the Scamander outputted 50 000 gallons per hour at its lowest ebb, about the time Xerxes' army arrived. I've ready a study on the Climate Change Impacts On Streamflow of Karamenderes (Scamander) River (http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/268566) and the minimum output of the river was at least five times that, most likely more since the flow of the Scamander has been decreasing in modern times. He also puts the throne of Xerxes in the wrong place - there's no hill on the site he marks on his map but there is one further south which gives a fine view of the plain below and the Hellespont. He also maintains that a British force of 72 000 men with 22 000 animals camped as close together as possible and occupied an area of 20 square miles. That's 45 square kilometers or 625 square metres per man excluding the animals. Let's give the beasties 16 square metres each. That leaves 620 square metres per man. To put it colloquially, what was Maurice smoking?
I've been told I won't change my mind no matter how many facts are pushed my way. I will, if they're facts. Is anyone interested in me doing a more detailed analysis of Maurice from the angle of getting facts right? Or do we leave this as kettle and pot?
according to the paper quoted the maximum flow rate of the river is 1530 m3 s-1
but interesting table 2 has some far lower figures, below 3 m3 s-1
https://wikivividly.com/wiki/Karamenderes_River also has some figures
Like the other locations of the Mediterranean Region annual precipitation is mostly in the spring, so the flow rate is highly irregular depending on the season. While the average rate is quite low, 303 m3/s had been recorded during the flood of 2001.
Maurice's 50 gallons per hour apparently (according to google) translates as 6.3 m3 s-1
Which puts it well above the table 2 figures, and seems reasonable for a formulae, used in military reconnaissance to estimate water sufficiently accurate results
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 11:50:44 AM
QuoteThey were specialised for optimisation in a specific role, but arguing from form to function (or perhaps vice versa) there is no reason large grain ships could not have existed earlier, when bulk grain transportation at the behest of national and/or imperial authorities seems to have taken place.
So, as we have no proof such large ships didn't exist before the Romans, we can assume whole fleets of them under the Persians? Still doesn't make them suitable for beach landings, though.
Whether or not the Persians had such ships, the Athenian expedition to Syracuse in 415 BC had "thirty ships of burden (
strogguloi) laden with corn" which look like specialised grain carriers (Thucydides VI.44). Must I incidentally point out again that they do not have to land, but can discharge cargoes into boats which do?
Interestingly enough, the Athenians 'drew their ships on shore' at Rhegium. Do we take this statement to include the corn-carriers, or to exclude them?
QuoteQuoteIsn't that the approach commonly advocated here regarding Herodotus? ;)
No, not seen any evidence of it. Most people just seem to want to use a critical approach on Herodotus' work, as opposed to an inerrancy approach.
Except that the critical approach seems to smack of
falsus in unum, falsus in omnibus, which is essentially a fallacy:
"It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless, first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in themselves." - John Henry Wigmore,
Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law
Just checking on the importance of the Scamander on the progress for Northern Greece. The Scamander/Karamenderes is in Asia Minor. Am I missing something?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 06:54:02 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 06:11:54 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 04:09:27 PM
Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France, and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these
I've read Maurice and on several crucial points he is wildly out. He affirms the Scamander outputted 50 000 gallons per hour at its lowest ebb, about the time Xerxes' army arrived. I've ready a study on the Climate Change Impacts On Streamflow of Karamenderes (Scamander) River (http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/268566) and the minimum output of the river was at least five times that, most likely more since the flow of the Scamander has been decreasing in modern times. He also puts the throne of Xerxes in the wrong place - there's no hill on the site he marks on his map but there is one further south which gives a fine view of the plain below and the Hellespont. He also maintains that a British force of 72 000 men with 22 000 animals camped as close together as possible and occupied an area of 20 square miles. That's 45 square kilometers or 625 square metres per man excluding the animals. Let's give the beasties 16 square metres each. That leaves 620 square metres per man. To put it colloquially, what was Maurice smoking?
I've been told I won't change my mind no matter how many facts are pushed my way. I will, if they're facts. Is anyone interested in me doing a more detailed analysis of Maurice from the angle of getting facts right? Or do we leave this as kettle and pot?
according to the paper quoted the maximum flow rate of the river is 1530 m3 s-1
but interesting table 2 has some far lower figures, below 3 m3 s-1
https://wikivividly.com/wiki/Karamenderes_River also has some figures
Like the other locations of the Mediterranean Region annual precipitation is mostly in the spring, so the flow rate is highly irregular depending on the season. While the average rate is quite low, 303 m3/s had been recorded during the flood of 2001.
Maurice's 50 gallons per hour apparently (according to google) translates as 6.3 m3 s-1
Which puts it well above the table 2 figures, and seems reasonable for a formulae, used in military reconnaissance to estimate water sufficiently accurate results
A few more sums. The average lows for the Scamander in modern times according to the chart sit at about 7 m3 s-1. That's 25200 m3 per hour. There are 220 imperial gallons per cubit metre so we are looking at 5 544 000 gallons per hour, more than 100 times Maurice's estimate.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 07:04:50 PM
Just checking on the importance of the Scamander on the progress for Northern Greece. The Scamander/Karamenderes is in Asia Minor. Am I missing something?
It's Maurice who points out it's the last decent water source before the bridge, the next decent one is the River Hebrus in Thrace.
I haven't actually seen a' killer argument' on this thread that proves that Herodotus is incapable of being wrong or of grossly exaggerating.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 07:14:10 PM
A few more sums. The average lows for the Scamander in modern times according to the chart sits at about 7 m3 s-1. That's 25200 m3 per hour. There are 220 imperial gallons per cubit metre so we are looking at 5 544 000 gallons per hour, more than 100 times Maurice's estimate.
I merely used https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=gallons+per+hour+to+cubic+meters+per+second&oq=gallons+per+&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j0l4.4155j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 04:16:07 PM
Well, anyone can have a bad idea day! Generally, I think Peter Green is pretty good, but you need be critical as well, of course. With regards to our topic, he neatly summarizes the main objections to large numbers, so that's why I would refer skeptical people to his reasoning rather than anything I could say.
But how valid are his objections?
Quote
The Thessalians at least were a medizing 'work in progress', so they weren't going to have four year grain stockpiles built up there. Other areas also by the looks of it, but more noticeable once into Greece itself.
A more careful reading of the source some here so disparage would reveal the stocking up (or at least the preparations) took four years but the campaign was intended for less than one. As to what was demanded and obtained from the populations the Achaemenid army marched through:
"Now the dinner, about which a great deal of fuss had been made and for the preparation of which orders had been given long ago, proceeded as I will tell. As soon as the townsmen had word from the herald's proclamation, they divided corn among themselves in their cities and all of them for many months ground it to wheat and barley meal; moreover, they fed the finest beasts that money could buy, and kept landfowl and waterfowl in cages and ponds, for the entertaining of the army. They also made gold and silver cups and bowls and all manner of service for the table. These things were provided for the king himself and those that ate with him. For the rest of the army they provided only food. At the coming of the army, there was always a tent ready for Xerxes to take his rest in, while the men camped out in the open air. When the hour came for dinner, the real trouble for the hosts began. When they had eaten their fill and passed the night there, the army tore down the tent on the next day and marched off with all the movables, leaving nothing but carrying all with them." - Herodotus VII.119
So the Persians were saving their own stocks by living off the locals, who themselves saw a whole year's reserve vanish in a day. I shall not bother repeating the calculation that the 400 talents spent on a day's food could have fed 2,448,000 men.
QuoteAt Thermopylae there are four days of waiting, three days of fighting, and a lot of supplies needed to cope with that. Perhaps they could skimp on rations temporarily, but not on water, and the terrain was not going to get much better thereafter either. A good planner would perhaps want a smaller force at this point?
Or a larger supply instalment. In fact the Persians suffered heavily from the storm at Artemisium, and were never quite the same afterwards, but managed to sustain themselves up to Salamis. Dividing their army in two after passing through Phocis may have been as much an emergency foraging measure as an attempt to pursue two objectives simultaneously. Once Salamis was fought, with the corollary that the Persian maritime supply chain was no longer safe, the Achaemenid army was instantly in deep trouble.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AM
Acccording to the Landmark H there are points before and after Thermopylae, but no matter where they are, the effect would be the same in that it would take a very long whack of time to feed 1.7M fighting men plus horses, 3.5M hangers on, food on the hoof, and carts through narrow gaps. H doesn't mention an alternative route that I can see (but that's no guarantee – I might've missed it!), but if there were, where would you see the move into Phocian territory occurring, and would it be much more easily manageable?
This is one of the things which intrigued me about the campaign. We do note that Xerxes hung on for four days at Thermopylae, perhaps waiting for his army to clear the first of these as much as waiting for the Greeks to go away. I suspect that only the vehicles went through that gap, the men traversing (at some inconvenience) the higher ground.
Quote
That's one way to look at it, but it doesn't make sense to me: if numbers are important enough that 1.7M fighting men (and a fleet on top of that) are considered necessary, then why are those numbers not being emphasized here? If you've got them, why not flaunt them more obviously?
Perhaps because of the way the army marched:
"First went the baggage train and the beasts of burden, and after them a mixed army of all sorts of nations, not according to their divisions but all mingled together; when more than half had passed there was a space left, and these did not come near the king. After that, first came a thousand horsemen, chosen out of all Persians; next, a thousand spearmen, picked men like the others ... [etc.] ... After these there was a space of two stadia, and then the rest of the multitude followed all mixed together." - Herodotus VII.40-41
The picture Herodotus emphasises is
hoi polloi in front, then the magnificence of the imperial entourage, then more
hoi polloi behind. He anyway goes through the arithmetic of the army twice (at Doriscus and at Thermopylae) and probably felt that would be sufficient for most readers.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 07:19:10 PM
I haven't actually seen a' killer argument' on this thread that proves that Herodotus is incapable of being wrong or of grossly exaggerating.
Is this really the way to look at a historical source? Is not a better one to consider: if the source is correct, we would expect/need the following to occur; how do peripheral clues tie in with this? Is the account itself consistent or inconsistent? How does it fit with the practises of the powers concerned as seen in other sources?
I would point out that a number of recent finds have supported some of Herodotus' unlikelier stories, e.g. about Scythian 'drug tents'. It would be particularly unwise to condemn his account without firm evidence behind one.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 07:24:32 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 07:14:10 PM
A few more sums. The average lows for the Scamander in modern times according to the chart sits at about 7 m3 s-1. That's 25200 m3 per hour. There are 220 imperial gallons per cubit metre so we are looking at 5 544 000 gallons per hour, more than 100 times Maurice's estimate.
I merely used https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=gallons+per+hour+to+cubic+meters+per+second&oq=gallons+per+&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j0l4.4155j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
That gives US gallons: 1 m3 s-1 = 951019 US liquid gallons per hour. So 7 metres a second comes out at 6 657 133 US gallons per hour which shows just how little Maurice can be trusted. I still can't figure out how he thought each English infantryman needed a camping area measuring 25 x 25 metres for his personal convenience.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 07:30:28 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 07:19:10 PM
I haven't actually seen a' killer argument' on this thread that proves that Herodotus is incapable of being wrong or of grossly exaggerating.
Is this really the way to look at a historical source? Is not a better one to consider: if the source is correct, we would expect/need the following to occur; how do peripheral clues tie in with this? Is the account itself consistent or inconsistent? How does it fit with the practises of the powers concerned as seen in other sources?
I would point out that a number of recent finds have supported some of Herodotus' unlikelier stories, e.g. about Scythian 'drug tents'. It would be particularly unwise to condemn his account without firm evidence behind one.
I would argue that accepting the possibility that a historical or other source is not fully reliable is compatible with Western enlightenment thinking; I also am not aware of where I have been particularity unwise enough to condemn his account.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 07:34:16 PM
I still can't figure out how he thought each English infantryman needed a camping area measuring 25 x 25 metres for his personal convenience.
now you've lost me, I cannot even find where he was saying that?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 07:55:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 07:34:16 PM
I still can't figure out how he thought each English infantryman needed a camping area measuring 25 x 25 metres for his personal convenience.
now you've lost me, I cannot even find where he was saying that?
(https://i.imgur.com/ob27k6S.jpg)
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 10:30:12 AM
As an example, if I told you that 80 Rhodesian soldiers utterly defeated an enemy camp of 5000 guerrillas all armed to the teeth with the latest in Russian and Chinese military hardware, killing over 1000 of them, would you think that a propaganda exercise a la Herodotus?
Wait – you want me to put modern Rhodesians into service in support or your argument, but you dismiss Maurice and Young? ;)
The point was that it actually happened. The most unlikely events can take place even though on paper they may look like propaganda exercises. Maurice is coming apart for me. I'm willing to read Young - any chance of sending me the relevant pages as scans?
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PMQuote
One needs to look at this in terms of ships. 4700 tons per day means 47 ships with a carrying capacity of 100 tons or 16 ships with a carrying capacity of 300 tons. Choose a middle figure and say 30 ships that must offload each day or 3 ships an hour. Not actually such a big deal.
I would suggest that you are being unrealistic.
Because....
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PMQuote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!
Herodotus mentions the chokepoint being at Trachis, which is just before Thermopolae. It is there precisely that Xerxes' problems began, not during the trip from the Hellespont to Greece.
Good, so you do agree that chokepoints are an issue.
They became so at Greece where they were real chokepoints (hence Thermopylae). But not before.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PMQuote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:02:09 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 09:43:57 AMThere are of course other objections too, but one that I don't think has been noted in this thread so far is the 'shock and awe factor' that 10 white horses, a chariot, 10 more white horses, 1000 picked cavalrymen, 1000 picked foot, and the 10,000 Immortals elicits in 7.40-41 & 7.55. If the army was really 1,700,000 strong, would so much be made of these comparatively small elite contingents?
Why mention 10 white horses for an army of 200 000 for that matter? The context of the passage is important. Pythius the Lydian had asked Xerxes to release one of his five sons from the army to stay with him at home. Xerxes, furious, has the son executed and "set one half of his body on the right side of the road and the other on the left, so that the army would pass between them." It is not stated how wide the 'road' is, nor if it is the entire army or just a contingent of it that passes by. The army is in three sections: hoi-polloi come first, then a gap, then the king with his elite troops, then a gap, then more hoi-polloi. The mention of the white horses etc. is clearly meant to underscore the magnificence of Xerxes.
Yes, the context is important. The entire army as it was constituted at that stage is marching through (if we are to credit 7.39 & 7.41), yet those were the units mentioned. If the army were 50,000-80,000 strong, then perhaps that would make sense; if the army were 1,000,000 or larger, we might expect to be impressed by mention of contingents from various exotic places, and in larger numbers.
But nobody seems to have been impressed by the levies as such. It was the cream of the Persian army that drew the attention of the writers.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PMBut this is minor by comparison to the logistical problems posed by moving, feeding and providing water for such a massive army.
Well, that's what this thread is trying to examine. Thus far the problems do not seem to have been crippling so long as the Persian fleet dominated the Aegean.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 15, 2018, 02:21:09 PMYou will believe what you want to believe of course, and nothing anyone here says will change your mind, but you are not convincing anyone either, so it's at a bit of an impasse.
Convince me Aaron! Just one little irrefutable fact....
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:00:52 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 07:55:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 07:34:16 PM
I still can't figure out how he thought each English infantryman needed a camping area measuring 25 x 25 metres for his personal convenience.
now you've lost me, I cannot even find where he was saying that?
(https://i.imgur.com/ob27k6S.jpg)
it's hardly personal convenience. It's an area of concentration. So you've got proper spacing between units to allow units to march in and out and deploy. To make sure latrines aren't dug in bad areas or too close together. To give room for horses to be exercised even if only walked, and all that sort of stuff.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 08:26:02 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:00:52 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 07:55:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 07:34:16 PM
I still can't figure out how he thought each English infantryman needed a camping area measuring 25 x 25 metres for his personal convenience.
now you've lost me, I cannot even find where he was saying that?
(https://i.imgur.com/ob27k6S.jpg)
it's hardly personal convenience. It's an area of concentration. So you've got proper spacing between units to allow units to march in and out and deploy. To make sure latrines aren't dug in bad areas or too close together. To give room for horses to be exercised even if only walked, and all that sort of stuff.
So 16 men per hectare. Then by Maurice's standards, Roman soldiers (http://www.bandaarcgeophysics.co.uk/arch/roman_marching_camps_uk.html#march_stats) must have perched on each other's shoulders.
Beyond irony, Justin.
You insist in being proven wrong before you will change your mind, yet dismiss any evidence that contests your position, which you hold to be a matter of faith that the ancient sources must be right .
The only evidence you accept is a differing ancient source , or something supporting an ancient source that you happen to agree with.
Literality nothing has changed from ten pages ago.
Which is remarkably similar to all the other threads where you post reams of your own research and diagrams to back it up, while Patrick requotes masses to translations
The common denominator, the two participants who believe as a mater of faith that the ancient texts are true, and who just coincidentally also happen to be the two participants who have expressed doubts about the scientific method and academic research. Funny how they are the same two who never seem to accept evidence contradicting their positions.
Best advice now is just let them post their last word and move on.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:34:13 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 08:26:02 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:00:52 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 07:55:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 07:34:16 PM
I still can't figure out how he thought each English infantryman needed a camping area measuring 25 x 25 metres for his personal convenience.
now you've lost me, I cannot even find where he was saying that?
(https://i.imgur.com/ob27k6S.jpg)
it's hardly personal convenience. It's an area of concentration. So you've got proper spacing between units to allow units to march in and out and deploy. To make sure latrines aren't dug in bad areas or too close together. To give room for horses to be exercised even if only walked, and all that sort of stuff.
So 16 men per hectare. Then by Maurice's standards, Roman soldiers (http://www.bandaarcgeophysics.co.uk/arch/roman_marching_camps_uk.html#march_stats) must have perched on each other's shoulders.
given that it was earlier said that using Roman figures meant that camps were too big and that troops could be packed more tightly, I would suggest that actually Maurice should give us pause. He's on about troops being got ready to march, they've got to be able to mend their kit, find the latrines which have been dug well away from their lines and everything.
I don't suppose that any man got the 25m by 25m that you mention, but units will have to be kept apart if only so that guard patrols can get through and break up trouble before it starts.
I'd say that the Roman marching camp is the most densely backed we could expect
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 04:09:27 PMand I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these
That I have done! A side trip from my favorite city for history - Istanbul.
But at the time, I didn't go to equip myself with a view on this topic.
Still, it was a frightfully silly place to start a fight. I mean Gallipoli, not this thread... :)
Just for some practical considerations regarding the unloading process, I asked my brother who skippers a deep sea fishing vessel out of Australia about the feasibility of unloading a 50 ton vessel in a day. He reckons a crew of 58, working shifts of one hour on and half an hour off for maximum efficiency, using nets and a pulley system capable of lifting 500kgs at a time, and with foremen who knew what they were doing, could unload 50 ton of cargo from ship to dock in 12 hours. Done chain gang style, with no nets or pulleys used, he reckons you'd need double the number of men.
As for unloading via smaller ships ferrying goods to a beach, it would depend how far off shore the vessel was moored, but he reckoned you'd struggle to unload 50 tons in a day. In his opinion, for a modern vessel you'd need something like twelve dinghies / tenders per ship working in constant relays, good weather and sea conditions, and 150 men for the job. You could use fewer ferrying vessels for a ship which mooring closer to the beach, but you'd still need the same number of trips.
So in practice unloading 3000 tons a day via 60 50 ton ships would not be as easy as it might appear!
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 11, 2018, 12:13:18 PM
To provide 1.7 million (or rather 3.4 million if noncombatants are provided for) men with a daily choenix (roughly 2 lbs) of food each, which Herodotus considers the minimum requirement, requires moving about 6.8 million pounds or about 3,000 tons per day. This translates to unloading about sixty 50-ton ships on a daily basis, a figure well within the capacity of the coastal cities of the Persian Empire to provide and the average Greek beach to handle. At the other end of the pipeline, loading sixty 50-tonners daily should not tax the capability of a decent port.
So, as long as there are no storms and no hostile fleets interfering with the system, there should be no problem keeping Xerxes' army supplied.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 03:30:51 PM
QuoteYou will believe what you want to believe of course, and nothing anyone here says will change your mind, but you are not convincing anyone either, so it's at a bit of an impasse.
You have to treat it like WWI Aaron. Man the fire step and keep the MGs supplied with ammunition and water. Eventually they falter and you can stand down but you know that sometime soon they'll charge across that same shell-blasted terrain and it will all begin again :)
;D
A good joke's a good joke, but I do of course fully support Patrick and Justin's right to their own approach to the sources. There are points of disagreement (often large ones!) but debate is healthy, provided it's done in a respectful way, as it has been here.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 03:51:14 AM
A good joke's a good joke, but I do of course fully support Patrick and Justin's right to their own approach to the sources. There are points of disagreement (often large ones!) but debate is healthy, provided it's done in a respectful way, as it has been here.
There does seem to be significant differences of opinion regarding, when to apply doubt, or how much doubt should be applied to literary sources.
I am guessing that no one is really a literalist, and that everyone sits on a continuum.
And I would hazard a guess that in some cases we would reach consensus.
For example, in the
Chronicles of Chiang Mai, one of the first kings is described as having an army of 117 million men. I am guessing we could reach consensus on that.
It is almost as likely that we'll reach consensus on whether a cross really did appear above the battle of Milvian Bridge with 'conquer by this' written on it, as per the
Life of Constantine.
For me, events without precedent or antecedent (like squeezing 3 million Persians through a small gap) don't pass the sniff test, even before we get to detailed criticisms like that of Maurice.
Perhaps at least, being aware of where we each sit on the incredulity continuum can tell us the risks we take balancing efficiency and criticism?
PS: Personally I think it of as a ratio of certainty over evidence, and it may lead me to worry unnecessarily about things like the quality of evidence for Roman auxiliary equipment...
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 03:09:27 AM
Just for some practical considerations regarding the unloading process, I asked my brother who skippers a deep sea fishing vessel out of Australia about the feasibility of unloading a 50 ton vessel in a day. He reckons a crew of 58, working shifts of one hour on and half an hour off for maximum efficiency, using nets and a pulley system capable of lifting 500kgs at a time, and with foremen who knew what they were doing, could unload 50 ton of cargo from ship to dock in 12 hours. Done chain gang style, with no nets or pulleys used, he reckons you'd need double the number of men.
Here's one comparison. We use a lot of 80gsm white bond paper at my print shop. It is ordered by reams, each ream measuring 61x86cm and weighing 40kg. I often order 20 reams. When the truck arrives I help unload it with one, possibly two men from the truck. It takes about 10 - 15 minutes to unload 800kg. So at that rate with breaks totalling 2 hours we would unload 50 tons in 12 hours - just the three of us.
The secret is to unload the cargo a bit at a time, in quantities individual men can manage.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 05:08:10 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 03:09:27 AM
Just for some practical considerations regarding the unloading process, I asked my brother who skippers a deep sea fishing vessel out of Australia about the feasibility of unloading a 50 ton vessel in a day. He reckons a crew of 58, working shifts of one hour on and half an hour off for maximum efficiency, using nets and a pulley system capable of lifting 500kgs at a time, and with foremen who knew what they were doing, could unload 50 ton of cargo from ship to dock in 12 hours. Done chain gang style, with no nets or pulleys used, he reckons you'd need double the number of men.
Here's one comparison. We use a lot of 80gsm white bond paper at my print shop. It is ordered by reams, each ream measuring 61x86cm and weighing 40kg. I often order 20 reams. When the truck arrives I help unload it with one, possibly two men from the truck. It takes about 10 - 15 minutes to unload 800kg. So at that rate with breaks totalling 2 hours we would unload 50 tons in 12 hours - just the three of us.
The secret is to unload the cargo a bit at a time, in quantities individual men can manage.
well that's certainly an argument for loading lose grain
Looking at one of Patrick's amphora, apparently the standard on held 5·77 imperial gallons
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Quadrantal.html
So it holds just over 20kg
As for the weight of the amphora itself these vary but I saw an interesting comment
https://www.anticopedie.fr/dossiers/dossiers-gb/amphora.html
Their shape may seem strange at the first look, since they cannot stand upright, but it's however very convenient to stack them up in a boat and to be carried by man. A clever point is that the weight of some amphoras, when empty, is equal to that of their content (it should thus not exceed 23-24 kg!) thus, when a boat has to be loaded, one will know that one full amphora will be balanced by two empty ones...
So our grain filled amphora, should such a thing need to ever be transported, weights in at about 50kg.
I've unloaded by ten tons of 50kg bags of ammonium nitrate far too many times, but I'm not sure I'd want to do it on a moving surface
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 15, 2018, 07:46:17 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 15, 2018, 07:30:28 PM
I would point out that a number of recent finds have supported some of Herodotus' unlikelier stories, e.g. about Scythian 'drug tents'. It would be particularly unwise to condemn his account without firm evidence behind one.
I would argue that accepting the possibility that a historical or other source is not fully reliable is compatible with Western enlightenment thinking; I also am not aware of where I have been particularity unwise enough to condemn his account.
There is a world of difference between 'not fully reliable' and 'dismissable on sight'. The essence of the question and crux of the matter is whether the source is basically correct. Western 'enlightenment thinking' (which I take to be the 21st century rather than the 18th century approach) seems to assume
guilty until proven to agree with a particular outlook or theory, the standard of proof often being a moving goalpost. I prefer and consider it more logical to assume innocent until at least some indication of guilt becomes manifest (e.g. as Nicholas points out, an army of 117 million for a king of Chiang Mai presupposes various factors which do not seem to have been present at the time, most notably a population of around 1,170,000,000 in Chiang Mai's territories).
Had my interlocutor been unwise enough to condemn Herodotus' account out of hand I would not have used the conditional 'it would be'. Instead I salute his discretion. ;)
Just to recap on general approach: I've been proven wrong too many times in the past to think it won't happen again in the future (my wife regularly proves me wrong in the present). If Herodotus is talking rubbish then fine, I'll drop him like a hot brick. But I was about to say what Patrick said: innocent until proven guilty, not vice versa. Reading Herodotus, Arrian, Livy and the like, I pick up the fact that they were trying to be historians and get their facts right. Obviously they had bias like any human, but I don't get the impression they had it anywhere near the level of a Goebbels. It's especially interesting when they give precise numbers and concomitant details: Herodotus citing 1 700 000 million rather than just 5 000 000 or 10 000 000, and describing how Xerxes determined the size of his army by measuring 10 000 man contingents. It's rather too elaborate to be just a vague exaggeration. If wrong, it has to be a systematic fabrication.
What was the Greek word for fact, and it's entomology?
what irritates me about the whole debate is that it would be much more useful if we could find out where Herodotus got his figures from, what sort of figures the Persian Empire kept etc
We have the details of how some contingents were put together and paid, and it might be that Herodotus had seen some sort of Empire wide summary document
But the idea that Xerxes took damned near six million people to Greece in summer is getting in the way of actually looking at proper history
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 03:09:27 AM
Just for some practical considerations regarding the unloading process, I asked my brother who skippers a deep sea fishing vessel out of Australia about the feasibility of unloading a 50 ton vessel in a day. He reckons a crew of 58, working shifts of one hour on and half an hour off for maximum efficiency, using nets and a pulley system capable of lifting 500kgs at a time, and with foremen who knew what they were doing, could unload 50 ton of cargo from ship to dock in 12 hours. Done chain gang style, with no nets or pulleys used, he reckons you'd need double the number of men.
As for unloading via smaller ships ferrying goods to a beach, it would depend how far off shore the vessel was moored, but he reckoned you'd struggle to unload 50 tons in a day. In his opinion, for a modern vessel you'd need something like twelve dinghies / tenders per ship working in constant relays, good weather and sea conditions, and 150 men for the job. You could use fewer ferrying vessels for a ship which mooring closer to the beach, but you'd still need the same number of trips.
Interesting to know, Aaron, although as Jim's useful and practical information on amphorae suggests, unloading amphorae is a bit different to unloading fish. Not sure if that is a full enough response, but as Jim and Justin indicate, the trawlerman's estimate might be a bit on the time- and labour-intensive side.
Now on the matter of Thermopylae and its associated choke points ...
Herodotus VIII.24-25 gives us a clue how the Persians could have shifted their army past Thermopylae:
While they were there, Xerxes sent a herald to the fleet. Before sending him, Xerxes had made the following preparations: of all his own soldiers who had fallen at Thermopylae (that is, as many as twenty thousand) he left about a thousand, and the rest he buried in trenches, which he covered with leaves and heaped earth so that the men of the fleet might not see them. [2] When the herald had crossed over to Histiaea, he assembled all the men of the fleet and said: "Men of our allies, King Xerxes permits any one of you who should so desire to leave his place and come to see how he fights against those foolish men who thought they could overcome the king's power."
After this proclamation, there was nothing so hard to get as a boat, so many were they who wanted to see this. They crossed over and went about viewing the dead. All of them supposed that the fallen Greeks were all Lacedaemonians and Thespians, though helots were also there for them to see. [2] For all that, however, those who crossed over were not deceived by what Xerxes had done with his own dead, for the thing was truly ridiculous; of the Persians a thousand lay dead before their eyes, but the Greeks lay all together assembled in one place, to the number of four thousand. [3] All that day they spent in observation, and on the next the shipmen returned to their fleet at Histiaea while Xerxes' army set forth on its march.
What Xerxes actually did, however, was to march through Phocis. The Thessalians who acted as his guides (Herodotus VIII.31) took him through a route 'no more than thirty furlongs wide', which must have seemed more congenial for the movement of a large army than the one-carriage-wide route via Thermopylae. From Phocis he went on into Boeotia and thence to Attica (Herodotus VIII.32-34 and 50-51), with a contingent splitting off to attack Delphi (VIII.35-38).
Quote from: Mark G on April 16, 2018, 07:57:23 AM
What was the Greek word for fact, and it's entomology?
Please explain the relevance of the study of insects to this discussion. ???
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 16, 2018, 08:07:23 AM
what irritates me about the whole debate is that it would be much more useful if we could find out where Herodotus got his figures from, what sort of figures the Persian Empire kept etc
For that we need to find archives. And we probably need to find them in Iran.
QuoteBut the idea that Xerxes took damned near six million people to Greece in summer is getting in the way of actually looking at proper history
The $64,000 dollar question: why?
QuoteExcept that the critical approach seems to smack of falsus in unum, falsus in omnibus, which is essentially a fallacy:
Genuinely struggling to see this. If this were the case, we could reject Herodotus' whole story by pointing to his obviously fabulous tales. Whereas a coherent set of problems has been raised, not against Herodotus' whole narrative, but a particular aspect of it, his numbers.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 15, 2018, 07:16:34 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 15, 2018, 07:04:50 PM
Just checking on the importance of the Scamander on the progress for Northern Greece. The Scamander/Karamenderes is in Asia Minor. Am I missing something?
It's Maurice who points out it's the last decent water source before the bridge, the next decent one is the River Hebrus in Thrace.
Thanks. But we are making no allowance for transport of water, so are we assuming that the army only stops at major rivers to drink, and if so, would that work? I was more thinking of drinking maybe once, at the end of the march, each day.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2018, 08:20:46 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 16, 2018, 08:07:23 AM
it would be much more useful if we could find out where Herodotus got his figures from, what sort of figures the Persian Empire kept etc
For that we need to find archives. And we probably need to find them in Iran.
From the archives we do have (see http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/persepolis-admin-archive for example), unfortunately, it would be hard to prove that the Achaemenids even had an army...
I have owned a Persian wargames army for years but sadly and a little embarrassingly know very little about their culture and society. Are they semi-feudal ? I assume they are not a totalitarian ' hydraulic' civilisation like the Sumerians or Egyptians.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:17:27 PM
Convince me Aaron! Just one little irrefutable fact....
I don't believe it would be possible to reliably deliver the posited daily requirement of 3000+ tons of shipped grain supplies.
See here, regarding traffic through Ostia in Imperial times, which was of course a special case:
http://www.ostia-antica.org/med/med.htm#52
"Generally speaking the unloading of a ship of 150 tons will have taken two to four days. A cargo of 250 tons required six to eight days. Certain cargoes required special loading and unloading facilities. Sacks of grain and lighter amphorae could be carried by dockhands. Heavier amphorae were carried by two men, using poles slipped through the handles. Mobile cranes were used for lifting heavy objects such as marble sarcophagi and wild animals in cages. For the unloading of an obelisk, weighing many tons, exceptionally strong cranes must have been built."
If you are transporting via amphora as posited (say 39l capacity each @ 30kgs a pop (not including tare)), you need to be loading 100,000 and transporting, delivering and unloading another 100,000 of them daily.
And you are still having to get another 1700 tons from land sources as well.
It would be a massive operation. I don't think you are taking that properly into account.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2018, 08:20:46 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 16, 2018, 08:07:23 AM
what irritates me about the whole debate is that it would be much more useful if we could find out where Herodotus got his figures from, what sort of figures the Persian Empire kept etc
For that we need to find archives. And we probably need to find them in Iran.
I don't think Herodotus refers to such things? Do we know they existed?
We can't expect Herodotus use of sources to be rigorous.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 16, 2018, 09:34:07 AM
I have owned a Persian wargames army for years but sadly and a little embarrassingly know very little about their culture and society. Are they semi-feudal ? I assume they are not a totalitarian ' hydraulic' civilisation like the Sumerians or Egyptians.
Things like the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury archives suggest that they had a developed bureaucracy very much on Mesopotamian lines. The use of Elamite, particularly, indicates that the homeland of Persis/Parsa itself was at least partially a Near Eastern bureaucratic society. But this administration was in the service of an Iranian warrior aristocracy, and it is not entirely clear (to me, at least) how far into the hinterlands of the Empire the bureaucratic habit penetrated.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 10:50:54 AM
Things like the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury archives suggest that they had a developed bureaucracy very much on Mesopotamian lines. The use of Elamite, particularly, indicates that the homeland of Persis/Parsa itself was at least partially a Near Eastern bureaucratic society. But this administration was in the service of an Iranian warrior aristocracy, and it is not entirely clear (to me, at least) how far into the hinterlands of the Empire the bureaucratic habit penetrated.
Bureaucracies take a special interest in maintaining tax records.
Collecting interesting historical snippets and then making them publicly available for would-be Greek historians to spend a leisurely afternoon browsing, probably less so.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 09:13:12 AM
From the archives we do have (see http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/persepolis-admin-archive for example), unfortunately, it would be hard to prove that the Achaemenids even had an army...
I rather like that Iranica Online - I've referred to quite a bit of their stuff during this debate. What this does show us is the level of bureacracy denotes a sophisticated administrative system, as we would expect from an empire drawing a great deal from the great Mesopotamian civilisations. To me, it shows we can safely say that the Persians could build up a major military effort and supply it as well as any of the ancient empires. There is nothing to suggest they were particularly less competent in this respect. But then, it doesn't seem to prove they were the most competent administration until modern times either, unless there is other compelling evidence?
Quote from: Dangun on April 16, 2018, 10:56:31 AMBureaucracies take a special interest in maintaining tax records.
Collecting interesting historical snippets and then making them publicly available for would-be Greek historians to spend a leisurely afternoon browsing, probably less so.
It seems to me quite plausible - though probably unprovable - that:
- Achaemenid administrators produced some form of documentation summarising the composition of the expeditionary army of 480.
- That some copies of that documentation would have been present in Europe or Western Anatolia with the army.
- That one or more of those copies might have fallen into Greek hands, for instance at the capture of Mardonios' camp after Plataia or the capture of Sestos or of some other previously-Persian garrison.
- That the Greeks could find someone who could read Achaemenid administrative Aramaic.
I don't find it implausible, therefore, that Herodotos could have had genuine sources for his contingent-list of the army and for the logistic arrangements. Other stuff maybe less so, depending what "interesting historical snippets" you had in mind.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 10:38:41 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:17:27 PM
Convince me Aaron! Just one little irrefutable fact....
I don't believe it would be possible to reliably deliver the posited daily requirement of 3000+ tons of shipped grain supplies.
See here, regarding traffic through Ostia in Imperial times, which was of course a special case:
http://www.ostia-antica.org/med/med.htm#52
"Generally speaking the unloading of a ship of 150 tons will have taken two to four days. A cargo of 250 tons required six to eight days. Certain cargoes required special loading and unloading facilities. Sacks of grain and lighter amphorae could be carried by dockhands. Heavier amphorae were carried by two men, using poles slipped through the handles. Mobile cranes were used for lifting heavy objects such as marble sarcophagi and wild animals in cages. For the unloading of an obelisk, weighing many tons, exceptionally strong cranes must have been built."
If you are transporting via amphora as posited (say 39l capacity each @ 30kgs a pop (not including tare)), you need to be loading 100,000 and transporting, delivering and unloading another 100,000 of them daily.
And you are still having to get another 1700 tons from land sources as well.
It would be a massive operation. I don't think you are taking that properly into account.
Fine Aaron. Let's work with this.
If the 50-ton capacity ships used amphorae then they were carrying 25 tons of grain. For 3000 tons you need 120 ships. If a 150 ton Roman ship unloads on average in 3 days then a 50-tonner unloads on average in one day. So the 120 ships must all unload together on the same day. Each ship is about 30 metres long. End-to-end they measure 3600 metres. Given them some clearance and make it 50 metres per ship (the ships needn't be aligned end-to-end but anyway) and you require 6000 metres or 6km or 4 miles of usuable beach. it doesn't have to be continuous beach, just close enough to the campsite.
If the 50-ton capacity ships store grain in sacks then you will require about half the length of beach - 3km or 2 miles - to unload 3000 tons a day (I prefer sacks).
Personally I think the Persians would have unloaded the ships much more quickly since there were any number of available hands and speed was of the essence. I also think the ships could have crowded closer together without colliding against each other.
The question now is whether there is enough usable beach along the northern and western Aegean coastline. Proving there isn't will kill the idea of a huge army as effectively as genuine chokepoints that can't be passed on either side by the infantry.
PS: just did a Google Maps tour of the coastline. It seems to be mostly beach though of course that isn't necessarily an accurate representation of the situation in 480 BC.
(http://collections.rmg.co.uk/mediaLib/387/media-387594/large.jpg)
I think we should be looking more at this sort of process than lightering. Though in our case, I'd envisage chains of men shifting stuff up the beach to load on animal transport (because we don't seem to allow any wagons, presumably due to terrain, rather than technology not available). The level of swell in this picture would be pretty marginal for offloading to human chains though. Incidentally, this also shows how you beach - bow on. Our ancient mariners could then potentially offload on both sides.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 16, 2018, 12:40:44 PM
(http://collections.rmg.co.uk/mediaLib/387/media-387594/large.jpg)
I think we should be looking more at this sort of process than lightering. Though in our case, I'd envisage chains of men shifting stuff up the beach to load on animal transport (because we don't seem to allow any wagons, presumably due to terrain, rather than technology not available). The level of swell in this picture would be pretty marginal for offloading to human chains though. Incidentally, this also shows how you beach - bow on. Our ancient mariners could then potentially offload on both sides.
Fascinating, Anthony. :)
Ancient (Roman) depiction of grain transported by sea (https://i.pinimg.com/originals/67/eb/c8/67ebc8d57763114fe83a08457c35fde1.jpg) - being brought on board in sacks and poured into some sort of larger container.
For the Humongous Herodotusian Army Hypothesis (HHAH) to be even slightly plausible I think we need to demonstrate the following.
1. An extensive empire wide bureaucracy and police/security service with the authority and ability to enforce policy compliance on any recalcitrant nobles/tribal leaders
2. A huge regular logistics corps able to set up large and effective supply dumps able to store food stuffs for years at a time. Oh, and ensure quality compliance.
3. An extensive mapping service able to provide planned routes across country for multiple columns of men which also ensures they can reach the above.
4. A sort of Persian Ofsted capable of monitoring the extensive apprentice scheme needed to produce a large number of effective sailors and ships captains. The service would need to be multilingual to deal effectively with locals who don't or claim they cant speak Persian.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 11:08:47 AM
It seems to me quite plausible - though probably unprovable - that:
Yes, possible. Certainly unprovable. (Unless someone who new the Histories better than me could point to a reference in the text. But the set of all possible explanations is very, very large.
But Herodotus does a lot of quoting anecdotes or stories, "learned men say," and so recycling fiction is another possibility.
I would prefer it not to be, since its a solitary source for so much stuff, but...?
In an idle moment, I thought I'd maintain the flow of new information by looking up the weather in the Aegean in summer
This website for yachtsmen (http://www.sailingissues.com/meltemi.html) is quite interesting. The Meltimi or Etesian winds make for a more unpredictable sea state than has been suggested before and would be something to be factored into any cross-Aegean nautical conveyor belt.
Quote from: Dangun on April 16, 2018, 02:16:16 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 11:08:47 AM
It seems to me quite plausible - though probably unprovable - that:
Yes, possible. Certainly unprovable. (Unless someone who new the Histories better than me could point to a reference in the text. But the set of all possible explanations is very, very large.
But Herodotus does a lot of quoting anecdotes or stories, "learned men say," and so recycling fiction is another possibility.
I would prefer it not to be, since its a solitary source for so much stuff, but...?
A question that occurred to me: assuming a OOB ended up in Greek hands along Duncan's suggestion, how likely is it that Herodotus would have used it? He stands more-or-less at the start of Greek historiography - presumably nobody in 479 would have thought to keep the document for the future benefit of a profession not yet invented. And if it were kept in some archive somewhere, would Herodotus have gone looking for it? His basic MO were autopsy and interview, not archival studies, right?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 16, 2018, 03:54:22 PM
A question that occurred to me: assuming a OOB ended up in Greek hands along Duncan's suggestion, how likely is it that Herodotus would have used it? He stands more-or-less at the start of Greek historiography - presumably nobody in 479 would have thought to keep the document for the future benefit of a profession not yet invented. And if it were kept in some archive somewhere, would Herodotus have gone looking for it? His basic MO were autopsy and interview, not archival studies, right?
He did use the work of earlier historians - at least, he quotes what "Hecataeus the son of Hegesandrus declares in his history". (It's commonly suggested that he got his list of Achaemenid satrapies and their revenues from Hecataeus, but he doesn't actually say so.) So he was not averse to using written sources. But given that we have no knowledge that he read Aramaic, his source would presumably have to have been interview of someone who could.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 16, 2018, 03:54:22 PM
Quote from: Dangun on April 16, 2018, 02:16:16 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 11:08:47 AM
It seems to me quite plausible - though probably unprovable - that:
Yes, possible. Certainly unprovable. (Unless someone who new the Histories better than me could point to a reference in the text. But the set of all possible explanations is very, very large.
But Herodotus does a lot of quoting anecdotes or stories, "learned men say," and so recycling fiction is another possibility.
I would prefer it not to be, since its a solitary source for so much stuff, but...?
A question that occurred to me: assuming a OOB ended up in Greek hands along Duncan's suggestion, how likely is it that Herodotus would have used it? He stands more-or-less at the start of Greek historiography - presumably nobody in 479 would have thought to keep the document for the future benefit of a profession not yet invented. And if it were kept in some archive somewhere, would Herodotus have gone looking for it? His basic MO were autopsy and interview, not archival studies, right?
At the beginning of his Histories Herodotus mentions 'Persians best informed in history', 'Persian learned men' - λόγιοι having the sense of a) versed in tales or stories; b) learned, erudite (most common usage); or c) skilled in words, eloquent.
b) fits the context here. This implies writing. If Herodotus had access to Persian historical accounts the natural conclusion is that he would have looked for written records of Xerxes' campaign. He was a Persian subject and the fact that he was able to travel so much indicates his family were well off and well-connected. He was related to Panyassis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panyassis). I think it natural he would have been able to lay his hands on what he was looking for.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 05:06:21 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 16, 2018, 03:54:22 PM
Quote from: Dangun on April 16, 2018, 02:16:16 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 11:08:47 AM
It seems to me quite plausible - though probably unprovable - that:
Yes, possible. Certainly unprovable. (Unless someone who new the Histories better than me could point to a reference in the text. But the set of all possible explanations is very, very large.
But Herodotus does a lot of quoting anecdotes or stories, "learned men say," and so recycling fiction is another possibility.
I would prefer it not to be, since its a solitary source for so much stuff, but...?
A question that occurred to me: assuming a OOB ended up in Greek hands along Duncan's suggestion, how likely is it that Herodotus would have used it? He stands more-or-less at the start of Greek historiography - presumably nobody in 479 would have thought to keep the document for the future benefit of a profession not yet invented. And if it were kept in some archive somewhere, would Herodotus have gone looking for it? His basic MO were autopsy and interview, not archival studies, right?
At the beginning of his Histories Herodotus mentions 'Persians best informed in history', 'Persian learned men' - λόγιοι having the sense of a) versed in tales or stories; b) learned, erudite (most common usage); or c) skilled in words, eloquent.
b) fits the context here. This implies writing. If Herodotus had access to Persian historical accounts the natural conclusion is that he would have looked for written records of Xerxes' campaign. He was a Persian subject and the fact that he was able to travel so much indicates his family were well off and well-connected. He was related to Panyassis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panyassis). I think it natural he would have been able to lay his hands on what he was looking for.
Interesting that there seem to be quite different standards of proof depending on whether things fit or don't fit your argument, Justin! ;D
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 06:17:25 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 05:06:21 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 16, 2018, 03:54:22 PM
Quote from: Dangun on April 16, 2018, 02:16:16 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 11:08:47 AM
It seems to me quite plausible - though probably unprovable - that:
Yes, possible. Certainly unprovable. (Unless someone who new the Histories better than me could point to a reference in the text. But the set of all possible explanations is very, very large.
But Herodotus does a lot of quoting anecdotes or stories, "learned men say," and so recycling fiction is another possibility.
I would prefer it not to be, since its a solitary source for so much stuff, but...?
A question that occurred to me: assuming a OOB ended up in Greek hands along Duncan's suggestion, how likely is it that Herodotus would have used it? He stands more-or-less at the start of Greek historiography - presumably nobody in 479 would have thought to keep the document for the future benefit of a profession not yet invented. And if it were kept in some archive somewhere, would Herodotus have gone looking for it? His basic MO were autopsy and interview, not archival studies, right?
At the beginning of his Histories Herodotus mentions 'Persians best informed in history', 'Persian learned men' - λόγιοι having the sense of a) versed in tales or stories; b) learned, erudite (most common usage); or c) skilled in words, eloquent.
b) fits the context here. This implies writing. If Herodotus had access to Persian historical accounts the natural conclusion is that he would have looked for written records of Xerxes' campaign. He was a Persian subject and the fact that he was able to travel so much indicates his family were well off and well-connected. He was related to Panyassis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panyassis). I think it natural he would have been able to lay his hands on what he was looking for.
Interesting that there seem to be quite different standards of proof depending on whether things fit or don't fit your argument, Justin! ;D
Not really. I'm being hesitant here. Very little is known about Herodotus' life or circumstances. I can't really go any further than Duncan: it's feasible/reasonable that Herodotus could have seen or at least heard translated Persian records of the campaign, but it can't be proven that he did.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 06:24:09 PM
If Herodotus had access to Persian historical accounts the natural conclusion is that he would have looked for written records of Xerxes' campaign. He was a Persian subject and the fact that he was able to travel so much indicates his family were well off and well-connected. He was related to Panyassis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panyassis). I think it natural he would have been able to lay his hands on what he was looking for.
That's you being hesitant? Really?
Compare this to your response to assertions contrary to your argument by Maurice, a career military man, whose expertise you dismiss with a 'what's he been smoking', and to a ship's captain, whose considered opinion on time and manpower needed to unload cargo you dismiss on the basis of your having unloaded a delivery van or two...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2018, 08:20:46 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 03:09:27 AM
Just for some practical considerations regarding the unloading process, I asked my brother who skippers a deep sea fishing vessel out of Australia about the feasibility of unloading a 50 ton vessel in a day. He reckons a crew of 58, working shifts of one hour on and half an hour off for maximum efficiency, using nets and a pulley system capable of lifting 500kgs at a time, and with foremen who knew what they were doing, could unload 50 ton of cargo from ship to dock in 12 hours. Done chain gang style, with no nets or pulleys used, he reckons you'd need double the number of men.
As for unloading via smaller ships ferrying goods to a beach, it would depend how far off shore the vessel was moored, but he reckoned you'd struggle to unload 50 tons in a day. In his opinion, for a modern vessel you'd need something like twelve dinghies / tenders per ship working in constant relays, good weather and sea conditions, and 150 men for the job. You could use fewer ferrying vessels for a ship which mooring closer to the beach, but you'd still need the same number of trips.
Interesting to know, Aaron, although as Jim's useful and practical information on amphorae suggests, unloading amphorae is a bit different to unloading fish. Not sure if that is a full enough response, but as Jim and Justin indicate, the trawlerman's estimate might be a bit on the time- and labour-intensive side.
My question was how big a working party he would consider necessary to unload 50 ton of foodstuffs by hand from a docked ship in 12 hours, and how feasible he would consider it to ferry 50 ton of materials from a moored ship to a beach in the same time frame. His answers regarding dock unloading times match those of the Ostia website link I posted earlier.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 06:59:34 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 06:24:09 PM
If Herodotus had access to Persian historical accounts the natural conclusion is that he would have looked for written records of Xerxes' campaign. He was a Persian subject and the fact that he was able to travel so much indicates his family were well off and well-connected. He was related to Panyassis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panyassis). I think it natural he would have been able to lay his hands on what he was looking for.
That's you being hesitant? Really?
Compare this to your response to assertions contrary to your argument by Maurice, a career military man, whose expertise you dismiss with a 'what's he been smoking', and to a ship's captain, whose considered opinion on time and manpower needed to unload cargo you dismiss on the basis of your having unloaded a delivery van or two...
'Natural' doesn't mean 'proven'. The fact that Herodotus has so much to say about the details of the campaign does
suggest he used written sources, or at least listened to people who read from those sources or had comprehensive knowledge of them.
As for Maurice, I'm sorry Aaron, but he's talking nonsense if he thinks a British army camp, squeezed as tight as possible to facilitate getting supplies from a railway line, needed 620 square metres per man. We have a pretty accurate idea of how compact a Roman camp was and it wasn't 16 men per hectare. Estimates put it between 480 and 1180 men.
He's also impossibly out in his estimation of the output of the Scamander. He didn't have a remotely accurate method for calculating its flow but affirms he did. I conclude that as an army officer he had a certain set of skills but these did not include calculating the area covered by a camp or the rate of flow of a river. There's a lot more I could say about Maurice but we can leave it at that.
Your brother calculated the rate of unloading a ship by dividing the cargo into loads of half a ton each, which requires nets and a pulley system: tricky and I think slow. My take is that if you split the load into units a man can handle - say 50kg - unloading will go much faster. One really has to try out both techniques and see how fast they actually are.
A delivery van of course is not a ship, but I think the comparison is a fair one. The hard part is getting the cargo over the side to the men in the water below - something like a 3-metre drop. If the grain is in amphorae you just lower it with a rope; if it's in a sack then maybe you use a net, I don't know. In any case taking your brother's estimates (which I did), landing the necessary supplies by beach remains feasible for the Persian fleet.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 07:09:07 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2018, 08:20:46 AM
Interesting to know, Aaron, although as Jim's useful and practical information on amphorae suggests, unloading amphorae is a bit different to unloading fish. Not sure if that is a full enough response, but as Jim and Justin indicate, the trawlerman's estimate might be a bit on the time- and labour-intensive side.
My question was how big a working party he would consider necessary to unload 50 ton of foodstuffs by hand from a docked ship in 12 hours, and how feasible he would consider it to ferry 50 ton of materials from a moored ship to a beach in the same time frame. His answers regarding dock unloading times match those of the Ostia website link I posted earlier.
And the Ostia times are presumably also derived from 21st century estimates, based on 21st century techniques.
Would it be possible to ask him to make the same estimate for a Phoenician vessel using classical period techniques? I have this difficulty seeing Phoenician traders turning up at a beach in the Casseritides, taking 2-3 days to offload their trade goods, then another 2-3 days to get their new goodies on board one trading is concluded.
The
modus operandi I have in mind for the Achaemenids is this: ship anchors in shallow water offshore, hoists amphorae onto boats in a fairly steady stream; boats pull for shore, beach; willing hands on shore help boat crews lift amphorae over the gunwales; crews get boats back into water and row back for the next amphora or two or four or whatever. The tempo is going to be that of military operations rather than that of dock persons who traditionally feel that haste is a waste of earning opportunity.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 06:59:34 PM
That's you being hesitant? Really?
Compare this to your response to assertions contrary to your argument by Maurice, a career military man, whose expertise you dismiss with a 'what's he been smoking', and to a ship's captain, whose considered opinion on time and manpower needed to unload cargo you dismiss on the basis of your having unloaded a delivery van or two...
I must second Justin's reservations about Maurice's conclusions: yes, he was a career military man, and very knowledgeable concerning what he wrote about, it is just that what he wrote about bore no relation to the 5th century BC.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 16, 2018, 03:03:07 PM
In an idle moment, I thought I'd maintain the flow of new information by looking up the weather in the Aegean in summer
This website for yachtsmen (http://www.sailingissues.com/meltemi.html) is quite interesting. The Meltimi or Etesian winds make for a more unpredictable sea state than has been suggested before and would be something to be factored into any cross-Aegean nautical conveyor belt.
In Herodotus, one gets the impression that the weather is either fine for everything the navies want to do or it is very bad. Very bad essentially means a storm and a storm creates absolute havoc (and two fo them did). The Etesian Winds were of course a known quantity and their effect on transit would be built into schedules.
My impression of Thucydides is that we see much the same pattern: either there is a storm, which interferes (sometimes drastically) with operations, or nothing interferes. There seems to be no middle state of uncertainty or partial effectiveness except in human decision-making.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 16, 2018, 01:39:41 PM
For the Humongous Herodotusian Army Hypothesis (HHAH) to be even slightly plausible I think we need to demonstrate the following.
1. An extensive empire wide bureaucracy and police/security service with the authority and ability to enforce policy compliance on any recalcitrant nobles/tribal leaders
This is a fairly safe bet.
Quote2. A huge regular logistics corps able to set up large and effective supply dumps able to store food stuffs for years at a time. Oh, and ensure quality compliance.
We actually only need an
organisation capable of this as opposed to a 'regular logistics corps' - we can surmise its existence from the long preparation times leading up to Achaemenid campaigns.
Quote3. An extensive mapping service able to provide planned routes across country for multiple columns of men which also ensures they can reach the above.
An interesting attestation to the existence of maps occurs during Herodotus' account of the Ionian revolt, in which (Herodotus V.49) Aristagoras of Miletus , trying to convince the Spartans to support the revolt, produces
"a bronze tablet on which the map of all the earth was engraved, and all the sea and all the rivers."
Quote4. A sort of Persian Ofsted capable of monitoring the extensive apprentice scheme needed to produce a large number of effective sailors and ships captains. The service would need to be multilingual to deal effectively with locals who don't or claim they cant speak Persian.
The reality seems to have been somewhat simpler:
"Then Darius attempted to learn whether the Greeks intended to wage war against him or to surrender themselves. He sent heralds this way and that throughout Hellas, bidding them demand a gift of earth and water for the king. [2] He despatched some to Hellas, and
he sent others to his own tributary cities of the coast, commanding that ships of war and transports for horses be built." - Herodotus VI.48
Each coastal city provided its own ships and crews, and these would be as good as the others habitually produced by that city (nobody would deliberately build a sub-standard ship that he would have to sail in). Communication would be in the usual manner by which the Empire was governed.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:17:27 PM
Maurice is coming apart for me. I'm willing to read Young - any chance of sending me the relevant pages as scans?
I don't have a copy of the Young article, but Mark K kindly quoted some of it on a yahoo group, which I will requote here (and do note the size of the force he is considering):
Quote
Though I can well imagine that many will have been glad to see no mention of this topic lately, I cannot restrain myself from mentioning another article: T. Cuyler Young, Jr., "480/479 B.C – A Persian Perspective" (1980), 15 Iranica Antiqua 213.
Young calculates some logistical and transport requirements for a hypothetical Persian force of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses, based on the assumption that each soldier required approximately 3 pounds of grain per day, and each pack and cavalry animal 10 pounds of grain and 10 pounds of straw or other fodder. At pp. 225-227, for example, he considers the advance from Therma to Thermopylae :
Hide message history
"Once having departed from Therma we may reasonably assume that the Persians were marching through hostile country, and had left territories which they had been able to supply with stores before the campaign began. [Footnote 31: Persian control before the start of the campaign could hardly have extended much south of Therma. Certainly it reached no further south than Tempe, for early in the campaign season of 480 B.C. Greek troops, under Spartan command, had been active that far north. For details see Burn 1962: 339-345.] In other words, from Therma on they had either to carry their grain supplies with them (by pack-horse, or by sea), or to live off the Greek harvest, or both. There would have been no prepared grain supplies along the route of march.
"The chronology of this march is subject to various interpretations, but the figures offered by Maurice are reasonable: the march itself took thirteen days, and the Persians were some six days at Thermopylae . [Footnote 32: Maurice 1930: 233.] While in the latter position, supply by sea would have been both possible and relatively easy, since the navy could control the approaches to the bay of Lamia . The situation was much different along most of the route of march to Thermopylae , however, and it is on this stretch that the Persian Quartermaster Corps would have been severely tested. The army divided and marched south from Therma by at least two, if not three, different roads (following perfectly the Napoleonic maxim to march divided, fight combined). [Footnote 33: For an excellent map of the Persian routes of march south from Therma v. Burn 1962: 340.] Only one of these routes was along the coast, and even then contact with the sea was easy only for about the first thirty miles. This left a total of one hundred and ten miles for that column to march on an inland road before reaching Thermopylae, and the other two columns were inland the whole distance from Terma [sic] to Thermopylae . Thus, the coastal column was out of touch with the sea for about ten days, and the rest of the army could not be supplied by ship for the whole thirteen days of the march south to the pass where Leonidas was to win his niche in history.
"Let us return to some plain facts and figures of military reality with this march in mind. An army of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses required a total of 1,380,000 pounds of grain a day (fodder and water needs may be left aside to simplify the discussion). A single pack-horse can carry about two hundred and fifty pounds of grain, but we must remember that the pack-horse itself eats ten pounds of grain a day, so its effective carrying capacity beyond its own needs is two hundred and forty pounds [Footnote 34: Engels 1978: 19 and Table 1.] A simple calculation reveals that 5,750 pack-horses would be needed to carry south from Therma the grain necessary to feed for one day an army which ate 1,380,000 pounds of cereal a day (1,380,000 divided by 24). For a two day march one would need 12,000 pack-horses to carry 2,760,000 pounds of grain, a two day supply for the army with each horse now able to carry only 230 pounds because that horse would itself eat twenty pounds of grain in two days. If one continues with this straightforward calculation to cover a ten day march, the minimum amount of time the one coastal column would have been out of touch with the sea and hence unable to be supplied by ship, on that tenth day the army would require 4,710,000 pack-horses to provide a total of 706,560,000 pounds of grain which is what the troops and animals would have eaten in the ten days of marching.
"Even if: (1) we assume that at least half of the army's grain needs were met from the Greek countryside, and (2) we ignore the transportation which would have been required to move that foraged grain to the troops, one is still left with an impossible demand on the Persian Quartermaster General to move grain forward from Therma. The only reasonable conclusion from these calculations is that the Persian army which marched to Thermopylae did not even come close to numbering 210,000 men and 75,000 animals."
Young goes on to assert that similar considerations would apply to limit the size of the Persian force that could have moved from Thermopylae to Athens , and the size of the Persian force at Plataea .
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2018, 07:39:23 PM
The modus operandi I have in mind for the Achaemenids is this: ship anchors in shallow water offshore, hoists amphorae onto boats in a fairly steady stream; boats pull for shore, beach; willing hands on shore help boat crews lift amphorae over the gunwales; crews get boats back into water and row back for the next amphora or two or four or whatever. The tempo is going to be that of military operations rather than that of dock persons who traditionally feel that haste is a waste of earning opportunity.
remember that grain transported in amphora is still a claim, the only evidence anybody has been able to provide is that grain was moved in sacks or bulk
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 08:09:55 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:17:27 PM
Maurice is coming apart for me. I'm willing to read Young - any chance of sending me the relevant pages as scans?
I don't have a copy of the Young article, but Mark K kindly quoted some of it on a yahoo group, which I will requote here (and do note the size of the force he is considering):
Quote
Though I can well imagine that many will have been glad to see no mention of this topic lately, I cannot restrain myself from mentioning another article: T. Cuyler Young, Jr., "480/479 B.C – A Persian Perspective" (1980), 15 Iranica Antiqua 213.
Young calculates some logistical and transport requirements for a hypothetical Persian force of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses, based on the assumption that each soldier required approximately 3 pounds of grain per day, and each pack and cavalry animal 10 pounds of grain and 10 pounds of straw or other fodder. At pp. 225-227, for example, he considers the advance from Therma to Thermopylae :
Hide message history
"Once having departed from Therma we may reasonably assume that the Persians were marching through hostile country, and had left territories which they had been able to supply with stores before the campaign began. [Footnote 31: Persian control before the start of the campaign could hardly have extended much south of Therma. Certainly it reached no further south than Tempe, for early in the campaign season of 480 B.C. Greek troops, under Spartan command, had been active that far north. For details see Burn 1962: 339-345.] In other words, from Therma on they had either to carry their grain supplies with them (by pack-horse, or by sea), or to live off the Greek harvest, or both. There would have been no prepared grain supplies along the route of march.
"The chronology of this march is subject to various interpretations, but the figures offered by Maurice are reasonable: the march itself took thirteen days, and the Persians were some six days at Thermopylae . [Footnote 32: Maurice 1930: 233.] While in the latter position, supply by sea would have been both possible and relatively easy, since the navy could control the approaches to the bay of Lamia . The situation was much different along most of the route of march to Thermopylae , however, and it is on this stretch that the Persian Quartermaster Corps would have been severely tested. The army divided and marched south from Therma by at least two, if not three, different roads (following perfectly the Napoleonic maxim to march divided, fight combined). [Footnote 33: For an excellent map of the Persian routes of march south from Therma v. Burn 1962: 340.] Only one of these routes was along the coast, and even then contact with the sea was easy only for about the first thirty miles. This left a total of one hundred and ten miles for that column to march on an inland road before reaching Thermopylae, and the other two columns were inland the whole distance from Terma [sic] to Thermopylae . Thus, the coastal column was out of touch with the sea for about ten days, and the rest of the army could not be supplied by ship for the whole thirteen days of the march south to the pass where Leonidas was to win his niche in history.
"Let us return to some plain facts and figures of military reality with this march in mind. An army of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses required a total of 1,380,000 pounds of grain a day (fodder and water needs may be left aside to simplify the discussion). A single pack-horse can carry about two hundred and fifty pounds of grain, but we must remember that the pack-horse itself eats ten pounds of grain a day, so its effective carrying capacity beyond its own needs is two hundred and forty pounds [Footnote 34: Engels 1978: 19 and Table 1.] A simple calculation reveals that 5,750 pack-horses would be needed to carry south from Therma the grain necessary to feed for one day an army which ate 1,380,000 pounds of cereal a day (1,380,000 divided by 24). For a two day march one would need 12,000 pack-horses to carry 2,760,000 pounds of grain, a two day supply for the army with each horse now able to carry only 230 pounds because that horse would itself eat twenty pounds of grain in two days. If one continues with this straightforward calculation to cover a ten day march, the minimum amount of time the one coastal column would have been out of touch with the sea and hence unable to be supplied by ship, on that tenth day the army would require 4,710,000 pack-horses to provide a total of 706,560,000 pounds of grain which is what the troops and animals would have eaten in the ten days of marching.
"Even if: (1) we assume that at least half of the army's grain needs were met from the Greek countryside, and (2) we ignore the transportation which would have been required to move that foraged grain to the troops, one is still left with an impossible demand on the Persian Quartermaster General to move grain forward from Therma. The only reasonable conclusion from these calculations is that the Persian army which marched to Thermopylae did not even come close to numbering 210,000 men and 75,000 animals."
Young goes on to assert that similar considerations would apply to limit the size of the Persian force that could have moved from Thermopylae to Athens , and the size of the Persian force at Plataea .
Two things come to mind:
1. I don't see why the Persian army needed to be inland for longer than five days at any time. It starts out from Therma and follows the coast to Phila. It then moves inland along the valley of the Tempe river. That part is brutal, moving through a hilly pass for about 10km to the plain beyond but from what I can see from Google maps and street views, it's doable. It's then four days to the coast again at Pagasae. After that the army can then split into two halves, one half following the coast the other half going inland and both meeting five days later on the broad valley of the Spercheus river before Thermopylae.
2. Grain is harvested in Greece in June, just in time for the arrival of the Persians. Over the Tempe river pass there is a broad fertile plain and they can take all they want: food for the locals' needs for twelve months. Foraging parties would strip the area, giving the army more than enough for its requirements during its passage.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2018, 08:09:20 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 16, 2018, 03:03:07 PM
In an idle moment, I thought I'd maintain the flow of new information by looking up the weather in the Aegean in summer
This website for yachtsmen (http://www.sailingissues.com/meltemi.html) is quite interesting. The Meltimi or Etesian winds make for a more unpredictable sea state than has been suggested before and would be something to be factored into any cross-Aegean nautical conveyor belt.
In Herodotus, one gets the impression that the weather is either fine for everything the navies want to do or it is very bad. Very bad essentially means a storm and a storm creates absolute havoc (and two fo them did). The Etesian Winds were of course a known quantity and their effect on transit would be built into schedules.
My impression of Thucydides is that we see much the same pattern: either there is a storm, which interferes (sometimes drastically) with operations, or nothing interferes. There seems to be no middle state of uncertainty or partial effectiveness except in human decision-making.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 16, 2018, 01:39:41 PM
For the Humongous Herodotusian Army Hypothesis (HHAH) to be even slightly plausible I think we need to demonstrate the following.
1. An extensive empire wide bureaucracy and police/security service with the authority and ability to enforce policy compliance on any recalcitrant nobles/tribal leaders
This is a fairly safe bet.
Quote2. A huge regular logistics corps able to set up large and effective supply dumps able to store food stuffs for years at a time. Oh, and ensure quality compliance.
We actually only need an organisation capable of this as opposed to a 'regular logistics corps' - we can surmise its existence from the long preparation times leading up to Achaemenid campaigns.
Quote3. An extensive mapping service able to provide planned routes across country for multiple columns of men which also ensures they can reach the above.
An interesting attestation to the existence of maps occurs during Herodotus' account of the Ionian revolt, in which (Herodotus V.49) Aristagoras of Miletus , trying to convince the Spartans to support the revolt, produces
"a bronze tablet on which the map of all the earth was engraved, and all the sea and all the rivers."
Quote4. A sort of Persian Ofsted capable of monitoring the extensive apprentice scheme needed to produce a large number of effective sailors and ships captains. The service would need to be multilingual to deal effectively with locals who don't or claim they cant speak Persian.
The reality seems to have been somewhat simpler:
"Then Darius attempted to learn whether the Greeks intended to wage war against him or to surrender themselves. He sent heralds this way and that throughout Hellas, bidding them demand a gift of earth and water for the king. [2] He despatched some to Hellas, and he sent others to his own tributary cities of the coast, commanding that ships of war and transports for horses be built." - Herodotus VI.48
Each coastal city provided its own ships and crews, and these would be as good as the others habitually produced by that city (nobody would deliberately build a sub-standard ship that he would have to sail in). Communication would be in the usual manner by which the Empire was governed.
Thank you for taking the time and effort to write a response
In order .
1. Can you produce any evidence for this Cheka style organisation? for example is it mentioned by any writers contemporary to the Persian empire
2. What would this organisation capable of replicating the work of a 'regular logistics corps' and able to organise the feeding of several million men be.
3. The Bronze tablet would it be accurate enough and be of the right scale to lead people to a supply dump bearing in mind they are travelling across country in a land they have never seen before and do not have the benefit of GPS. Are such Bronze tablets common and is map reading a common skill within the Persian Empire
4. Which simply goes to prove that the invasion army was of a reasonable size as opposed to the HHAH that is to say there is no evidence for the creation unusual number of sailors and the like
For me the problem is that you and Justin start from the assumption that Herodotus must be right about the size of Xerxes army and then work backwards to create the conditions that allow for its existence, it is not falsifiable. Without wishing to be rude the Persian Empire that you need to depict is a totalitarian society with a magical ability to collect, analyse and disseminate information- it has more in common with the worlds of M A R Barker or Clarke Ashton Smith than than an actual ancient society.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 09:54:16 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 08:09:55 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:17:27 PM
Maurice is coming apart for me. I'm willing to read Young - any chance of sending me the relevant pages as scans?
I don't have a copy of the Young article, but Mark K kindly quoted some of it on a yahoo group, which I will requote here (and do note the size of the force he is considering):
Quote
Though I can well imagine that many will have been glad to see no mention of this topic lately, I cannot restrain myself from mentioning another article: T. Cuyler Young, Jr., "480/479 B.C – A Persian Perspective" (1980), 15 Iranica Antiqua 213.
Young calculates some logistical and transport requirements for a hypothetical Persian force of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses, based on the assumption that each soldier required approximately 3 pounds of grain per day, and each pack and cavalry animal 10 pounds of grain and 10 pounds of straw or other fodder. At pp. 225-227, for example, he considers the advance from Therma to Thermopylae :
Hide message history
"Once having departed from Therma we may reasonably assume that the Persians were marching through hostile country, and had left territories which they had been able to supply with stores before the campaign began. [Footnote 31: Persian control before the start of the campaign could hardly have extended much south of Therma. Certainly it reached no further south than Tempe, for early in the campaign season of 480 B.C. Greek troops, under Spartan command, had been active that far north. For details see Burn 1962: 339-345.] In other words, from Therma on they had either to carry their grain supplies with them (by pack-horse, or by sea), or to live off the Greek harvest, or both. There would have been no prepared grain supplies along the route of march.
"The chronology of this march is subject to various interpretations, but the figures offered by Maurice are reasonable: the march itself took thirteen days, and the Persians were some six days at Thermopylae . [Footnote 32: Maurice 1930: 233.] While in the latter position, supply by sea would have been both possible and relatively easy, since the navy could control the approaches to the bay of Lamia . The situation was much different along most of the route of march to Thermopylae , however, and it is on this stretch that the Persian Quartermaster Corps would have been severely tested. The army divided and marched south from Therma by at least two, if not three, different roads (following perfectly the Napoleonic maxim to march divided, fight combined). [Footnote 33: For an excellent map of the Persian routes of march south from Therma v. Burn 1962: 340.] Only one of these routes was along the coast, and even then contact with the sea was easy only for about the first thirty miles. This left a total of one hundred and ten miles for that column to march on an inland road before reaching Thermopylae, and the other two columns were inland the whole distance from Terma [sic] to Thermopylae . Thus, the coastal column was out of touch with the sea for about ten days, and the rest of the army could not be supplied by ship for the whole thirteen days of the march south to the pass where Leonidas was to win his niche in history.
"Let us return to some plain facts and figures of military reality with this march in mind. An army of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses required a total of 1,380,000 pounds of grain a day (fodder and water needs may be left aside to simplify the discussion). A single pack-horse can carry about two hundred and fifty pounds of grain, but we must remember that the pack-horse itself eats ten pounds of grain a day, so its effective carrying capacity beyond its own needs is two hundred and forty pounds [Footnote 34: Engels 1978: 19 and Table 1.] A simple calculation reveals that 5,750 pack-horses would be needed to carry south from Therma the grain necessary to feed for one day an army which ate 1,380,000 pounds of cereal a day (1,380,000 divided by 24). For a two day march one would need 12,000 pack-horses to carry 2,760,000 pounds of grain, a two day supply for the army with each horse now able to carry only 230 pounds because that horse would itself eat twenty pounds of grain in two days. If one continues with this straightforward calculation to cover a ten day march, the minimum amount of time the one coastal column would have been out of touch with the sea and hence unable to be supplied by ship, on that tenth day the army would require 4,710,000 pack-horses to provide a total of 706,560,000 pounds of grain which is what the troops and animals would have eaten in the ten days of marching.
"Even if: (1) we assume that at least half of the army's grain needs were met from the Greek countryside, and (2) we ignore the transportation which would have been required to move that foraged grain to the troops, one is still left with an impossible demand on the Persian Quartermaster General to move grain forward from Therma. The only reasonable conclusion from these calculations is that the Persian army which marched to Thermopylae did not even come close to numbering 210,000 men and 75,000 animals."
Young goes on to assert that similar considerations would apply to limit the size of the Persian force that could have moved from Thermopylae to Athens , and the size of the Persian force at Plataea .
Two things come to mind:
1. I don't see why the Persian army needed to be inland for longer than five days at any time. It starts out from Therma and follows the coast to Phila. It then moves inland along the valley of the Tempe river. That part is brutal, moving through a hilly pass for about 10km to the plain beyond but from what I can see from Google maps and street views, it's doable. It's then four days to the coast again at Pagasae. After that the army can then split into two halves, one half following the coast the other half going inland and both meeting five days later on the broad valley of the Spercheus river before Thermopylae.
2. Grain is harvested in Greece in June, just in time for the arrival of the Persians. Over the Tempe river pass there is a broad fertile plain and they can take all they want: food for the locals' needs for twelve months. Foraging parties would strip the area, giving the army more than enough for its requirements during its passage.
Is that several million men moving along the Valley of the Tempe River and through the hilly pass?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 05:06:21 PM
At the beginning of his Histories Herodotus mentions 'Persians best informed in history', 'Persian learned men' - λόγιοι having the sense of a) versed in tales or stories; b) learned, erudite (most common usage); or c) skilled in words, eloquent.
Its possible. A long list of things are possible.
But historiography, public libraries, scientific method - all that good stuff - were a work in progress.
So when Herodotus writes, "Persian's say," is it a sailor's tale over a glass of akraton at his local pub?
Or for example, Herodotus writes "Corinthians say, and the Lesbians agree" - so he's double-checked it right? Two sources? But they agree that
Arion rode to Taenarsus on the back of a dolphin. So is that exemplary of his incredulity?
While very helpfully Herodotus sometimes refers to other authors' histories, does that mean he is going without in the vast majority of times he does not? Who knows.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 16, 2018, 08:20:46 AM
Quote from: Mark G on April 16, 2018, 07:57:23 AM
What was the Greek word for fact, and it's entomology?
Please explain the relevance of the study of insects to this discussion. ???
To be fair to Mark, he's clearly been messed around by spellcheck / text prediction / automatic text correction or some unholy alliance of the three. As a regular victim of the same myself, he has my sympathies!
Quote from: Dangun on April 17, 2018, 12:33:33 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 05:06:21 PM
At the beginning of his Histories Herodotus mentions 'Persians best informed in history', 'Persian learned men' - λόγιοι having the sense of a) versed in tales or stories; b) learned, erudite (most common usage); or c) skilled in words, eloquent.
Its possible. A long list of things are possible.
But historiography, public libraries, scientific method - all that good stuff - were a work in progress.
So when Herodotus writes, "Persian's say," is it a sailor's tale over a glass of akraton at his local pub?
Or for example, Herodotus writes "Corinthians say, and the Lesbians agree" - so he's double-checked it right? Two sources? But they agree that Arion rode to Taenarsus on the back of a dolphin. So is that exemplary of his incredulity?
While very helpfully Herodotus sometimes refers to other authors' histories, does that mean he is going without in the vast majority of times he does not? Who knows.
What is so incredible about a dolphin saving the life of a man? They do it all the time (https://www.dolphins-world.com/dolphins-rescuing-humans/). Here's a story (http://www.eurocbc.org/page158.html) of dolphin pushing a non-swimmer to safety. And another similar story (http://www.neatorama.com/2008/12/19/saved-by-dolphins/). And another (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2011652/July-Fourth-tragedy-Dolphins-carried-Luis-Arturo-Polanco-Morales-body-shore.html). And another (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1328806/Dick-Van-Dyke-Pod-porpoises-saved-I-fell-asleep-surfboard.html).
Here's a video (http://www.newsweek.com/watch-humpback-whale-stops-deadly-shark-attack-pushing-woman-safety-incredible-776243) of a humpback whale pushing a diver to safety.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 16, 2018, 10:20:04 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 16, 2018, 09:54:16 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 08:09:55 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 15, 2018, 08:17:27 PM
Maurice is coming apart for me. I'm willing to read Young - any chance of sending me the relevant pages as scans?
I don't have a copy of the Young article, but Mark K kindly quoted some of it on a yahoo group, which I will requote here (and do note the size of the force he is considering):
Quote
Though I can well imagine that many will have been glad to see no mention of this topic lately, I cannot restrain myself from mentioning another article: T. Cuyler Young, Jr., "480/479 B.C – A Persian Perspective" (1980), 15 Iranica Antiqua 213.
Young calculates some logistical and transport requirements for a hypothetical Persian force of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses, based on the assumption that each soldier required approximately 3 pounds of grain per day, and each pack and cavalry animal 10 pounds of grain and 10 pounds of straw or other fodder. At pp. 225-227, for example, he considers the advance from Therma to Thermopylae :
Hide message history
"Once having departed from Therma we may reasonably assume that the Persians were marching through hostile country, and had left territories which they had been able to supply with stores before the campaign began. [Footnote 31: Persian control before the start of the campaign could hardly have extended much south of Therma. Certainly it reached no further south than Tempe, for early in the campaign season of 480 B.C. Greek troops, under Spartan command, had been active that far north. For details see Burn 1962: 339-345.] In other words, from Therma on they had either to carry their grain supplies with them (by pack-horse, or by sea), or to live off the Greek harvest, or both. There would have been no prepared grain supplies along the route of march.
"The chronology of this march is subject to various interpretations, but the figures offered by Maurice are reasonable: the march itself took thirteen days, and the Persians were some six days at Thermopylae . [Footnote 32: Maurice 1930: 233.] While in the latter position, supply by sea would have been both possible and relatively easy, since the navy could control the approaches to the bay of Lamia . The situation was much different along most of the route of march to Thermopylae , however, and it is on this stretch that the Persian Quartermaster Corps would have been severely tested. The army divided and marched south from Therma by at least two, if not three, different roads (following perfectly the Napoleonic maxim to march divided, fight combined). [Footnote 33: For an excellent map of the Persian routes of march south from Therma v. Burn 1962: 340.] Only one of these routes was along the coast, and even then contact with the sea was easy only for about the first thirty miles. This left a total of one hundred and ten miles for that column to march on an inland road before reaching Thermopylae, and the other two columns were inland the whole distance from Terma [sic] to Thermopylae . Thus, the coastal column was out of touch with the sea for about ten days, and the rest of the army could not be supplied by ship for the whole thirteen days of the march south to the pass where Leonidas was to win his niche in history.
"Let us return to some plain facts and figures of military reality with this march in mind. An army of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses required a total of 1,380,000 pounds of grain a day (fodder and water needs may be left aside to simplify the discussion). A single pack-horse can carry about two hundred and fifty pounds of grain, but we must remember that the pack-horse itself eats ten pounds of grain a day, so its effective carrying capacity beyond its own needs is two hundred and forty pounds [Footnote 34: Engels 1978: 19 and Table 1.] A simple calculation reveals that 5,750 pack-horses would be needed to carry south from Therma the grain necessary to feed for one day an army which ate 1,380,000 pounds of cereal a day (1,380,000 divided by 24). For a two day march one would need 12,000 pack-horses to carry 2,760,000 pounds of grain, a two day supply for the army with each horse now able to carry only 230 pounds because that horse would itself eat twenty pounds of grain in two days. If one continues with this straightforward calculation to cover a ten day march, the minimum amount of time the one coastal column would have been out of touch with the sea and hence unable to be supplied by ship, on that tenth day the army would require 4,710,000 pack-horses to provide a total of 706,560,000 pounds of grain which is what the troops and animals would have eaten in the ten days of marching.
"Even if: (1) we assume that at least half of the army's grain needs were met from the Greek countryside, and (2) we ignore the transportation which would have been required to move that foraged grain to the troops, one is still left with an impossible demand on the Persian Quartermaster General to move grain forward from Therma. The only reasonable conclusion from these calculations is that the Persian army which marched to Thermopylae did not even come close to numbering 210,000 men and 75,000 animals."
Young goes on to assert that similar considerations would apply to limit the size of the Persian force that could have moved from Thermopylae to Athens , and the size of the Persian force at Plataea .
Two things come to mind:
1. I don't see why the Persian army needed to be inland for longer than five days at any time. It starts out from Therma and follows the coast to Phila. It then moves inland along the valley of the Tempe river. That part is brutal, moving through a hilly pass for about 10km to the plain beyond but from what I can see from Google maps and street views, it's doable. It's then four days to the coast again at Pagasae. After that the army can then split into two halves, one half following the coast the other half going inland and both meeting five days later on the broad valley of the Spercheus river before Thermopylae.
2. Grain is harvested in Greece in June, just in time for the arrival of the Persians. Over the Tempe river pass there is a broad fertile plain and they can take all they want: food for the locals' needs for twelve months. Foraging parties would strip the area, giving the army more than enough for its requirements during its passage.
Is that several million men moving along the Valley of the Tempe River and through the hilly pass?
It would probably need to be over the hilly ground north (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.906775,22.6246439,976a,35y,238.5h,73.21t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) of the Tempe valley which itself is a steep and narrow gorge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8816868,22.5920488,3a,60y,245.91h,98.23t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sbKrh3K15Ao7hsTqTIPlh6g!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en). The army must be able to march in a column/columns several hundred yards wide at all times.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 04:51:33 PM
He did use the work of earlier historians - at least, he quotes what "Hecataeus the son of Hegesandrus declares in his history". (It's commonly suggested that he got his list of Achaemenid satrapies and their revenues from Hecataeus, but he doesn't actually say so.) So he was not averse to using written sources. But given that we have no knowledge that he read Aramaic, his source would presumably have to have been interview of someone who could.
If the "History" of Hecataeus he refered to was the work now known by that name, it wasn't a history in the modern sense, but a book criticizing myths. And even if he did use earlier historians, would
those have consulted a hypothetical Persian document in an archive or
Kuriosenkabinett somewhere? Merely using written sources isn't the same as going to the archives for primary documentation.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 17, 2018, 05:18:44 AM
What is so incredible about a dolphin saving the life of a man?
As I suggested earlier, there are different places to sit on the incredulity continuum.
After being captured by pirates, and before being tossed from the ship, Arion played his harp and sang to Apollo. The music attracted dolphins who duly rescued him after he walked the plank. The dolphins carried him to a temple of Poseidon... and Hyginus writes that the dolphin was eventually placed in the heavens as the castellation Delphinus. (In my earlier post I didn't mean to leave this bit out - my apologies - I was just quoting from Herodotus.)
Myth and history got a little blurry.
Quote from: Dangun on April 17, 2018, 07:22:09 AM
As I suggested earlier, there are different places to sit on the incredulity continuum.
Yes indeed.
So far we've had practical evidence presented against the idea of a 5 million men plus expedition dismissed on what might be termed 'technicalities', while various theories with nothing to support them other than 'my impression is...' or 'I once did that...' or why wouldn't they just do this?' are accepted without question.
Wind and weather conditions are not always ideal for sailing -
dismissed.
It takes quite a lot of time and effort to unload vessels -
only if they're modern vessels.
That chokepoints make timely passage impossible for such a large number of people -
well, they'd just go over the mountains.
That what we know of supply considerations would make feeding and watering a travelling band of 5 plus million folk impossible, and at particular points very difficult even for forces an order of magnitude lower -
these are the Persians we're talking about! Normal considerations don't apply!That men with experience moving large bodies of troops and who had walked the ground felt that it would not be possible -
I dispute a calculation, and besides, he's from a different era - he must be wrong.
Herodotus doesn't always tell the truth -
you can rely on me to know the truth when I see it.
And that's about where we're at!
Quote from: Prufrock on April 16, 2018, 08:09:55 PM
"Let us return to some plain facts and figures of military reality with this march in mind. An army of 210,000 men and 75,000 horses required a total of 1,380,000 pounds of grain a day (fodder and water needs may be left aside to simplify the discussion). A single pack-horse can carry about two hundred and fifty pounds of grain, but we must remember that the pack-horse itself eats ten pounds of grain a day, so its effective carrying capacity beyond its own needs is two hundred and forty pounds [Footnote 34: Engels 1978: 19 and Table 1.] A simple calculation reveals that 5,750 pack-horses would be needed to carry south from Therma the grain necessary to feed for one day an army which ate 1,380,000 pounds of cereal a day (1,380,000 divided by 24). For a two day march one would need 12,000 pack-horses to carry 2,760,000 pounds of grain, a two day supply for the army with each horse now able to carry only 230 pounds because that horse would itself eat twenty pounds of grain in two days. If one continues with this straightforward calculation to cover a ten day march, the minimum amount of time the one coastal column would have been out of touch with the sea and hence unable to be supplied by ship, on that tenth day the army would require 4,710,000 pack-horses to provide a total of 706,560,000 pounds of grain which is what the troops and animals would have eaten in the ten days of marching.
Er ... should that be 1,380,000 divided by 240? (I suspect a typo because the result, 5,750 horses, works out correctly).
There are a few notable assumptions here:
1) Pack horses - mules and camels can take double the 250 lbs Young assigns to a pack horse. Young may have up to twice as many animals as Xerxes actually used.
2) Young assumes no fodder anywhere along the route, despite the Persians having marched 'at the best season of the year' (Herodotus VII.50).
3) Curious geometric rather than arithmetic increase in animals.
1 day's supply = 5,750 animals
10 days' supply = 4,710,000 animals (should be 57,500)
If the army is eating 5,750 animal loads' worth on day 1, it will eat the same on each of days 2-10. Ergo, the number of animals needed to carry supplies for ten days = 10x the number of animals needed to carry supplies for one day. Young's arithmetic is wildly out.
4) Curious rationale for loading ("a two day supply for the army with each horse now able to carry only 230 pounds because that horse would itself eat twenty pounds of grain in two days") - the horse still carries 250 lbs; the consumption fo grain is effectively being levied twice.
5) The root of the problem: "carry south from Therma the grain necessary" - Young is assuming an 18th century depot system rather then the actual practice of having the baggage train move with the army.
Because of this fundamental mistaken assumption, Young's calculations are entirely worthless. Unless you want to move an 18th century army between fortresses, and even then they somehow managed 10-day journeys without all this fuss (thinking of Frederick the Great's marches in the Seven Years' War).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 08:30:42 AM
3) Curious geometric rather than arithmetic increase in animals.
1 day's supply = 5,750 animals
10 days' supply = 4,710,000 animals (should be 57,500)
If the army is eating 5,750 animal loads' worth on day 1, it will eat the same on each of days 2-10. Ergo, the number of animals needed to carry supplies for ten days = 10x the number of animals needed to carry supplies for one day. Young's arithmetic is wildly out.
It's not quite that simple - as Engels points out with detailed calculations, IIRC - because all the extra pack animals have to eat from the supplies they carry, as well. An army with x men, y horses, and z pack animals will need a lot less than an army with x men, y horses, and 10z pack-animals. (Unless they can graze, and of course the more animals you have, the harder it is to find enough grazing.) Doesn't Engels claim that no army can carry more than about eight days' worth of provisions, because beyond that the extra pack animals are just eating their own loads? There are ways round the problem (like redistributing loads and then eating the spare animals, feeding them to Thracian lions, or even just sending them back) but you can't just use an arithmetic progression.
Quote from: Dangun on April 17, 2018, 07:22:09 AM
As I suggested earlier, there are different places to sit on the incredulity continuum.
Sitting on the analytical continuum might be a better bet. :)
QuoteMyth and history got a little blurry.
If this blurring occurs through trying to discredit Herodotus because he reports a seemingly miraculous rescue, I suggest it might unblur if one were simply to read the source without preconceptions.
We are coming up against a key factor in the readnig/understanding/interpretation of history. I have noticed a tendency to smack down a Procrustean bed of 20th/21st century concepts and assumptions followed by surgery on anything protruding past those assumptions. This does not result in history, merely in self-confirmation of self-delusion (given that any period's outlook and ethos will generally contain more delusion than fact).
So how do we get to history? My recomendation is to treat it as an intelligence-gathering exercise, not a debating society exercise. To do that, one must pay more attention to one's sources than one's preconceptions. Cross-check the information in sources wherever possible, and consider the implications of any source statement, but consider it as accurately rather than as preconceptually as possible and be aware of the operating systems, ethos and outlook of the time.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 17, 2018, 08:27:12 AM
So far we've had practical evidence presented against the idea of a 5 million men plus expedition dismissed on what might be termed 'technicalities', while various theories with nothing to support them other than 'my impression is...' or 'I once did that...' or why wouldn't they just do this?' are accepted without question.
We have not had practical evidence, only assessments by 20th/21st century people of how things would be done in the 20th/21st century. This is about as valuable as a modern tactician explaining how a modern infantry company would take an objective and concluding this is how it was for a Roman century.
QuoteWind and weather conditions are not always ideal for sailing - dismissed.
Why not come up with examples from
classical sources of unloading delayed by weather? If you are right about iffy conditions, there ought to be at least some instances where the best-laid unloading plans gang aft agley on account of playful Mother Nature.
QuoteIt takes quite a lot of time and effort to unload vessels - only if they're modern vessels.
Modern vessels actually unload pretty quickly because of containerisation, which is essentially the same principle as using amphorae but on a larger scale.
QuoteThat chokepoints make timely passage impossible for such a large number of people - well, they'd just go over the mountains.
Logical enough - the Assyrians did it, the Spartans did it.
QuoteThat what we know of supply considerations would make feeding and watering a travelling band of 5 plus million folk impossible, and at particular points very difficult even for forces an order of magnitude lower - these are the Persians we're talking about! Normal considerations don't apply!
Maybe what we think we know is wrong. See my post on Young.
QuoteThat men with experience moving large bodies of troops and who had walked the ground felt that it would not be possible - I dispute a calculation, and besides, he's from a different era - he must be wrong.
Well, he is applying the calculations of an entirely different type of army with entirely different practices to a situation beyond his ken and experience.
QuoteHerodotus doesn't always tell the truth - you can rely on me to know the truth when I see it.
There is a bit more to it that that, Mr Bell. Be fair!
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 17, 2018, 08:50:50 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 08:30:42 AM
3) Curious geometric rather than arithmetic increase in animals.
1 day's supply = 5,750 animals
10 days' supply = 4,710,000 animals (should be 57,500)
If the army is eating 5,750 animal loads' worth on day 1, it will eat the same on each of days 2-10. Ergo, the number of animals needed to carry supplies for ten days = 10x the number of animals needed to carry supplies for one day. Young's arithmetic is wildly out.
It's not quite that simple - as Engels points out with detailed calculations, IIRC - because all the extra pack animals have to eat from the supplies they carry, as well. An army with x men, y horses, and z pack animals will need a lot less than an army with x men, y horses, and 10z pack-animals. (Unless they can graze, and of course the more animals you have, the harder it is to find enough grazing.) Doesn't Engels claim that no army can carry more than about eight days' worth of provisions, because beyond that the extra pack animals are just eating their own loads? There are ways round the problem (like redistributing loads and then eating the spare animals, feeding them to Thracian lions, or even just sending them back) but you can't just use an arithmetic progression.
A valid point, and an illuminating one in view of the classical period habit of carrying about one week's worth of provisions in the baggage train, although once one has allowed for the additional animals to carry fodder for the other animals the increase is still more arithmetic than geometric. I calculated (roughly) 135,000 animals to feed the army for a week rising to around 400,000 if they have to carry fodder to feed themselves. This is still a whole order of magnitude lower than Young's 4 million.
Quote from: Dangun on April 17, 2018, 07:22:09 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 17, 2018, 05:18:44 AM
What is so incredible about a dolphin saving the life of a man?
As I suggested earlier, there are different places to sit on the incredulity continuum.
After being captured by pirates, and before being tossed from the ship, Arion played his harp and sang to Apollo. The music attracted dolphins who duly rescued him after he walked the plank. The dolphins carried him to a temple of Poseidon... and Hyginus writes that the dolphin was eventually placed in the heavens as the castellation Delphinus. (In my earlier post I didn't mean to leave this bit out, I was just quoting from Herodotus.)
Myth and history got a little blurry.
Let's summarise what happened to Arion in more contemporary terms. He is captured by Pirates off the coast of southern Greece and they intend to kill him. He decides to invoke the help of Apollo (not Poseidon notice) and disguises his prayer as a song so the pirates don't catch on and shut him up. The last thought in his head are the dolphins who, as dolphins do, are following the ship. Apollo doesn't answer his plea and he gets tossed into the sea by the impatient pirates. The dolphins, to his complete surprise, decide to help him out - they nudge him towards land and he catches hold of the fin of them. The dolphin gets the idea and takes him to the shore. By coincidence there is a temple to Poseidon nearby where they land, but I imagine there would be quite a few temples to Poseidon along the coastline to Greece where fishermen depend on the good graces of the god in order to ply their trade.
For some odd reason the dolphin doesn't just leave him on the beach with a wave of its fin and head back to sea, but gets stranded on the sand. Something obviously happened here to trap the dolphin, the details of which we are not told, which would be strange if this was a myth but sounds believable as an incomplete factual account.
How does that sound?
I'm not sure whether continuing with factual inputs is worth it after the dolphin episode but here goes.
From wikipedia Mule :
The median weight range for a mule is between about 370 and 460 kg (820 and 1,000 lb). While a few mules can carry live weight up to 160 kg (353 lb), the superiority of the mule becomes apparent in their additional endurance.
In general, a mule can be packed with dead weight of up to 20% of its body weight, or approximately 90 kg (198 lb).[6] Although it depends on the individual animal, it has been reported that mules trained by the Army of Pakistan can carry up to 72 kilograms (159 lb) and walk 26 kilometres (16.2 mi) without resting. The average equine in general can carry up to approximately 30% of its body weight in live weight, such as a rider.
From wikipedia pack animal
Loads for equids are disputed. The US Army specifies a maximum of 20 percent of body weight for mules walking up to 20 miles a day in mountains, giving a load of up to about 150 kg. However an 1867 text mentioned a load of up to 800 pounds (about 360 kg). In India, the prevention of cruelty rules (1965) limit mules to 200 kg and ponies to 70 kg.
Of course, we could use the idea that things were different in the past and ancient mules were super beasts capable of carrying vastly more or they were gigantically big, so 20% of their body weight was more but I'd suggest we aim at mule loads 72-150 kg for long range, difficult terrain work. So Young is closer than Patrick here.
According to the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), maximum safe load for pack camels is 300kg, so Patrick is correct to say they can carry twice the load of mules.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 16, 2018, 10:15:30 PM
Thank you for taking the time and effort to write a response
In order .
1. Can you produce any evidence for this Cheka style organisation? for example is it mentioned by any writers contemporary to the Persian empire
References to the 'King's Eyes' are found throughout Greek historical literature.
Quote2. What would this organisation capable of replicating the work of a 'regular logistics corps' and able to organise the feeding of several million men be.
The same that kept provinces administered and armies raised in normal circumstances: the satrapal government system.
Quote3. The Bronze tablet would it be accurate enough and be of the right scale to lead people to a supply dump bearing in mind they are travelling across country in a land they have never seen before and do not have the benefit of GPS. Are such Bronze tablets common and is map reading a common skill within the Persian Empire
These maps were highly functional (cf. London Underground maps) but were not used for this purpose. The army marched - with guides - towards known locations (cities) where supplies had been gathered by the locals (under advance planning from above, see Herodotus VII.119) or obvious unloading areas ("There's the sea, there are the ships, here come the boats").
Quote4. Which simply goes to prove that the invasion army was of a reasonable size as opposed to the HHAH that is to say there is no evidence for the creation unusual number of sailors and the like
This is a
non sequitur.
QuoteFor me the problem is that you and Justin start from the assumption that Herodotus must be right about the size of Xerxes army
Well, he is either right or wrong. So we try checking out a few parameters. Was the Achaemenid Empire capable of creating those conditions, operating with 5th century BC (not 20th century AD) methods? Do the dimensions of the bridge across the Hellespont and the crossing time for his army match up with the claimed figures? For what approximate size of army would the loss of sea supply following Salamis cause a more or less instant logistical collapse, given Mardonius' ability to maintain 300,000 over winter in Thessaly without maritime supply? And so on.
Quoteand then work backwards to create the conditions that allow for its existence, it is not falsifiable.
Do you mean 'verifiable' rather than 'falsifiable'? I would be saddened to think that falsification was one's aim when studying history.
QuoteWithout wishing to be rude the Persian Empire that you need to depict is a totalitarian society with a magical ability to collect, analyse and disseminate information- it has more in common with the worlds of M A R Barker or Clarke Ashton Smith than than an actual ancient society.
I suggest getting to know Biblical period societies a bit better - in particular, the extent and depth of detail in their archives, e.g. Amarna archives, Pylos archives, Hattusas archives and the many Babylonian archives, tablets and hides under various regimes including the Achaemenids. And yes, they were what we would consider totalitarian - in accordance with their laws and customs, and without continually outpouring a 'party line' - but, to someone thinking in 20th/21st century terms, totalitarian.
QuoteHow does that sound?
Like something out of one of those American TV shows on minor channels that everyone watches for a laugh?
I suggest we stick to the area of Herodotus' historical writings. Fortunately, we don't need to assume that, because he repeated fantastical stories, he is a fantasist.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 09:14:38 AM
From wikipedia Mule :
The median weight range for a mule is between about 370 and 460 kg (820 and 1,000 lb). While a few mules can carry live weight up to 160 kg (353 lb), the superiority of the mule becomes apparent in their additional endurance.
In general, a mule can be packed with dead weight of up to 20% of its body weight, or approximately 90 kg (198 lb).[6] Although it depends on the individual animal, it has been reported that mules trained by the Army of Pakistan can carry up to 72 kilograms (159 lb) and walk 26 kilometres (16.2 mi) without resting. The average equine in general can carry up to approximately 30% of its body weight in live weight, such as a rider.
From wikipedia pack animal
Loads for equids are disputed. The US Army specifies a maximum of 20 percent of body weight for mules walking up to 20 miles a day in mountains, giving a load of up to about 150 kg. However an 1867 text mentioned a load of up to 800 pounds (about 360 kg). In India, the prevention of cruelty rules (1965) limit mules to 200 kg and ponies to 70 kg.
Of course, we could use the idea that things were different in the past and ancient mules were super beasts capable of carrying vastly more or they were gigantically big, so 20% of their body weight was more but I'd suggest we aim at mule loads 72-150 kg for long range, difficult terrain work. So Young is closer than Patrick here.
It really depends upon how kind the Achaemenids were to their animals. Spanish in the Napoleonic Wars, for example, appear always to have loaded their mules to something like the 500 lbs mark. US Army practice varied (as per the Wikipedia pack animals article) and Near Eastern societies on the whole are not noted for their concern for animal welfare. So the average Achamenid mule load could be 250lbs, 500 lbs or anywhere in between (I am assuming that unlike the US Army they had not bred anything capable of standing up under 800 lbs). Given that their masters would aim to carry the most material upon the fewest animals, I would go for around 500 lbs, noting that the load will get lighter every day so it is not quite as bad for the animals as it looks.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 09:23:35 AM
QuoteHow does that sound?
Like something out of one of those American TV shows on minor channels that everyone watches for a laugh?
Actually I find Justin's suggestion quite reasonable. We get unlikelier things happening in this day and age, and something noteworthy must have happened to Arion for such a tale (which is well within the known general behaviour patterns of dolphins) to be recorded. What I dislike is the 'cultural racism' approach which seems to take for granted that any tale told in classical Greek sources must be the inventive product of an inferior mind.
QuoteDo you mean 'verifiable' rather than 'falsifiable'? I would be saddened to think that falsification was one's aim when studying history.
Falsifiability (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability) is a criterion for something to be considered testable in scientific method. The test must be able to show that the hypothesis is wrong. Justin, who I know has studied the Philosophy of Science, will doubtless recognise this.
Whether the study of history is scientific and subject to the falsification test is another matter :)
QuoteIt really depends upon how kind the Achaemenids were to their animals.
Not really. It depends on whether they need them to last more than a couple of weeks. If the Persian army is even moderately competent, it will load its animals according to the job to be done - long range travel in rough conditions.
QuoteWhat I dislike is the 'cultural racism' approach which seems to take for granted that any tale told in classical Greek sources must be the inventive product of an inferior mind.
Of which there is no evidence whatsoever here. Herodotus may live in a world in which faith, myth and reality were intertwined whereas we do not. This is evidence of a different world view, rather than an inferiority of mind.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 08:58:27 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 17, 2018, 08:50:50 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 08:30:42 AM
3) Curious geometric rather than arithmetic increase in animals.
1 day's supply = 5,750 animals
10 days' supply = 4,710,000 animals (should be 57,500)
If the army is eating 5,750 animal loads' worth on day 1, it will eat the same on each of days 2-10. Ergo, the number of animals needed to carry supplies for ten days = 10x the number of animals needed to carry supplies for one day. Young's arithmetic is wildly out.
It's not quite that simple - as Engels points out with detailed calculations, IIRC - because all the extra pack animals have to eat from the supplies they carry, as well. An army with x men, y horses, and z pack animals will need a lot less than an army with x men, y horses, and 10z pack-animals. (Unless they can graze, and of course the more animals you have, the harder it is to find enough grazing.) Doesn't Engels claim that no army can carry more than about eight days' worth of provisions, because beyond that the extra pack animals are just eating their own loads? There are ways round the problem (like redistributing loads and then eating the spare animals, feeding them to Thracian lions, or even just sending them back) but you can't just use an arithmetic progression.
A valid point, and an illuminating one in view of the classical period habit of carrying about one week's worth of provisions in the baggage train, although once one has allowed for the additional animals to carry fodder for the other animals the increase is still more arithmetic than geometric. I calculated (roughly) 135,000 animals to feed the army for a week rising to around 400,000 if they have to carry fodder to feed themselves. This is still a whole order of magnitude lower than Young's 4 million.
Has anyone given thought to the Texan cattle drives (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cattle_drives_in_the_United_States#Cattle_drive_era)? Herds of up to 10 000 cattle could travel over 500 miles at a rate of 10 - 12 miles a day through dry country and not have anything to each or drink except what they could find en route - and they had to be in good condition at the end.
The Achaemenid army will have animals several times more numerous than the largest drive, but theirs are smaller beasts, traveling through countryside with more grass than in Texas and are not expected to last.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 17, 2018, 10:56:43 AMThe Achaemenid army ... animals ... are not expected to last.
That may be one of the key issues, not just for this expedition but for ancient logistics in general. Maurice, Engels and the like calculate consumption based on what's needed to keep pack animals in a usable condition; the picture is a bit different if they are expendable.
But are they expendable? If you're on a march for a limited time and you expect to be able to get new mules (camels, whatever) the next time you need them, yes. If you're still going to need the animals to shuttle food from shipborne deliveries to the army in six months' time, and your army's so big that Greece (which doesn't breed camels, or apparently all that many mules) can't supply enough replacement beasts, then your pack animals surely do need to last.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 09:31:17 AM
What I dislike is the 'cultural racism' approach which seems to take for granted that any tale told in classical Greek sources must be the inventive product of an inferior mind.
Is that a thing?
Anyway, Herodotus' mind may have been capable of a lot. Maybe even more capable than most. But there was just a lot less information and understanding to feed him with.
Its not his fault, but his understanding of many things would have been objectively primitive.
At this point in the thread I will channel my inner Douglas Adams, and call it quits with the dolphins.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 17, 2018, 08:50:50 AM
It's not quite that simple - as Engels points out with detailed calculations, IIRC - because all the extra pack animals have to eat from the supplies they carry, as well.... Doesn't Engels claim that no army can carry more than about eight days' worth of provisions, because beyond that the extra pack animals are just eating their own loads?
Yes, in a nice little book, he said exactly that. (an edit: its page 20 he says 7 days with abundant water <3 if the water has to be carried.)
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 17, 2018, 11:14:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 17, 2018, 10:56:43 AMThe Achaemenid army ... animals ... are not expected to last.
That may be one of the key issues, not just for this expedition but for ancient logistics in general. Maurice, Engels and the like calculate consumption based on what's needed to keep pack animals in a usable condition; the picture is a bit different if they are expendable.
But are they expendable? If you're on a march for a limited time and you expect to be able to get new mules (camels, whatever) the next time you need them, yes. If you're still going to need the animals to shuttle food from shipborne deliveries to the army in six months' time, and your army's so big that Greece (which doesn't breed camels, or apparently all that many mules) can't supply enough replacement beasts, then your pack animals surely do need to last.
Fine, so we suppose the Persians needed to keep most of their pack animals alive. They also needed to travel 20km a day at least when moving inland so as to reach the next sea-stop within 5 days where everyone can rest for a day or two. Whilst traveling let's assume the pack animals need to live entirely off the land. Texan herds, which were kept bunched together so as not to lose any of the cattle, managed it. What stops a Persian baggage train from managing it? The hypothesis supposes that the baggage train is considerably
wider but no
longer than the train of a conventional army - which also had to live off the land.
QuoteHas anyone given thought to the Texan cattle drives? Herds of up to 10 000 cattle could travel over 500 miles at a rate of 10 - 12 miles a day through dry country and not have anything to each or drink except what they could find en route - and they had to be in good condition at the end.
With respect, a cattle drive and an army on the march are not the same thing. There is virtually no individual care of the animals, no animals assigned to individuals as mounts, no animals working.
I don't understand why anyone would think you just turned all the tens of thousands of animals out to graze at night and they would find the food they need. You have to care for them. It's not a soft-hearted welfare thing - you have these animals either as transport or as weapons. They need to be maintained to function effectively.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 11:32:58 AM
QuoteHas anyone given thought to the Texan cattle drives? Herds of up to 10 000 cattle could travel over 500 miles at a rate of 10 - 12 miles a day through dry country and not have anything to each or drink except what they could find en route - and they had to be in good condition at the end.
With respect, a cattle drive and an army on the march are not the same thing. There is virtually no individual care of the animals, no animals assigned to individuals as mounts, no animals working.
I don't understand why anyone would think you just turned all the tens of thousands of animals out to graze at night and they would find the food they need. You have to care for them. It's not a soft-hearted welfare thing - you have these animals either as transport or as weapons. They need to be maintained to function effectively.
Then you maintain them. Once the army reaches camp you unload the animals and take them to grazing ground or let them graze
in situ. You then fetch them water or take them to water. An average hiker with backpack can manage 3km/h. That means 7 hours to cover 20km. Add faff factor and the journey takes 9 hours. That leaves several daylight hours to give the animals what they need.
I suspect foraging for animals became an issue only at stops of several days, which were all at the coast where fodder could be supplied directly from the ships.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 09:31:17 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 09:14:38 AM
From wikipedia Mule :
The median weight range for a mule is between about 370 and 460 kg (820 and 1,000 lb). While a few mules can carry live weight up to 160 kg (353 lb), the superiority of the mule becomes apparent in their additional endurance.
In general, a mule can be packed with dead weight of up to 20% of its body weight, or approximately 90 kg (198 lb).[6] Although it depends on the individual animal, it has been reported that mules trained by the Army of Pakistan can carry up to 72 kilograms (159 lb) and walk 26 kilometres (16.2 mi) without resting. The average equine in general can carry up to approximately 30% of its body weight in live weight, such as a rider.
From wikipedia pack animal
Loads for equids are disputed. The US Army specifies a maximum of 20 percent of body weight for mules walking up to 20 miles a day in mountains, giving a load of up to about 150 kg. However an 1867 text mentioned a load of up to 800 pounds (about 360 kg). In India, the prevention of cruelty rules (1965) limit mules to 200 kg and ponies to 70 kg.
Of course, we could use the idea that things were different in the past and ancient mules were super beasts capable of carrying vastly more or they were gigantically big, so 20% of their body weight was more but I'd suggest we aim at mule loads 72-150 kg for long range, difficult terrain work. So Young is closer than Patrick here.
It really depends upon how kind the Achaemenids were to their animals. Spanish in the Napoleonic Wars, for example, appear always to have loaded their mules to something like the 500 lbs mark. US Army practice varied (as per the Wikipedia pack animals article) and Near Eastern societies on the whole are not noted for their concern for animal welfare. So the average Achamenid mule load could be 250lbs, 500 lbs or anywhere in between (I am assuming that unlike the US Army they had not bred anything capable of standing up under 800 lbs). Given that their masters would aim to carry the most material upon the fewest animals, I would go for around 500 lbs, noting that the load will get lighter every day so it is not quite as bad for the animals as it looks.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 09:23:35 AM
QuoteHow does that sound?
Like something out of one of those American TV shows on minor channels that everyone watches for a laugh?
Actually I find Justin's suggestion quite reasonable. We get unlikelier things happening in this day and age, and something noteworthy must have happened to Arion for such a tale (which is well within the known general behaviour patterns of dolphins) to be recorded. What I dislike is the 'cultural racism' approach which seems to take for granted that any tale told in classical Greek sources must be the inventive product of an inferior mind.
You aren't seriously suggesting that questioning Herodotus is racist?
Quote from: Dangun on April 17, 2018, 11:14:19 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 17, 2018, 08:50:50 AM
It's not quite that simple - as Engels points out with detailed calculations, IIRC - because all the extra pack animals have to eat from the supplies they carry, as well.... Doesn't Engels claim that no army can carry more than about eight days' worth of provisions, because beyond that the extra pack animals are just eating their own loads?
Yes, in a nice little book, he said exactly that.
It's a fairly straightforward calculation using figures from the internet. A pack equid can carry 20% of its bodyweight for sustained periods. It eats 2.5% of its body weight a day. It therefore eats the equivalent of its load in eight days. Give or take. Mules are anecdotally more fuel efficient and you might get away with 2.0% body weight a day. Rather than arguing the specifics (when none of us are mule wranglers), we should recognise Engels caution that, if using mules, you shouldn't be expecting a long gap between replenishment stops.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 09:54:28 AM
QuoteWhat I dislike is the 'cultural racism' approach which seems to take for granted that any tale told in classical Greek sources must be the inventive product of an inferior mind.
Of which there is no evidence whatsoever here. Herodotus may live in a world in which faith, myth and reality were intertwined whereas we do not. This is evidence of a different world view, rather than an inferiority of mind.
If recounting a man being saved by dolphins is the gauge of a mindset that mixes faith, myth and reality, then we live in a world that has a far greater proportion of faith and myth than in Herodotus' time since he reported only one dolphin incident whereas modern news outlets report dozens. ;)
QuoteI suspect foraging for animals became an issue only at stops of several days,
No, the cavalry would be worrying about fodder every day. Probably every day they would be short and they would be concerned on the long term effect on the horses. And this would be with a realistic (i.e. comparable to other periods in military history) army.
QuoteIf recounting a man being saved by dolphins is the gauge of a mindset that mixes faith, myth and reality, then we live in a world that has a far greater proportion of faith and myth than in Herodotus' time since he reported only one dolphin incident whereas modern news outlets report dozens. ;)
Thank goodness Herodutus didn't have access to social media :)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 01:20:24 PM
QuoteI suspect foraging for animals became an issue only at stops of several days,
No, the cavalry would be worrying about fodder every day. Probably every day they would be short and they would be concerned on the long term effect on the horses. And this would be with a realistic (i.e. comparable to other periods in military history) army.
QuoteIf recounting a man being saved by dolphins is the gauge of a mindset that mixes faith, myth and reality, then we live in a world that has a far greater proportion of faith and myth than in Herodotus' time since he reported only one dolphin incident whereas modern news outlets report dozens. ;)
Thank goodness Herodutus didn't have access to social media :)
;D
Returning to Maurice for a bit, here are the stats for Camp Gordon (http://www.fortwiki.com/Camp_Gordon_(3)), a WW1 US army training camp built in Georgia. It occupied an area of 2400 acres and could hold 47 000 troops. It had 1600 buildings and was spread out with plenty of space between the buildings as the photos show. Its 2400 acres = 971 hectares translates to 48 men per hectare.
Camp Hancock (http://www.fortwiki.com/Camp_Hancock_(2)) in Georgia occupied 1777 acres and could hold 50 000 men. it's a little more compact than Camp Gordon but still spread out, with 70 men per hectare.
So even by luxurious US training camp standards, Maurice is well off the mark.
I suspect that you are using a different approach to maurice. He is thinking in terms of the sorts of concentration areas armies need to work from a fixed supply point and maintain military efficiency, not just how many men can be crammed in a space. Doesn't mean he isn't on the generous side but lets try and get where he is coming from. Poor chap, if he's been writing BC, we'd not bat an eyelid at his numbers .
AS an alternative comparator, what if we look at the Persian camp as more like a refugee camp - a few functional areas like hospitals, storage, assembly spaces and some closely arranged tents? If we take UNHCR guidelines
The average camp size is recommended by UNHCR to be 45 sqm per person of accessible camp area. Sleeping accommodations are frequently tents, prefabricated huts, or dwellings constructed of locally available materials. UNHCR recommends a minimum of 3.5 sqm of covered living area per person. There should be at least 2m between shelters.
The UNHCR allow 15sq m garden space per person, so actual camp density would be at 30 sq m per person. In real lfe, they can be denser but lets stick to the guidance. Of course, UNHCR camps tend to be settled with some infrastructure, so may well be more sophisticated than a daily camp. But then again, they don't have thousands of cavalry and baggage animals.
Pompey's troops at Dyrrachium had about the same area per man as in Maurice's example, given a 12km by 2.5km area as suggested by the Livius map and 45,000 men, so doesn't seem excessive if intending to stay for some time and there are a lot of animals as well. Another thing, as Anthony suggests, Maurice is using the British for comparison purposes, not as a model. He puts the Persian host into an area 3 miles by 7 before Thermopylae for instance, which is far more densely packed than the British.
Regarding the Scamander (Mendere) note that Maurice measures the Mendere at 20 feet side and 6 inches deep (see his notes) and that he treats what he calls the Homeric Scamander, fed by pools, as a separate watercourse (narrow, good water). Between them he thinks they would struggle to consistently deliver 400,000 usable gallons a day for a period of days.
I agree though that his numbers seem to be confusing here when compared to Justin's climate change paper - but that is not thoroughly consistent either, so it's a bit of a head-scratcher. It would be helpful to know what the army recon. formula he was using might have been. I've had a search but haven't had any luck turning anything up.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 05:34:41 PM
AS an alternative comparator, what if we look at the Persian camp as more like a refugee camp - a few functional areas like hospitals, storage, assembly spaces and some closely arranged tents? If we take UNHCR guidelines
The average camp size is recommended by UNHCR to be 45 sqm per person of accessible camp area. Sleeping accommodations are frequently tents, prefabricated huts, or dwellings constructed of locally available materials. UNHCR recommends a minimum of 3.5 sqm of covered living area per person. There should be at least 2m between shelters.
The UNHCR allow 15sq m garden space per person, so actual camp density would be at 30 sq m per person. In real lfe, they can be denser but lets stick to the guidance. Of course, UNHCR camps tend to be settled with some infrastructure, so may well be more sophisticated than a daily camp. But then again, they don't have thousands of cavalry and baggage animals.
Interesting approach, and we can probably contract it some more by assuming the Achaemenids, like other armies, are not too picky about assigning 10'x10' to the average soldier. If however we stay at 30m per person overall this gives about 333 people per hectare, quite a bit denser than US training camps and significantly more so than Maurice's concentration areas.
Getting back to animal logistics, I am left wondering what proportion of the baggage train consisted of camels. In some ways, camels are a logistician's dream: their supply requirement is not necessarily less than that of other animals, but they have the ability to defer it, or more accurately carry much of it with them in that thing known as a hump.
In practice, this means Xerxes' army would not have had to carry fodder for its camels, because they would replenish themselves at the next grazing area. They are also quite tolerant of going the odd day or two without water, which may be why the rivers which did not suffice for the entire army did not result in massive animal mortality: watering the camels only once other requirements were satisfied would make good use of these animals' ability to sustain themselves from internal resources (they could replenish at the next adequate water source) and give some flexibility in water management.
A thought about pasturage.
Judging by the number of Thracians Herodotus records as joining Xerxes' army (c.300.000) there would have to be significant pasturage areas to sustain their livestock. Does anyone have any idea how many animals 300,000 adult male Thracians plus the population of northern Greece would maintain? I do not, but suspect it would be quite a few, with concomitant grazing facilities. And there is a kind of cruel logic to the Achamenid army's progress: as its baggage animals crop the grazing lands, consuming in a day or so what would perhaps have lasted the local livestock weeks (allowing for regrowth of grass), so the original livestock gets enlisted as part of the meat on the hoof contingent to replace its late predecessors in this role.
The Achaemenid invasion was timed to coincide with the spring grass; this would presumably remove much if not all of the need for fodder, assuming the continued survival of the bulk of the local livestock was not a major concern. This would bring us back to a pack train which carries food for the men but not the animals, greatly reducing the requirement. (Personally, I suspect a certain amount of stored fodder would anyway have been laid up as insurance, and also that the Achaemenids would empty the barns of areas they passed through if the grazing was not up to expectations.)
It may be unrealistic to assume that pasturage would be exactly where the army wanted it every day of the marching week. It would not however be beyond the capabilities of the army's camp followers plus cooperative locals to cut plenty of fresh material and ensure it reached the campsite on time.
QuotePoor chap, if he's been writing BC, we'd not bat an eyelid at his numbers.
But then, if he had been writing BC, would he have had the same numbers?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 11:50:38 AM
You aren't seriously suggesting that questioning Herodotus is racist?
Not the act of questioning itself (heaven forbid!) but the blinkered culturally-led way it seems to be done.
[Edited typo: 'wated' to 'wanted']
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 17, 2018, 11:14:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 17, 2018, 10:56:43 AMThe Achaemenid army ... animals ... are not expected to last.
That may be one of the key issues, not just for this expedition but for ancient logistics in general. Maurice, Engels and the like calculate consumption based on what's needed to keep pack animals in a usable condition; the picture is a bit different if they are expendable.
But are they expendable? If you're on a march for a limited time and you expect to be able to get new mules (camels, whatever) the next time you need them, yes. If you're still going to need the animals to shuttle food from shipborne deliveries to the army in six months' time, and your army's so big that Greece (which doesn't breed camels, or apparently all that many mules) can't supply enough replacement beasts, then your pack animals surely do need to last.
The question here would seem to be whether if the animals are operating on a one-week loading cycle (i.e. about 1/7 of their load is offloaded for consumption daily), one can start the week with an overload and finish it with an underload without harming the animals and sustain this over an indefinite period.
One feature of animal load manuals seems to be that they assume the animal will be carrying the same load on a continuing basis, i.e. it will have that load all the time. But if the load starts heavy and then becomes progressively lighter over the next six days, is the animal better able to maintain its health and efficiency? A mule loaded to 500 lbs at the start of such a week will be carrying nothing or a few empty containers by the end of the week and will
on average be carrying the manual-stipulated 250 lbs.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 17, 2018, 05:34:41 PM
I suspect that you are using a different approach to maurice. He is thinking in terms of the sorts of concentration areas armies need to work from a fixed supply point and maintain military efficiency, not just how many men can be crammed in a space. Doesn't mean he isn't on the generous side but lets try and get where he is coming from. Poor chap, if he's been writing BC, we'd not bat an eyelid at his numbers .
AS an alternative comparator, what if we look at the Persian camp as more like a refugee camp - a few functional areas like hospitals, storage, assembly spaces and some closely arranged tents? If we take UNHCR guidelines
The average camp size is recommended by UNHCR to be 45 sqm per person of accessible camp area. Sleeping accommodations are frequently tents, prefabricated huts, or dwellings constructed of locally available materials. UNHCR recommends a minimum of 3.5 sqm of covered living area per person. There should be at least 2m between shelters.
The UNHCR allow 15sq m garden space per person, so actual camp density would be at 30 sq m per person. In real lfe, they can be denser but lets stick to the guidance. Of course, UNHCR camps tend to be settled with some infrastructure, so may well be more sophisticated than a daily camp. But then again, they don't have thousands of cavalry and baggage animals.
I suspect that Roman army camping arrangements are our best comparative marker. The contubernum tent (http://legioneromana.altervista.org/content/tents-roman-camp?language=en) measured a little under 3 x 3m and could sleep 6 men at any one time (the other two were on guard duty). Add a couple of metres between one tent and the next (as per UNHCR) and you have an area of 5 x 5m per tent which is per 8 men. So each man gets 3m
2. If you exclude space for kitchens, parade ground, latrines, officers' more luxurious accommodation and of course a corral for the animals, you get 3333 men per hectare. Cut that by 2/3 to include the extras but don't add space for camp walls or ditches and you come out at 1111 men per hectare. With this ball park figure 3 400 000 men will occupy 3060 hectares or 5,5 x 5,5 km. Xerxes would have wanted his camp as closely packed as possible so this figure seems to make sense. Pack animals could be spread out more thinly on the periphery of the camp the facilitate grazing. Overcrowding and its concomitant sanitary problems is not really an issue since the army will break camp the next day and move one.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 07:44:54 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 11:50:38 AM
You aren't seriously suggesting that questioning Herodotus is racist?
Not the act of questioning itself (heaven forbid!) but the blinkered culturally-led way it seems to be done.
[Edited typo: 'wated' to 'wanted']
So in essence yes
Quote
It would probably need to be over the hilly ground north (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.906775,22.6246439,976a,35y,238.5h,73.21t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) of the Tempe valley which itself is a steep and narrow gorge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8816868,22.5920488,3a,60y,245.91h,98.23t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sbKrh3K15Ao7hsTqTIPlh6g!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en). The army must be able to march in a column/columns several hundred yards wide at all times.
Sorry Justin I might be misunderstanding you but did you not in an earlier post say that it would be impossible for an army of 3 million to move along a single track?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 11:07:59 PM
Quote
It would probably need to be over the hilly ground north (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.906775,22.6246439,976a,35y,238.5h,73.21t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) of the Tempe valley which itself is a steep and narrow gorge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8816868,22.5920488,3a,60y,245.91h,98.23t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sbKrh3K15Ao7hsTqTIPlh6g!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en). The army must be able to march in a column/columns several hundred yards wide at all times.
Sorry Justin I might be misunderstanding you but did you not in an earlier post say that it would be impossible for an army of 3 million to move along a single track?
Sure Ian. The army obviously cannot march in the Tempe valley itself as it is too narrow, but the hilly ground just to the north of it is wide enough and not too steeply-sloping. Wouldn't be much fun though.
Should the army at any time be obliged to march through a narrow area that will stop it dead in its tracks. Suppose it marches 8 wide. The column would be 3 400 000 divided by 8 x 2 yards = 825km long. It would take a month to pass a given point.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 06:58:01 AM
Sure Ian. The army obviously cannot march in the Tempe valley itself as it is too narrow, but the hilly ground just to the north of it is wide enough and not too steeply-sloping. Wouldn't be much fun though.
Should the army at any time be obliged to march through a narrow area that will stop it dead in its tracks. Suppose it marches 8 wide. The column would be 3 400 000 divided by 8 x 2 yards = 825km long. It would take a month to pass a given point.
Not sure how practical it would be to march a couple of million men and beasts over these hills in a column several hundred men wide!
https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8817216,22.5921391,3a,75y,315.76h,104.63t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1s7LfT-a1iXqED6zGWXNVj4A!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en
https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8585485,22.5315659,3a,75y,4.18h,110.33t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sXtDfxD6V6Q07VoouzopPAQ!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 06:58:01 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 11:07:59 PM
Quote
It would probably need to be over the hilly ground north (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.906775,22.6246439,976a,35y,238.5h,73.21t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) of the Tempe valley which itself is a steep and narrow gorge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8816868,22.5920488,3a,60y,245.91h,98.23t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sbKrh3K15Ao7hsTqTIPlh6g!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en). The army must be able to march in a column/columns several hundred yards wide at all times.
Sorry Justin I might be misunderstanding you but did you not in an earlier post say that it would be impossible for an army of 3 million to move along a single track?
Sure Ian. The army obviously cannot march in the Tempe valley itself as it is too narrow, but the hilly ground just to the north of it is wide enough and not too steeply-sloping. Wouldn't be much fun though.
Should the army at any time be obliged to march through a narrow area that will stop it dead in its tracks. Suppose it marches 8 wide. The column would be 3 400 000 divided by 8 x 2 yards = 825km long. It would take a month to pass a given point.
During this month the column would be being fed by supplies brought in by boat?
I am also wondering about how much excrement, dead bodies and other detritus would be piling up in such a comparatively small area - I suspect that by the end of the first week the place would be a major health hazard.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 18, 2018, 08:57:20 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 06:58:01 AM
Sure Ian. The army obviously cannot march in the Tempe valley itself as it is too narrow, but the hilly ground just to the north of it is wide enough and not too steeply-sloping. Wouldn't be much fun though.
Should the army at any time be obliged to march through a narrow area that will stop it dead in its tracks. Suppose it marches 8 wide. The column would be 3 400 000 divided by 8 x 2 yards = 825km long. It would take a month to pass a given point.
Not sure how practical it would be to march a couple of million men and beasts over these hills in a column several hundred men wide!
https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8817216,22.5921391,3a,75y,315.76h,104.63t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1s7LfT-a1iXqED6zGWXNVj4A!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en
https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8585485,22.5315659,3a,75y,4.18h,110.33t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sXtDfxD6V6Q07VoouzopPAQ!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en
That's through the gorge.
This is the route I suggest: Starting here (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.9196726,22.6495711,2142a,35y,254.62h,67.59t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) (gorge to the left), then a close-up (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.9073476,22.6182523,944a,35y,254.62h,68.01t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en), then here (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.9000024,22.5965267,551a,35y,243.19h,68.8t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en), then to the top (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8913429,22.5804385,716a,35y,245.25h,54.25t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en), then shift right (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.892254,22.5745058,697a,35y,245.25h,54.25t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) then (180 degree rotation of view) head down the slope (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.892254,22.5745058,697a,35y,245.25h,54.25t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en), and further down to the widening valley floor, (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.892254,22.5745058,697a,35y,245.25h,54.25t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) and there you are.
QuoteI suspect that Roman army camping arrangements are our best comparative marker.
This document (http://romanarmy.info/camp2_hyginus/camp_hyginus.html) on the Hyginus ideal camp and this study (http://www.bandaarcgeophysics.co.uk/arch/roman_campaigning.html)may be useful. These provide a density of about 1160 per hectare for Hyginus, though the marching camp paper suggests 900-1000 per hectare may be more likely.
We should note Hyginus' army is under 50,000 strong, so we don't know from this how the Roman army would tackle encamping several million people. I suspect given an army across the Empire about half a million strong, the question wouldn't have occured. From the larger armies recorded of up to 200,000 strong, I don't know whether they used one mega-camp or a concentration area model as Maurice describes.
H 7.173 has the army go through Northern Macedon, Perrabia and come out near Gonnoi, so perhaps we are back with Young again in any case.
H does also mention in 7.131 using a third of the army to clear 'the Macedonian mountain' and create path for the army to pass through to reach the Perraibians.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 09:25:30 AM
QuoteI suspect that Roman army camping arrangements are our best comparative marker.
This document (http://romanarmy.info/camp2_hyginus/camp_hyginus.html) on the Hyginus ideal camp and this study (http://www.bandaarcgeophysics.co.uk/arch/roman_campaigning.html)may be useful. These provide a density of about 1160 per hectare for Hyginus, though the marching camp paper suggests 900-1000 per hectare may be more likely.
We should note Hyginus' army is under 50,000 strong, so we don't know from this how the Roman army would tackle encamping several million people. I suspect given an army across the Empire about half a million strong, the question wouldn't have occured. From the larger armies recorded of up to 200,000 strong, I don't know whether they used one mega-camp or a concentration area model as Maurice describes.
We have Pompey at Dyrrachium, which is about the same density as Maurice gives for his Brits in France.
Here is Xerxes' army encamped (Herodotus VII.127):
"When he had arrived at Therma, Xerxes quartered his army there. Its encampment by the sea covered all the space from Therma and the Mygdonian country to the rivers Lydias and Haliacmon, which unite their waters in one stream and so make the border between the Bottiaean and the Macedonian territory. In this place the foreigners [barbaroi] lay encamped; of the rivers just mentioned [in VII.124-126], the Cheidorus, which flows from the Crestonaean country, was the only one which could not suffice for the army's drinking but was completely drained by it."
Can we get an approximate size from this description?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 06:58:01 AM
Sure Ian. The army obviously cannot march in the Tempe valley itself as it is too narrow, but the hilly ground just to the north of it is wide enough and not too steeply-sloping. Wouldn't be much fun though.
Might be worth observing how many of the Persian contingents came from hilly or mountainous regions. They would not have been too bothered about using hill tracks or just climbing hills or the odd mountain once in a while; even the Immortals managed Ephialtes' goat-track at Thermpoylae without problems. I think we tend to be a bit too 'road-bound' in our thinking, like the US Army in Korea in 1950-51. (Students of that conflict will recall the communist Chinese managed to move massive armies around in mountainous areas and keep them supplied, albeit not by Achaemenid methods!)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 09:38:19 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 07:44:54 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 11:50:38 AM
You aren't seriously suggesting that questioning Herodotus is racist?
Not the act of questioning itself (heaven forbid!) but the blinkered culturally-led way it seems to be done.
So in essence yes
No, just the way it is done.
We grow up in our culture, with our culture's perceptions, which is well and good, for it enables us to survive, and on occasion prosper, in our culture. This has the side-effect that we tend to see everything through the eyes of our culture, which is good up to a point, as it allows mutual understanding with those who have the same mindset. But when dealing with history, we seem all too often to feel a compulsion to convert recorded historical events to conform with our own mindset, particularly when it involves some outstanding deed or performance. There seems to be a compulsion to reduce such events to a squalid mediocrity, and for what reason or purpose?
This Procrustean process seems often to be disguised, or excused, under the pretext of applying a critical faculty. There is nothing wrong with applying one's critical faculty to history, but much wrong with arbitrarily rewriting history to accord with the norms of one's culture under the pretense that one is employing one's critical faculty. That is my gripe.
[If this develops into a philosophy-of-history discussion we might take it to a new thread.]
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 18, 2018, 10:32:48 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 09:38:19 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 07:44:54 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 11:50:38 AM
You aren't seriously suggesting that questioning Herodotus is racist?
Not the act of questioning itself (heaven forbid!) but the blinkered culturally-led way it seems to be done.
So in essence yes
No, just the way it is done.
We grow up in our culture, with our culture's perceptions, which is well and good, for it enables us to survive, and on occasion prosper, in our culture. This has the side-effect that we tend to see everything through the eyes of our culture, which is good up to a point, as it allows mutual understanding with those who have the same mindset. But when dealing with history, we seem all too often to feel a compulsion to convert recorded historical events to conform with our own mindset, particularly when it involves some outstanding deed or performance. There seems to be a compulsion to reduce such events to a squalid mediocrity, and for what reason or purpose?
This Procrustean process seems often to be disguised, or excused, under the pretext of applying a critical faculty. There is nothing wrong with applying one's critical faculty to history, but much wrong with arbitrarily rewriting history to accord with the norms of one's culture under the pretense that one is employing one's critical faculty. That is my gripe.
[If this develops into a philosophy-of-history discussion we might take it to a new thread.]
Ooh, for once in my life I feel i am being out-post-modernised ;)
I would be interested to see how your approach to history works on analysing Geoffrey of Monmouth's The History of the Kings of Britain.
Quote(Students of that conflict will recall the communist Chinese managed to move massive armies around in mountainous areas and keep them supplied, albeit not by Achaemenid methods!)
I'm no expert on the Korean War but I'm not sure this is really compatable. The Chinese deployed a smaller army over a much wider front and weren't tied to naval supply.
I am a bit baffled by the approach to modern analogy of the "source first" group. Maurice has been rejected as he is too early 20th century British but Lawrence of Arabia has been cited with approval. 18th century practice is right out but the PVA in 1950 is OK. Modern US and Pakistan army experience with mule transport is disregarded as too humane (as opposed to being based on operational requirements).
QuoteI would be interested to see how your approach to history works on analysing Geoffrey of Monmouth's The History of the Kings of Britain.
Patrick is consistent in that he holds to the accuracy of Geoffrey of Monmouth's Arthurian tales, as we know from another thread. He has even reconstructed the campaigns therein in some detail. Needless to say, he found himself in (polite) conflict with those with an interest in Early Medieval Britain.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 18, 2018, 09:52:16 AM
H 7.173 has the army go through Northern Macedon, Perrabia and come out near Gonnoi, so perhaps we are back with Young again in any case.
H does also mention in 7.131 using a third of the army to clear 'the Macedonian mountain' and create path for the army to pass through to reach the Perraibians.
I checked the location of ancient Gonnus: it's just north of the Peneus on the other side of the pass - exactly where the Persians would arrive if they took the high ground north of the Tempe valley. This suggests that the Greeks thought the Persians would come along the valley floor and hence considered it an ideal blocking point as it is only a hundred yards wide. The Persians bypass the valley by going through "another pass leading into Thessaly by the hill country of Macedonia through the country of the Perrhaebi, near the town of Gonnus". They'll be coming down the slopes on a wide front, too much for the Greeks to handle.
(https://i.imgur.com/qYQHIXX.jpg)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 11:01:13 AM
Quote(Students of that conflict will recall the communist Chinese managed to move massive armies around in mountainous areas and keep them supplied, albeit not by Achaemenid methods!)
I'm no expert on the Korean War but I'm not sure this is really compatable. The Chinese deployed a smaller army over a much wider front and weren't tied to naval supply.
I am a bit baffled by the approach to modern analogy of the "source first" group. Maurice has been rejected as he is too early 20th century British but Lawrence of Arabia has been cited with approval. 18th century practice is right out but the PVA in 1950 is OK. Modern US and Pakistan army experience with mule transport is disregarded as too humane (as opposed to being based on operational requirements).
There isn't a consistent over arching methodology which is explainable - we can disregard modern historians as they are 'not are not by training generals, economists, horsemen, merchants, seamen or waggoneers'. However, we can usefully draw on personal experience of C21 South African print shop operation or the experience of people watching Jefferson Airplane or Tiny Tim at Woodstock. It is only a matter of time before the well documented Dalek Invasion of Earth in 2150 is utilised in support of Herodotus.
QuoteIt is only a matter of time before the well documented Dalek Invasion of Earth in 2150 is utilised in support of Herodotus.
I know it is hard to resist a drift into sarcasm, but you must resist :) I think there is value to the "sources first" challenge to the orthodox/conventional approach, in that it does avoid lazy thinking. I've often come across an approach to ancient numbers in books where the an author just downsizes a figure by 10 without any rationale or a vague reference to Delbruck. Patrick and Justin are right to shout "Oi, hang on a minute". What I find difficult is, when criticisms of sources are deployed, they are picked at to expose issues, which are used to undermine the whole, or just ignored. Also, if a range of critical opinions are raised, by disproving one you can wave the others away.
I've confessed to be a fairly conventional thinker when it comes to history. I was taught the value of the critical thinking at school and university and I'm pretty wedded to that paradigm. I'm also wedded in numbers games to what I was taught in physics at school - does your answer look right when compared with other things you know? So, in this case, if all other armies in Europe for which we have reliable figures in the pre-modern era are under 600,000 strong, is there a good case why this one should buck the trend? Was there a technological advantage? An organisational one? Were the logistics especially simple? Was the route more straightforward? We don't seem to have evidence to answer yes to any of these questions - most of them come up no.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 18, 2018, 09:10:13 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 06:58:01 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 17, 2018, 11:07:59 PM
Quote
It would probably need to be over the hilly ground north (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.906775,22.6246439,976a,35y,238.5h,73.21t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en) of the Tempe valley which itself is a steep and narrow gorge (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.8816868,22.5920488,3a,60y,245.91h,98.23t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sbKrh3K15Ao7hsTqTIPlh6g!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en). The army must be able to march in a column/columns several hundred yards wide at all times.
Sorry Justin I might be misunderstanding you but did you not in an earlier post say that it would be impossible for an army of 3 million to move along a single track?
Sure Ian. The army obviously cannot march in the Tempe valley itself as it is too narrow, but the hilly ground just to the north of it is wide enough and not too steeply-sloping. Wouldn't be much fun though.
Should the army at any time be obliged to march through a narrow area that will stop it dead in its tracks. Suppose it marches 8 wide. The column would be 3 400 000 divided by 8 x 2 yards = 825km long. It would take a month to pass a given point.
During this month the column would be being fed by supplies brought in by boat?
I am also wondering about how much excrement, dead bodies and other detritus would be piling up in such a comparatively small area - I suspect that by the end of the first week the place would be a major health hazard.
The point is that the army does
not march through any narrow gaps that oblige it to contract to a column 8 men wide. It marches in a column or columns several hundred yards wide with the column(s) about 20 km long or so, which causes as much inconvenience as the columns of a regular army.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 18, 2018, 10:20:53 AM
Here is Xerxes' army encamped (Herodotus VII.127):
"When he had arrived at Therma, Xerxes quartered his army there. Its encampment by the sea covered all the space from Therma and the Mygdonian country to the rivers Lydias and Haliacmon, which unite their waters in one stream and so make the border between the Bottiaean and the Macedonian territory. In this place the foreigners [barbaroi] lay encamped; of the rivers just mentioned [in VII.124-126], the Cheidorus, which flows from the Crestonaean country, was the only one which could not suffice for the army's drinking but was completely drained by it."
Can we get an approximate size from this description?
The distance from Therma to the Haliacmon river is about 25km (15 miles).
(https://i.imgur.com/Mt2JXSB.jpg)
QuoteThe distance Therma to the Haliacmon river is about 25km (15 miles).
So, if we assume a fairly generous coastal strip of 1km, we have 25 sq km of concentration area. We know Maurice would be thinking this small for an army of 210,000 men. If it were one giant UNHCR camp, it would contain 833,000 people. If it were all a big Roman camp, it could hold 2.5 million. I think no-one would assume something the density of a Roman camp, not least because it assumes you can camp on every part of the available space, and we know it has watering points and the track several hundred yards wide running through it. We obviously can't work out an actual number from this (because we don't really know how widely armies needed to be spread when concentrated to make for effective military operation, unless we take much later examples) but it would be a lot less than 3.5 million.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 02:07:16 PM
QuoteThe distance Therma to the Haliacmon river is about 25km (15 miles).
So, if we assume a fairly generous coastal strip of 1km, we have 25 sq km of concentration area. We know Maurice would be thinking this small for an army of 210,000 men. If it were one giant UNHCR camp, it would contain 833,000 people. If it were all a big Roman camp, it could hold 2.5 million. I think no-one would assume something the density of a Roman camp, not least because it assumes you can camp on every part of the available space, and we know it has watering points and the track several hundred yards wide running through it. We obviously can't work out an actual number from this (because we don't really know how widely armies needed to be spread when concentrated to make for effective military operation, unless we take much later examples) but it would be a lot less than 3.5 million.
No reason why we should assume a width of 1km. We can assume a width of 2km (half an hour to walk from the landward edge of the camp to the coast) and double the numbers. I walk 2km to and from work each day. It's nothing.
What is more difficult to assume is that an army of 150 000 to 200 000 men that camps in anything like Roman military concentration is going to need 25 - 30km of coastline
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 01:05:25 PM
The point is that the army does not march through any narrow gaps that oblige it to contract to a column 8 men wide. It marches in a column or columns several hundred yards wide with the column(s) about 20 km long or so, which causes as much inconvenience as the columns of a regular army.
That's not what it means at all. It means that they didn't use the Tempe pass. It does not mean that they had a mountain superhighway over which they could march several million men in columns 200 men wide with neat spacing between ranks while also accommodating cavalry horses, pack animals and the supply train.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 02:21:49 PM
No reason why we should assume a width of 1km. We can assume a width of 2km (half an hour to walk from the landward edge of the camp to the coast) and double the numbers. I walk 2km to and from work each day. It's nothing.
A fairly broad strip but not impossible. Something laid out on the density of a Roman camp I think would be stretching it though.
Quote
What is more difficult to assume is that an army of 150 000 to 200 000 men that camps in anything like Roman military concentration is going to need 25 - 30km of coastline
I think this goes back to what we have in our minds eye. Maurice was envisaging a military concentration area. A set of dispersed camps, each perhaps approaching Roman densities. Or we might think in terms of one vast, organised but not strictly regimented camp a bit like a refugee camp. These also tend not to be continous.
Why it was so spread could be because there was no reason to tighten it up - the army was used to being spread over a march distance of a couple of days, maybe with the elite units at the front and the ones further back wading through a sea of detritus every day. Or, as Herodotus seems to be thinking, access to water is the issue. Doesn't really tell us a lot in absolute terms except the army was big and nobody disputes that.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 18, 2018, 03:02:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 01:05:25 PM
The point is that the army does not march through any narrow gaps that oblige it to contract to a column 8 men wide. It marches in a column or columns several hundred yards wide with the column(s) about 20 km long or so, which causes as much inconvenience as the columns of a regular army.
That's not what it means at all. It means that they didn't use the Tempe pass. It does not mean that they had a mountain superhighway over which they could march several million men in columns 200 men wide with neat spacing between ranks while also accommodating cavalry horses, pack animals and the supply train.
I'm trying to form an idea of just how difficult the ground north of the pass is. Here's an image of a Drakensberg hike I did, from Giant's Castle hotel (red dot at bottom) to Bannerman's hut (red dot at top). The distance is 7km and took about 4 hours. It's what hiking books would term 'difficult'. Tiring but not really exhausting and not dangerous.
(https://i.imgur.com/a4aC5tb.jpg)
Here, on the same scale, is the hilly ground north of the river valley. Distance from the flat plain below to the summit ridge is about 4km; distance from the summit ridge to the plain beyond is about 3km. It's less steep than the Drakensberg climb. I'd say quite manageable for men and animals in a number of columns that avoid the steep bits. The traversable area looks to be about 1,5km wide.
(https://i.imgur.com/lMHFMl4.jpg)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 03:22:32 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 02:21:49 PM
No reason why we should assume a width of 1km. We can assume a width of 2km (half an hour to walk from the landward edge of the camp to the coast) and double the numbers. I walk 2km to and from work each day. It's nothing.
A fairly broad strip but not impossible. Something laid out on the density of a Roman camp I think would be stretching it though.
Quote
What is more difficult to assume is that an army of 150 000 to 200 000 men that camps in anything like Roman military concentration is going to need 25 - 30km of coastline
I think this goes back to what we have in our minds eye. Maurice was envisaging a military concentration area. A set of dispersed camps, each perhaps approaching Roman densities. Or we might think in terms of one vast, organised but not strictly regimented camp a bit like a refugee camp. These also tend not to be continous.
Why it was so spread could be because there was no reason to tighten it up - the army was used to being spread over a march distance of a couple of days, maybe with the elite units at the front and the ones further back wading through a sea of detritus every day. Or, as Herodotus seems to be thinking, access to water is the issue. Doesn't really tell us a lot in absolute terms except the army was big and nobody disputes that.
A good gauge for camp density would be contemporary squatter camps. The layout of a squatter camp is self-regulating and not governed by municipal laws, i.e. the people live as close together as possible whilst still having some sort of a life. Here's a typical example (http://www.worldwatch.org/node/526) from Nairobi: 6000 people who live on 5-6 hectares. They have no electricity or running water and no sewerage system, but they manage to get by in a permanent setup with 2 water taps and 3 pit latrines.
Here's (https://www.slideshare.net/tudorgeog/case-study-of-a-squatter-settlement-kibera-nairobi) an extreme case: between 800 000 and 1 000 000 people live on 255 hectares, which means 1 person per 2,5m
2. Mortality here is high. I can't imagine the Persian camp being this packed.
A marching camp needn't worry as much about sewerage: holes dug in the ground are enough. 1000 people per hectare seems quite manageable if less than idyllic.
QuoteA good gauge for camp density would be contemporary squatter camps. The layout of a squatter camp is self-regulating and not governed by municipal laws, i.e. the people live as close together as possible whilst still having some sort of a life.
How the mighty have fallen. We've gone from one of the most highly organised armies in pre-modern history to a migrating squatter camp of gigantic proportions. Perhaps time for some reflection on the difference? I don't think the highly ordered supply and march routine and the mobile squatter camp are easy bedfellows.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 05:48:35 PM
QuoteA good gauge for camp density would be contemporary squatter camps. The layout of a squatter camp is self-regulating and not governed by municipal laws, i.e. the people live as close together as possible whilst still having some sort of a life.
How the mighty have fallen. We've gone from one of the most highly organised armies in pre-modern history to a migrating squatter camp of gigantic proportions. Perhaps time for some reflection on the difference? I don't think the highly ordered supply and march routine and the mobile squatter camp are easy bedfellows.
let me clarify. I've visited several squatter camps and they can be well organised, clean and tidy. The point is that their inhabitants must fit into as little space as possible whilst still maintaining living conditions and do it with a virtual absence of a modern infrastructure. They need to be able to perform all the functions of a human community without making life unbearable for themselves. With this in mind, 1000 people per hectare is workable for a
permanent settlement. It is more than adequate for a temporary camp that lasts only a few days at the most.
I of course bow to your personal knowledge of squatter camps and I see the sense in your comment about them being organised - I can't see how they would work otherwise. I still have my doubts that they are a good model for an ancient army though.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 11:01:13 AM
Quote(Students of that conflict will recall the communist Chinese managed to move massive armies around in mountainous areas and keep them supplied, albeit not by Achaemenid methods!)
I'm no expert on the Korean War but I'm not sure this is really compatable. The Chinese deployed a smaller army over a much wider front and weren't tied to naval supply.
As I pointed out, they did not use Achaemenid methods. The essence of my point is that we tend to be too 'road-bound' in our military thinking; the PRC put 400,000 men into terrain where MacArthur did not think they would be able to deploy 100,000.
QuoteI am a bit baffled by the approach to modern analogy of the "source first" group. Maurice has been rejected as he is too early 20th century British but Lawrence of Arabia has been cited with approval. 18th century practice is right out but the PVA in 1950 is OK. Modern US and Pakistan army experience with mule transport is disregarded as too humane (as opposed to being based on operational requirements).
Then let me explain.
Lawrence is not trying to perform logistical calculations for Herodotus but for troops under his care. We can therefore take his figures as applicable to his situation; whether they also apply to 5th century BC Achaemenids is a moot point: their importance is to show that Maurice's staff figures are not universal and in particular seem overstated in a non-European Near Eastern context.
The communist Chinese are invoked not to advocate an inapplicable supply system but to demonstrate that we English-speakers tend to be too wedded to communications routes when considering what an army could or could not do, and this despite some very recent examples of our getting it wrong because other cultures do things differently.
Modern US and Pakistani mule transport might not be the best guide to how mules were loaded.
This site (http://www.mulemuseum.org/history-of-the-mule.html) contains the following intriguing snippet:
General George Crook, in the late 1870's, preferred to ride his mule "Apache", which he considered much superior to the horse, and he continually stressed the importance of having healthy pack mules under his command. He believed that the success of any campaign, to a great extent, depended upon them. General Crook's mules
easily carried twice the load the Army manual stipulated because he allowed only the best equipment to be used on the best mules - - and each pack saddle was tailored to fit each mule. Crook's troops always had the ammunition they needed because his mule trains never failed.
We do not know what carrying harnesses, panniers etc. the Achamenids used, but we do know they came from a long tradition of mule use. I therefore suggest they had learned to optimise the use of their mules, notably by using equipment fitted to the individual animal, and hence their loads - which, as explained earlier, were not constant but regularly diminishing - could easily be double the sustained loads carried by more modern mules such as those cited by our Mr Clipsom.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 05:48:35 PM
How the mighty have fallen. We've gone from one of the most highly organised armies in pre-modern history to a migrating squatter camp of gigantic proportions. Perhaps time for some reflection on the difference? I don't think the highly ordered supply and march routine and the mobile squatter camp are easy bedfellows.
I know it is hard to resist a drift into sarcasm, but you must resist. ;D
QuoteI'm also wedded in numbers games to what I was taught in physics at school - does your answer look right when compared with other things you know? So, in this case, if all other armies in Europe for which we have reliable figures in the pre-modern era are under 600,000 strong, is there a good case why this one should buck the trend?
Yes, and a very good one. Although previous Achamenid armies, or at least those for which we have source numbers, did not exceed 700,000 men, this one represented a full mobilisation of the Empire, or as full as could be managed without leaving everything defenceless, and was the first and last time this was done for the purpose of expanding the Empire. There would be later mass mobilisations for defensive purposes, threatened Achaemenid monarchs massing armies recorded as being around the 1 million mark in Mesopotamia (Artaxerxes II in 401 BC; Darius III in 331 BC) but never again for a conquest or reconquest. This was a unique event, and like all unique events, does not fit comfortably into a standard pattern.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 06:40:04 PM
I of course bow to your personal knowledge of squatter camps and I see the sense in your comment about them being organised - I can't see how they would work otherwise. I still have my doubts that they are a good model for an ancient army though.
They may or may not be, but they do show the density achievable for a
sustained human settlement*, thus indicating a transient military camp could easily be more densely inhabited.
*
In particular, one without multi-storey constructions, which would considerably distort the picture.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 03:51:13 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 18, 2018, 03:02:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 01:05:25 PM
The point is that the army does not march through any narrow gaps that oblige it to contract to a column 8 men wide. It marches in a column or columns several hundred yards wide with the column(s) about 20 km long or so, which causes as much inconvenience as the columns of a regular army.
That's not what it means at all. It means that they didn't use the Tempe pass. It does not mean that they had a mountain superhighway over which they could march several million men in columns 200 men wide with neat spacing between ranks while also accommodating cavalry horses, pack animals and the supply train.
I'm trying to form an idea of just how difficult the ground north of the pass is. Here's an image of a Drakensberg hike I did, from Giant's Castle hotel (red dot at bottom) to Bannerman's hut (red dot at top). The distance is 7km and took about 4 hours. It's what hiking books would term 'difficult'. Tiring but not really exhausting and not dangerous.
(https://i.imgur.com/a4aC5tb.jpg)
Here, on the same scale, is the hilly ground north of the river valley. Distance from the flat plain below to the summit ridge is about 4km; distance from the summit ridge to the plain beyond is about 3km. It's less steep than the Drakensberg climb. I'd say quite manageable for men and animals in a number of columns that avoid the steep bits. The traversable area looks to be about 1,5km wide.
(https://i.imgur.com/lMHFMl4.jpg)
There is a fair old difference between a fellow going on a hike with a backpack for fun and 3,500,000 + fellows going to war and relying on cavalry mounts, animals, and baggage trains for their survival now and over the coming weeks. If we use other ancient hillwalkers as examples, Xenophon and the 10,000 valued their roads, and while delegated portions of the 10,000 could go over the rough portion of a hill if they absolutely needed to, it was out of military necessity, and not part of everyday movement. It took its toll when you look at the rest days required, and these guys were both fit and motivated.
And the Achaemenids had a thing for roads - they had the royal ones, of course - so they knew how to make them. But their royal roads measured 7m across, not the 200m plus that has been asserted applied to armies of this size. What evidence is there for these massively wide columns?
Is there any positive evidence for column widths of the size here maintained?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 06:09:07 PMWith this in mind, 1000 people per hectare is workable for a permanent settlement.
If we compare Mongkok in Hong Kong to Kibera, Kenya it is interesting that the application of technology and capital doesn't do a lot to maximum population density - it rises from about 90,000/km2 in Kibera to 130,000/km2 in Mongkok. But I live on the 44th floor in HK which was unlikely an option for a Persian camp.
For the perfect s%t-storm of technology and poverty, consider Kowloon's Walled City, also in Hong Kong, which peaked out a population density of 1.3million per km2 - about 0.8sqm per person! Again, not relevant, but interesting.
But something that IS relevant, is that Kibera, or Kowloon Walled City are only 1 to 10% the size of our posited Persian army. So NONE OF THEM have to grapple with the same walking-to-edge-of-camp problems that the posited Persian camp would. In other words, the evidence suggests that as scale increases density must decrease - there are no slums in the world as big as this Persian camp.
What you want to be true is really that unprecedented.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 18, 2018, 08:14:18 PMThere is a fair old difference between a fellow going on a hike with a backpack for fun and 3,500,000 + fellows going to war and relying on cavalry mounts, animals, and baggage trains for their survival now and over the coming weeks. If we use other ancient hillwalkers as examples, Xenophon and the 10,000 valued their roads, and while delegated portions of the 10,000 could go over the rough portion of a hill if they absolutely needed to, it was out of military necessity, and not part of everyday movement. It took its toll when you look at the rest days required, and these guys were both fit and motivated.
Sure. The kind of difficult patch I gave above was exceptional: most of the time the army was walking on flat ground. It went the hilly route only because there was no other option.
Hiking and military marching are comparable IMHO with two important differences: a hiker like myself is not really fit when he goes on a hike, whereas the Persian infantry, who came from far more active backgrounds, had been marching for weeks and were as fit as fiddles. On the other hand, a hiker uses trails which wind up a slope, substantially easier than going straight up over virgin ground. I suspect the two more-or-less cancelled out, so that a Persian infantryman tramping over hilly ground didn't enjoy himself but wasn't clapped out at the end.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 18, 2018, 08:14:18 PMAnd the Achaemenids had a thing for roads - they had the royal ones, of course - so they knew how to make them. But their royal roads measured 7m across, not the 200m plus that has been asserted applied to armies of this size. What evidence is there for these massively wide columns?
Is there any positive evidence for column widths of the size here maintained?
That's the point of this thread. It's a feasibility study of the ability of the Persian empire to maintain and move such huge armies in the field. If there was conclusive evidence the Persian army did march that wide then we wouldn't be having this discussion. :) If 3,4 million men are to move from one campsite to another in a single day they have no choice but to march in a column several hundred men wide - not in neat parade-groups files and ranks of course, just wide. They can't do it any other way. There are indications the army did indeed march this way: the Thracians who don't cultivate the ground the Persians have trod, the need for the army to clear a forest in Macedonia during their passage (why clear a forest if they can just use the regular roads?).
Let me emphasize that this is just a feasibility study. Nobody is being asked to believe the Persian army was in fact several million strong. One can argue feasibility and disbelieve Herodotus' numbers for other reasons.
Quote from: Dangun on April 19, 2018, 12:27:39 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 18, 2018, 06:09:07 PMWith this in mind, 1000 people per hectare is workable for a permanent settlement.
If we compare Mongkok in Hong Kong to Kibera, Kenya it is interesting that the application of technology and capital doesn't do a lot to maximum population density - it rises from about 90,000/km2 in Kibera to 130,000/km2 in Mongkok. But I live on the 44th floor in HK which was unlikely an option for a Persian camp.
For the perfect s%t-storm of technology and poverty, consider Kowloon's Walled City, also in Hong Kong, which peaked out a population density of 1.3million per km2 - about 0.8sqm per person! Again, not relevant, but interesting.
But something that IS relevant, is that Kibera, or Kowloon Walled City are only 1 to 10% the size of our posited Persian army. So NONE OF THEM have to grapple with the same walking-to-edge-of-camp problems that the posited Persian camp would. In other words, the evidence suggests that as scale increases density must decrease - there are no slums in the world as big as this Persian camp.
What you want to be true is really that unprecedented.
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 08:30:42 AM
2) Young assumes no fodder anywhere along the route, despite the Persians having marched 'at the best season of the year' (Herodotus VII.50).
The best season for marching is not the best season for grass growth
We know they were marching in the dry season. So grass was not growing. It might have been 'ripening' but that merely means its feed value was dropping. Indeed you would start to see the phenomena that is known as 'burning off' where grass effectively 'disappears' because the the heat and dryness.
So once the fodder had gone, it had gone, it would not be replaced.
So perhaps Young might have a better idea about what he's talking about that somebody who has never had to farm grass or forage?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:18:59 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 08:30:42 AM
2) Young assumes no fodder anywhere along the route, despite the Persians having marched 'at the best season of the year' (Herodotus VII.50).
The best season for marching is not the best season for grass growth
We know they were marching in the dry season. So grass was not growing. It might have been 'ripening' but that merely means its feed value was dropping. Indeed you would start to see the phenomena that is known as 'burning off' where grass effectively 'disappears' because the the heat and dryness.
So once the fodder had gone, it had gone, it would not be replaced.
So perhaps Young might have a better idea about what he's talking about that somebody who has never had to farm grass or forage?
The harvest in Greece is in June. The army is marching from April to, say, September. Does that allow for decent grazing for the animals?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
Squatter camps are not comparable to ancient military camps.
Firstly each unit has to have room to form up as a military formation without having to take down its tents (should they have any) because the unit might have to leave the camp ready to fight.
There have to be lanes through the camp wide enough and clear enough to let the equivalent of the military police move at speed to break up trouble
These same lanes will be used to let the formed up units march out of the camp without having to march through the camping areas of other troops
I think we take the Roman camps as an absolute minimum for the amount of size needed
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:26:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
Squatter camps are not comparable to ancient military camps.
Firstly each unit has to have room to form up as a military formation without having to take down its tents (should they have any) because the unit might have to leave the camp ready to fight.
There have to be lanes through the camp wide enough and clear enough to let the equivalent of the military police move at speed to break up trouble
These same lanes will be used to let the formed up units march out of the camp without having to march through the camping areas of other troops
I think we take the Roman camps as an absolute minimum for the amount of size needed
Roman camps are estimated at an upper limit of 1186 men per hectare. If we make the Persian camp 1000 men per hectare would that be reasonable?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:24:56 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:18:59 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 08:30:42 AM
2) Young assumes no fodder anywhere along the route, despite the Persians having marched 'at the best season of the year' (Herodotus VII.50).
The best season for marching is not the best season for grass growth
We know they were marching in the dry season. So grass was not growing. It might have been 'ripening' but that merely means its feed value was dropping. Indeed you would start to see the phenomena that is known as 'burning off' where grass effectively 'disappears' because the the heat and dryness.
So once the fodder had gone, it had gone, it would not be replaced.
So perhaps Young might have a better idea about what he's talking about that somebody who has never had to farm grass or forage?
The harvest in Greece is in June. The army is marching from April to, say, September. Does that allow for decent grazing for the animals?
No
It's as simple as that. Study the agriculture of Greece, they didn't rely on Grazing animals because the vast amount of the country was not fit for grazing. (Hence the use of olive oil rather than butter)
They also used to move what grazing animals they did have up into the mountains because that is where the grazing was in summer.
If you want to move large numbers of horses and graze or collect fodder as you go, then the rule of thumb is to move them through areas where cattle graze all the year round.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:28:40 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:26:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
Squatter camps are not comparable to ancient military camps.
Firstly each unit has to have room to form up as a military formation without having to take down its tents (should they have any) because the unit might have to leave the camp ready to fight.
There have to be lanes through the camp wide enough and clear enough to let the equivalent of the military police move at speed to break up trouble
These same lanes will be used to let the formed up units march out of the camp without having to march through the camping areas of other troops
I think we take the Roman camps as an absolute minimum for the amount of size needed
Roman camps are estimated at an upper limit of 1186 men per hectare. If we make the Persian camp 1000 men per hectare would that be reasonable?
Given that we have no evidence whatsoever that the Persians had camps organised on anything like the efficiency of the Romans we are flattering them. Certainly the Greeks didn't didn't have anything that would pass as an organised camp that Romans would recognise, and they never commented on the Persians being remarkably efficient
But because we need a rule of thumb than if you take a thousand man per hectare, this gives you the absolute minimum camp size.
Given at times the army plus baggage seems to have been anywhere up to five or six million strong, the camp north of Thermopylae for example, could have quite a size
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
The present-day evidence suggests it is not comparable.
800,000 is a quarter of the size of your Persian camp.
The largest dense slums on the planet today are Dharavi, Kibera etc., nothing much more than a million people.
The slums that exist today which are larger, e.g. the largest - Orangi (2mn people) is much less dense.
This is probably telling us something.
Conceptually a slum/camp is limited by how far you can walk in a day to get food, fresh water and bring it back again, or dispose of your waste.
This limits the maximum size, as observed by... Maurice.
Herodotus' Persian camp is not just unprecedented at the time, but without precedent since.
Quote from: Dangun on April 19, 2018, 07:50:04 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
The present-day evidence suggests it is not comparable.
800,000 is a quarter of the size of your Persian camp.
The largest dense slums on the planet today are Dharavi, Kibera etc., nothing much more than a million people.
The slums that exist today which are larger, e.g. the largest - Orangi (2mn people) is much less dense.
This is probably telling us something.
Conceptually a slum/camp is limited by how far you can walk in a day to get food, fresh water and bring it back again, or dispose of your waste.
This limits the maximum size, as observed by... Maurice.
Herodotus' Persian camp is not just unprecedented at the time, but without precedent since.
The main differences between a squatter camp and a Persian military camp is that squatter camps don't all have to be in the same place and are not supported by the machinery of an imperial economy (they're hardly supported by anything). Xerxes' army had to be in one place and was supplied by food dumps and the entire Persian fleet. If 1 000 000 people congregate
of themselves into a single area at 1000 people/ha or more, what is the great difficulty in 3,4 million people congregating into an area under the command of the Great King, an area moreover that they don't occupy for more than a few days at a time?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:08:15 AM
Quote from: Dangun on April 19, 2018, 07:50:04 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
The present-day evidence suggests it is not comparable.
800,000 is a quarter of the size of your Persian camp.
The largest dense slums on the planet today are Dharavi, Kibera etc., nothing much more than a million people.
The slums that exist today which are larger, e.g. the largest - Orangi (2mn people) is much less dense.
This is probably telling us something.
Conceptually a slum/camp is limited by how far you can walk in a day to get food, fresh water and bring it back again, or dispose of your waste.
This limits the maximum size, as observed by... Maurice.
Herodotus' Persian camp is not just unprecedented at the time, but without precedent since.
The main differences between a squatter camp and a Persian military camp is that squatter camps don't all have to be in the same place and are not supported by the machinery of an imperial economy (they're hardly supported by anything). Xerxes' army had to be in one place and was supplied by food dumps and the entire Persian fleet. If 1 000 000 people congregate of themselves into a single area at 1000 people/ha or more, what is the great difficulty in 3,4 million people congregating into an area under the command of the Great King, an area moreover that they don't occupy for more than a few days at a time?
Are you actually claiming that there were food dumps prepared inside Greek territory prior to or during the invasion?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:17:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:08:15 AM
Quote from: Dangun on April 19, 2018, 07:50:04 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
The present-day evidence suggests it is not comparable.
800,000 is a quarter of the size of your Persian camp.
The largest dense slums on the planet today are Dharavi, Kibera etc., nothing much more than a million people.
The slums that exist today which are larger, e.g. the largest - Orangi (2mn people) is much less dense.
This is probably telling us something.
Conceptually a slum/camp is limited by how far you can walk in a day to get food, fresh water and bring it back again, or dispose of your waste.
This limits the maximum size, as observed by... Maurice.
Herodotus' Persian camp is not just unprecedented at the time, but without precedent since.
The main differences between a squatter camp and a Persian military camp is that squatter camps don't all have to be in the same place and are not supported by the machinery of an imperial economy (they're hardly supported by anything). Xerxes' army had to be in one place and was supplied by food dumps and the entire Persian fleet. If 1 000 000 people congregate of themselves into a single area at 1000 people/ha or more, what is the great difficulty in 3,4 million people congregating into an area under the command of the Great King, an area moreover that they don't occupy for more than a few days at a time?
Are you actually claiming that there were food dumps prepared inside Greek territory prior to or during the invasion?
The food dumps were laid down from the Thracian coast to Therma in Macedonia, i.e. on most of the route the Persian army would march along. After that the army depended on the fleet and whatever it could strip from the countryside (which would be considerable as the Greeks had just gathered their harvest).
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:18:59 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 17, 2018, 08:30:42 AM
2) Young assumes no fodder anywhere along the route, despite the Persians having marched 'at the best season of the year' (Herodotus VII.50).
The best season for marching is not the best season for grass growth
We know they were marching in the dry season.
Do we? Is this just because Maurice says so?
Herodotus VII.37: "... the host, having wintered at Sardis, began its march towards Abydos, fully equipped,
at the first approach of spring."
You are going to have a lot of trouble convincing me that spring was the dry season in Greece.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:33:13 AM
Study the agriculture of Greece, they didn't rely on Grazing animals because the vast amount of the country was not fit for grazing. (Hence the use of olive oil rather than butter)
But Xerxes was moving through Thrace and northern Greece, places which, unlike Greece south of Boeotia, sustained substantial cavalry forces and had numerous herdsmen. Objection overruled.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:26:06 AM
Firstly each unit has to have room to form up as a military formation without having to take down its tents (should they have any) because the unit might have to leave the camp ready to fight.
Not really: the Achaemenids were marching through non-hostile territory until Thermopylae, and even then do not seem to have paid any attention to this aspect of encamping. When the Immortals left to use Ephialtes' pass at Thermopylae, they 'left the camp at about the time of the lighting of the lamps' but do not seem to have formed up inside it. So yes, they need the ability to leave, but no, they do not need the ability to form up inside the camp, only to move if called upon.
QuoteThere have to be lanes through the camp wide enough and clear enough to let the equivalent of the military police move at speed to break up trouble
These same lanes will be used to let the formed up units march out of the camp without having to march through the camping areas of other troops
Yes, this is eminently reasonable.
QuoteI think we take the Roman camps as an absolute minimum for the amount of size needed
Disagree, because Roman camps added a 200-yard anti-missile buffer all round. I would thus take Roman camps (marching, not permanent, as the latter add various facilities and stores) as a maximum, not a minimum.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 08:28:32 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:33:13 AM
Study the agriculture of Greece, they didn't rely on Grazing animals because the vast amount of the country was not fit for grazing. (Hence the use of olive oil rather than butter)
But Xerxes was moving through Thrace and northern Greece, places which, unlike Greece south of Boeotia, sustained substantial cavalry forces and had numerous herdsmen. Objection overruled.
patrick, that is not worthy of you
Just do some homework and read up about Greek agriculture rather than trying to fob evidence off with smug one liners.
The herdsmen were in the very areas where the army didn't go!
A lot of the grazing for cattle was on marshland where the army couldn't pass
Please, actually ready something relevant to the discussion because frankly, if you're going to just make facile remarks like that, then I'm going to give up wasting time, because I've better things to do with it than spit into the wind
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 08:28:32 AM
Not really: the Achaemenids were marching through non-hostile territory until Thermopylae, and even then do not seem to have paid any attention to this aspect of encamping. When the Immortals left to use Ephialtes' pass at Thermopylae, they 'left the camp at about the time of the lighting of the lamps' but do not seem to have formed up inside it. So yes, they need the ability to leave, but no, they do not need the ability to form up inside the camp, only to move if called upon.
Please explain how you draw the conclusion in Green from the statement in red
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 08:28:32 AM
QuoteI think we take the Roman camps as an absolute minimum for the amount of size needed
Disagree, because Roman camps added a 200-yard anti-missile buffer all round. I would thus take Roman camps (marching, not permanent, as the latter add various facilities and stores) as a maximum, not a minimum.
Given that nobody has ever produced any evidence that the Persians routinely fortified their camps (we know they did a couple of times when they were stopped for a long period,) then it is actually highly likely that there was nobody in the Persian army who know just exactly where the camp perimeter was, if only because of the sheer size.
Remember you're the one trying to convince us that the Persians had camps of about six million people and livestock (and remember, there are properly laid out latrines and everything because the last thing an army this size needs is dysentery) and on a regular basis.
So produce some evidence? Show us something in the literature, what does Xenophon say?
Hell even a few quotes from the Cyropaedia would be nice
You're claiming the an ancient source has primacy over modern experience, so let's see some more quotes from ancient sources to support Herodotus.
Taking persian camps as an example, Xenophon lived in one for some months, go and see what he says about it
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:26:46 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:17:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:08:15 AM
Quote from: Dangun on April 19, 2018, 07:50:04 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
The present-day evidence suggests it is not comparable.
800,000 is a quarter of the size of your Persian camp.
The largest dense slums on the planet today are Dharavi, Kibera etc., nothing much more than a million people.
The slums that exist today which are larger, e.g. the largest - Orangi (2mn people) is much less dense.
This is probably telling us something.
Conceptually a slum/camp is limited by how far you can walk in a day to get food, fresh water and bring it back again, or dispose of your waste.
This limits the maximum size, as observed by... Maurice.
Herodotus' Persian camp is not just unprecedented at the time, but without precedent since.
The main differences between a squatter camp and a Persian military camp is that squatter camps don't all have to be in the same place and are not supported by the machinery of an imperial economy (they're hardly supported by anything). Xerxes' army had to be in one place and was supplied by food dumps and the entire Persian fleet. If 1 000 000 people congregate of themselves into a single area at 1000 people/ha or more, what is the great difficulty in 3,4 million people congregating into an area under the command of the Great King, an area moreover that they don't occupy for more than a few days at a time?
Are you actually claiming that there were food dumps prepared inside Greek territory prior to or during the invasion?
The food dumps were laid down from the Thracian coast to Therma in Macedonia, i.e. on most of the route the Persian army would march along. After that the army depended on the fleet and whatever it could strip from the countryside (which would be considerable as the Greeks had just gathered their harvest).
So you army of several million men concentrated in one area fed itself from foraging the Greek countryside
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:17:06 AM
Are you actually claiming that there were food dumps prepared inside Greek territory prior to or during the invasion?
It really would help if people contributing this thread were to read Herodotus.
"King Xerxes, then, mourned for the death of Artachaees. But the Greeks who received Xerxes' army and entertained the king himself were brought to such a degree of misery, that they were driven from house and home. Witness the case of the Thasians, who received and feasted Xerxes' army on behalf of their towns on the mainland; Antipatrus son of Orgeus, as notable a man as any of his townsmen, chosen by them for this task, rendered them an account of four hundred silver talents expended on the dinner.
Similar accounts were returned by the officers in the other towns. Now the dinner, about which a great deal of fuss had been made and for the preparation of which orders had been given long ago, proceeded as I will tell. [2] As soon as the townsmen had word from the herald's proclamation, they divided corn among themselves in their cities and all of them for many months ground it to wheat and barley meal; moreover, they fed the finest beasts that money could buy, and kept landfowl and waterfowl in cages and ponds, for the entertaining of the army. They also made gold and silver cups and bowls and all manner of service for the table. [3] These things were provided for the king himself and those that ate with him. For the rest of the army they provided only food. At the coming of the army, there was always a tent ready for Xerxes to take his rest in, while the men camped out in the open air. [4] When the hour came for dinner, the real trouble for the hosts began. When they had eaten their fill and passed the night there, the army tore down the tent on the next day and marched off with all the movables, leaving nothing but carrying all with them." - Herodotus VII.118-119
So not only were 'food dumps' prepared 'inside Greek territory', some of them were prepared by Greeks themselves. It depended on whose service you were in: if you had sent earth and water to the Persian king, you obeyed his commands. If there were: 'have food ready for my army', you had food ready for his army. Is there anything here particularly hard to understand?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 08:32:53 AM
The herdsmen were in the very areas where the army didn't go!
A lot of the grazing for cattle was on marshland where the army couldn't pass
At least we agree on the existence of cattle and herdsmen. :)
What we now need to consider is the effects of the erosion/submergence of the northern Aegean coastline over the past couple of millennia. The plain of Doriscus, for example, is now underwater, along with a lot of other potential grazing areas. Erosion around Alexandroupolis (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16849142) is still a major concern.
Suffice to say that the map of Thrace and northern Greece today is not that of 480 BC.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 08:36:51 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 08:28:32 AM
Not really: the Achaemenids were marching through non-hostile territory until Thermopylae, and even then do not seem to have paid any attention to this aspect of encamping. When the Immortals left to use Ephialtes' pass at Thermopylae, they 'left the camp at about the time of the lighting of the lamps' but do not seem to have formed up inside it. So yes, they need the ability to leave, but no, they do not need the ability to form up inside the camp, only to move if called upon.
Please explain how you draw the conclusion in Green from the statement in red
I do not. An Achaemenid unit of 10,000 men formed for battle would be 100 wide and 100 deep. These men are intended to move out and cross a mountain track which is perhaps a few men wide. What is the point of forming them up as opposed to simply leading them out of camp a few files wide? Herodotus uses 'hormeato', setting out, to describe their activity.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:55:11 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:26:46 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:17:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:08:15 AM
Quote from: Dangun on April 19, 2018, 07:50:04 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
The present-day evidence suggests it is not comparable.
800,000 is a quarter of the size of your Persian camp.
The largest dense slums on the planet today are Dharavi, Kibera etc., nothing much more than a million people.
The slums that exist today which are larger, e.g. the largest - Orangi (2mn people) is much less dense.
This is probably telling us something.
Conceptually a slum/camp is limited by how far you can walk in a day to get food, fresh water and bring it back again, or dispose of your waste.
This limits the maximum size, as observed by... Maurice.
Herodotus' Persian camp is not just unprecedented at the time, but without precedent since.
The main differences between a squatter camp and a Persian military camp is that squatter camps don't all have to be in the same place and are not supported by the machinery of an imperial economy (they're hardly supported by anything). Xerxes' army had to be in one place and was supplied by food dumps and the entire Persian fleet. If 1 000 000 people congregate of themselves into a single area at 1000 people/ha or more, what is the great difficulty in 3,4 million people congregating into an area under the command of the Great King, an area moreover that they don't occupy for more than a few days at a time?
Are you actually claiming that there were food dumps prepared inside Greek territory prior to or during the invasion?
The food dumps were laid down from the Thracian coast to Therma in Macedonia, i.e. on most of the route the Persian army would march along. After that the army depended on the fleet and whatever it could strip from the countryside (which would be considerable as the Greeks had just gathered their harvest).
So you army of several million men concentrated in one area fed itself from foraging the Greek countryside
My take is that it would spread out, like Sherman's army in Georgia in 1864, and help itself to the harvest - a harvest meant to keep the entire local population and livestock fed for 12 months until the next harvest.
Here's a street view (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.7694439,22.4682243,3a,75y,309.79h,90.46t/data=!3m7!1e1!3m5!1s39uNu9XU1c3FQYuBZJz4QA!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo1.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fpanoid%3D39uNu9XU1c3FQYuBZJz4QA%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps_sv.tactile.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D152.2206%26pitch%3D0%26thumbfov%3D100!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en) of the Thessalian countryside. Doesn't look too bad for grazing to me. The texan herd drivers would have liked it. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 08:57:21 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:17:06 AM
Are you actually claiming that there were food dumps prepared inside Greek territory prior to or during the invasion?
It really would help if people contributing this thread were to read Herodotus.
To be fair, it was Justin who mentioned the food dumps. Ian was simply asking if Justin was claiming that there were food dumps in Greece itself.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 18, 2018, 07:23:24 PM
Lawrence is not trying to perform logistical calculations for Herodotus but for troops under his care. We can therefore take his figures as applicable to his situation; whether they also apply to 5th century BC Achaemenids is a moot point: their importance is to show that Maurice's staff figures are not universal and in particular seem overstated in a non-European Near Eastern context.
The communist Chinese are invoked not to advocate an inapplicable supply system but to demonstrate that we English-speakers tend to be too wedded to communications routes when considering what an army could or could not do, and this despite some very recent examples of our getting it wrong because other cultures do things differently.
Ok, so Lawrence was three times more efficient than the contemporary British army and the Chinese could move four times the number of men. So we should expect the real force is three or four times the size of Maurice as a "thinking outside the box "?
Quote
Quote from: Erpingham on April 18, 2018, 05:48:35 PM
How the mighty have fallen. We've gone from one of the most highly organised armies in pre-modern history to a migrating squatter camp of gigantic proportions. Perhaps time for some reflection on the difference? I don't think the highly ordered supply and march routine and the mobile squatter camp are easy bedfellows.
I know it is hard to resist a drift into sarcasm, but you must resist. ;D
That was me being wry - do we have a wry emoji? :)
QuoteAlthough previous Achamenid armies, or at least those for which we have source numbers, did not exceed 700,000 men, this one represented a full mobilisation of the Empire, or as full as could be managed without leaving everything defenceless, and was the first and last time this was done for the purpose of expanding the Empire. There would be later mass mobilisations for defensive purposes, threatened Achaemenid monarchs massing armies recorded as being around the 1 million mark in Mesopotamia (Artaxerxes II in 401 BC; Darius III in 331 BC) but never again for a conquest or reconquest. This was a unique event, and like all unique events, does not fit comfortably into a standard pattern.
Are these sources describing the 700,000 armies better documented than Herodotus? If not, all we can say is Xerxes army was big by comparison with other Persian armies.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 09:43:37 AM
That was me being wry - do we have a wry emoji? :)
How about this one? ::) (my favourite)
Or this one if you like. :o
Quote from: Prufrock on April 19, 2018, 09:35:51 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 08:57:21 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:17:06 AM
Are you actually claiming that there were food dumps prepared inside Greek territory prior to or during the invasion?
It really would help if people contributing this thread were to read Herodotus.
To be fair, it was Justin who mentioned the food dumps. Ian was simply asking if Justin was claiming that there were food dumps in Greece itself.
Thats Ok I have been condescended to before;)
I did mean hostile Greek territory
On George Crook and his double loaded mules, I looked up whether we had an estimate of their load. This paper (http://www.transportation.army.mil/historian/documents/pack%20mules.pdf) states
When promoted to the Commander of the Department of Arizona in 1871, Crook finally had the resources to work on the problem. He had his quartermaster purchase 15,000 mules and recruited civilian packers. Crook hired Thomas Moore as his chief packer and Dave Mears as his assistant to recruit, train, equip, organize and supervise the pack trains. Crook then treated the study of the pack trains as a science. He learned that if they custom fitted the aparejo pack to each mule, they could increase the weight carried to four hundred pounds
So modern US army mules seem to have benefitted from Crook's expertise and no longer carry half his load.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 09:28:02 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:55:11 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:26:46 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 08:17:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:08:15 AM
Quote from: Dangun on April 19, 2018, 07:50:04 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 06:59:51 AM
There are squatter camps that are comparable - that one example I gave from Nairobi numbering 800 000 to 1 000 000, jammed far closer together than I would conceive for the Persian camp, in a permanent settlement, and it still manages to function more-or-less.
The present-day evidence suggests it is not comparable.
800,000 is a quarter of the size of your Persian camp.
The largest dense slums on the planet today are Dharavi, Kibera etc., nothing much more than a million people.
The slums that exist today which are larger, e.g. the largest - Orangi (2mn people) is much less dense.
This is probably telling us something.
Conceptually a slum/camp is limited by how far you can walk in a day to get food, fresh water and bring it back again, or dispose of your waste.
This limits the maximum size, as observed by... Maurice.
Herodotus' Persian camp is not just unprecedented at the time, but without precedent since.
The main differences between a squatter camp and a Persian military camp is that squatter camps don't all have to be in the same place and are not supported by the machinery of an imperial economy (they're hardly supported by anything). Xerxes' army had to be in one place and was supplied by food dumps and the entire Persian fleet. If 1 000 000 people congregate of themselves into a single area at 1000 people/ha or more, what is the great difficulty in 3,4 million people congregating into an area under the command of the Great King, an area moreover that they don't occupy for more than a few days at a time?
Are you actually claiming that there were food dumps prepared inside Greek territory prior to or during the invasion?
The food dumps were laid down from the Thracian coast to Therma in Macedonia, i.e. on most of the route the Persian army would march along. After that the army depended on the fleet and whatever it could strip from the countryside (which would be considerable as the Greeks had just gathered their harvest).
So you army of several million men concentrated in one area fed itself from foraging the Greek countryside
My take is that it would spread out, like Sherman's army in Georgia in 1864, and help itself to the harvest - a harvest meant to keep the entire local population and livestock fed for 12 months until the next harvest.
Here's a street view (https://www.google.co.za/maps/@39.7694439,22.4682243,3a,75y,309.79h,90.46t/data=!3m7!1e1!3m5!1s39uNu9XU1c3FQYuBZJz4QA!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo1.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fpanoid%3D39uNu9XU1c3FQYuBZJz4QA%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps_sv.tactile.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D152.2206%26pitch%3D0%26thumbfov%3D100!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en) of the Thessalian countryside. Doesn't look too bad for grazing to me. The texan herd drivers would have liked it. :)
Much like the other examples such as the Helvetti and the Voortrekkers Shermans army in Georgia was considerably smaller.
Just thought but if this was the say in say Boeotia, Thessaly etc and other medizing areas would it not have caused mass famine which would mean that these states would not have been able to field troops to support Mardonious at Platea?
What I haven't been able to find out is any estimate of the size of the Greek population at the time broken down by areas.
QuoteDisagree, because Roman camps added a 200-yard anti-missile buffer all round. I would thus take Roman camps (marching, not permanent, as the latter add various facilities and stores) as a maximum, not a minimum.
But the figure being quoted is the density of the camp space, not including the defences.
I think we are falling down here on not thinking of this as a working military operation. Interestingly, we have discovered from two wildly different sources - a squatter camp and a Roman army camp - that the reasonable top end density is around 1000 people per hectare. We also know from everything else that there are size constraints on camps, to make them work i.e. that a sea of several million people and animals at maximum density wouldn't work. However, we have no real idea of how much dead ground we need between encampments and clusters to enable watering, mustering, stockpiling and so on. I suspect we may be reaching a dead end here.
On fodder, I think some have developed a mental image that moving a horse powered army is like a cattle drive in the wild west. Animals roam around the camp in big herds and basically look after themselves. This might work for meat on the hoof but mounted units maintain their animals - they gather fodder if its available locally and they have time. Troopers take their animals down to the watering point, they don't just drive them in big herds (a horse ridden all day has to be controlled in its drinking).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 08:08:15 AM
If 1 000 000 people congregate of themselves into a single area at 1000 people/ha or more, what is the great difficulty in 3,4 million people congregating into an area under the command of the Great King, an area moreover that they don't occupy for more than a few days at a time?
This has been addressed a couple of times already.
But since you asked, camps
do not scale up linearly - a point made by Maurice (point 11, if memory serves).
Which is probably why we have not seen a camp of this size at any time in the last two millennia.
For example, because the maintenance of a camp involves leaving it regularly to get food, water, and achieve something outside of the camp, the costs of travel in and out limit total size.
Here's (http://romanarmy.info/camp3_dimensions/camp_dimensions.html) an interesting study on the size of Roman army camps. It goes into some detail - haven't read all of it yet nor seen if it confirms my hypothesis or blows it out the water. ;)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 10:32:50 AM
QuoteDisagree, because Roman camps added a 200-yard anti-missile buffer all round. I would thus take Roman camps (marching, not permanent, as the latter add various facilities and stores) as a maximum, not a minimum.
But the figure being quoted is the density of the camp space, not including the defences.
I think we are falling down here on not thinking of this as a working military operation. Interestingly, we have discovered from two wildly different sources - a squatter camp and a Roman army camp - that the reasonable top end density is around 1000 people per hectare. We also know from everything else that there are size constraints on camps, to make them work i.e. that a sea of several million people and animals at maximum density wouldn't work. However, we have no real idea of how much dead ground we need between encampments and clusters to enable watering, mustering, stockpiling and so on. I suspect we may be reaching a dead end here.
On fodder, I think some have developed a mental image that moving a horse powered army is like a cattle drive in the wild west. Animals roam around the camp in big herds and basically look after themselves. This might work for meat on the hoof but mounted units maintain their animals - they gather fodder if its available locally and they have time. Troopers take their animals down to the watering point, they don't just drive them in big herds (a horse ridden all day has to be controlled in its drinking).
the reason cavalry men had servants was often to cut the fodder, because if you just let animals graze it, they'll waste a lot by trampling on it, pissing on it and shitting on it.
Also they'll graze selectively and only take the nice stuff, so what's left no others will eat.
So fodder has to be within walking distance of the camp, because if you've got to ride to get it,it reduces the time the horse has to eat and digest it
Thanks Jim. That confirms my reading too - that fodder would be gathered, not horses ridden out to hunt for pasture. In this case, I think Herodotus has plenty of servants around but the time factor coupled with the availability of cuttable fodder within range would be key. Other armies seem to have used cut fodder as supplemental to dry fodder or done without it. Does Xenophon or any of the ancient authorities speak about horse care on campaign, which may guide us here?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 10:32:50 AMOn fodder, I think some have developed a mental image that moving a horse powered army is like a cattle drive in the wild west. Animals roam around the camp in big herds and basically look after themselves. This might work for meat on the hoof but mounted units maintain their animals - they gather fodder if its available locally and they have time. Troopers take their animals down to the watering point, they don't just drive them in big herds (a horse ridden all day has to be controlled in its drinking).
I'd sort of been assuming that the cattle-drive parallel was being applied only to the baggage-animals, and that everyone agreed that the cavalry horses would be more directly looked after. But perhaps I was wrong. And perhaps it wouldn't work even then :)
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 19, 2018, 01:35:15 PM
I'd sort of been assuming that the cattle-drive parallel was being applied only to the baggage-animals, and that everyone agreed that the cavalry horses would be more directly looked after. But perhaps I was wrong. And perhaps it wouldn't work even then :)
I think the cattle drive thing would work for meat on the hoof. I don't think it makes sense for baggage animals, where you need to a continuity between baggage teams and loads. The effect of masses of mule drivers wandering through herds of mules to find their own before loading them with their personalised pack saddles on the timing of the march is a bit alarming.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 19, 2018, 01:35:15 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 10:32:50 AMOn fodder, I think some have developed a mental image that moving a horse powered army is like a cattle drive in the wild west. Animals roam around the camp in big herds and basically look after themselves. This might work for meat on the hoof but mounted units maintain their animals - they gather fodder if its available locally and they have time. Troopers take their animals down to the watering point, they don't just drive them in big herds (a horse ridden all day has to be controlled in its drinking).
I'd sort of been assuming that the cattle-drive parallel was being applied only to the baggage-animals, and that everyone agreed that the cavalry horses would be more directly looked after. But perhaps I was wrong. And perhaps it wouldn't work even then :)
A cattle drive would only work for 'meat on the hoof', baggage animals are as individually managed as cavalry horses
(And the cattle drive would take a lot of careful managing)
If you had two bullocks pulling a cart (just as an example), they'd eat about 50lb per day dry grass. (Which is all you'd find in the area are the time.)
So your man 'parks' his bullocks. Picks up his sack and his sickle and walks through out 6000 hectare camp. (assuming he only has to cross half of it, then I'll let you work out how long that takes him)
Then outside the camp he can start collecting grass, but the nearby stuff will either have been already taken, or will have been earmarked for cavalry horses etc (with cavalrymen lounging about making sure nobody nicks it whilst their servants cut it)
So he could have to walk a mile or so more to get to an area where the grass is fresh, he'll have to cut it, then carry 50lb back. So just the cutting could take an hour and he might have a second hour outside the camp just looking. Then there's the crossing of the camp as well.........
Indeed on reason for having so many camp followers is that one can cut grass whilst the other is 'parking the bullocks.' Cutting on the move wouldn't really be possible for a lot of them because most of the grass within easy reach of the road would have gone by the time most of the baggage got there
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 19, 2018, 01:35:15 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 10:32:50 AMOn fodder, I think some have developed a mental image that moving a horse powered army is like a cattle drive in the wild west. Animals roam around the camp in big herds and basically look after themselves. This might work for meat on the hoof but mounted units maintain their animals - they gather fodder if its available locally and they have time. Troopers take their animals down to the watering point, they don't just drive them in big herds (a horse ridden all day has to be controlled in its drinking).
I'd sort of been assuming that the cattle-drive parallel was being applied only to the baggage-animals, and that everyone agreed that the cavalry horses would be more directly looked after. But perhaps I was wrong. And perhaps it wouldn't work even then :)
Here's a link (https://books.google.co.za/books?id=ntMeWddadwAC&pg=PA21&lpg=PA21&dq=how+many+square+metres+of+grass+does+a+horse+eat+each+day?&source=bl&ots=1mZAJV-Z4o&sig=fdVpka3zI3l8_RSXpI2HBE7l09k&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjltrGrrsbaAhVjBsAKHXycCOoQ6AEIeTAH#v=onepage&q=how%20many%20square%20metres%20of%20grass%20does%20a%20horse%20eat%20each%20day%3F&f=false) to the grazing area needed per horse - 20 to 50 horses per acre. Haven't worked out the implications for the Persian army.
There's a lot on pasture levels for horses out there but they are usually based on sustained grazing in a single field or paddock.
This may help, from The Horse
So, how much grass can be eaten per hour of grazing activity? This will vary with pasture forage quantity, quality, and palatability, and also with the amount of time horses are on pasture. However, about 1-1.4 pounds (0.5-0.6 kg) per hour (DM basis) is a reasonable range assuming quantity is not a limiting factor. This means that a horse with 24-hour access to good-quality pasture grazing 17 hours each day can consume up to 25 pounds (11.3 kg) as forage, which is plenty to satisfy his daily DM needs. A minimum of eight to 10 hours at pasture would be needed to achieve a DM intake of at least 1% of body weight. Anything less than this duration of grazing and the horse will need supplemental forage (such as hay) to satisfy his forage needs.
As Justin's quote points out, horses are as happy grazing at night, so if you could find the right levels of pasturage, you could probably provide a horse with half its needs in fresh fodder by grazing. This doesn't help with the area question though.
Jim, who knows these things, might be able to assess the productivity of unimproved meadow on the basis of fodder cutting, as a comparison.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 02:15:54 PM
There's a lot on pasture levels for horses out there but they are usually based on sustained grazing in a single field or paddock.
This may help, from The Horse
So, how much grass can be eaten per hour of grazing activity? This will vary with pasture forage quantity, quality, and palatability, and also with the amount of time horses are on pasture. However, about 1-1.4 pounds (0.5-0.6 kg) per hour (DM basis) is a reasonable range assuming quantity is not a limiting factor. This means that a horse with 24-hour access to good-quality pasture grazing 17 hours each day can consume up to 25 pounds (11.3 kg) as forage, which is plenty to satisfy his daily DM needs. A minimum of eight to 10 hours at pasture would be needed to achieve a DM intake of at least 1% of body weight. Anything less than this duration of grazing and the horse will need supplemental forage (such as hay) to satisfy his forage needs.
As Justin's quote points out, horses are as happy grazing at night, so if you could find the right levels of pasturage, you could probably provide a horse with half its needs in fresh fodder by grazing. This doesn't help with the area question though.
Jim, who knows these things, might be able to assess the productivity of unimproved meadow on the basis of fodder cutting, as a comparison.
The problem is that, yes, you can graze horses over night, but somebody needs to stand guard over them in case somebody runs them off (other cavalry units in your own army are as likely to do it as barbarian horse thieves)
Also it's an inefficient use of fodder, they waste far more than if you just cut it. Herbivores selectively graze. They'll eat the stuff that's nice, ignoring stuff that's just as nutritious but is further down their list of preferences.
It's also an inefficient use of time. If the horses are grazing they have to be caught and brought in through your 6000 hectare camp to be harnessed and made ready. If they're in nice tidy horse lines to start off with, that is so much faster. The horse can still eat over night, but it does so in one place and just soils one area. You'll get much more fodder per acre if you cut and carry it to the animal
If it's any use, Xenophon mentions in the Anabasis that Persian horses are tethered and hobbled at night. (3.4.35)
Quote from: Prufrock on April 19, 2018, 02:52:58 PM
If it's any use, Xenophon mentions in the Anabasis that Persian horses are tethered and hobbled at night. (3.4.35)
Definitely of use. :) It's looking like food was taken to horses, not vice versa. Would the same apply to pack animals? I suppose it would. How would a regular army like Rome's feed its animals on the march?
Quote from: Prufrock on April 19, 2018, 02:52:58 PM
If it's any use, Xenophon mentions in the Anabasis that Persian horses are tethered and hobbled at night. (3.4.35)
It's the way I'd do it to be honest. It's far more efficient to have the cavalry horses (and draft animals) safe and eating under guard whilst some expendable servant goes out cutting fodder. It's a lot easier to get a cavalry unit into the saddle if you need them in a hurry if they don't have to conduct the last roundup first ;D
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 03:00:47 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 19, 2018, 02:52:58 PM
If it's any use, Xenophon mentions in the Anabasis that Persian horses are tethered and hobbled at night. (3.4.35)
Definitely of use. :) It's looking like food was taken to horses, not vice versa. Would the same apply to pack animals? I suppose it would. How would a regular army like Rome's feed its animals on the march?
A lot of armies had servants/slaves for cavalry, and one of their jobs would be cutting fodder. If it's only a small force the servants could probably cut stuff within sight of the road as the baggage advances.
The problem is the bigger the army, the more space the army takes up and the further the servants have to go for fodder.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 03:00:47 PM
It's looking like food was taken to horses, not vice versa. Would the same apply to pack animals? I suppose it would. How would a regular army like Rome's feed its animals on the march?
Yes, you'd need to deal with pack animals similarly, for reasons already given. You need to be able to be able to round up your animals and get them loaded in reasonable order at the beginning of the day.
I've looked at some of the figures in the Crusades logistics book and compared with what is said about hay yields on the internet. There is a huge difference in yields over time and space but essentially modern hay yields are much higher than historical ones, so we should try to go that way. There is also some confusion on whether yields are per year or per cut, and how many cuts per year. Round here they cut twice. From my quick viewpoint 1.0-1.5 tonnes per acre for a cut would probably bracket it. 1 tonne would feed 100 horses for a day, proportional to the amount of dry fodder put in. I can't remember how many horses, mules and camels we have.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 03:33:29 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 03:00:47 PM
It's looking like food was taken to horses, not vice versa. Would the same apply to pack animals? I suppose it would. How would a regular army like Rome's feed its animals on the march?
Yes, you'd need to deal with pack animals similarly, for reasons already given. You need to be able to be able to round up your animals and get them loaded in reasonable order at the beginning of the day.
I've looked at some of the figures in the Crusades logistics book and compared with what is said about hay yields on the internet. There is a huge difference in yields over time and space but essentially modern hay yields are much higher than historical ones, so we should try to go that way. There is also some confusion on whether yields are per year or per cut, and how many cuts per year. Round here they cut twice. From my quick viewpoint 1.0-1.5 tonnes per acre for a cut would probably bracket it. 1 tonne would feed 100 horses for a day, proportional to the amount of dry fodder put in. I can't remember how many horses, mules and camels we have.
If somebody can tell us the number of animals, nutrition requirements is just a matter of calculation :-)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 03:38:03 PM
If somebody can tell us the number of animals, nutrition requirements is just a matter of calculation :-)
Very true. I thought presenting this in such a generic way would be more useful to Justin. Whether Justin can create anything more plausible by using them, I don't know.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 03:38:03 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 03:33:29 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 03:00:47 PM
It's looking like food was taken to horses, not vice versa. Would the same apply to pack animals? I suppose it would. How would a regular army like Rome's feed its animals on the march?
Yes, you'd need to deal with pack animals similarly, for reasons already given. You need to be able to be able to round up your animals and get them loaded in reasonable order at the beginning of the day.
I've looked at some of the figures in the Crusades logistics book and compared with what is said about hay yields on the internet. There is a huge difference in yields over time and space but essentially modern hay yields are much higher than historical ones, so we should try to go that way. There is also some confusion on whether yields are per year or per cut, and how many cuts per year. Round here they cut twice. From my quick viewpoint 1.0-1.5 tonnes per acre for a cut would probably bracket it. 1 tonne would feed 100 horses for a day, proportional to the amount of dry fodder put in. I can't remember how many horses, mules and camels we have.
If somebody can tell us the number of animals, nutrition requirements is just a matter of calculation :-)
Someone want to do the maths? I'm feeling lazy.
To take us further into the fog of agricultural production, timed tests of Indian sickle harvesting on line show about 100 square metres per hour. So an acre could be harvested in 40 hrs, or 40 people could harvest the acre in an hour. The killers (regardless of number of horses) would be distance needing to be travelled to the pasture and the productivity of the pasture when the harvest team arrived. Given all the other calls on the horse-support team, relying on fodder carried with the unit and available in its horse lines makes sense.
OK, let me do the maths.
Take 1 ton per acre which feeds 100 horses. There are 2,47 acres to a hectare so assume one hectare feeds 250 horses.
Now let's assume that the army, at least whilst marching inland, feeds its animals entirely from fodder collected from the land.
Each man needs 1kg of grain a day. Each mule can, at a cautious estimate, carry 250 pounds of grain = 113kg, call it 100 kg.
The army marches inland for 5 days tops. So each mule must carry 5kg per man, which works out to 1 mule per 20 men.
The army numbers 3 400 000 men. That's 170 000 mules. Tack on another 20 000 horses or so for the cavalry. 190 000 animals. Call it 200 000 animals
Assume a mule eats as much as a horse. That means you will need 800 hectares of fodder each day.
The army pitches camp. Working on 1000 men per hectare it occupies an area of 3400 hectares.
40 people can harvest an acre in an hour so 100 people can harvest a hectare in an hour. 80 000 people can harvest 800 hectares in an hour.
Following these figures, the time spent preparing the camp will be enough to gather about four times the fodder requirements for the animals without the gatherers having to stray beyond the camp limits.
Any chinks in the argumentation?
One problem is that you're assuming constant hayfields
Firstly I think you have to exclude the camp from the calculation, because that will be full of people doing stuff and once the first units have arrived they're going to trample and soil things. There could be a bit from the site but it'll probably end up fenced for for the private horse herds of guard units and the the great man's chariots etc
Secondly unless land is actively fenced off to ensure that the grass is protected, it doesn't end up the length you are talking about. Local livestock will have taken it long before.
I found a picture entitled, Europe, Grece, Plain of Thessaly, Valley of Penee, herd of goats -
Given the colour it's in the fertile time of the year. Even if there were no goats, you're not harvesting grass from endless plains.
You'll probably need an order of magnitude more area to get the amount of grass you need and that will be in the good times. When it's earlier in the season you'll actually take longer because the grass is shorter so it's harder to cut. It's also lower dry matter so you'll need more weight.
with regard to the men doing it, every army I've ever read about, each animal will be fed as an individual or as a team. So 200,000 animals will probably have over 100,000 men out there getting the fodder for the animal/s they are personally responsible for.
Using the camp area to forage from is quite neat Justin - novel. Presumably, there would always be a camp construction unit a day ahead of the main army who would stack the fodder for the next day? You'd need different arrangements for the once a week depots, if still having them.
The biggest issue is really Jim's - can you find 3,400 hectares of good quality hay field every 24 hours? At one point, you're crossing a mountain, another carving through a forest and a third you are in a concentration area for several days. Was the rest lush, unutilised grassland?
The other issue I think I spot is the number of horses. I thought we started with either 80,000 cavalry? According to Iranica online, there were also 20,000 charioteers (assuming two man light chariots, that 20,000 horses) and some camel cavalry as well.
When we've done this bit, maybe we could talk naval logistics? Is the fleet using the same depots? Assuming the sealift conveyor can carry their own crews supplies (which seems reasonable), Iranica reckons there were about 250,000 rowers and marines. Rowers probably had a higher ration rate than the common herd, because of their job.
Finally, a bit of trivia. You could fit Yasgur's Farm 14 times into Justin's camp :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 05:27:01 PM
One problem is that you're assuming constant hayfields
Firstly I think you have to exclude the camp from the calculation, because that will be full of people doing stuff and once the first units have arrived they're going to trample and soil things. There could be a bit from the site but it'll probably end up fenced for for the private horse herds of guard units and the the great man's chariots etc
Secondly unless land is actively fenced off to ensure that the grass is protected, it doesn't end up the length you are talking about. Local livestock will have taken it long before.
I found a picture entitled, Europe, Grece, Plain of Thessaly, Valley of Penee, herd of goats -
Given the colour it's in the fertile time of the year. Even if there were no goats, you're not harvesting grass from endless plains.
You'll probably need an order of magnitude more area to get the amount of grass you need and that will be in the good times. When it's earlier in the season you'll actually take longer because the grass is shorter so it's harder to cut. It's also lower dry matter so you'll need more weight.
with regard to the men doing it, every army I've ever read about, each animal will be fed as an individual or as a team. So 200,000 animals will probably have over 100,000 men out there getting the fodder for the animal/s they are personally responsible for.
A properly cultivated field can give you 10 tons per acre (https://www.farminglife.com/farming-news/how-to-measure-grass-silage-yields-1-8014167), so 1 ton per acre for unimproved land seems reasonable to me, and the army will be camping on flat ground (most amount of soil, least amount of rock - optimal for grass) pretty much all the time.
I think it natural that the army high command will order foragers to reap the grass from the campsite before the arrival of the main body of men. They don't want to waste time having cast around beyond the camping area for the fodder.
One must also factor in time. From April to September there are at least 15 hours of visibility (https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/greece/thessaloniki) per day. At a steady 3km/h, the army can cover 20km in 7 hours. Add a couple of hours for breaks, delays and general faff and the army is on the road for 9 hours. That leaves 6 hours of daylight for non-marching activities.
One thing which does queer the pitch somewhat is the length of the column. Presuming the army marches 300 men or 600 yards wide, the column will be somewhere in the region of 23km long if each 'rank' is 2 yards deep. This means that if the head of the column sets out at 6 am, say, it will reach the next campsite at 3 pm without the tail end of the column having yet left camp. Presuming the army marches only during daylight, it has 15 hours of marching time. The entire column must be able to pass a given point in half that time - 7,5 hours, for all the army to reach the next campsite before dark. Which suggests either that the men don't stop marching for any reason during the entire day (eating and drinking what they carry with them) or that the column is substantially wider, say 450 men on a frontage of 900 yards. Final option: the army doesn't cover more than about 12 km in a day. It is a poser.
QuoteA properly cultivated field can give you 10 tons per acre, so 1 ton per acre for unimproved land seems reasonable to me, and the army will be camping on flat ground pretty much all the time.
Just a reminder. You have to remember yields have risen a bit since Xerxes day and that Northern Ireland isn't Northern Greece. As suggested, I'd look at a range of historical yields, rather than modern ones.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 05:55:41 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 05:27:01 PM
One problem is that you're assuming constant hayfields
Firstly I think you have to exclude the camp from the calculation, because that will be full of people doing stuff and once the first units have arrived they're going to trample and soil things. There could be a bit from the site but it'll probably end up fenced for for the private horse herds of guard units and the the great man's chariots etc
Secondly unless land is actively fenced off to ensure that the grass is protected, it doesn't end up the length you are talking about. Local livestock will have taken it long before.
I found a picture entitled, Europe, Grece, Plain of Thessaly, Valley of Penee, herd of goats -
Given the colour it's in the fertile time of the year. Even if there were no goats, you're not harvesting grass from endless plains.
You'll probably need an order of magnitude more area to get the amount of grass you need and that will be in the good times. When it's earlier in the season you'll actually take longer because the grass is shorter so it's harder to cut. It's also lower dry matter so you'll need more weight.
with regard to the men doing it, every army I've ever read about, each animal will be fed as an individual or as a team. So 200,000 animals will probably have over 100,000 men out there getting the fodder for the animal/s they are personally responsible for.
A properly cultivated field can give you 10 tons per acre (https://www.farminglife.com/farming-news/how-to-measure-grass-silage-yields-1-8014167), so 1 ton per acre for unimproved land seems reasonable to me, and the army will be camping on flat ground (most amount of soil, least amount of rock - optimal for grass) pretty much all the time.
I think it natural that the army high command will order foragers to reap the grass from the campsite before the arrival of the main body of men. They don't want to waste time having cast around beyond the camping area for the fodder.
One must also factor in time. From April to September there are at least 15 hours of visibility (https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/greece/thessaloniki) per day. At a steady 3km/h, the army can cover 20km in 7 hours. Add a couple of hours for breaks, delays and general faff and the army is on the road for 9 hours. That leaves 6 hours of daylight for non-marching activities.
One thing which does queer the pitch somewhat is the length of the column. Presuming the army marches 300 men or 600 yards wide, the column will be somewhere in the region of 23km long if each 'rank' is 2 yards deep. This means that if the head of the column sets out at 6 am, say, it will reach the next campsite at 3 pm without the tail end of the column having yet left camp. Presuming the army marches only during daylight, it has 15 hours of marching time. The entire column must be able to pass a given point in half that time - 7,5 hours, for all the army to reach the next campsite before dark. Which suggests either that the men don't stop marching for any reason during the entire day (eating and drinking what they carry with them) or that the column is substantially wider, say 450 men on a frontage of 900 yards. Final option: the army doesn't cover more than about 12 km in a day. It is a poser.
I) you're not talking about 'unimproved grassland' Much of Greece doesn't even aspire to the title grassland.
2) The army 'high command' has nothing to do with the foragers. The foragers are the private servants of the individual soldiers. They're not an army unit for the high command to order about.
3) marching. Rule of thumb here. Oxen can work for 8 hours, graze for 8 hours, ruminate for 8 hours. Camels ruminate as well as oxen. Horses don't but they cannot cope with working and an all grass diet. So forget having your baggage march for 20km a day
4) the maths are beginning to catch up with you. You're now beginning to see why very few believe that Xerxes lead an army that large. For large parts of the journey, for example Gallipoli, there is nowhere you can march 300 men wide. Basically a lot of men are going to be camping where other men camped the night before.
Rather than thinking of an army leaving camp, marching and entering camp, with the sort of numbers Herodotus was talking, it makes more sense to consider the army as a camp which is moving because only the lead units will ever camp of ground that hasn't been camped on
Quote from: Erpingham on April 19, 2018, 06:07:54 PM
QuoteA properly cultivated field can give you 10 tons per acre, so 1 ton per acre for unimproved land seems reasonable to me, and the army will be camping on flat ground pretty much all the time.
Just a reminder. You have to remember yields have risen a bit since Xerxes day and that Northern Ireland isn't Northern Greece. As suggested, I'd look at a range of historical yields, rather than modern ones.
Northern Ireland is one of the best grass growing areas in the world. Parts of New Zealand might be better 8)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 06:13:58 PM
I) you're not talking about 'unimproved grassland' Much of Greece doesn't even aspire to the title grassland.
Here's (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.224.5389&rep=rep1&type=pdf) something interesting, a paper on grazing land in Greece. Page 4 describes the different yields between poor brushland and improved grassland. The poorest brushland (at 100% cover) yields 762kg of fodder per hectare whilst good quality grassland yields 4500kg/ha - which comes out at a ton per acre for average land. This means that poor land in Greece will feed 70 horses per hectare or 30 horses per acre (or somewhat less since brush is not as nutritious as grass). At the worst campsite harvest everything in the camp and a little beyond and the animals will be fed.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 06:13:58 PM2) The army 'high command' has nothing to do with the foragers. The foragers are the private servants of the individual soldiers. They're not an army unit for the high command to order about.
Then Xerxes orders that a foraging corps be organised that collects the grass/brush at each site. it must be done so it is done.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 06:13:58 PM3) marching. Rule of thumb here. Oxen can work for 8 hours, graze for 8 hours, ruminate for 8 hours. Camels ruminate as well as oxen. Horses don't but they cannot cope with working and an all grass diet. So forget having your baggage march for 20km a day
12km a day?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 06:13:58 PM4) the maths are beginning to catch up with you. You're now beginning to see why very few believe that Xerxes lead an army that large. For large parts of the journey, for example Gallipoli, there is nowhere you can march 300 men wide. Basically a lot of men are going to be camping where other men camped the night before.
12 km a day.
I dispute Gallipoli. I mapped out a route that allows for a wide column to move up the peninsula. Shall I post photos?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 06:13:58 PM
I) you're not talking about 'unimproved grassland' Much of Greece doesn't even aspire to the title grassland.
Here's (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.224.5389&rep=rep1&type=pdf) something interesting, a paper on grazing land in Greece. Page 4 describes the different yields between poor brushland and improved grassland. The poorest brushland (at 100% cover) yields 762kg of fodder per hectare whilst good quality grassland yields 4500kg/ha. This means that poor land in Greece will feed 70 horses per hectare or 30 horses per acre (or somewhat less since brush is not as nutritious as grass). At the worst campsite harvest everything in the camp and a little beyond and the animals will be fed.
you missed this bit about the uses of the brushland
" Goat raising, and to some extent sheep raising also, depends greatly on browse and grass produced on evergreen brushlands. This is
especially true for the period from late autumn to late spring, when the upland ranges are not ready to be grazed."
The local livestock have been wintered on this land already, there's damn all there and what there was was just about suitable for Goats
Getting back to the number of animals, we have for the Achaemenid mounted component in Herodotus VII.86-87:
>80,000 horsemen, consisting of Medes, Cissians, Bactrians, Caspeirians and Paricanians, plus some Indians.
>Libyan and Indian chariots, number unspecified, plus Arabian camelry, number unspecified.
In VII.184 Herodotus reckons the chariotry and camelry together as 20,000 men. The chariots would be multi-man, with 2-3 per Libyan chariot and perhaps 3-4 per Indian chariot, while the camelry could be single- or double-mounted. We are probably looking at something like one man per mount, so a grand total of 100,000 combat animals with 100,000 mounted troops.
Baggage animal numbers depend heavily on forage considerations. If forage can be cut and stocked locally, then we are looking at only enough baggage animals to carry rations for the men (and presumably camp followers, assuming these are intended to survive). Leaving aside meat on the hoof, and taking Herodotus' minimum of one choenix (about 2 lbs or slightly under 1 kg), the 3.6 milion souls in Xerxes' army would have a daily requirement of 7.2 million pounds of grain.
If we use Anthony's latest finding for General Crook's 400 lbs per mule, and for simplicity let the camels carry a similar load, we get 18,000 animals per day's capacity of food. Giving the baggage train one week's supply capacity requires 126,000 animals, which we can take as the minimum number.
Any addition of animals over and above this represents 1) meat on the hoof, which where possible will be grazed, and 2) fodder carriers. The latter will be required only where fodder is inadequate, and given that Xerxes' march as far as Thermpoylae was principally through territory where he had ordered the population to stockpile and provide food for his army, which they did (unless we are going to start disputing Herodotus' account of this point), there is every reason to suppose they were collecting fodder, too.
In essence, this would mean that the Persians would not need a massive addition of fodder-carrying animals to their baggage train, and thus would substantially avoid the vicious cycle whereby as soon as one starts adding fodder-carriers one needs to carry fodder for the fodder-carriers.
So we are looking at a baggage train in the order of 126,000 animals, not far off my earlier estimate of 135,000. To give 3.6 million men a meal at 50 men to the ox, assume 72,000 cattle are tagging along as well at any one time, for a total fodder requirement of:
>100,000 combat mounts
>130,000 (rough average of 126,000 and 135,000 for convenience) baggage animals
> 72,000 cattle for consumption
This is about 300,000 animals overall. If the obedient locals through whose lands the army is passing are gathering much of the fodder, as seems reasonable in view of their having fed the Achaemenid army while it passed through, then the army itself is spared much of the drudgery of collection and has only the task of distribution.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
Then Xerxes orders that a foraging corps be organised that collects the grass/brush at each site. it must be done so it is done.
Any historical evidence that the Persian army ever had this?
An army with virtually no regular troops suddenly invents the regular commissariat.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
I dispute Gallipoli. I mapped out a route that allows for a wide column to move up the peninsula. Shall I post photos?
no, could we have a contour map please, they're far easy to read than photos
Jim
Quote
Rather than thinking of an army leaving camp, marching and entering camp, with the sort of numbers Herodotus was talking, it makes more sense to consider the army as a camp which is moving because only the lead units will ever camp of ground that hasn't been camped on
Does that not make the army into a giant moving typhoid epidemic waiting to happen?
The aim of the thread is to establish (if we can) whether Xerxes could conceivably logistically support the army Herodotus ascribes to him given the means stated, which amount to:
> Four years' advance preparation (Herodotus VII.20)
> 4,007 warships (idem VII.184)
> Unnumbered "corn-barks and other craft accompanying the army" (idem VII.187)
> Local support which fed the army for a day at a time in northern Greece (idem VII.118-120)
Of course it all started to go wrong after Thermopylae, but we only need to get him as far as Thermopylae with this level of support.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 07:19:20 PM
This is about 300,000 animals overall. If the obedient locals through whose lands the army is passing are gathering much of the fodder, as seems reasonable in view of their having fed the Achaemenid army while it passed through, then the army itself is spared much of the drudgery of collection and has only the task of distribution.
just to put this in proportion
All those animals would approximate to 1 livestock unit.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Agricultural_census_in_Greece#Livestock
The current livestock figures for all of modern Greece (2000 AD)
Cattle 463,660
Sheep 875,270
Goats 532,720
equidae 35,490
To get things in proportion, cattle and equidae are probably 1 livestock unit, sheep and goats are 0.15 livestock units each
So merely ordering people to produce fodder for your 300,000 LSU is all well and good, but frankly they couldn't support that many livestock anyway, even if they had none of their own.
To put things in proportion for those who're used to British conditions, in the UK we have over 10 million cattle alone. This is what you can do in decent grass growing country 8)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 07:27:13 PM
Quote
Rather than thinking of an army leaving camp, marching and entering camp, with the sort of numbers Herodotus was talking, it makes more sense to consider the army as a camp which is moving because only the lead units will ever camp of ground that hasn't been camped on
Does that not make the army into a giant moving typhoid epidemic waiting to happen?
I remember mentioning this aspect of the issue some pages ago, but lacked your rather elegant turn of phrase which slices directly to the nub of the issue 8)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 07:27:13 PM
Quote
Rather than thinking of an army leaving camp, marching and entering camp, with the sort of numbers Herodotus was talking, it makes more sense to consider the army as a camp which is moving because only the lead units will ever camp of ground that hasn't been camped on
Does that not make the army into a giant moving typhoid epidemic waiting to happen?
Funny you should say that, given what happened after Salamis. See Herodotus VIII.115.
"So the herald took that response and departed, but Xerxes left Mardonius in Thessaly. He himself journeyed with all speed to the Hellespont and came in forty-five days to the passage for crossing, bringing back with him as good as none (if one may say so) of his host. Wherever and to whatever people they came, they seized and devoured its produce. If they found none, they would eat the grass of the field and strip the bark and pluck the leaves of the trees, garden and wild alike, leaving nothing—such was the degree of their starvation. Moreover, pestilence and dysentery broke out among them on their way, from which they died. Some who were sick Xerxes left behind, charging the cities to which he came in his march to care for them and nourish them, some in Thessaly and some in Siris of Paeonia and in Macedonia."
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 07:34:45 PM
The aim of the thread is to establish (if we can) whether Xerxes could conceivably logistically support the army Herodotus ascribes to him given the means stated, which amount to:
> Four years' advance preparation (Herodotus VII.20)
> 4,007 warships (idem VII.184)
> Unnumbered "corn-barks and other craft accompanying the army" (idem VII.187)
> Local support which fed the army for a day at a time in northern Greece (idem VII.118-120)
Of course it all started to go wrong after Thermopylae, but we only need to get him as far as Thermopylae with this level of support.
plus a route wide enough for men to march 300 abreast
A regular commissariat which has thousands of fodder gathers in it
thousands of 'longshore men' unloading these corn-barks over open beaches.
An expansion of the amphora making industry to produce all these extra amphora which are used to carry the corn. Plus a sweep-up team to dispose of broken amphorae off the beaches when the inevitable accidents happened
Local support which actually imported fodder from the north because Greece didn't produce that much for its own livestock
Grain storage technology superior to what we have because nobody in their right mind stores wheat for four years
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:37:20 PM
So merely ordering people to produce fodder for your 300,000 LSU is all well and good, but frankly they couldn't support that many livestock anyway, even if they had none of their own.
But how good a guide to ancient Greece (and Thrace) is modern Greece? Sicily used to be considered a granary of the Mediterranean and wonderfully fertile, ditto Cyrenaica - and look at them today.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:20:35 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
Then Xerxes orders that a foraging corps be organised that collects the grass/brush at each site. it must be done so it is done.
Any historical evidence that the Persian army ever had this?
An army with virtually no regular troops suddenly invents the regular commissariat.
I think this was touched on in the debate 3 days back; to make the army at all plausible one has to invent a whole group of supporting arms more like one would find post C17th. Or at the very least not something that a semi-feudal society could be reasonably expected to have.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:43:12 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 07:34:45 PM
The aim of the thread is to establish (if we can) whether Xerxes could conceivably logistically support the army Herodotus ascribes to him given the means stated, which amount to:
> Four years' advance preparation (Herodotus VII.20)
> 4,007 warships (idem VII.184)
> Unnumbered "corn-barks and other craft accompanying the army" (idem VII.187)
> Local support which fed the army for a day at a time in northern Greece (idem VII.118-120)
Of course it all started to go wrong after Thermopylae, but we only need to get him as far as Thermopylae with this level of support.
plus a route wide enough for men to march 300 abreast
A regular commissariat which has thousands of fodder gathers in it
thousands of 'longshore men' unloading these corn-barks over open beaches.
An expansion of the amphora making industry to produce all these extra amphora which are used to carry the corn. Plus a sweep-up team to dispose of broken amphorae off the beaches when the inevitable accidents happened
Local support which actually imported fodder from the north because Greece didn't produce that much for its own livestock
Grain storage technology superior to what we have because nobody in their right mind stores wheat for four years
I would also argue for a large military police style organisation necessary to enforce march discipline. Due to the multi-national nature of the host it would probably need be be multi-lingual
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 07:44:52 PM
I think this was touched on in the debate 3 days back; to make the army at all plausible one has to invent a whole group of supporting arms more like one would find post C17th. Or at the very least not something that a semi-feudal society could be reasonably expected to have.
Please, the Achaemenid Empire was Biblical rather than semi-feudal (whatever that is supposed to mean, but I get the impression of 'disorganised' and 'primitive'). It was heir to a tradition of superprojects (Wonders of the World) and, according to the unanimous testimony of sources, super-armies of a size not again reached until the 20th century. It was also heir to tradition of organisation that oozed bureaucracy at every pore, kept extensive records and, in the case of the Assyrians, moved whole populations (as did the Achaemenids on occasion, witness the Paeonians).
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 07:51:41 PM
I would also argue for a large military police style organisation necessary to enforce march discipline. Due to the multi-national nature of the host it would probably need be be multi-lingual
The actual 'organisation' seems to have been comparatively small but thoroughly pervasive: there are frequent references to the Persian 'whip-men' who appear to have been responsible for maintaining march progress (at least across the Hellespont, but I doubt they were unemployed the rest of the time) and battlefield enthusiasm.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 07:43:43 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:37:20 PM
So merely ordering people to produce fodder for your 300,000 LSU is all well and good, but frankly they couldn't support that many livestock anyway, even if they had none of their own.
But how good a guide to ancient Greece (and Thrace) is modern Greece? Sicily used to be considered a granary of the Mediterranean and wonderfully fertile, ditto Cyrenaica - and look at them today.
Sicily was never the granary of the Med, it topped up Rome. By the time it became important again (after the loss of Africa) it was mainly because church lands there were being used by the church to support the decreasing Roman population.
But if you want to invent a golden age of Greek agriculture when it could outproduce what it does now in a desperate attempt to prop up the theory, feel free
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 08:12:31 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 07:44:52 PM
I think this was touched on in the debate 3 days back; to make the army at all plausible one has to invent a whole group of supporting arms more like one would find post C17th. Or at the very least not something that a semi-feudal society could be reasonably expected to have.
Please, the Achaemenid Empire was Biblical rather than semi-feudal (whatever that is supposed to mean, but I get the impression of 'disorganised' and 'primitive'). It was heir to a tradition of superprojects (Wonders of the World) and, according to the unanimous testimony of sources, super-armies of a size not again reached until the 20th century. It was also heir to tradition of organisation that oozed bureaucracy at every pore, kept extensive records and, in the case of the Assyrians, moved whole populations (as did the Achaemenids on occasion, witness the Paeonians).
indeed it was probably competent enough to get an army of a couple of hundred thousand to Thermopylae
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 19, 2018, 08:12:31 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 19, 2018, 07:51:41 PM
I would also argue for a large military police style organisation necessary to enforce march discipline. Due to the multi-national nature of the host it would probably need be be multi-lingual
The actual 'organisation' seems to have been comparatively small but thoroughly pervasive: there are frequent references to the Persian 'whip-men' who appear to have been responsible for maintaining march progress (at least across the Hellespont, but I doubt they were unemployed the rest of the time) and battlefield enthusiasm.
keeping order in encampments measured in hundreds of hectares you're going to need more that a few whip men
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:25:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
I dispute Gallipoli. I mapped out a route that allows for a wide column to move up the peninsula. Shall I post photos?
no, could we have a contour map please, they're far easy to read than photos
Jim
Here (https://www.dropbox.com/s/vk2vafiscabpxeq/route.pdf?dl=0) it is. A rather large pdf file. Once you open it you need to zoom in. Contours are at 20m intervals. I see only one potential chokepoint at a now-existing dam. I've included a photo to give an idea of how difficult the chokepoint is. It doesn't seem that difficult.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 09:04:05 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:25:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
I dispute Gallipoli. I mapped out a route that allows for a wide column to move up the peninsula. Shall I post photos?
no, could we have a contour map please, they're far easy to read than photos
Jim
Here (https://www.dropbox.com/s/vk2vafiscabpxeq/route.pdf?dl=0) it is. A rather large pdf file. Once you open it you need to zoom in. Contours are at 20m intervals. I see only one potential chokepoint at a now-existing dam. I've included a photo to give an idea of how difficult the chokepoint is. It doesn't seem that difficult.
You were talking about having to have these men advance on a 600m front, 300 men abreast.
Given that a lot of the valleys, from crest to crest, are less that 2km wide, I see rather more choke points than you do I'm afraid. Even after checking it on google maps with the satellite view it doesn't look any better
Quote
Please, the Achaemenid Empire was Biblical rather than semi-feudal (whatever that is supposed to mean, but I get the impression of 'disorganised' and 'primitive').
You would be getting the wrong impression.
I have been thinking more about the scalability of camps, and the factors that limit them.
For example water supply.
If we imagine a water hole that is 10m in diameter and supplies an infinite amount of unfoulable water.
Assuming: 1) a man needs 5minutes to drink and fill his water bottle for the day; and 2) will occupy 1m of the circumference of the water hole when drinking, then the water hole can support only 9040 soldiers. Moreover, they would be a very sad bunch of soldiers because they would have to stay at the water hole permanently, not having the time to leave and do anything as a unit.
If an army of 3million is to be watered by such a watering hole, making the same assumptions, then the watering hole would have to have a diameter of 3.3km. Now you still have the problem of the army being incapable of moving as a whole during the day. But you have another problem, a water hole this large will have a circumference of 10.4km, any single soldier would spend the day walking across the camp.
If you want to water the army faster, so that they can say... march somewhere, then the water hole has to be bigger, but then you have the problem that the water hole is so big it is an obstacle that the army can't walk around in day without needing to return to it to drink. They get stuck!
It does NOT scale.
OK, maybe we like rivers instead. But the maths is no more appealing.
Assuming every soldier needs 5 minutes a day to drink and fill his canteen, of a 3million person army, a minimum of 10,416 will be drinking at any one moment. If they need 1m of riverbank to do this, then your army must be stretched over a minimum of 10.4km of river AT ALL TIMES, just to be watered. If you actually want to do something like fight, go elsewhere, etc. then it gets even sillier.
Quote from: Dangun on April 20, 2018, 02:46:26 AM
Assuming every soldier needs 5 minutes a day to drink and fill his canteen, of a 3million person army, a minimum of 10,416 will be drinking at any one moment. If they need 1m of riverbank to do this, then your army must be stretched over a minimum of 10.4km of river AT ALL TIMES, just to be watered. If you actually want to do something like fight, go elsewhere, etc. then it gets even sillier.
Yes, water is a big issue, and again, I think Maurice is valuable here in that he had direct experience of the time and space (and other considerations) needed to do things like fill up the water bottles and water the horses when there are large numbers of troops, whereas we armchair warriors do not!
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 09:04:05 PM
Here (https://www.dropbox.com/s/vk2vafiscabpxeq/route.pdf?dl=0) it is. A rather large pdf file. Once you open it you need to zoom in. Contours are at 20m intervals. I see only one potential chokepoint at a now-existing dam. I've included a photo to give an idea of how difficult the chokepoint is. It doesn't seem that difficult.
Looking at in on google earth and walking the ground are different things. Even if they are able to walk across hills rather than use tracks, men and horses will need to chose their route constantly, which creates congestion, and when you've got 2 million men following behind you there are going to be massive jams, long periods of no movement, and fights breaking out as people jostle each other. Some fall down and are trampled to death; crowd dynamics come into play. On top of all that, units lose their cohesion, men become separated from their commanders and animals; they lose access to their food and water supplies; they don't get orders. It would be a disaster.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 09:53:43 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 09:04:05 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:25:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
I dispute Gallipoli. I mapped out a route that allows for a wide column to move up the peninsula. Shall I post photos?
no, could we have a contour map please, they're far easy to read than photos
Jim
Here (https://www.dropbox.com/s/vk2vafiscabpxeq/route.pdf?dl=0) it is. A rather large pdf file. Once you open it you need to zoom in. Contours are at 20m intervals. I see only one potential chokepoint at a now-existing dam. I've included a photo to give an idea of how difficult the chokepoint is. It doesn't seem that difficult.
You were talking about having to have these men advance on a 600m front, 300 men abreast.
Given that a lot of the valleys, from crest to crest, are less that 2km wide, I see rather more choke points than you do I'm afraid. Even after checking it on google maps with the satellite view it doesn't look any better
This is where the contours matter. Those valleys have slopes at angles of 1 in 10 or less - they can easily be walked along. The army needs a width of about 600m only, not 2000m.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 20, 2018, 04:10:48 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 09:04:05 PM
Here (https://www.dropbox.com/s/vk2vafiscabpxeq/route.pdf?dl=0) it is. A rather large pdf file. Once you open it you need to zoom in. Contours are at 20m intervals. I see only one potential chokepoint at a now-existing dam. I've included a photo to give an idea of how difficult the chokepoint is. It doesn't seem that difficult.
Looking at in on google earth and walking the ground are different things. Even if they are able to walk across hills rather than use tracks, men and horses will need to chose their route constantly, which creates congestion, and when you've got 2 million men following behind you there are going to be massive jams, long periods of no movement, and fights breaking out as people jostle each other. Some fall down and are trampled to death; crowd dynamics come into play. On top of all that, units lose their cohesion, men become separated from their commanders and animals; they lose access to their food and water supplies; they don't get orders. It would be a disaster.
Which would make migrating tribes like the Helvetii ambulating accidents. ;)
Seriously though, if the ground is pretty flat, has been cleared of obstacles like difficult vegetation beforehand, everyone walks reasonably spaced from each other (like a normal army on the march), what real problems could there be?
Quote from: Dangun on April 20, 2018, 02:46:26 AM
I have been thinking more about the scalability of camps, and the factors that limit them.
For example water supply.
If we imagine a water hole that is 10m in diameter and supplies an infinite amount of unfoulable water.
Assuming: 1) a man needs 5minutes to drink and fill his water bottle for the day; and 2) will occupy 1m of the circumference of the water hole when drinking, then the water hole can support only 9040 soldiers. Moreover, they would be a very sad bunch of soldiers because they would have to stay at the water hole permanently, not having the time to leave and do anything as a unit.
If an army of 3million is to be watered by such a watering hole, making the same assumptions, then the watering hole would have to have a diameter of 3.3km. Now you still have the problem of the army being incapable of moving as a whole during the day. But you have another problem, a water hole this large will have a circumference of 10.4km, any single soldier would spend the day walking across the camp.
If you want to water the army faster, so that they can say... march somewhere, then the water hole has to be bigger, but then you have the problem that the water hole is so big it is an obstacle that the army can't walk around in day without needing to return to it to drink. They get stuck!
It does NOT scale.
OK, maybe we like rivers instead. But the maths is no more appealing.
Assuming every soldier needs 5 minutes a day to drink and fill his canteen, of a 3million person army, a minimum of 10,416 will be drinking at any one moment. If they need 1m of riverbank to do this, then your army must be stretched over a minimum of 10.4km of river AT ALL TIMES, just to be watered. If you actually want to do something like fight, go elsewhere, etc. then it gets even sillier.
Water just takes a little organisation. If a squatter camp of 6000 people can get all its water requirements from just 2 taps then a large army on the move can manage. It doesn't take 5 minutes to drink one's fill of water and fill a canteen.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 05:24:03 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 09:53:43 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 09:04:05 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:25:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
I dispute Gallipoli. I mapped out a route that allows for a wide column to move up the peninsula. Shall I post photos?
no, could we have a contour map please, they're far easy to read than photos
Jim
Here (https://www.dropbox.com/s/vk2vafiscabpxeq/route.pdf?dl=0) it is. A rather large pdf file. Once you open it you need to zoom in. Contours are at 20m intervals. I see only one potential chokepoint at a now-existing dam. I've included a photo to give an idea of how difficult the chokepoint is. It doesn't seem that difficult.
You were talking about having to have these men advance on a 600m front, 300 men abreast.
Given that a lot of the valleys, from crest to crest, are less that 2km wide, I see rather more choke points than you do I'm afraid. Even after checking it on google maps with the satellite view it doesn't look any better
This is where the contours matter. Those valleys have slopes at angles of 1 in 10 or less - they can easily be walked along. The army needs a width of about 600m only, not 2000m.
have you ever marched a column 300 men wide when the column was both climbing AND the men were were marching along a slope?
What speed did they manage?
I've done enough fell walking to know that on the sort of rough terrain you see on the satellite image you're going to have a mob because nobody will be able to keep in ranks for more than a few yards
Have you any examples of armies marching through hill country in columns 300 men across? For days
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 05:31:18 AM
Water just takes a little organisation. If a squatter camp of 6000 people can get all its water requirements from just 2 taps then a large army on the move can manage. It doesn't take 5 minutes to drink one's fill of water and fill a canteen.
the difference is in the name. Nobody in the squatter camp is going anywhere (hence squatters)
Maurice, who actually knew how these things were done, was talking about damming the river to create pools to allow men to fill containers more quickly
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 08:18:35 PM
Sicily was never the granary of the Med, it topped up Rome. By the time it became important again (after the loss of Africa) it was mainly because church lands there were being used by the church to support the decreasing Roman population.
And neither was Cyrenaica, but both are noted in classical sources as being wonderfuly fertile.
QuoteBut if you want to invent a golden age of Greek agriculture when it could outproduce what it does now in a desperate attempt to prop up the theory, feel free
Except am not inventing it, simply describing what sources have written. Incidentally, have you assessed the effects of industrialisation, mechanisation, two world wars and the EU agricultural policy on animal numbers in Europe in general and Greece in particular? You cannot just use today's numbers as a basis for what an area could support in 480 BC.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 08:04:32 AM
have you ever marched a column 300 men wide when the column was both climbing AND the men were were marching along a slope?
What speed did they manage?
I've done enough fell walking to know that on the sort of rough terrain you see on the satellite image you're going to have a mob because nobody will be able to keep in ranks for more than a few yards
But a mob moving at a reasonable speed, especially when a significant proportion of the men concerned themselves come from hilly and mountainous areas. And they will keep up their speed as long as the whip-men have breath.
QuoteHave you any examples of armies marching through hill country in columns 300 men across? For days
What we do have is examples of more recent armies moving tens of thousands of men through much worse country in a way British staff believed could not be done. The Kohima/Imphal campaign is not a bad illustration of this. The point is that the way we look at a situation is not necessarily the best or only way that situation can be handled.
In any event, if one gets past a potential choke-point in a rough and ready fashion rather than in immaculate formation, one is still past it.
Quote from: Dangun on April 20, 2018, 02:46:26 AM
I have been thinking more about the scalability of camps, and the factors that limit them.
For example water supply.
<>
Assuming every soldier needs 5 minutes a day to drink and fill his canteen, of a 3million person army, a minimum of 10,416 will be drinking at any one moment. If they need 1m of riverbank to do this, then your army must be stretched over a minimum of 10.4km of river AT ALL TIMES, just to be watered. If you actually want to do something like fight, go elsewhere, etc. then it gets even sillier.
But if you have camp followers who each draw water for several people at the same time, using a waterskin ...
... and if they fill the skins before the army (or their particular part of the army) sets off, they can be fulfilling needs during the day, like the
bhistis of an Indian army.
One can also get camp followers to dig watering trenches for the army's animals; if the ground is clean enough, additional channels of this nature can also be used by the men, vastly increasing the available access interface.
Small efficiency factors like this can make a huge difference. And one does need to consider them.
there is a limit to how much time I'm willing to waste
So now Patrick sees that Persian army as a whip driven mob up to six million strong if you include baggage etc
We're also assured that they were so well organised that you could water all of them from two taps, and this whip driven mob camped with a tightness and discipline that the Imperial Roman army would have admired
On top of this, they passed through a land which whilst now a little desolate, was in reality a land of milk and honey which could carry stocking rates for livestock an order of magnitude higher than can be done today, even though the same land was known at the time to be so dry the rivers got very low in summer
To feed this whip driven mob the Persians invented grain storage techniques nobody in the world has used before or since.
It is getting beyond silly. Fatuous got embarrassed and left some time ago. We have people who have never seen an area looking at photos and deriding the comments of men who walked the ground and who had had to move armies.
I'm getting sick of wasting my time digging up genuine evidence only to have it dismissed by get another bout of 'handwavium.
Look, there are some simple things you can do.
Go to Xenophon. He lived in a Persian army camp for months. See how he described them both in his Cyropaedia and his Anabasis
Come back and quote that as evidence to support your case
Then you have his march to the sea through rough country. Give that as an example of how it was easy for heavy infantry to march
Could I just check how the army is carrying its non-food supplies e.g. the large numbers of arrows it needs? Are we assuming that these are being carried by the camp followers (disregarding those on special duties)?
While I do sympathise with Jim, I think we must credit Justin with trying to grapple with the geography and the numbers, rather than dismiss them.
I agree with Jim we are all armchair soldiers in this but perhaps the problem is partially how we approach that. Do we assume soldiers of the past had it right - that absolutely everything on campaign will be sub-optimal and everything will take longer, be harder and more confused than expected (remember SNAFU starts with the words Situation Normal). Or do we proceed with sunny optimism that it will all be OK not just today but all the other days?
While Jim has raised it in something of an exasperated tone, I do think the "sources first" advocates perhaps need to sort out the apparent contradictions the model of the Persian army is generating. As a force, the current model requires it to be extremely efficient, with discipline among its camp followers that many later regular armies would envy for their soldiers. Its march and camp discipline are greatly in advance of the Romans. Is this high degree of regularity and discipline consistent with other sources or even with Herodotus himself? Why would such a force need to be driven forward with whips? Does their battlefield performance indicate great discipline and drill?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 09:15:44 AM
Could I just check how the army is carrying its non-food supplies e.g. the large numbers of arrows it needs? Are we assuming that these are being carried by the camp followers (disregarding those on special duties)?
strangely enough this is the sort of thing I'm happy to see stockpiled years in advance. At least they don't go off too badly over three or four years.
I'd suggest that footwear, miscellaneous leather straps and suchlike would also be good things to have in the stockpiles because they'd all wear out
I wonder if Justin and Patrick aren't missing a trick. In Thrace, the Persian land forces split into three groups. Do they do that after the break at Therma, too? Herodotus doesn't say, but later commentators think they probably did. If so, it would a) ease congestion on the march, b) allow more fruitful foraging and c) allow targeted use of pack animals, as the coastal division can be supplied more readily by sea. If they cross into Thessaly using three passes rather than one, go past Lamia Larissa and proceed down towards Thermopylae, still in their divisions, they can assemble there over four days, rest, organise, and then attack at Thermopylae. Certainly, moving in three columns is a lot more efficient than moving in one giant one.
Now, I don't agree that there could have be 3.5M plus people on the march (as if it wasn't obvious already!), but it was clearly a very big army, and after this discussion I'm prepared to raise my estimate of how big the army was to something larger than I would have previously accepted, and having them split into divisions would reduce my concerns about choke points and gathering / delivering supplies.
Of course, three divisions into Thessaly doesn't really help with the water issues and choke points on the Gallipoli peninsular that Maurice addresses (this I think really does effectively limit the size of the army to something in the six figure range rather than the sevens, even if how Maurice arrived at the 40,000 gallons of water per day figure for the Scamander is a bit of a mystery), but does mean that it's easier to see how a really large army could function in Greece itself.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 10:25:02 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 09:15:44 AM
Could I just check how the army is carrying its non-food supplies e.g. the large numbers of arrows it needs? Are we assuming that these are being carried by the camp followers (disregarding those on special duties)?
strangely enough this is the sort of thing I'm happy to see stockpiled years in advance. At least they don't go off too badly over three or four years.
I'd suggest that footwear, miscellaneous leather straps and suchlike would also be good things to have in the stockpiles because they'd all wear out
Agreed, I don't think the stockpiling of these is an issue. But, because of my HYW interests, I tend to think about arrow supplies :) An archer-based tactical system needs lots of arrows. They are not massively heavy but they are rather bulky. You could pile them on camp followers attached to units to lug about, or you could put them in the baggage. Presumably the camp followers also carry all the pots and pans and the quern stones too (you could probably get away with one of those between every two or three men).
Ah, but in such a multi national enterprise you will be dealing with five or so different types of arrows, some of which have to be transported hundreds of miles to the initial assembly point because they are not generic items like .303 cartridges. Shoes are the same...all different by contingent and nit a popular decision to be giving some Persians Arab sandals.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on April 20, 2018, 11:09:16 AM
Ah, but in such a multi national enterprise you will be dealing with five or so different types of arrows, some of which have to be transported hundreds of miles to the initial assembly point because they are not generic items like .303 cartridges. Shoes are the same...all different by contingent and nit a popular decision to be giving some Persians Arab sandals.
Roy
Good point. Although it can be suggested that the army is extremely regular, Herodotus does describe contingents as differently equipped.
Quote from: aligern on April 20, 2018, 11:09:16 AM
Ah, but in such a multi national enterprise you will be dealing with five or so different types of arrows, some of which have to be transported hundreds of miles to the initial assembly point because they are not generic items like .303 cartridges. Shoes are the same...all different by contingent and nit a popular decision to be giving some Persians Arab sandals.
Roy
It also once again implies a really well organised and culturally aware ministry, in thiscase dedicated to arms and equipment procurement- imagine a civil servant in the Persian capital having a spec for Ethiopian Arrows.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 20, 2018, 11:46:21 AM
Quote from: aligern on April 20, 2018, 11:09:16 AM
Ah, but in such a multi national enterprise you will be dealing with five or so different types of arrows, some of which have to be transported hundreds of miles to the initial assembly point because they are not generic items like .303 cartridges. Shoes are the same...all different by contingent and nit a popular decision to be giving some Persians Arab sandals.
Roy
It also once again implies a really well organised and culturally aware ministry, in thiscase dedicated to arms and equipment procurement- imagine a civil servant in the Persian capital having a spec for Ethiopian Arrows.
I suspect a degree of subsidiarity in this issue . So, the invites would have said "Bring weapons, we'll provide the eats".
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 12:11:26 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 20, 2018, 11:46:21 AM
Quote from: aligern on April 20, 2018, 11:09:16 AM
Ah, but in such a multi national enterprise you will be dealing with five or so different types of arrows, some of which have to be transported hundreds of miles to the initial assembly point because they are not generic items like .303 cartridges. Shoes are the same...all different by contingent and nit a popular decision to be giving some Persians Arab sandals.
Roy
It also once again implies a really well organised and culturally aware ministry, in thiscase dedicated to arms and equipment procurement- imagine a civil servant in the Persian capital having a spec for Ethiopian Arrows.
I suspect a degree of subsidiarity in this issue . So, the invites would have said "Bring weapons, we'll provide the eats".
So, the invites would have said "Bring weapons, we'll provide the eats, expect to be whipped- a lot."
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 08:04:32 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 05:24:03 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 09:53:43 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 09:04:05 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 19, 2018, 07:25:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 19, 2018, 07:12:39 PM
I dispute Gallipoli. I mapped out a route that allows for a wide column to move up the peninsula. Shall I post photos?
no, could we have a contour map please, they're far easy to read than photos
Jim
Here (https://www.dropbox.com/s/vk2vafiscabpxeq/route.pdf?dl=0) it is. A rather large pdf file. Once you open it you need to zoom in. Contours are at 20m intervals. I see only one potential chokepoint at a now-existing dam. I've included a photo to give an idea of how difficult the chokepoint is. It doesn't seem that difficult.
You were talking about having to have these men advance on a 600m front, 300 men abreast.
Given that a lot of the valleys, from crest to crest, are less that 2km wide, I see rather more choke points than you do I'm afraid. Even after checking it on google maps with the satellite view it doesn't look any better
This is where the contours matter. Those valleys have slopes at angles of 1 in 10 or less - they can easily be walked along. The army needs a width of about 600m only, not 2000m.
have you ever marched a column 300 men wide when the column was both climbing AND the men were were marching along a slope?
What speed did they manage?
I've done enough fell walking to know that on the sort of rough terrain you see on the satellite image you're going to have a mob because nobody will be able to keep in ranks for more than a few yards
Have you any examples of armies marching through hill country in columns 300 men across? For days
I've done enough hiking to know that a 1 in 10 slope is not a problem to walk along provided:
a) it isn't covered with difficult vegetation
b) it isn't broken ground - lots of steep up-and-down that averages out at 1 in 10 but in reality is much more than that.
For both of the above, 4 year's preparation of the ground would suffice to remove most obstacles from otherwise doable terrain.
Here's a diagram showing men on a 1 in 10 slope and each with 2 yards lateral space. They obviously don't have to march in tidy ranks and files, just keep a reasonable distance apart. What problem does this pose for the walkers?
(https://i.imgur.com/7gdXvOm.png)
Here is a photo of the valley leading inland from the Bosphorus crossing. Not particularly formidable slopes. Grazing doesn't look too bad either. :)
(https://i.imgur.com/FuODldi.jpg)
QuoteGrazing doesn't look too bad either. :)
I suspect that is a South African perspective. A Northern Irishman would think he was looking at a desert.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 20, 2018, 12:20:01 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 12:11:26 PM
I suspect a degree of subsidiarity in this issue . So, the invites would have said "Bring weapons, we'll provide the eats".
So, the invites would have said "Bring weapons, we'll provide the eats, expect to be whipped- a lot."
I've been to parties like that.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 12:33:37 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 20, 2018, 12:20:01 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 12:11:26 PM
I suspect a degree of subsidiarity in this issue . So, the invites would have said "Bring weapons, we'll provide the eats".
So, the invites would have said "Bring weapons, we'll provide the eats, expect to be whipped- a lot."
I've been to parties like that.
One would have thought that the 'whip-men' would have suffered a great deal of friendly fire incidents.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 12:27:24 PM
Here's a diagram showing men on a 1 in 10 slope and each with 2 yards lateral space. They obviously don't have to march in tidy ranks and files, just keep a reasonable distance apart. What problem does this pose to the walkers?
Firstly the photo
This is the sort of area you're expecting people to cut forage from remember. So I think carefully studying this picture will tell you a great deal about just how big an area you'll really need. Look at the grass length and sparsity
Secondly if you want to believe that you can march men three hundred abreast through Gallipoli then I'm not even going to try to convince you otherwise.
But please, provide one example from ancient literature of an army than advanced in a column 300 men abreast? Come on, just one
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 12:31:42 PM
QuoteGrazing doesn't look too bad either. :)
I suspect that is a South African perspective. A Northern Irishman would think he was looking at a desert.
The wild horses (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namib_Desert_Horse) of the Namib would have loved it. ::)
(https://i.imgur.com/FaNTpgR.jpg)
I hope the Persian cavalry kept their horses in better condition. I'd say the guy on the left has only a body condition (http://henneke%20horse%20body%20condition%20scoring%20system) of 2-3.
I will confess, I hadn't heard of body condition scores until we started this thread - remarkable what you discover well looking for something else :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 12:42:52 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 12:27:24 PM
Here's a diagram showing men on a 1 in 10 slope and each with 2 yards lateral space. They obviously don't have to march in tidy ranks and files, just keep a reasonable distance apart. What problem does this pose to the walkers?
Firstly the photo
This is the sort of area you're expecting people to cut forage from remember. So I think carefully studying this picture will tell you a great deal about just how big an area you'll really need. Look at the grass length and sparsity
Secondly if you want to believe that you can march men three hundred abreast through Gallipoli then I'm not even going to try to convince you otherwise.
But please, provide one example from ancient literature of an army than advanced in a column 300 men abreast? Come on, just one
You got me! I don't have a single reliable primary source quote that unequivocally states that X army marched 300 men abreast. If I did, 3-million-man Achaemenid armies would be in the history books and we would be
arguing about discussing something else.
My 300-man-wide column is a necessity to account for a 3,4 million man army marching from the Hellespont to Thermopylae. It's a hypothesis with some circumstantial evidence to back it up: the time taken to cross the Hellespont on two 30-yard-wide bridges, the need to cut down a forest to make a passageway in Macedonia, etc. (I think there's some etc.) The purpose of the thread is to see if such a hypothetical 300-man-wide army could in fact cross the Balkan countryside and be fed and watered whilst doing so. Still waiting for the killer argument... (and no, quoting Maurice as an authority isn't a killer argument).
BTW the forage in the photo looks fine. There's some clear ground near the river but it doesn't cover most of the area in the photo. Keeping in mind that average grazing ground in Greece is around one ton per acre which is more than enough to supply the needs of animals from the camp area itself.
QuoteBTW the forage in the photo looks fine. There's some clear ground near the river but it doesn't cover most of the area in the photo. Keeping in mind that average grazing ground in Greece is around one ton per hectare which is more than enough to supply the needs of animals from the camp area itself.
I think we suffering that numbers fixation again. If we assume that advance units select camp sites that happen to be covered in good pasture untouched by animals and they carefully stack that fodder for the army, you could have theoretically could find sufficient fodder round the camp. In reality, you can't guarantee that every camp will be in good pasture untouched by animals and the gathering process may not be carried out with the delicacy required. Likewise, the idea that engineering detachment will be able to construct a sophisticated water distribution system at each stop seems optimistic. Maurice's dams might be more do-able practically but you still have to overcome the shear lengths of accessible drinking space needed.
Quote
The purpose of the thread is to see if such a hypothetical 300-man-wide army could in fact cross the Balkan countryside and be fed and watered whilst doing so. Still waiting for the killer argument... (and no, quoting Maurice as an authority isn't a killer argument).
You will be waiting forever for the killer argument - because there can be no single killer argument against such a thing, just lots of smaller more or less compelling arguments that have already been presented, and which you reject individually because they are not the killer argument.
Maybe a different approach would be advsiable. Pretty much nobody today, AFAIK, believes Xerxes army was 3M+ strong, so the burden of proof rests with those who want to argue that it was. Your aim, presumably, is to persuade others of your point of view, otherwise why bother discussing it.* That being so, shouldn't you present a killer argument that it was 3M strong? Do so, and all objections must melt away. Of course, you will be unable to do so (barring the archaeological discovery of a sequence of Xerxes' marching camps) for the same reason - no such killer argument exists, or can exist.
* alternatively your aim might have been to invite others to convince you that you are wrong, but if so then you are still setting the burden of proof impossibly high.
It might help if Justin could give us an indication might be- then people could provide the evidence for this and the thread can end before we get to 2151- AD that is not nine minutes to ten
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 01:58:31 PM
Quote
The purpose of the thread is to see if such a hypothetical 300-man-wide army could in fact cross the Balkan countryside and be fed and watered whilst doing so. Still waiting for the killer argument... (and no, quoting Maurice as an authority isn't a killer argument).
You will be waiting forever for the killer argument - because there can be no single killer argument against such a thing, just lots of smaller more or less compelling arguments that have already been presented, and which you reject individually because they are not the killer argument.
Maybe a different approach would be advsiable. Pretty much nobody today, AFAIK, believes Xerxes army was 3M+ strong, so the burden of proof rests with those who want to argue that it was. Your aim, presumably, is to persuade others of your point of view, otherwise why bother discussing it.* That being so, shouldn't you present a killer argument that it was 3M strong? Do so, and all objections must melt away. Of course, you will be unable to do so (barring the archaeological discovery of a sequence of Xerxes' marching camps) for the same reason - no such killer argument exists, or can exist.
* alternatively your aim might have been to invite others to convince you that you are wrong, but if so then you are still setting the burden of proof impossibly high.
Let me clarify what I'm trying to achieve with this thread.
Starting with the fact that the general academic consensus is that Herodotus and other primary sources were out in their estimates of the size of Achaemenid armies by a factor of between 5 and 10. To refresh, here are the sizes of the armies as per the sources:
Herodotus:
1 700 000 men (Greek campaign)
700 000 men (Scythian campaign)
Xenophon:
900 000 men + 300 000 men (Cunaxa)
Arrian:
600 000 men (Issus)
1000 000 men (Gaugamela)
Diodorus, Curtius, Justin (not me - the martyr) and others give similar figures of these magnitudes.
Since these are pretty much all the sources we have for Persian history and to reject them to this extent means putting our understanding of the Persian Empire in question, I propose that one examine if these numbers are feasible. Apart from the affirmations of the sources, I can't scientifically prove that Persian armies were this big. Nobody can. But neither can anyone scientifically prove that they were considerably smaller. There is no hard evidence either way other than the sources themselves. This means we have to respect the sources as much as possible. If we cover them with a blanket of doubt right from the word go, affirming that the only certitude we have is from scientific experimentation and you can't perform scientific experiments on history, then history as a serious subject of study is dead.
I suggest that instead of scientific certitude (which is impossible) we go for moral certitude, i.e. examining the writer of the period in the same way a lawyer cross-examines a witness in court. A witness may be hostile - not inclined to spill the necessary beans - but it is still possible to glean the facts from what he/she says with enough certitude to arrive at a judgment. Ditto for Herodotus. It just needs a good dose of common sense.
The only thing we can establish with some sort of scientific accuracy is the practicality of moving 3 million men from Asia Minor to Greece. If it is possible then I'm quite happy to take Herodotus at his word. To establish if it is possible from my armchair (actually a rather uncomfortable plastic chair) simply means establishing whether there are any insuperable obstacles, as opposed to obstacles that can be overcome with some preparation, ingenuity and organisation.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 01:13:23 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 12:42:52 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 12:27:24 PM
Here's a diagram showing men on a 1 in 10 slope and each with 2 yards lateral space. They obviously don't have to march in tidy ranks and files, just keep a reasonable distance apart. What problem does this pose to the walkers?
Firstly the photo
This is the sort of area you're expecting people to cut forage from remember. So I think carefully studying this picture will tell you a great deal about just how big an area you'll really need. Look at the grass length and sparsity
Secondly if you want to believe that you can march men three hundred abreast through Gallipoli then I'm not even going to try to convince you otherwise.
But please, provide one example from ancient literature of an army than advanced in a column 300 men abreast? Come on, just one
You got me! I don't have a single reliable primary source quote that unequivocally states that X army marched 300 men abreast. If I did, 3-million-man Achaemenid armies would be in the history books and we would be arguing about discussing something else.
My 300-man-wide column is a necessity to account for a 3,4 million man army marching from the Hellespont to Thermopylae. It's a hypothesis with some circumstantial evidence to back it up: the time taken to cross the Hellespont on two 30-yard-wide bridges, the need to cut down a forest to make a passageway in Macedonia, etc. (I think there's some etc.) The purpose of the thread is to see if such a hypothetical 300-man-wide army could in fact cross the Balkan countryside and be fed and watered whilst doing so. Still waiting for the killer argument... (and no, quoting Maurice as an authority isn't a killer argument).
No it's a circular argument.
The argument starts out with "A 4 million man army had to pass this way."
To achieve this the army has to march 300 men abreast.
Therefore Persian armies were capable of marching 300 men abreast through Gallipoli
To paraphrase Richard, and repeat something said earlier, neither the position "If you can't show it's impossible, it must be true" nor "If you can't show it's possible, it must be false" take us far. Instead we need to look at a balance of probabilities.
Though Justin fails to see any "killer" arguments, the conventional position does pile up a lot of obstacles. So far, the "sources first" advocates have struggled to answer these and the balance of probability is strongly with the orthodox position. It may be that is in part due to the fact that we only see bits of argument at a time and Justin would do better if he could provide a summary of his case.
As I understand it, there was a 3 year preparation period where stores and armies were assembled and a large construction battalion was sent to Greece. We know the construction battalion built a canal - it is archaeologically detectable. Apparently they also surveyed the route, marking out daily camp sites and weekly depot sites. Sometime in this three years they built a 300 m wide road from the Hellespont to Thermopylae. Then, with the approach of D-day, bridges were built and rebuilt and an advanced force set off to establish the first weekly depots. They advanced carefully to avoid trampling any pasturage. Then, a few days later, the engineering vanguard crossed the Hellespont and proceeded a day in advance of the main army, harvesting fodder, building irrigation systems and laying out camps. These were then followed in a very orderly and disciplined fashion by the remained of the army (I don't think we've discussed march order) who are spread over two days. The back of the army camps where the previous one did the day before (I'm unclear here whether the first half of the army has left fodder for the second half, whether the second half use transported fodder or whether they go further abroad to forage). The naval supply chain is delivering supplies across beaches using lighters to stock the seven day depots. When the depot is stocked, they move to the next and the fleet of lighters sails down the coast. Warships are presumably covering this operation, based at a beach near the depot, close enough to draw supplies from it and with an independent water supply (we haven't discussed the naval side). I hope this does justice to the theory Justin is developing.
I presume part of Justin's geographic research is to identify potential sites for his daily camps and his depots, plus operating beaches for 1207 warships?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 01:13:23 PM
BTW the forage in the photo looks fine. There's some clear ground near the river but it doesn't cover most of the area in the photo. Keeping in mind that average grazing ground in Greece is around one ton per acre which is more than enough to supply the needs of animals from the camp area itself.
The grazing looks fine. Unfortunately your numbers don't allow grazing. Remember we had servants going out and collecting forage with a sickle. Indeed at one point a calculation was provided to state that the army needed less fodder than could be provided by the campsite alone if the haymaking crews got there first.
But look at that picture. It could provide 1 ton per acre, but you couldn't harvest one ton per acre with a sickle, there just isn't enough length of grass to work with.
Sickle use seen here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8nI0GK6qrdk
The sickle was the standard harvesting tool in Greece and Persia
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 03:07:45 PM
Justin (not me - the martyr) and others give similar figures of these magnitudes.
Justin the epitomator of Trogus, presumably? Not generally thought to be the same bloke as the martyr.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 03:42:27 PM
Justin the epitomator of Trogus, presumably?
Wow, you could build an entire Dr Who episode around that name !
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 03:42:27 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 03:07:45 PM
Justin (not me - the martyr) and others give similar figures of these magnitudes.
Justin the epitomator of Trogus, presumably? Not generally thought to be the same bloke as the martyr.
Having read Justin I would cheerfully have martyred him :-[
I thought I had trouble remembering people's names but Justin took it to a whole new level!
You could also include Ctesias for example (800,000 for Scythia and Xerxes in Greece), or Simonides (3,000,000 at Thermopylae). You might also consider the fact that the numbers in each source are different from each other - but it's OK for the purposes of this to talk about orders of magnitude.
Quote
Since these are pretty much all the sources we have for Persian history and to reject them to this extent means putting our understanding of the Persian Empire in question,.
Well I think you go wrong there at the first step. Our understanding of the Persian Empire is absolutely fine if we reject these figures - indeed because most people reject these figures, our understanding of the Persina Empire is already based on the assumption that these figures are incorrect.
Quote
... I propose that one examine if these numbers are feasible. Apart from the affirmations of the sources, I can't scientifically prove that Persian armies were this big. Nobody can. But neither can anyone scientifically prove that they were considerably smaller. There is no hard evidence either way other than the sources themselves.
That depends on what you mean by 'hard evidence'. Plenty of fairly hard evidence has been presented in this thread. And most people would argue that a statement of Herodotus is not hard evidence (this was already the view in antiquity of course - many 'sources' - writers and historians in antiquity - regarded Herodotus as wholly unreliable - whether justly or not is another matter - but it's not some modern fashion).
Quote
This means we have to respect the sources as much as possible. If we cover them with a blanket of doubt right from the word go, affirming that the only certitude we have is from scientific experimentation and you can't perform scientific experiments on history, then history as a serious subject of study is dead.
Wrong again! Without getting all meta, there are lots of sources of information a historian can use, and naively accepting every statement of an ancient author is not the only option.
Quote
I suggest that instead of scientific certitude (which is impossible) we go for moral certitude, i.e. examining the writer of the period in the same way a lawyer cross-examines a witness in court. A witness may be hostile - not inclined to spill the necessary beans - but it is still possible to glean the facts from what he/she says with enough certitude to arrive at a judgment.
Well I hope I never have to have you as my lawyer! I'm all for the method (moral certitude is fine by me). But in most legal cases, you wouldn't rely on a single witness statement without, at the very least, examining the expertise, knowledge and motivations of the witness, looking for corroborating statements and (above all) considering forensic evidence. You would reject such methods and rely entirely on the unvarnished witness statement.
Quote
Ditto for Herodotus. It just needs a good dose of common sense.
Sure. Funnily enough, common sense is what I suspect most people in this thread feel you lack... It's a slippery concept, common sense.
Quote
The only thing we can establish with some sort of scientific accuracy is the practicality of moving 3 million men from Asia Minor to Greece. If it is possible then I'm quite happy to take Herodotus at his word. To establish if it is possible from my armchair (actually a rather uncomfortable plastic chair) simply means establishing whether there are any insuperable obstacles, as opposed to obstacles that can be overcome with some preparation, ingenuity and organisation.
OK I'm fine with the method - but you apply exceptionally high standards of proof to arguments against the practicality of it, while being remarkably easy to convince as to its practicality. For example, drawing a diagram of a 1 in 10 slope, placing some figures on it, and presenting this as proof that several million men can walk en masse across the hills of northern Greece, is not, I feel, an argument that would convince many juries. But maybe the proof of the pudding is in the eating - we are all unbiassed jurors here, full of common sense - if you can convince us then that's a big step forward for your argument. If you can't, then maybe you should consider the possibility that it is your argument, rather than our understanding, or common sense, or historical method, that might be flawed after all.
FWIW my position is as is was when we discussed this in 2015 - I can't prove Xerxes army wasn't 3,000,000 strong, and maybe it was, but comparisons with other periods of history, and consideration of the practical difficulties, make me think it unlikely.
Incidentally (to wind up my overlong and unintended foray into this thread), has anyone tried wargaming an army of 3,000,000, or even 800,000? At a figure scale of 1:20, 800,000 men would only need 40,000 figures. Or alternatively, take something like DBA. If we take a standard 12 element army to represent about 40,000 men, then 800,000 would be represented by 240 elements, 3M by 900. Sounds doable - I can't think of any practical objections to that.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 03:49:09 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 03:42:27 PM
Justin the epitomator of Trogus, presumably?
Wow, you could build an entire Dr Who episode around that name !
Epitomate! Epitomate!
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 04:02:50 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 03:49:09 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 03:42:27 PM
Justin the epitomator of Trogus, presumably?
Wow, you could build an entire Dr Who episode around that name !
Epitomate! Epitomate!
Justin always struck me as the sort of person who'd describe an episode of Doctor Who for you.
But he'd have missed the point, have seen only half the episode, but had also seen a trailer for the next season
And kept getting the companion's name wrong
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 03:42:27 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 20, 2018, 03:07:45 PM
Justin (not me - the martyr) and others give similar figures of these magnitudes.
Justin the epitomator of Trogus, presumably? Not generally thought to be the same bloke as the martyr.
Oh, right.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 04:10:02 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 04:02:50 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 03:49:09 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 03:42:27 PM
Justin the epitomator of Trogus, presumably?
Wow, you could build an entire Dr Who episode around that name !
Epitomate! Epitomate!
Justin always struck me as the sort of person who'd describe an episode of Doctor Who for you.
But he'd have missed the point, have seen only half the episode, but had also seen a trailer for the next season
And kept getting the companion's name wrong
He'd have to epitomate the Doctor and then find some other way of dealing with K9 - you can't epitomate inorganic entities (but I don't have to describe this in detail, do I?)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 04:10:02 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 04:02:50 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 03:49:09 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 20, 2018, 03:42:27 PM
Justin the epitomator of Trogus, presumably?
Wow, you could build an entire Dr Who episode around that name !
Epitomate! Epitomate!
Justin always struck me as the sort of person who'd describe an episode of Doctor Who for you.
But he'd have missed the point, have seen only half the episode, but had also seen a trailer for the next season
And kept getting the companion's name wrong
Jim, have you ever thought such an unreliable epitomator might make an interesting character in a fantasy novel?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 04:34:31 PM
Jim, have you ever thought such an unreliable epitomator might make an interesting character in a fantasy novel?
Now there is an idea!
Quote from: Rich
Incidentally (to wind up my overlong and unintended foray into this thread), has anyone tried wargaming an army of 3,000,000, or even 800,000? At a figure scale of 1:20, 800,000 men would only need 40,000 figures. Or alternatively, take something like DBA. If we take a standard 12 element army to represent about 40,000 men, then 800,000 would be represented by 240 elements, 3M by 900. Sounds doable - I can't think of any practical objections to that.
I was going to suggest for the next conference a committee game on planning the 3 million man plus assorted supporting creatures march to Thermopylae.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 03:17:00 PM
To paraphrase Richard, and repeat something said earlier, neither the position "If you can't show it's impossible, it must be true" nor "If you can't show it's possible, it must be false" take us far. Instead we need to look at a balance of probabilities.
Though Justin fails to see any "killer" arguments, the conventional position does pile up a lot of obstacles. So far, the "sources first" advocates have struggled to answer these and the balance of probability is strongly with the orthodox position. It may be that is in part due to the fact that we only see bits of argument at a time and Justin would do better if he could provide a summary of his case.
As I understand it, there was a 3 year preparation period where stores and armies were assembled and a large construction battalion was sent to Greece. We know the construction battalion built a canal - it is archaeologically detectable. Apparently they also surveyed the route, marking out daily camp sites and weekly depot sites. Sometime in this three years they built a 300 m wide road from the Hellespont to Thermopylae. Then, with the approach of D-day, bridges were built and rebuilt and an advanced force set off to establish the first weekly depots. They advanced carefully to avoid trampling any pasturage. Then, a few days later, the engineering vanguard crossed the Hellespont and proceeded a day in advance of the main army, harvesting fodder, building irrigation systems and laying out camps. These were then followed in a very orderly and disciplined fashion by the remained of the army (I don't think we've discussed march order) who are spread over two days. The back of the army camps where the previous one did the day before (I'm unclear here whether the first half of the army has left fodder for the second half, whether the second half use transported fodder or whether they go further abroad to forage). The naval supply chain is delivering supplies across beaches using lighters to stock the seven day depots. When the depot is stocked, they move to the next and the fleet of lighters sails down the coast. Warships are presumably covering this operation, based at a beach near the depot, close enough to draw supplies from it and with an independent water supply (we haven't discussed the naval side). I hope this does justice to the theory Justin is developing.
I presume part of Justin's geographic research is to identify potential sites for his daily camps and his depots, plus operating beaches for 1207 warships?
A good summing up. I would modify it slightly thus:
The Persians marked out suitable campsites well in advance with the help of local knowledge. They also surveyed the route the army would take. They didn't so much build a 600m wide road as oblige the locals to spend four years clearing away obstructive vegetation and other obstacles - not every obstacle as most could simply be walked around. Keep in mind that the human body is designed to walk on ground - not road but ground - which means that if in good shape it can handle terrain that is not too difficult without exhausting itself. Wild animals do it all the time.
The locals are also required to prepare the campsites just before the arrival of the army, with perhaps an advance guard arriving to oversee operations. This preparation consists of gathering up the brush and grass which clears the ground and supplies fodder for the animals. If possible, channels would be dug to facilitate watering the animals. The army marches along the cleared 'road', in a loose and not particularly orderly fashion but with reasonable spacing between individuals and animals to allow for some bunching up when flowing around obstacles.
The entire army marches in one day from campsite to campsite. This is easier if the army splits into several columns which happens whenever possible but can be done even when the army is together. With more than 15 hours visibility each day, if the head of the column starts out at the crack of dawn and marches with one half-hour break round the three-hour mark, the tail of the column will reach the next campsite while it is still light and the entire army will have advanced about 20km. Men and animals will actually spend only 7 hours on the march at a moderate pace of 3km/h, so the journey will not be too fatiguing for them. In fact, I get the impression that Xerxes is not really hard on his army. Bar the whipping at the Hellespont - necessary to get the men across the narrow bridges as quickly as possible - he does not seem to have unduly driven his troops.
I envisage the food transports as ships small enough to beach (50 tonners) and unload grain in sacks by short chain gangs to waiting mules just a few yards away on the sand - or even right next to the ships' sides, why not? (unless the sacks would get wet) Unloading a ship must be done with maximum speed to permit enough ships to arrive at and leave the shore in a day which actually isn't too many ships. Most of the Aegean shore on the northern and western coast is beach - I checked - so the ships won't lack for space. Rocky shores are precisely where the army won't be marching. It'll be inland for those stretches.
The depots are already stocked when the army and ships arrive and serve to ease the logistics burden of the navy.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 09:15:44 AM
Could I just check how the army is carrying its non-food supplies e.g. the large numbers of arrows it needs? Are we assuming that these are being carried by the camp followers (disregarding those on special duties)?
Given the occasional reference to 'harmata' (which could be chariots or wagons) there may have been some wheeled transport in the Persian lineup. Whether these rather than pack animals would be carrying ammunition, farriers' tools etc. is anyone's guess, but I would incline to iit being the likelier option.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 09:47:51 AM
While Jim has raised it in something of an exasperated tone, I do think the "sources first" advocates perhaps need to sort out the apparent contradictions the model of the Persian army is generating. As a force, the current model requires it to be extremely efficient, with discipline among its camp followers that many later regular armies would envy for their soldiers. Its march and camp discipline are greatly in advance of the Romans. Is this high degree of regularity and discipline consistent with other sources or even with Herodotus himself? Why would such a force need to be driven forward with whips? Does their battlefield performance indicate great discipline and drill?
'Discipline' may be the wrong word here; I would suggest 'practice'. They are doing something they are intimately familiar with from generations of tradition and, for many but by no means all, actual campaigning. The difference is principally scale, and we see this applied in planning: cutting the Athos canal, spending four years in preparation for the war, ordering the gathering of food and reasources ahead of the march and applying what looks like maritime overkill to supply requirements.
An analogy might be India in almost any age: Indian armies were large, often astonishingly so compared to their opponents, but were they 'disciplined' or effective?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 20, 2018, 07:37:06 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 09:15:44 AM
Could I just check how the army is carrying its non-food supplies e.g. the large numbers of arrows it needs? Are we assuming that these are being carried by the camp followers (disregarding those on special duties)?
Given the occasional reference to 'harmata' (which could be chariots or wagons) there may have been some wheeled transport in the Persian lineup. Whether these rather than pack animals would be carrying ammunition, farriers' tools etc. is anyone's guess, but I would incline to iit being the likelier option.
did Persians shoe their horses? I ask purely out of interest because the Romans used hipposandals which were 'tied on'
But even without horseshoes there'd be plenty for metal workers to do so I have no doubt there would be metal and leather workers with their tools. Whether they were men attached to units making stuff in traditional patterns I don't know.
You'd certainly need bronze smiths as well as blacksmiths because stuff would break through fair wear and tear
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 07:46:24 PM
did Persians shoe their horses? I ask purely out of interest because the Romans used hipposandals which were 'tied on'
But even without horseshoes there'd be plenty for metal workers to do so I have no doubt there would be metal and leather workers with their tools. Whether they were men attached to units making stuff in traditional patterns I don't know.
As far as I know they did not, nor did the Macedonians a century and a half later; Alexander's men in India were complaining that their horses' hooves were worn down almost to the frogs.
Given the number of people in Xerxes' army carrying cane spears and reed arrows, there may have been less metalwork than we think, but there must have been some on account of the better-armoured contingents, e.g. Medes and Persians. Whether they needed to have smiths etc. with the army all the time or whether they could get away with carrying many of them and their materials on ships and just meeting up on occasion in coastal camps to fix things I do not know.
The item most likely to be in need of ongoing manintenance would, to my mind, be footwear. I would guess this would fall to camp followers who were handy leatherworkers; leather, or at least uncured leather, would probably not be too hard to come by during the campaign.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 03:17:00 PM
I presume part of Justin's geographic research is to identify potential sites for his daily camps and his depots, plus operating beaches for 1207 warships?
That is for Justin to decide.
On a related matter, one wonders how many of Xerxes' troops moved by sea, and in what circumstances.
"Xerxes marched past these Greek cities of the coast, keeping them on his left. The Thracian tribes through whose lands he journeyed were the Paeti, Cicones, Bistones, Sapaei, Dersaei, Edoni, and Satrae. Of these,
the ones who dwelt by the sea followed his army on shipboard; the ones living inland, whose names I have recorded, were forced to join with his land army, all of them except the Satrae." - Herodotus VII.110
The 'sightseeing' at Thermopylae I have already mentioned. The point here is that sealift is a capability the Achaemenids could easily have used to get at least part of their army past any constriction on their route. This in itself complicates any choke-point calculations and increases the likely size of the Achaemenid army.
Getting back to warships and beaches, we have one example in Herodotus VII.118:
"The Persian fleet put to sea and reached the beach of the Magnesian land, between the city of Casthanaea and the headland of Sepia. The first ships to arrive moored close to land, with the others after them at anchor; since the beach was not large, they lay at anchor in rows eight ships deep out into the sea."
If I read this correctly, one eighth of the ships 'moored close to land' without actually beaching. The rest dropped the hook (or stone) in open water.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 03:59:49 PM
Well I think you go wrong there at the first step. Our understanding of the Persian Empire is absolutely fine if we reject these figures - indeed because most people reject these figures, our understanding of the Persina Empire is already based on the assumption that these figures are incorrect.
For circular arguments, this one has to win a prize. :)
QuoteQuote
This means we have to respect the sources as much as possible. If we cover them with a blanket of doubt right from the word go, affirming that the only certitude we have is from scientific experimentation and you can't perform scientific experiments on history, then history as a serious subject of study is dead.
Wrong again! Without getting all meta, there are lots of sources of information a historian can use, and naively accepting every statement of an ancient author is not the only option.
But we are not naively accepting statements; we are taking them as stated and working out whether there is any reason we should not do so.
QuoteQuote
I suggest that instead of scientific certitude (which is impossible) we go for moral certitude, i.e. examining the writer of the period in the same way a lawyer cross-examines a witness in court. A witness may be hostile - not inclined to spill the necessary beans - but it is still possible to glean the facts from what he/she says with enough certitude to arrive at a judgment.
Well I hope I never have to have you as my lawyer! I'm all for the method (moral certitude is fine by me). But in most legal cases, you wouldn't rely on a single witness statement without, at the very least, examining the expertise, knowledge and motivations of the witness, looking for corroborating statements and (above all) considering forensic evidence. You would reject such methods and rely entirely on the unvarnished witness statement.
This seems to me to be a misrepresentation of what Justin is saying. Herodotus is a careful 'witness' and not credulous about what he reports, as anyone who reads him extensively will see. Just what forensics we can get from 480 BC is an open question, but internal consistency in Herodotus - the extensive preparation time, the shipping required to support such a huge army, the crossing time to get it across the Hellespont on a bridge constructed from warships whose dimensions we can be reasonably sure of - works out rather too well to be dismissed.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 03:59:49 PM
You could also include Ctesias for example (800,000 for Scythia and Xerxes in Greece), or Simonides (3,000,000 at Thermopylae). You might also consider the fact that the numbers in each source are different from each other - but it's OK for the purposes of this to talk about orders of magnitude.
Quote
Since these are pretty much all the sources we have for Persian history and to reject them to this extent means putting our understanding of the Persian Empire in question,.
Well I think you go wrong there at the first step. Our understanding of the Persian Empire is absolutely fine if we reject these figures - indeed because most people reject these figures, our understanding of the Persina Empire is already based on the assumption that these figures are incorrect.
If a writer like Herodotus makes a Persian army ten times larger than it actually was then he can't be trusted in anything else he affirms. Keep in mind he goes into some detail about where he got the number from: Xerxe's counting his men in batches of 10 000's. Add to this the 7 days to get the army across the Hellespont, a campsite stretching 20 miles along the shore south of Therme, and so on. If other writers get Persian numbers as wildly wrong as Herodotus then they can't be trusted either. Size is significant - a general would have to have an accurate idea of how large his army was so as to ascertain if it was capable of beating his opponent. It's a fundamental piece of information. Saying Herodotus
et al. can't be trusted to get it right completely undermines their reliability as historians. Saying they
can get it right and deliberately exaggerate it by a factor of ten is worse.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 03:59:49 PMQuote
... I propose that one examine if these numbers are feasible. Apart from the affirmations of the sources, I can't scientifically prove that Persian armies were this big. Nobody can. But neither can anyone scientifically prove that they were considerably smaller. There is no hard evidence either way other than the sources themselves.
That depends on what you mean by 'hard evidence'. Plenty of fairly hard evidence has been presented in this thread. And most people would argue that a statement of Herodotus is not hard evidence (this was already the view in antiquity of course - many 'sources' - writers and historians in antiquity - regarded Herodotus as wholly unreliable - whether justly or not is another matter - but it's not some modern fashion).
By hard evidence I mean something concrete - traces of the passage of the Persian army to show how wide it marched, of the layout of the camps to show how big they were, and so on. Something archaeological in other words. Herodotus himself has a good
contemporary reputation as a reliable source, which is saying something.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 03:59:49 PMQuote
This means we have to respect the sources as much as possible. If we cover them with a blanket of doubt right from the word go, affirming that the only certitude we have is from scientific experimentation and you can't perform scientific experiments on history, then history as a serious subject of study is dead.
Wrong again! Without getting all meta, there are lots of sources of information a historian can use, and naively accepting every statement of an ancient author is not the only option.
Actually there isn't. About 90% of what we know about human events in the past comes from what people during or near that past wrote about them. 'Human events' as opposed to architecture, burial practices, arms and armour, and the like. Knowing what a Persian arrowhead looks like tells us nothing about the route the Persian army took during the Greek campaign. And it's not about naively accepting. Check my courtroom response below.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 03:59:49 PMQuote
I suggest that instead of scientific certitude (which is impossible) we go for moral certitude, i.e. examining the writer of the period in the same way a lawyer cross-examines a witness in court. A witness may be hostile - not inclined to spill the necessary beans - but it is still possible to glean the facts from what he/she says with enough certitude to arrive at a judgment.
Well I hope I never have to have you as my lawyer! I'm all for the method (moral certitude is fine by me). But in most legal cases, you wouldn't rely on a single witness statement without, at the very least, examining the expertise, knowledge and motivations of the witness, looking for corroborating statements and (above all) considering forensic evidence. You would reject such methods and rely entirely on the unvarnished witness statement.
Obviously the background, motivations and general reliability of the witness is examined, corroborating evidence brought forward and forensic evidence submitted if it exists. The point is that witness testimony is acceptable in a court of law, even the testimony of hostile witnesses (cross-examination reveals consistencies or lack of them). In this case we have the testimony of a number of witnesses all of whom give Persian armies huge numbers. We have little or no forensic evidence. Expert testimony thus far in this thread does not refute the affirmations of the witnesses.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 03:59:49 PMQuote
Ditto for Herodotus. It just needs a good dose of common sense.
Sure. Funnily enough, common sense is what I suspect most people in this thread feel you lack... It's a slippery concept, common sense.
Remarks like this I just prefer to let go.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 03:59:49 PMQuote
The only thing we can establish with some sort of scientific accuracy is the practicality of moving 3 million men from Asia Minor to Greece. If it is possible then I'm quite happy to take Herodotus at his word. To establish if it is possible from my armchair (actually a rather uncomfortable plastic chair) simply means establishing whether there are any insuperable obstacles, as opposed to obstacles that can be overcome with some preparation, ingenuity and organisation.
OK I'm fine with the method - but you apply exceptionally high standards of proof to arguments against the practicality of it, while being remarkably easy to convince as to its practicality. For example, drawing a diagram of a 1 in 10 slope, placing some figures on it, and presenting this as proof that several million men can walk en masse across the hills of northern Greece, is not, I feel, an argument that would convince many juries. But maybe the proof of the pudding is in the eating - we are all unbiassed jurors here, full of common sense - if you can convince us then that's a big step forward for your argument. If you can't, then maybe you should consider the possibility that it is your argument, rather than our understanding, or common sense, or historical method, that might be flawed after all.
Showing that the terrain is traversible if cleared of obstacles like difficult vegetation is a fair argument IMHO. And one can hardly compare posters in this thread to a jury. When a jury walks into a courtroom it knows a crime has been committed but it has not seen the evidence proving the innocence or guilt of the accused. The jurors are, as far as is humanly possible, mentally neutral. They acquire their understanding of the case from the evidence and arguments put forward by Prosecution and Defence.
Here however everyone pretty much had settled opinions on the topic before the thread was posted. I'm willing to change my mind if the big army hypothesis can be proven to be untenable. I'm even willing to put forward arguments against it - I'll put forward another one in my next post. But the point is that nobody is going to change their minds on the basis of probabilities and circumstantial evidence, I accept that.
Quote from: RichT on April 20, 2018, 03:59:49 PMIncidentally (to wind up my overlong and unintended foray into this thread), has anyone tried wargaming an army of 3,000,000, or even 800,000? At a figure scale of 1:20, 800,000 men would only need 40,000 figures. Or alternatively, take something like DBA. If we take a standard 12 element army to represent about 40,000 men, then 800,000 would be represented by 240 elements, 3M by 900. Sounds doable - I can't think of any practical objections to that.
It would work in Optio terms. Each element has a frontage of 50 yards and occupies a battlefield square 2 elements wide or 100x100 yards. So fill a square with 8 bases and you get 10 000 men if you assume depth now corresponds to width in scale. Create a battlefield 40 squares wide and 20 squares deep - that's about 4 x 2m. The Persians deploy their 1 000 000 or so infantry 20 squares wide and 5 squares deep and put the cavalry on the 10 squares on either side of the infantry. The infantry will number about 800 bases. Have fun painting that!
Quote
The Persians deploy their 1 000 000 or so infantry
Just a thought but is it possible to work out how long it would take to deploy 1,000,000 or so infantry?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 04:34:31 PM
Jim, have you ever thought such an unreliable epitomator might make an interesting character in a fantasy novel?
tis done Anthony
I'll stick it on the Tallis Steelyard Blog and put a link in to this thread for you ;)
Here's another problem with 1 700 000 soldiers (you're welcome :)) ). Xerxes stops at Doriscos and counts his army. He does this by getting 10 000 men - probably his Immortals - to bunch together in a single space. A circle is drawn around the crowd and a fence put up (obviously with several gaps). The rest of the soldiers are then made to enter the enclosure, fill it, and leave, with a scribe ticking off the number of times the enclosure is filled. For 1 700 000 men that would require 170 fillings and emptyings. How long would it actually take to do that? How long was Xerxes at Doriscos?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 09:38:46 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 04:34:31 PM
Jim, have you ever thought such an unreliable epitomator might make an interesting character in a fantasy novel?
tis done Anthony
I'll stick it on the Tallis Steelyard Blog and put a link in to this thread for you ;)
Here you are Anthony, and others. An Unreliable Epitomator
https://tallissteelyard.wordpress.com/2018/04/21/an-unreliable-epitomator/
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 21, 2018, 08:03:21 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 09:38:46 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 04:34:31 PM
Jim, have you ever thought such an unreliable epitomator might make an interesting character in a fantasy novel?
tis done Anthony
I'll stick it on the Tallis Steelyard Blog and put a link in to this thread for you ;)
Here you are Anthony, and others. An Unreliable Epitomator
https://tallissteelyard.wordpress.com/2018/04/21/an-unreliable-epitomator/
I like it Jim. Well written.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2018, 07:58:55 AM
Here's another problem with 1 700 000 soldiers (you're welcome :)) ). Xerxes stops at Doriscos and counts his army. He does this by getting 10 000 men - probably his Immortals - to bunch together in a single space. A circle is drawn around the crowd and a fence put up (obviously with several gaps). The rest of the soldiers are then made to enter the enclosure, fill it, and leave, with a scribe ticking off the number of times the enclosure is filled. For 1 700 000 men that would require 170 fillings and emptyings. How long would it actually take to do that? How long was Xerxes at Doriscos?
An excellent question. Herodotus VII.59:
"The territory of Doriscus is in Thrace, a wide plain by the sea, and through it flows a great river, the Hebrus; here had been built that royal fortress which is called Doriscus, and a Persian guard had been posted there by Darius ever since the time of his march against Scythia. [2] It seemed to Xerxes to be a fit place for him to arrange and number his army, and he did so. All the ships had now arrived at Doriscus, and the captains at Xerxes' command brought them to the beach near Doriscus, where stands the Samothracian city of Sane, and Zone; at the end is Serreum, a well-known headland. This country was in former days possessed by the Cicones. [3] To this beach they brought in their ships and hauled them up for rest [
anepsukhon - let the ships rest and get dry]. Meanwhile Xerxes made a reckoning of his forces at Doriscus."
The answer thus appears to be: long enough for the warships to be hauled up onto the beach for a good dry-out.
Quite a while at Doriscos.
This is the suggested timetable found in Green:
Leave Sardis at end of March.
Begin crossing at Abydos May 10th or so.
Head of column arrives in Doriscos c.May 16th; tail of column May 22nd.
Depart Doriscus mid June (c.16th).
Arrive Strymon River beginning of July.
Reach Therme c. 24 July.
Leave Therme beginning of August.
Head of column / first column arrives at Thermopylae August 14th.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 12:42:52 PM
But please, provide one example from ancient literature of an army than advanced in a column 300 men abreast? Come on, just one
Sadly I have none of an army advancing on so narrow a frontage, but I have two of Persian armies advancing on a considerably greater frontage. The question is: once I cite them, is Jim going to accept that Persian armies did happily and habitually advance on a wide front rather than in a long column of route? ;)
"And now it was midday, and the enemy were not yet in sight; but when afternoon was coming on, there was seen a rising dust, which appeared at first like a white cloud, but some time later like a kind of blackness in the plain, extending over a great distance. As the enemy came nearer and nearer, there were presently flashes of bronze here and there, and spears and the hostile ranks began to come into sight." - Xenophon, Anabasis I.8.8
"Thereupon with one silent attendant who knew the country he sent me to some lofty cliffs a long distance from there, from which, unless one's eyesight was impaired, even the smallest object was visible at a distance of fifty miles. There we stayed for two full days, and
at dawn of the third day we saw below us the whole circuit of the lands (which we call horizontes) filled with innumerable troops with the king leading the way, glittering in splendid attire. Close by him on the left went Grumbates, king of the Chionitae, a man of moderate strength, it is true, and with shrivelled limbs, but of a certain greatness of mind and distinguished by the glory of many victories. On the right was the king of the Albani, of equal rank, high in honour. After them came various leaders, prominent in reputation and rank, followed by a multitude of every degree, chosen from the flower of the neighbouring nations and taught to endure hardship by long continued training. How long, storied Greece, will you continue to tell us of Doriscus, the city of Thrace, and of the armies drawn up in troops within enclosures and numbered? For I am too cautious, or (to speak more truly) too timid, to exaggerate anything beyond what is proven by trustworthy and sure evidence." - Ammianus XVIII.6.21-23
OK, the second example is of a Sassanid army rather than an Achaemenid one, but it looks as if old habits die hard.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 20, 2018, 07:37:06 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 09:15:44 AM
Could I just check how the army is carrying its non-food supplies e.g. the large numbers of arrows it needs? Are we assuming that these are being carried by the camp followers (disregarding those on special duties)?
Given the occasional reference to 'harmata' (which could be chariots or wagons) there may have been some wheeled transport in the Persian lineup. Whether these rather than pack animals would be carrying ammunition, farriers' tools etc. is anyone's guess, but I would incline to iit being the likelier option.
Herodotus, of course, gives us 20,000 charioteers. This would give the army 5,000 - 10,000 vehicles. I don't know if Near Eastern armies regularly used their chariots as baggage vehicles. Also, if operating with so many vehicles already (which would have required much more levelling and clearing by the construction battalion than Justin has so far allowed, I think) did the persian army not use wagons instead of baggage animals?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2018, 08:18:07 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 21, 2018, 08:03:21 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 20, 2018, 09:38:46 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 04:34:31 PM
Jim, have you ever thought such an unreliable epitomator might make an interesting character in a fantasy novel?
tis done Anthony
I'll stick it on the Tallis Steelyard Blog and put a link in to this thread for you ;)
Here you are Anthony, and others. An Unreliable Epitomator
https://tallissteelyard.wordpress.com/2018/04/21/an-unreliable-epitomator/
I like it Jim. Well written.
thanks :)
QuoteWell I think you go wrong there at the first step. Our understanding of the Persian Empire is absolutely fine if we reject these figures - indeed because most people reject these figures, our understanding of the Persina Empire is already based on the assumption that these figures are incorrect.
For circular arguments, this one has to win a prize. :)
Not really. If the current model of the Persian Empire is based on an assumption then reaffirming the assumption will change nothing. Doesn't mean the assumption is right but it is logically consistent.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 21, 2018, 10:45:03 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 20, 2018, 07:37:06 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 20, 2018, 09:15:44 AM
Could I just check how the army is carrying its non-food supplies e.g. the large numbers of arrows it needs? Are we assuming that these are being carried by the camp followers (disregarding those on special duties)?
Given the occasional reference to 'harmata' (which could be chariots or wagons) there may have been some wheeled transport in the Persian lineup. Whether these rather than pack animals would be carrying ammunition, farriers' tools etc. is anyone's guess, but I would incline to iit being the likelier option.
Herodotus, of course, gives us 20,000 charioteers. This would give the army 5,000 - 10,000 vehicles. I don't know if Near Eastern armies regularly used their chariots as baggage vehicles. Also, if operating with so many vehicles already (which would have required much more levelling and clearing by the construction battalion than Justin has so far allowed, I think) did the persian army not use wagons instead of baggage animals?
Some armies seem to have pulled their chariots on campaign with draught animals, even bullocks (I think the Indians did this?) to spre the horses for battle
I think the Persians might have done this, but whether they did or not I suspect the chariot was too busy being used for the crew's kit than as general baggage.
But their presence does remind me that the presence of ox carts (for example) probably wouldn't demand much more road clearing than was needed for the chariots etc.
Whilst travelling in the dry time would have many disadvantages, from the point of view of road wear it was an advantage ;D
Quote"The Persian fleet put to sea and reached the beach of the Magnesian land, between the city of Casthanaea and the headland of Sepia. The first ships to arrive moored close to land, with the others after them at anchor; since the beach was not large, they lay at anchor in rows eight ships deep out into the sea."
If I read this correctly, one eighth of the ships 'moored close to land' without actually beaching. The rest dropped the hook (or stone) in open water.
They can't do this for long, because they need to rewater and resupply. Galleys normally beach to do this. Riding at anchor would be highly risky - galleys were very vulnerable to the weather. In fact, why build a canal to avoid storms if you are going to lie offshore everyday?
QuoteSadly I have none of an army advancing on so narrow a frontage, but I have two of Persian armies advancing on a considerably greater frontage. The question is: once I cite them, is Jim going to accept that Persian armies did happily and habitually advance on a wide front rather than in a long column of route?
Looks like a major change of tack there Patrick. The narrow column has been one thing that everyone so far has accepted - we are working with Justin's 300 metre road. Are you now proposing that the army advanced on a wide front? If so, how did they do this, if their advance has been predicated by Justin on massive advanced engineering works and single mega camps? How does it fit with the supply by sea and the depot strategy? It certainly gives a new perspective on choke points, with the army expanding and contracting more regularly than would be required by Justin.
QuoteSome armies seem to have pulled their chariots on campaign with draught animals, even bullocks (I think the Indians did this?) to spre the horses for battle
I think the Persians might have done this, but whether they did or not I suspect the chariot was too busy being used for the crew's kit than as general baggage.
The problem with this is it adds another 10,000-20,000 animals and we have enough problems with forage as it is. Given the unsuitability of the terrain for massed chariot use before you get to Greece proper, might they just have marched the men and animals overland to re-unite them with their vehicles, dropped off by the Landing Craft Chariots on a convenient beach later?
You know, this topic would be quite fascinating if you started with realistic numbers because the numbers thing is really overshadowing what a major achievement the Persian advance through Greece was. OK, it's up there with sailing the Baltic fleet to the Far East in terms of end result but its impressive none the less.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 21, 2018, 11:29:38 AM
QuoteSome armies seem to have pulled their chariots on campaign with draught animals, even bullocks (I think the Indians did this?) to spre the horses for battle
I think the Persians might have done this, but whether they did or not I suspect the chariot was too busy being used for the crew's kit than as general baggage.
The problem with this is it adds another 10,000-20,000 animals and we have enough problems with forage as it is. Given the unsuitability of the terrain for massed chariot use before you get to Greece proper, might they just have marched the men and animals overland to re-unite them with their vehicles, dropped off by the Landing Craft Chariots on a convenient beach later?
You know, this topic would be quite fascinating if you started with realistic numbers because the numbers thing is really overshadowing what a major achievement the Persian advance through Greece was. OK, it's up there with sailing the Baltic fleet to the Far East in terms of end result but its impressive none the less.
Yes I'm beginning to think that the Persians did have something like 3 or 4 'logistics/supply chain' people to every fighting man for this campaign.
Think of the engineering staff they sent ahead build roads and level ground. Almost by definition this couldn't have been local corvee labour because they'd already asked the locals to increase agricultural output and stockpile food.
When you take into account men unloading boats and managing and guarding the stores, they're all going to have to be fed, and if they're just fed from local surplus, it merely means that less local surplus is available to supply troops and the baggage travelling with them.
Quote
Given the unsuitability of the terrain for massed chariot use before you get to Greece proper, might they just have marched the men and animals overland to re-unite them with their vehicles, dropped off by the Landing Craft Chariots on a convenient beach later?
I suspect that depends on whether the chariot is someone's personal property which they would want to keep site of and the willingness of the charioteers to be reduced to mere infantry for a long period of time. I do like the mental image of Landing Craft Chariot though and I wonder if we could go further and posit the idea of amphibious Duplex Drive chariots for beach assaults ;D
Quote
Yes I'm beginning to think that the Persians did have something like 3 or 4 'logistics/supply chain' people to every fighting man for this campaign.
Think of the engineering staff they sent ahead build roads and level ground. Almost by definition this couldn't have been local corvee labour because they'd already asked the locals to increase agricultural output and stockpile food.
When you take into account men unloading boats and managing and guarding the stores, they're all going to have to be fed, and if they're just fed from local surplus, it merely means that less local surplus is available to supply troops and the baggage travelling with them.
Another issue is did the Persian troops have personal servants much as a Greek Hoplite might have,of course that adds to the numbers of the invasion force - so depending on what your starting point is it could reach towards 6 million or possibly more. Or twenty one million if each Persian the equivalent to the Spartan 7 helots per Hoplite.
I believe Herodotus gives as about as many camp followers as combatants. But this does not mean elite units didn't have multiple servants and line units shared one between several. Also, its not clear to me whether the labour corps is numbered in the army or the camp follower totals - Justin may be able to help there.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 21, 2018, 02:23:00 PM
I believe Herodotus gives as about as many camp followers as combatants. But this does not mean elite units didn't have multiple servants and line units shared one between several. Also, its not clear to me whether the labour corps is numbered in the army or the camp follower totals - Justin may be able to help there.
So using Herodotusian numbers we are looking at an invasion force of roughly 5 million which for comparison is about half the size of the Greek population at the time.
When these numbers are added to the numbers from Asia, the sum total of fighting men is two million, six hundred and forty-one thousand, six hundred and ten. This then is the number of soldiers. As for the service-train which followed them and the crews of the light corn-bearing vessels and all the other vessels besides which came by sea with the force, these I believe to have been not fewer but more than the fighting men. Suppose, however, that they were equal in number, neither more nor fewer. If they were equal to the fighting contingent, they made up as many tens of thousands as the others. Book 7 185-186
Note that Herodotus includes naval units in the count of fighting forces. There are about half a million people with the fleet (though an inconsistency in the fleet makeup means his estimate (he admits its an estimate) may be too high). So the land forces, inclusive of tail, must be over the four million mark.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 21, 2018, 03:28:07 PM
When these numbers are added to the numbers from Asia, the sum total of fighting men is two million, six hundred and forty-one thousand, six hundred and ten. This then is the number of soldiers. As for the service-train which followed them and the crews of the light corn-bearing vessels and all the other vessels besides which came by sea with the force, these I believe to have been not fewer but more than the fighting men. Suppose, however, that they were equal in number, neither more nor fewer. If they were equal to the fighting contingent, they made up as many tens of thousands as the others. Book 7 185-186
Note that Herodotus includes naval units in the count of fighting forces. There are about half a million people with the fleet (though an inconsistency in the fleet makeup means his estimate (he admits its an estimate) may be too high). So the land forces, inclusive of tail, must be over the four million mark.
It might worth considering that these numbers are based upon Xerxes review of the troops at Doriskos- obviously they don't include those who deserted or otherwise dropped out so the original starting army would be even larger. Possibly considerably so bearing in mind the irregular nature of the host.
As an aside I cant help but note that if this force for the most part never returned to Persia etc the invasion would become one of the greatest disasters in human history.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 21, 2018, 11:09:42 AM
QuoteSadly I have none of an army advancing on so narrow a frontage, but I have two of Persian armies advancing on a considerably greater frontage. The question is: once I cite them, is Jim going to accept that Persian armies did happily and habitually advance on a wide front rather than in a long column of route?
Looks like a major change of tack there Patrick. The narrow column has been one thing that everyone so far has accepted - we are working with Justin's 300 metre road. Are you now proposing that the army advanced on a wide front? If so, how did they do this, if their advance has been predicated by Justin on massive advanced engineering works and single mega camps? How does it fit with the supply by sea and the depot strategy? It certainly gives a new perspective on choke points, with the army expanding and contracting more regularly than would be required by Justin.
I would not say a 'major change of tack', rather a possible development of the same principle. Justin has been trying to wean people away from the idea that the Achaemenids moved solely along roads (which did not then exist apart from the mesenger highways in side the Rersian Empire) but instead travelled in bulk across the country. The above instances would seem to support that idea, because although the army of Artaxerxes could be assumed to be advancing in order of battle the army of Shapur could not. The fact is we have very few descriptions of an Achaemenid army on the march, and the other one (Herodotus VII.40-41) has already been hinted at by Aaron:
First went the baggage train and the beasts of burden, and after them a mixed army of all sorts of nations, not according to their divisions but all mingled together [ou diakekrimenoi = not separated]; when more than half had passed there was a space left, and these did not come near the king.
[Description of Xerxes and escorting troops omitted]
After these there was a space of two stadia, and then the rest of the multitude followed all mixed together [anamix = promiscuously, pell-mell rather than 'mixed'].
Distances other than those separating the two contingents of ordinary troops from the King's are not given, but one gets a similar impression of a vast mass rather than a narrow column. Whether this would have been 300 yards wide or 3,000 or whatever I have no idea.
With regard to 'choke points', the mass would tend to flow around these, with just the wheeled transport and perhaps the royal entourage having to pass through the 'choke'. The army would not, as I understand it, contract to go through a pass but rather scramble over such passable terrain as they could find, leaving the pass proper for those who had no option but to use it and those who did not wish to get their royal robes dirty.
Encamping and resupply by sea would be much as previously considered, in that the army would camp along rivers and along beaches, the different contingents being marshalled into places allocated to them.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 21, 2018, 11:02:37 AM
Quote"The Persian fleet put to sea and reached the beach of the Magnesian land, between the city of Casthanaea and the headland of Sepia. The first ships to arrive moored close to land, with the others after them at anchor; since the beach was not large, they lay at anchor in rows eight ships deep out into the sea."
If I read this correctly, one eighth of the ships 'moored close to land' without actually beaching. The rest dropped the hook (or stone) in open water.
They can't do this for long, because they need to rewater and resupply. Galleys normally beach to do this. Riding at anchor would be highly risky - galleys were very vulnerable to the weather. In fact, why build a canal to avoid storms if you are going to lie offshore everyday?
Because the fleet is so big. In point of fact they
were hit by a storm the very next day, with considerable losses. The spring of 480 BC had more than its fair share of stormy weather; the Athos canal probably saved the Persians the equivalent of one storm, but there were - apparently unexpectedly - two more in the offing.
The fleet did not lie offshore every day unless they had to. Remember when they were all pulled up onto the beach at Doriscus and dried out there while Xerxes was numbering his army? One wonders whether someone had belatedly realised this would be the last chance many of them would get for some time.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 21, 2018, 07:15:09 PM
With regard to 'choke points', the mass would tend to flow around these, with just the wheeled transport and perhaps the royal entourage having to pass through the 'choke'. The army would not, as I understand it, contract to go through a pass but rather scramble over such passable terrain as they could find, leaving the pass proper for those who had no option but to use it and those who did not wish to get their royal robes dirty.
How on earth do the mass tend to flow around a choke point? If you can flow round it, it isn't a choke point.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 21, 2018, 03:28:07 PM
Note that Herodotus includes naval units in the count of fighting forces. There are about half a million people with the fleet (though an inconsistency in the fleet makeup means his estimate (he admits its an estimate) may be too high). So the land forces, inclusive of tail, must be over the four million mark.
1.7 million Achaemenid infantry, 20,000 Achaemenid mounted and 300,000 Thracians gets us to 2 million plus; adding camp followers and support personnel at Herodotus' estimated 1:1 ratio would give around 4 million. Note that Herodotus does not differentiate between support personnel on land and support personnel crewing the corn ships etc. (although one gets the impression he is counting the latter twice at Thermopylae) so the actual terrestrial as opposed to aquatic component might be lower than 4 million.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 21, 2018, 04:16:40 PM
As an aside I cant help but note that if this force for the most part never returned to Persia etc the invasion would become one of the greatest disasters in human history.
I have been trying to track down a half-remembered reference which says almost exactly that. Apparently, if I remember correctly, it m aintains that the loss of manpower crippled the Achaemenid Empire for about a generation and caused shortages in agruculture and just about everything else.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 21, 2018, 07:22:59 PM
How on earth do the mass tend to flow around a choke point? If you can flow round it, it isn't a choke point.
Because
we think of it as a 'choke point' whereas
they thought of it as a narrow flat bit that has to be left for the use of Their Excellencies and the chaps with wheels while the rest of us go up another [expletive deleted] hillside
again.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 21, 2018, 07:32:46 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 21, 2018, 07:22:59 PM
How on earth do the mass tend to flow around a choke point? If you can flow round it, it isn't a choke point.
Because we think of it as a 'choke point' whereas they thought of it as a narrow flat bit that has to be left for the use of Their Excellencies and the chaps with wheels while the rest of us go up another [expletive deleted] hillside again.
remember some of these choke points are choke points because armies couldn't just go up the hillside
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 21, 2018, 09:08:04 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 21, 2018, 07:32:46 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 21, 2018, 07:22:59 PM
How on earth do the mass tend to flow around a choke point? If you can flow round it, it isn't a choke point.
Because we think of it as a 'choke point' whereas they thought of it as a narrow flat bit that has to be left for the use of Their Excellencies and the chaps with wheels while the rest of us go up another [expletive deleted] hillside again.
remember some of these choke points are choke points because armies couldn't just go up the hillside
From what I've been able to see from Google maps, there was actually no chokepoint between Asia Minor and Thermopylae that was not either at least 600m wide or could not be bypassed over the hilly ground on either side. The Greeks initially took up position at Tempe until they learned that that chokepoint could be bypassed over the ground to the north, and then stood at Thermopylae precisely because it could not be bypassed until the Persians learned of the goat path. Looking at the terrain just west of Mount Kallidrome the ground is not that steep and not especially broken. It's covered with trees which possibly is what made Xerxes discount it as a route around Leonidas until someone told him there was a path through them.
For interest, here is Thermopylae. Mount Kallidrome with Leonidas' memorial below:
(https://i.imgur.com/pttb8CF.jpg)
My proposed route around the mountain that takes the least sloping terrain. The contours are at 40m intervals:
(https://i.imgur.com/hvcX9a6.jpg)
A few close ups of the ground west of the mountain (just off left of the pictures). Not terribly formidable if you have a path through the trees:
(https://i.imgur.com/yKbzlJ5.jpg)
(https://i.imgur.com/wmrnCIA.jpg)
(https://i.imgur.com/aVmNIFq.jpg)
(https://i.imgur.com/3eDhPpc.jpg)
Lucky for the Greeks Patrick wasn't in charge. He's have just sent the entire PBI straight up the hillside with orders to reform when they hit level ground again
Wonder why the Persians never thought of that
At least we seem to be rid of the 'choke points' - up to Thermopylae, at any rate.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 08:00:17 AM
At least we seem to be rid of the 'choke points' - up to Thermopylae, at any rate.
Just a reminder that the "choke points" issue came up again when the idea was floated of the army advancing on a broad front. Justin's work on choke points is still predicated on a 300m road. Patrick's speculated 3000m wide advance would generate more "choke points" if we define them as when the army has to narrow frontage.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2018, 10:31:39 PM
From what I've been able to see from Google maps, there was actually no chokepoint between Asia Minor and Thermopylae that was not either at least 600m wide or could not be bypassed over the hilly ground on either side. The Greeks initially took up position at Tempe until they learned that that chokepoint could be bypassed over the ground to the north, and then stood at Thermopylae precisely because it could not be bypassed until the Persians learned of the goat path. Looking at the terrain just west of Mount Kallidrome the ground is not that steep and not especially broken. It's covered with trees which possibly is what made Xerxes discount it as a route around Leonidas until someone told him there was a path through them.
So there's no choke point at Thermopylae, it's just the forested mountains on one side, the sea on the other, and the necessity of taking a secret path to get around it that make it seem so? Well, I'm sure we're all in agreement on that one ;-)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 22, 2018, 08:20:47 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 08:00:17 AM
At least we seem to be rid of the 'choke points' - up to Thermopylae, at any rate.
Just a reminder that the "choke points" issue came up again when the idea was floated of the army advancing on a broad front. Justin's work on choke points is still predicated on a 300m road. Patrick's speculated 3000m wide advance would generate more "choke points" if we define them as when the army has to narrow frontage.
To be fair, I don't think Patrick is suggesting that the Persian army on campaign march habitually advanced on a front of 3000m - though it could do so when nearing the enemy - but that it had no problem with moving cross-country.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 08:00:17 AM
At least we seem to be rid of the 'choke points' - up to Thermopylae, at any rate.
No we haven't
You may cheerfully assert that the persian army merely ignored terrain, but assertion doesn't just 'make it so'
We have no evidence of ancient armies using this technique. In a very boring manner they used passes just like everybody else.
Quote from: Prufrock on April 22, 2018, 09:01:19 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2018, 10:31:39 PM
From what I've been able to see from Google maps, there was actually no chokepoint between Asia Minor and Thermopylae that was not either at least 600m wide or could not be bypassed over the hilly ground on either side. The Greeks initially took up position at Tempe until they learned that that chokepoint could be bypassed over the ground to the north, and then stood at Thermopylae precisely because it could not be bypassed until the Persians learned of the goat path. Looking at the terrain just west of Mount Kallidrome the ground is not that steep and not especially broken. It's covered with trees which possibly is what made Xerxes discount it as a route around Leonidas until someone told him there was a path through them.
So there's no choke point at Thermopylae, it's just the forested mountains on one side, the sea on the other, and the necessity of taking a secret path to get around it that make it seem so? Well, I'm sure we're all in agreement on that one ;-)
Not quite. There is no way troops could advance uphill 600m wide on a goat track and the ground, with an elevation of 1 in 3 in places and covered with trees and dense undergrowth (from what I can see) doesn't permit going up on a broad front. So an elite strike force of a few thousand could get around the mountain, but not the entire army.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 22, 2018, 09:02:41 AM
To be fair, I don't think Patrick is suggesting that the Persian army on campaign march habitually advanced on a front of 3000m - though it could do so when nearing the enemy - but that it had no problem with moving cross-country.
Have we any evidence at all that the Persian army had no problem moving cross country?
Other than they had to have this ability to get five or six million of them through Northern Greece?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 09:04:38 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 08:00:17 AM
At least we seem to be rid of the 'choke points' - up to Thermopylae, at any rate.
No we haven't
You may cheerfully assert that the persian army merely ignored terrain, but assertion doesn't just 'make it so'
We have no evidence of ancient armies using this technique. In a very boring manner they used passes just like everybody else.
If they were 20 000, 30 000, 40 000 strong, sure, they could just use the passes. Easier that way.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 09:06:43 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 22, 2018, 09:02:41 AM
To be fair, I don't think Patrick is suggesting that the Persian army on campaign march habitually advanced on a front of 3000m - though it could do so when nearing the enemy - but that it had no problem with moving cross-country.
Have we any evidence at all that the Persian army had no problem moving cross country?
Patrick's quotes?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 22, 2018, 09:05:28 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 22, 2018, 09:01:19 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2018, 10:31:39 PM
From what I've been able to see from Google maps, there was actually no chokepoint between Asia Minor and Thermopylae that was not either at least 600m wide or could not be bypassed over the hilly ground on either side. The Greeks initially took up position at Tempe until they learned that that chokepoint could be bypassed over the ground to the north, and then stood at Thermopylae precisely because it could not be bypassed until the Persians learned of the goat path. Looking at the terrain just west of Mount Kallidrome the ground is not that steep and not especially broken. It's covered with trees which possibly is what made Xerxes discount it as a route around Leonidas until someone told him there was a path through them.
So there's no choke point at Thermopylae, it's just the forested mountains on one side, the sea on the other, and the necessity of taking a secret path to get around it that make it seem so? Well, I'm sure we're all in agreement on that one ;-)
Not quite. There is no way troops could advance uphill 600m wide on a goat track and the ground, with an elevation of 1 in 3 in places and covered with trees and dense undergrowth (from what I can see) doesn't permit going up on a broad front. So an elite strike force of a few thousand could get around the mountain, but not the entire army.
I'm confused. So what were the images of Mt Kallidrome and 'the ground is not that steep, etc' comments for if you do accept that it's a choke point?
Quote from: Prufrock on April 22, 2018, 09:14:05 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 22, 2018, 09:05:28 AM
Quote from: Prufrock on April 22, 2018, 09:01:19 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 21, 2018, 10:31:39 PM
From what I've been able to see from Google maps, there was actually no chokepoint between Asia Minor and Thermopylae that was not either at least 600m wide or could not be bypassed over the hilly ground on either side. The Greeks initially took up position at Tempe until they learned that that chokepoint could be bypassed over the ground to the north, and then stood at Thermopylae precisely because it could not be bypassed until the Persians learned of the goat path. Looking at the terrain just west of Mount Kallidrome the ground is not that steep and not especially broken. It's covered with trees which possibly is what made Xerxes discount it as a route around Leonidas until someone told him there was a path through them.
So there's no choke point at Thermopylae, it's just the forested mountains on one side, the sea on the other, and the necessity of taking a secret path to get around it that make it seem so? Well, I'm sure we're all in agreement on that one ;-)
Not quite. There is no way troops could advance uphill 600m wide on a goat track and the ground, with an elevation of 1 in 3 in places and covered with trees and dense undergrowth (from what I can see) doesn't permit going up on a broad front. So an elite strike force of a few thousand could get around the mountain, but not the entire army.
I'm confused. So what were the images of Mt Kallidrome and 'the ground is not that steep, etc' comments for if you do accept that it's a choke point?
I meant not that steep to go up if you use a track, i.e. the goat track story is believable. I can also envisage the Immortals broadening out and pushing their way through the last few metres of trees so as to emerge in attack formation when assaulting the Greek guard at the top (it'd make a good movie scene).
But a solidly-forested 1 in 3 slope isn't going to work for millions of men going straight up on a broad front. There are limits.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 22, 2018, 09:19:57 AM
I meant not that steep to go up if you use a track, i.e. the goat track story is believable. I can also envisage the Immortals broadening out and pushing their way through the last few metres of trees so as to emerge in attack formation when assaulting the Greek guard at the top (it'd make a good movie scene).
But a solidly-forested 1 in 3 slope isn't going to work for millions of men going straight up on a broad front. There are limits.
Ah no problems, I got the wrong end of the stick - it was just to illustrate the path. Thank you, and sorry for jumping to hasty conclusions!
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 22, 2018, 09:02:41 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 22, 2018, 08:20:47 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 08:00:17 AM
At least we seem to be rid of the 'choke points' - up to Thermopylae, at any rate.
Just a reminder that the "choke points" issue came up again when the idea was floated of the army advancing on a broad front. Justin's work on choke points is still predicated on a 300m road. Patrick's speculated 3000m wide advance would generate more "choke points" if we define them as when the army has to narrow frontage.
To be fair, I don't think Patrick is suggesting that the Persian army on campaign march habitually advanced on a front of 3000m - though it could do so when nearing the enemy - but that it had no problem with moving cross-country.
Patrick said
QuoteSadly I have none of an army advancing on so narrow a frontage, but I have two of Persian armies advancing on a considerably greater frontage. The question is: once I cite them, is Jim going to accept that Persian armies did happily and habitually advance on a wide front rather than in a long column of route?
The intention was to evidence that Persian armies "happily and habitually" moved on a wide front. I think actually your point about nearing the enemy is key - in both examples this was were they were at. The other Herodotus example of the Persians, before they are in Greece, seems to show some kind of columnar arrangement - not a narrow column necessarily but not kilometres across either.
What examples do we have of other armies in Antiquity moving cross-country - at least for considerable stretches - and pretty much ignoring roads/paths?
As an aside, here's an image of Greek mountain woodland - the stuff the Immortals would have to push through when deploying to attack the Greek guard. Passible but not much fun.
(https://i.imgur.com/EfX9bJm.jpg)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 22, 2018, 09:09:44 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 09:06:43 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 22, 2018, 09:02:41 AM
To be fair, I don't think Patrick is suggesting that the Persian army on campaign march habitually advanced on a front of 3000m - though it could do so when nearing the enemy - but that it had no problem with moving cross-country.
Have we any evidence at all that the Persian army had no problem moving cross country?
Patrick's quotes?
The ones that I read do not mention broad formations or troops advancing across a front of thousands of yards
I was wondering whether this series (http://romanarmy.info/march1/march_intro.html) on Roman armies on the march might help at all. Obviously, there are limitations e.g. the assumption of the use of relatively narrow columns but some of the comparative stuff on column makeup and the supplemental section on pace, loads etc. may be handy.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 22, 2018, 04:59:58 PM
I was wondering whether this series (http://romanarmy.info/march1/march_intro.html) on Roman armies on the march might help at all. Obviously, there are limitations e.g. the assumption of the use of relatively narrow columns but some of the comparative stuff on column makeup and the supplemental section on pace, loads etc. may be handy.
Interesting that disciplined armies tended to march in relatively narrow columns.
There again anybody who has done much cross country walking will tell you that actually, the 'road' is normally so much faster that it's worth queuing at choke points
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 09:04:38 AM
We have no evidence of ancient armies using this technique. In a very boring manner they used passes just like everybody else.
We might have.
Assyrian kings make repeated references to their armies scaling not just hills but mountains as part of their transit into an area; Tiglath-pileser I even refers to something the translators render as 'iron sledges' to get chariots up mountains.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 09:06:43 AM
Have we any evidence at all that the Persian army had no problem moving cross country?
Let me once again mention Herodotus VII.115
"The route which the army of Xerxes took remains to this day untouched; the Thracians neither plough nor sow it, but hold it in great honour."
This tells us that the route taken is wide enough to be ploughed and sown and that the passage of the army made a huge impression on the Thracians.
Remember that in this period
there were no roads* and armies habitually moved across country.
*
With the exception of the Royal Persian Highway. But that was within the Persian Empire and was intended for rapid transit of Persian messengers.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 22, 2018, 04:59:58 PM
I was wondering whether this series (http://romanarmy.info/march1/march_intro.html) on Roman armies on the march might help at all.
From what I can see, it looks very good for Roman armies, misleading for Greek and Macedonian armies and not really representative of Biblical armies at all. The Achaemenid army was the last of the Biblical pattern armies, and one may note in Book IX of Herodotus the Greek supply and marching arrangements at Plataea, which bear no relation whatsoever to the Roman series and can be contrasted with those of Xerxes' army in Book VII, which also bear no relationship to the Roman pattern.
Frankly, if there were the slightest relationship between Roman and Achaemenid practice, it would be a gift for archaeology and the study of history because one could extrapolate so many things.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 07:25:25 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 09:04:38 AM
We have no evidence of ancient armies using this technique. In a very boring manner they used passes just like everybody else.
We might have.
Assyrian kings make repeated references to their armies scaling not just hills but mountains as part of their transit into an area; Tiglath-pileser I even refers to something the translators render as 'iron sledges' to get chariots up mountains.
Yes, well many people have campaigned in mountains. Even dragging carrying cannon behind them on mules. But they still followed tracks and roads. This doesn't show that the Assyrians travelled like locusts and a front measured in thousands of yards
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 07:25:25 PM
Let me once again mention Herodotus VII.115
"The route which the army of Xerxes took remains to this day untouched; the Thracians neither plough nor sow it, but hold it in great honour."
This tells us that the route taken is wide enough to be ploughed and sown and that the passage of the army made a huge impression on the Thracians.
Which might merely mean that it was trampled so hard by a narrow column that they couldn't break the surface with their ards. It's true that primitive ploughs do have a lot of trouble with hard packed ground.
It says absolutely nothing about the width of the road. With this level of technology fields were often small. When ploughing the field only really needs to be long in one direction.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 07:22:53 PM
Interesting that disciplined armies tended to march in relatively narrow columns.
There again anybody who has done much cross country walking will tell you that actually, the 'road' is normally so much faster that it's worth queuing at choke points
I may have pointed this out before, but in better attested ages, it was consistently found that narrow columns could maintain higher speeds than wide lines, because of the difficulty of maintaining alignment in the later. So I submit that very wide columns are a non-starter: they'll either move ridiculously slowly, or turn into mobs.
(Patrick will now doubtlessly postulate that Xerxes had hit on principles for formation maintenance that eluded dabblers like Frederick II and Napoleon.)
Herodotus' veracity and judgement have occasionally been questioned during this discussion, so it may be interesting to see how he handles source material. The material in question is in Herodotus VIII.117-120 and deals with the transit of Xerxes from Europe to Asia on his return journey.
"Now the Persians, journeying through Thrace to the passage, made haste to cross to Abydos in their ships, for they found the bridges no longer made fast but broken by a storm. There their march halted, and more food was given them than on their way. [2] Then by reason of their immoderate gorging and the change of the water which they drank, many of the army that had survived died. The rest came with Xerxes to Sardis.
There is, however, another tale, which is this: when Xerxes came in his march from Athens to Eion on the Strymon, he travelled no farther than that by land, but committed his army to Hydarnes to be led to the Hellespont. He himself embarked and set sail for Asia in a Phoenician ship. [2] In the course of this voyage he was caught by a strong wind called the Strymonian, which lifted up the waves. This storm bearing the harder upon him by reason of the heavy load of the ship (for the Persians of his company who were on the deck were so many), the king grew afraid and cried to the ship's pilot asking him if there were any way of deliverance. To this the man said, [3] "Sire, there is none, if we do not rid ourselves of these many who are on board." Hearing that, it is said, Xerxes said to the Persians, "Now it is for you to prove your concern for your king, for it seems that my deliverance rests with you." [4] At this they bowed and leapt into the sea. The ship, now much lighter, came by these means safe to Asia. No sooner had Xerxes disembarked on land, than he made the pilot a gift of a golden crown for saving the king's life but cut off his head for being the death of many Persians."
Here we have a classic historian's dilemma: two sources, and they are in total contradiction. Let us see how Herodotus handles this problem.
First, the application of cultural knowledge and logic:
"This is the other tale of Xerxes' return; but I for my part believe neither the story of the Persians' fate nor any other part of it. For if indeed the pilot had spoken to Xerxes in this way, I think that there is not one in ten thousand who would not say that the king would have bidden the men on deck (who were Persians and of the best blood of Persia) descend into the ship's hold, and would have taken from the Phoenician rowers a number equal to the number of the Persians and cast them into the sea. No, the truth is that Xerxes did as I have already said, and returned to Asia with his army by road."
Next comes the application of further information:
"There is further proof of this, for it is known that when Xerxes came to Abdera in his return, he made a compact of friendship with its people and gave them a golden sword and a gilt tiara. As the people of Abdera say (but for my part I wholly disbelieve them), it was here that Xerxes in his flight back from Athens first loosed his girdle, as being here in safety. Now Abdera lies nearer to the Hellespont than the Strymon and Eion, where they say that he took ship."
Note incidentally Herodotus' evaluation of the Abderite story, part being rejected presumably on the ground sof implausibility and part accepted on the ground of logic.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 07:25:25 PM
Remember that in this period there were no roads* and armies habitually moved across country.
*With the exception of the Royal Persian Highway. But that was within the Persian Empire and was intended for rapid transit of Persian messengers.
I am not stupid. But archaeologists talk about iron age roads and tracks in this country, none of which had a metalled surface.
Indeed they talk about tracks and roads in Greece, but there again the Greeks were a sad pedestrian people who didn't realise that merely by ignoring terrain they could have advanced across a far wider frontage.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 22, 2018, 07:41:06 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 07:22:53 PM
Interesting that disciplined armies tended to march in relatively narrow columns.
There again anybody who has done much cross country walking will tell you that actually, the 'road' is normally so much faster that it's worth queuing at choke points
I may have pointed this out before, but in better attested ages, it was consistently found that narrow columns could maintain higher speeds than wide lines, because of the difficulty of maintaining alignment in the later. So I submit that very wide columns are a non-starter: they'll either move ridiculously slowly, or turn into mobs.
(Patrick will now doubtlessly postulate that Xerxes had hit on principles for formation maintenance that eluded dabblers like Frederick II and Napoleon.)
walking cross country without the terrain being a little cleared is a nightmare. This is why you'll see walkers following sheep paths etc.
it's so much faster and you've far less chance of catching your foot in a hole hidden in the knee deep lush grass people are going to come along and cut for animal fodder and twisting your ankle.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 22, 2018, 07:41:06 PM
I may have pointed this out before, but in better attested ages, it was consistently found that narrow columns could maintain higher speeds than wide lines, because of the difficulty of maintaining alignment in the later. So I submit that very wide columns are a non-starter: they'll either move ridiculously slowly, or turn into mobs.
But is this considering battlefield formations (for which the above would be true) or troops on the march, for whom the maintenance of formation was an optional extra (very optional in some cases)? It might be worth looking at how Zulus moved, for example.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 07:45:08 PM
Indeed they talk about tracks and roads in Greece, but there again the Greeks were a sad pedestrian people who didn't realise that merely by ignoring terrain they could have advanced across a far wider frontage.
Why not take a look at the Greek retreat from Plataea in Herodotus Book IX? It might be a good idea to do this before (or better still, instead of) posting any more comments in this vein.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 07:50:06 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 22, 2018, 07:41:06 PM
I may have pointed this out before, but in better attested ages, it was consistently found that narrow columns could maintain higher speeds than wide lines, because of the difficulty of maintaining alignment in the later. So I submit that very wide columns are a non-starter: they'll either move ridiculously slowly, or turn into mobs.
But is this considering battlefield formations (for which the above would be true) or troops on the march, for whom the maintenance of formation was an optional extra (very optional in some cases)? It might be worth looking at how Zulus moved, for example.
AFAIK, nobody was daft enough to use "lines of march". But if your "columns" aren't concerned with maintaining a semblance of formation - i.e. if they're willing to turn into mobs as I put it above - I withdraw this particular objection.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 07:50:06 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 22, 2018, 07:45:08 PM
Indeed they talk about tracks and roads in Greece, but there again the Greeks were a sad pedestrian people who didn't realise that merely by ignoring terrain they could have advanced across a far wider frontage.
Why not take a look at the Greek retreat from Plataea in Herodotus Book IX? It might be a good idea to do this before (or better still, instead of) posting any more comments in this vein.
So they resolved in their council that if the Persians held off through that day from giving battle, they would go to the Island.22 This is ten furlongs distant from the Asopus and the Gargaphian spring, near which their army then lay, and in front of the town of Plataea. [2] It is like an island on dry land because the river in its course down from Cithaeron into the plain is parted into two channels, and there is about three furlongs space in between till presently the two channels unite again, and the name of that river is Oeroe, who (as the people of the country say ) was the daughter of Asopus. [3] To that place then they planned to go so that they might have plenty of water for their use and not be harmed by the horsemen, as now when they were face to face with them; and they resolved to change places in the second watch of the night, lest the Persians should see them setting forth and the horsemen press after them and throw them into confusion. [4] Furthermore, they resolved that when they had come to that place, which is encircled by the divided channels of Asopus' daughter Oeroe as she flows from Cithaeron, they would in that night send half of their army to Cithaeron, to remove their followers who had gone to get the provisions; for these were cut off from them on Cithaeron. 52.
Having made this plan, all that day they suffered constant hardship from the cavalry which continually pressed upon them. When the day ended, however, and the horsemen stopped their onslaught, then at that hour of the night at which it was agreed that they should depart, most of them rose and departed, not with intent to go to the place upon which they had agreed. Instead of that, once they were on their way, they joyfully shook off the horsemen and escaped to the town of Plataea. In the course of their flight they came to the temple of Hera which is outside of that town, twenty furlongs distant from the Gargaphian spring and piled their arms in front of the temple. 53.
So they encamped around the temple of Hera. Pausanias, however, seeing their departure from the camp, gave orders to the Lacedaemonians to take up their arms likewise and follow the others who had gone ahead, supposing that these were making for the place where they had agreed to go. [2] Thereupon, all the rest of the captains being ready to obey Pausanias, Amompharetus son of Poliades, the leader of the Pitanate23 battalion, refused to flee from the barbarians or (save by compulsion) bring shame on Sparta; the whole business seemed strange to him, for he had not been present in the council recently held. [3] Pausanias and Euryanax were outraged that Amompharetus disobeyed them. Still more, however, they disliked that his refusing would compel them to abandon the Pitanate battalion, for they feared that if they fulfilled their agreement with the rest of the Greeks and abandoned him, Amompharetus and his men would be left behind to perish. [4] Bearing this in mind, they kept the Laconian army where it was and tried to persuade Amompharetus that he was in the wrong. 54.
So they reasoned with Amompharetus, he being the only man left behind of all the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans. As for the Athenians, they stood unmoved at their post, well aware that the purposes and the promises of Lacedaemonians were not alike. [2] But when the army left its station, they sent a horseman of their own to see whether the Spartans were attempting to march or whether they were not intending to depart, and to ask Pausanias what the Athenians should do. 55.
When the messenger arrived among the Lacedaemonians, he saw them arrayed where they had been, and their chief men by now in hot dispute. For though Euryanax and Pausanias reasoned with Amompharetus, that the Lacedaemonians should not be endangered by remaining there alone, they could in no way prevail upon him. At last, when the Athenian messenger came among them, angry words began to pass. [2] In this wrangling Amompharetus took up a stone with both hands and threw it down before Pausanias' feet, crying that it was the pebble with which he voted against fleeing from the strangers (meaning thereby the barbarians). Pausanias called him a madman; then when the Athenian messenger asked the question with which he had been charged, Pausanias asked the man to tell the Athenians of his present condition, and begged them to join themselves to the Lacedaemonians and, as for departure, to do as they did. 56.
The messenger then went back to the Athenians. When dawn found the dispute still continuing, Pausanias, who had up to this point kept his army where it was, now gave the word and led all the rest away between the hillocks, the Tegeans following, for he supposed that Amompharetus would not stay behind when the rest of the Lacedaemonians left him; this was in fact exactly what happened. [2] The Athenians marshalled themselves and marched, but not by the same way as the Lacedaemonians, who stayed close to the broken ground and the lower slopes of Cithaeron in order to stay clear of the Persian horse. The Athenians marched down into the plain instead. 57.
Now Amompharetus at first supposed that Pausanias would never have the heart to leave him and his men, and he insisted that they should remain where they were and not leave their post. When Pausanias' men had already proceeded some distance, he thought that they had really left him. He accordingly bade his battalion take up its arms and led it in marching step after the rest of the column, [2] which after going a distance of ten furlongs, was waiting for Amompharetus by the stream Molois and the place called Argiopium, where there is a shrine of Eleusinian Demeter. The reason for their waiting was that, if Amompharetus and his battalion should not leave the place where it was posted but remain there, they would then be able to assist him. [3] No sooner had Amompharetus' men come up than the barbarians' cavalry attacked the army, for the horsemen acted as they always had. When they saw no enemy on the ground where the Greeks had been on the days before this, they kept riding forward and attacked the Greeks as soon as they overtook them. 58.
When Mardonius learned that the Greeks had departed under cover of night and saw the ground deserted, he called to him Thorax of Larissa and his brothers Eurypylus and Thrasydeius and said: [2] "What will you say now, sons of Aleuas, when you see this place deserted? For you, who are their neighbors, kept telling me that Lacedaemonians fled from no battlefield and were the masters of warfare. These same men, however, you just saw changing their post, and now you and all of us see that they have fled during the night. The moment they had to measure themselves in battle with those that are in very truth the bravest on earth, they plainly showed that they are men of no account, and all other Greeks likewise. [3] Now you, for your part, were strangers to the Persians, and I could readily pardon you for praising these fellows, who were in some sort known to you; but I marvelled much more that Artabazus, be he ever so frightened, should give us a coward's advice to strike our camp, and march away to be besieged in Thebes. Of this advice the king will certainly hear from me, but it will be discussed elsewhere. [4] Now we must not permit our enemies to do as they want; they must be pursued till they are overtaken and pay the penalty for all the harm they have done the Persians." 59.
-----------------------------------------
So there you have it. What in that provides evidence for armies of hundreds of thousands advancing over a very broad front?
If there is any evidence it is of the troops falling back in Column (red)
So a poorly organised army tries to fall back and ends up in chaos. It would have gone better if they'd all followed off in one column :D
On the subject of tidy formations or not tidy formations when in a wide column, Asklepiodotus maintains that the open order of 2 yards frontage per file is a natural formation and doesn't have a name. I would like to suggest that when a crowd of people walk cross-country on a broad frontage they instinctively keep about 2 yards between themselves and those around them, in the same way a flock of birds keeps a certain distance between themselves to avoid midair collisions. So the Persians, preserving neither ranks nor files, and sometimes even mixing up their national groupings, advance along a wide avenue with a spacing that permits getting around any obstacles in their way like rocks without slowing their pace.
Of course this needs to be proved. Any examples of crowds on the march in the open?
QuoteIf there is any evidence it is of the troops falling back in Column (red)
Alas not; translator's artefact.
IX.57.1: "As for Amompharetus, at first he did not really believe that Pausanias would really dare to leave him behind; he therefore remained form in his resolve to keep his men at their post; when however Pausanias and his troops were now some way off, Amompharetus, thinking himself forsaken in good earnest, ordered his band take their arms
and led them at a walk towards the main army."
But one does need to read further.
In IX.59, the Achaemenid army takes up the pursuit, with the Persian cavalry and infantry leading, "at their best speed and in great disorder and disarray," a description which indicates that nobody in their own army could possibly have overtaken them. Mardonius crosses the Asopus in pursuit, but "He could not see the Athenians; for, as they had taken the way of the plain, they were hidden from his sight by the hills; he therefore led his troops on against the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans." - IX.59.2
Observe that while the Spartans were moving through the hills, the Athenians 'had taken the way of the plain'. These contingents were travelling in parallel, i.e. on a broad front, not in series (as would be the case with a march column). This is confirmed by what happened next.
In IX.60, Pausanias "at the time when the cavalry first fell upon him" sends a horseman to the Athenians asking for their help. In IX.61, the Athenians are anxious to go and help them, but
"... as they were upon the march, the Greeks on the King's side, whose place in the line had been opposite theirs, fell upon them and so harassed them by their attack that it was not possible for them to give the succour they desired."
Since Pausanias sent his horsemen with the appeal for aid "at the time when the cavalry first fell upon him," (IX.60) the Medising Greeks would not have had time or opportunity to march around the Persian/Spartan imbroglio before the Athenians could arrive. Their direct interception of the Athenians is ascribed by Herodotus to their 'place in the line' having been opposite that of the Athenians, which indicates that not only did the armies encamp in line of battle, the Greek army also retired
en masse with its contingents parallel, in more or less the same relative positions they had been when in line of battle. This was an army travelling from point A to point B without expectation of battle, and it seems fair to conclude that this was how a Greek army customarily moved, with the one caveat that size presumably matters: a Spartan contingent alone would probably not feel any compulsion to spread itself across both hills and plain but would use the one or the other.
One may also note that when attacked by the Persian cavalry, the Spartans and Tegeans are almost immediately in a defensive formation, not cut up by cavalry attacks on a long marching column. This in itself would indicate they were moving in a broad front, shallow depth configuration, allowing them to assemble rapidly into combat formation.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 06:45:41 AM
On the subject of tidy formations or not tidy formations when in a wide column, Asklepiodotus maintains that the open order of 2 yards frontage per file is a natural formation and doesn't have a name. I would like to suggest that when a crowd of people walk cross-country on a broad frontage they instinctively keep about 2 yards between themselves and those around them, in the same way a flock of birds keeps a certain distance between themselves to avoid midair collisions. So the Persians, preserving neither ranks nor files, and sometimes even mixing up their national groupings, advance along a wide avenue with a spacing that permits getting around any obstacles in their way like rocks without slowing their pace.
Of course this needs to be proved. Any examples of crowds on the march in the open?
I've been fell walking (and walking generally) for many years. People do keep between three and six feet apart, and they tend to spread out into a two or three people wide irregular column as they follow the leader down the easiest line of advance. If it's a path, they'll stick to the path and walk at the width of the path, because if you try and walk next to the person on the path, the person on the path naturally walks much faster than the person on the ground next to the path.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:48:16 AM
QuoteIf there is any evidence it is of the troops falling back in Column (red)
Alas not; translator's artefact.
IX.57.1: "As for Amompharetus, at first he did not really believe that Pausanias would really dare to leave him behind; he therefore remained form in his resolve to keep his men at their post; when however Pausanias and his troops were now some way off, Amompharetus, thinking himself forsaken in good earnest, ordered his band take their arms and led them at a walk towards the main army."
But one does need to read further.
In IX.59, the Achaemenid army takes up the pursuit, with the Persian cavalry and infantry leading, "at their best speed and in great disorder and disarray," a description which indicates that nobody in their own army could possibly have overtaken them. Mardonius crosses the Asopus in pursuit, but "He could not see the Athenians; for, as they had taken the way of the plain, they were hidden from his sight by the hills; he therefore led his troops on against the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans." - IX.59.2
Observe that while the Spartans were moving through the hills, the Athenians 'had taken the way of the plain'. These contingents were travelling in parallel, i.e. on a broad front, not in series (as would be the case with a march column). This is confirmed by what happened next.
Nowhere does this even hint that this was done by troops shambling like locusts on a broad front. It could have been done by contingents forming up into columns two or three wide (or given the size of some of the contingents, one man and his servant wide, and pulling back)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:48:16 AM
One may also note that when attacked by the Persian cavalry, the Spartans and Tegeans are almost immediately in a defensive formation, not cut up by cavalry attacks on a long marching column. This in itself would indicate they were moving in a broad front, shallow depth configuration, allowing them to assemble rapidly into combat formation.
No it doesn't. Any army marching and being harassed by cavalry stays in a tight column, probably on a frontage of ten to eight wide, because then you're in line of battle if you turn 90 degrees.
But the whole example is a waste of time from your point of view
1) Now where does it show troops moving locust like across the rough terrain
2) The distances involved were small. If there are something like seven or eight Furlongs to the Km, then nobody probably moved more than 5km and it was nearer 3
3) These movements were made in the face of the enemy so would be made by units marching in a manner that would enable them to form line of battle at an instance. The speed with which they got into battle formation showed this. None this is evidence for units marching all Higgledy-piggledy over a broad front.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 22, 2018, 07:32:53 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 22, 2018, 04:59:58 PM
I was wondering whether this series (http://romanarmy.info/march1/march_intro.html) on Roman armies on the march might help at all.
From what I can see, it looks very good for Roman armies, misleading for Greek and Macedonian armies and not really representative of Biblical armies at all.
<snip>
Frankly, if there were the slightest relationship between Roman and Achaemenid practice, it would be a gift for archaeology and the study of history because one could extrapolate so many things.
Rather than dismiss it out of hand, we could actually consider this quite carefully constructed discussion of how a well-disciplined army marched and look at what some of the various experts thought were the parameters of food supply, march pace, transport capability.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 07:06:19 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 06:45:41 AM
On the subject of tidy formations or not tidy formations when in a wide column, Asklepiodotus maintains that the open order of 2 yards frontage per file is a natural formation and doesn't have a name. I would like to suggest that when a crowd of people walk cross-country on a broad frontage they instinctively keep about 2 yards between themselves and those around them, in the same way a flock of birds keeps a certain distance between themselves to avoid midair collisions. So the Persians, preserving neither ranks nor files, and sometimes even mixing up their national groupings, advance along a wide avenue with a spacing that permits getting around any obstacles in their way like rocks without slowing their pace.
Of course this needs to be proved. Any examples of crowds on the march in the open?
I've been fell walking (and walking generally) for many years. People do keep between three and six feet apart, and they tend to spread out into a two or three people wide irregular column as they follow the leader down the easiest line of advance. If it's a path, they'll stick to the path and walk at the width of the path, because if you try and walk next to the person on the path, the person on the path naturally walks much faster than the person on the ground next to the path.
So the implication is that should a lot of people advance on a front several hundred yards wide on ground that doesn't have paths but has been sufficiently cleared to be passable, they would actually form a lot of irregular narrow columns that advance in parallel.
QuoteIt might be worth looking at how Zulus moved, for example.
Ah, so archaeologists have found a connection between them and Achaemenid practice? :)
Actually, its not to bad an idea. Here we have a disciplined army not bound by the conventions of the European parade ground. I haven't really got time to research this at the moment but we know that Zulu armies moved by regiments, each with its supply chain of boys and probably with its own cattle herd. I'm not aware of the density used or whether they used routes - they may have wandering directly across country as Patrick implies, I just don't know. One thing we should be aware of is scale. Zulu armies were in the tens of thousands not the millions. They also had no cavalry or baggage animals ( just a few ponies for officers and scouts).
Quote from: Erpingham on April 23, 2018, 09:33:03 AM
QuoteIt might be worth looking at how Zulus moved, for example.
Zulu armies were in the tens of thousands not the millions.
One of the many facts that IMHO opinions kills off the multi-million man argument is just how does one go about commanding such a host? As others have intimated on this thread Patrick and Justin's Persians move more like a swarm of insects than a human army.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 09:14:30 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 07:06:19 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 06:45:41 AM
On the subject of tidy formations or not tidy formations when in a wide column, Asklepiodotus maintains that the open order of 2 yards frontage per file is a natural formation and doesn't have a name. I would like to suggest that when a crowd of people walk cross-country on a broad frontage they instinctively keep about 2 yards between themselves and those around them, in the same way a flock of birds keeps a certain distance between themselves to avoid midair collisions. So the Persians, preserving neither ranks nor files, and sometimes even mixing up their national groupings, advance along a wide avenue with a spacing that permits getting around any obstacles in their way like rocks without slowing their pace.
Of course this needs to be proved. Any examples of crowds on the march in the open?
I've been fell walking (and walking generally) for many years. People do keep between three and six feet apart, and they tend to spread out into a two or three people wide irregular column as they follow the leader down the easiest line of advance. If it's a path, they'll stick to the path and walk at the width of the path, because if you try and walk next to the person on the path, the person on the path naturally walks much faster than the person on the ground next to the path.
So the implication is that should a lot of people advance on a front several hundred yards wide on ground that doesn't have paths but has been sufficiently cleared to be passable, they would actually form a lot of irregular narrow columns that advance in parallel.
Now two different things are being conflated.
If the ground has been sufficiently cleared (which would involve cutting down brush, levelling it a bit so people don't twist ankles in holes they cannot see etc but not producing a graded road surface) then troops could advance in columns in parallel, or even if the fancy took them, advance in battle formation. After all we know the Persians did prepare battlefields for chariots. But it'll involve a lot of man hours but not as much as genuine road making. Troops probably wouldn't be able to travel as quickly as on a road
However this is an entirely different thing from telling troops to just advance across a broad front to avoid choke points. Where the ground hasn't been cleared men would probably march in single file following whatever paths there are. These paths might be separated by a hundred yards or even wander apparently at random. It is a far slower way of moving men than just having decent march discipline and moving them through the choke points
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 09:54:28 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 09:14:30 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 07:06:19 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 06:45:41 AM
On the subject of tidy formations or not tidy formations when in a wide column, Asklepiodotus maintains that the open order of 2 yards frontage per file is a natural formation and doesn't have a name. I would like to suggest that when a crowd of people walk cross-country on a broad frontage they instinctively keep about 2 yards between themselves and those around them, in the same way a flock of birds keeps a certain distance between themselves to avoid midair collisions. So the Persians, preserving neither ranks nor files, and sometimes even mixing up their national groupings, advance along a wide avenue with a spacing that permits getting around any obstacles in their way like rocks without slowing their pace.
Of course this needs to be proved. Any examples of crowds on the march in the open?
I've been fell walking (and walking generally) for many years. People do keep between three and six feet apart, and they tend to spread out into a two or three people wide irregular column as they follow the leader down the easiest line of advance. If it's a path, they'll stick to the path and walk at the width of the path, because if you try and walk next to the person on the path, the person on the path naturally walks much faster than the person on the ground next to the path.
So the implication is that should a lot of people advance on a front several hundred yards wide on ground that doesn't have paths but has been sufficiently cleared to be passable, they would actually form a lot of irregular narrow columns that advance in parallel.
Now two different things are being conflated.
If the ground has been sufficiently cleared (which would involve cutting down brush, levelling it a bit so people don't twist ankles in holes they cannot see etc but not producing a graded road surface) then troops could advance in columns in parallel, or even if the fancy took them, advance in battle formation. After all we know the Persians did prepare battlefields for chariots. But it'll involve a lot of man hours but not as much as genuine road making. Troops probably wouldn't be able to travel as quickly as on a road
However this is an entirely different thing from telling troops to just advance across a broad front to avoid choke points. Where the ground hasn't been cleared men would probably march in single file following whatever paths there are. These paths might be separated by a hundred yards or even wander apparently at random. It is a far slower way of moving men than just having decent march discipline and moving them through the choke points
Fine. The idea is that the the ground is sufficiently cleared on either side of the choke points, i.e. that the column has about 600m of cleared and passable ground at all times. Which is partly what makes Thermopylae a genuine choke point since the ground around the mountain is not cleared of forest, even if it can theoretically be scaled.
(https://static.independent.co.uk/s3fs-public/styles/article_small/public/thumbnails/image/2014/04/06/18/p19-ww1.jpg)
Time for a visual stimulus, I think. To me, the most evocative of August 1914 pictures. A German battalion advancing through knee-deep flowers and clouds of dust. As we look back, we can probably see a front of about 300m, though the ground is probably less uneven. Despite being a regular army, moving across country they are not in tight rows and files but more a clumpy mass. Note too the big gaps between companies - I think it is Delbruck who tells us that keeping units discrete with gaps between was standard German doctrine on the march as it helped keep a steady pace (avoiding stop/start).
As I say, an aid to imagining, not to be taken as literal evidence of Persian practice.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 10:46:51 AM
Fine. The idea is that the the ground is sufficiently cleared on either side of the choke points, i.e. that the column has about 600m of cleared and passable ground at all times. Which is partly what makes Thermopylae a genuine choke point since the ground around the mountain is not cleared of forest, even if it can theoretically be scaled.
No it's not fine. Admittedly 600m is an improvement on the figures that have been bandied about like 3000m or even more but not it's not fine.
The only reason that we've having these bizarre discussions is that if you have to move six million people by foot through the area it becomes impossible unless you assume they adopt bizarre expedients like clearing roads hundreds of meters wide.
Actually most of the difficulties disappear if you assume the Persian army plus baggage that had to march down the road was under 500,000 men. There might have been another 100,000 in the area who had been there for a couple of years, digging canals, guarding stockpiles and suchlike. But the whole fatuous debate stems from the impossibility of accepting the figures Herodotus gave as the actual army marching, as opposed perhaps the theoretical manpower of the army.
It's a bit like taking the figures Polybius gives for the total Roman manpower about 225BC and assuming it was all deployed against the Gauls
(https://c7.alamy.com/comp/E84PAK/zulu-war-1879-col-henry-woods-column-passing-through-general-edward-E84PAK.jpg)
This one was triggered looking through images of the Zulu war prompted by Patrick. Most images of the British columns are of long thin ones but here we have a rather straggling column, made up of roughly parallel sub-columns as envisaged by Justin. Within the wide column we see companies marching in close order, squadrons of cavalry and lines of wagons. Width of the advance perhaps 100m ? In many ways, it reminds me of the typical pictures of medieval armies on the advance - the parallel wagon columns, the clumps of infantry and cavalry. One of the mistakes Delbruck made in visualising the persian army on the march is he could only envisage a German Corps moving along a road in narrow column. A wider, sprawling, approach like this, would have seen shorter columns. But note that while some units are in quite tight order, the overall density of the column is not that great, with intervals between sub-columns and also between units.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 11:42:33 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 10:46:51 AM
Fine. The idea is that the the ground is sufficiently cleared on either side of the choke points, i.e. that the column has about 600m of cleared and passable ground at all times. Which is partly what makes Thermopylae a genuine choke point since the ground around the mountain is not cleared of forest, even if it can theoretically be scaled.
No it's not fine. Admittedly 600m is an improvement on the figures that have been bandied about like 3000m or even more but not it's not fine.
The only reason that we've having these bizarre discussions is that if you have to move six million people by foot through the area it becomes impossible unless you assume they adopt bizarre expedients like clearing roads hundreds of meters wide.
Actually most of the difficulties disappear if you assume the Persian army plus baggage that had to march down the road was under 500,000 men. There might have been another 100,000 in the area who had been there for a couple of years, digging canals, guarding stockpiles and suchlike. But the whole fatuous debate stems from the impossibility of accepting the figures Herodotus gave as the actual army marching, as opposed perhaps the theoretical manpower of the army.
It's a bit like taking the figures Polybius gives for the total Roman manpower about 225BC and assuming it was all deployed against the Gauls
OK, let's assume an army of 480 000 men. About the best they could hope for in terms of roads is a track wide enough for a cart, allowing, say, a column 4 men abreast.
That means a column 120 000 men long.
Allow two yards depth per rank and you have a column 240 000 yards or 136,36 miles long.
A Consular army of 22 000 infantry is estimated to have formed a column 6 men wide and about 15 miles long including baggage (a little more than 3 miles for the infantry if the ranks stay fairly close together) and be able to complete a march of about 10 miles from camp to camp in about 9 hours. How does it work for an army 20 times that number?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 23, 2018, 11:58:50 AM
(https://c7.alamy.com/comp/E84PAK/zulu-war-1879-col-henry-woods-column-passing-through-general-edward-E84PAK.jpg)
This one was triggered looking through images of the Zulu war prompted by Patrick. Most images of the British columns are of long thin ones but here we have a rather straggling column, made up of roughly parallel sub-columns as envisaged by Justin. Within the wide column we see companies marching in close order, squadrons of cavalry and lines of wagons. Width of the advance perhaps 100m ? In many ways, it reminds me of the typical pictures of medieval armies on the advance - the parallel wagon columns, the clumps of infantry and cavalry. One of the mistakes Delbruck made in visualising the persian army on the march is he could only envisage a German Corps moving along a road in narrow column. A wider, sprawling, approach like this, would have seen shorter columns. But note that while some units are in quite tight order, the overall density of the column is not that great, with intervals between sub-columns and also between units.
Interesting. The infantry are still thinking of roads with their tight columns but the cavalry and wagons don't seem to give a hoot. Notice how uneven the terrain is and even the wagons aren't bothered by it. That slope in the background looks like a 1 in 7 gradient or so.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 12:20:29 PM
OK, let's assume an army of 480 000 men. About the best they could hope for in terms of roads is a track wide enough for a cart, allowing, say, a column 4 men abreast.
stop right there
Firstly Patrick will tell you there is only one Road and that's the Persian Royal road and that doesn't enter Greece
Secondly, Ancient roads or tracks tended to have variable widths. In South African terms roads used to widen immensely when they came to a river. The ford or drift would be far wider than the road to ensure that wagons were not churning up the river bed through very heavy usage.
Thirdly we have Persian engineers apparently working in the area, they dug a canal, they could have tidied the roads up a bit as well. You cannot assume just a column four men wide. The "road"could have been wide enough to pass two parallel columns four men wide down.
Fourthly
On the level bits, moving in parallel you might have had cavalry units out covering the flanks, or light troops out screening the flanks. After all it was a Persian army, it almost certain marched with some semblance of military order
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 12:35:35 PM
Interesting. The infantry are still thinking of roads with their tight columns but the cavalry and wagons don't seem to give a hoot. Notice how uneven the terrain is and even the wagons aren't bothered by it. That slope in the background looks like a 1 in 7 gradient or so.
Infantry keep formation because they might be called upon to fight. They're soldiers.
As for the wagons note how they're largely following the infantry and are actively avoiding the uneven terrain between the camp and the infantry
Also whatever the slope is, troops have largely avoided it
(https://c8.alamy.com/comp/K088EA/anglo-zulu-war-1879-coloured-engraving-from-the-illustrated-london-K088EA.jpg)
(https://www.britishbattles.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/7-Isandlwana.jpg)
Plenty of Zulu War images out there but, while they are keeping us thinking, here are two different images of columns at choke points. Note in the first the column compresses, in the second it attenuates. I suspect the first one they are coming out of a drift. Note how bad the going is on a dirt track when everything has to use a narrow front, which may explain the spreading out in other pictures.
QuoteOK, let's assume an army of 480 000 men. About the best they could hope for in terms of roads is a track wide enough for a cart, allowing, say, a column 4 men abreast.
That means a column 120 000 men long.
Allow two yards depth per rank and you have a column 240 000 yards or 136,36 miles long.
Justin is channeling Delbruck here (didn't expect to say that :) ). He reckoned that, using the German army staff estimates, that a 33,000 man corps took up 14 miles of road. So he reckoned Herodotus' army would be 2,000 miles long. Of course, he was ridiculing the literalists of his time.
From the figures Justin has been using - a daily march of about 20km - we can calculate we need 24,000 men per kilometre. Each man needs four square metres of march space, by Justin's formula. So a march column of 96,000 sq m per kilometre or 96 m wide. Obviously, its more complex than that because of the animals and baggage. Given I think the army would be looser than this, because of the gaps between sub columns and between units, we'd need a cleared route of about 150 m width. If we concluded 100 metres of cleared route was realistic, we could have an army of 320,000.
If we use the Roman army density Justin quotes, I suspect a 150m cleared road would give us around a 250,000 army but I haven't calculated it out.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 23, 2018, 02:10:24 PM
From the figures Justin has been using - a daily march of about 20km - we can calculate we need 24,000 men per kilometre. Each man needs four square metres of march space, by Justin's formula. So a march column of 96,000 sq m per kilometre or 96 m wide. Obviously, its more complex than that because of the animals and baggage. Given I think the army would be looser than this, because of the gaps between sub columns and between units, we'd need a cleared route of about 150 m width. If we concluded 100 metres of cleared route was realistic, we could have an army of 320,000.
If we use the Roman army density Justin quotes, I suspect a 150m cleared road would give us around a 250,000 army but I haven't calculated it out.
So if the Persians can clear 150 metres of pathway, what's stopping them clearing 600 metres? They had 4 years to do it.
Napoleon's
Grande Armée was divided into corps of 20 000 to 30 000 troops, which is the practical size for marching on a single road, with each corps taking a separate route to the battlefield. The road system in Europe at the end of the 18th century was far more developed than that in Thrace and Macedonia (and in the rest of the Persian Empire for that matter).
For a Persian army of 480 000 men, or just 200 000 men, to march to Greece, it would either have to do it in a string of separate corps
a la Napoleon all following each other on the same road, or take separate routes along pathways broad enough for a column at least 4 men wide. Any evidence for either option?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 03:12:17 PM
For a Persian army of 480 000 men, or just 200 000 men, to march to Greece, it would either have to do it in a string of separate corps a la Napoleon all following each other on the same road, or take separate routes along pathways broad enough for a column at least 4 men wide. Any evidence for either option?
For the second, yes: H (7.121) says the army was split into three commands while moving through Thrace.
QuoteThe order of the army's march, from Doriscus to Acanthus, had been such as I will show. Dividing his entire land army into three parts, Xerxes appointed one of them to march beside his fleet along the coast. [3] Mardonius and Masistes were the generals of this segment, while another third of the army marched, as appointed, further inland under Tritantaechmes and Gergis. The third part, with which Xerxes himself went, marched between the two, and its generals were Smerdomenes and Megabyzus.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Hdt.%207.121&lang=original
Quote from: Prufrock on April 23, 2018, 03:22:48 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 03:12:17 PM
For a Persian army of 480 000 men, or just 200 000 men, to march to Greece, it would either have to do it in a string of separate corps a la Napoleon all following each other on the same road, or take separate routes along pathways broad enough for a column at least 4 men wide. Any evidence for either option?
For the second, yes: H (7.121) says the army was split into three commands while moving through Thrace.
QuoteThe order of the army's march, from Doriscus to Acanthus, had been such as I will show. Dividing his entire land army into three parts, Xerxes appointed one of them to march beside his fleet along the coast. [3] Mardonius and Masistes were the generals of this segment, while another third of the army marched, as appointed, further inland under Tritantaechmes and Gergis. The third part, with which Xerxes himself went, marched between the two, and its generals were Smerdomenes and Megabyzus.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Hdt.%207.121&lang=original
If 30 000 men is the practical size for a force marching along a single road from one campsite to another in a single day, then 3 groups aren't enough for Xerxes' army. He'll need at least 7 or so (as did Napoleon) for an army 200 000 strong, and 16 for an army 480 000 strong. He'll also need to keep them separated for the entire route.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 03:25:53 PM
If 30 000 men is the practical size for a force marching along a single road from one campsite to another in a single day, then 3 groups aren't enough for Xerxes' army. He'll need at least 7 or so (as did Napoleon) for an army 200 000 strong, and 16 for an army 480 000 strong. He'll also need to keep them separated for the entire route.
Our old friend Maurice has each column about 60,000-80,000 strong, from memory.
Napoleons columns always took a road.
Always.
Infantry to the ditch alongside, guns and horses on the road itself, with half width so that messengers could return along it, and a crash was not going to block the entire army.
There is no comparison to the magical manoeuvres you are proposing here.
It really is astounding that you two are still seeking to prove this.
Has anyone actually changed their opinion yet?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 03:12:17 PM
So if the Persians can clear 150 metres of pathway, what's stopping them clearing 600 metres? They had 4 years to do it.
An interesting question. What does Herodotus actually say on the road building programme? Where we have examples of armies building routes of advance, do they tend to clear huge areas or keep it fairly narrow and road like? I've seen quoted distances for the overall distance between the boundary ditches of a Roman road in Britain of up to 100 m. Edward I had a law that roads had to have a clear space 200 ft (60m) either side.
Incidentally, do we know work started on the road building programme immediately. As I have often said to colleagues who'd say "It's Ok, we have a year to do it" - "Only if we start today". Do we know they started immediately?
Quote
For a Persian army of 480 000 men, or just 200 000 men, to march to Greece, it would either have to do it in a string of separate corps a la Napoleon all following each other on the same road, or take separate routes along pathways broad enough for a column at least 4 men wide. Any evidence for either option?
I thought we had no roads at all (according to Patrick)? The answers have to be somewhere in the geography - could the army advance along several parallel routes? So far, we've assumed no. Also, there has been an emphasis on the whole army moving between camps a day apart every day. The idea that the same routes and camps were used over multiple days was rejected. If the army is spread over several days in a long column it brings new march rate issues (will the disturbed and manured ground slow the march of the rear elements) logistical issues (fodder will be depleted at the camp site, stockpiles may no longer be adequate for the rear units) and certainly some hygiene issues of reuse of fouled ground.
Quote from: Mark G on April 23, 2018, 03:45:58 PM
Has anyone actually changed their opinion yet?
I didn't realise this was the idea :) I've just been providing Justin with info to make more realistic calculations.
On further reflection : I think I did change my view a bit in the second major on this a few years ago. I became more open to the idea that we could be talking an army of 250,000 or a bit more, including support troops. I wouldn't reject 500,000 as impossible, just feel it is very unlikely. I must admit, I find ancient (and especially medieval - no surprise) logistics interesting so I don't mind learning more.
The only Iranian source I have been able to find http://www.iranchamber.com/history/achaemenids/achaemenid_army.php (http://www.iranchamber.com/history/achaemenids/achaemenid_army.php)talks about the slow pace of marches due to 'the heavy baggage-train which often comprised litters for conveying the wives and concubines of the commanders' which would tend to indicate that strategic off road travel for Persian forces wasnt a realisitc option.
In the continuing spirit of opening up thinking on what a "road" might have meant, I found this by Historic England
Most new roads dating from the post-Roman period to the
18th century were merely heavily used trackways. They share
the characteristics of trackways and, apart from a few town
streets, bridge approaches and causeways, they were not
metalled. They follow the natural contours of the land and
avoid existing boundaries. When a road was obstructed or
impassable, travellers had the right (enshrined in the Statute
of Winchester of 1285) to diverge from its course, causing
multiple hollow-ways running alongside each other to be
created. Prior to enclosure, roads were often not restricted by
walls or hedges and so they tended to be wide, consisting of
large numbers of roughly parallel hollow-ways spreading out
across broad swathes of the countryside.
Greece may, of course , have been different but the idea of a trampled route rather than a narrow paved street in the Roman manner might help.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 23, 2018, 03:48:40 PM
I thought we had no roads at all (according to Patrick)?
Of course there were roads in Greece - albeit not nice metalled straight maintained roads like Roman ones (outside of cities). Probably more like the unsurfaced roads still to be found in rural areas today. Sometimes they followed river beds, which is fine in summer, or if you've already drunk the river dry ::)
Edited to comment on:
Quote
Prior to enclosure, roads were often not restricted by walls or hedges and so they tended to be wide, consisting of large numbers of roughly parallel hollow-ways spreading out across broad swathes of the countryside.
A good model for this type of thing for those of us in southern England is the Ridgeway.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 03:12:17 PM
So if the Persians can clear 150 metres of pathway, what's stopping them clearing 600 metres? They had 4 years to do it.
[/quote]
The basic maths is that it would take four times as long. But actually it would take far longer because the area nearer the central line of the road/track would be easier to work on.
As an interesting side issue, because nobody was actually using this notional 600 meter frontage in the three years or four years before the army came through, unless you went to the trouble of physically uprooting stuff and burning it, you'd probably find that you'd have scrub and brush growing again so it would still need redoing.
Quote from: RichT on April 23, 2018, 04:27:13 PM
Quote
Prior to enclosure, roads were often not restricted by walls or hedges and so they tended to be wide, consisting of large numbers of roughly parallel hollow-ways spreading out across broad swathes of the countryside.
A good model for this type of thing for those of us in southern England is the Ridgeway.
Example from Twyford Down
(https://heritagecalling.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/twyford-down-trackways-hampshire-crawford-collection.jpg?w=640&h=487)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 23, 2018, 03:48:40 PM
QuoteFor a Persian army of 480 000 men, or just 200 000 men, to march to Greece, it would either have to do it in a string of separate corps a la Napoleon all following each other on the same road, or take separate routes along pathways broad enough for a column at least 4 men wide. Any evidence for either option?
I thought we had no roads at all (according to Patrick)? The answers have to be somewhere in the geography - could the army advance along several parallel routes? So far, we've assumed no. Also, there has been an emphasis on the whole army moving between camps a day apart every day. The idea that the same routes and camps were used over multiple days was rejected. If the army is spread over several days in a long column it brings new march rate issues (will the disturbed and manured ground slow the march of the rear elements) logistical issues (fodder will be depleted at the camp site, stockpiles may no longer be adequate for the rear units) and certainly some hygiene issues of reuse of fouled ground.
This occurred to me as well. Right now I've put aside the 3,4 million man army and am looking at the problem of moving 480 000 or just 200 000 men in undeveloped Thrace and Macedonia with the presumption there is no clearing of broad avenues, the Persians are not cross-country types anyway, and the army moves exclusively along the track(s) it finds there. Just how feasible is that?
Incidentally, I find it an interesting coincidence that the size of a Roman field army throughout the history of the Republic and Empire seems to hover around the 20 000 to 30 000 mark, regardless of the size of its component legions, and that this matches the size a French corps - all these units expected to march from camp to camp along a single road/track. Hannibal seems to have pushed the limits on his Italian campaign with 38 000 infantry and 8000 cavalry (which all marched along a single mountain track through the Alps).
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 04:35:12 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 03:12:17 PM
So if the Persians can clear 150 metres of pathway, what's stopping them clearing 600 metres? They had 4 years to do it.
The basic maths is that it would take four times as long. But actually it would take far longer because the area nearer the central line of the road/track would be easier to work on.
As an interesting side issue, because nobody was actually using this notional 600 meter frontage in the three years or four years before the army came through, unless you went to the trouble of physically uprooting stuff and burning it, you'd probably find that you'd have scrub and brush growing again so it would still need redoing.
That occurred to me. Spend 3 years clearing away the big stuff like trees then the last year removing the smaller stuff that grows in a few months like shrubbery.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 05:07:22 PM
This occurred to me as well. Right now I've put aside the 3,4 million man army and am looking at the problem of moving 480 000 or just 200 000 men in undeveloped Thrace and Macedonia with the presumption there is no clearing of broad avenues, the Persians are not cross-country types anyway, and the army moves exclusively along the track(s) it finds there. Just how feasible is that?
Incidentally, I find it an interesting coincidence that the size of a Roman field army throughout the history of the Republic and Empire seems to hover around the 20 000 to 30 000 mark, regardless of the size of its component legions, and that this matches the size a French corps - all these units expected to march from camp to camp along a single road/track.
A lot will depend on camp discipline. The better is is, the less problem you have with units marching from camp to camp. If you had a number of camps, and perhaps even a thousand men per camp, permanently stationed as military police, they could probably ensure the camps weren't too bad, troops used latrines etc.
But there again, if Persian marching camps were as informal as Greek marching camps, it might be that you had everybody marching the same distance, but camping two miles apart.(so on the first day the first corps marched 16 miles, the second 14 miles, the third 12 miles etc On the second day everybody marched 16 miles.) This way with your corps of 20,000, yes you'll march through old camp sites, (although they could be kept off the road) but each corps will have a fresh site, with untouched fodder for the servants to collect.
You could probably have seven corps and run this system, and nobody has to march too far.
If you've done some road tidying, perhaps cleared 'trails' inland (no point in clearing a full 3000 yards, just clear 150 yards, twice, you could perhaps double the number of corps. But then for collecting fodder the southern road would have to collect 'south' and the northern road 'north'
That would give you 14 corps of 20,000 men or pretty close to 300,000.
The advantage of this number following two parallel trails is that you're marching on a relatively narrow front (when dealing with choke points. You're foraging more widely but servants can forage on slopes when the army is camped and don't slow the army down
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 23, 2018, 05:19:29 PM
That occurred to me. Spend 3 years clearing away the big stuff like trees then the last year removing the smaller stuff that grows in a few months like shrubbery.
I don't think you'd need to do it. Just clear 40 yards. Then 100 yards north clear another 40 yards. Then you've got two 'roads' and you can put your troops down like i mentioned above
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 07:11:53 AM
Quote
Observe that while the Spartans were moving through the hills, the Athenians 'had taken the way of the plain'. These contingents were travelling in parallel, i.e. on a broad front, not in series (as would be the case with a march column). This is confirmed by what happened next.
Nowhere does this even hint that this was done by troops shambling like locusts on a broad front. It could have been done by contingents forming up into columns two or three wide (or given the size of some of the contingents, one man and his servant wide, and pulling back)
Actually it does. If the Athenians had been in a long narrow column, they would either have been chewed up piecemeal by the Medising Greeks (who, like their Persian friends, were not fussy about advancing in a disorderly swarm) or they could have attempted to assemble a rearguard while the bulk of the column departed to aid the Spartans. Neither of these things happened. The Athenians were able to form up quickly enough to fend off their attackers, which precludes their having been in a long, thin column of march, and were unable to send the Spartans any assistance, which means their foes were able to assemble quite quickly, too.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 07:26:57 AM
Any army marching and being harassed by cavalry stays in a tight column, probably on a frontage of ten to eight wide, because then you're in line of battle if you turn 90 degrees.
The problem with this comment is that when the Greeks moved out they were not being harassed by cavalry, nor did they expect to be (if they had expected it, Pausanias would have called over the Athenians a lot sooner).
Quote from: Mark G on April 23, 2018, 03:45:58 PM
Napoleons columns always took a road.
Always.
Infantry to the ditch alongside, guns and horses on the road itself, with half width so that messengers could return along it, and a crash was not going to block the entire army.
Erm ... Mark, helpful though that is for those of us interested in the Napoleonic period, the Achaemenid army had a) no guns and b) no roads (or ditches) to follow. Besides, it soldiered in the Biblical, not the Napoleonic, tradition.
So far in this thread we have seemingly grudgingly accepted that naval supply is possible, that storing up the necessary grain is possible, that Xerxes' army occupied a very large camp and that not all armies everywhere march exclusively two to four wide along roads. We have not studied the demographics of the Persian Empire in any detail (one reason being that there is not a lot of detail to study), but population estimates run from 17 million to 55 million for this period, so a fighting manpower of a couple of million backed by a similar number of noncombatants is by no means out of the question.
The big hang-up seems to be moving the army. Because we cannot think of methods which satisfy everyone we seem to be adopting a dog-in-the-manger attitude and assuming it could not be done. We seem incapable of allowing for the possibility that people with a lot more experience of moving large Achaemeneid armies than ourselves might have thought of and implemented methods beyond our ken.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:53:32 PM
Besides, it soldiered in the Biblical, not the Napoleonic, tradition.
What do you mean by 'soldering in the Biblical tradition'? it could be read as either something pertaining to the bible or something very large indeed- neither of which really seem to be what you are saying.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:39:51 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 07:11:53 AM
Quote
Observe that while the Spartans were moving through the hills, the Athenians 'had taken the way of the plain'. These contingents were travelling in parallel, i.e. on a broad front, not in series (as would be the case with a march column). This is confirmed by what happened next.
Nowhere does this even hint that this was done by troops shambling like locusts on a broad front. It could have been done by contingents forming up into columns two or three wide (or given the size of some of the contingents, one man and his servant wide, and pulling back)
Actually it does. If the Athenians had been in a long narrow column, they would either have been chewed up piecemeal by the Medising Greeks (who, like their Persian friends, were not fussy about advancing in a disorderly swarm) or they could have attempted to assemble a rearguard while the bulk of the column departed to aid the Spartans. Neither of these things happened. The Athenians were able to form up quickly enough to fend off their attackers, which precludes their having been in a long, thin column of march, and were unable to send the Spartans any assistance, which means their foes were able to assemble quite quickly, too.
who said anything about a 'long thin column of march'
Advancing in an eight wide column across a battlefield was standard enough procedure because you could just bring the column round 90 degrees and you're in line of battle
So as I said, it shows nothing about troops shambling about like locusts on a broad front. The Persians too might have deployed into a line of battle, advanced rapidly and lost formation but this is on a battlefield.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:53:32 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 07:26:57 AM
Any army marching and being harassed by cavalry stays in a tight column, probably on a frontage of ten to eight wide, because then you're in line of battle if you turn 90 degrees.
The problem with this comment is that when the Greeks moved out they were not being harassed by cavalry, nor did they expect to be (if they had expected it, Pausanias would have called over the Athenians a lot sooner).
We're not talking about the Spartans, we're talking about the minor states, other than the Athenians and Spartans. They had been harassed, the harassing had stopped but they could expect it to restart at any time.
Nowhere does it say they adopted the 'Persian locust' formation and just sprawled across the countryside with no formation whatsoever
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:53:32 PM
The big hang-up seems to be moving the army. Because we cannot think of methods which satisfy everyone we seem to be adopting a dog-in-the-manger attitude and assuming it could not be done. We seem incapable of allowing for the possibility that people with a lot more experience of moving large Achaemeneid armies than ourselves might have thought of and implemented methods beyond our ken.
your case seems to be based on the fact that apparently the Achaemeneids developed techniques for moving huge armies that they forgot (because they never achieved it again) and that the rest of the world forgot (because nobody else attempted to do it either)
There were two thousand years of people moving armies after the Achaemeneids forgot their marvelous techniques and until the advent of the railway nobody tried moving six million men in a compact theatre of war like that.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:53:32 PM
So far in this thread we have seemingly grudgingly accepted that naval supply is possible, that storing up the necessary grain is possible,
You might have accepted that it's possible to store wheat for four years without modern technology (when we still don't store wheat for that length of time if we can help it) but please don't assume that other people have
Wow. 34 pages! Impressive.
I did not read all of the very erudite replies to this and I am away from my library at the moment but as I recall didn't Engels cover this a bit in his most excellent "Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army"?
Also, I recall reading in some ancient primary source (Herodotus?) that the Persians had to leave Macedonia because they ran out of food and fodder...
Cheers,
Weighing up the on-road vs off-road systems of march, which seems the most likely?
For on-road one assumes the Persian army could have marched probably 4 abreast at best on tracks designed for carts, and probably 2 abreast on other tracks. Given that most scholars allow at least 200 000 men for the army, could it have marched in this fashion from the Hellespont to Greece? Either a) it marches entirely on a single track in separate corps (at least 6 or 7) that move and camp separately, or b) it marches along 6 or 7 different tracks, occasionally meeting at a common campsite where the tracks converge (how often would that happen?).
Is a) feasible? (I start thinking of poo and related difficulties). This option means that the Greeks could ambush a single corps of the army without the other corps being able to come to the rescue, and it would take about a week for the entire army to concentrate. Option b) also allows corps to be ambushed and in this case it is even more difficult for the other corps to come to the rescue. This option also supposes an extensive network of tracks heading in the desired direction.
For off-road the Persians are required to clear a path many yards wide from the Hellespont to southern Macedonia, and probably across Asia Minor as well. Could they have achieved this in a 4 year period? How long does it take to clear land, leaving the odd boulder and large tree in place? They succeeded in clearing the battlefield at Gaugamela in presumably a few days at most - how does that compare?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 23, 2018, 07:32:38 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:53:32 PM
Besides, it soldiered in the Biblical, not the Napoleonic, tradition.
What do you mean by 'soldering in the Biblical tradition'? it could be read as either something pertaining to the bible or something very large indeed- neither of which really seem to be what you are saying.
I refer to the period c.3,200-500 BC and the Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Hebrew, Chaldean, Median etc. cultures, with the Sumerians getting a look in. 'Biblical' is an easy temporal designation for this period, cf. 'Islamic' for the period of Muslim expansion and subsequent caliphates. The art of warfare developed considerably during this period, but certain elements seem to have remained constant more or less throughout.
The period is marked by large (some very large) armies, cross-country travel by those armies, big battles (mostly) and store-cities along the route of march providing supply for those armies.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 06:47:39 AM
Weighing up the on-road vs off-road systems of march, which seems the most likely?
For on-road one assumes the Persian army could have marched probably 4 abreast at best on tracks designed for carts, and probably 2 abreast on other tracks. Given that most scholars allow at least 200 000 men for the army, could it have marched in this fashion from the Hellespont to Greece? Either a) it marches entirely on a single track in separate corps (at least 6 or 7) that move and camp separately, or b) it marches along 6 or 7 different tracks, occasionally meeting at a common campsite where the tracks converge (how often would that happen?).
Actually the Persians could have dealt with this by throwing a cavalry screen forward to the passes where Macedonia meets Thessaly to avoid the risk of unexpected infantry attack. Their fleet should have been able to screen their flank
There's obviously the risk of local treachery, but each corps marching in decent military order was probably enough to cope with that.
Actually the way I mentioned it, a corps on the march would have a minimum of two other corps within two miles of it, and the system allows everybody clean camping and fresh forage to collect
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 09:09:47 PM
who said anything about a 'long thin column of march'
Someone who mentioned 'two or three wide' - the name escapes me. ;)
QuoteAdvancing in an eight wide column across a battlefield was standard enough procedure because you could just bring the column round 90 degrees and you're in line of battle
Very true, although the Greeks had no reason to believe they would be in a battle. They were pulling out before the Persians were awake, and expected to relocate before the Persians could do anything about it. Amompharetus spoiled all that, which was not part of the plan.
QuoteSo as I said, it shows nothing about troops shambling about like locusts on a broad front. The Persians too might have deployed into a line of battle, advanced rapidly and lost formation but this is on a battlefield.
They may or may not have advanced 'like locusts', but they did advance on a broad front. One may recall that in the lineup in IX.46-47, the last before the Greeks decided to pull out to a new camp, the Spartans were on the right and the Athenians on the left of the Greek army, which puts the other contingents in between them. These other contingents, not being delayed by Amompharetus or Medising Greeks, had continued on their journey until they became aware there was fighting, and so came late to the party.
"During this steadily growing rout there came a message to the rest of the Greeks, who were by the temple of Hera and had stayed out of the fighting, that there had been a battle and that Pausanias' men were victorious. When they heard this, they set forth in no ordered array, those who were with the Corinthians keeping to the spurs of the mountain and the hill country, by the road that led upward straight to the temple of Demeter, and those who were with the Megarians and Philasians taking the most level route over the plain." - Herodotus IX.69
'Set forth in no ordered array' might seem indicative of at least a hint of 'locust' behaviour. The 'road', incidentally, is not in the Greek.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 09:12:25 PM
We're not talking about the Spartans, we're talking about the minor states, other than the Athenians and Spartans. They had been harassed, the harassing had stopped but they could expect it to restart at any time.
No, they had not been harassed, they had proceeded without let or hindrance and subsequently joined the battle once they knew the fighting had started (see Herodotus IX.69). They proceeded to the fighting by various different routes, i.e. a 'broad front' advance.
QuoteNowhere does it say they adopted the 'Persian locust' formation and just sprawled across the countryside with no formation whatsoever
Herodotus IX.69 might be considered to disagree. But the army did proceed on a wide front over a variety of countryside, which is the point I wish to establish.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 09:17:53 PM
You might have accepted that it's possible to store wheat for four years without modern technology (when we still don't store wheat for that length of time if we can help it) but please don't assume that other people have
It may or may not have been possible for the Achaemenids to store wheat for that length of time, but it was nevertheless eminently possible for them to fill their store-cities on a rolling basis in anticipation of a particular campaign date as you have previously sensibly and knowledgeably described.
Have you considered the makeup of the Persian host. Large amounts of subject peoples, un willing and unlikely to be disciplined.
I submit no king would allow them to pick their own route or remain far out of sight of reliable troops to keep them under control.
Quote from: Dave Beatty on April 24, 2018, 04:42:43 AM
Wow. 34 pages! Impressive.
What's the SoA forum without at least one good bunfight in progress?
Quote from: Dave Beatty on April 24, 2018, 04:42:43 AM
Wow. 34 pages! Impressive.
I did not read all of the very erudite replies to this and I am away from my library at the moment but as I recall didn't Engels cover this a bit in his most excellent "Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army"?
Not sure whether Engles considered all aspects of the situation, but he did try, certainly.
QuoteAlso, I recall reading in some ancient primary source (Herodotus?) that the Persians had to leave Macedonia because they ran out of food and fodder...
There is nothing in Book VII of Herodotus to suggest he ran out of supplies in Macedonia during his advance, but in Book VIII the Battle of Salamis deprived the Achamenid army of any ship-borne resupply, and the results were rapid and catastrophic.
"So the herald took that response and departed, but Xerxes left Mardonius in Thessaly. He himself journeyed with all speed to the Hellespont and came in forty-five days to the passage for crossing, bringing back with him as good as none (if one may say so) of his host. [2] Wherever and to whatever people they came, they seized and devoured its produce. If they found none, they would eat the grass of the field and strip the bark and pluck the leaves of the trees, garden and wild alike, leaving nothing—such was the degree of their starvation. [3] Moreover, pestilence and dysentery broke out among them on their way, from which they died. Some who were sick Xerxes left behind, charging the cities to which he came in his march to care for them and nourish them, some in Thessaly and some in Siris of Paeonia and in Macedonia." - Herodotus IX.115
Might this be the bit you had in mind?
Quote from: Mark G on April 24, 2018, 07:42:45 AM
Have you considered the makeup of the Persian host. Large amounts of subject peoples, un willing and unlikely to be disciplined.
I submit no king would allow them to pick their own route or remain far out of sight of reliable troops to keep them under control.
I doubt they were that undisciplined; the one case of 'insubordination' (at Plataea) involved an officer, not soldiery, disobeying orders and leaving early with his contingent. Artabazus had taken the oracles to heart and decided he wanted no part in any upcoming defeat, so hied off back to Asia with his entire corps. They seem to have obeyed him without question.
The Achaemenids anyway seem to have had had their own system which substituted threat of the whip for actual discipline except among Persians, Medes and similar high-status troops.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:40:04 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 23, 2018, 09:09:47 PM
who said anything about a 'long thin column of march'
Someone who mentioned 'two or three wide' - the name escapes me. ;)
QuoteAdvancing in an eight wide column across a battlefield was standard enough procedure because you could just bring the column round 90 degrees and you're in line of battle
Very true, although the Greeks had no reason to believe they would be in a battle. They were pulling out before the Persians were awake, and expected to relocate before the Persians could do anything about it. Amompharetus spoiled all that, which was not part of the plan.
The Greeks weren't stupid. They could see the Persian camp when they set off. Of course they knew they could be in a battle
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:40:04 AM
It may or may not have been possible for the Achaemenids to store wheat for that length of time, but it was nevertheless eminently possible for them to fill their store-cities on a rolling basis in anticipation of a particular campaign date as you have previously sensibly and knowledgeably described.
what store cities? Where are the cities in Thrace or Macedonia (or even Asia minor) where archaeology shows us the granaries capable of holding the grain to feed six million men for the campaign?
Remember you're looking at something an order of magnitude larger and more impressive than Ostia
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 08:09:55 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:40:04 AM
It may or may not have been possible for the Achaemenids to store wheat for that length of time, but it was nevertheless eminently possible for them to fill their store-cities on a rolling basis in anticipation of a particular campaign date as you have previously sensibly and knowledgeably described.
what store cities? Where are the cities in Thrace or Macedonia (or even Asia minor) where archaeology shows us the granaries capable of holding the grain to feed six million men for the campaign?
Remember you're looking at something an order of magnitude larger and more impressive than Ostia
Maybe some maths is in order here. What does a granary building look like, how much can it hold, and how many would be needed for several million men for a few days? (supplemented by what the navy can offload on the neighbouring shore)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 09:09:16 AM
Maybe some maths is in order here. What does a granary building look like, how much can it hold, and how many would be needed for a several million men for a few days? (supplemented by what the navy can offload on the neighbouring shore)
I think there is a danger of two alternative systems getting muddled here. Patrick has expressed disdain for a "magazine" approach of building up large stocks on the march route. After an initial dabble with daily supply over beaches, we seem to have settled for weekly depots. I thought the intention was to stock them from magazines in Asia Minor by ship in sequence, rather than prestock all of them before the start? So nowhere in Europe would we expect to find sophisticated granary structures, just wooden camps near suitable beaches. On a previous discussion of the topic, Patrick has proposed the existence of vast semi-permanent granaries near one or two ports in Asia Minor, which have yet to be archaeologically detected.
Talking about clarifications, I'm a little concerned that operational manoeuvers in proximity to the enemy and the long route march through territory with no real threat of attack are being assumed to use the same type of deployment.
Personally, I continue to be uncomfortable with a Persian army that is the most efficient military machine logistically in the pre-modern era, whose march discipline and routine is so precise, yet when it comes in sight of the enemy, it becomes "a horde of locusts". Unless "horde of locusts" is a practiced tactic performed on command, I think we have a dissonance here.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 09:09:16 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 08:09:55 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:40:04 AM
It may or may not have been possible for the Achaemenids to store wheat for that length of time, but it was nevertheless eminently possible for them to fill their store-cities on a rolling basis in anticipation of a particular campaign date as you have previously sensibly and knowledgeably described.
what store cities? Where are the cities in Thrace or Macedonia (or even Asia minor) where archaeology shows us the granaries capable of holding the grain to feed six million men for the campaign?
Remember you're looking at something an order of magnitude larger and more impressive than Ostia
Maybe some maths is in order here. What does a granary building look like, how much can it hold, and how many would be needed for several million men for a few days? (supplemented by what the navy can offload on the neighbouring shore)
Rome had three hundred horrea or granaries (but they probably stored more than just grain, oil was stored in them as well.
The Horrea Galbae contained 140 rooms on the ground floor alone, covering an area of some 225,000 square feet (21,000 m²).
An agricultural rule of thumb is that 60 x 40 x 9 feet is 18.29m x 12.19m x 2.74m or 611 m3 or 427 tonnes of wheat if you have it enclosed on all 4 sides. That's obviously loose grain.
As for how much grain per man, 1 choinix per day (1.5lb) isn't enough to keep a man alive and active (Romans and ACW had 3lb a day). So if 1 choinix is right it had to be supplemented by something, but that too would have to be carried in and stored. So I'll assume 3lb per day.
5000 men will need six and two third tons per day. (or 3.3 tons and 17 Cattle a day slaughtered if there was only 1.5lbs of grain.)
So a million men will need 1338 tons a day (or half that and 3400 cattle slaughtered a day)
So for six million men (because there's the fleet and all those engineers working etc) we need 8028 tons a day.
let us assume they cross the Bridge on the 1st May (and at that point start on European stored rations) and fight Salamis late in September so approximately 150 days..
So that's 1,204,200 tons of wheat, of 600,000 and 3,060,000 cattle. Obviously not all the cattle need to be cattle, but in crude terms a bullock replaces 8 sheep, both in meat produced and food eaten
We have five depots mentioned so each is going to hold 240,840 tons of wheat which means each granary has 564 bins each about 60 x 40 x 9 feet
Obviously different bin sizes can be chosen but for smaller ones you need more, and for storing grain in amphorae or sacks you need more again
Quote from: Erpingham on April 24, 2018, 09:20:23 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 09:09:16 AM
Maybe some maths is in order here. What does a granary building look like, how much can it hold, and how many would be needed for a several million men for a few days? (supplemented by what the navy can offload on the neighbouring shore)
I think there is a danger of two alternative systems getting muddled here. Patrick has expressed disdain for a "magazine" approach of building up large stocks on the march route. After an initial dabble with daily supply over beaches, we seem to have settled for weekly depots. I thought the intention was to stock them from magazines in Asia Minor by ship in sequence, rather than prestock all of them before the start? So nowhere in Europe would we expect to find sophisticated granary structures, just wooden camps near suitable beaches. On a previous discussion of the topic, Patrick has proposed the existence of vast semi-permanent granaries near one or two ports in Asia Minor, which have yet to be archaeologically detected.
doesn't Herodotus mention 5 depots?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:26:35 AM
We have five depots mentioned so each is going to hold 240,840 tons of wheat which means each granary has 564 bins each about 60 x 40 x 9 feet
Obviously different bin sizes can be chosen but for smaller ones you need more, and for storing grain in amphorae or sacks you need more again
About 390 yards square for a depot. Not inconceivable. The Long Walls (http://www.livius.org/articles/place/athens/athens-photos/athens-long-walls/) of Athens, built of stone and each about 6km long, took 4 years to build.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:26:35 AMRome had three hundred horrea or granaries (but they probably stored more than just grain, oil was stored in them as well. ...
As for how much grain per man, 1 choinix per day (1.5lb) isn't enough to keep a man alive and active (Romans and ACW had 3lb a day). So if 1 choinix is right it had to be supplemented by something, but that too would have to be carried in and stored. So I'll assume 3lb per day. ...
So a million men will need 1338 tons a day (or half that and 3400 cattle slaughtered a day)
So for six million men (because there's the fleet and all those engineers working etc) we need 8028 tons a day.
Earlier, Jim, you were talking about the difficulties of storing grain for several years. So given that Xerxes was allegedly preparing this expedition for four years, I wonder how much spoilage we should allow for.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 10:35:31 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:26:35 AM
We have five depots mentioned so each is going to hold 240,840 tons of wheat which means each granary has 564 bins each about 60 x 40 x 9 feet
Obviously different bin sizes can be chosen but for smaller ones you need more, and for storing grain in amphorae or sacks you need more again
About 390 yards square for a depot. Not inconceivable. The Long Walls (http://www.livius.org/articles/place/athens/athens-photos/athens-long-walls/) of Athens, built of stone and each about 6km long, took 4 years to build.
Oh they could have been built, but we'd struggle not to find them. Because there'd be a lot of internal walls (and good thick internal walls because grain 'pushes')
Granaries survive well in the archaeological record because they have to be so well built. :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:38:00 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 10:35:31 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:26:35 AM
We have five depots mentioned so each is going to hold 240,840 tons of wheat which means each granary has 564 bins each about 60 x 40 x 9 feet
Obviously different bin sizes can be chosen but for smaller ones you need more, and for storing grain in amphorae or sacks you need more again
About 390 yards square for a depot. Not inconceivable. The Long Walls (http://www.livius.org/articles/place/athens/athens-photos/athens-long-walls/) of Athens, built of stone and each about 6km long, took 4 years to build.
Oh they could have been built, but we'd struggle not to find them. Because there'd be a lot of internal walls (and good thick internal walls because grain 'pushes')
Granaries survive well in the archaeological record because they have to be so well built. :)
Presuming they were temporary wooden structures built in a depot port, and later removed and built over because there was no further need of them, would we find any trace of them now?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:58:41 AM
Quote from: Mark G on April 24, 2018, 07:42:45 AM
Have you considered the makeup of the Persian host. Large amounts of subject peoples, un willing and unlikely to be disciplined.
I submit no king would allow them to pick their own route or remain far out of sight of reliable troops to keep them under control.
I doubt they were that undisciplined; the one case of 'insubordination' (at Plataea) involved an officer, not soldiery, disobeying orders and leaving early with his contingent. Artabazus had taken the oracles to heart and decided he wanted no part in any upcoming defeat, so hied off back to Asia with his entire corps. They seem to have obeyed him without question.
The Achaemenids anyway seem to have had had their own system which substituted threat of the whip for actual discipline except among Persians, Medes and similar high-status troops.
Leaving side the idea of just how regular the 1,700,000 or so Persian Infantry were apart from Herodotus is there any other evidence for these whip men? whipping a large number of armed men seems to be an invite for disaster.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:27:33 AM
doesn't Herodotus mention 5 depots?
I believe so. Excuse my ignorance but do we know where they were? These presumably are where the fleet is moving stuff from, as they won't supply an army with a seven day supply establishment. Justin clearly envisages wooden depot structures to service the army on the march, with very short operational lives, which is consistent. We should be able to find some trace of these - we have various Roman temporary camps from across the empire which have been located.
If we are saying that the Athenian Long Walls are the sort of evidence we are looking for for the big depots, although Piraeus is very built up, we can still detect these. So they should still be archaeologically detectable even if below modern cities. It maybe that we have of course detected bits of them but haven't joined the dots to reconstruct them as mega-depots.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:12:17 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 23, 2018, 07:32:38 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 23, 2018, 06:53:32 PM
Besides, it soldiered in the Biblical, not the Napoleonic, tradition.
What do you mean by 'soldering in the Biblical tradition'? it could be read as either something pertaining to the bible or something very large indeed- neither of which really seem to be what you are saying.
I refer to the period c.3,200-500 BC and the Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Hebrew, Chaldean, Median etc. cultures, with the Sumerians getting a look in. 'Biblical' is an easy temporal designation for this period, cf. 'Islamic' for the period of Muslim expansion and subsequent caliphates. The art of warfare developed considerably during this period, but certain elements seem to have remained constant more or less throughout.
The period is marked by large (some very large) armies, cross-country travel by those armies, big battles (mostly) and store-cities along the route of march providing supply for those armies.
I thought that might be what you meant, but is there really evidence of large- to pick an example- Hebrew armies? Also these large armies are considerably smaller than Xerxes which I think we are all agreed was an extraordinary event. What make you think that 'biblical' methods of logistics would be scale up to the efficiency needed to support Xerxes army of 2 or so million?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 10:43:21 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:38:00 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 10:35:31 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:26:35 AM
We have five depots mentioned so each is going to hold 240,840 tons of wheat which means each granary has 564 bins each about 60 x 40 x 9 feet
Obviously different bin sizes can be chosen but for smaller ones you need more, and for storing grain in amphorae or sacks you need more again
About 390 yards square for a depot. Not inconceivable. The Long Walls (http://www.livius.org/articles/place/athens/athens-photos/athens-long-walls/) of Athens, built of stone and each about 6km long, took 4 years to build.
Oh they could have been built, but we'd struggle not to find them. Because there'd be a lot of internal walls (and good thick internal walls because grain 'pushes')
Granaries survive well in the archaeological record because they have to be so well built. :)
Presuming they were temporary wooden structures built in a depot port, and later removed and built over because there was no further need of them, would we find any trace of them now?
Given that they had to be handy for somewhere where it was easy to unload boats, and had to have a decent water supply (for the staff working there as well as passing 'customers' I'd suggest that if they were the size they would have to be for that sheer number of men, they'd have become towns. The sheer amount of 'recyclable' timber already cut and dressed would have people sailing from Asia minor and Greece just to load boats with it!
Personally given locally available building materials, I think it would be faster and easier to put up low buildings with local stone which would be far easier to keep the contents dry
The roofs would present an interesting issue. You couldn't use thatch, you'd almost certainly have to use clay tile, even if you had timber walls. So the sites would probably be easy to find now because of broken roofing tiles, plus broken amphorae from wine and oil transport.
Also thinking about it, you'd need a lot of clear, 'concreted' area where you could empty a bin, re-dry the grain that's got a bit fusty, and then load the grain back into the fumigated bin
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 24, 2018, 10:36:23 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:26:35 AMRome had three hundred horrea or granaries (but they probably stored more than just grain, oil was stored in them as well. ...
As for how much grain per man, 1 choinix per day (1.5lb) isn't enough to keep a man alive and active (Romans and ACW had 3lb a day). So if 1 choinix is right it had to be supplemented by something, but that too would have to be carried in and stored. So I'll assume 3lb per day. ...
So a million men will need 1338 tons a day (or half that and 3400 cattle slaughtered a day)
So for six million men (because there's the fleet and all those engineers working etc) we need 8028 tons a day.
Earlier, Jim, you were talking about the difficulties of storing grain for several years. So given that Xerxes was allegedly preparing this expedition for four years, I wonder how much spoilage we should allow for.
I'm assuming that they practiced good rotation of stocks, used sacks for haulage and storage, and that most of the grain in store was from the previous year's harvest and not before.
So given the lack of facilities for consumer complaints ( 8) ) I think they'd be able to keep on top of things. Anything a bit iffy might be fed to draught animals.
If they were really on top of the ball I'd suggest you might get away with 10% waste (and some of that would be straight pilfering)
If they really were storing grain for multiple years, unless each year they emptied each bin, re-dried it in the sun and fumigated the bin whilst it was empty, then you could start getting major losses. You might find that this building was fine and the one next to it was a salvage operation and you might save 20%.
The manpower in these depots, if they're having to re-dry grain and re-store it is going be be large.
Imagine you have to deal with five hundred bins, each of which has four hundred tons of grain in it. And you've got to manually empty the bin, dry the grain and then manually refill the bin. Of course a small team could fumigate the bin whilst the main labour force is drying it and carrying it back into an already fumigated bin.
Quote from: Dave Beatty on April 24, 2018, 04:42:43 AM
I did not read all of the very erudite replies to this and I am away from my library at the moment but as I recall didn't Engels cover this a bit in his most excellent "Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army"?
Yes. Engels has been mentioned a couple of times. But the literalists are unimpressed.
Here's (http://spiru.cgahr.ksu.edu/proj/iwcspp/pdf2/7/1581.pdf) an experiment in underground grain storage. The bottom line seems to be that properly-dried grain with a moisture content of 15% or less can last several years. Drying out grain to this extent is a fairly straightforward process in a climate like Egypt's. If stored in sealed amphorae for the voyage to the depots in Greece the moisture content shouldn't rise significantly as amphorae are impermeable to water.
And no, it doesn't have to be underground silos.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 12:17:13 PM
Here's (http://spiru.cgahr.ksu.edu/proj/iwcspp/pdf2/7/1581.pdf) an experiment in underground grain storage. The bottom line seems to be that properly-dried grain with a moisture content of 15% or less can last several years. Drying out grain to this extent is a fairly straightforward process in a climate like Egypt's. If stored in sealed amphorae for the voyage to the depots in Greece the moisture content shouldn't rise significantly as amphorae are impermeable to water.
And no, it doesn't have to be underground silos.
I'm not sure how transferable the results would be to Greece. "Yuanbaoshan lies in 118°93'£, 42°6TN, where belongs to cold zone and sub-dry continent climate with 23. 7°e of maximum averaged monthly temperature, minimum monthly temperature IS - 30.1 °e, lowest dally temperature is - 31.2°e , and top dally temperature IS 42"C. The averaged annual temperature IS 6. 7°e There are 130 days with mean temperature 0 degrees C. The annual mean rainfall reaches 394.7mm while the evaporation reaches 1880mm. The
deepest frozen soil layer IS 1.3 meter thick. The constant temperature of the layer 15 meters beneath the earth is 8.0 - 9 .ooe, resulting in stable low temperature in this granary.
but if the Persians used this technique it is going to be so easy to find these places for archaeologist. Each of these 5 stock piles has 500 underground bins, each 60x40 feet and about six meters deep (because you have to go 4 meters down for the temperature control)
The sheer quantity of grain to be stored means that you need a vast storage area. And the amount of excavation they'd have to do would mean we'd probably be able to pick out these places on google earth!
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 12:31:32 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 12:17:13 PM
Here's (http://spiru.cgahr.ksu.edu/proj/iwcspp/pdf2/7/1581.pdf) an experiment in underground grain storage. The bottom line seems to be that properly-dried grain with a moisture content of 15% or less can last several years. Drying out grain to this extent is a fairly straightforward process in a climate like Egypt's. If stored in sealed amphorae for the voyage to the depots in Greece the moisture content shouldn't rise significantly as amphorae are impermeable to water.
And no, it doesn't have to be underground silos.
I'm not sure how transferable the results would be to Greece. "Yuanbaoshan lies in 118°93'£, 42°6TN, where belongs to cold zone and sub-dry continent climate with 23. 7°e of maximum averaged monthly temperature, minimum monthly temperature IS - 30.1 °e, lowest dally temperature is - 31.2°e , and top dally temperature IS 42"C. The averaged annual temperature IS 6. 7°e There are 130 days with mean temperature 0 degrees C. The annual mean rainfall reaches 394.7mm while the evaporation reaches 1880mm. The
deepest frozen soil layer IS 1.3 meter thick. The constant temperature of the layer 15 meters beneath the earth is 8.0 - 9 .ooe, resulting in stable low temperature in this granary.
but if the Persians used this technique it is going to be so easy to find these places for archaeologist. Each of these 5 stock piles has 500 underground bins, each 60x40 feet and about six meters deep (because you have to go 4 meters down for the temperature control)
The sheer quantity of grain to be stored means that you need a vast storage area. And the amount of excavation they'd have to do would mean we'd probably be able to pick out these places on google earth!
Doesn't have to be underground silos. Just dry grain kept dry. Wheat with a moisture content of 11.8% can last 15 years with no appreciable change when stored at a fairly constant temperature of around 10 degrees celsius. The report emphasises that the lack of oxygen also contributes to the preservation process. I submit that dry grain in a sealed amphora where moisture and oxygen remain low will last 4 years without too much trouble even if the ambient temperature is much higher.
As a final point the grain doesn't have to be moved to Thrace and Macedonia right from year one. It can be stored in Egypt where the climate facilitates preservation and transported by ship to the depots only in the year preceding the invasion.
On amphorae, are we able to check what the usual operation of the day was? Would the grain have been stored in the depot in amphorae or in bins? Would amphorae have been filled just before transport? On permeability, incidentally, the amphorae were naturally permeable but sealed internally for carrying liquids.
If we assume that amphorae were in use to carry grain because of the issues of protecting them during beach unloading (I don't think we have evidence of amphorae as the usual grain carrying method, though we know they could be used for that), are they stored in the landing depots in the amphorae and are they issued to the army as is? We haven't really considered the effect of issuing the grain in amphorae on the supply train - an amphora roughly weighs the same as its contents, so will double the number of animals required. It maybe though it was transfered into something lighter (baskets? sacks?), which would leave us with a lot of amphorae at the depot. They could potentially be reloaded returning transports or maybe discarded. In any case, there are going to be scattered amphorae fragments around the depot, which should help identify it to archaeologists.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 12:07:48 PM
I'm assuming that they practiced good rotation of stocks, used sacks for haulage and storage, and that most of the grain in store was from the previous year's harvest and not before.
Not sure we can assume that, because in Year 2 there isn't a huge army there to eat most of Year 1's grain and replace it with Year 2's. This isn't like a permanent settlement - you're stockpiling grain that there isn't a requirement for until Year 4 (or is it 5?).
While exploring amphorae I chanced upon this (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247738955_Commercial_Amphoras_The_Earliest_Consumer_Packages). Interesting because its all about amphorae as shipping containers, rather than about types and sequences.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 12:36:40 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 12:31:32 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 24, 2018, 12:17:13 PM
Here's (http://spiru.cgahr.ksu.edu/proj/iwcspp/pdf2/7/1581.pdf) an experiment in underground grain storage. The bottom line seems to be that properly-dried grain with a moisture content of 15% or less can last several years. Drying out grain to this extent is a fairly straightforward process in a climate like Egypt's. If stored in sealed amphorae for the voyage to the depots in Greece the moisture content shouldn't rise significantly as amphorae are impermeable to water.
And no, it doesn't have to be underground silos.
I'm not sure how transferable the results would be to Greece. "Yuanbaoshan lies in 118°93'£, 42°6TN, where belongs to cold zone and sub-dry continent climate with 23. 7°e of maximum averaged monthly temperature, minimum monthly temperature IS - 30.1 °e, lowest dally temperature is - 31.2°e , and top dally temperature IS 42"C. The averaged annual temperature IS 6. 7°e There are 130 days with mean temperature 0 degrees C. The annual mean rainfall reaches 394.7mm while the evaporation reaches 1880mm. The
deepest frozen soil layer IS 1.3 meter thick. The constant temperature of the layer 15 meters beneath the earth is 8.0 - 9 .ooe, resulting in stable low temperature in this granary.
but if the Persians used this technique it is going to be so easy to find these places for archaeologist. Each of these 5 stock piles has 500 underground bins, each 60x40 feet and about six meters deep (because you have to go 4 meters down for the temperature control)
The sheer quantity of grain to be stored means that you need a vast storage area. And the amount of excavation they'd have to do would mean we'd probably be able to pick out these places on google earth!
Doesn't have to be underground silos. Just dry grain kept dry. Wheat with a moisture content of 11.8% can last 15 years with no appreciable change when stored at a fairly constant temperature of around 10 degrees celsius. The report emphasises that the lack of oxygen also contributes to the preservation process. I submit that dry grain in a sealed amphora where moisture and oxygen remain low will last 4 years without too much trouble even if the ambient temperature is much higher.
As a final point the grain doesn't have to be moved to Thrace and Macedonia right from year one. It can be stored in Egypt where the climate facilitates preservation and transported by ship to the depots only in the year preceding the invasion.
If it's in amphorae, that means at 30lb per amphora and 89,913,600 of them to transport 1,204,200 tons of grain.
If they used amphorae there should be shoals of broken amphorae in places.
The reason the grain was buried was to get the temperature stable and low. Keeping it low is no going to be easy in Egypt.
Don't be too enthusiastic about just keeping oxygen out. You can then get an anaerobic fermentation. (Silage is just grass preserved by anaerobic fermentation.) All it means with this is that your wheat ends up getting pickled in lactic acid, which isn't going to be particularly good
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 24, 2018, 01:29:55 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 12:07:48 PM
I'm assuming that they practiced good rotation of stocks, used sacks for haulage and storage, and that most of the grain in store was from the previous year's harvest and not before.
Not sure we can assume that, because in Year 2 there isn't a huge army there to eat most of Year 1's grain and replace it with Year 2's. This isn't like a permanent settlement - you're stockpiling grain that there isn't a requirement for until Year 4 (or is it 5?).
I'd assume that you'd have the initial stocks to feed your people in place. Your canal diggers and road clearers and suchlike.
The actual stockpiles would have to be in the grain producing area where you could rotate them.
You'd only shift the bulk of the stuff north in the year before the army was going to travel.
I'm not talking about whipping, that's for 300.
I'm thinking of many of the listed contingents in herodotus being the sort of peoples likely to engage in a bit of pillage and then clear off back home at the first opportunity.
If you had as much loot as you could carry, why stay longer?
So they would have to be kept under observation to stay in line, or order would collapse .
Quote from: Erpingham on April 24, 2018, 09:32:08 AM
Talking about clarifications, I'm a little concerned that operational manoeuvers in proximity to the enemy and the long route march through territory with no real threat of attack are being assumed to use the same type of deployment.
Not quite: operational manoeuvres in proximity to the enemy occurred when both sides expected a battle. Anything else was transit. Occasionally someone got it wrong and their 'transit' turned into an unexpected engagement, e.g. Herodotus IX.69:
"So the Greeks, now having the upper hand, followed Xerxes' men, pursuing and slaying. During this steadily growing rout there came a message to the rest of the Greeks, who were by the temple of Hera and had stayed out of the fighting, that there had been a battle and that Pausanias' men were victorious. When they heard this,
they set forth in no ordered array, those who were with the Corinthians keeping to the spurs of the mountain and the hill country, by the road that led upward straight to the temple of Demeter, and those who were with the Megarians and Philasians taking the most level route over the plain. [2] However, when the Megarians and Philasians had come near the enemy, the Theban horsemen (whose captain was Asopodorus son of Timander)
caught sight of them approaching in haste and disorder, and rode at them; in this attack they trampled six hundred of them, and pursued and drove the rest to Cithaeron."
It is notable in Thucydides, who describes events half a century later, that Greek armies of his period tend to be a bit more careful when heading towards a known or suspected enemy.
QuotePersonally, I continue to be uncomfortable with a Persian army that is the most efficient military machine logistically in the pre-modern era, whose march discipline and routine is so precise, yet when it comes in sight of the enemy, it becomes "a horde of locusts". Unless "horde of locusts" is a practiced tactic performed on command, I think we have a dissonance here.
Actually when not in sight of an enemy it is moving freely in what we might consider 'horde of locusts' or 'transit' mode. This is essentially what wargamers would call 'irregular loose formation' as opposed to complete individualistic confusion. If the enemy is in sight, the army forms up, and in Herodotus armies seem to form up pretty quickly when danger threatens (overenthusiastic Megarans and Philasians excepted). I would estimate the standard travel formation for a contingent as a 'box' with little attempt to keep alignment but reasonable effort to keep cohesion. The two are not necessarily one and the same.
On Ramses II's Kadesh reliefs his army is shown on the move. The infantry are shown in square formations with chariots in the spaces between the infantry blocks. This raises interesting possibilities about the use of mounted troops being used to prevent straggling and generally keep contingents in shape.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 24, 2018, 10:54:42 AM
Leaving side the idea of just how regular the 1,700,000 or so Persian Infantry were apart from Herodotus is there any other evidence for these whip men? whipping a large number of armed men seems to be an invite for disaster.
To give one example, Diodorus XVII.60.4, at Gaugamela:
"As both flanks became closed, the king himself was alarmed and retreated. The flight thus became general. Dust raised by the Persian cavalry rose to a height, and as Alexander's squadrons followed on their heels, because of their numbers and the thickness of the dust, it was impossible to tell in what direction Dareius was fleeing. The air was filled with the groans of the fallen, the din of the cavalry, and the constant sound of lashing of whips."
Disciplinary measures depend upon what one is used to and how fairly or capriciously they are administered. The Roman centurion with his vine-stick or a Royal Navy bosun with his 'starter' would have been at no greater risk than a Persian whip-man.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:38:00 AM
Oh they could have been built, but we'd struggle not to find them. Because there'd be a lot of internal walls (and good thick internal walls because grain 'pushes')
Granaries survive well in the archaeological record because they have to be so well built. :)
Which puts a premuium on excavations in Asia Minor, an area which significantly lags with regard to archaeology (for example: as far as I know, the number of Lydian helmets found still remains at one). Asia Minor coastal city archaeology suffers from the same problem as archaeology in Damascus and Jerusalem - there are people living on the sites you really want to dig up.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 24, 2018, 11:09:50 AM
I thought that might be what you meant, but is there really evidence of large- to pick an example- Hebrew armies? Also these large armies are considerably smaller than Xerxes which I think we are all agreed was an extraordinary event. What make you think that 'biblical' methods of logistics would be scale up to the efficiency needed to support Xerxes army of 2 or so million?
Because they managed to support quite large armies locally. The only proof for the size of these armies is in written sources (notably palace and temple inscriptions and archives) but they have a certain consistency about them - it is not one culture claiming huge forces, but all of them.
Store cities were the order of the day: just looking in a Concordance turns up about eleven Old Testament references to store cities Hebrew kings were using or ordering to be built. Various tablets from Sumeria to Assyria refer to drawing materials from royal storehouses. Egypt stored grain like a squirrel stocking up on nuts. Storing up material - and grain - on a large scale for contingencies and future use was second nature to these cultures. The standard
modus operandi on campaign was to require nearby cities (never mind their notional affiliation) to supply the army from their own grain stocks - they usually complied, because the alternative was not pleasant.
We may note that Xerxes was really 'pushing the envelope' with his expedition: he was using an army twice the size of anything the Achaemenid Empire had fielded before, and seemingly doing so mostly out of vanity (it was his power and he wanted to see it in action - besides, who was going to resist such numbers as were under his command?). It is very noteworthy that future Persian expeditions, essentially those to reconquer Egypt, were on a much more modest scale (220,000 or 330,000 plus fleet) and the really large armies of a million or so were reserved for defence of the Empire's heartland (Cunaxa 401 BC; Gaugamela 331 BC), where logistics were easier to arrange. Xerxes managed to supply his army up to Salamis - but only just. Once he lost naval superiority his system crashed with a venegeance. Even so, Mardonius' 300,000 were sustained over winter by Thessaly and Boeotia, leading one to suppose that had Xerxes come with just 300,000 he would not have had the post-Salamis supply crisis that he did.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 24, 2018, 01:39:04 PM
While exploring amphorae I chanced upon this (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247738955_Commercial_Amphoras_The_Earliest_Consumer_Packages). Interesting because its all about amphorae as shipping containers, rather than about types and sequences.
Nice find, Anthony.
Incidentally, if anyone is still interested in camp sizes, Herodotus gives the Persian fortified camp at Plataea in 479 BC as 10 furlongs by 10 furlongs (2,200 yards by 2,200 yards). His army partly occupied the camp and partly spread out over the adjacent countryside (Herodotus IX.15).
Quote from: Mark G on April 24, 2018, 06:55:01 PM
I'm thinking of many of the listed contingents in herodotus being the sort of peoples likely to engage in a bit of pillage and then clear off back home at the first opportunity.
They might wish to do this, but there would be some obstacles.
To begin with, whether or not the camp was internally policed, there would be guards on the perimeter, and anyone leaving without a very good reason (e.g. being a King's Messenger) would be detained. If they were clanking with purloined spoil, their future would shortly involve a sharp stake.
Then there was the matter of exactly where any plunder would be kept once plundered. It would be loaded onto the baggage train and would be guarded. One gets the impression from Herodotus' account of the Persian expedition to Euboea in 490 BC that the Persian nobility pretty much had a monopoly on plunder. Anyone among the lower ranks trying unauthorisedly to help themselves might expect a short, sharp shock from which they never recovered.
This is not to say that Achaemenid soldiery would have passed up opportunities to slip a bit of jewellery into their girdles. However attempting unauthorised departure to turn this into a good life at home would run afoul of camp perimeter guards, and even if these were bypassed the fellow's troubles are only just beginning. He has to make his way back home through country where the locals will happily slaughter him for his ill-gotten gains and any King's officers will just as happily relieve him of them - and his life - for desertion.
Achaemenid troops, even those of remote rustic origin, do not seem to have been willing or able to commit serious acts of indiscipline. Whether this was submissive temperament when outside their home territories, awe of those in power, effective officering or whatever, this problem which so affected soldiery like Montrose's Highlanders does not appear to have been a problem in an Achaemenid army.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:34:58 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 24, 2018, 10:54:42 AM
Leaving side the idea of just how regular the 1,700,000 or so Persian Infantry were apart from Herodotus is there any other evidence for these whip men? whipping a large number of armed men seems to be an invite for disaster.
To give one example, Diodorus XVII.60.4, at Gaugamela:
"As both flanks became closed, the king himself was alarmed and retreated. The flight thus became general. Dust raised by the Persian cavalry rose to a height, and as Alexander's squadrons followed on their heels, because of their numbers and the thickness of the dust, it was impossible to tell in what direction Dareius was fleeing. The air was filled with the groans of the fallen, the din of the cavalry, and the constant sound of lashing of whips."
Disciplinary measures depend upon what one is used to and how fairly or capriciously they are administered. The Roman centurion with his vine-stick or a Royal Navy bosun with his 'starter' would have been at no greater risk than a Persian whip-man.
As always I am in awe if your mastery of ancient sources however the quote you provide could easily refer to whipping horses rather than men - it is not definitive proof of a Persian military police corps that could push armies of millions of men forward. The Roman Centurion and the Royal Navy Bosun both exist within regular organisations and the vine-stick etc is as much as symbol of authority as anything else;It is not quite the same as a Persian whip man should such exist trying to force Ethiopian or Thracian irregulars forward to fight Hoplites or to leave off pillaging a village or bothering local women.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:38:36 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 10:38:00 AM
Oh they could have been built, but we'd struggle not to find them. Because there'd be a lot of internal walls (and good thick internal walls because grain 'pushes')
Granaries survive well in the archaeological record because they have to be so well built. :)
Which puts a premuium on excavations in Asia Minor, an area which significantly lags with regard to archaeology (for example: as far as I know, the number of Lydian helmets found still remains at one). Asia Minor coastal city archaeology suffers from the same problem as archaeology in Damascus and Jerusalem - there are people living on the sites you really want to dig up.
I assumed these five depots would be along the coast of what is now Greece. I'm not sure Herodotus explicitly says. But there would have to be depots in Asia minor as well as these troops gathered there even if they came from somewhat different directions, the armies of the eastern Satrapies concentrated in Cappadocia and then marched to Sardis where they over-wintered. The armies of the Western Satrapies concentrated in Abydos and the other armies joined it. I assume that 'Eastern Satrapies' probably included anybody not Asia Minor
But Abydos and Sardis would need major granaries. Abydos would be easy to provision by sea, Sardis less so, I don't know how navigable the river was.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:53:31 PM
Because they managed to support quite large armies locally. The only proof for the size of these armies is in written sources (notably palace and temple inscriptions and archives) but they have a certain consistency about them - it is not one culture claiming huge forces, but all of them.
I think the operative words here are quite and locally. My admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time.I am a little suspicious of temple inscriptions as by their nature they are not meant as historical documents giving a realistic depiction of events. For example Rameses is not some 20 times the size of a Egyptian or Hittite soldier from the lower classes.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:53:31 PM
Store cities were the order of the day: just looking in a Concordance turns up about eleven Old Testament references to store cities Hebrew kings were using or ordering to be built. Various tablets from Sumeria to Assyria refer to drawing materials from royal storehouses. Egypt stored grain like a squirrel stocking up on nuts. Storing up material - and grain - on a large scale for contingencies and future use was second nature to these cultures. The standard modus operandi on campaign was to require nearby cities (never mind their notional affiliation) to supply the army from their own grain stocks - they usually complied, because the alternative was not pleasant.
At the risk of starting a religious row can I respectfully point out that the Old Testament isn't universally considered a historical document some people even doubt the the existence of an extensive Kingdom of Israel pointing to lack of archaeological evidence in spite of Israeli archaeologists best efforts to unearth it. There are certainly no royal inscriptions proving evidence of enormous Hebrew forces off roading. Also theses societies are not really that similar Egypt was probably good at organising lots of men due to being a society that existed around irrigation. Urartu, the Sea Peoples and David's Hebrew Empire should it have existed were different beasts.
It is also the case that Kadesh one of the better recorded battles from the 'biblical ' period the Egyptian army didn't swarm across the countryside like locusts but split into 4 segments following roads/tracks presumably due to supply issues.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:53:31 PM
We may note that Xerxes was really 'pushing the envelope' with his expedition: he was using an army twice the size of anything the Achaemenid Empire had fielded before, and seemingly doing so mostly out of vanity (it was his power and he wanted to see it in action - besides, who was going to resist such numbers as were under his command?). It is very noteworthy that future Persian expeditions, essentially those to reconquer Egypt, were on a much more modest scale (220,000 or 330,000 plus fleet) and the really large armies of a million or so were reserved for defence of the Empire's heartland (Cunaxa 401 BC; Gaugamela 331 BC), where logistics were easier to arrange. Xerxes managed to supply his army up to Salamis - but only just. Once he lost naval superiority his system crashed with a venegeance. Even so, Mardonius' 300,000 were sustained over winter by Thessaly and Boeotia, leading one to suppose that had Xerxes come with just 300,000 he would not have had the post-Salamis supply crisis that he did.
Taking the numbers as read it is obvious that where the Persian Empire attempted to campaign away from home the numbers involved were in the low or mid hundred thousands rather than in the millions. Perhaps that might give you reason to doubt the numbers claimed by Herodotos?
I suspect not!
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:53:31 PM
Store cities were the order of the day: just looking in a Concordance turns up about eleven Old Testament references to store cities Hebrew kings were using or ordering to be built. the army
If we could work out the size and population of the store cities we might be able to guestimate the size of the army they were supporting. Jerusalem at the supposed time of David has been calculated as having a population between 2,000 - 5,000 and as that was the capital we can only assume that the satellite store cities would be smaller. In comparison modern Staines -upon -Thames would be a mighty metropolis (not just the cultural/intellectual /artistic centre of the entire universe) The idea that there was a Biblical tradition of warfare involving super-size armies and hyper efficient logistics is very dubious and doesn't really support the HHAH
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 24, 2018, 09:20:30 PM
As always I am in awe if your mastery of ancient sources however the quote you provide could easily refer to whipping horses rather than men
Doubtful; as far as I know whips were not part of cavalry equipment at the time and the Persian army at Gaugamela was predominantly infantry - besides, by this point in the battle the Persian cavalry left had run away and their cavalry right was off-stage busy with Parmenio.
Quoteit is not definitive proof of a Persian military police corps that could push armies of millions of men forward.
We may be looking at this the wrong way. The whip-men may be integral to the unit, effectively NCOs given power over their fellow-countrymen. I never saw them as a 'military police corps' as such, although they may have had such responsibilities, but rather as members of that contingent who had NCO rank and Achaemenid loyalty.
Of course there may have been some of each: the King may have had his own band of whip-men to help out on special occasions, e.g. the crossing of the Hellespont. But our sources are not specific enough for us to conclude that.
QuoteThe Roman Centurion and the Royal Navy Bosun both exist within regular organisations and the vine-stick etc is as much as symbol of authority as anything else;It is not quite the same as a Persian whip man should such exist trying to force Ethiopian or Thracian irregulars forward to fight Hoplites or to leave off pillaging a village or bothering local women.
Perhaps my use of 'Persian' was misleading; there is nothing in our sources which gives any particular nationality to the whip-men, and in any event to get their contingents as far as Sardis in the first place they would presumably have to be integral to the unit or contingent whose discipline (or discipline substitute) they were providing. I suspect this was just the normal Achaemenid way of officering (or rather NCO-ing).
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 24, 2018, 09:54:33 PM
I assumed these five depots would be along the coast of what is now Greece. I'm not sure Herodotus explicitly says. But there would have to be depots in Asia minor as well as these troops gathered there even if they came from somewhat different directions, the armies of the eastern Satrapies concentrated in Cappadocia and then marched to Sardis where they over-wintered. The armies of the Western Satrapies concentrated in Abydos and the other armies joined it. I assume that 'Eastern Satrapies' probably included anybody not Asia Minor
They would also need to draw on store-cities across the Empire for this initial concentration, so those on the Euphrates, for example, would need to be well stoocked to supply the transiting Eastern satrapies troops. In Greece, I am not sure about 'depots' but Herodotus does (Book VII, especially 118-120) note that certain of the the local Greek cities had each made extensive advance arrangements to feed the Achaemenid army for a day as it passed through, often in cooperation with other cities and islands.
QuoteBut Abydos and Sardis would need major granaries. Abydos would be easy to provision by sea, Sardis less so, I don't know how navigable the river was.
Sardis could have been challenging to provision by sea; the river Hermus (currently 'Gediz') flows close to the city but not through it, so any large-scale Achaemenid storage facilities might be along the banks of the Hermus (the second largest river in Asia Minor) as opposed to in Sardis itself. The Pactolus, which flows directly through Sardis, is a stream which as far as I know usually carried nothing larger or heavier than gold dust from Mount Tmolus. Whether it was considered worthwhile transshipping grain onto barges to carry up the Pactolus would have depended upon whether the army was being quartered
in Sardis (potentially a rather tight squeeze) or just
around it. I do not exclude the possibility of the Achaemenids having both stocked up Sardis via the Pactolus and erected additional storage facilities along the banks of the Hermus.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:29:09 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 24, 2018, 09:32:08 AM
Talking about clarifications, I'm a little concerned that operational manoeuvers in proximity to the enemy and the long route march through territory with no real threat of attack are being assumed to use the same type of deployment.
Not quite: operational manoeuvres in proximity to the enemy occurred when both sides expected a battle. Anything else was transit.
No, I don't think so. Arrangements for marching through friendly territory are rarely those of operating within striking distance of the enemy. Why do you think the Persian army before Plataea is operating in the same way as on the march from the Hellespont?
QuoteI assumed these five depots would be along the coast of what is now Greece.
So if we assume five in Greece, which are presumably not identical to the cities who feed the army for a day, which Patrick identified. That isn't enough for a one week between restocking march. So are we looking at a hierarchy of supply dumps? Or are there only five? If only five, we are looking at a different mechanism for feeding the army on the march. A longer supply train, for example, or that supply ships actually accompanied the army, rather than just operating a conveyor to Asia Minor?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 08:21:42 AM
They would also need to draw on store-cities across the Empire for this initial concentration, so those on the Euphrates, for example, would need to be well stoocked to supply the transiting Eastern satrapies troops.
I wonder if there were 'store-cities' as such. Certainly for such things as grain.
A city would have to store enough grain to get itself through until next years harvest. Citizens and the market would normally handle matters perfectly well, but if the city had a stockpile which they purchased after harvest when grain was cheap, they could help manipulate the price down later in the season to the advantage of the inhabitants.
But even if a city habitually did store enough grain to carry the inhabitants though a year, these were not large cities.
According to the wiki as source of all knowledge, Babylon itself had a population of perhaps 150,000.
So an army with 600,000 men and 600,000 servants is going to strain the resources.
But within the Empire, there is one thing in favour of the army. If these men had stayed at home, they would have been fed. What we have here is the 'milk bottle problem'
(This comes from the fact that in the days of the old Milk Marketing Board, you would have your order for milk placed on your doorstep every morning. But when you went on holiday you cancelled the order and the MMB then had to guess whether you were going to Scarborough or Blackpool and send your milk on after you. Because the last thing you wanted is to arrive on holiday and discover there was no milk in the resort. So wise people without computers would have to know where extra milk should be sent)
So in theory if you take 60,000 men from Media, that's so many meals not eaten in Media but eaten in Ionia instead.
The problem is one of transport. Actually unless there are major river and sea connections it would probably be easier to grow the grain elsewhere. So Egyptian troops could be followed by Egyptian grain. Median troops would have to have grain grown for them on arrival because there's no way they could haul enough with them.
The problem comes once you cross into Europe. The newly conquered territories are not as well managed and don't have the level of agriculture that you're used to. They can probably find the rations for troops raised in that area, but they're not going to be able to find rations for those who've crossed the bridge.
QuoteMy admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time
I think if we are to discuss the size of "Biblical" armies, it ought to be elsewhere. I know from other discussions that Patrick unsurprisingly has a different approach to the evidence than the conventional and to fully develop it would throw this thread off. Also, if we discuss it here, people with an interest in the ancient Near East may miss it.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 24, 2018, 11:04:13 PM
My admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time.I am a little suspicious of temple inscriptions as by their nature they are not meant as historical documents giving a realistic depiction of events. For example Rameses is not some 20 times the size of a Egyptian or Hittite soldier from the lower classes.
I would caution against confusing conventions of visual depiction (Pharaoh is bigger because he is more important) with numerical confusion. On the subject of large armies, Herodotus (II.165-6) credits Egypt's military class with 160,000 'Hermotybians' and 250,000 'Calasirians', giving 410,000. Diodorus I.47.6 gives a pharaoh ('Ozymandias', i.e. Ramses II Usermaatre) 400,000 infantry and 20,000 mounted troops for a campaign against 'Bactria' (probably a misreading for ta-Kheta, the Land of Hatti).
Tacitus II.60 describes part of Germanicus' journey to Egypt, during which he visits Thebes and has some of the inscriptions explained to him, one of which describes how Thutmose III had a military manpower of 700,000. This interestingly ties in with II Chronicles 12:2-3 in which 'Shishak' (Thutmose III Djeserkau-sekhempeti, also 'seksek', 'destroyer' or 'conqueror') conquers Judah with 1,200 chariots, 60,000 cavalry and infantry 'without number'. If we assume a 1:10 ratio of cavalry to infantry, as was customary in Near Eastern armies, it would bring 'without number' down to 600,000 and give us an interestingly close coincidence with Tacitus' second-hand 700,000.
When Sargon II was campaigning against Urartu, he does not specify numerical strengths but does note that he captured the capital whose armoury contained a scattering of other weapons but 325,000 short swords (presumably of an obsolete pattern and hence not issued to the troops).
The Bible is full of massive armies. In II Samuel 24:9 David's census as reported by Joab gives 800,000 fighting men of Israel and 500,000 of Judah. (One might wonder why these are numbered separately in a supposedly unified kingdom, but that is how it is recorded.) When Israel revolts against Rehoboam, he musters 180,000 choice fighting men to go and subdue it (the campaign proved abortive); II Chronicles 13 describes a battle between 800,000 men of Israel under Jeroboam against 400,000 men of Judah under Abijah (Abijah won when Jeroboam's encircling attempt came apart). And so forth. We are all presumably familiar with the Assyrians losing 185,000 men under the walls of Jerusalem in 702 BC.
Some armies are smaller: at Qarqar, Shalmaneser III enumerates his foes as 60,000 infantry, 4,000 chariots, 2,000 cavalry and 1,000 camelry. This force was a collection of contingents supplied by various allies; the largest contingent was that of Damascus, 1,200 chariots, 1,200 cavalry and 20,000 infantry. This heterogenous army nevertheless sufficed to check Shalmaneser's progress.
I would caution about taking at face value any figures given in secondary sources (i.e. academic books as oposed to historical texts). Historical texts (inscriptions, books, scrolls) may or may not be correct, but they show a reasonably consistent pattern, whereas academics seem to pluck figures out of thin air and then make up reasons to arrive at those figures. If one sticks to the historical sources one has only one level of potential errors to consider.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:53:31 PMQuote
Store cities were the order of the day: just looking in a Concordance turns up about eleven Old Testament references to store cities Hebrew kings were using or ordering to be built. Various tablets from Sumeria to Assyria refer to drawing materials from royal storehouses. Egypt stored grain like a squirrel stocking up on nuts. Storing up material - and grain - on a large scale for contingencies and future use was second nature to these cultures. The standard modus operandi on campaign was to require nearby cities (never mind their notional affiliation) to supply the army from their own grain stocks - they usually complied, because the alternative was not pleasant.
At the risk of starting a religious row can I respectfully point out that the Old Testament isn't universally considered a historical document some people even doubt the the existence of an extensive Kingdom of Israel pointing to lack of archaeological evidence in spite of Israeli archaeologists best efforts to unearth it. There are certainly no royal inscriptions proving evidence of enormous Hebrew forces off roading. Also theses societies are not really that similar Egypt was probably good at organising lots of men due to being a society that existed around irrigation. Urartu, the Sea Peoples and David's Hebrew Empire should it have existed were different beasts.
The Bible actually turns out to be better than expected as a historical document; a lot of the 'lack' of archaeological evidence is simply a corpus of archaeologists seemingly obsessed with disproving the Bible. Every time there is a new 'Davidic' or 'Solomonic' find in Israel the story is the same: some archaeologists consider it 10th century BC, some 9th, some stridently affirm it is 8th. It is not so much that evidence is lacking as that some people have an agenda to ensure that it is never ascribed to the Kingdom of David.
QuoteIt is also the case that Kadesh one of the better recorded battles from the 'biblical ' period the Egyptian army didn't swarm across the countryside like locusts but split into 4 segments following roads/tracks presumably due to supply issues.
If you look at the reliefs of Ramses II's army on the march (sorry no links but the pictures tend to be hidden behind paywalls these days) the infantry is in squares, several of these squares are marching in parallel (i.e. over a wide front) and they have chariots between them on all sides. This would be quite an effective way of keeping the body of troops together on the march.
The Egyptian army advanced in four 'divisions'. There is much misunderstanding of what constitutes a 'division, because of a text by Hori, the 'speedy scribe', challenging his corrspondent to allocate rations for a force of 5,000 men of various nationalities. The actual 'divisions' are described by Diodorus, quoting Ramses II's tomb inscriptions:
"... he had made a campaign with four hundred thousand foot-soldiers and twenty thousand cavalry, the whole army having been divided into four divisions, all of which were under the command of sons of the king."
The 'cavalry' are presumably a total of mounted troops including chariotry; if so, this would give four 'divisions' each of 100,000 infantry and 5,000 mounted. Given their size, it is unsurprising that they were separated for the march through the 'forest of Baw' and its environs, particularly as Ramses had been led to believe that his opponents were nowhere near. I understand that his army stretched back 20 miles, including intervals, which rather nullifies modern attempts to limit him to 20,000 troops as even with the intervals this would leave him with an army in single file. Given the way his reliefs depict his infantry as moving in square formations, single file or even quadruple file is out. If on the reliefs one figure = one man, then nothing less than 30 wide (plus chariots) will serve. If the relief scale is more of a wargaming scale (1 figure = 10 men, for example) the avenue of advance becomes even wider.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 24, 2018, 07:53:31 PM
Taking the numbers as read it is obvious that where the Persian Empire attempted to campaign away from home the numbers involved were in the low or mid hundred thousands rather than in the millions. Perhaps that might give you reason to doubt the numbers claimed by Herodotos?
This is looking at it the wrong way, I fear. The numbers given by Diodorus for the reconquest of Egypt followed, not preceded, Xerxes' invasion of Greece and incorporated lessons (doubtless including logistical lessons) learned fighting the Greeks. There is no reason why Artaxerxes II and III's expeditions against Egypt in the 4th century BC should give reason to doubt Xerxes' indiscriminate mass mobilisation in the 5th century BC.
One may note that when the Achaemenid Empire was invaded, it mustered numbers not far off those mobilised by Xerxes. Xenophon records that Artaxerxes II in 401 BC brought together 900,000 at Cunaxa, and another 300,000 under Abrocomas were on their way but dawdled to await the winner. Cyrus the Younger took only his best 100,000 Anatolians and his 12,500 Greeks against Artaxerxes - and nearly won. When Alexander invaded the Persian Empire, Darius took the field against him with 600,000 at Issus (I use Arrian's figures because the quality of Arrian's research seems far superior to that of his predecessors), lost, and attempted a reprise two years later with 1,000,000 or so at Gaugamela. The pattern of massive mobilisation is consistent, and one can detect the trace of an outline in which six parts of the Empire each provide a force of 300,000 troops at full mobilisation; given that Xerxes left 120,000 men to garrison Egypt, his mobilising 1.7 million instead of the expected 1.8 million under this system looks exactly right.
Artaxerxes in 401 BC mobilised 1,200,000 men, which would be four of the six areas (Asia Minor was not available - it was supporting Cyrus - and he presumably did not draw upon the easternmost provinces, Bactria, Sogdiana, etc.) Darius in 333 BC (Issus campaign) presumably had the Mesopotamian and Syro-Phoenician levies for his 600,000 while in 331 BC he would have not been able to draw on Asia Minor, Syria/Phoenicia or Egypt, so fielded his Mesopotamian, Medo-Persian and Eastern Satrapies levies, which should provide 900,000 men under this system, plus his mercenaries, royal guards and survivors of Issus, which neatly allows Arrian's 1 million or so. There is an interesting and attractive consistency about this, and as mentioned this accords with Xerxes putting 1.7 million into the field when he mobilised the entire Empire, i.e. all six zones.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2018, 08:58:19 AM
The problem comes once you cross into Europe. The newly conquered territories are not as well managed and don't have the level of agriculture that you're used to. They can probably find the rations for troops raised in that area, but they're not going to be able to find rations for those who've crossed the bridge.
True, and this would seem to be why in Herodotus VII.115 we have heralds visiting months in advance, instructing that food in certain quantities be gathered in a certain place for a certain date, resulting in feverish grain accrual (and 'many months' supply of corn being ground together at once' as the army approached), animal purchase and breeding, etc. followed by the Achamenid army being fed for a day in that locality and incidentally decamping with the valuable serving ware. It suggests someone had been along, taken a look and concluded that a very special effort would have to be made just to get the army through the area for one day.
(https://ssl.c.photoshelter.com/img-get/I0000nCzwjj56010/s/900/720/Imperialism-Africa-Colonialism-Imperialism-Cartoons-Punch-1885-02-14-79.jpg)
I tried :)
Patrick has a very consistent approach. Ancient numbers must be accepted at face value. Archaeology can largely be discounted as it is interpreted by academics.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 08:40:20 AM
No, I don't think so. Arrangements for marching through friendly territory are rarely those of operating within striking distance of the enemy.
As a general principle, this is fine. However it does not fit every situation, particularly where we have explicit source testimony to the contrary.
QuoteWhy do you think the Persian army before Plataea is operating in the same way as on the march from the Hellespont?
Because it is the same army? :) Actually it is racing in pursuit over a wide front as opposed to tramping through the countryside on a wide front. Is there an important point to be made here?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 08:56:54 AM
So if we assume five in Greece, which are presumably not identical to the cities who feed the army for a day, which Patrick identified. That isn't enough for a one week between restocking march. So are we looking at a hierarchy of supply dumps? Or are there only five? If only five, we are looking at a different mechanism for feeding the army on the march. A longer supply train, for example, or that supply ships actually accompanied the army, rather than just operating a conveyor to Asia Minor?
There are enough supply ships (c.3,000) to accompany the army and sustain a 'pipeline' from Asia Minor. Incidentally, Herodotus IX.3 gives us an intriguing insight into Achaemenid trans-Aegean communications:
"What he [Mardonius] desired was to take Athens once more; this was partly out of mere perversity, and partly because he intended to signify to the king at Sardis by the line of beacons across the islands that he held Athens."
It looks as if the Achaemenids had the capability to notify ships (convoys?) departing from Asia Minor of the progress of the army and hence any intended rendezvous.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 09:13:21 AM
I think if we are to discuss the size of "Biblical" armies, it ought to be elsewhere. I know from other discussions that Patrick unsurprisingly has a different approach to the evidence than the conventional and to fully develop it would throw this thread off. Also, if we discuss it here, people with an interest in the ancient Near East may miss it.
We can at least mention them here, as they form part of a source pattern, even if they are more suitably discussed elsewhere.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 09:42:49 AM
Patrick has a very consistent approach. Ancient numbers must be accepted at face value. Archaeology can largely be discounted as it is interpreted by academics.
I would rather say that if they are accepted at face value and compared, they give a surprisingly consistent picture. It would be disingenuous to pretend that archaeology is anything other than a highly interpretative discipline. This does not make it valueless, rather that the conclusions of archaeologists need to be treated with an eye open to their methodology and an understanding of their agenda - not unlike historical sources!
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 09:13:21 AM
QuoteMy admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time
I think if we are to discuss the size of "Biblical" armies, it ought to be elsewhere. I know from other discussions that Patrick unsurprisingly has a different approach to the evidence than the conventional and to fully develop it would throw this thread off. Also, if we discuss it here, people with an interest in the ancient Near East may miss it.
I thought he might have ;)
It is worth noting that the argument for the massive size of Xerxes Army due to it being heir to a biblical way of warfare is ultimately based on a literalist reading of the Bible.
The military use of the whip is an interesting sub-topic.
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Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 24, 2018, 09:20:30 PM
As always I am in awe if your mastery of ancient sources however the quote you provide could easily refer to whipping horses rather than men
Doubtful; as far as I know whips were not part of cavalry equipment at the time and the Persian army at Gaugamela was predominantly infantry - besides, by this point in the battle the Persian cavalry left had run away and their cavalry right was off-stage busy with Parmenio.
Diod 17.60.3f. "A shout went up at this from the Persians around Dareius, and those at a greater distance thought that the king had fallen. They were the first to take to flight, and they were followed by those next to them, and steadily, little by little, the solid ranks of Dareius's guard disintegrated. As both flanks became closed, the king himself was alarmed and retreated. The flight thus became general. Dust raised by the
Persian cavalry rose to a height, and as Alexander's squadrons followed on their heels, because of their numbers and the thickness of the dust, it was impossible to tell in what direction Dareius was fleeing. The air was filled with the groans of the fallen,
the din of the cavalry, and the constant sound of lashing of whips."
It's interesting to compare Curtius' account (4.15.33): "And already it had ceased to be a battle and became a massacre, when Darius also turned his chariot to flee. The victor was close upon the backs of the fugitives, but the cloud of dust which rose to the ksy made it impossible to see; therefore they wandered as if in the darkness of night, ever and anon coming together at the sound of a familiar voice or in response to a signal. Yet they made out
the noise of the reins by which the horses which drew the chariot were constantly lashed; these were the only traces of the fleeing king that they had."
We can't be sure what Diodorus' and Curtius source originally said, but the 'whips' in this case are exceedingly unlikely to be the massed whips of Persian infantry NCOs.
These are the other mentions of whips in Herodotus (missing out straightforward whipping of individuals):
Hdt 4.3.4 (Scythians fight their rebellious slaves: "Men of Scythia, look at what we are doing! We are fighting our own slaves; they kill us, and we grow fewer; we kill them, and shall have fewer slaves. Now, then, my opinion is that we should drop our spears and bows, and meet them with horsewhips in our hands. As long as they see us armed, they imagine that they are our equals and the sons of our equals; let them see us with whips and no weapons, and they will perceive that they are our slaves; and taking this to heart they will not face our attack."
Hdt 7.22.1 (the digging of Xerxes' canal): "Since those who had earlier attempted to sail around Athos had suffered shipwreck, for about three years preparations had been underway there. Triremes were anchored off Elaeus in the Chersonese; with these for their headquarters, all sorts of men in the army were compelled by whippings to dig a canal, coming by turns to the work; the inhabitants about Athos also dug."
Hdt 7.35 (Xerxes whips the sea): "When Xerxes heard of this, he was very angry and commanded that the Hellespont be whipped with three hundred lashes, and a pair of fetters be thrown into the sea. I have even heard that he sent branders with them to brand the Hellespont."
Hdt 7.56.1 (crossing the bridges): "When Xerxes had passed over to Europe, he viewed his army crossing under the lash. Seven days and seven nights it was in crossing, with no pause."
Hdt 7.103.3f. (Xerxes responds to Demaratus' views on the superiority of the Spartans): "Let us look at it with all reasonableness: how could a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, if they are all equally free and not under the rule of one man, withstand so great an army as mine? If you Greeks are five thousand, we still would be more than a thousand to one. If they were under the rule of one man according to our custom, they might out of fear of him become better than they naturally are, and under compulsion of the lash they might go against greater numbers of inferior men; but if they are allowed to go free they would do neither. I myself think that even if they were equal in numbers it would be hard for the Greeks to fight just against the Persians. What you are talking about is found among us alone, and even then it is not common but rare; there are some among my Persian spearmen who will gladly fight with three Greeks at once. You have no knowledge of this and are spouting a lot of nonsense."
Hdt 7.223.2-3 (Thermopylae): "Xerxes and his barbarians attacked, but Leonidas and his Hellenes, knowing they were going to their deaths, advanced now much farther than before into the wider part of the pass. In all the previous days they had sallied out into the narrow way and fought there, guarding the defensive wall. Now, however, they joined battle outside the narrows and many of the barbarians fell, for the leaders of the companies (hegemones ton teleon) beat everyone with whips from behind, urging them ever forward. Many of them were pushed into the sea and drowned; far more were trampled alive by each other, with no regard for who perished."
Other military lashings:
Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.25: "And the Greeks were well pleased to see the hills, as was natural considering that the enemy's force was cavalry; when, however, in their march out of the plain they had mounted to the top of the first hill, and were descending it, so as to ascend the next, at this moment the barbarians came upon them and down from the hilltop discharged their missiles and sling-stones and arrows, fighting under the lash."
That's all I know of.
Comments - a Persian whip-corps, or more likely habitual use of the whip by officers/NCOs, seems unlikely based on these passing references, but possible. It looks more like an extension of the exhortatory, prodding, pushing role of the rear rank men in battle which is familiar to us from other discussions and from other eras (which is what Hdt 7.223 suggests). At the same time, there is clearly a cultural aspect to consider, as shown by Xerxes 'speech' to Demaratus.
Incidentally, I like "You have no knowledge of this and are spouting a lot of nonsense". How apposite.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 09:56:41 AM
Actually it is racing in pursuit over a wide front as opposed to tramping through the countryside on a wide front. Is there an important point to be made here?
You're the one making it - is it important? You are saying, as I understand it, that we can assume that the army marching down from the Hellespont used the same formation because it was the same army, regardless of circumstances like proximity to the enemy, terrain, army composition. It's quite a radical view but whether its important in this discussion, I don't know.
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There are enough supply ships (c.3,000) to accompany the army and sustain a 'pipeline' from Asia Minor.
The ships of thirty and of fifty oars, the light galleys, and the great transports for horses came to a total of three thousand all together. 7.97.1
Are there another three thousand transports hidden somewhere, because these are all warships except for the horse transports. When H adds up their crews in 7.184, he assumes they are all penteconters.
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I would rather say that if they are accepted at face value and compared, they give a surprisingly consistent picture. It would be disingenuous to pretend that archaeology is anything other than a highly interpretative discipline. This does not make it valueless, rather that the conclusions of archaeologists need to be treated with an eye open to their methodology and an understanding of their agenda - not unlike historical sources!
The apparent consistency of the sources should be viewed as critically as anything else. If there is a systematic bias in the figures, they will be equally consistent. To me, we seem to have a pattern. A fairly compact count of "elite" forces - chariots, cavalry, hoplites - accompanied by "unnumbered hordes" of infantry and camp followers (not always properly distinguished). Estimates of the horde are coloured by accounts of other hordes and so the
topos self reinforces.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 09:56:41 AM
I would rather say that if they are accepted at face value and compared, they give a surprisingly consistent picture.
This is exactly why the Xerxes figure is obviously problematic.
Whether or not you agree with the Xerxes figure being inconsistent with what was logically possible - as presented by 20th century academia, then:
The Xerxes figure is still inconsistent with just about any other literary claim for large armies, by about an order of magnitude.
The Xerxes figure is also still inconsistent with any other military action in the following 2400 years.
It is so strikingly inconsistent, that your pattern recognition software should be flashing red and an alarm blaring in the background.
If these examples are too nuanced, what exactly is consistent with the 117million man army of Lan Na or the reality of Constantine's aerial crucifix over Malvin Bridge?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 09:35:00 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 24, 2018, 11:04:13 PM
My admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time.I am a little suspicious of temple inscriptions as by their nature they are not meant as historical documents giving a realistic depiction of events. For example Rameses is not some 20 times the size of a Egyptian or Hittite soldier from the lower classes.
I would caution against confusing conventions of visual depiction (Pharaoh is bigger because he is more important) with numerical confusion. On the subject of large armies, Herodotus (II.165-6) credits Egypt's military class with 160,000 'Hermotybians' and 250,000 'Calasirians', giving 410,000. Diodorus I.47.6 gives a pharaoh ('Ozymandias', i.e. Ramses II Usermaatre) 400,000 infantry and 20,000 mounted troops for a campaign against 'Bactria' (probably a misreading for ta-Kheta, the Land of Hatti).
Tacitus II.60 describes part of Germanicus' journey to Egypt, during which he visits Thebes and has some of the inscriptions explained to him, one of which describes how Thutmose III had a military manpower of 700,000. This interestingly ties in with II Chronicles 12:2-3 in which 'Shishak' (Thutmose III Djeserkau-sekhempeti, also 'seksek', 'destroyer' or 'conqueror') conquers Judah with 1,200 chariots, 60,000 cavalry and infantry 'without number'.
What you have to beware of here is that Germanicus and Chronicles may well have got their information from the same, flawed, source. They don't need to be independent.
Also I suspect that a lot of ink could be spilled in the discussion as to whether Shishak in II Chronicles is actually Thutmose III because that depends on the chronology somebody decides to follow and that is an argument I am not getting drawn into
What you must remember is that the Bible does have a penchant for large numbers, the number of Israelites which Moses is supposed to have led may have been larger than the population of Egypt.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 09:41:42 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2018, 08:58:19 AM
The problem comes once you cross into Europe. The newly conquered territories are not as well managed and don't have the level of agriculture that you're used to. They can probably find the rations for troops raised in that area, but they're not going to be able to find rations for those who've crossed the bridge.
True, and this would seem to be why in Herodotus VII.115 we have heralds visiting months in advance, instructing that food in certain quantities be gathered in a certain place for a certain date, resulting in feverish grain accrual (and 'many months' supply of corn being ground together at once' as the army approached), animal purchase and breeding, etc. followed by the Achamenid army being fed for a day in that locality and incidentally decamping with the valuable serving ware. It suggests someone had been along, taken a look and concluded that a very special effort would have to be made just to get the army through the area for one day.
To increase a breeding flock takes rather more than months. It means the population has to reduce their meat intake now (which for subsistence farmers is tricky because malnourishment beckons. You then keep a non-breeding female for one or two years when she does nothing but eat, and then get your first lamb in the third year.
So your flock is now taking more grazing and needs more manpower to manage it.
On top of this if Xerxes is demanding more grain grown, this also takes more land and more manpower. Also by definition, the good land that is easily worked is already farmed. Putting more land into cultivation takes far more manpower. And we have subsistence farmers who have enough to do to produce what they're already producing.
Can we have some numbers please as to how large an increase in production you imagine Xerxes demanded? How many men they were supposed to feed as opposed to being fed from imports.
By this time Greece was almost certainly dependent on grain imports anyway
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 10:24:04 AM
Are there another three thousand transports hidden somewhere, because these are all warships except for the horse transports. When H adds up their crews in 7.184, he assumes they are all penteconters.
We wouldn't need 3000 transports. Presuming the navy has the job of
entirely supplying 3 million men throughout the campaign. That's 3000 tons of grain a day deposited on the shore by 60 50-tonner ships. Assume an average round trip of 10 days from the Balkan/Macedonian/Thessalian shore to Asia Minor and you need 600 not-very-big ships. Include the supply depots and what is furnished by the locals and you probably need considerably less.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2018, 11:50:13 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 09:41:42 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2018, 08:58:19 AM
The problem comes once you cross into Europe. The newly conquered territories are not as well managed and don't have the level of agriculture that you're used to. They can probably find the rations for troops raised in that area, but they're not going to be able to find rations for those who've crossed the bridge.
True, and this would seem to be why in Herodotus VII.115 we have heralds visiting months in advance, instructing that food in certain quantities be gathered in a certain place for a certain date, resulting in feverish grain accrual (and 'many months' supply of corn being ground together at once' as the army approached), animal purchase and breeding, etc. followed by the Achamenid army being fed for a day in that locality and incidentally decamping with the valuable serving ware. It suggests someone had been along, taken a look and concluded that a very special effort would have to be made just to get the army through the area for one day.
To increase a breeding flock takes rather more than months. It means the population has to reduce their meat intake now (which for subsistence farmers is tricky because malnourishment beckons. You then keep a non-breeding female for one or two years when she does nothing but eat, and then get your first lamb in the third year.
So your flock is now taking more grazing and needs more manpower to manage it.
On top of this if Xerxes is demanding more grain grown, this also takes more land and more manpower. Also by definition, the good land that is easily worked is already farmed. Putting more land into cultivation takes far more manpower. And we have subsistence farmers who have enough to do to produce what they're already producing.
Can we have some numbers please as to how large an increase in production you imagine Xerxes demanded? How many men they were supposed to feed as opposed to being fed from imports.
By this time Greece was almost certainly dependent on grain imports anyway
It would be an idea to try and determine what percentage of the army's needs would be met by a) local contributions, b) the supply depots, and c) the navy.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 25, 2018, 12:07:46 PM
We wouldn't need 3000 transports. Presuming the navy has the job of entirely supplying 3 million men throughout the campaign. That's 3000 tons of grain a day deposited on the shore by 60 50-tonner ships. Assume an average round trip of 10 days from the Balkan/Macedonian/Thessalian shore to Asia Minor and you need 600 not-very-big ships. Include the supply depots and what is furnished by the locals and you probably need considerably less.
A reminder it is Patrick who claims 3000 transports, not me. Also, the figure of 3,000 tons calculated at the beginning was wrong on the figures being used at the time (It should be 3,500 tonnes at 1 kg per man per day) and that was before we realised there are at least 4.5 million people to feed according to Herodotus, so we need 4,500 tonnes. Then we placed all the grain in amphorae, which cut the weight of grain a 50 ton ship could carry by half (the other half being ceramic). So you need the equivalent of 9,000 tonnes of stores offloaded per day. That is assuming you can source your fodder locally. So, the true figure is around 1,800 50 tonne ships. I leave the plausibility of that in the context of the time to others.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 12:36:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 25, 2018, 12:07:46 PM
We wouldn't need 3000 transports. Presuming the navy has the job of entirely supplying 3 million men throughout the campaign. That's 3000 tons of grain a day deposited on the shore by 60 50-tonner ships. Assume an average round trip of 10 days from the Balkan/Macedonian/Thessalian shore to Asia Minor and you need 600 not-very-big ships. Include the supply depots and what is furnished by the locals and you probably need considerably less.
A reminder it is Patrick who claims 3000 transports, not me. Also, the figure of 3,000 tons calculated at the beginning was wrong on the figures being used at the time (It should be 3,500 tonnes at 1 kg per man per day) and that was before we realised there are at least 4.5 million people to feed according to Herodotus, so we need 4,500 tonnes. Then we placed all the grain in amphorae, which cut the weight of grain a 50 ton ship could carry by half (the other half being ceramic). So you need the equivalent of 9,000 tonnes of stores offloaded per day. That is assuming you can source your fodder locally. So, the true figure is around 1,800 50 tonne ships. I leave the plausibility of that in the context of the time to others.
I propose that the grain taken to the storage depots along the Balkan and Asia Minor coastlines would be in amphorae since there's plenty of time to get it there so weight is not an issue. The grain taken from Asia Minor to the army travelling along the Balkan coast would probably be in sacks to save weight and facilitate loading on mules. That gets your vessels back to 50 tons grain per ship which supplies only a percentage of the army's needs whilst it is on the march. How much could the depots store and the locals supply?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 25, 2018, 12:21:17 PM
It would be an idea to try and determine what percentage of the army's needs would be met by a) local contributions, b) the supply depots, and c) the navy.
I tried a thought experiment based on the idea of "Feed the Army for a day". Imagine a community of 10,000 people - on the big side for the area but lets try it. Assume it feeds itself under normal conditions. It is given notice to boost production over three harvests and quickly creates perfect grain stores. It's basic annual production is 3,650,000 person days a year. A ten percent increase in production will store up 365,000 person days a year, 1,095,000 in 3 years. So a sustained production increase of 40% would give us the sort of scale we need for Herodotus' figures for a day. We can speculate on how many largish polities like this there were, how viable the resources needed for building that huge single use granary, how viable the increase in production, especially when a lot of the male population may have been conscripted to build the great road and associated infrastructure. But in the end, it is speculation. As I've said several times, just calculating numbers like this only takes us so far unless they are placed in the context of an army on a mission.
That would be 10 000 working people, for your maths to work, and a quite unusual 365 day a year growing period, uninterrupted for three years, from a standing start.
One characteristic that both Thracian Tribes and Greek City states share is that hey are not command economies. It is not that simple to get a lot of independent small farmers to increase production so dramatically so as to feed an army of several million,even supposing they had the ability to do so.
Quote from: Mark G on April 25, 2018, 03:57:48 PM
That would be 10 000 working people, for your maths to work, and a quite unusual 365 day a year growing period, uninterrupted for three years, from a standing start.
Actually, no. It is based on mouths to feed and the number of days on which they are fed. So the entire community, on a break even basis, must produce 10,000 rations a day for a whole year. It is deliberately abstracted, so as not to have to fiddle with yield rates, growing periods, ration scales, the balance of crops v. animal products etc.
With little refinement, we can see some obvious flaws that mean productivity is lower. Half the population would have been children and ate less. Half the adults would be women, who would also eat less. We assume constant harvests and no spoilage. We assume that full scale up could be achieved in a year (where did the extra seed come from, have you got that much spare growing land under your control that you can clear and plant it?) The point was to give a ball park idea of what the "each city could feed the army for a day" theory represents.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2018, 11:50:13 AM
Can we have some numbers please as to how large an increase in production you imagine Xerxes demanded? How many men they were supposed to feed as opposed to being fed from imports.
By this time Greece was almost certainly dependent on grain imports anyway
Disagree about Greece being dependent upon grain imports: that did not happen for another century, when Egypt sent corn to whichever cities were prepared to send troops to help it out. Even Athens was self-sufficient in 480 BC; fuss about Black Sea corn does not begin until Thucydides makes mention of it.
As for numbers, we make our own guesses from Herodotus VII.119:
"Similar accounts were returned by the officers in the other towns. Now the dinner, about which a great deal of fuss had been made and for the preparation of which orders had been given long ago, proceeded as I will tell. [2] As soon as the townsmen had word from the herald's proclamation, they divided corn among themselves in their cities and all of them for many months ground it to wheat and barley meal; moreover, they fed the finest beasts that money could buy, and kept landfowl and waterfowl in cages and ponds, for the entertaining of the army. They also made gold and silver cups and bowls and all manner of service for the table. [3] These things were provided for the king himself and those that ate with him. For the rest of the army they provided only food. At the coming of the army, there was always a tent ready for Xerxes to take his rest in, while the men camped out in the open air. [4] When the hour came for dinner, the real trouble for the hosts began. When they had eaten their fill and passed the night there, the army tore down the tent on the next day and marched off with all the movables, leaving nothing but carrying all with them."
What the above indicates is that there were no imports but a lot of drain on local resources. One notes incidentally the corn being 'in their cities' - the above (Perseus' Godley) translation incidentally seems to have a phrase out of place: "they divided corn among themselves in their cities and all of them for many months ground it to wheat and barley meal" is elsewhere translated as: "the inhabitants made a division of their stores of corn and proceeded to grind flour of wheat and of barley for many months together". It seems more sensible that they ground many months' grain allowance at once than that they spent months grinding grain ... either way, that was the equivalent of their winter store gone to feed Xerxes' army for a day.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2018, 11:44:06 AM
What you have to beware of here is that Germanicus and Chronicles may well have got their information from the same, flawed, source. They don't need to be independent.
Germanicus had Egyptian inscriptions translated; would the writer of Chronicles have bothered to acquire information from such a source? The Chronicler in any event did not take his numbers for chariots or cavalry from that source. I think we can safely conclude that they were independent.
QuoteWhat you must remember is that the Bible does have a penchant for large numbers, the number of Israelites which Moses is supposed to have led may have been larger than the population of Egypt.
This was exactly what worried the pharaoh who decided to end the Hebrews' work-free, tax-free status, and his successor, who wanted their male children out of the way.
The question about persistent large numbers in the Bible is whether they were persistently large because of several generation of writers' constantly overheated imagination or because the numbers really were large. If it were only the Bible which mentions armies of hundreds of thousands, we migth be justified in assuming exaggeration. But
all major cultures of the period record themselves and/or their opponents as fielding massive armies.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 12:36:09 PM
Also, the figure of 3,000 tons calculated at the beginning was wrong on the figures being used at the time (It should be 3,500 tonnes at 1 kg per man per day) and that was before we realised there are at least 4.5 million people to feed according to Herodotus, so we need 4,500 tonnes. Then we placed all the grain in amphorae, which cut the weight of grain a 50 ton ship could carry by half (the other half being ceramic). So you need the equivalent of 9,000 tonnes of stores offloaded per day. That is assuming you can source your fodder locally. So, the true figure is around 1,800 50 tonne ships. I leave the plausibility of that in the context of the time to others.
Some curious arithmetic here.
1,800 ships for 9,000 tons is 5 tons per ship; on Anthony's figures it should be 25. The number of ships is thus 1,800/5 = 360.
Tonnage in a merchantman is generally reckoned in gross registered tonnage rather than deadweight tonage and thus is not so much weight as volume; putting grain in amphorae may double the weight but it does not double the volume. Hence the 50-tonner could be carrying 50 tons of grain in 50 tons of amphorae, or more likely 40 tons of grain in 40 tons of amphorae if we consider amphorae to add 20% to overall volume. This would take the daily complement of ships down to 225.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 25, 2018, 04:21:10 PM
With little refinement, we can see some obvious flaws that mean productivity is lower. Half the population would have been children and ate less. Half the adults would be women, who would also eat less. We assume constant harvests and no spoilage. We assume that full scale up could be achieved in a year (where did the extra seed come from, have you got that much spare growing land under your control that you can clear and plant it?) The point was to give a ball park idea of what the "each city could feed the army for a day" theory represents.
A good idea. The impression Herodotus gives is that the cities routinely kept in store something like six months' supply (1,800,000 person-days or so), which suggests (along with a lot of other incidental information) that yields were habitually well above subsistence. In Herodotus VII.118 we get the information that Antipater son of Orges reckoned that it cost the Thasians 400 talents to feed Xerxes' army for a day and that this was pretty much the experience of other communities. This hints at (without proving) a certain amount of buying-in (as opposed to importing
per se) to make up what was needed.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 25, 2018, 04:18:00 PM
One characteristic that both Thracian Tribes and Greek City states share is that hey are not command economies. It is not that simple to get a lot of independent small farmers to increase production so dramatically so as to feed an army of several million,even supposing they had the ability to do so.
But they are not independent small farmers; they are part of a highly cohesive community, a tribe or a
polis.
We are not necessarily looking at a dramatic production increase; we are looking at an effort to make up margins in the face of a massive obligation. The main obligation was met through drastic depletion of stocks. The additional animal and avian increase was presumably to ensure no shortfall in the Persian nobility receiving only the finest meats and their followers receiving at least something containing protein.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 25, 2018, 09:03:03 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 08:07:46 PM
In Herodotus VII.118 we get the information that Antipater son of Orges reckoned that it cost the Thasians 400 talents to feed Xerxes' army for a day and that this was pretty much the experience of other communities.
How much grain could a talent buy? Any way of arriving at an approximate figure?
After a quick look-around I get an Attic talent equivalent to 6000 drachmae (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attic_talent), and a half-drachma enough to feed a family of three (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_drachma#Value) for one day. So, doing the sums, 400 talents supplies a day's minimum sustenance to 400 x 6000 x 2 x 3 people = 14 400 000 men. That number can be brought down somewhat by assuming the soldiers were fed more than the bare minimum and by the cost of feeding the Persian VIPs with fancier food along with the gold and silver cups and bowls, but we are definitely not in the 200 000 man category (a talent BTW consists of 26kg of silver so most of the 400 talents - 10,4 tons of silver - did
not go into the tableware).
According to this source (http://historylink101.com/2/greece3/money.htm) a loaf of barley bread cost 1 obol (6 obols to the drachma). I can't find out how much the loaf weighed.
The meal BTW would have cost the Thasians about US$ 8,000,000.00 in contemporary terms.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 08:14:04 PM
But they are not independent small farmers; they are part of a highly cohesive community, a tribe or a polis.
I am afraid I am going to have to politely disagree with that statement.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 25, 2018, 12:21:17 PM
It would be an idea to try and determine what percentage of the army's needs would be met by a) local contributions, b) the supply depots, and c) the navy.
Given that some estimates of the population of Ancient Greece and the Greeks in Asia minor are 12.5 million and 2.5 million (500BC)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Greece
Michael Grant gives 4,000,000 for the Macedonian kingdom, 7,000,000 for the Ptolemaic kingdom, and 30,000,000 for the Seleucid empire in the the third century BC
So the 6 million that Xerxes dumped on their shores would be a very significant part of the population. I cannot see them feeding a meaningful proportion of that number
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 07:49:28 PM
This was exactly what worried the pharaoh who decided to end the Hebrews' work-free, tax-free status, and his successor, who wanted their male children out of the way.
The question about persistent large numbers in the Bible is whether they were persistently large because of several generation of writers' constantly overheated imagination or because the numbers really were large. If it were only the Bible which mentions armies of hundreds of thousands, we migth be justified in assuming exaggeration. But all major cultures of the period record themselves and/or their opponents as fielding massive armies.
The Israelites journeyed from Rameses to Sukkoth. There were about six hundred thousand men on foot, besides women and children. 38 Many other people went up with them, and also large droves of livestock, both flocks and herds.
The first census gave 603,550 men over the age of twenty
Pretty damned good for people wandering in the wilderness. Makes old Xerxes look like a complete waste of space
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 07:49:28 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 25, 2018, 11:50:13 AM
Can we have some numbers please as to how large an increase in production you imagine Xerxes demanded? How many men they were supposed to feed as opposed to being fed from imports.
By this time Greece was almost certainly dependent on grain imports anyway
Disagree about Greece being dependent upon grain imports:
then you are at odds with most historians. Why do you think the Greeks sent out so many colonists? The main reason historians assure is was because they couldn't feed them at home
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 25, 2018, 09:32:16 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 08:14:04 PM
But they are not independent small farmers; they are part of a highly cohesive community, a tribe or a polis.
I am afraid I am going to have to politely disagree with that statement.
Are you entirely sure you wish to disagree with mainstream history?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 08:07:46 PM
The impression Herodotus gives is that the cities routinely kept in store something like six months' supply
of course people store six months supply. They cannot rely on the southern hemisphere for an extra harvest!
That six month's supply is to get them through to the next harvest, if somebody else eats it, they die
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 07:18:44 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 25, 2018, 09:32:16 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 08:14:04 PM
But they are not independent small farmers; they are part of a highly cohesive community, a tribe or a polis.
I am afraid I am going to have to politely disagree with that statement.
Are you entirely sure you wish to disagree with mainstream history?
Well it's never worried you!
And of course the Greek cities and the Thracian tribes weren't a command economy. The idea that Xerxes could merely ordain that an area produced an order of magnitude more food than they usually did and it happened is fantasy
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 06:59:52 AM
So the 6 million that Xerxes dumped on their shores would be a very significant part of the population. I cannot see them feeding a meaningful proportion of that number
Not for any length of time, certainly. But for a day at a time, to help out the Persians' cross-Aegean supply arrangements, yes.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 07:13:39 AM
The Israelites journeyed from Rameses to Sukkoth. There were about six hundred thousand men on foot, besides women and children. 38 Many other people went up with them, and also large droves of livestock, both flocks and herds.
The first census gave 603,550 men over the age of twenty
Pretty damned good for people wandering in the wilderness. Makes old Xerxes look like a complete waste of space
Ramses to Succoth is Egypt, not wilderness (the wilderness came later). The Hebrews were apparently living off their 'large droves of livestock' as they went, and quite rapidly bringing down the numbers, because by Exodus 16:3 they are already complaining of hunger and need flights of quails and a nightly delivery of manna to sustain them.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 07:17:16 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 07:49:28 PM
Disagree about Greece being dependent upon grain imports:
then you are at odds with most historians. Why do you think the Greeks sent out so many colonists? The main reason historians assure is was because they couldn't feed them at home
The main reason is as Thucydides I.12 tells us:
"Even after the Trojan war Hellas was still engaged in removing and settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede growth. [2] The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities."
He then seems to undermine this somewhat by saying:
"Twenty years later the Dorians and the Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that much had to be done [4] and many years had to elapse before Hellas could attain to a durable tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the islands, and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the rest of Hellas. All these places were founded subsequently to the war with Troy.
But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere,— the old form of government being hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives,— and Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply herself more closely to the sea."
What he appears to be saying is that a) the round of civil conflicts following the Trojan War produced colonies in the form of displaced exiles, and b) later on, colonies were sent out deliberately as a means of increasing the home city's influence.
So Thucydides' 'take' is that it was politics which created the colonies; famine and/or grain underproduction had little if anything to do with it (surplus population might, as there was only so much land to work). In any event, regarding Xerxes, it is Thrace's and Greece's supply potential (and actual) in 480 BC which counts, not in any preceding year. Nobody was founding colonies in 480 BC (in 465 and again in 437 BC Athens founded one at Amphipolis, but that was for strategic reasons).
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 07:21:10 AM
And of course the Greek cities and the Thracian tribes weren't a command economy. The idea that Xerxes could merely ordain that an area produced an order of magnitude more food than they usually did and it happened is fantasy
I repeat that they were
depleting stocks on an order of magnitude greater than usual, not conjuring extra food of an order of magnitude greater than usual (they did add additional food to make up margins). One does not need to be a command economy to give up the whole of one's existing stocks (or close to it), just a community in the way of a very large and intimidating army. Xerxes simply ordained that a certain amount of food be made available; how the locals achieved that was up to them.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 07:42:48 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 06:59:52 AM
So the 6 million that Xerxes dumped on their shores would be a very significant part of the population. I cannot see them feeding a meaningful proportion of that number
Not for any length of time, certainly. But for a day at a time, to help out the Persians' cross-Aegean supply arrangements, yes.
not even that, 6 million extra mouths is going to swamp them. They might help feed all the canal diggers and road wideners and guards and escorts travelling with them in the first four years.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 07:42:48 AM
Ramses to Succoth is Egypt, not wilderness (the wilderness came later). The Hebrews were apparently living off their 'large droves of livestock' as they went, and quite rapidly bringing down the numbers, because by Exodus 16:3 they are already complaining of hunger and need flights of quails and a nightly delivery of manna to sustain them.
The census figures were taken before and after the wilderness, there was a couple of thousand difference. I merely used them to point out that biblical history tends to produce huge numbers which are unsustainable
It's like Xerxes more than doubling the population of Macedonia
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 07:42:48 AM
The main reason is as Thucydides I.12 tells us:
"Even after the Trojan war Hellas was still engaged in removing and settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede growth. [2] The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities."
He then seems to undermine this somewhat by saying:
Yes, funnily enough I don't think Thucydides is the last word on the issue. There is a lot of work that has been done since
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 07:42:48 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 07:21:10 AM
And of course the Greek cities and the Thracian tribes weren't a command economy. The idea that Xerxes could merely ordain that an area produced an order of magnitude more food than they usually did and it happened is fantasy
I repeat that they were depleting stocks on an order of magnitude greater than usual, not conjuring extra food of an order of magnitude greater than usual (they did add additional food to make up margins). One does not need to be a command economy to give up the whole of one's existing stocks (or close to it), just a community in the way of a very large and intimidating army. Xerxes simply ordained that a certain amount of food be made available; how the locals achieved that was up to them.
Patrick please be sensible
A community doesn't just hand over its entire food stocks. They are merely condemning themselves to slow, lingering and unpleasant death.
I think even Herodotus would have mentioned that the entirely population of Northern Greece and Macedonia disappeared through starvation.
similarly a population of perhaps four million does not have the food stocks to feed an army of six million with hangers on. If they have a 10% surplus that will be about it. These are subsistence economies! In some years they'll struggle to feed themselves!
Xerxes can say what he damn well likes but if it's a bad harvest it's a bad harvest and there's not a damned thing anybody can do about it
The whole debate is reaching new levels of fatuous. I realise that in the UK we were the first into the industrial revolution and thus are the European population with least connection to practical agriculture and the land, but some of the arguments I've seen have driven home to me just how disconnected some at least of our population has become
QuoteSome curious arithmetic here.
1,800 ships for 9,000 tons is 5 tons per ship; on Anthony's figures it should be 25. The number of ships is thus 1,800/5 = 360.
This is per day. If you read Justin more carefully, he has ten days worth of ships in the conveyor. So not so curious after all.
Jim is talking sense here. Pre industrial societies grow their population to the limit of the productive capacity of the good. agricultural land that they control. If they have plenty of land and a few peaceful generations people are are healthy and able to support more children. The growth will be stopped when marginal land has to be brought into production and that results in a more fragile population, more vulnerable to disease or crop failure.Only a major change in farming methods and transport capability is going to change things.
There has to be a relationship between the number of people working the land and the amount of food produced. New land is not sitting around waiting to be put into production, it is in need of clearing, of plowing to break up the soil, likely of fertilising. If an animal or human dung method of fertilisation is used then there aren't suddenly extra animals around, if they are defecating on new land they are not servicing existing fields. Bringing new land into cultivation requires labour and this labour is not sitting around doing nothing because in a subsistence economy very few people can afford to be waiting around for work to appear. It is very difficult to massively increase grain production. The only area I can see this being feasible are the rice bowl areas of the Ganges and Yellow river flood plains where you can get two crops per year and even there population will rise to the level of food production available. Simultaneously the believers in a 'big army' scenario have the Great king recruiting large numbers of men into the army. and these men have to be fed whilst they are organised and trained and marched to the Hellespont . If the Empire had a population of 50 million then there are roughly 13 million men of military age. Even taking 1.5 million for the army and its logistics component is taking a lot of men out of the food production process at a time when, in theory, more land is to be added and more food produced and an awful lot of these men and their food ( and the animals to be fed,) will be in the wrong places. A man whose food is 300 miles away is still a starving man.
Roy
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 07:18:44 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 25, 2018, 09:32:16 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 25, 2018, 08:14:04 PM
But they are not independent small farmers; they are part of a highly cohesive community, a tribe or a polis.
I am afraid I am going to have to politely disagree with that statement.
Are you entirely sure you wish to disagree with mainstream history?
Bit of an Alanis Morrissette situation
If we assume that the 400 talents was used to buy subsistence food at equivalent to Athenian prices, grain was 3 drachmae per medimnos. A Medimnos was 51.84 litres and a litre of grain weighs about 0.8 kg. There are 6,000 drachmae in an Athenian talent. I believe therefore a talent would by 82 tonnes. 400 talents would feed 3,280,000 per day.
Another approach is that it is stated by Aristophanes that three people could subsist on half a drachma a day. So 400 talents would feed 4,800,000.
What we don't know is if the figure of 400 talents is actual and not exaggerated, or what proportion was spent on the lavish hospitality for Xerxes, or even what effect on the market price suddenly needing to find hundreds of tonnes of grain would cause. But 400 talents is internally consistent.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2018, 08:34:55 AM
QuoteSome curious arithmetic here.
1,800 ships for 9,000 tons is 5 tons per ship; on Anthony's figures it should be 25. The number of ships is thus 1,800/5 = 360.
This is per day. If you read Justin more carefully, he has ten days worth of ships in the conveyor. So not so curious after all.
you could make a conveyor work but I'd be wary about 'just in time' practices.
After all you could lose days if a sudden storm scatters ships. I think you'd have to work on the principle of 'over -supply' to build up stocks on the beach for the days when you couldn't land stuff.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 09:38:23 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2018, 08:34:55 AM
QuoteSome curious arithmetic here.
1,800 ships for 9,000 tons is 5 tons per ship; on Anthony's figures it should be 25. The number of ships is thus 1,800/5 = 360.
This is per day. If you read Justin more carefully, he has ten days worth of ships in the conveyor. So not so curious after all.
you could make a conveyor work but I'd be wary about 'just in time' practices.
After all you could lose days if a sudden storm scatters ships. I think you'd have to work on the principle of 'over -supply' to build up stocks on the beach for the days when you couldn't land stuff.
I agree. The modern concept of "just in time" logistics relies on computers and machine age supply chains. Operating it at the mercy of the weather with no rapid communications seems like tempting fate. It reflects I think the different approaches being taken by the orthodox and "sources first" proponents. Instead of checking sources against realities and parallels, "sources first" methodology bends reality round the source. So, in order to supply the Great Army, Northern Greece must be well populated, highly centralised and producing significant agricultural surpluses. The fact that the evidence isn't there for this is waved away. Agricultural production can be boosted 50% overnight and sustained without any major changes that have driven such changes elsewhere in history, like mechanisation.
To support the conveyor (and credit to Justin he has built in more slack than Patrick allows), we must assume that the weather in the Northern Aegean was very calm with an occassional (rapid onset, rapid passing) storm. Modern sailing instructions cast doubt on this. We must also assume over beach supply is easy, when it's actually difficult even with modern landing ships. And so on.
While I think I can see the bones of a much more thorough analysis forming, with a deeper study of things like the demographics and economy of Northern Greece, I don't think anyone has the time and knowledge to do it. So, we'll just trade random facts until we collapse with exhaustion.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 08:10:08 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 07:42:48 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 07:21:10 AM
And of course the Greek cities and the Thracian tribes weren't a command economy. The idea that Xerxes could merely ordain that an area produced an order of magnitude more food than they usually did and it happened is fantasy
I repeat that they were depleting stocks on an order of magnitude greater than usual, not conjuring extra food of an order of magnitude greater than usual (they did add additional food to make up margins). One does not need to be a command economy to give up the whole of one's existing stocks (or close to it), just a community in the way of a very large and intimidating army. Xerxes simply ordained that a certain amount of food be made available; how the locals achieved that was up to them.
Patrick please be sensible
A community doesn't just hand over its entire food stocks. They are merely condemning themselves to slow, lingering and unpleasant death.
I think even Herodotus would have mentioned that the entirely population of Northern Greece and Macedonia disappeared through starvation.
similarly a population of perhaps four million does not have the food stocks to feed an army of six million with hangers on. If they have a 10% surplus that will be about it. These are subsistence economies! In some years they'll struggle to feed themselves!
Xerxes can say what he damn well likes but if it's a bad harvest it's a bad harvest and there's not a damned thing anybody can do about it
The whole debate is reaching new levels of fatuous. I realise that in the UK we were the first into the industrial revolution and thus are the European population with least connection to practical agriculture and the land, but some of the arguments I've seen have driven home to me just how disconnected some at least of our population has become
It would help if we take the time frame into account. Xerxes' 3.4 or 5.4 million man army doesn't eat a third or half or more of the available stocks of the population in Thrace and Greece. The army takes about 2 months to travel from the Hellespont to Greece. That's 16,7% of a year, hence 16,7% of the annual food requirement each way - say 8,4% passing through Thrace and 8,4% passing through Macedonia. It also feeds partly off the food dumps and partly off considerable supplies ferried over by the fleet (considerable because when the fleet could no longer function the army was in immediate trouble). I'm guessing Xerxes intended to strip Greece proper to lay up further stocks for the return journey. It is not unreasonable to assume that the allied tribes/nations the Persians passed through were not actually required to supply more than about 10% of their annual harvest, which is something they could manage.
As a possible indicator, the Thasians supplied the Persian army with
one meal on behalf of their compatriots on the mainland. Thasian control of the Thracian mainland (https://books.google.co.za/books?id=0qAoqP4g1fEC&pg=PA117&lpg=PA117&dq=extent+of+thasian+control+of+mainland+thrace&source=bl&ots=_iXGzxHu06&sig=tLplPKcKPAERpqzNk4iITj15GXc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiPvNv25tfaAhXWFsAKHaZeAWUQ6AEwAnoECAAQNw#v=onepage&q=extent%20of%20thasian%20control%20of%20mainland%20thrace&f=false) extended from Stryme in the east to Galepsos in the west, a distance of about 110km in a straight line and probably at least 50% more following the coastline. If the Persians march 20km a day and don't stop for any of the days except the one where they enjoyed their hosts' hospitality, they spent at least 8 days in Thasian territory. So as a ballpark figure, the Persians relied on the locals for 12% of their needs. Doing the sums, that's 12% of 16,7% of their requirements each way = 2% of the annual harvest. Call it 4%. Hardly an intolerable burden on local resources.
(https://i.imgur.com/CERUFc6.jpg)
I'm not sure those figures work. Lets use a nice round figure army of 4 million and a transit time of 60 days. We need 240,000,000 person days rations. If this was 10% of the agricultural output of the region on a break even basis, it would produce 2.4 billion rations in a year. Thats approximately 6.6 million a day. This is much too high, even by the highest estimates.
If we work it back from (still quite generous) population estimate of 1 million, a break even community produces 365 million rations a year. An available 10% surplus would therefore be 36.5 million rations, which would feed an army of 608,000 for two months. Or we can offset it and say our 4 million army would still need to import around 200,000 tonnes of supplies (on a 1kg a day basis).
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2018, 12:27:12 PM
I'm not sure those figures work. Lets use a nice round figure army of 4 million and a transit time of 60 days. We need 240,000,000 person days rations. If this was 10% of the agricultural output of the region on a break even basis, it would produce 2.4 billion rations in a year. Thats approximately 6.6 million a day. This is much too high, even by the highest estimates.
If we work it back from (still quite generous) population estimate of 1 million, a break even community produces 365 million rations a year. An available 10% surplus would therefore be 36.5 million rations, which would feed an army of 608,000 for two months. Or we can offset it and say our 4 million army would still need to import around 200,000 tonnes of supplies (on a 1kg a day basis).
One other consideration - see my modified post.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2018, 11:34:33 AM
It would help if we take the time frame into account. Xerxes' 3.4 or 5.4 million man army doesn't eat a third or half or more of the available stocks of the population in Thrace and Greece. The army takes about 2 months to travel from the Hellespont to Greece. That's 16,7% of a year, hence 16,7% of the annual food requirement each way - say 8,4% passing through Thrace and 8,4% passing through Macedonia. It also feeds partly off the food dumps and partly off considerable supplies ferried over by the fleet (considerable because when the fleet could no longer function the army was in immediate trouble). I'm guessing Xerxes intended to strip Greece proper to lay up further stocks for the return journey. It is not unreasonable to assume that the allied tribes/nations the Persians passed through were not actually required to supply more than about 10% of their annual harvest, which is something they could manage.
I was taking the population as 4 million, so assuming they are assiduous in their response to orders, I assumed that they might produce an extra 10% surplus, which is 400,000 men a year. (Which given the average fluctuation in yields because of weather, is quite an achievement.)
Some of this surplus would be eaten during the four year period by the Persian garrison (and their servants, slaves, horseboys, horses etc) in the area or the crews of any Persian naval presence. Some of it will be eaten by the roadbuilders and canal diggers, those imported into the area to physically construct the depots. Some of it will probably be drawn on by local forces mustering to join the army of Xerxes. At the end of the four year period, when Xerxes arrives with his army, there will be some stockpile still left, but I wouldn't factor it in as a major source of supply for the however many million men crossed into Europe
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 12:35:13 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2018, 11:34:33 AM
It would help if we take the time frame into account. Xerxes' 3.4 or 5.4 million man army doesn't eat a third or half or more of the available stocks of the population in Thrace and Greece. The army takes about 2 months to travel from the Hellespont to Greece. That's 16,7% of a year, hence 16,7% of the annual food requirement each way - say 8,4% passing through Thrace and 8,4% passing through Macedonia. It also feeds partly off the food dumps and partly off considerable supplies ferried over by the fleet (considerable because when the fleet could no longer function the army was in immediate trouble). I'm guessing Xerxes intended to strip Greece proper to lay up further stocks for the return journey. It is not unreasonable to assume that the allied tribes/nations the Persians passed through were not actually required to supply more than about 10% of their annual harvest, which is something they could manage.
I was taking the population as 4 million, so assuming they are assiduous in their response to orders, I assumed that they might produce an extra 10% surplus, which is 400,000 men a year. (Which given the average fluctuation in yields because of weather, is quite an achievement.)
Some of this surplus would be eaten during the four year period by the Persian garrison (and their servants, slaves, horseboys, horses etc) in the area or the crews of any Persian naval presence. Some of it will be eaten by the roadbuilders and canal diggers, those imported into the area to physically construct the depots. Some of it will probably be drawn on by local forces mustering to join the army of Xerxes. At the end of the four year period, when Xerxes arrives with his army, there will be some stockpile still left, but I wouldn't factor it in as a major source of supply for the however many million men crossed into Europe
Reread my last but one post. A careful reading of the Thasian incident shows that the local Greeks supplied the Persian army only the occasional meal and did not feed it on a daily basis. Most of the army's food had to come from elsewhere.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2018, 12:40:40 PM
Reread my last but one post. A careful reading of the Thasian incident shows that the local Greeks supplied the Persian army only the occasional meal and did not feed it on a daily basis. Most of the army's food had to come from elsewhere.
An occasional meal might be possible. I agree entirely the food had to come from elsewhere
One problem with the logistics is we don't know how many men had to be fed in the four years lead up to the invasion. It might have been possible for them to be supported locally
QuoteI was taking the population as 4 million,
Estimates of the Classical Greek population I can find online vary from 3-15 million but the more considered seem to fit in the 8-12 million range. This would mean Northern Greece in the coastal strip boasted half to a third of the Greek population. Given the fact that the more densely populated bits were Southern Greece, Asia Minor and Sicily, this seems unlikely.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2018, 02:07:44 PM
QuoteI was taking the population as 4 million,
Estimates of the Classical Greek population I can find online vary from 3-15 million but the more considered seem to fit in the 8-12 million range. This would mean Northern Greece in the coastal strip boasted half to a third of the Greek population. Given the fact that the more densely populated bits were Southern Greece, Asia Minor and Sicily, this seems unlikely.
The figures I got were 12.5 for Greece and 2.5 for Ionia, but Macedonia was 4.
So to give a positive spin on things and to chose figures that would give some hope of them being able to contribute, I went for 4 million for the strip of Greece,plus those bits of Macedonia and Thrace that are involved :D
but it is a very generous estimate
QuoteThe figures I got were 12.5 for Greece and 2.5 for Ionia, but Macedonia was 4.
I did spot the estimate for Macedonia of 4 million but it was tagged as Hellenistic, when Macedon was both larger and more economically active. However, it is all rather gestimated at the best of times. I think on further reflection I'd revise my population estimate of the region upwards from 1 million though. How much of it is in range to be involved with the Great Army I don't know. Most of the cities and plains are in striking distance of the coast I think, so the economy is probably weighted that way too.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2018, 03:15:15 PM
QuoteThe figures I got were 12.5 for Greece and 2.5 for Ionia, but Macedonia was 4.
I did spot the estimate for Macedonia of 4 million but it was tagged as Hellenistic, when Macedon was both larger and more economically active. However, it is all rather gestimated at the best of times. I think on further reflection I'd revise my population estimate of the region upwards from 1 million though. How much of it is in range to be involved with the Great Army I don't know. Most of the cities and plains are in striking distance of the coast I think, so the economy is probably weighted that way too.
Yes, and none of the area along that north coast strikes me as a grain basket. The simple economics of animal transport mean that once you are hauling the grain more than so many days, you might as well ship it in from Egypt by sea.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 02:56:28 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2018, 02:07:44 PM
QuoteI was taking the population as 4 million,
Estimates of the Classical Greek population I can find online vary from 3-15 million but the more considered seem to fit in the 8-12 million range. This would mean Northern Greece in the coastal strip boasted half to a third of the Greek population. Given the fact that the more densely populated bits were Southern Greece, Asia Minor and Sicily, this seems unlikely.
The figures I got were 12.5 for Greece and 2.5 for Ionia, but Macedonia was 4.
So to give a positive spin on things and to chose figures that would give some hope of them being able to contribute, I went for 4 million for the strip of Greece,plus those bits of Macedonia and Thrace that are involved :D
but it is a very generous estimate
Let's leave it a 4 million and make the Persian army 4 million strong. Using the Thasian coastline as a rough rule, the Persians demand one meal from their hosts every 8 days. They spend 60 days marching to Greece so require 8 meals. The Balkan Greeks grow/import enough food to feed themselves for a year. The Persians take 8 days of that food during the outward journey and, presumably, would take 8 days food during the return trip had they conquered Greece. That's 16 days food out of a stockpile meant for 365 days. Thus, 16 ÷ 365 x 100 =
4,4% of the harvested grain. The locals would not even have to grow more food to make it work, just tighten their belts a bit.
So you are going with a proportion of food locally sourced to imported at approximately 1:8? Import levels will be in the region of 200,000 tonnes.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2018, 05:34:31 PM
Let's leave it a 4 million and make the Persian army 4 million strong. Using the Thasian coastline as a rough rule, the Persians demand one meal from their hosts every 8 days. They spend 60 days marching to Greece so require 8 meals. The Balkan Greeks grow/import enough food to feed themselves for a year. The Persians take 8 days of that food during the outward journey and, presumably, would take 8 days food during the return trip had they conquered Greece. That's 16 days food out of a stockpile meant for 365 days. Thus, 16 ÷ 365 x 100 = 4,4% of the harvested grain. The locals would not even have to grow more food to make it work, just tighten their belts a bit.
The problem is we have to remember the 'Persians' already there. Somebody has been feeding the engineers etc.
This meal is on top of that.
Also when you look at the island itself it's known for olive oil, wine and honey, not grain growing. The hinterland is Thracian so you're not talking about major civilised agricultural areas. I suspect the Thasians imported a lot of grain, and being the wealthy owners of gold mines, imported a bit more to make a show of loyalty.
The Thracians on the mainland aren't known as grain exporters.
Yes, some communities could and would have contributed, I'd say West of the Thasians might hold out more hope.
I'm coming to think that even if the Persians had sent an army of 40,000 into this area, they'd probably have depended largely for supplies on the sea. Unless it was a pacification campaign where you didn't are how many villages you sacked and devastated.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2018, 05:46:21 PM
So you are going with a proportion of food locally sourced to imported at approximately 1:8? Import levels will be in the region of 200,000 tonnes.
Locals: 12%; depots and ships: 88%. Those figures make sense in the context of the Thasian incident. For 4 million men that's 200 000 tons, yes. 80 50-ton ships beach and offload 4000 tons a day and you get 240 000 tons if they operate every day of the campaign. If the transport fleet numbers 800 ships and they can work 7 days out of 8 it is feasible
without taking the depots into account. Take them into account and the ships can do the job in 6, 5 or 4 days out of 8.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 05:53:36 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2018, 05:34:31 PM
Let's leave it a 4 million and make the Persian army 4 million strong. Using the Thasian coastline as a rough rule, the Persians demand one meal from their hosts every 8 days. They spend 60 days marching to Greece so require 8 meals. The Balkan Greeks grow/import enough food to feed themselves for a year. The Persians take 8 days of that food during the outward journey and, presumably, would take 8 days food during the return trip had they conquered Greece. That's 16 days food out of a stockpile meant for 365 days. Thus, 16 ÷ 365 x 100 = 4,4% of the harvested grain. The locals would not even have to grow more food to make it work, just tighten their belts a bit.
The problem is we have to remember the 'Persians' already there. Somebody has been feeding the engineers etc.
This meal is on top of that.
Also when you look at the island itself it's known for olive oil, wine and honey, not grain growing. The hinterland is Thracian so you're not talking about major civilised agricultural areas. I suspect the Thasians imported a lot of grain, and being the wealthy owners of gold mines, imported a bit more to make a show of loyalty.
The Thracians on the mainland aren't known as grain exporters.
Yes, some communities could and would have contributed, I'd say West of the Thasians might hold out more hope.
I'm coming to think that even if the Persians had sent an army of 40,000 into this area, they'd probably have depended largely for supplies on the sea. Unless it was a pacification campaign where you didn't are how many villages you sacked and devastated.
Work on the presumption Xerxes had all the figures we have discussed here and knows it is not a good idea to starve his vassal states to death (it makes them disgruntled and rebellious). He can feed his engineers by sea during the 4 years they work at the canal, etc. The Thasians import food, fine, the point is their economy is sufficient to feed them and spare 4,4% for a transient Persian army. Bear in mind the meal cost them 400 talents. Their mines made them between 200 and 300 talents of silver a year, so 4 years is adequate time to store up enough lucre to do some serious buying in preparation for the arrival of the Persian host (and I doubt they bought all their own food from their silver).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2018, 05:54:24 PM
For 4 million men that's 200 000 tons, yes. 80 50-ton ships beach and offload 4000 tons a day and you get 240 000 tons if they operate every day of the campaign. If the transport fleet numbers 800 ships and they can work 7 days out of 8 it is feasible without taking the depots into account. Take them into account and the ships can do the job in 6, 5 or 4 days out of 8.
Rome imported around 420-30 ktonnes a year, using fixed infrastructure and distribution, as a comparison.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 26, 2018, 06:22:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2018, 05:54:24 PM
For 4 million men that's 200 000 tons, yes. 80 50-ton ships beach and offload 4000 tons a day and you get 240 000 tons if they operate every day of the campaign. If the transport fleet numbers 800 ships and they can work 7 days out of 8 it is feasible without taking the depots into account. Take them into account and the ships can do the job in 6, 5 or 4 days out of 8.
Rome imported around 420-30 ktonnes a year, using fixed infrastructure and distribution, as a comparison.
The Persians move 200 000 tons in two months. The Romans move 400 000+ tons in 8 months (sailing is closed for 4 months of the year). That's over twice as much grain in a period 4 times longer, which means the Persians move their grain nearly twice as fast. If they've dedicated pretty much their entire merchant fleet to the job and have built many extra ships as well, it's not inconceivable.
I do not wish to disturb a positive line of discussion, but do want to sort out one point.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 08:10:08 AM
Patrick please be sensible
A community doesn't just hand over its entire food stocks. They are merely condemning themselves to slow, lingering and unpleasant death.
Herodotus mentions grinding corn for 'many months' into flour. This indicates that as of early spring they had 'many months' of corn available to grind. Whether this was their entire stock is another matter - probably not, because as you rightly point out Herodotus does not mention mass starvation among the local population (although the returning Persian army
is subject to mass starvation).
Quotesimilarly a population of perhaps four million does not have the food stocks to feed an army of six million with hangers on. If they have a 10% surplus that will be about it. These are subsistence economies! In some years they'll struggle to feed themselves!
Everything I have read about this (5th century BC) period convinces me these are
not subsistence economies; they are economies producing a comfortable surplus which allows extensive storage, fuels plenty of ongoing wars and the sources conspicuously lack mention of famine
except when a city is under prolonged siege. A good deal of
polis organisation seems to have gone into provisioning the home city for a siege, and this would give a significant reserve upon which to draw. It would of course have to be turned over on a regular basis to avoid spoilage, but later in the century cities like Potidaea could hold out for over a year without reprovisioning.
It is also not a case of feeding six million men for an indefinite length of time: it is about feeding them for a day. If one person has six months of surplus food (180 person-days) they can feed 90 persons for two days or 180 for one day. So if 90 people drop in for one day the individual is down to three months of
surplus food - not an impossible or life-threatening situation.
Given this 1:90 sustain-for-a-day ratio, a population of (say) 1 million would be able to host a transient 6 million who stayed only briefly. It would be a burden, but not a killing one.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 26, 2018, 06:01:21 PM
Work on the presumption Xerxes had all the figures we have discussed here and knows it is not a good idea to starve his vassal states to death (it make them disgruntled and rebellious). He can feed his engineers by sea during the 4 years they work at the canal, etc. The Thasians import food, fine, the point is their economy is sufficient to feed them and spare 4,4% for a transient Persian army. Bear in mind the meal cost them 400 talents. Their mines made them between 200 and 300 talents of silver a year, so 4 years is adequate time to store up enough lucre to do some serious buying in preparation for the arrival of the Persian host (and I doubt they bought all their own food from their silver).
Xerxes (or his people) would have the figures, they'd have people who could look at the land as they rode through and make a pretty good assessment. 8)
Buying food locally for the engineers might actually be good 'PR' in that it creates a market and encourages production. Paying a little over the odds locally might make for happy subjects (and still be cheaper than too much in boats.
The Thasians were apparently known for their wine and oil, so I suspect that their exports could cover a lot of imports.
The advantage the Thasians would have is that if they were major grain importers for their own use, they'd have the facilities to be able to cope and produce the extra meal. They could just have bought grain from Egypt from the early harvest in April/May.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 08:25:56 PM
I do not wish to disturb a positive line of discussion, but do want to sort out one point.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 08:10:08 AM
Patrick please be sensible
A community doesn't just hand over its entire food stocks. They are merely condemning themselves to slow, lingering and unpleasant death.
Herodotus mentions grinding corn for 'many months' into flour. This indicates that as of early spring they had 'many months' of corn available to grind. Whether this was their entire stock is another matter - probably not, because as you rightly point out Herodotus does not mention mass starvation among the local population (although the returning Persian army is subject to mass starvation).
You do not store flour for many months, it goes off. That's why armies issue troops grain and let them grind it themselves.
This might have been flour for the detachments already there. By definition they were not making flour for troops who wouldn't eat it for another three or four months
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 26, 2018, 08:25:56 PM
Everything I have read about this (5th century BC) period convinces me these are not subsistence economies;
seriously, read something about ancient Greek agriculture
Also just to try and put these things into perspective. If you had the land to produce eight tons of wheat, in Athens that made you wealthy enough to be a hoplite.
You know those grain trailers you can end up following through Lincolnshire or the eastern counties in summer. Eight tons isn't going to fill one.
These people were subsistence farmers. Most hoplites cultivated their own land with their own family and perhaps a slave or two. They were the wealthy ones who almost certainly had some to sell. The rest, the smaller farmers, would rarely sell wheat, because they never had enough surplus. They made any cash from selling vegetables, olives and suchlike when they had a good year.
To support Patrick's point about Greek
poleis maintaining stockpiles of surplus grain, here's an anecdote from (pseudo-)Aristotle's
Economics II:
QuoteThe people of Selymbria had a law, passed in time of famine, which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain, they passed a resolution that citizens should deliver up their corn to the polis at the regular fixed price, each retaining for himself a year's supply. They then granted right of export to any who desired it, fixing what they deemed a suitable price.
Not dated, unfortunately. Selymbria is on the Thracian coast, west of Byzantium.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 26, 2018, 10:23:26 PM
To support Patrick's point about Greek poleis maintaining stockpiles of surplus grain, here's an anecdote from (pseudo-)Aristotle's Economics II:
QuoteThe people of Selymbria had a law, passed in time of famine, which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain, they passed a resolution that citizens should deliver up their corn to the polis at the regular fixed price, each retaining for himself a year's supply. They then granted right of export to any who desired it, fixing what they deemed a suitable price.
Not dated, unfortunately. Selymbria is on the Thracian coast, west of Byzantium.
the year's supply is what will carry them through to the next harvest, the extra would be whatever surplus the farmer would sell anyway.
A lot of Greek cities had laws forbidding the export of grain. Athens had at various times laws saying that any ship that entered the harbour with grain had to sell it. With cities perpetually on the edge of famine, these rules were important and policed.
So in the case of Selymbria, like a lot of cities they don't allow the export. They'd store grain, buying the surplus from their citizens every year, and every year they'd sell out of store to their citizens who didn't have their own grain. This allows the rotation of stocks and means that you rarely have 'old grain' lying about. If there was a poor harvest then the city could run the stock down.
(A bit like the intervention buying policy of the EU)
Finally after a number of good years, the city has got more grain that it needs so it'll sell the grain to anybody from abroad who wanted to buy it.
Stepping back a bit to get some perspective, Xerxes taking an army of several million into Greece is a crazy idea, even if it can be shown to be logistically feasible, so I understand an instinctive disinclination to believe it. My own take is that after his father's first campaign failed Xerxes raised the stakes. Estimates from the primary sources put the army of Darius I at between 200 000 and 600 000 men. Working on the notion that Persians used huge numbers to intimidate enemies into submission and that Darius' army hadn't been big enough - in Persian eyes - for the job, Xerxes' solution was to increase its size fivefold or more.
But it's still crazy to put millions of men at the end of a fragile supply network that depended on good weather and the Greek fleet being overcome. It's up there with Hitler declaring war on the US just as the German army ground to a halt in Russia. Thinking about it, I see quite a bit in common between Xerxes and Hitler. They both had grandiose ideas and possessed capable and docile subordinates and powerful state machinery to carry them out, but they were fundamentally out of touch with reality.
And back to the nazis again.
Incredible
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 04:51:41 AM
capable and docile subordinates and powerful state machinery to carry them out, but they were fundamentally out of touch with reality.
I'm not sure how powerful the state machinery was or how docile the subordinates were.
Cyrus was the founder and fought all his life so we can set him aside.
Cambyses seems to have inherited the empire smoothly enough, but whilst he was campaigning in Egypt the throne was seized by Bardiya who might or might not have been his brother and Cambyses dies 'in disputed circumstances', perhaps assassinated by either the supporters of Bardiya or Darius who went on to challenge Bardiya
Bardiya might have been the brother of Cambyses whom Cambyses had had secretly murdered and then the identity was stolen by an imposter who seized power, or he might have been the brother who seized power. He ruled for about a year
Darius seized power from Bardiya, perhaps legitimately, perhaps not. He spent the first year or so putting down revolts around the Empire. After the defeat of his invasion of Greece there was a revolt in Egypt and died before he could lead his army to put down the revolt.
Xerxes followed his father and crushed rebellions in Egypt and Babylonia. Then he had to go back and crush at least one more rebellion in Babylonia.
Finally he led his army to Greece, lost and fifteen years later died in a complicated palace coup where his family only retained power by the skin of their teeth.
I must admit I'd suggest that Xerxes might even have been the opposite. He could have demanded small token contingents from the various satrapies, drawn from their military and political elite (They probably didn't need to be any more than a thousand or so strong) more as hostages, to limit the chance of more revolts springing up behind them.
The State machinery wasn't powerful as we would see it. The power lay in the ability of the Great King to keep the loyalty of the core army of the Medes and the Persians, and in the ability of that army to crush any revolt that broke out.
The subordinates were not docile. Only one of the Kings named died in his own bed of natural causes, three were assassinated or murdered by the winner in a coup
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 10:38:28 PM
A lot of Greek cities had laws forbidding the export of grain. Athens had at various times laws saying that any ship that entered the harbour with grain had to sell it. With cities perpetually on the edge of famine, these rules were important and policed.
But were cities 'perpetually on the edge of famine'? There are a number of long sieges in Thucydides. Discounting Plataea, which sent away most of the population in advance, we have Samos (440-439, nine months) Potidaea (432-430/429, about two years), Mitylene (428-427 BC), Melos (416 BC or 416-15 BC, depending upon whom you read), Syracuse (415-414 then re-established briefly in 413) and even Athens, famously dependent upon imported corn, held out for several months from 405 to 404 BC.
While the last few weeks of a siege usually saw the population surviving on very reduced and/or improvised rations, the fact is that Greek cities had stocks which lasted them many months and in some cases a few years. This is not living 'on the edge of famine', and cities such as Sybaris in Sicily gained a reputation for exactly the opposite: a life of abundance.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 07:39:47 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 04:51:41 AM
capable and docile subordinates and powerful state machinery to carry them out, but they were fundamentally out of touch with reality.
I'm not sure how powerful the state machinery was or how docile the subordinates were.
We can probably allow Xerxes' subordinates a reasonable degree of docility until things start to go wrong.
He succeeded to the throne without fuss, crushed national risings without serious difficulty, mustered the greatest-ever mobilisation in Achaemenid history without fuss (beyond the sheer effort of getting it done) and bestrode the world like a colossus, secure in his supreme power, punishing with impunity acts of disloyalty (like grandees who wanted at least one of their sons to stay at home) and even chastising the Hellespont when it disobeyed him. None of this would have been lost on his subordinates, nor the rewards for those who pleased him.
QuoteI must admit I'd suggest that Xerxes might even have been the opposite. He could have demanded small token contingents from the various satrapies, drawn from their military and political elite (They probably didn't need to be any more than a thousand or so strong) more as hostages, to limit the chance of more revolts springing up behind them.
The State machinery wasn't powerful as we would see it.
It was nevertheless highly pervasive. An extensive bureaucracy was backed up by the King's Eyes and a still-present sense of Persian supremacy and the mentality was still that of a successful outward-looking empire; the satrapal rebellions (as opposed to national risings) did not begin until the Empire was locked into itself following the failure of Xerxes' expedition, the devastating Greek reprise under Cimon and the Egyptian revolts. And while Xerxes could have limited himself to 'hostage contingents' (and the concomitant problem of ambitious stay-behinds raising a revolt now that all of their rivals were at the King's mercy) his vanity would have demanded nothing less than a full mobilisation. A king who wipes out a whole family because one of them wants to stay behind is not going to be satisfied with token contingents from anyone.
QuoteThe power lay in the ability of the Great King to keep the loyalty of the core army of the Medes and the Persians, and in the ability of that army to crush any revolt that broke out.
There was of course much more to it than that. Satraps were appointed for loyalty, influential nobles rewarded when they pleased the King of Kings and punished when they displeased him, and the whole business was as much about anatomy and minds as Medo-Persian force. It may be worth noting that when, later in the dynasty, rebellions did occur, the task of suppressing them was customarily given to another satrap and did not necessarily involve the bulk of the core Medo-Persian forces. Of course by then mercenary Greeks had replaced the Medes and Persians as the cutting edge of Achaemenid forces, and Achaemenid control seems to have centred as much on manipulating the Greek cities as anything else.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 08:06:37 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 10:38:28 PM
A lot of Greek cities had laws forbidding the export of grain. Athens had at various times laws saying that any ship that entered the harbour with grain had to sell it. With cities perpetually on the edge of famine, these rules were important and policed.
But were cities 'perpetually on the edge of famine'? There are a number of long sieges in Thucydides. Discounting Plataea, which sent away most of the population in advance, we have Samos (440-439, nine months) Potidaea (432-430/429, about two years), Mitylene (428-427 BC), Melos (416 BC or 416-15 BC, depending upon whom you read), Syracuse (415-414 then re-established briefly in 413) and even Athens, famously dependent upon imported corn, held out for several months from 405 to 404 BC.
While the last few weeks of a siege usually saw the population surviving on very reduced and/or improvised rations, the fact is that Greek cities had stocks which lasted them many months and in some cases a few years. This is not living 'on the edge of famine', and cities such as Sybaris in Sicily gained a reputation for exactly the opposite: a life of abundance.
Any siege that starts after harvest is by definition going to find the inhabitants with enough grain to get through to the next harvest. Please I'm embarrassed at having to write this.
If you want to discuss individual sieges then we can start a separate thread, and look in each one in detail.
The reason Greek cities did attempt to stockpile grain was because they lived on the edge of famine. One bad harvest for an inland city could lead to drastic consequences. The stockpiles would rise and fall. This is standard stuff, early on I recommended a book on the grain trade in the ancient world. There are plenty of excellent books discussing Ancient Greek agriculture (as well as Agriculture in the ancient world generally.) It's a well researched area.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 08:31:37 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 07:39:47 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 04:51:41 AM
capable and docile subordinates and powerful state machinery to carry them out, but they were fundamentally out of touch with reality.
I'm not sure how powerful the state machinery was or how docile the subordinates were.
We can probably allow Xerxes' subordinates a reasonable degree of docility until things start to go wrong.
He succeeded to the throne without fuss, crushed national risings without serious difficulty, mustered the greatest-ever mobilisation in Achaemenid history without fuss
stop right there. That is a circular argument. You cannot argue that the Persian Empire logistically supported an army several million strong by saying it had strong kings who mustered the greatest ever army in Persian history.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 08:31:37 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 07:39:47 AM
QuoteI must admit I'd suggest that Xerxes might even have been the opposite. He could have demanded small token contingents from the various satrapies, drawn from their military and political elite (They probably didn't need to be any more than a thousand or so strong) more as hostages, to limit the chance of more revolts springing up behind them.
The State machinery wasn't powerful as we would see it.
It was nevertheless highly pervasive. An extensive bureaucracy was backed up by the King's Eyes and a still-present sense of Persian supremacy and the mentality was still that of a successful outward-looking empire; the satrapal rebellions (as opposed to national risings)
Good, another milestone. This successful outward-looking empire had national rebellions. It had them regularly. Pretty well every King had to face them. They were the norm
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 08:31:37 AM
There was of course much more to it than that. Satraps were appointed for loyalty, influential nobles rewarded when they pleased the King of Kings and punished when they displeased him,
And three of the five Persian Kings including Xerxes were murdered by influential nobles or family members. They were a group who had to be kept on side.
Only one Persian king in this period wasn't
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 08:31:37 AM
It may be worth noting that when, later in the dynasty, rebellions did occur, the task of suppressing them was customarily given to another satrap and did not necessarily involve the bulk of the core Medo-Persian forces. Of course by then mercenary Greeks had replaced the Medes and Persians as the cutting edge of Achaemenid forces, and Achaemenid control seems to have centred as much on manipulating the Greek cities as anything else.
I have made a point of ignoring the later Persian monarchs, because they cannot have had an impact on the thinking of Xerxes or why he took the army he did
But his successor Artaxerxes I was probably a success, in that he seized power in a coup, held in with only a few rebellions and probably died in his bed
His successor Xerxes II was assassinated after 45 days
His successor Sogdianus reigned for six months before being overthrown by his brother who executed him
Darius II took power in a coup and seems to have died of natural causes after a reign of 19 years
Artaxerxes II inherited the throne and immediately faced revolt from his brother Cyrus. He then lost Egypt but did defeat the Satraps revolt.
Artaxerxes III waded to the throne in blood, but the killing might have been done by his father to ensure the succession, finally put down the Egyptian revolt and may have died of natural causes or may have been murdered by Bagoas, the Vizier
Artaxerxes IV, raised to the throne by a coup plotted by Bagoas, and ended up being poisoned by Bagoas
Darius III Killed Bagoas and ended up being murdered by Bessus, his cousin.
So of the first 5, one died in his bed and three were murdered, and one died in battle.
Of the next 8, 3 or 4 died of natural causes and 4 or 5 may have been murdered.
If you were Great King, King of Kings the one group of people you didn't trust was your family and the Persian aristocracy!
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 04:51:41 AM
My own take is that after his father's first campaign failed Xerxes raised the stakes. Estimates from the primary sources put the army of Darius I at between 200 000 and 600 000 men. Working on the notion that Persians used huge numbers to intimidate enemies into submission and that Darius' army hadn't been big enough - in Persian eyes - for the job, Xerxes' solution was to increase its size fivefold or more.
Though I'll agree it is internally consistent, you can't really "prove" Xerxes numbers by reference to those of Darius. If there is a systematic tendency to overstate the size of the barbarian horde, it will apply to both figures. If we take modern estimates of Darius' army of 25,000-50,000 and multiply by five to get Xerxes, we get 125-250,000, remarkably similar to modern estimates. But it doesn't prove anything.
Quote
But it's still crazy to put millions of men at the end of a fragile supply network that depended on good weather and the Greek fleet being overcome.
Napoleon in Russia in 1812 is probably a better comparator than Hitler. A flawed supply strategy meant that even taking his main objective meant he was doomed and he had no chance of extracating his army, most of which was lost in the retreat. And he had the advantage of land supply and a wide front.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 10:38:28 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 26, 2018, 10:23:26 PM
To support Patrick's point about Greek poleis maintaining stockpiles of surplus grain, here's an anecdote from (pseudo-)Aristotle's Economics II:
QuoteThe people of Selymbria had a law, passed in time of famine, which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain, they passed a resolution that citizens should deliver up their corn to the polis at the regular fixed price, each retaining for himself a year's supply. They then granted right of export to any who desired it, fixing what they deemed a suitable price.
Not dated, unfortunately. Selymbria is on the Thracian coast, west of Byzantium.
the year's supply is what will carry them through to the next harvest, the extra would be whatever surplus the farmer would sell anyway.
A lot of Greek cities had laws forbidding the export of grain. Athens had at various times laws saying that any ship that entered the harbour with grain had to sell it. With cities perpetually on the edge of famine, these rules were important and policed.
So in the case of Selymbria, like a lot of cities they don't allow the export. They'd store grain, buying the surplus from their citizens every year, and every year they'd sell out of store to their citizens who didn't have their own grain. This allows the rotation of stocks and means that you rarely have 'old grain' lying about. If there was a poor harvest then the city could run the stock down.
(A bit like the intervention buying policy of the EU)
Finally after a number of good years, the city has got more grain that it needs so it'll sell the grain to anybody from abroad who wanted to buy it.
The point is:
- This is not
quite a picture of a subsistence economy. Not that far off the subsistence level by modern standards, maybe, but the community overall expects to generate a surplus in most years.
- The
polis decides what to do with that surplus, by compulsorily purchasing it at a price fixed by the state. So these are not completely "independent" farmers, in the phrase someone used earlier. This level of local state control is going to make it easier to meet the requirements of the Imperial superstate than if each individual farmer could decide what to do with his surplus.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 09:32:29 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 04:51:41 AM
My own take is that after his father's first campaign failed Xerxes raised the stakes. Estimates from the primary sources put the army of Darius I at between 200 000 and 600 000 men. Working on the notion that Persians used huge numbers to intimidate enemies into submission and that Darius' army hadn't been big enough - in Persian eyes - for the job, Xerxes' solution was to increase its size fivefold or more.
Though I'll agree it is internally consistent, you can't really "prove" Xerxes numbers by reference to those of Darius. If there is a systematic tendency to overstate the size of the barbarian horde, it will apply to both figures. If we take modern estimates of Darius' army of 25,000-50,000 and multiply by five to get Xerxes, we get 125-250,000, remarkably similar to modern estimates. But it doesn't prove anything.
Sure. The idea was that if we accept Herodotus' figures for the Persian army, why would Xerxes go for such a huge number, since Persian armies before that time habitually numbered in the hundreds of thousands and not the millions? (if we accept the primary sources) It makes sense in the context that for the Persians quantity was the decisive battle-winner and thus if the Greeks were able to stop half a million men, then one and a half million would be needed to put them down.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 09:32:29 AMQuote
But it's still crazy to put millions of men at the end of a fragile supply network that depended on good weather and the Greek fleet being overcome.
Napoleon in Russia in 1812 is probably a better comparator than Hitler. A flawed supply strategy meant that even taking his main objective meant he was doomed and he had no chance of extracating his army, most of which was lost in the retreat. And he had the advantage of land supply and a wide front.
Fair enough. One could argue that Xerxes came closer to achieving his objective than Napoleon. If he could just have beaten the Greek fleet or at least kept it at bay he might have achieved something on land. But that's doubtful as well. Most of the Persian army were not actually fighting men - just a cheering chorus that looked big and frightening - and the part that were proper fighters fought the Greeks at Plataea and lost.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 09:00:30 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 08:31:37 AM
It may be worth noting that when, later in the dynasty, rebellions did occur, the task of suppressing them was customarily given to another satrap and did not necessarily involve the bulk of the core Medo-Persian forces. Of course by then mercenary Greeks had replaced the Medes and Persians as the cutting edge of Achaemenid forces, and Achaemenid control seems to have centred as much on manipulating the Greek cities as anything else.
I have made a point of ignoring the later Persian monarchs, because they cannot have had an impact on the thinking of Xerxes or why he took the army he did
But his successor Artaxerxes I was probably a success, in that he seized power in a coup, held in with only a few rebellions and probably died in his bed
His successor Xerxes II was assassinated after 45 days
His successor Sogdianus reigned for six months before being overthrown by his brother who executed him
Darius II took power in a coup and seems to have died of natural causes after a reign of 19 years
Artaxerxes II inherited the throne and immediately faced revolt from his brother Cyrus. He then lost Egypt but did defeat the Satraps revolt.
Artaxerxes III waded to the throne in blood, but the killing might have been done by his father to ensure the succession, finally put down the Egyptian revolt and may have died of natural causes or may have been murdered by Bagoas, the Vizier
Artaxerxes IV, raised to the throne by a coup plotted by Bagoas, and ended up being poisoned by Bagoas
Darius III Killed Bagoas and ended up being murdered by Bessus, his cousin.
So of the first 5, one died in his bed and three were murdered, and one died in battle.
Of the next 8, 3 or 4 died of natural causes and 4 or 5 may have been murdered.
If you were Great King, King of Kings the one group of people you didn't trust was your family and the Persian aristocracy!
The point appears to be that the subordinates of the king either did what they were told or tried to assassinate their master. There was no middle ground. If they didn't do what they were told they were executed themselves. Knife or poison (or whatever was used) was the only means of objecting to the Great King's commands. It's not like, say, a Mediaeval monarchy in which the dukes and barons had to be persuaded to do what the king wanted or at least not oppose him.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 27, 2018, 09:34:02 AM
- This is not quite a picture of a subsistence economy. Not that far off the subsistence level by modern standards, maybe, but the community overall expects to generate a surplus in most years.
Well, a subsistence economy needs to. If the average year doesn't give some surplus you're doomed when a bad year comes around. If the average surplus is zero, expected reserves when a bad year happens is also zero.
(Mathematically, you could have a deficit or breakeven most years compensated for occasional bumper years that keep the average positive, but apart from the problems of storage Jim has mentioned that's not particularly realistic ecologically. You're more likely to have occasional disaster years when the crop is eaten by locusts (Persian or otherwise).)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 10:23:14 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 09:00:30 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 08:31:37 AM
It may be worth noting that when, later in the dynasty, rebellions did occur, the task of suppressing them was customarily given to another satrap and did not necessarily involve the bulk of the core Medo-Persian forces. Of course by then mercenary Greeks had replaced the Medes and Persians as the cutting edge of Achaemenid forces, and Achaemenid control seems to have centred as much on manipulating the Greek cities as anything else.
I have made a point of ignoring the later Persian monarchs, because they cannot have had an impact on the thinking of Xerxes or why he took the army he did
But his successor Artaxerxes I was probably a success, in that he seized power in a coup, held in with only a few rebellions and probably died in his bed
His successor Xerxes II was assassinated after 45 days
His successor Sogdianus reigned for six months before being overthrown by his brother who executed him
Darius II took power in a coup and seems to have died of natural causes after a reign of 19 years
Artaxerxes II inherited the throne and immediately faced revolt from his brother Cyrus. He then lost Egypt but did defeat the Satraps revolt.
Artaxerxes III waded to the throne in blood, but the killing might have been done by his father to ensure the succession, finally put down the Egyptian revolt and may have died of natural causes or may have been murdered by Bagoas, the Vizier
Artaxerxes IV, raised to the throne by a coup plotted by Bagoas, and ended up being poisoned by Bagoas
Darius III Killed Bagoas and ended up being murdered by Bessus, his cousin.
So of the first 5, one died in his bed and three were murdered, and one died in battle.
Of the next 8, 3 or 4 died of natural causes and 4 or 5 may have been murdered.
If you were Great King, King of Kings the one group of people you didn't trust was your family and the Persian aristocracy!
The point appears to be that the subordinates of the king either did what they were told or tried to assassinate their master. There was no middle ground. If they didn't do what they were told they were executed themselves. Knife or poison (or whatever was used) was the only means of objecting to the Great King's commands. It's not like, say, a Mediaeval monarchy in which the dukes and barons had to be persuaded to do what the king wanted or at least not oppose him.
I can't see how we can know that for certain - the information provided could just as easily indicate the Persian King having to constantly manage his faction through negotiation and bribes etc.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 27, 2018, 09:34:02 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 10:38:28 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 26, 2018, 10:23:26 PM
To support Patrick's point about Greek poleis maintaining stockpiles of surplus grain, here's an anecdote from (pseudo-)Aristotle's Economics II:
QuoteThe people of Selymbria had a law, passed in time of famine, which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain, they passed a resolution that citizens should deliver up their corn to the polis at the regular fixed price, each retaining for himself a year's supply. They then granted right of export to any who desired it, fixing what they deemed a suitable price.
Not dated, unfortunately. Selymbria is on the Thracian coast, west of Byzantium.
the year's supply is what will carry them through to the next harvest, the extra would be whatever surplus the farmer would sell anyway.
A lot of Greek cities had laws forbidding the export of grain. Athens had at various times laws saying that any ship that entered the harbour with grain had to sell it. With cities perpetually on the edge of famine, these rules were important and policed.
So in the case of Selymbria, like a lot of cities they don't allow the export. They'd store grain, buying the surplus from their citizens every year, and every year they'd sell out of store to their citizens who didn't have their own grain. This allows the rotation of stocks and means that you rarely have 'old grain' lying about. If there was a poor harvest then the city could run the stock down.
(A bit like the intervention buying policy of the EU)
Finally after a number of good years, the city has got more grain that it needs so it'll sell the grain to anybody from abroad who wanted to buy it.
The point is:
- This is not quite a picture of a subsistence economy. Not that far off the subsistence level by modern standards, maybe, but the community overall expects to generate a surplus in most years.
- The polis decides what to do with that surplus, by compulsorily purchasing it at a price fixed by the state. So these are not completely "independent" farmers, in the phrase someone used earlier. This level of local state control is going to make it easier to meet the requirements of the Imperial superstate than if each individual farmer could decide what to do with his surplus.
well it depends on the nature of the polis, but those farmers who were the major grain producers would be in the hoplite class and in most cases they would be the ones who voted or whose opinions would have counted. I'm not sure of the population size of Ancient Selymbria but in our terms it would have been small.
In Greek cities one of the causes of tension between the classes was that the Hoplite class as landowners and grain sellers wanted exports to keep the price up. The 'navy rabble' hoi polloi or whatever wanted grain prices kept down and where they had the vote, they would tend to vote to ban exports, except where there was enough grain in the market to ensure prices stayed low.
The other thing to remember is the structure of agriculture. In most cities it's probable that most farmers weren't members of the hoplite class. They'd be men with some land. There would be a drive to produce enough grain to guarantee their family's supply. But if you haven't got a lot of land, once you've sown your grain, you're better growing 'unpolitical' higher value, easy to sell crops than just growing more grain. So once you've got your family grain, then you've got your olive trees, figs, perhaps even a few vines, but more importantly your vegetables which can be a cash crop to sell in town.
The city cannot command the production of grain, it can merely attempt to control the sale. If it keeps prices too low then it'll merely discourage production and you'll get a long term drift to olives and other crops. If it has the prices too high without some other policy like a food dole, it will run the risk of discontent among the landless
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 10:23:14 AM
The point appears to be that the subordinates of the king either did what they were told or tried to assassinate their master. There was no middle ground. If they didn't do what they were told they were executed themselves. Knife or poison (or whatever was used) was the only means of objecting to the Great King's commands. It's not like, say, a Mediaeval monarchy in which the dukes and barons had to be persuaded to do what the king wanted or at least not oppose him.
the problem is, we don't know that. We haven't a clue what discussions went on within the higher echelons. Herodotus does mention members of the Persian aristocracy having problems with the whole invasion plan, then there is the story about Xerxes, Artabanus and dreams. Herodotus portrays Xerxes in a particular light, but that need to have been how the Persian aristocracy saw him, or how he saw himself.
The Accession of Darius and the legend of the six or seven families show that some of the Persian aristocracy regarded the king as little more than first among equals
I seem to detect a drift to the periphery here, with much on the nature of Persian kingship and governance and the nature of the city-state economy.
Way back, the challenge was made to those who take an orthodox position as to why they felt Herodotus' figures couldn't be accepted at face value. This led to a list of maybe fifteen reasons.
Justin has determinedly tried to tackle some of them head on. I think he has drawn out a lot of quantification of the problem and introduced some notable images, like the giant mobile squatter camp. He has also tried to create a model of how the advance across northern Greece may have been done (though I think we still await the grand scheme of how the Asiatic magazine cities, Greek depots, supply conveyor, "feed for a day" cities, baggage train, fodder cutters, hydraulic engineers and camp builders all fitted together).
At the end of the day, I don't know if any minds will be changed. I know that all the figure work has confirmed to me that the orthodox view is closer to a practical reality at the same time pointing up the flaws of some of the more minimal estimates, like Delbruck or Young.
Incidentally, I managed to find this estimate by Percy Molesworth Sykes in his History of Persia. Percy Sykes was a British general who fought the Turks in WWI. I do not know whether that makes him a contemptable source, like Maurice, or a quotable one, like Lawrence, but here is what he says. Having enumerated the army and navy following Herodotus' figures, he goes on
Reinforcements in Europe and servants bring up the figures
to over five millions, a total which it is impossible to accept.
In view of the reliance the Persians placed on numbers and
the size of the empire, we are perhaps justified in assuming
that the land and sea forces combine inclusive of followers,
aggregated about one million. After deducting the crews,
this total would give at the most 200,000 fighting men, so
numerous are camp followers in an Eastern army, an allowing
for strong detachments posted on the lines of communication,
for sickness, and other causes, the actual numbers that met the
Greeks at sea, and finally on land, were not overwhelming.
Surprisingly similar to his contemporary Maurice. Perhaps they corresponded, or maybe the same staff training led to the same estimate of scale.
Note Sykes takes the fleet at face value, which I suspect is an error. The trireme count can be said to come from Aeschylus (though the Greek is said to be ambiguous) but the 3000 lesser ships (triaconters, penteconters and horse transports) have no independent authority and may suffer nautical "horde" mode.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 26, 2018, 10:38:28 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 26, 2018, 10:23:26 PM
To support Patrick's point about Greek poleis maintaining stockpiles of surplus grain, here's an anecdote from (pseudo-)Aristotle's Economics II:
QuoteThe people of Selymbria had a law, passed in time of famine, which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain, they passed a resolution that citizens should deliver up their corn to the polis at the regular fixed price, each retaining for himself a year's supply. They then granted right of export to any who desired it, fixing what they deemed a suitable price.
Not dated, unfortunately. Selymbria is on the Thracian coast, west of Byzantium.
the year's supply is what will carry them through to the next harvest, the extra would be whatever surplus the farmer would sell anyway.
A lot of Greek cities had laws forbidding the export of grain. Athens had at various times laws saying that any ship that entered the harbour with grain had to sell it. With cities perpetually on the edge of famine, these rules were important and policed.
So in the case of Selymbria, like a lot of cities they don't allow the export. They'd store grain, buying the surplus from their citizens every year, and every year they'd sell out of store to their citizens who didn't have their own grain. This allows the rotation of stocks and means that you rarely have 'old grain' lying about. If there was a poor harvest then the city could run the stock down.
(A bit like the intervention buying policy of the EU)
Finally after a number of good years, the city has got more grain that it needs so it'll sell the grain to anybody from abroad who wanted to buy it.
Duncan's point though is that Selymbria was capable of falling short of its requirements
only if it exported its grain. The law implied that if the city kept all its harvest it would manage in a poor year. The problem then becomes what to do with the excess grain in a normal or good year. This all suggests that a Greek polis like Selymbria on average produced more than it needed (their law had left them with a large surplus they now had to dispose of). Certainly enough to supply a large passing Persian army with a meal.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 11:42:46 AM
Duncan's point though is that Selymbria was capable of falling short of its requirments only if it exported its grain. The law implied that if the city kept all its harvest it would manage in a poor year. The problem then becomes what to do with the excess grain in a normal or good year. This all suggests that a Greek polis like Selymbria on average produced more than it needed.
I didn't want to get into this but I think the conclusion here goes to far. In order not to be left with a danger of famine/massive inflation, Selymbria restricted exports to maintain a constant supply. Occassionally, surpluses were sufficient to operate the buffer and have an exportable surplus but we don't know how often this happened. We also don't know how often Selymbria needed to buy grain to overcome a shortfall and restock the granaries. So assuming this points to a regular surplus is overstating things.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 11:42:46 AMThis all suggests that a Greek polis like Selymbria on average produced more than it needed (their law had left them with a large surplus they now had to dispose of). Certainly enough to supply a large passing Persian army with a meal.
I don't actually think that the first sentence necessarily implies the second.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 11:55:17 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 11:42:46 AM
Duncan's point though is that Selymbria was capable of falling short of its requirments only if it exported its grain. The law implied that if the city kept all its harvest it would manage in a poor year. The problem then becomes what to do with the excess grain in a normal or good year. This all suggests that a Greek polis like Selymbria on average produced more than it needed.
I didn't want to get into this but I think the conclusion here goes to far. In order not to be left with a danger of famine/massive inflation, Selymbria restricted exports to maintain a constant supply. Occassionally, surpluses were sufficient to operate the buffer and have an exportable surplus but we don't know how often this happened. We also don't know how often Selymbria needed to buy grain to overcome a shortfall and restock the granaries. So assuming this points to a regular surplus is overstating things.
OK. What we can draw out from the passage is that Selymbria passed the law when they did have a famine and had exported their grain (hence the law). It was the combination of imprudent export plus poor harvest that got them in the dwang. The city then manages in bad years by not exporting and possibly by importing, which means that in a bad year they can get by (their economy is robust enough to pay for the imports) and in an average and good year they will produce a surplus. If they had a lot of bad years - in other words, if they grew only enough to feed themselves provided the harvest was decent - then I suspect they wouldn't have passed a law, just had a general practice of not exporting their grain.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 11:42:46 AM
Duncan's point though is that Selymbria was capable of falling short of its requirements only if it exported its grain. The law implied that if the city kept all its harvest it would manage in a poor year. The problem then becomes what to do with the excess grain in a normal or good year. This all suggests that a Greek polis like Selymbria on average produced more than it needed (their law had left them with a large surplus they now had to dispose of). Certainly enough to supply a large passing Persian army with a meal.
The purpose of storing grain in a polis is that most years you're OK. But a bad year might destroy you. Even a 5% shortfall can lead to price gouging, riots and violent political change.
The fact that a city banned exports shows how important this is, and how close to the edge they habitually sailed.
If you look at the example Duncan gave, "On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain....."
So it was a one off.
It wasn't a large surplus they now had to dispose of, they were in need of funds and the only way the city had of raising those funds was to sell some of their grain. It was a gamble the city felt prepared to take.
With the funds raised they appear to have gone back to squirrelling away grain again, breathing a sigh of relief that they'd 'got away with it' this once.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:05:05 PM
If they had a lot of bad years - in other words, if they grew only enough to feed themselves provided the harvest was decent - then I suspect they wouldn't have passed a law, just had a general practice of not exporting their grain.
The grain belongs to private individuals who could, without a law, sell to anyone they liked. A bad harvest was unlikely to be highly localised, so demand would be high for any surplus. If you don't constrain the market forces, local grain will be sold to a wealthy city down the coast for a tidy profit and the polis will end up with paying top import prices or letting the poor starve. So you constrain the market.
Following on Anthony's status quaestionis I sum up the progress of the discussion as follows:
A number of objections were made to the feasibility of the Achaemenid Empire raising, moving and supplying an army as large as 5 million men in a journey from the Hellespont to Greece. Thus far I honestly haven't found any of them to be irrefutable:
1. It can be assumed the Empire had a population large enough to spare 5 million males of military age and still keep going.
2. The army can march overland without having to form impossibly long columns a few men wide. Examples exist of Persian armies moving cross-country in this fashion.
3. The Hellespont can be crossed over a bridge of ships by several million men in the timespan given by Herodotus.
4. Before Thermopylae the overland route does not have any bottlenecks that cannot be traversed by a broad column.
5. The navy can be assumed to be large enough (800 smallish vessels) to supply an army this size. There are sufficient beaches and offloading can be done quickly enough to deposit several thousand tons of grain each day.
6. The campsites need not be impossibly large and the local water supply is adequate for the needs of 5 million men.
7. The local allied Greeks are capable of supplying the army with an occasional meal without overstraining their resources and the 400 talent supper supplied by the Thasians indicates an army in the millions, not low hundreds of thousands.
8. Maurice as an argument of authority is not conclusive. He has been proven seriously inaccurate in several crucial estimates.
9. Herodotus is too systematic in affirming or implying an army in the millions rather than low hundreds of thousands. If he is wrong then he is guilty of deliberate fabrication, not just vague exaggeration. This makes him completely unreliable as a source, despite the fact he generally has a good reputation among contemporary historians.
Let me know if I've missed anything out.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 12:32:37 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 11:42:46 AM
Duncan's point though is that Selymbria was capable of falling short of its requirements only if it exported its grain. The law implied that if the city kept all its harvest it would manage in a poor year. The problem then becomes what to do with the excess grain in a normal or good year. This all suggests that a Greek polis like Selymbria on average produced more than it needed (their law had left them with a large surplus they now had to dispose of). Certainly enough to supply a large passing Persian army with a meal.
The purpose of storing grain in a polis is that most years you're OK. But a bad year might destroy you. Even a 5% shortfall can lead to price gouging, riots and violent political change.
The fact that a city banned exports shows how important this is, and how close to the edge they habitually sailed.
If you look at the example Duncan gave, "On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain....."
So it was a one off.
It wasn't a large surplus they now had to dispose of, they were in need of funds and the only way the city had of raising those funds was to sell some of their grain. It was a gamble the city felt prepared to take.
With the funds raised they appear to have gone back to squirrelling away grain again, breathing a sigh of relief that they'd 'got away with it' this once.
Mmm...fair enough. The Selymbria example proves that a polis could produce a surplus for export but doesn't state how often that surplus was produced. So we can't draw any conclusions from it on the general productivity of a Greek polis.
There, backpedalled. ;)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
4. Before Thermopylae the overland route does not have any bottlenecks that cannot be traversed by a broad column.
This is your opinion, it is not something that is widely agreed. Personally I would put Gallipoli down as a bottleneck on the strength of the opinion of people who have tried to move troops through it, or were used to moving troops and didn't like the ground
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
6. The campsites need not be impossibly large and the local water supply is adequate for the needs of 5 million men.
This is again not something agreed, it is your opinion but some of us express doubts. Personally I don't think Xerxes had a snowballs chance in hell in getting an army of 5 million strong across the bridge and to Thermopylae
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
Following on Anthony's status quaestionis I sum up the progress of the discussion as follows:
Let me know if I've missed anything out.
well the fact that I for one don't actually agree with any of the above 8)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 12:51:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
4. Before Thermopylae the overland route does not have any bottlenecks that cannot be traversed by a broad column.
This is your opinion, it is not something that is widely agreed. Personally I would put Gallipoli down as a bottleneck on the strength of the opinion of people who have tried to move troops through it, or were used to moving troops and didn't like the ground
The military men who don't like the ground all work from the assumption the army sticks to roads/tracks and the countryside hasn't been cleared to permit cross-country marching. They need to be asked the question: "If we spend 4 years clearing away trees, difficult undergrowth and other obstacles, is there a way through the Gallipoli peninsula that would permit a column 600 yards wide to advance?"
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 12:54:56 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
Following on Anthony's status quaestionis I sum up the progress of the discussion as follows:
Let me know if I've missed anything out.
well the fact that I for one don't actually agree with any of the above 8)
10. The fact that Jim Webster does not endorse a 5-million man army might not constitute a conclusive refutation even though he has excellent things to say and I've enjoyed his articles in Slingshot. :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 12:32:37 PM
If you look at the example Duncan gave, "On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain....."
So it was a one off.
Actually, we don't know that. How did (pseudo-)Aristotle know about this event? Probably he, or his source, saw an inscription in Selymbria's
agora recording the decree for the "compulsory purchase" and the free export - that's how a lot of these things pass into wider knowledge, a Greek
polis will set up an inscription commemorating almost
anything. And there could have been
dozens of such decrees. So obviously not an annual event, but not necessarily all that rare, either.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
I don't want to enter into tit-for-tat but I assume you've abandoned the cautious, reasoned approach for deliberate provocation to try to refocus our minds, so here goes.
1. It can be assumed the Empire had a population large enough to spare 5 million males of military age and still keep going.
Not impossible but we lack evidence that this happened or that this military capacity could be deployed in one place.
2. The army can march overland without having to form impossibly long columns a few men wide. Examples exist of Persian armies moving cross-country in this fashion.
The "columns a few wide" are a straw man argument. Cross country movement is assumed by all parties as there are no proper roads. Behaviour of later Persian armies in open plains has disputable relevance
3. The Hellespont can be crossed over a bridge of ships by several million men in the timespan given by Herodotus.
Probably true, though has no bearing on numbers crossing
4. Before Thermopylae the overland route does not have any bottlenecks that cannot be traversed by a broad column.
This seems to be disputed
5. The navy can be assumed to be large enough (800 smallish vessels) to supply an army this size. There are sufficient beaches and offloading can be done quickly enough to deposit several thousand tons of grain each day.
You can only make this statement by ignoring much of what has been written above. It is doubtful that sufficient supplies could be unloaded over beaches with the regularity and quantity given. We have no independent evidence of the size of the fleet and 800 ships is an estimate based on army size, not an independent confirmation of it
6. The campsites need not be impossibly large and the local water supply is adequate for the needs of 5 million men.
This statement can only really be made by ignoring arguments made. The water issue has only been tackled by stating Maurice made a major miscalculation of the rate of flow in Asia Minor, so therefore all issues modern armies on the march had with watering horses can be dismissed
7. The local allied Greeks are capable of supplying the army with an occasional meal without overstraining their resources and the 400 talent supper supplied by the Thasians indicates an army in the millions, not low hundreds of thousands.
The first part of the statement is true (because it's vague), the second part relies on a figure provided by Herodotus so can't be used to confirm Herodotus' figures are correct
8. Maurice as an argument of authority is not conclusive. He has been proven seriously inaccurate in several crucial estimates.
Maurice is one of many modern estimates of the size of the army which dispute Herodotus' figures. He seems to have taken on a prominence because he approached the march as a military exercise as opposed to a papers and pencil (or calculator) one. Most of the areas where he raised issues have not been satisfactorially bottomed even if he may not be correct in all details.
9. Herodotus is too systematic in affirming or implying an army in the millions rather than low hundreds of thousands. If he is wrong then he is guilty of systematic fabrication, not just vague exaggeration. This makes him completely unreliable as a source, despite the fact he generally has a good reputation among contemporary historians.
He seems to have had a worse reputation among Ancient historians than modern ones. He does seem to have thought about his numbers but seems to have been the victim either of propaganda or a "barbarian horde" trope, which in this setting would be mutually reinforcing
Let me know if I've missed anything out.
Quite a bit but lets not get carried away :)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:58:47 PM
10. The fact that Jim Webster does not endorse a 5-million man army might not constitute a conclusive refutation even though he has excellent things to say and I've enjoyed his articles in Slingshot. :)
11. Just because Justin and Patrick say something is so don't make it so either, even though lots of interesting byways have been explored and calculations made. :)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:55:25 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 12:51:09 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
4. Before Thermopylae the overland route does not have any bottlenecks that cannot be traversed by a broad column.
This is your opinion, it is not something that is widely agreed. Personally I would put Gallipoli down as a bottleneck on the strength of the opinion of people who have tried to move troops through it, or were used to moving troops and didn't like the ground
The military men who don't like the ground all work from the assumption the army sticks to roads/tracks and the countryside hasn't been cleared to permit cross-country marching. They need to be asked the question: "If we spend 4 years clearing away trees, difficult undergrowth and other obstacles, is there a way through the Gallipoli peninsula that would permit a column 600 yards wide to advance?"
Not the military men I read. They know how troops move because they've moved them which in my eyes is a pretty big plus for them. If the locust formation was such a success, it would have been used more widely
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 01:11:29 PM
I don't want to enter into tit-for-tat but I assume you've abandoned the cautious, reasoned approach for deliberate provocation to try to refocus our minds, so here goes.
Not at all. You gave your own position in your summing up: "I know that all the figure work has confirmed to me that the orthodox view is closer to a practical reality at the same time pointing up the flaws of some of the more minimal estimates, like Delbruck or Young" - so I gave mine. But whether I think 5 million men is reasonable or whether Jim thinks it's tosh is neither here nor there for the purposes of the discussion. I'm quite happy to separate my own opinions from the direction the arguments take and change my mind if necessary (I just did so over the Selymbria example).
To sum up the discussion in terms that does not include my personal convictions: whilst the majority of posters keep to the position of an army below half a million, the arguments and facts put forward do not seem to have conclusively ruled out the possibility of an army of several million strong though most posters feel these arguments and facts have not conclusively or even substantially proved the big army hypothesis either.
Sounds OK?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 01:18:25 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:58:47 PM
10. The fact that Jim Webster does not endorse a 5-million man army might not constitute a conclusive refutation even though he has excellent things to say and I've enjoyed his articles in Slingshot. :)
11. Just because Justin and Patrick say something is so don't make it so either, even though lots of interesting byways have been explored and calculations made. :)
Agreed.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 27, 2018, 01:09:55 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 12:32:37 PM
If you look at the example Duncan gave, "On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain....."
So it was a one off.
Actually, we don't know that. How did (pseudo-)Aristotle know about this event? Probably he, or his source, saw an inscription in Selymbria's agora recording the decree for the "compulsory purchase" and the free export - that's how a lot of these things pass into wider knowledge, a Greek polis will set up an inscription commemorating almost anything. And there could have been dozens of such decrees. So obviously not an annual event, but not necessarily all that rare, either.
I'd suggest that the fact they set up an inscription meant that it wasn't the default option.
It's something that is going to fluctuate with time. A series of bad harvests and exports might be banned for a number of years.
But the bit that interested me was it was done because they were in need of funds. Whatever overrode their desire to ban exports was entirely pragmatic, they needed the money.
Admittedly they might have needed the money to fund a really good annual dinner for the magistrates but it's still a priority. 8)
I've just trawled through the last 20 or so pages to catch up.......lively thread ;D
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 02:34:54 PM
I've just trawled through the last 20 or so pages to catch up.......lively thread ;D
Quite entertaining if you treat these epic debates as a chance for some serendipitous learning (I know more about ancient shipping, Roman marching practices and refugee camps than I did :) ) somewhat frustrating if you are seeking any answers on the main topic. I suspect having a different approach to evidence and the testing thereof doesn't help.
its certainly been an education Anthony and just goes to show what a clever bunch of people we have on here
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 02:34:54 PM
I've just trawled through the last 20 or so pages to catch up.......lively thread ;D
One that may well beat the 100 page record.
A problem is that for some of the thread participants the question is existential - if a key ancient writer such as Herodotus 'lied' then this casts doubt on other ancient writers and thus throws into question ancient history as a serious field of study. If the source can be wrong what can we rely on in our historical studies- might we just as well be reading Michael Moorcock. There is also an issue that if we doubt ancient sources we are displaying a type of cultural arrogance that is akin to racism and much like the numerous historians and archaeologists who study these matters we have an agenda that derives from bad faith or moral failings. The latter tendency seems to be combined with what I experience as a magical world view that accepts the historical existence of 'manna from heaven' and the bible as history. One could further posit that questions around common sense and logic is equally existential and is not free from value-based analysis.
In these circumstances I am not convinced that the question posed is in any way answerable to the satisfaction of the participants.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 01:11:29 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
7. The local allied Greeks are capable of supplying the army with an occasional meal without overstraining their resources and the 400 talent supper supplied by the Thasians indicates an army in the millions, not low hundreds of thousands.
The first part of the statement is true (because it's vague), the second part relies on a figure provided by Herodotus so can't be used to confirm Herodotus' figures are correct
Sorry for dipping in and out of this thread, but regarding the 400 talents, Athenaeus has 'the king of the Persians' expending 400 talents to feed
15,000 men; so that H reports 400 talents being used does not necessarily mean that it must be for millions of men.
See here:
Quote[27.] G But Herodotus, in his seventh book, says:- "The Greeks, who received Xerxes in hospitality, and invited him to supper, all came to the very extremity of ruin, so as to be utterly turned out of their houses; as for instance, among the Thasians, who, because of the cities which they had on the continent, received the army of Xerxes and entertained it at supper. Antipater, one of the citizens, expended four hundred talents in that single entertainment; and he placed on the tables gold and silver cups and goblets; and then the soldiers, when they departed after the supper, took them away with them. And, wherever Xerxes took two meals, dining as well as supping, that city would be utterly ruined."
And in the ninth book of his Histories, the same author tells us:- "The king provides a royal entertainment; and this is provided once every year, on the day on which the king was born. And the name of this feast is in Persian τυκτὰ, but in Greek Ï„Îλειον; and that is the only day that he has his head rubbed, and gives presents to the Persians."
But Alexander the Great, whenever he supped with any of his friends, as Ephippus the Olynthian relates in his book on the Deaths of Alexander and Hephaestion, expended each day a hundred minae, as perhaps sixty or seventy of his friends supped with him. But the king of the Persians as Ctesias and Dinon relate in the Histories of Persia, supped with fifteen thousand men, and there were expended on the supper four hundred talents; and this amounts in Italian money to twenty four hundred thousand [denarii]. And this sum when divided among fifteen thousand men is a hundred and sixty [denarii] of Italian money for each individual; so that it comes to very nearly the same as the expense of Alexander; for he expended a hundred minae, according to the account of Ephippus.
http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus4.html
Quote from: Prufrock on April 27, 2018, 04:58:00 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 01:11:29 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
7. The local allied Greeks are capable of supplying the army with an occasional meal without overstraining their resources and the 400 talent supper supplied by the Thasians indicates an army in the millions, not low hundreds of thousands.
The first part of the statement is true (because it's vague), the second part relies on a figure provided by Herodotus so can't be used to confirm Herodotus' figures are correct
Sorry for dipping in and out of this thread, but regarding the 400 talents, Athenaeus has 'the king of the Persians' expending 400 talents to feed 15,000 men; so that H reports 400 talents being used does not necessarily mean that it must be for millions of men.
See here:
Quote[27.] G But Herodotus, in his seventh book, says:- "The Greeks, who received Xerxes in hospitality, and invited him to supper, all came to the very extremity of ruin, so as to be utterly turned out of their houses; as for instance, among the Thasians, who, because of the cities which they had on the continent, received the army of Xerxes and entertained it at supper. Antipater, one of the citizens, expended four hundred talents in that single entertainment; and he placed on the tables gold and silver cups and goblets; and then the soldiers, when they departed after the supper, took them away with them. And, wherever Xerxes took two meals, dining as well as supping, that city would be utterly ruined."
And in the ninth book of his Histories, the same author tells us:- "The king provides a royal entertainment; and this is provided once every year, on the day on which the king was born. And the name of this feast is in Persian τυκτὰ, but in Greek Ï„Îλειον; and that is the only day that he has his head rubbed, and gives presents to the Persians."
But Alexander the Great, whenever he supped with any of his friends, as Ephippus the Olynthian relates in his book on the Deaths of Alexander and Hephaestion, expended each day a hundred minae, as perhaps sixty or seventy of his friends supped with him. But the king of the Persians as Ctesias and Dinon relate in the Histories of Persia, supped with fifteen thousand men, and there were expended on the supper four hundred talents; and this amounts in Italian money to twenty four hundred thousand [denarii]. And this sum when divided among fifteen thousand men is a hundred and sixty [denarii] of Italian money for each individual; so that it comes to very nearly the same as the expense of Alexander; for he expended a hundred minae, according to the account of Ephippus.
http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus4.html
The birthday supper the king gave once a year was a rather different affair from the supper the king took whilst on campaign. The birthday bash involved inviting 15 000 distinguished guests to his palace and supplying a 'royal entertainment' with lavish gifts and the last word in Persian cuisine. Expense was of no concern. The bill would have come out to about US$530 per guest which sounds about right for an
a la carte menu plus entertainment and pressie.
QuoteThe birthday supper the king gave once a year was a rather different affair from the supper the king took whilst on campaign.
While this is true, I think the tale does warn us to be careful with figures. We now know the Thasians probably spent far more on entertaining Xerxes than we had assumed.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 04:48:12 PM
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 02:34:54 PM
I've just trawled through the last 20 or so pages to catch up.......lively thread ;D
One that may well beat the 100 page record.
A problem is that for some of the thread participants the question is existential - if a key ancient writer such as Herodotus 'lied' then this casts doubt on other ancient writers and thus throws into question ancient history as a serious field of study. If the source can be wrong what can we rely on in our historical studies- might we just as well be reading Michael Moorcock. There is also an issue that if we doubt ancient sources we are displaying a type of cultural arrogance that is akin to racism and much like the numerous historians and archaeologists who study these matters we have an agenda that derives from bad faith or moral failings. The latter tendency seems to be combined with what I experience as a magical world view that accepts the historical existence of 'manna from heaven' and the bible as history. One could further posit that questions around common sense and logic is equally existential and is not free from value-based analysis.
In these circumstances I am not convinced that the question posed is in any way answerable to the satisfaction of the participants.
Yes. It's a bit if a nebulous question/answer. The trouble with authors and writers is that boss creeps in somewhere and where there is boss there is poetic licence lurking over it's shoulder. You only have to read the same story told by different newspapers today to see what I mean
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 05:29:22 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 04:48:12 PM
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 02:34:54 PM
I've just trawled through the last 20 or so pages to catch up.......lively thread ;D
One that may well beat the 100 page record.
A problem is that for some of the thread participants the question is existential - if a key ancient writer such as Herodotus 'lied' then this casts doubt on other ancient writers and thus throws into question ancient history as a serious field of study. If the source can be wrong what can we rely on in our historical studies- might we just as well be reading Michael Moorcock. There is also an issue that if we doubt ancient sources we are displaying a type of cultural arrogance that is akin to racism and much like the numerous historians and archaeologists who study these matters we have an agenda that derives from bad faith or moral failings. The latter tendency seems to be combined with what I experience as a magical world view that accepts the historical existence of 'manna from heaven' and the bible as history. One could further posit that questions around common sense and logic is equally existential and is not free from value-based analysis.
In these circumstances I am not convinced that the question posed is in any way answerable to the satisfaction of the participants.
Yes. It's a bit if a nebulous question/answer. The trouble with authors and writers is that boss creeps in somewhere and where there is boss there is poetic licence lurking over it's shoulder. You only have to read the same story told by different newspapers today to see what I mean
Plutarch got a little bitter and twisted about Herodotus at the time, claiming he pandered to the Athenian dislike of Thebes
http://www.bostonleadershipbuilders.com/plutarch/moralia/malice_of_herodotus.htm
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 04:48:12 PM
A problem is that for some of the thread participants the question is existential - if a key ancient writer such as Herodotus 'lied' then this casts doubt on other ancient writers and thus throws into question ancient history as a serious field of study.
If.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 06:00:56 PM
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 05:29:22 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 04:48:12 PM
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 02:34:54 PM
I've just trawled through the last 20 or so pages to catch up.......lively thread ;D
One that may well beat the 100 page record.
A problem is that for some of the thread participants the question is existential - if a key ancient writer such as Herodotus 'lied' then this casts doubt on other ancient writers and thus throws into question ancient history as a serious field of study. If the source can be wrong what can we rely on in our historical studies- might we just as well be reading Michael Moorcock. There is also an issue that if we doubt ancient sources we are displaying a type of cultural arrogance that is akin to racism and much like the numerous historians and archaeologists who study these matters we have an agenda that derives from bad faith or moral failings. The latter tendency seems to be combined with what I experience as a magical world view that accepts the historical existence of 'manna from heaven' and the bible as history. One could further posit that questions around common sense and logic is equally existential and is not free from value-based analysis.
In these circumstances I am not convinced that the question posed is in any way answerable to the satisfaction of the participants.
Yes. It's a bit if a nebulous question/answer. The trouble with authors and writers is that boss creeps in somewhere and where there is boss there is poetic licence lurking over it's shoulder. You only have to read the same story told by different newspapers today to see what I mean
Plutarch got a little bitter and twisted about Herodotus at the time, claiming he pandered to the Athenian dislike of Thebes
http://www.bostonleadershipbuilders.com/plutarch/moralia/malice_of_herodotus.htm
I particular like:
Quote
First then, whoever in relating a story shall use the odious terms when gentler expressions might do as well, is it not to be esteemed impartial, but an enjoyer of his own fancy, in putting the worst construction on things; as if any one, instead of saying Nicias is too superstitious, should call him fanatic, or should accuse Cleon of presumption and madness rather than of inconsiderateness in speech.
Is Herodotus's work written to be performed in public as much as it is to be pored over in a library is he more Frankie Boyle than David Starkey? ;)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 06:33:13 PM
Is Herodotus's work written to be performed in public as much as it is to be pored over in a library is he more Frankie Boyle than David Starkey? ;)
It's a good point. There is some discussion as to when people stopped reading aloud and started reading silently. We know people like Alexander the Great could and did do it, but it appears it was by no means the norm. Reading was a social activity. The cost of owning the works of Herodotus was high, so if you had a set it was likely you'd have them read aloud to you and your guests
This actually makes a difference to the way things are written. The King James Bible was meant to be read aloud, and thus has a far higher use of synonyms than later translations. Also it is far more poetic
So I suspect more people would have heard Herodotus read than would have read him. Also I suspect certain passages would have become favorites whilst other bits were less often aired.
This brief essay (https://www.weeklystandard.com/joseph-epstein/father-of-history) is not unsympathetic to Herodotus but does point out that among his ancient critics were Thucydides, Aristotle and Plutarch. Cicero referred admiringly of Herodotus as the Father of History but said, in the same sentence, his work contained many legends. Placing Herodotus on an infallible pedestal seems inappropriate given his ancient reputation and does him a disservice. He was a ground breaker, a man of expansive interests and no mean writer. He doesn't need to be a demi-god.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 01:11:29 PM
I don't want to enter into tit-for-tat but I assume you've abandoned the cautious, reasoned approach for deliberate provocation to try to refocus our minds, so here goes.
Isn't that a bit slanted?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
1. It can be assumed the Empire had a population large enough to spare 5 million males of military age and still keep going.
Not impossible but we lack evidence that this happened or that this military capacity could be deployed in one place.
We have 'evidence' - our very own academics' estimates for the Achamenid Empire at this period, which range from 17 to 55 million. As for 'deploying this military capacity in one place', Artaxerxes II did so at Cunaxa and Darius III at Gaugamela. There is no doubt that it could be done.
Quote2. The army can march overland without having to form impossibly long columns a few men wide. Examples exist of Persian armies moving cross-country in this fashion.
The "columns a few wide" are a straw man argument. Cross country movement is assumed by all parties as there are no proper roads. Behaviour of later Persian armies in open plains has disputable relevance
Cross country movement and lack of proper roads have been late conclusions for some. Columns a few men wide are a Maurice argument. ;)
Quote3. The Hellespont can be crossed over a bridge of ships by several million men in the timespan given by Herodotus.
Probably true, though has no bearing on numbers crossing
Actually it does: if a bridge is of a certain width/capacity it bears some relationship to the expected traffic.
Quote4. Before Thermopylae the overland route does not have any bottlenecks that cannot be traversed by a broad column.
This seems to be disputed
But only by the disputatious.
Quote5. The navy can be assumed to be large enough (800 smallish vessels) to supply an army this size. There are sufficient beaches and offloading can be done quickly enough to deposit several thousand tons of grain each day.
You can only make this statement by ignoring much of what has been written above. It is doubtful that sufficient supplies could be unloaded over beaches with the regularity and quantity given. We have no independent evidence of the size of the fleet and 800 ships is an estimate based on army size, not an independent confirmation of it
And what would sir consider to be 'independent evidence'? Remember we are working from essentially a single source, which means our best bet for getting somewhere is to check it for internal consistency. Wanting 'independent evidence' is a cop-out.
Quote6. The campsites need not be impossibly large and the local water supply is adequate for the needs of 5 million men.
This statement can only really be made by ignoring arguments made. The water issue has only been tackled by stating Maurice made a major miscalculation of the rate of flow in Asia Minor, so therefore all issues modern armies on the march had with watering horses can be dismissed
If their calculation accuracy is anything like Maurice's, we had better not just dismiss them but discard them altogether. Herodotus notes which rivers (and lakes) supplied the army effectively and which ran dry.
Quote7. The local allied Greeks are capable of supplying the army with an occasional meal without overstraining their resources and the 400 talent supper supplied by the Thasians indicates an army in the millions, not low hundreds of thousands.
The first part of the statement is true (because it's vague), the second part relies on a figure provided by Herodotus so can't be used to confirm Herodotus' figures are correct
Not so - it relies on contemporary Greek standards of living. 400 talents could purchase a day's food for a few million people whether or not we ever heard of Herodotus.
Quote8. Maurice as an argument of authority is not conclusive. He has been proven seriously inaccurate in several crucial estimates.
Maurice is one of many modern estimates of the size of the army which dispute Herodotus' figures. He seems to have taken on a prominence because he approached the march as a military exercise as opposed to a papers and pencil (or calculator) one. Most of the areas where he raised issues have not been satisfactorially bottomed even if he may not be correct in all details.
He gets the water supply spectacularly wrong. He gets Achaemenid marching practice spectacularly wrong. How much further do we need to go with him?
Quote9. Herodotus is too systematic in affirming or implying an army in the millions rather than low hundreds of thousands. If he is wrong then he is guilty of systematic fabrication, not just vague exaggeration. This makes him completely unreliable as a source, despite the fact he generally has a good reputation among contemporary historians.
He seems to have had a worse reputation among Ancient historians than modern ones. He does seem to have thought about his numbers but seems to have been the victim either of propaganda or a "barbarian horde" trope, which in this setting would be mutually reinforcing
No, he undertook to get at and provide the facts about the war.
"This is the display of the inquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, so that things done by man not be forgotten in time, and that great and marvelous deeds, some displayed by the Hellenes, some by the barbarians, not lose their glory, including among others what was the cause of their waging war on each other." - Herodotus I.1
His work indicates that he interviewed many people with a leading role in the war, and he shows throughout a wish to get facts straight or, if they are ambiguous, give the available versions and let the reader decide. This is not the behaviour of a man swayed by 'tropes', however popular .
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 06:50:50 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 01:11:29 PM
I don't want to enter into tit-for-tat but I assume you've abandoned the cautious, reasoned approach for deliberate provocation to try to refocus our minds, so here goes.
Isn't that a bit slanted?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 27, 2018, 12:40:34 PM
1. It can be assumed the Empire had a population large enough to spare 5 million males of military age and still keep going.
Not impossible but we lack evidence that this happened or that this military capacity could be deployed in one place.
We have 'evidence' - our very own academics' estimates for the Achamenid Empire at this period, which range from 17 to 55 million. As for 'deploying this military capacity in one place', Artaxerxes II did so at Cunaxa and Darius III at Gaugamela. There is no doubt that it could be done.
none of the accounts of these two actions talk about 6 million
Not only that but it is a lot easier to do things in the heart of the Empire than it is to project power into a rocky, grain deficient wasteland beyond the empire.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 06:50:50 PM
Quote8. Maurice as an argument of authority is not conclusive. He has been proven seriously inaccurate in several crucial estimates.
Maurice is one of many modern estimates of the size of the army which dispute Herodotus' figures. He seems to have taken on a prominence because he approached the march as a military exercise as opposed to a papers and pencil (or calculator) one. Most of the areas where he raised issues have not been satisfactorially bottomed even if he may not be correct in all details.
He gets the water supply spectacularly wrong. He gets Achaemenid marching practice spectacularly wrong. How much further do we need to go with him?
I await with interest your evidence for the Achaemenid marching practice that proves Maurice wrong, spectacularly or otherwise.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 27, 2018, 06:50:50 PM
Quote6. The campsites need not be impossibly large and the local water supply is adequate for the needs of 5 million men.
This statement can only really be made by ignoring arguments made. The water issue has only been tackled by stating Maurice made a major miscalculation of the rate of flow in Asia Minor, so therefore all issues modern armies on the march had with watering horses can be dismissed
If their calculation accuracy is anything like Maurice's, we had better not just dismiss them but discard them altogether. Herodotus notes which rivers (and lakes) supplied the army effectively and which ran dry.
Remember that Herodotus was not an eye witness for this.
He may merely be quoting a source that was wrong on army size (or he misunderstood it) and quoted a source that was correct on the rivers running dry.
Maurice's calculation accuracy with regard river flow seems nearer what is possible than the calculations of Herodotus with regards army size ;D
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 05:29:22 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 04:48:12 PM
Quote from: Holly on April 27, 2018, 02:34:54 PM
I've just trawled through the last 20 or so pages to catch up.......lively thread ;D
One that may well beat the 100 page record.
A problem is that for some of the thread participants the question is existential - if a key ancient writer such as Herodotus 'lied' then this casts doubt on other ancient writers and thus throws into question ancient history as a serious field of study. If the source can be wrong what can we rely on in our historical studies- might we just as well be reading Michael Moorcock. There is also an issue that if we doubt ancient sources we are displaying a type of cultural arrogance that is akin to racism and much like the numerous historians and archaeologists who study these matters we have an agenda that derives from bad faith or moral failings. The latter tendency seems to be combined with what I experience as a magical world view that accepts the historical existence of 'manna from heaven' and the bible as history. One could further posit that questions around common sense and logic is equally existential and is not free from value-based analysis.
In these circumstances I am not convinced that the question posed is in any way answerable to the satisfaction of the participants.
Yes. It's a bit if a nebulous question/answer. The trouble with authors and writers is that boss creeps in somewhere and where there is boss there is poetic licence lurking over it's shoulder. You only have to read the same story told by different newspapers today to see what I mean
damn autoquote....I wasnt referring to Roy by the way. It should have said BIAS ::)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 07:07:27 PM
Remember that Herodotus was not an eye witness for this.
Is there not some doubt as to his ability to speak Persian?
I am waiting for someone, not necessarily Patrick or Justin to address the command and control issues that a multi-million man army has particularity as a host of such a size is a novelty for the Persian Empire.
Xerxes invasion has been in Western eyes is a key event with existential overtones in that it has been claimed that if it had succeeded Western culture as we know it would not have existed. This is debatable however I feel it is reasonable to assert that the invasion is on some level viewed in that light. Might a Persian perspective be radically different? True the first invasion had been beaten back but prior to this the Greeks had generally been defeated. Xerxes invasion therefore would be business as usual Persian expansion and therefore a large army was needed but not one that would damage the Persian economy and possibly destabilise the regime. I find the argument that the 4-5 million army was a vanity project as lacking evidence. From that perspective the need for such a huge army to terrify the Greeks seems less essential and an army within the range suggested by modern authors seems more likely. Most Greek city states would find an army circa 60,000+ terrifyingly large.
On a separate point the arguments put forward to support the Herodotusian figures dehumanises the Persians. They become a swarm of sub-humans obeying the will of a Hitler like leader, needing less space than westerners as well as mistreating the very animals upon which they are dependent They have so little human qualities that although largely irregular troops they can march in step in wide formations across country keeping order that the Brigade of Guards would find challenging. Whilst, of course, being forced on by an extensive corps of whip men which although the soldiers are armed they are too scared to challenge as unlike the Greeks they are effeminate unfree men who wear trousers. They also seem to be able to swarm over mountains like locusts and be able to home in on off road strategic objectives which they can't be aware of as accurate mapping for the area would be non-existent. This is Orientalism gone mad and is uncomfortably close to Frank Miller's 300; all that is missing is the Rhino, Giant Elephants and Lena Hedey.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 11:01:42 PM
On a separate point the arguments put forward to support the Herodotusian figures dehumanises the Persians.
I don't think we can blame Herodutus for either Orientalism or Frank Miller.
How about we simply generalize with - historians whether recording a victory or a defeat, may be tempted to overstate the number of enemies?
Equating any defense of Herodutus' numbers to Orientalism or dehumanization is basically ad hominem and therefore unhelpful.
Quote from: Dangun on April 28, 2018, 03:16:53 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 11:01:42 PM
On a separate point the arguments put forward to support the Herodotusian figures dehumanises the Persians.
I don't think we can blame Herodutus for either Orientalism or Frank Miller.
How about we simply generalize with - historians whether recording a victory or a defeat, may be tempted to overstate the number of enemies?
Those are both points I would agree with.
Quote from: Dangun on April 28, 2018, 03:16:53 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 27, 2018, 11:01:42 PM
On a separate point the arguments put forward to support the Herodotusian figures dehumanises the Persians.
Equating any defense of Herodutus' numbers to Orientalism or dehumanization is basically ad hominem and therefore unhelpful.
Actually the argument put forward has been the reverse; that doubting Herodotus's figures s an exemplar of 'cultural racism' and in any casedemeans the Persians as it implies they were primitive.Obviously the intent on the part of those defending Herodotus figures is not to dehumanise the Persians but the arguments they put forward depicts the Empire in a very peculiar way which does accidentaly imping on ideas of orientalism.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 05:27:41 PM
QuoteThe birthday supper the king gave once a year was a rather different affair from the supper the king took whilst on campaign.
While this is true, I think the tale does warn us to be careful with figures. We now know the Thasians probably spent far more on entertaining Xerxes than we had assumed.
The Persians were able to carry away with their baggage the tent in which the king and those who with him had dined, which implies it wasn't that big and therefore didn't accommodate a very large number. It makes sense - looking at other military commanders on campaign - that the high command eats well but on a modest scale. An army on the march is not the place for huge banquets.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 06:47:46 PM
This brief essay (https://www.weeklystandard.com/joseph-epstein/father-of-history) is not unsympathetic to Herodotus but does point out that among his ancient critics were Thucydides, Aristotle and Plutarch. Cicero referred admiringly of Herodotus as the Father of History but said, in the same sentence, his work contained many legends. Placing Herodotus on an infallible pedestal seems inappropriate given his ancient reputation and does him a disservice. He was a ground breaker, a man of expansive interests and no mean writer. He doesn't need to be a demi-god.
I don't think anyone in this thread has tried to place Herodotus on an infallible pedestal and make him a demi-god...
*********************
...sorry, had to take time off to refill the lamp next to his statue. (https://i.imgur.com/QSLFoMu.gif)
Now where were we?
Ah, yes. My approach has been to assume a primary source like Herodotus is accurate unless he can be proven wrong, rather than assume he is inaccurate on as major an issue as whether the Persian army numbered 3,4 million men or 200 000 whilst accepting the opinions of contemporary scholars on the subject as being necessarily accurate. The opinions of contemporaries are built on a number of wrong assumptions or at least assumptions that cannot be proven: the rate of flow of rivers, size of a Persian camp, method of march of the Persian army, the inability of the Persian fleet to supply such an army, and so on. These assumptions, though unprovable, have become fixed truths in Academia, such that it is seen as absurd to question them, and any serious discussion of them is ruled out of court right from word go.
So it is possible to discuss Herodotus as a kind of entertaining mental exercise, but to consider that he might actually have got his numbers right is to put him on a pedestal and make him a demi-god.
Would you consider that a fair assessment?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 06:12:18 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 05:27:41 PM
QuoteThe birthday supper the king gave once a year was a rather different affair from the supper the king took whilst on campaign.
While this is true, I think the tale does warn us to be careful with figures. We now know the Thasians probably spent far more on entertaining Xerxes than we had assumed.
The Persians were able to carry away with their baggage the tent in which the king and those who with him had dined, which implies it wasn't that big and therefore didn't accommodate a very large number. It makes sense - looking at other military commanders on campaign - that the high command eats well but on a modest scale. An army on the march is not the place for huge banquets.
We have to remember that Kings had other priorities, an army on the march was their capital city and they had to rule and dispense judgement from it.
If you look at http://www.livius.org/sources/content/polyaenus-stratagems/alexanders-tent/
Alexander's tent
[4.3.24] When deciding legal cases among the Macedonians or the Greeks, Alexander preferred to have a modest and common courtroom. but among the barbarians he preferred a brilliant courtroom suitable for a general, astonishing the barbarians even by the courtroom's appearance. When deciding cases among the Bactrians, Hyrcanians, and Indians, he had a tent made as follows: the tent was large enough for 100 couches;note fifty gold pillars supported it; embroidered gold canopies, stretched out above, covered the place. Inside the tent 500 Persian Apple Bearersnote stood first, dressed in purple and yellow clothing. After the Apple Bearers stood an equal number of archers in different clothing, for some wore flame-colored, some dark blue, and some scarlet. In front of these stood Macedonian Silver Shields, 500 of the tallest men. In the middle of the room stood the gold throne, on which Alexander sat to give audiences. Bodyguards stood on each side when the king heard cases.
In a circle around the tent stood the corps of elephants Alexander had equipped, and 1,000 Macedonians wearing Macedonian apparel. Next to these were 500 Elamites dressed in purple, and after them, in a circle around them, 10,000 Persians, the handsomest and tallest of them, adorned with Persian decorations, and all carrying short swords. Such was Alexander's courtroom among the barbarians.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 06:41:03 AM
Ah, yes. My approach has been to assume a primary source like Herodotus is accurate unless he can be proven wrong,
He will never be proven wrong. It's an impossibility. Even if we find a Persian record of the campaign which showed the Army was barely 100,000 strong, it might merely be a propaganda account to talk away the defeat.
For me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage, given what I've read about agriculture in the area and in the period, given what I've read about Persian armies at the time, the internal politics of the Empire, the fact that this can only be done using techniques nobody used before or since. Everything conspires against Xerxes and his horde
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:08:13 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 06:12:18 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 27, 2018, 05:27:41 PM
QuoteThe birthday supper the king gave once a year was a rather different affair from the supper the king took whilst on campaign.
While this is true, I think the tale does warn us to be careful with figures. We now know the Thasians probably spent far more on entertaining Xerxes than we had assumed.
The Persians were able to carry away with their baggage the tent in which the king and those who with him had dined, which implies it wasn't that big and therefore didn't accommodate a very large number. It makes sense - looking at other military commanders on campaign - that the high command eats well but on a modest scale. An army on the march is not the place for huge banquets.
We have to remember that Kings had other priorities, an army on the march was their capital city and they had to rule and dispense judgement from it.
If you look at http://www.livius.org/sources/content/polyaenus-stratagems/alexanders-tent/
Alexander's tent
[4.3.24] When deciding legal cases among the Macedonians or the Greeks, Alexander preferred to have a modest and common courtroom. but among the barbarians he preferred a brilliant courtroom suitable for a general, astonishing the barbarians even by the courtroom's appearance. When deciding cases among the Bactrians, Hyrcanians, and Indians, he had a tent made as follows: the tent was large enough for 100 couches;note fifty gold pillars supported it; embroidered gold canopies, stretched out above, covered the place. Inside the tent 500 Persian Apple Bearersnote stood first, dressed in purple and yellow clothing. After the Apple Bearers stood an equal number of archers in different clothing, for some wore flame-colored, some dark blue, and some scarlet. In front of these stood Macedonian Silver Shields, 500 of the tallest men. In the middle of the room stood the gold throne, on which Alexander sat to give audiences. Bodyguards stood on each side when the king heard cases.
In a circle around the tent stood the corps of elephants Alexander had equipped, and 1,000 Macedonians wearing Macedonian apparel. Next to these were 500 Elamites dressed in purple, and after them, in a circle around them, 10,000 Persians, the handsomest and tallest of them, adorned with Persian decorations, and all carrying short swords. Such was Alexander's courtroom among the barbarians.
Fair enough. Alexander's tent corresponds closely to a Persian royal pavilion and may even have been the tent of Darius.
The question then remains how big the tent of the Thasians was and how many Persian notables it held, which then questions what percentage of the 400 talents was spent regaling the Persian high command what percentage was spent feeding the ordinary troops. Which then leaves the number of ordinary troops an open question if we just look at the Thasian supper.
One point though: the Thasian tent was made specifically for a supper, not for judging cases. How many men of the Persian army would be of a sufficient rank to dine with the king? A couple of dozen? A hundred? More? That would help to get some idea of the size of the tent.
One other final point: assume an army of 4 million men. It would take 111 talents to feed them for a day - give them the equivalent of one really good meal. That leaves 80 talents = US$3,560,000.00 for Xerxes and VIPs.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 07:02:41 PM
none of the accounts of these two actions talk about 6 million
Not only that but it is a lot easier to do things in the heart of the Empire than it is to project power into a rocky, grain deficient wasteland beyond the empire.
Of course. But Artaxerxes' 900,000 (1.2 million if Abrocomas' tranients are considered) and Darius' 1,000,000 are also contested and for much the same reasons as Xerxes' 1.7 million. Remember that 5.23 million is Herodotus' estimate including noncombatants, and that being difficult is not the same as being impossible.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
For me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage, given what I've read about agriculture in the area and in the period, given what I've read about Persian armies at the time, the internal politics of the Empire, the fact that this can only be done using techniques nobody used before or since.
Then I suspect your reading is seriously flawed in this respect: Greek sources give a very different picture. Ultimately it comes down to a question of who knows better about the conditions of the time: people writing at the time, or people writing a couple of millennia later.
The internal politics of the Empire need to be looked at reign-by-reign rather than telescoped; the latter approach is misleading and ascribes to the early Empire the difficulties of the later Empire.
QuoteEverything conspires against Xerxes and his horde
Replace 'everything' by 'everyone' and you get a more accurate picture.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 28, 2018, 03:56:52 AM
Actually the argument put forward has been the reverse; that doubting Herodotus's figures s an exemplar of 'cultural racism'
Let us straighten out this misrepresentation. 'Cultural racism' (or we can call it 'cultural vanity' in order to avoid using an -ism) is the imposition of our own outlook on previous culture(s), which I regret some people do in spades, perhaps through unfamiliarity with the culture(s) in question, and as part of the process automatically reject any really significant achievement by such cultures, principally:
1) Fielding very large numbers
2) Defeating large numbers with small numbers
3) Possessing organisational capabilities in excess of those found in intervening ages.
Quoteand in any casedemeans the Persians as it implies they were primitive.
More importantly, it seems to assume that the Achaemenids would follow our imposed picture of them, a standpoint of arrogance based on ignorance. Arrogance can be lived with; it is the ignorance which is so damaging.
QuoteObviously the intent on the part of those defending Herodotus figures is not to dehumanise the Persians but the arguments they put forward depicts the Empire in a very peculiar way which does accidentaly imping on ideas of orientalism.
Imping??
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 07:43:16 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 27, 2018, 07:02:41 PM
none of the accounts of these two actions talk about 6 million
Not only that but it is a lot easier to do things in the heart of the Empire than it is to project power into a rocky, grain deficient wasteland beyond the empire.
Of course. But Artaxerxes' 900,000 (1.2 million if Abrocomas' tranients are considered) and Darius' 1,000,000 are also contested and for much the same reasons as Xerxes' 1.7 million. Remember that 5.23 million is Herodotus' estimate including noncombatants, and that being difficult is not the same as being impossible.
yes, contested, often by people who have actually had to move large numbers of men about.
There appears to be a general rule that the better our evidence of a campaign, the smaller the armies get
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 07:43:16 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
For me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage, given what I've read about agriculture in the area and in the period, given what I've read about Persian armies at the time, the internal politics of the Empire, the fact that this can only be done using techniques nobody used before or since.
Then I suspect your reading is seriously flawed in this respect: Greek sources give a very different picture.
pretty well all sources for Persia ARE Greek sources
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 07:43:16 AM
The internal politics of the Empire need to be looked at reign-by-reign rather than telescoped; the latter approach is misleading and ascribes to the early Empire the difficulties of the later Empire.
I did look at the internal politics of the Empire. In fact in the first post in which I discussed them I only discussed the Emperors up to Xerxes. So I can hardly be accused to ascribing to the early Empire the difficulties of the later Empire
Three out of the first five Emperors were murdered
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 07:43:16 AM
QuoteEverything conspires against Xerxes and his horde
Replace 'everything' by 'everyone' and you get a more accurate picture.
I am not illiterate, I picked my words with care. I feel that using the word 'everything' gives the most accurate picture of all.
Let me do a brief breakdown of this.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
He will never be proven wrong. It's an impossibility. Even if we find a Persian record of the campaign which showed the Army was barely 100,000 strong, it might merely be a propaganda account to talk away the defeat.
We haven't found one yet but we do have other sources all of which give huge numbers for the Persian armies.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMFor me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage,
grazing - it was established that even poor grazing ground in Greece would be enough to feed the animals of the Persian army from the campsite itself and a little around. Average and good grazing ground would feed them from the campsite alone.
grain production - grain production does not have to notably increase since there are not actually more mouths to feed. It's more about moving the grain to where the army will need it.
storage - it was established that grain can be stored for years in a dry climate and provided it is properly dried beforehand and kept in a reasonably dry environment (e.g. sealed amphorae) it can probably last a considerable length of time in a not-so-dry climate.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMgiven what I've read about agriculture in the area
agriculture in the area - meaning I presume Thrace, Macedonia and Greece proper would not be a factor since the locals - following the rule of thumb of the Thasians - supplied the Persian army only the occasional meal, something well within their means.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMand in the period, given what I've read about Persian armies at the time, the internal politics of the Empire, the fact that this can only be done using techniques nobody used before or since. Everything conspires against Xerxes and his horde
Persian armies at the time - The primary sources give huge numbers for the Persian armies at the time. Contemporary scholars give numbers a fraction of these sizes. One chooses who to believe.
internal politics of the Empire - this did not affect a campaign since a Persian king ensured his grip on power was secure before setting out with his army.
techniques nobody used before or since - the only such technique looked at in this thread is a cross-country advance of the Persian army. People do it all the time - I do it when I hike. It's hardly remarkable. Many post-Persian armies didn't do it because it wasn't necessary. Once the Persian bluff of huge numbers had been called and Alexander conquered the Persian Empire with an army of about 40 000 men, subsequent armies used paths where paths were available and marched in narrow columns anyway since they could quickly form up for battle that way and could march from camp to camp in a single day.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 07:40:21 AM
Fair enough. Alexander's tent corresponds closely to a Persian royal pavilion and may even have been the tent of Darius.
The question then remains how big the tent of the Thasians was and how many Persian notables it held, which then questions what percentage of the 400 talents was spent regaling the Persian high command what percentage was spent feeding the ordinary troops. Which then leaves the number of ordinary troops an open question if we just look at the Thasian supper.
One point though: the Thasian tent was made specifically for a supper, not for judging cases. How many men of the Persian army would be of a sufficient rank to dine with the king? A couple of dozen? A hundred? More? That would help to get some idea of the size of the tent.
One other final point: assume an army of 4 million men. It would take 111 talents to feed them for a day - give them the equivalent of one really good meal. That leaves 80 talents = US$3,560,000.00 for Darius and VIPs.
From memory there are accounts of Alexander the Great feasting very large numbers of people.
Given summer weather in the area, it's probably not too unreasonable to have the big tent for the inner party, perhaps a couple of hundred, but with the sides rolled up and as many thousand as you wanted sitting around, with more formality the nearer you got to the king's tent ;D
I don't think the tent needs to be limiting in that I don't think the size of the tent is linked to the size of the army. So it might have been a modest tent but with tens of thousands of men drawn up around it eating.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 08:38:01 AM
Let me do a brief breakdown of this.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
He will never be proven wrong. It's an impossibility. Even if we find a Persian record of the campaign which showed the Army was barely 100,000 strong, it might merely be a propaganda account to talk away the defeat.
We haven't found one yet but we do have other sources all of which give huge numbers for the Persian armies.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMFor me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage,
grazing - it was established that even poor grazing ground in Greece would be enough to feed the animals of the Persian army from the campsite itself and a little around. Average and good grazing ground would feed them from the campsite alone.
I disputed that one at the time, it isn't unless the camp sites are specifically chosen on well fertilised hayfields 800 hectares in extent
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 08:38:01 AM
Let me do a brief breakdown of this.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
He will never be proven wrong. It's an impossibility. Even if we find a Persian record of the campaign which showed the Army was barely 100,000 strong, it might merely be a propaganda account to talk away the defeat.
We haven't found one yet but we do have other sources all of which give huge numbers for the Persian armies.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMFor me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage,
grazing - it was established that even poor grazing ground in Greece would be enough to feed the animals of the Persian army from the campsite itself and a little around. Average and good grazing ground would feed them from the campsite alone.
grain production - grain production does not have to notably increase since there are not actually more mouths to feed. It's more about moving the grain to where the army will need it.
I made that point. But I also pointed out that unless you have sea or major river transport, you have to get the grain from somewhere else. It can be argued how far you can more grain by pack animals, but ten days to a fortnight seems to be the limit. So troops fetched from beyond Babylonia would have to be supplied from new sources of supply
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 08:43:23 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 08:38:01 AM
Let me do a brief breakdown of this.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
He will never be proven wrong. It's an impossibility. Even if we find a Persian record of the campaign which showed the Army was barely 100,000 strong, it might merely be a propaganda account to talk away the defeat.
We haven't found one yet but we do have other sources all of which give huge numbers for the Persian armies.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMFor me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage,
grazing - it was established that even poor grazing ground in Greece would be enough to feed the animals of the Persian army from the campsite itself and a little around. Average and good grazing ground would feed them from the campsite alone.
I disputed that one at the time, it isn't unless the camp sites are specifically chosen on well fertilised hayfields 800 hectares in extent
They don't have to be well fertilized hayfields - check the posts on the fodder content of unimproved Greek pasture.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 08:38:01 AM
Let me do a brief breakdown of this.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
He will never be proven wrong. It's an impossibility. Even if we find a Persian record of the campaign which showed the Army was barely 100,000 strong, it might merely be a propaganda account to talk away the defeat.
We haven't found one yet but we do have other sources all of which give huge numbers for the Persian armies.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMFor me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage,
grazing - it was established that even poor grazing ground in Greece would be enough to feed the animals of the Persian army from the campsite itself and a little around. Average and good grazing ground would feed them from the campsite alone.
grain production - grain production does not have to notably increase since there are not actually more mouths to feed. It's more about moving the grain to where the army will need it.
storage - it was established that grain can be stored for years in a dry climate and provided it is properly dried beforehand and kept in a reasonably dry environment (e.g. sealed amphorae) it can probably last a considerable length of time in a not-so-dry climate.
It has been asserted that this can be done.
evidence has been presented for small amounts being preserved in Egyptian graves
Better underground storage facilities were possible, but the examples given were of ground that remained cold, and the fact that you'd need thousands of six meter deep underground grain bins which would still be on the archaeological record seem to indicate that this wasn't done
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 08:46:06 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 08:43:23 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 08:38:01 AM
Let me do a brief breakdown of this.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
He will never be proven wrong. It's an impossibility. Even if we find a Persian record of the campaign which showed the Army was barely 100,000 strong, it might merely be a propaganda account to talk away the defeat.
We haven't found one yet but we do have other sources all of which give huge numbers for the Persian armies.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMFor me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage,
grazing - it was established that even poor grazing ground in Greece would be enough to feed the animals of the Persian army from the campsite itself and a little around. Average and good grazing ground would feed them from the campsite alone.
I disputed that one at the time, it isn't unless the camp sites are specifically chosen on well fertilised hayfields 800 hectares in extent
They don't have to be well fertilized hayfields - check the posts on the fodder content of unimproved Greek pasture.
I read it, it specifically said it wasn't bad grazing for goats. I highlighted this at the time
edited to add, and I think the stocking rate given was low as well
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 08:38:01 AM
techniques nobody used before or since - the only such technique looked at in this thread is a cross-country advance of the Persian army. People do it all the time - I do it when I hike. It's hardly remarkable. Many post-Persian armies didn't do it because it wasn't necessary. Once the Persian bluff of huge numbers had been called and Alexander conquered the Persian Empire with an army of about 40 000 men, subsequent armies used paths where paths were available and marched in narrow columns anyway since they could quickly form up for battle that way and could march from camp to camp in a single day.
no, we've also had people assume the use of millions of amphorae for grain transport which wasn't much used, we've had the development of multiyear grain stores on a vast scale, the list goes on
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 07:58:54 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 28, 2018, 03:56:52 AM
Actually the argument put forward has been the reverse; that doubting Herodotus's figures s an exemplar of 'cultural racism'
Let us straighten out this misrepresentation. 'Cultural racism' (or we can call it 'cultural vanity' in order to avoid using an -ism) is the imposition of our own outlook on previous culture(s), which I regret some people do in spades, perhaps through unfamiliarity with the culture(s) in question, and as part of the process automatically reject any really significant achievement by such cultures, principally:
1) Fielding very large numbers
2) Defeating large numbers with small numbers
3) Possessing organisational capabilities in excess of those found in intervening ages.
Quoteand in any casedemeans the Persians as it implies they were primitive.
More importantly, it seems to assume that the Achaemenids would follow our imposed picture of them, a standpoint of arrogance based on ignorance. Arrogance can be lived with; it is the ignorance which is so damaging.
QuoteObviously the intent on the part of those defending Herodotus figures is not to dehumanise the Persians but the arguments they put forward depicts the Empire in a very peculiar way which does accidentaly imping on ideas of orientalism.
Imping??
impinge ::)
This doesn't make much if any sense Patrick, you claim your are being misrepresented but then point out exactly why you aren't :o
The world is divided into two camps. The first camp consists of Patrick and Herodotus whilst the second are those who disagree with them due to their arrogance, ignorance, a desire to belittle the past and unlike the first camp their lack of first hand familiarity with the Persian Empire.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 08:45:17 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 08:38:01 AM
Let me do a brief breakdown of this.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AM
He will never be proven wrong. It's an impossibility. Even if we find a Persian record of the campaign which showed the Army was barely 100,000 strong, it might merely be a propaganda account to talk away the defeat.
We haven't found one yet but we do have other sources all of which give huge numbers for the Persian armies.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 07:12:51 AMFor me, it's the big picture. Given what I know about grazing, and grain production and storage,
grazing - it was established that even poor grazing ground in Greece would be enough to feed the animals of the Persian army from the campsite itself and a little around. Average and good grazing ground would feed them from the campsite alone.
grain production - grain production does not have to notably increase since there are not actually more mouths to feed. It's more about moving the grain to where the army will need it.
I made that point. But I also pointed out that unless you have sea or major river transport, you have to get the grain from somewhere else. It can be argued how far you can more grain by pack animals, but ten days to a fortnight seems to be the limit. So troops fetched from beyond Babylonia would have to be supplied from new sources of supply
Right. So the Persian Empire needs to move a lot of grain from their sources to the storage ports in Asia Minor and the depots along the Thracian/Macedonian coastline. It then needs to ship this grain to the army marching along the coastline. This is the big challenge for the Persian infrastructure.
What are the major sources of supply of grain in the Persian Empire? Can grain be transported overland from these sources to the Mediterranean coast? Bear in mind that an army doesn't carry more than about a week's grain to feed itself. But a grain caravan can transport a large load of grain much longer distances without having to eat it all.
If we limit the grain supply sources to Egypt, the Black Sea and the coastline and adjacent hinterland of Asia Minor and Syria/Palestine, will that supply enough grain? Bear in mind that over 400 000 tons of grain were shipped to Rome from Carthage each year. About the same amount of grain would be required by the army for its entire campaign - a 4 month round trip with 4000 tons per day for about 4 million men. With 4 years' planning, it should have been possible to procure it from these areas. (interesting all these 4's)
It may not be necessary for these areas to grow much more than usual as they supplied customers beyond the Persian Empire. Xerxes could simply have mandated that all surplus grain was not to be exported but stored up for the army. Egyptian grain could have been stored
in situ. It would have kept until it was shipped to the major depots around the Aegean in the year before the campaign. Ditto for Syrian/Palestinian grain and grain from drier parts of Asia Minor. Not so sure about grain from the Black Sea. (one consequence of this arrangement is that the folks at home in the Persian hinterland would have had plenty of nosh whilst the army was away :) )
Not intending to reply in detail to Patrick's long reposte because much has been said since, but I can't let this go by
QuoteAnd what would sir consider to be 'independent evidence'? Remember we are working from essentially a single source, which means our best bet for getting somewhere is to check it for internal consistency. Wanting 'independent evidence' is a cop-out.
Independent evidence is from a different source, not copied directly or indirectly from the original. I do not believe that, if something is internally consistent, it is true. It is a good sign but not decisive. To suggest wanting independent evidence is a "cop-out" is a bit alarming. If we don't test our sources - if we just treat them as infallible - where are we? And finally, in the context, I was pointing out that just relying on the single source can lead to circular arguments, which this debate is prone to.
QuoteSo it is possible to discuss Herodotus as a kind of entertaining mental exercise, but to consider that he might actually have got his numbers right is to put him on a pedestal and make him a demi-god.
Would you consider that a fair assessment?
No, to treat his words as holy writ is to put him on a pedestal and make him a demi-god. We should do Herodotus the credit of treating him as an extraordinary man of his time. That means trying to place him in his world, being aware of his skills as a story teller and writer and of his agendas and viewpoints (his view of the persians is still very Greek).
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 09:33:46 AM
Not intending to reply in detail to Patrick's long reposte because much has been said since, but I can't let this go by
QuoteAnd what would sir consider to be 'independent evidence'? Remember we are working from essentially a single source, which means our best bet for getting somewhere is to check it for internal consistency. Wanting 'independent evidence' is a cop-out.
Independent evidence is from a different source, not copied directly or indirectly from the original. I do not believe that, if something is internally consistent, it is true. It is a good sign but not decisive. To suggest wanting independent evidence is a "cop-out" is a bit alarming. If we don't test our sources - if we just treat them as infallible - where are we? And finally, in the context, I was pointing out that just relying on the single source can lead to circular arguments, which this debate is prone to.
This seems to be the core of the problem in this thread. We have only one written source that gives details of the Persian campaign. There's no way of corroborating these details from other sources. So the entire debate revolves around proving or disproving the credibility of that source. Since this involves circumstantial evidence and arguments of probability, none of which are enough to supply scientific proof, we all stay where we are.
Bear in mind that both sides of the argument are making a leap of faith: Patrick and I start with the assumption (belief) that Herodotus is to be relied on unless clear proof can be brought forward that he is wrong (he was wrong in his breakdown of the 1207 Persian warships so, yes, he can be wrong). The other side starts with the assumption that contemporary academics are to be relied on, full stop, and Herodotus is necessarily wrong. None of these academics can bring any scientific proofs to the discussion. They, like Patrick and I, work on circumstantial evidence and arguments (many flawed) of probability.
I can understand both sides' approach and cut the Gordon's knot by considering that Herodotus was clearly trying to write a serious history, and nothing indicates he was part of a propaganda machine
a la Goebbels. Hence with something as fundamental as the numbers of the Persian army, he might have been prone to some exaggeration, but not to the degree of making the Persian army ten or twenty times its real size.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 09:02:15 AM
What are the major sources of supply of grain in the Persian Empire? Can grain be transported overland from these sources to the Mediterranean coast? Bear in mind that an army doesn't carry more than about a week's grain to feed itself. But a grain caravan can transport a large load of grain much longer distances without having to eat it all.
The basic rule is about ten days and your grain caravan has eaten everything it's carrying
There is a fixed number of drivers needed, they eat.
Working draught animals, along with cavalry horses, need some grain if they're going to work.
This is why the railways opened up America and started the wheat growing on the plains. Because until you had railways there was no way you could have got the wheat out. (The Mississippi river was an exception because obviously it was another form of transport.)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:05:27 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 09:02:15 AM
What are the major sources of supply of grain in the Persian Empire? Can grain be transported overland from these sources to the Mediterranean coast? Bear in mind that an army doesn't carry more than about a week's grain to feed itself. But a grain caravan can transport a large load of grain much longer distances without having to eat it all.
The basic rule is about ten days and your grain caravan has eaten everything it's carrying
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
It restocks regularly. For example, if you restock every five days, it will only eat half its load, leaving half the load weight to provide for accompanying troops.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 09:02:15 AM
It may not be necessary for these areas to grow much more than usual as they supplied customers beyond the Persian Empire. Xerxes could simply have mandated that all surplus grain was not to be exported but stored up for the army. Egyptian grain could have been stored in situ. It would have kept until it was shipped to the major depots around the Aegean in the year before the campaign. Ditto for Syrian/Palestinian grain and grain from drier parts of Asia Minor. Not so sure about grain from the Black Sea. (one consequence of this arrangement is that the folks at home in the Persian hinterland would have had plenty of nosh whilst the army was away :) )
nobody produces surplus grain except by accident.
The grain market is a very inelastic thing. If you produce 5% under, you have civil disturbance, riots, and some people will go hungry.
If you produce 5% over, the price collapses because that 5% is frantically chasing any sort of market at all and drives the price down. After all nobody is going to eat an extra meal of barley bread.
So any surplus is accidental and ideally is bought up by the city (as in our Greek example) to keep for the year when there's a drop.
So to guarantee extra grain you've really got to push and pull. You've got to guarantee a market and price, and you've got to encourage people breaking new land.
So you're asking Egypt to feed 6 million people for six months (or thereabouts.)
The population of Egypt in the New Kingdom was four to five million, apparently Josephus gives 7.5 million people for the Ptolemaic period.
So you're asking Egypt to increase it's output by 50% or thereabouts. This means they've got to find 50% more land and 50% more labour
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:05:27 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 09:02:15 AM
What are the major sources of supply of grain in the Persian Empire? Can grain be transported overland from these sources to the Mediterranean coast? Bear in mind that an army doesn't carry more than about a week's grain to feed itself. But a grain caravan can transport a large load of grain much longer distances without having to eat it all.
The basic rule is about ten days and your grain caravan has eaten everything it's carrying
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
seriously, read Engels, he discusses possible routes in great detail.
It is a very serious problem armies faced on long marches. It's one reason why the Roman frontiers tended to follow rivers, because it made supply possible.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 10:12:08 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
It restocks regularly. For example, if you restock every five days, it will only eat half its load, leaving half the load weight to provide for accompanying troops.
Doesn't quite add up. If a mule can carry 100kg of grain (a modest estimate), it can feed 20 men for 5 days. Assume 1 handler to each mule (a generous estimate) and the grain caravan can keep going for 100 days, on the assumption the animals graze off the land.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:17:40 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:05:27 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 09:02:15 AM
What are the major sources of supply of grain in the Persian Empire? Can grain be transported overland from these sources to the Mediterranean coast? Bear in mind that an army doesn't carry more than about a week's grain to feed itself. But a grain caravan can transport a large load of grain much longer distances without having to eat it all.
The basic rule is about ten days and your grain caravan has eaten everything it's carrying
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
seriously, read Engels, he discusses possible routes in great detail.
It is a very serious problem armies faced on long marches. It's one reason why the Roman frontiers tended to follow rivers, because it made supply possible.
Yes because armies - many men to each pack animal - can keep going only for about a week on their supplies before needing replenishment. But a grain caravan is a different story. The main problem would be preserving the grain, which actually wouldn't be a problem in a dry climate with no rainfall during the trip.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 10:12:08 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
It restocks regularly. For example, if you restock every five days, it will only eat half its load, leaving half the load weight to provide for accompanying troops.
The problem is that if we take it that the caravan eats its load in ten days, if you transport grain for thirty days, you can restock if you want, but you've still eaten thirty days grain to transport ten days grain for a month.The grain when you hand it over at the end of the month has cost you three times more than it's worth. This is why people didn't do it. It's why caravans tended to trade in high value low weight commodities.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:18:19 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 10:12:08 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
It restocks regularly. For example, if you restock every five days, it will only eat half its load, leaving half the load weight to provide for accompanying troops.
Doesn't quite add up. If a mule can carry 100kg of grain (a modest estimate), it can feed 20 men for 5 days. Assume 1 handler to each mule (a generous estimate) and the grain caravan can keep going for 100 days, on the assumption the animals graze off the land.
An equine needs roughly 2% of its body weight a day and can carry 20% of its body weight. So it will eat its load in ten days. Or to use your example, 100kg represents a 500kg animal (a large mule for the time) eating 10kg per day. If you are moving between areas where fodder can be independently obtained, you can obviously extend the range. Caravans on caravan routes may have been able to do this, army baggage trains much less so.
Noting Jim's reply : The caravan thing only works if the load value is greater than the transportation costs. So, better for the Silk Road perhaps. But if you can get a premium price (e.g. there's a shortage where you are going and you bought when local surplus has depressed the price) and things are peaceful, so you don't need to pay too many caravan guards, it could be worth it for grain.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:15:56 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 09:02:15 AM
It may not be necessary for these areas to grow much more than usual as they supplied customers beyond the Persian Empire. Xerxes could simply have mandated that all surplus grain was not to be exported but stored up for the army. Egyptian grain could have been stored in situ. It would have kept until it was shipped to the major depots around the Aegean in the year before the campaign. Ditto for Syrian/Palestinian grain and grain from drier parts of Asia Minor. Not so sure about grain from the Black Sea. (one consequence of this arrangement is that the folks at home in the Persian hinterland would have had plenty of nosh whilst the army was away :) )
nobody produces surplus grain except by accident.
The grain market is a very inelastic thing. If you produce 5% under, you have civil disturbance, riots, and some people will go hungry.
If you produce 5% over, the price collapses because that 5% is frantically chasing any sort of market at all and drives the price down. After all nobody is going to eat an extra meal of barley bread.
So any surplus is accidental and ideally is bought up by the city (as in our Greek example) to keep for the year when there's a drop.
So to guarantee extra grain you've really got to push and pull. You've got to guarantee a market and price, and you've got to encourage people breaking new land.
So you're asking Egypt to feed 6 million people for six months (or thereabouts.)
The population of Egypt in the New Kingdom was four to five million, apparently Josephus gives 7.5 million people for the Ptolemaic period.
So you're asking Egypt to increase it's output by 50% or thereabouts. This means they've got to find 50% more land and 50% more labour
To slightly trim the figures, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor and the Black Seas lands are being asked to supply 88% of the requirements of 4 million men for 4 months which is the equivalent of 3,5 million men for 1/3 of a year which is the equivalent of 1,167 million men for a year. The Egyptian population is 7,5 million, so if Egypt
alone feeds the army, it is being asked to supply 15,56% of its annual harvest - or just the portion of the annual harvest necessary to feed its own people. Take its surplus into account and the grain supplied by the rest of the Mediterranean coastline and the Black Sea and it doesn't look so unreasonable.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 10:28:48 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:18:19 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 10:12:08 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
It restocks regularly. For example, if you restock every five days, it will only eat half its load, leaving half the load weight to provide for accompanying troops.
Doesn't quite add up. If a mule can carry 100kg of grain (a modest estimate), it can feed 20 men for 5 days. Assume 1 handler to each mule (a generous estimate) and the grain caravan can keep going for 100 days, on the assumption the animals graze off the land.
An equine needs roughly 2% of its body weight a day and can carry 20% of its body weight. So it will eat its load in ten days. Or to use your example, 100kg represents a 500kg animal (a large mule for the time) eating 10kg per day. If you are moving between areas where fodder can be independently obtained, you can obviously extend the range. Caravans on caravan routes may have been able to do this, army baggage trains much less so.
Why should the pack animals eat from their grain? If Texan cattle herds of thousands of animals can cover hundreds of miles and remain in good condition solely from living off the land, then a smallish caravan that isn't under the time constraints of an army on the march can surely do the same.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:18:19 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 10:12:08 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
It restocks regularly. For example, if you restock every five days, it will only eat half its load, leaving half the load weight to provide for accompanying troops.
Doesn't quite add up. If a mule can carry 100kg of grain (a modest estimate), it can feed 20 men for 5 days. Assume 1 handler to each mule (a generous estimate) and the grain caravan can keep going for 100 days, on the assumption the animals graze off the land.
The rule of thumb is that a mule can carry 20% of its body weight, which is apparently 90kg but that will include the saddle.
One man per mule is merely standard.
So we'll take 80kg as the load (after pack saddle and the handlers bits and bods)
That's 176lbs which at 3lb per man will be about 58 man days,
BUT you've got to feed the mule, because even though animals graze working animals have to be grain fed
For feeding working horses the rule was half a pound of grain per 100lb weight of the horse. Your mule will weigh about 1000lb so if a horse would need 5lb of grain. Because it's a mule it needs less, but because it's working hard because you've got it heavily laden, I'd put it on the same ration as the man. So you'll have about 28 days before you run out. But of course if you're wisely carrying your grain in Amphorae as everybody insisted was necessary to stop it getting damp, the amphora weighs the same as its' load, so you'd end up 14 days from home having eaten everything but with a lot of empty amphorae to admire.
By picking mules you have picked the elite of the pack animal world and modern mules are apparently particularly well bred. The ancient world was more likely to use donkeys or horses which are a lot less efficient, needing to be fed more grain for the load carried.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:30:57 AM
so if Egypt alone feeds the army, it is being asked to supply 15,56% of its annual harvest - or just the portion of the annual harvest necessary to feed its own people. Take its surplus into account and the grain supplied by the rest of the Mediterranean coastline and the Black Sea and it doesn't look so unreasonable.
No, it is being asked to increase its production
If you take away 15% of a national harvest and use if for something else people will starve!
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:33:31 AM
Why should the pack animals eat from their grain? If Texan cattle herds of thousands of animals can cover hundreds of miles and remain in good condition solely from living off the land, then a smallish caravan that isn't under the time constraints of an army on the march can surely do the same.
The obvious answer is that the people who used to do this discovered it's necessary
Cattle are ruminants, horses are not. Cattle can put on weight travelling and grazing. (15 miles a day is about the distance they need to travel to not lose weight provided they've got stops for grazing)
They're a different species and do things differently
QuoteWhy should the pack animals eat from their grain? If Texan cattle herds of thousands of animals can cover hundreds of miles and remain in good condition solely from living off the land, then a smallish caravan that isn't under the time constraints of an army on the march can surely do the same.
Jim has answered most of this. A horse can spend 18 hours a day grazing. So anything less than that, it will have difficulty eating its fill and will need supplements (e.g. grain). The good news is horses will graze at night. The advantage of cows is you don't need to deal with individual cows. You can't just turn all your pack animals loose - you need to tether or hobble them and that will reduce their access to grazing and increase the fodder input.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:37:54 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:18:19 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 10:12:08 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:07:09 AM
Question: if a grain caravan eats all its grain in 10 days, how does an army, with many more men per pack animal, survive for 10 days?
It restocks regularly. For example, if you restock every five days, it will only eat half its load, leaving half the load weight to provide for accompanying troops.
Doesn't quite add up. If a mule can carry 100kg of grain (a modest estimate), it can feed 20 men for 5 days. Assume 1 handler to each mule (a generous estimate) and the grain caravan can keep going for 100 days, on the assumption the animals graze off the land.
The rule of thumb is that a mule can carry 20% of its body weight, which is apparently 90kg but that will include the saddle.
One man per mule is merely standard.
So we'll take 80kg as the load (after pack saddle and the handlers bits and bods)
That's 176lbs which at 3lb per man will be about 58 man days,
BUT you've got to feed the mule, because even though animals graze working animals have to be grain fed
For feeding working horses the rule was half a pound of grain per 100lb weight of the horse. Your mule will weigh about 1000lb so if a horse would need 5lb of grain. Because it's a mule it needs less, but because it's working hard because you've got it heavily laden, I'd put it on the same ration as the man. So you'll have about 28 days before you run out. But of course if you're wisely carrying your grain in Amphorae as everybody insisted was necessary to stop it getting damp, the amphora weighs the same as its' load, so you'd end up 14 days from home having eaten everything but with a lot of empty amphorae to admire.
By picking mules you have picked the elite of the pack animal world and modern mules are apparently particularly well bred. The ancient world was more likely to use donkeys or horses which are a lot less efficient, needing to be fed more grain for the load carried.
OK, assuming the mule eats as much as the man, that's 2kg per day gone out of a load of 100 kg which means 50 days and the load is gone. To get most of the grain - say 3/4 - to its destination means a journey of 2 weeks tops. That's 20km x 14 days = 280km to the coastline or nearest navigable river.
Which gives us this area excluding Egypt:
(https://i.imgur.com/5FZiqud.jpg)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:41:35 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:30:57 AM
so if Egypt alone feeds the army, it is being asked to supply 15,56% of its annual harvest - or just the portion of the annual harvest necessary to feed its own people. Take its surplus into account and the grain supplied by the rest of the Mediterranean coastline and the Black Sea and it doesn't look so unreasonable.
No, it is being asked to increase its production
If you take away 15% of a national harvest and use if for something else people will starve!
You don't take away 15% of the national harvest. You forbid the export of the surplus and take that, plus a few percent of the local harvest - having asked the farmers to grow a bit more in the preceding years. Assuming Egypt supplies half the total needs you are getting the equivalent of 7,5% of its domestic harvest, largely from surplus and extra grain.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 10:59:37 AM
OK, assuming the mule eats as much as the man, that's 2kg per day gone out of a load of 100 kg which means 50 days and the load is gone. To get most of the grain - say 3/4 - to its destination means a journey of 2 weeks tops. That's 20km x 14 days = 280km to the coastline or nearest navigable river.
Which gives us this area excluding Egypt:
no, it's not a 100kg. It starts off at 90 and gets down to 80 by the time you deduct saddle and kit. That's why I ended up with 28 days before you run out
Not only that but it's modern mules, so you're talking about the elite. The vast majority of the ancient world used donkeys
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:05:04 AM
no, it's not a 100kg. It starts off at 90 and gets down to 80 by the time you deduct saddle and kit. That's why I ended up with 28 days before you run out
Fine, so 2/3 of the load reaches its destination. Bear in mind that the handlers would have eaten half that anyway.
Work also on the assumption that the grain would be stored in amphorae but carried in sacks.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:06:04 AM
You don't take away 15% of the national harvest. You forbid the export of the surplus and take that, plus a few percent of the local harvest - having asked the farmers to grow a bit more in the preceding years. Assuming Egypt supplies half the total needs you are getting the equivalent of 7,5% of its domestic harvest, largely from surplus and extra grain.
there isn't a surplus. What happens is 100% is earmarked.
Hopefully in year one you get 105% and you quietly store away the 5% so it doesn't crash the market
In year two you get 95% and you release the 5% onto the market with a smile and nobody dies.
If you want to produce an extra amount, you have to grow an extra amount. Over a three or four year period there is no surplus.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:10:45 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:06:04 AM
You don't take away 15% of the national harvest. You forbid the export of the surplus and take that, plus a few percent of the local harvest - having asked the farmers to grow a bit more in the preceding years. Assuming Egypt supplies half the total needs you are getting the equivalent of 7,5% of its domestic harvest, largely from surplus and extra grain.
there isn't a surplus. What happens is 100% is earmarked.
Hopefully in year one you get 105% and you quietly store away the 5% so it doesn't crash the market
In year two you get 95% and you release the 5% onto the market with a smile and nobody dies.
If you want to produce an extra amount, you have to grow an extra amount. Over a three or four year period there is no surplus.
Egypt was an exporter of grain.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:09:03 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:05:04 AM
no, it's not a 100kg. It starts off at 90 and gets down to 80 by the time you deduct saddle and kit. That's why I ended up with 28 days before you run out
Fine, so 2/3 of the load reaches its destination. Bear in mind that the handlers would have eaten half that anyway.
Please stop playing with perfect figures. These are what I gave you, this is the elite and a modern elite. It's to show you how good you can get under perfect conditions.
In the real world people budgeted on ten days to a fortnight because that's what worked with the livestock they had at the time.
Even the Byzantines seem to have worked on similar figures
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:12:33 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:09:03 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:05:04 AM
no, it's not a 100kg. It starts off at 90 and gets down to 80 by the time you deduct saddle and kit. That's why I ended up with 28 days before you run out
Fine, so 2/3 of the load reaches its destination. Bear in mind that the handlers would have eaten half that anyway.
Please stop playing with perfect figures. These are what I gave you, this is the elite and a modern elite. It's to show you how good you can get under perfect conditions.
In the real world people budgeted on ten days to a fortnight because that's what worked with the livestock they had at the time.
Even the Byzantines seem to have worked on similar figures
Do you have the Byzantine figures?
Quote'Cultural racism' (or we can call it 'cultural vanity' in order to avoid using an -ism) is the imposition of our own outlook on previous culture(s), which I regret some people do in spades,
But fortunately is rare in this forum. However, if application of critical thinking, based on a Western tradition, is cultural vanity then many of us will be guilty as charged. As to "imposition of our own outlook", it is something we all do. The "sources first" approach is equally an "imposition of our own outlook". So, maybe, stepping back and being a little less judgemental of others legitimate intellectual approaches may be the way to go.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:12:26 AM
Egypt was an exporter of grain.
Funnily enough I noticed.
The exported grain isn't surplus. It isn't being bought by people who buy it purely for the joy of allowing Egyptian grain run through their fingers. it's bought to eat.
Every year people from the same cities will turn up in Egypt and will buy pretty much the same amount every time. Some time a little more, some time a little less. That's how grain markets work. Egyptian peasant farmers know when they sow their grain that a proportion of it will go out of Egypt. Temple warehousemen will expect to see the foreigners every year buying, often the same foreigners. They're part of the market.
If you're saying that Xerxes is going to have his person stand at the docks and ban grain being exported to the hungry citizens of his empire we're back to the argument I had with Patrick probably about page one or two.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:13:39 AM
Do you have the Byzantine figures?
I remember them being quoted in Slingshot many years ago, they stuck in mind mainly because they were so close to Engels. But then why not. Engels almost certainly knew of them
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:16:35 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:12:26 AM
Egypt was an exporter of grain.
Funnily enough I noticed.
The exported grain isn't surplus. It isn't being bought by people who buy it purely for the joy of allowing Egyptian grain run through their fingers. it's bought to eat.
Every year people from the same cities will turn up in Egypt and will buy pretty much the same amount every time. Some time a little more, some time a little less. That's how grain markets work. Egyptian peasant farmers know when they sow their grain that a proportion of it will go out of Egypt. Temple warehousemen will expect to see the foreigners every year buying, often the same foreigners. They're part of the market.
If you're saying that Xerxes is going to have his person stand at the docks and ban grain being exported to the hungry citizens of his empire we're back to the argument I had with Patrick probably about page one or two.
The surplus grain was exported to areas outside the Persian Empire, so the hungry citizens remain fed with the domestic harvest. The buyers from outside Persian borders have to find their grain from elsewhere, it's not Xerxes' problem.
Xerxes forbids the export of the surplus grain and buys it himself or takes it as a tax, along with the extra grain he orders to be grown for the campaign.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:23:06 AM
The surplus grain was exported to areas outside the Persian Empire, so the hungry citizens remain fed with the domestic harvest. The buyers from outside Persian borders have to find their grain from elsewhere, it's not Xerxes' problem.
Xerxes forbids the export of the surplus grain and buys it himself or takes it as a tax, along with the extra grain he orders to be grown for the campaign.
that's the problem with having a really big empire. Apart from a handful of Greeks, some of whom may have Medized to guarantee their grain supplies, the grain is bound for within the Empire.
If hungry citizens could be fed with the domestic harvest, then they wouldn't buy grain from Egypt in the first place.
So there's still no surplus grain. He's got to order more and find a way of increasing the manpower and farmable land of Egypt by a considerable percent
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:39:21 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:23:06 AM
The surplus grain was exported to areas outside the Persian Empire, so the hungry citizens remain fed with the domestic harvest. The buyers from outside Persian borders have to find their grain from elsewhere, it's not Xerxes' problem.
Xerxes forbids the export of the surplus grain and buys it himself or takes it as a tax, along with the extra grain he orders to be grown for the campaign.
that's the problem with having a really big empire. Apart from a handful of Greeks, some of whom may have Medized to guarantee their grain supplies, the grain is bound for within the Empire.
If hungry citizens could be fed with the domestic harvest, then they wouldn't buy grain from Egypt in the first place.
So there's still no surplus grain. He's got to order more and find a way of increasing the manpower and farmable land of Egypt by a considerable percent
I'm working on the assumption that most of Egyptian surplus grain was not destined for the Persian Empire but for the Greek cities and other customers on the Mediterranean littoral. But do we have source material on this?
Even presuming Egypt didn't export a single bushel beyond the Empire's borders, at most it is being asked to supply something like 7,5 percent its annual harvest
of a single year. Is it asking too much from Egyptian farmers to farm 1,9% more land over 4 years?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:47:32 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:39:21 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:23:06 AM
The surplus grain was exported to areas outside the Persian Empire, so the hungry citizens remain fed with the domestic harvest. The buyers from outside Persian borders have to find their grain from elsewhere, it's not Xerxes' problem.
Xerxes forbids the export of the surplus grain and buys it himself or takes it as a tax, along with the extra grain he orders to be grown for the campaign.
that's the problem with having a really big empire. Apart from a handful of Greeks, some of whom may have Medized to guarantee their grain supplies, the grain is bound for within the Empire.
If hungry citizens could be fed with the domestic harvest, then they wouldn't buy grain from Egypt in the first place.
So there's still no surplus grain. He's got to order more and find a way of increasing the manpower and farmable land of Egypt by a considerable percent
I'm working on the assumption that most of Egyptian surplus grain was not destined for the Persian Empire but for the Greek cities and other customers on the Mediterranean littoral. But do we have source material on this?
Even presuming Egypt didn't export a single bushel beyond the Empire's borders, at most it is being asked to supply something like 7,5 percent its annual harvest of a single year. Is it asking too much from Egyptian farmers to farm 1,9% more land over 4 years?
Actually if the population of Egypt is 5 million, (7.5 million is Ptolemaic, at least 300 years later than our date and after considerable immigration and agricultural improvement) and you're asking them to feed six million for 6 months. So I suggest my figure of 50% increase is more accurate.
So you have the four years.
In year one I suppose Xerxes could have the Nile flogged to teach it a lesson and make sure the next three Niles are higher and allow more land to be cultivated. But other than that year 1 is going to consist of planning the major irrigation works you need to put a minimum of 15% more land into cultivation, and finding the labour to work it.
You're looking at a project on the same sort of scale as the Ptolemaic work on the Faiyum
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:09:03 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:05:04 AM
no, it's not a 100kg. It starts off at 90 and gets down to 80 by the time you deduct saddle and kit. That's why I ended up with 28 days before you run out
Fine, so 2/3 of the load reaches its destination. Bear in mind that the handlers would have eaten half that anyway.
Work also on the assumption that the grain would be stored in amphorae but carried in sacks.
you mean it'd be put in all these amphorae apparently necessary for sea transport when it got to the docks? 8)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 12:17:27 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:47:32 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:39:21 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:23:06 AM
The surplus grain was exported to areas outside the Persian Empire, so the hungry citizens remain fed with the domestic harvest. The buyers from outside Persian borders have to find their grain from elsewhere, it's not Xerxes' problem.
Xerxes forbids the export of the surplus grain and buys it himself or takes it as a tax, along with the extra grain he orders to be grown for the campaign.
that's the problem with having a really big empire. Apart from a handful of Greeks, some of whom may have Medized to guarantee their grain supplies, the grain is bound for within the Empire.
If hungry citizens could be fed with the domestic harvest, then they wouldn't buy grain from Egypt in the first place.
So there's still no surplus grain. He's got to order more and find a way of increasing the manpower and farmable land of Egypt by a considerable percent
I'm working on the assumption that most of Egyptian surplus grain was not destined for the Persian Empire but for the Greek cities and other customers on the Mediterranean littoral. But do we have source material on this?
Even presuming Egypt didn't export a single bushel beyond the Empire's borders, at most it is being asked to supply something like 7,5 percent its annual harvest of a single year. Is it asking too much from Egyptian farmers to farm 1,9% more land over 4 years?
Actually if the population of Egypt is 5 million, (7.5 million is Ptolemaic, at least 300 years later than our date and after considerable immigration and agricultural improvement) and you're asking them to feed six million for 6 months. So I suggest my figure of 50% increase is more accurate.
So you have the four years.
In year one I suppose Xerxes could have the Nile flogged to teach it a lesson and make sure the next three Niles are higher and allow more land to be cultivated. But other than that year 1 is going to consist of planning the major irrigation works you need to put a minimum of 15% more land into cultivation, and finding the labour to work it.
You're looking at a project on the same sort of scale as the Ptolemaic work on the Faiyum
Fine, let's take 5 million as the population of Egypt and 6 million tops as the size of Xerxes' army and allow 6 months for the campaign, working on the fair assumption that Xerxes intended to strip Greece of grain to help supplement supplies for the return journey. We also assume Egypt supplied half the required 88% grain - generous estimate - needed the feed the army (the 12% comes from the Greek hosts on the army's route).
So Egypt needs to come up with 44% of the grain. That's the size of army (6 million) ÷ size of Egyptian population (5 million) ÷ 2 (half a year's supplies) ÷ 4 (4 year's preparation) x 44% (percentage Egypt must supply) = 6,6% of the annual harvest. This is the absolute worst case scenario.
I suggest that Xerxes doesn't spend year one flogging the Nile but pays for extra labourers to dig irrigation channels and plant the grain without wasting time - if he can afford to dig a canal for his fleet he can afford this. The labourers stay on the job for the next 4 years and gather in the extra harvest. They can then stay and make Egypt a larger exporter of grain than it originally was or they can go home.
Bearing in mind you need to cultivate at most another 6,6% of the land. Assuming 90% of the population of 5 million work the land that's 297 000 extra labourers committed to the job. Not inconceivable.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 12:20:14 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 11:09:03 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 11:05:04 AM
no, it's not a 100kg. It starts off at 90 and gets down to 80 by the time you deduct saddle and kit. That's why I ended up with 28 days before you run out
Fine, so 2/3 of the load reaches its destination. Bear in mind that the handlers would have eaten half that anyway.
Work also on the assumption that the grain would be stored in amphorae but carried in sacks.
you mean it'd be put in all these amphorae apparently necessary for sea transport when it got to the docks? 8)
Only keep the grain in amphorae when in storage or when shipping during the 4 years' preparation (when speed of transport is not of the essence). When it is being carried by mules or shipped to the army on the march keep it in sacks.
As some sort of indicator of the kind of money the Persian Empire could have disposed of, the Seleucid Empire was required to pay Rome and indemnity 3000 talents on the nail and 2000 talents a year for 12 years thereafter. This had to come from the surplus of Seleucid economic production.
Presuming the Persian army cost 400 talents a day to feed (based on the Thasian incident), 4 months on campaign less 12% from local Greek cities would cost 105 days x 400 talents = 42 000 talents in all, or 10 500 a year presuming 4 years' stockpiling. A comparable figure to the Seleucids keeping mind all this money was destined for internal use, not to be given away without any recompense.
I note that we still consider the grain was carried by in amphorae. I continue to be troubled by this, as there seems very little evidence to support this. Most studies seem to distinguish between amphora cargo and bulk grain cargo. For example, David Gibbins writes this in a paper called Shipwrecks and Hellenistic Trade
As in the mediaeval period, grain was most efficiently carried in large, dedicated sitegoi, the grain being laden in sacks or a rifuso directly into the hold
(sitegoi are grain ships, a rifuso is the process of overloading the contracted amount, to allow for spoilage) Hellenistic and classical sitegoi seem to have been smaller than their Roman descendents - 100-400 tonnes seem to crop up.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 02:29:48 PM
I note that we still consider the grain was carried by in amphorae. I continue to be troubled by this, as there seems very little evidence to support this. Most studies seem to distinguish between amphora cargo and bulk grain cargo. For example, David Gibbins writes this in a paper called Shipwrecks and Hellenistic Trade
As in the mediaeval period, grain was most efficiently carried in large, dedicated sitegoi, the grain being laden in sacks or a rifuso directly into the hold
(sitegoi are grain ships, a rifuso is the process of overloading the contracted amount, to allow for spoilage) Hellenistic and classical sitegoi seem to have been smaller than their Roman descendents - 100-400 tonnes seem to crop up.
Very good. The grain would spend only a few days in the hold of a ship so amphorae would probably not be required. But I suggest that for long-term storage, at least on the Aegean coastline, sealed amphorae (as used for olive oil or wine) would be necessary.
Someone (Justin?) was asking about Byzantine figures
The approximate maximum weight a horse or mule can transport over reasonably long distances is about 250 1b (114kg) and a little more over short stretches, although the optimum has generally been set at about 200lb in modern and immediately pre-modern pack-trains. In the late third-century Edict of Diocletian (14.11) a load of 200 Roman pounds (65.49 kg/ 144 1b) is prescribed; a sixth-century source gives mules a total burden of 156—66 Roman pounds (110—16 1b/ 50—3 kg). Similar limits are established by the imperial legislation on the public post. A mid-tenth-century Byzantine text gives somewhat higher values ...... : three categories of load are specified: (a) saddle—horses carrying a man (presumably not armoured and carrying military panoply) and their own barley were loaded with four modioi each -106 Roman pounds=75 1b (34 kg); (b) unridden saddle-horses carried eight modioi—212 Roman pounds—I50 1b (68 kg); and (c) pack-animals loaded with barley carried ten modioi—265 Roman pounds= 187 1b (85 kg). Thus the maximum permitted load for an animal in the imperial baggage train in the ninth and tenth centuries was set at 10 modioi without the pack- saddle (stigma) and harness which, according to the legislation of the fourth sixth centuries, weighed approx. 50—60 Roman pounds (35—42 1b/ 16—19 kg, equivalent to 51—62 Byzantine pounds).
From Appendix 1 in Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204 by John F. Haldon. Most of the Appendix can be viewed via Google. Appendix 2 is on using grain to feed armies but alas most of it is inaccessible. I suspect some members of the forum own the book and may be able to help.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 12:52:50 PM
Fine, let's take 5 million as the population of Egypt and 6 million tops as the size of Xerxes' army and allow 6 months for the campaign, working on the fair assumption that Xerxes intended to strip Greece of grain to help supplement supplies for the return journey. We also assume Egypt supplied half the required 88% grain - generous estimate - needed the feed the army (the 12% comes from the Greek hosts on the army's route).
So Egypt needs to come up with 44% of the grain. That's the size of army (6 million) ÷ size of Egyptian population (5 million) ÷ 2 (half a year's supplies) ÷ 4 (4 year's preparation) x 44% (percentage Egypt must supply) = 6,6% of the annual harvest. This is the absolute worst case scenario.
I suggest that Xerxes doesn't spend year one flogging the Nile but pays for extra labourers to dig irrigation channels and plant the grain without wasting time - if he can afford to dig a canal for his fleet he can afford this. The labourers stay on the job for the next 4 years and gather in the extra harvest. They can then stay and make Egypt a larger exporter of grain than it originally was or they can go home.
Bearing in mind you need to cultivate at most another 6,6% of the land. Assuming 90% of the population of 5 million work the land that's 297 000 extra labourers committed to the job. Not inconceivable.
1) Why would Xerxes intend to strip an already grain deficient area of grain? He couldn't guarantee it, it could go in the flames of the burning cities. Anything could happen to it. But still I said 6 months for easy reckoning. But given that Greece had a population of 12.5 million or thereabouts, and by the time he'd conquered it they could have eaten half their harvest anyway, so even if they handed over everything, there might not be enough grain to feed them. After all with 6 million people coming in, he's increasing the population of Greece by 50%
2a) So what other countries are supplying the extra grain? Remember they have to be coastal or riverine. There aren't really a lot of areas that satisfy these conditions. He can hardly haul it from Babylonia and Asia Minor isn't a major grain exporting area. Neither are the Phoenician cities and Northern Syria only really took off under the Seleucids. So where did it come from?
3) The first year of the four years isn't going to produce anything extra. The size of the crop is fixed by the time Xerxes sends his messengers. The first year is spent in creating new water basins, digging new channels and that sort of thing. It's also spent frantically trying to find the extra labour force. The Egyptian labour force for building was available in the high water time because there was damn all else they could do. Unfortunately for Xerxes he needs it in the low water time when they're at their busiest doing agricultural stuff. So the year he actually does all this digging and suchlike, he still doesn't get extra yield because his farm workers are not doing farm work, they're doing engineering.
4) this 6.6% extra land of course depends on you finding somewhere else which is just as good at producing grain for export as Egypt. When you've come up with this place, then we can go with 6.6, otherwise it's over 12%
5) Your 300,000 (or 600,000 if we're on 12%) labourers. On the assumption that they'll all kept pretty busy just doing agricultural things, what do you want them to stop doing so they can start breaking land into production?
6) This is an absolute worst case scenario. No it isn't, you might get a low or a high Nile. Probably one in five is too low or too high, one being as bad as the other. So in a bad year, you're feeding Egyptians out of stocks.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 01:23:32 PM
As some sort of indicator of the kind of money the Persian Empire could have disposed of, the Seleucid Empire was required to pay Rome and indemnity 3000 talents on the nail and 2000 talents a year for 12 years thereafter. This had to come from the surplus of Seleucid economic production.
Presuming the Persian army cost 400 talents a day to feed (based on the Thasian incident), 4 months on campaign less 12% from local Greek cities would cost 105 days x 400 talents = 42 000 talents in all, or 10 500 a year presuming 4 years' stockpiling. A comparable figure to the Seleucids keeping mind all this money was destined for internal use, not to be given away without any recompense.
You walk into a grain market with money and try to buy when there's no grain to sell. Waving the cheque book around is no good. It was Alexander the Great who poured cash out in front of horses to point out to the Satrap who'd sent it that he needed the grain not the money.
The difficult bit isn't producing the money, it's producing the grain
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 02:50:37 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 02:29:48 PM
I note that we still consider the grain was carried by in amphorae. I continue to be troubled by this, as there seems very little evidence to support this. Most studies seem to distinguish between amphora cargo and bulk grain cargo. For example, David Gibbins writes this in a paper called Shipwrecks and Hellenistic Trade
As in the mediaeval period, grain was most efficiently carried in large, dedicated sitegoi, the grain being laden in sacks or a rifuso directly into the hold
(sitegoi are grain ships, a rifuso is the process of overloading the contracted amount, to allow for spoilage) Hellenistic and classical sitegoi seem to have been smaller than their Roman descendents - 100-400 tonnes seem to crop up.
Very good. The grain would spend only a few days in the hold of a ship so amphorae would probably not be required. But I suggest that for long-term storage, at least on the Aegean coastline, sealed amphorae (as used for olive oil or wine) would be necessary.
I think I calculated that something like 88 million of them would be needed. We should have found the traces of breakages archaeologically by now
Anyway, storing grain or any other crop in anaerobic conditions doesn't necessarily leave it fit for human consumption. You can end up with anaerobic digestion where anaerobic bacteria attack it, they produce lactic acid as a byproduct and the grain ends up pickled in lactic acid. It's called silage, I make it every year 8)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 04:24:21 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 02:50:37 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 02:29:48 PM
I note that we still consider the grain was carried by in amphorae. I continue to be troubled by this, as there seems very little evidence to support this. Most studies seem to distinguish between amphora cargo and bulk grain cargo. For example, David Gibbins writes this in a paper called Shipwrecks and Hellenistic Trade
As in the mediaeval period, grain was most efficiently carried in large, dedicated sitegoi, the grain being laden in sacks or a rifuso directly into the hold
(sitegoi are grain ships, a rifuso is the process of overloading the contracted amount, to allow for spoilage) Hellenistic and classical sitegoi seem to have been smaller than their Roman descendents - 100-400 tonnes seem to crop up.
Very good. The grain would spend only a few days in the hold of a ship so amphorae would probably not be required. But I suggest that for long-term storage, at least on the Aegean coastline, sealed amphorae (as used for olive oil or wine) would be necessary.
I think I calculated that something like 88 million of them would be needed. We should have found the traces of breakages archaeologically by now
Anyway, storing grain or any other crop in anaerobic conditions doesn't necessarily leave it fit for human consumption. You can end up with anaerobic digestion where anaerobic bacteria attack it, they produce lactic acid as a byproduct and the grain ends up pickled in lactic acid. It's called silage, I make it every year 8)
Another point is would the Persian Empire have the ability to radically increase the production of amphorae to the level that Justin's argument is now dependent on- I am assuming that no one is going to argue that the things were produced in Henry Ford style factories as part of a centralised command economy?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 04:24:21 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 02:50:37 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 02:29:48 PM
I note that we still consider the grain was carried by in amphorae. I continue to be troubled by this, as there seems very little evidence to support this. Most studies seem to distinguish between amphora cargo and bulk grain cargo. For example, David Gibbins writes this in a paper called Shipwrecks and Hellenistic Trade
As in the mediaeval period, grain was most efficiently carried in large, dedicated sitegoi, the grain being laden in sacks or a rifuso directly into the hold
(sitegoi are grain ships, a rifuso is the process of overloading the contracted amount, to allow for spoilage) Hellenistic and classical sitegoi seem to have been smaller than their Roman descendents - 100-400 tonnes seem to crop up.
Very good. The grain would spend only a few days in the hold of a ship so amphorae would probably not be required. But I suggest that for long-term storage, at least on the Aegean coastline, sealed amphorae (as used for olive oil or wine) would be necessary.
I think I calculated that something like 88 million of them would be needed. We should have found the traces of breakages archaeologically by now
Anyway, storing grain or any other crop in anaerobic conditions doesn't necessarily leave it fit for human consumption. You can end up with anaerobic digestion where anaerobic bacteria attack it, they produce lactic acid as a byproduct and the grain ends up pickled in lactic acid. It's called silage, I make it every year 8)
Keeping in mind that everyone, everywhere, has to be able to store grain in such a way that it keeps for up to 12 months. This applies in a wet or dry climate. I suggest that grain that is meant to last several years (which is not most of the grain) care must be taken to keep it dry. This may require sealed amphorae or it may be enough to keep it in rooms or pits specially constructed to keep humidity at a minimum, I don't know, I'm not a farmer. I suspect though that if the BC folks could preserve their grain for 12 months they could preserve it for considerably longer.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 28, 2018, 05:07:10 PM
Keeping in mind that everyone, everywhere, has to be able to store grain in such a way that it keeps for up to 12 months. This applies in a wet or dry climate. I suggest that grain that is meant to last several years (which is not most of the grain) care must be taken to keep it dry. This may require sealed amphorae or it may be enough to keep it in rooms or pits specially constructed to keep humidity at a minimum, I don't know, I'm not a farmer. I suspect though that if the BC folks could preserve their grain for 12 months they could preserve it for considerably longer.
The only way to do it for multiple years (assuming you cannot dig pits six or more meters down into seriously cold ground) is to have active storage. Firstly you get rid of the oldest first anyway. But secondly you'll have bins and inspect each bin regularly.
Inspection a bin means going into it and looking for infestations. The minute you find one you've got to be prepared to empty the bin (on the grounds that these people cannot flush it with C02 or similar) and use it immediately.
Secondly your inspector will doubtless have a couple of slaves with in him the bin and they'll dig down and that way you check if it's overheating. If it is, empty it immediately, spread it out thin on a hard surface and re-dry it. Then put it back in a different, dry and fumigated bin while the one it was in is cleaned and fumigated.
The alternative is opening the door after four years and going "Oh look, a bit full of uneatable rubbish"
QuoteI think I calculated that something like 88 million of them would be needed.
Amphora studies are an entire sub-set of archaeology - I'm not going there :) However, a quick google turned up the single reference to amphora production rates in Egyptian papyri - two men could make 30 amphorae in four days. Say four per man per day. So 22 million man days work. I'll let Justin create a scheme for organisaing the labour, recalling that the work was often seasonal (the potters were also farmers) and that it would have to be fitted in alongside regular production for wine, olive oil and perhaps fish industries (I don't know at what point salt fish became a big export industry).
Actually, I would be interested in any evidence of Egypt exporting grain in this period.
If you look at the wars, rebellions and invasions', the changes of dynasty, and all that entails in its recent past, I wonder whether it was stable enough to be a food exporter until much later.
The great dynasties were more known for being rich in gold, I thought.
And in the same vein, is it not a fundamental of the Persian economy that they never paid for things they could demand as tribute? I believe there is a sound analysis that they were so keen on hoarding gold that it threatened the entire empires cash flow.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 03:17:16 PM
From Appendix 1 in Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204 by John F. Haldon. Most of the Appendix can be viewed via Google. Appendix 2 is on using grain to feed armies but alas most of it is inaccessible. I suspect some members of the forum own the book and may be able to help.
I do, but I'm not about to go back and look for what the original question was. I'm happy to answer direct questions in reply to this post.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 28, 2018, 04:50:32 PM
I am assuming that no one is going to argue that the things were produced in Henry Ford style factories as part of a centralised command economy?
I once read a review of a book that apparently argued that the Greeks won because they had a capitalist economy while the Persians had a command one. The Union of Achaemenid Socialist Satrapies?
It is perhaps no surprise to anyone I didn't add the book to the wishlist. Nor do I recall the title; I seem to recall the author was some political or journalist type rather than an academic historian.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on April 28, 2018, 07:19:38 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 28, 2018, 04:50:32 PM
I am assuming that no one is going to argue that the things were produced in Henry Ford style factories as part of a centralised command economy?
I once read a review of a book that apparently argued that the Greeks won because they had a capitalist economy while the Persians had a command one. The Union of Achaemenid Socialist Satrapies?
It is perhaps no surprise to anyone I didn't add the book to the wishlist. Nor do I recall the title; I seem to recall the author was some political or journalist type rather than an academic historian.
I suspect the book was American :)
This article looks interesting http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-iii
great find Ian
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:15:56 AM
nobody produces surplus grain except by accident.
Beg pardon, but this is quite incorrect. Egypt, for example, produced surplus grain all the time, except during a famine. One should also remember that taxation was usually taken in grain and livestock, not coin, prior to the Roman Empire, and this meant that producing a significant surplus was built into people's lifestyles.
QuoteThe grain market is a very inelastic thing. If you produce 5% under, you have civil disturbance, riots, and some people will go hungry.
If you produce 5% over, the price collapses because that 5% is frantically chasing any sort of market at all and drives the price down. After all nobody is going to eat an extra meal of barley bread.
This may be true of a mediaeval market or even England prior to the Corn Laws. It is not true in a civilisation and culture where the majority of grain is not privately owned but is managed by the state. For the 'laws' of supply and demand to operate one needs speculators. Speculators did not exist under Biblical monarchies and, somewhat to my surprise, I found no evidence of corn speculators before Roman times (counting Carthage as being during 'Roman times'). The ability of the state to issue grain when it was needed essentially cut the knees from under potential speculators. Validation of this point can be seen by what happened during a siege, when the state had no reserves to issue and prices charged by private individuals for food were whatever the top end of the market would bear.
It was more difficult once speculators became well established, as they did under the Roman Empire. Julian in AD 360-1 tried to curb the grain speculators by releasing quantities of state-held corn onto the market at low prices, but such were the speculators' resources that they bought it all up and people were no better off than before. Without the speculators Julian would have fed the population at affordable prices and that would have been that.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 11:14:47 AM
Quote'Cultural racism' (or we can call it 'cultural vanity' in order to avoid using an -ism) is the imposition of our own outlook on previous culture(s), which I regret some people do in spades,
But fortunately is rare in this forum. However, if application of critical thinking, based on a Western tradition, is cultural vanity then many of us will be guilty as charged. As to "imposition of our own outlook", it is something we all do. The "sources first" approach is equally an "imposition of our own outlook". So, maybe, stepping back and being a little less judgemental of others legitimate intellectual approaches may be the way to go.
It is an understandable intellectual approach - there is nothing morally reprehensible about expressing an outlook based on one's own culture - but it is not legitimate for understanding other cultures at different periods in history.
An example. NATO officers were encouraged by a Soviet defector to think what a Soviet officer would do in a simple battlefield situation (you can read the example in Viktor Suvorov's
Inside the Soviet Army).
Not a single NATO officer ever got it right. This demonstrates how easy it is to misunderstand the motivation and thinking even of contemporary cultures. Had the Cold War gone hot, battles could have been lost because of this simple failure to appreciate how another culture thought. Dealing with history, the consequences of applying one's own culture are less drastic but no less misleading.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 04:24:21 PM
I think I calculated that something like 88 million of them would be needed. We should have found the traces of breakages archaeologically by now
Does the term 'ostraca' ring a bell?
Quote from: Mark G on April 28, 2018, 07:12:20 PM
Actually, I would be interested in any evidence of Egypt exporting grain in this period.
If you look at the wars, rebellions and invasions', the changes of dynasty, and all that entails in its recent past, I wonder whether it was stable enough to be a food exporter until much later.
Look at Egypt in the 4th century BC, where we have a certain amount of information. It revolts from Persia c.395 BC, fends off a reconquest attempt in 374-3 BC, exports grain to various places in Greece throughout much of the 4th century and in return gets mercenary contingents from one or another of the leading cities. Despite the 'disturbances' (including a three-cornered civil war in 360-359) it was happily producing a surplus right up to the Persian reconquest in 343 BC.
QuoteThe great dynasties were more known for being rich in gold, I thought.
Whenever they had access to Nubia, they had access to Nubian gold. As was customary for a Biblical period monarchy, they tended to store it up except when major building projects (canals, pyramids, temples, etc.) were under way.
QuoteAnd in the same vein, is it not a fundamental of the Persian economy that they never paid for things they could demand as tribute? I believe there is a sound analysis that they were so keen on hoarding gold that it threatened the entire empires cash flow.
This is an important point: the King of Kings demanded what he needed - or wanted - as tribute. Tribute gold went into the royal coffers, resulting in the huge stocks of precious metals found by Alexander. Tribute grain went into the royal store-houses; tribute animals into the royal herds. This could (and did) feed the King's court and dependents, and in addition the various satrapies could be ordered to support a campaign, which usually required lengthy preparation. While (as the Iranicaonline article Ian found points out) there were various degrees of legal ownership in the Achaemenid Empire, at the end of the day everything was subject to the King's command and anyone disobedient or even unduly reluctant could find his 'independent' holding sequestered and himself on top of a sharp wooden object.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 08:11:36 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:15:56 AM
nobody produces surplus grain except by accident.
Beg pardon, but this is quite incorrect. Egypt, for example, produced surplus grain all the time, except during a famine. One should also remember that taxation was usually taken in grain and livestock, not coin, prior to the Roman Empire, and this meant that producing a significant surplus was built into people's lifestyles.
If it's built into the system it's not a surplus. You don't say you've got surplus in your salary because the government takes tax off it.
A surplus is grain for which there is no home. Growing grain to pay tax with is no different to growing grain to eat. It's not surplus, it's already allocated
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 08:11:36 PM
QuoteThe grain market is a very inelastic thing. If you produce 5% under, you have civil disturbance, riots, and some people will go hungry.
If you produce 5% over, the price collapses because that 5% is frantically chasing any sort of market at all and drives the price down. After all nobody is going to eat an extra meal of barley bread.
This may be true of a mediaeval market or even England prior to the Corn Laws. It is not true in a civilisation and culture where the majority of grain is not privately owned but is managed by the state.
Please can I have some evidence that the Persian state managed the grain market throughout the Empire
Given that with land tenure the state in Egypt didn't even control all the land. The land was held by temple estates and large private estates, often of Persian and other nobles, and we know from the record they gave orders to buy and sell commodies
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 08:25:25 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 04:24:21 PM
I think I calculated that something like 88 million of them would be needed. We should have found the traces of breakages archaeologically by now
Does the term 'ostraca' ring a bell?
yes and I note with interest the fact that there are not heaps of distinctive Egyptian produced broken Amphorae discovered by archaeologists on the sites of five huge grain depots
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 08:38:23 PM
This is an important point: the King of Kings demanded what he needed - or wanted - as tribute. Tribute gold went into the royal coffers, resulting in the huge stocks of precious metals found by Alexander. Tribute grain went into the royal store-houses; tribute animals into the royal herds. This could (and did) feed the King's court and dependents, and in addition the various satrapies could be ordered to support a campaign, which usually required lengthy preparation. While (as the Iranicaonline article Ian found points out) there were various degrees of legal ownership in the Achaemenid Empire, at the end of the day everything was subject to the King's command and anyone disobedient or even unduly reluctant could find his 'independent' holding sequestered and himself on top of a sharp wooden object.
Indeed, as Cambyses, Bardiya and Xerxes were to discover
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:10:51 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 08:11:36 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:15:56 AM
nobody produces surplus grain except by accident.
Beg pardon, but this is quite incorrect. Egypt, for example, produced surplus grain all the time, except during a famine. One should also remember that taxation was usually taken in grain and livestock, not coin, prior to the Roman Empire, and this meant that producing a significant surplus was built into people's lifestyles.
If it's built into the system it's not a surplus. You don't say you've got surplus in your salary because the government takes tax off it.
A surplus is grain for which there is no home. Growing grain to pay tax with is no different to growing grain to eat. It's not surplus, it's already allocated
good point Jim although you could argue for the definition either way. I definitely take your point that this is allocated already its part of what people need to eat and to live off through payment
Quote from: Holly on April 28, 2018, 09:21:11 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:10:51 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 08:11:36 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:15:56 AM
nobody produces surplus grain except by accident.
Beg pardon, but this is quite incorrect. Egypt, for example, produced surplus grain all the time, except during a famine. One should also remember that taxation was usually taken in grain and livestock, not coin, prior to the Roman Empire, and this meant that producing a significant surplus was built into people's lifestyles.
If it's built into the system it's not a surplus. You don't say you've got surplus in your salary because the government takes tax off it.
A surplus is grain for which there is no home. Growing grain to pay tax with is no different to growing grain to eat. It's not surplus, it's already allocated
good point Jim although you could argue for the definition either way. I definitely take your point that this is allocated already its part of what people need to eat and to live off through payment
certainly I think that's where Justin and I had got to. He felt that Xerxes could block 'exports outside the Empire' without political damage provided he bought the grain himself. (Apologies if I have misrepresented Justin here)
I suspect he could, but I don't think there was all that much grain exported to outside the Empire, the Empire was so damned big.
Ironically here, if the Persian army was a more normal size, say 100,000 men (purely as an example) then this might actually go a way towards feeding them.
The problem is the numbers are so huge in relation to the populations of the countries involved, it gets unmanageable.
a plague of locusts springs to mind!
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:39:56 PM
Quote from: Holly on April 28, 2018, 09:21:11 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:10:51 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 08:11:36 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 10:15:56 AM
nobody produces surplus grain except by accident.
Beg pardon, but this is quite incorrect. Egypt, for example, produced surplus grain all the time, except during a famine. One should also remember that taxation was usually taken in grain and livestock, not coin, prior to the Roman Empire, and this meant that producing a significant surplus was built into people's lifestyles.
If it's built into the system it's not a surplus. You don't say you've got surplus in your salary because the government takes tax off it.
A surplus is grain for which there is no home. Growing grain to pay tax with is no different to growing grain to eat. It's not surplus, it's already allocated
good point Jim although you could argue for the definition either way. I definitely take your point that this is allocated already its part of what people need to eat and to live off through payment
certainly I think that's where Justin and I had got to. He felt that Xerxes could block 'exports outside the Empire' without political damage provided he bought the grain himself. (Apologies if I have misrepresented Justin here)
No, that's spot on. Bought it or levied it as a bearable tax. I'm minded of late Roman annonia which in Egypt (https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/18524/Taxation_in_the_later_Roman_Emp.pdf?sequence=1) could run up to 45% of net production and 25% gross (¾ to 2 artabas per aroura with a late Roman yield of 7-8 artabas per aroura, falling from 10-12 artabas per aroura in the first century AD), and that doesn't include other taxes.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:39:56 PMI suspect he could, but I don't think there was all that much grain exported to outside the Empire, the Empire was so damned big.
Keeping in mind our 2-week caravan travel limit rule, the only area to worry about is Egypt, the Syrian\Palestinian coastline and Asia Minor. The rest of the Empire feeds itself. I don't have the grain production levels for Asia Minor but it appears to have been an important food producer. See here (https://books.google.co.za/books?id=5vcRCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA295&lpg=PA295&dq=grain+production+asia+minor+antiquity&source=bl&ots=pdTSQYNf2R&sig=NWY7PZwbPv_sDkW6eZbrJFsknGQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwji3air797aAhVMFMAKHYAHCoYQ6AEwCXoECAAQUA#v=onepage&q=grain%20production%20asia%20minor%20antiquity&f=false), here (https://luwianstudies.org/habitat-and-natural-resources-in-western-asia-minor/) and here (https://books.google.co.za/books?id=wfcRCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA290&lpg=PA290&dq=grain+production+levels+asia+minor+antiquity&source=bl&ots=0bNGvqxoIA&sig=FXZx5Qx-gd21E36FMr8qPNZ2it0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj_x6Wj9d7aAhXFKcAKHQq8CaIQ6AEwB3oECAAQUQ#v=onepage&q=grain%20production%20levels%20asia%20minor%20antiquity&f=false).
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:10:51 PM
If it's built into the system it's not a surplus. You don't say you've got surplus in your salary because the government takes tax off it.
A surplus is grain for which there is no home. Growing grain to pay tax with is no different to growing grain to eat. It's not surplus, it's already allocated
The vital consideration here is the absolute amount of grain produced, not how it is defined. If you are being taxed so the state can store up grain, then overall respective to the community's food requirements you are producing a surplus. It ends up being retained or allocated as a state-controlled surplus. Nobody needs it at present, but it is there in case it is needed in future.
Mediaeval Italian cities had a similar, if usually less well-handled, system; in Florence it was called the
abbondanza and it was a state organisation to ensure that a surplus of grain was stored against possible future emergencies.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:14:28 PM
Please can I have some evidence that the Persian state managed the grain market throughout the Empire
Given that with land tenure the state in Egypt didn't even control all the land. The land was held by temple estates and large private estates, often of Persian and other nobles, and we know from the record they gave orders to buy and sell commodies
In effect they were acting as private speculators while they thought they could get away with it (Arsames in Egypt was notorious for this and other fiddles). But the King of Kings had to get his cut first.
Two points which indicate state management of the 'grain market' or at least overall grain distribution:
1) There was no grain market as such - the Achaemenids did not have markets. They referred to Greeks, who did, as "people who come together in one place to cheat and forswear each other".
2) "The sixth province was Egypt and the neighbouring parts of Libya, and Cyrene and Barca, all of which were included in the province of Egypt. From here came seven hundred talents, besides the income in silver from the fish of the lake Moeris; [3] besides that silver and the assessment of grain that was given also, seven hundred talents were paid; for
a hundred and twenty thousand bushels of grain were also assigned to the Persians quartered at the White Wall of Memphis and their allies in Egypt." (Herodotus III.91)
Local distribution and arangements between satraps were presumably not micromanaged by the King, but accrual and allocation of supplies for garrisons was definitely determined by the throne, not the market.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:17:01 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 28, 2018, 08:25:25 PM
Does the term 'ostraca' ring a bell?
yes and I note with interest the fact that there are not heaps of distinctive Egyptian produced broken Amphorae discovered by archaeologists on the sites of five huge grain depots
The point about ostraca is that they were carried off and reused. People made notes on them. People wrote prayers on them. People voted with them (Athenians could actually tell politicians to go away ...). They did not hang around
in situ waiting for archaeologists to find them (except when deposited
en masse at the Tomb of Osiris or similar).
Regarding the nature of Achaemenid rule, the opening of Book VII of Herodotus is instructive. Xerxes succeeds (peaceably) and is not inclined to attack Greece but rather deal with Egypt. He does, but meanwhile Mardonius and certain Greek exiles work on him, persuading him there are oracles to fulfil, glory to be had, an Empire to expand, vegenance to be taken. So once Egypt was subdued (and handed over to a vicious governor whose misrule would guarantee another revolt) Xerxes called his notables to him to discuss what to do about Greece. They spoke, giving their points of view, and he then made the decision. How did he make his decision?
He followed a dream. But once the decision was made, it was binding. Only the King could change the decision (and he did - twice).
Quote from: Erpingham on April 28, 2018, 03:17:16 PM
Someone (Justin?) was asking about Byzantine figures
The approximate maximum weight a horse or mule can transport over reasonably long distances is about 250 1b (114kg) and a little more over short stretches, although the optimum has generally been set at about 200lb in modern and immediately pre-modern pack-trains. In the late third-century Edict of Diocletian (14.11) a load of 200 Roman pounds (65.49 kg/ 144 1b) is prescribed; a sixth-century source gives mules a total burden of 156—66 Roman pounds (110—16 1b/ 50—3 kg). Similar limits are established by the imperial legislation on the public post. A mid-tenth-century Byzantine text gives somewhat higher values ...... : three categories of load are specified: (a) saddle—horses carrying a man (presumably not armoured and carrying military panoply) and their own barley were loaded with four modioi each -106 Roman pounds=75 1b (34 kg); (b) unridden saddle-horses carried eight modioi—212 Roman pounds—I50 1b (68 kg); and (c) pack-animals loaded with barley carried ten modioi—265 Roman pounds= 187 1b (85 kg). Thus the maximum permitted load for an animal in the imperial baggage train in the ninth and tenth centuries was set at 10 modioi without the pack- saddle (stigma) and harness which, according to the legislation of the fourth sixth centuries, weighed approx. 50—60 Roman pounds (35—42 1b/ 16—19 kg, equivalent to 51—62 Byzantine pounds).
From Appendix 1 in Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204 by John F. Haldon. Most of the Appendix can be viewed via Google. Appendix 2 is on using grain to feed armies but alas most of it is inaccessible. I suspect some members of the forum own the book and may be able to help.
Taking the earliest limit of 65,5kg, that means 33 days on the road and all the load is gone, which means 11 days travel and you still have 2/3 of your load which limits you to about 200km. Here is the revised map:
(https://i.imgur.com/z9r8Uw8.jpg)
QuoteQuote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 07:51:01 AM
certainly I think that's where Justin and I had got to. He felt that Xerxes could block 'exports outside the Empire' without political damage provided he bought the grain himself. (Apologies if I have misrepresented Justin here)
No, that's spot on. Bought it or levied it as a bearable tax. I'm minded of late Roman annonia which in Egypt (https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/18524/Taxation_in_the_later_Roman_Emp.pdf?sequence=1) could run up to 45% of net production and 25% gross (¾ to 2 artabas per aroura with a late Roman yield of 7-8 artabas per aroura, falling from 10-12 artabas per aroura in the first century AD), and that doesn't include other taxes.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:39:56 PMI suspect he could, but I don't think there was all that much grain exported to outside the Empire, the Empire was so damned big.
Keeping in mind our 2-week caravan travel limit rule, the only area to worry about is Egypt, the Syrian\Palestinian coastline and Asia Minor. The rest of the Empire feeds itself. I don't have the grain production levels for Asia Minor but it appears to have been an important food producer. See here (https://books.google.co.za/books?id=5vcRCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA295&lpg=PA295&dq=grain+production+asia+minor+antiquity&source=bl&ots=pdTSQYNf2R&sig=NWY7PZwbPv_sDkW6eZbrJFsknGQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwji3air797aAhVMFMAKHYAHCoYQ6AEwCXoECAAQUA#v=onepage&q=grain%20production%20asia%20minor%20antiquity&f=false), here (https://luwianstudies.org/habitat-and-natural-resources-in-western-asia-minor/) and here (https://books.google.co.za/books?id=wfcRCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA290&lpg=PA290&dq=grain+production+levels+asia+minor+antiquity&source=bl&ots=0bNGvqxoIA&sig=FXZx5Qx-gd21E36FMr8qPNZ2it0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj_x6Wj9d7aAhXFKcAKHQq8CaIQ6AEwB3oECAAQUQ#v=onepage&q=grain%20production%20levels%20asia%20minor%20antiquity&f=false).
What is interesting is how large a wheat producer Turkey now is, producing 3% of world output. There is a map of current growing regions at https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2011/07/Turkey/ which does seem to fit in with the book where it talks about the expansion in the 'middle' Roman Empire and huge granaries being built. It seems that the Roman road building, shifting to wheeled transport, did help some areas.
certainly looking at the map you could see why large armies could traverse the Royal Road and why Xerxes decided to winter and concentrate his army at Sardis.
Whether Asia Minor would have much grain to export after supporting Xerxes and his concentrating army over winter is another issue, but certainly you can why armies appear to have campaigned across it so comparatively easily in the ancient period 8)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2018, 08:17:38 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 28, 2018, 09:10:51 PM
If it's built into the system it's not a surplus. You don't say you've got surplus in your salary because the government takes tax off it.
A surplus is grain for which there is no home. Growing grain to pay tax with is no different to growing grain to eat. It's not surplus, it's already allocated
The vital consideration here is the absolute amount of grain produced, not how it is defined. If you are being taxed so the state can store up grain, then overall respective to the community's food requirements you are producing a surplus. It ends up being retained or allocated as a state-controlled surplus. Nobody needs it at present, but it is there in case it is needed in future.
But it's not a surplus. It's not 'in case' it will be needed in the future. it will be needed in the future. You have to have it because in the next couple of years there will be a poor harvest and if you don't have the food, there will be social and political disruption which will mean that the next harvest is also bad because of the actions taken to restore order.
Stepping back to take another overview, I sum up the progress of the thread below:
(https://i.imgur.com/5llNi5w.gif)
Keep watching to see how it ends...keep watching some more...and some more...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2018, 08:17:38 AM
The point about ostraca is that they were carried off and reused. People made notes on them. People wrote prayers on them. People voted with them (Athenians could actually tell politicians to go away ...). They did not hang around in situ waiting for archaeologists to find them (except when deposited en masse at the Tomb of Osiris or similar).
And the huge mountain of them in Ostia merely proves that the Romans were illiterate?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Testaccio
To expect assiduous note takers to come along and remove the largest heaps of broken pottery in Northern Greece thus leaving no archaeological trace is probably pushing the envelope a bit
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 08:33:10 AM
Stepping back to take another overview, I sum up the progress of the thread below:
(https://i.imgur.com/5llNi5w.gif)
Keep watching to see how it ends...keep watching some more...and some more...
Genius, pure genius!
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 08:30:23 AM
What is interesting is how large a wheat producer Turkey now is, producing 3% of world output. There is a map of current growing regions at https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2011/07/Turkey/ which does seem to fit in with the book where it talks about the expansion in the 'middle' Roman Empire and huge granaries being built. It seems that the Roman road building, shifting to wheeled transport, did help some areas.
certainly looking at the map you could see why large armies could traverse the Royal Road and why Xerxes decided to winter and concentrate his army at Sardis.
Whether Asia Minor would have much grain to export after supporting Xerxes and his concentrating army over winter is another issue, but certainly you can why armies appear to have campaigned across it so comparatively easily in the ancient period 8)
:)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 08:35:17 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2018, 08:17:38 AM
The point about ostraca is that they were carried off and reused. People made notes on them. People wrote prayers on them. People voted with them (Athenians could actually tell politicians to go away ...). They did not hang around in situ waiting for archaeologists to find them (except when deposited en masse at the Tomb of Osiris or similar).
And the huge mountain of them in Ostia merely proves that the Romans were illiterate?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Testaccio
To expect assiduous note takers to come along and remove the largest heaps of broken pottery in Northern Greece thus leaving no archaeological trace is probably pushing the envelope a bit
The Wiki article makes clear that largely one type of amphora - the Dressel 20 - containing exclusively one type of produce - olive oil - was deposited at Testaccio. This appears to be because Dressel 20 amphorae that had contained olive oil could not be reused in any way: they did not make useful shards when broken up and they were fatty and rancid from the residual oil. The shard pile was carefully arranged and built up by the state. This is deliberate dumping, not just shard fragments lying around. There is nothing equivalent to it anywhere else in the Roman Empire, which suggests that shards from other types of amphorae used to transport other kinds of produce were reused in a way that left no archaeological traces. Which confirms Patrick's hypothesis (what can I say?). ::)
QuoteIt is an understandable intellectual approach - there is nothing morally reprehensible about expressing an outlook based on one's own culture - but it is not legitimate for understanding other cultures at different periods in history.
But alas its all we have :) It is probably a philosophical difference in approach to the past between us. You believe that the historian can completely discard their own culture in looking at the past and I don't. Where we agree, I think, is that we must endeavour to recognise our cultural biases and seek to minimise their impact.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 09:27:54 AM
There is nothing equivalent to it anywhere else in the Roman Empire, which suggests that shards from other types of amphorae used to transport other kinds of produce were reused in a way that left no archaeological traces. Which confirms Patrick's hypothesis (what can I say?). ::)
Visit any Roman archaeological site and one thing you will see are amphora fragments. People didn't "transport them away", they threw them in with the rubbish. Any site handling amphorae - passing through or end use - is going to generate bits of broken amphora. There is no way sites involved in this operation wouldn't turn up amphorae fragments, even if not on the scale of Monte Testaccio, if the mass amphora use theory is correct. We should also expect to find some amphora filled wrecks directly associatable with the operation, as the naval conveyor would expect to lose some ships to the weather, as Justin has also allowed for above. However, the "everything in amphorae" theory is a theory. So far, no evidence of amphorae for bulk grain carriage at this time has been produced.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 29, 2018, 09:43:41 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 09:27:54 AM
There is nothing equivalent to it anywhere else in the Roman Empire, which suggests that shards from other types of amphorae used to transport other kinds of produce were reused in a way that left no archaeological traces. Which confirms Patrick's hypothesis (what can I say?). ::)
Visit any Roman archaeological site and one thing you will see are amphora fragments. People didn't "transport them away", they threw them in with the rubbish. Any site handling amphorae - passing through or end use - is going to generate bits of broken amphora. There is no way sites involved in this operation wouldn't turn up amphorae fragments, even if not on the scale of Monte Testaccio, if the mass amphora use theory is correct. We should also expect to find some amphora filled wrecks directly associatable with the operation, as the naval conveyor would expect to lose some ships to the weather, as Justin has also allowed for above. However, the "everything in amphorae" theory is a theory. So far, no evidence of amphorae for bulk grain carriage at this time has been produced.
Fine. The point though is that the only big pile of amphorae shards lying around are at Testaccio, and they are there simply because they could not be reused. Olive oil was not the only product shipped in bulk to Rome in amphorae. So a lot of amphorae at one site - one of the Persian food dumps for example - will not necessarily leave a lot of shard fragments in the archaeological record. If Rome is our gauge, amphorae used to carry anything other than olive oil will largely disappear.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 09:27:54 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 08:35:17 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2018, 08:17:38 AM
The point about ostraca is that they were carried off and reused. People made notes on them. People wrote prayers on them. People voted with them (Athenians could actually tell politicians to go away ...). They did not hang around in situ waiting for archaeologists to find them (except when deposited en masse at the Tomb of Osiris or similar).
And the huge mountain of them in Ostia merely proves that the Romans were illiterate?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Testaccio
To expect assiduous note takers to come along and remove the largest heaps of broken pottery in Northern Greece thus leaving no archaeological trace is probably pushing the envelope a bit
The Wiki article makes clear that largely one type of amphora - the Dressel 20 - containing exclusively one type of produce - olive oil - was deposited at Testaccio. This appears to be because Dressel 20 amphorae that had contained olive oil could not be reused in any way: they did not make useful shards when broken up and they were fatty and rancid from the residual oil. The shard pile was carefully arranged and built up by the state. This is deliberate dumping, not just shard fragments lying around. There is nothing equivalent to it anywhere else in the Roman Empire, which suggests that shards from other types of amphorae used to transport other kinds of produce were reused in a way that left no archaeological traces. Which confirms Patrick's hypothesis (what can I say?). ::)
pretty well every Roman site has bits of broken amphorae,
http://intarch.ac.uk/journal/issue1/tyers_index.html for British ones
The reason there's no evidence of amphorae along the coast where the depots were is because nobody transported large quantities of grain in amphorae. You carried in in bags or probably more rarely, bulk.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 09:48:52 AM
Fine. The point though is that the only big pile of amphorae shards lying around are at Testaccio, and they are there simply because they could not be reused. Olive oil was not the only product shipped in bulk to Rome in amphorae. So a lot of amphorae at one site - one of the Persian food dumps for example - will not necessarily leave a lot of shard fragments in the archaeological record. If Rome is our gauge, amphorae used to carry anything other than olive oil will largely disappear.
Remember that Rome has been built and rebuilt since the Roman period, as I mentioned elsewhere, amphora shards are commonplace in UK excavations
Quote from: Erpingham on April 29, 2018, 09:28:40 AM
QuoteIt is an understandable intellectual approach - there is nothing morally reprehensible about expressing an outlook based on one's own culture - but it is not legitimate for understanding other cultures at different periods in history.
I think, is that we must endeavour to recognise our cultural biases and seek to minimise their impact.
Would that be an approach that Herodtus would recognise I wonder?
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 09:56:39 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 09:27:54 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 08:35:17 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2018, 08:17:38 AM
The point about ostraca is that they were carried off and reused. People made notes on them. People wrote prayers on them. People voted with them (Athenians could actually tell politicians to go away ...). They did not hang around in situ waiting for archaeologists to find them (except when deposited en masse at the Tomb of Osiris or similar).
And the huge mountain of them in Ostia merely proves that the Romans were illiterate?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Testaccio
To expect assiduous note takers to come along and remove the largest heaps of broken pottery in Northern Greece thus leaving no archaeological trace is probably pushing the envelope a bit
The Wiki article makes clear that largely one type of amphora - the Dressel 20 - containing exclusively one type of produce - olive oil - was deposited at Testaccio. This appears to be because Dressel 20 amphorae that had contained olive oil could not be reused in any way: they did not make useful shards when broken up and they were fatty and rancid from the residual oil. The shard pile was carefully arranged and built up by the state. This is deliberate dumping, not just shard fragments lying around. There is nothing equivalent to it anywhere else in the Roman Empire, which suggests that shards from other types of amphorae used to transport other kinds of produce were reused in a way that left no archaeological traces. Which confirms Patrick's hypothesis (what can I say?). ::)
pretty well every Roman site has bits of broken amphorae,
http://intarch.ac.uk/journal/issue1/tyers_index.html for British ones
The reason there's no evidence of amphorae along the coast where the depots were is because nobody transported large quantities of grain in amphorae. You carried in in bags or probably more rarely, bulk.
Wine was shipped in bulk to Rome in amphorae and there is no equivalent hill of wine amphorae shards. I suggest that grain could be shipped in sacks or bulk and then stored in amphorae once at the food depot, the amphorae being sealed with resin to make them watertight. And no, I can't quote any primary source to back up the theory.
I may have missed it, are the amphorae reused for grain or made specifically for the grain Justin?
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 10:07:52 AM
I may have missed it, are the amphorae reused for grain or made specifically for the grain Justin?
It's a theory, Dave. Since grain has to spend only a few days in a ship there's no need to store it in amphorae to preserve it, though it might make sense to keep it in amphorae that will go directly into storage once at the food dump site - which is also easier than trying the get the local Greeks to make an awful lot of amphorae. So, yes, in this case amphorae would be made specially for the grain.
The big question then is how big were these food dumps? What percentage of the army's requirements were they expected to supply, as opposed to grain brought over from Asia Minor by ship or provided by local Greeks?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 10:00:39 AM
Would that be an approach that Herodtus would recognise I wonder?
I think Herodotus was an intelligent and curious individual. If a barbarian wanted to discuss the concepts behind writing history he'd be up for it, I think. But whether he'd adopt it, rather than an approach founded on Greek cultural superiority, I don't know :)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 10:02:33 AM
Wine was shipped in bulk to Rome in amphorae and there is no equivalent hill of wine amphorae shards. I suggest that grain could be shipped in sacks or bulk and then stored in amphorae once at the food depot, the amphorae being sealed with resin to make them watertight. And no, I can't quote any primary source to back up the theory.
Except we know that in Rome grain was stored in sacks, transported in sacks etc
It was never put in amphorae.
The idea of somebody producing in the region of 88 million amphorae and shipping them to the coast of Thrace to store grain in, when nobody else seems to have found the need, does look a little unlikely
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 10:10:19 AM
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 10:07:52 AM
I may have missed it, are the amphorae reused for grain or made specifically for the grain Justin?
It's a theory, Dave. Since grain has to spend only a few days in a ship there's no need to store it in amphorae to preserve it, though it might make sense to keep it in amphorae that will go directly into storage once at the food dump site - which is also easier than trying the get the local Greeks to make an awful lot of amphorae. So, yes, in this case amphorae would be made specially for the grain.
The big question then is how big were these food dumps? What percentage of the army's requirements were they expected to supply, as opposed to grain brought over from Asia Minor by ship or provided by local Greeks?
I think it's agreed that there's damn all from the local Greeks, they'd struggle to feed the engineers and roadbuilders plus military forces already in palce
Egypt has no record of exporting grain in amphorae
But because an amphora tended to weight the same as the load as standard, a 30lb of grain would need a 30lb amphora which is about as much as you could handle easily.
I seem to remember calculating that the amount of grain that was apparently needed for the 6 million host would need 88 million amphorae
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 10:07:52 AM
I may have missed it, are the amphorae reused for grain or made specifically for the grain Justin?
Different designs were used for different purposes. For a grain amphora, you'd need something with a wide neck and quite rounded, I think. But they wouldn't need sealing on the inside. Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be much out there on the internet on grain amphorae - wine, oil and fish seem to have been studied. But I'd expect the amphorae to be fairly distinctive and, following common practice, marked with what they contain and whose business it originated in. If they were specially made for this expedition, they might be marked "Great King's expedition" or some such. If just ordinary commercial production, we'd expect a lot of exporters business addresses "of Tyre", "of Sinope" etc.
Quote
I seem to remember calculating that the amount of grain that was apparently needed for the 6 million host would need 88 million amphorae
(https://d2v9y0dukr6mq2.cloudfront.net/video/thumbnail/2T0t-6V/film-vintage-the-end-animation-20s-animation-of-a-retro-vintage-old-fashioned-end-title-as-seen-in-1920s-silent-movies-hollywood-style-font-typography_7kh_gxoi__F0000.png)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 10:25:07 AM
I seem to remember calculating that the amount of grain that was apparently needed for the 6 million host would need 88 million amphorae
That's too much. A typical amphora used for transporting wine can hold about 40 litres. Grain weighs 0.79g per cm
3 so the amphora can hold 31.6 kg of wheat.
An army of 6 million men needs 6000 tons of grain a day which comes to a total for a campaign of 6 months of 1080 000 tons of grain. That makes it 34 177 215 amphorae. Say 34 million amphorae. But this assumes
all the grain is stored in amphorae and that
all the army's needs are supplied from depots. Work on one of the three preparatory harvests (going with Jim affirming that extra grain could not be grown in the first year) not being in stored in amphorae - it has to last only a year - and 12% of the army's needs coming from the local Greeks and we get 34 million x â…” x 88% = about 20 million amphorae.
If one man can make 4 amphorae in a day he can make a thousand in a year (lop off a month's leave) and 4 thousand in 4 years. So you will need 5000 labourers working about four years to make the necessary quantity. Add faff factor and make it 6000 labourers. These will be labourers all along the Mediterranean and Black Sea coastlines. Does that sound impossible? (don't all say yes)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 10:40:39 AM
Quote
I seem to remember calculating that the amount of grain that was apparently needed for the 6 million host would need 88 million amphorae
(https://d2v9y0dukr6mq2.cloudfront.net/video/thumbnail/2T0t-6V/film-vintage-the-end-animation-20s-animation-of-a-retro-vintage-old-fashioned-end-title-as-seen-in-1920s-silent-movies-hollywood-style-font-typography_7kh_gxoi__F0000.png)
(https://i.imgur.com/T7lDZwr.jpg)
Is that a warning, Justin, or a threat? :)
could wine amphorae be reused for grain and vice versa (assuming the theory holds water....or grain)?
Quote from: Erpingham on April 29, 2018, 11:46:20 AM
Is that a warning, Justin, or a threat? :)
Neither. It's stoic resignation.
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 11:54:55 AM
could wine amphorae be reused for grain and vice versa (assuming the theory holds water....or grain)?
I suppose so.
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 11:54:55 AM
could wine amphorae be reused for grain and vice versa (assuming the theory holds water....or grain)?
Not really. The neck is too narrow to easily fill with grain. Herodotus, I believe, said they were reused for shipping water though.
grain does behave like a fluid so it is possible although maybe unlikely here. Reuse of amphorae for whatever is a nice aside discussion though :)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 11:32:36 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 10:40:39 AM
Quote
I seem to remember calculating that the amount of grain that was apparently needed for the 6 million host would need 88 million amphorae
(https://d2v9y0dukr6mq2.cloudfront.net/video/thumbnail/2T0t-6V/film-vintage-the-end-animation-20s-animation-of-a-retro-vintage-old-fashioned-end-title-as-seen-in-1920s-silent-movies-hollywood-style-font-typography_7kh_gxoi__F0000.png)
(https://i.imgur.com/T7lDZwr.jpg)
(https://www.cherryred.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/NEVER-ENDING-STORY-OST.jpg)
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 12:23:26 PM
Reuse of amphorae for whatever is a nice aside discussion though :)
Perhaps a bit too marginal on the military history even for us? I must admit, Justin has had me looking at more articles on amphorae since my archaeology days. I get the impression that to really get to grips with amphora studies, you need an anorak.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 11:09:12 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 10:25:07 AM
I seem to remember calculating that the amount of grain that was apparently needed for the 6 million host would need 88 million amphorae
That's too much. A typical amphora used for transporting wine can hold about 40 litres. Grain weighs 0.79g per cm3 so the amphora can hold 31.6 kg of wheat.
you forget that the weight of the amphora is the weight of its load, so your 31kg amphora will weigh 62kg. If you're unloading these by hand from open boats onto a beach, I'd rather handle 60lb amphorae than 60kg ones
Or alternatively you could do what everybody did and carry it in sacks where you have very little added weight
Which saves having to set up a previously unexpected amphorae industry.
I suppose if somebody is going to transport unfeasibly large amounts of grain to feed an impossibly large army then they're going to have to create strange new industries on the strength of it
The whole discussion merely convinces me that the answer to the question is 'No' ;)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 12:26:31 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 11:32:36 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 10:40:39 AM
Quote
I seem to remember calculating that the amount of grain that was apparently needed for the 6 million host would need 88 million amphorae
(https://d2v9y0dukr6mq2.cloudfront.net/video/thumbnail/2T0t-6V/film-vintage-the-end-animation-20s-animation-of-a-retro-vintage-old-fashioned-end-title-as-seen-in-1920s-silent-movies-hollywood-style-font-typography_7kh_gxoi__F0000.png)
(https://i.imgur.com/T7lDZwr.jpg)
(https://www.cherryred.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/NEVER-ENDING-STORY-OST.jpg)
:)
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 12:23:26 PM
grain does behave like a fluid so it is possible although maybe unlikely here. Reuse of amphorae for whatever is a nice aside discussion though :)
it does behave like a fluid but can 'bridge' . But any neck that's wide enough to fill with a shovel is not going to bridge when you empty it 8)
We seem to have an attack of the giant images.
Contributors may not realise that you can use the image width parameter to control the size of the image in a post
Set the first image parameter in the sq bracket to [img width=x] where x is the size. I find that 300 is good. Make sure you have no space in front or after the = sign. Leave the closing bracket as is.
But maybe giant images are "in" at the moment, in which case, ignore the above :)
Specially for Dave, who is fascinated by amphorae, here (http://www.ancientportsantiques.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Containers.pdf) is another article on amphorae as shipping containers (as opposed to things to create typologies of).
Just a comparator for amphora production: Rome needed at least 7500 000 litres of olive oi (http://blog.scmglobe.com/?p=571)l each year which translates to 187500 amphorae per annum, all just used once.
Another estimate (https://vinepair.com/wine-blog/history-wine-transport-8000-years/) puts it at 20 000 000 litres of olive oil (500 000 amphorae) and, conservatively, 100,000,000 litres of wine (4,000,000 amphorae). That's just Rome for just one year. What was stopping Persia from matching these production figures for amphorae?
And where are the wine shards?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 04:06:55 PM
Just a comparator for amphora production: Rome needed at least 7500 000 litres of olive oi (http://blog.scmglobe.com/?p=571)l each year which translates to 187500 amphorae per annum, all just used once.
Another estimate (https://vinepair.com/wine-blog/history-wine-transport-8000-years/) puts it at 20 000 000 litres of olive oil (500 000 amphorae) and, conservatively, 100,000,000 litres of wine (4,000,000 amphorae). That's just Rome for just one year. What was stopping Persia from matching these production figures for amphorae?
It's not that the Persians couldn't produce amphorae.
It's just that to transport six million men to Greece they've got to find a minimum of 300,000 labourers in Egypt, expand their amphorae production industry several fold, but only for four years when it can dwindle back to normal, somehow find extra shipping and ships and men to load and unload them, and this is as well as taking 6 million men out of the workforce. (Given an estimated population of the Empire of 50 million, assuming half to be male and perhaps two thirds of them to be of 'working age' (rather than military age) there are perhaps 17 million men available. You're pulling 6 million of them out of the economy for over a year. (That assumes that they had to set off marching to Sardis to overwinter in the year before the campaign.
On top of this we have an untold number of 'engineers' and labourers to prepare roads and make canals.
Sorry, but I cannot see it being done.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 29, 2018, 03:50:08 PM
Specially for Dave, who is fascinated by amphorae, here (http://www.ancientportsantiques.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Containers.pdf) is another article on amphorae as shipping containers (as opposed to things to create typologies of).
actually quite enjoyed that article :)
should I get my anorak now or later :-[
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 01:09:46 PM
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 12:23:26 PM
grain does behave like a fluid so it is possible although maybe unlikely here. Reuse of amphorae for whatever is a nice aside discussion though :)
it does behave like a fluid but can 'bridge' . But any neck that's wide enough to fill with a shovel is not going to bridge when you empty it 8)
yes it can bridge. I've seen it a few times in my working life (being a brewer) and I acknowledge its unlikely for amphorae usage. Still an interesting topic though :)
Quote from: Erpingham on April 29, 2018, 09:28:40 AM
QuoteIt is an understandable intellectual approach - there is nothing morally reprehensible about expressing an outlook based on one's own culture - but it is not legitimate for understanding other cultures at different periods in history.
But alas its all we have :) It is probably a philosophical difference in approach to the past between us. You believe that the historian can completely discard their own culture in looking at the past and I don't. Where we agree, I think, is that we must endeavour to recognise our cultural biases and seek to minimise their impact.
That at least we can agree upon. If one is able to leave aside one's own culture, or at least its outlook and assumptions, it does permit a better understanding of other cultures and suspends the knee-jerk negativity reflex when the apparently unlikely is encountered.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 10:00:39 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 29, 2018, 09:28:40 AM
I think, is that we must endeavour to recognise our cultural biases and seek to minimise their impact.
Would that be an approach that Herodtus would recognise I wonder?
Yes. Herodotus travelled extensively during his research and spoke to many people from various different cultures. He did retain much of his Greek perspective, not least because he was a Greek writing for a Greek audience, but did not assume that Greek techniques were the answer to everything or that everyone had to operate using Greek systems.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2018, 07:34:47 PM
That at least we can agree upon. If one is able to leave aside one's own culture, or at least its outlook and assumptions, it does permit a better understanding of other cultures and suspends the knee-jerk negativity reflex when the apparently unlikely is encountered.
I agree entirely, I just wonder how much we can step outside our own culture?
When you look back at 'modern' historians, for example Gibbon, you can see in him a man of his place and his time.
To be fair that might have been what gave him the courage to tackle such a work :)
.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 07:44:14 PM
I agree entirely, I just wonder how much we can step outside our own culture?
More so than Herodotus et al as at least in theory we recognise cultural and other bias as an issue which ancient historians and their target audience would not.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 10:21:54 AM
The idea of somebody producing in the region of 88 million amphorae and shipping them to the coast of Thrace to store grain in, when nobody else seems to have found the need, does look a little unlikely
But how many amphorae would already be in existence? Would fresh millions be needed or would they already be in use or even waiting to be used? Any additional production might be quite modest over and above replacing breakages and other losses. And having already seen how convenient amphorae are for storing and handling maritime cargoes, and how widespread they are among wrecks of the classical period, we might wish not to discard them too readily.
Perhaps the lack of piles of shards on the beaches is considered a problem (would experienced handlers really be so careless as to break a substantial proportion of the items they were handling?). One might point out that the beaches are no longer where they used to be: the beaches of 480 BC are either under water (in the northern Aegean) or several hundred yards inland (in the western and eastern Aegean). So if there are shard dumps from 480 BC that is where they would be found. If on the other hand the experienced handlers had comparatively few breakages and the Ionians in Xerxes' fleet were using ostraca for their daily tallies, then we would not find shard dumps anywhere.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 07:44:14 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2018, 07:34:47 PM
That at least we can agree upon. If one is able to leave aside one's own culture, or at least its outlook and assumptions, it does permit a better understanding of other cultures and suspends the knee-jerk negativity reflex when the apparently unlikely is encountered.
I agree entirely, I just wonder how much we can step outside our own culture?
Interesting thought. In my experience it takes a bit of practice and a fair amount of immersion in the thought processes, outlook and general assumptions of earlier cultures. If one can do this a lot of things fall into place, particularly the degree to which things were factual or symbolic, and the thinking about how the world worked and what had to be done to make it work as one wished.
QuoteWhen you look back at 'modern' historians, for example Gibbon, you can see in him a man of his place and his time.
To be fair that might have been what gave him the courage to tackle such a work :)
Oh yes. Gibbon's history is thoroughly Anglophilic and one can see his approval of institutions who most nearly reach the ideal of English constitutional goverment and his implicit and occasionally explicit pronouncements about the inevitable doom of systems which do not. His sentences include a judgemental adjective in just about every phrase - it still makes wonderful reading, and the interesting thing is that he captures a picture of national charateristics without making it a caricature of a stereotype.
His picture of more or less constant decline once the Antonines were past is nowadays revised into a series of ups and downs which are often connected with economic rather than political stimuli by today's historians, but his technique of working closely from sources while being aware of the thinking of scholars, and on the whole preferring the former over the latter, is one with which I can sympathise. :)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 08:01:56 PM
.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 07:44:14 PM
I agree entirely, I just wonder how much we can step outside our own culture?
More so than Herodotus et al as at least in theory we recognise cultural and other bias as an issue which ancient historians and their target audience would not.
or is our recognition of cultural bias just a cultural hangup we have that future generations will point fingers at and mock us for
(I jest, honestly ;) )
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 08:08:06 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 08:01:56 PM
.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 07:44:14 PM
I agree entirely, I just wonder how much we can step outside our own culture?
More so than Herodotus et al as at least in theory we recognise cultural and other bias as an issue which ancient historians and their target audience would not.
or is our recognition of cultural bias just a cultural hangup we have that future generations will point fingers at and mock us for
(I jest, honestly ;) )
Depends if 'our' culture is going to be the dominant one in the future- in 200 years the main school of history might agree with Narendra Modi and take Ganesh as proof of ancient plastic surgery.
As a final point about amphorae and then I am definitely dropping the subject, a shard-hill of 50+ million amphorae in Rome represents part of a regular import of something like 300 000 amphorae per year over, say, two centuries. That means that in the same period of time 800 million wine amphorae were also imported, enough for Rome's own mini-Everest. Where have those shards gone? If they've gone, why worry about a few hundred thousand amphorae per food dump along the Aegean coastline?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 08:19:48 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 08:08:06 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 08:01:56 PM
.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 07:44:14 PM
I agree entirely, I just wonder how much we can step outside our own culture?
More so than Herodotus et al as at least in theory we recognise cultural and other bias as an issue which ancient historians and their target audience would not.
or is our recognition of cultural bias just a cultural hangup we have that future generations will point fingers at and mock us for
(I jest, honestly ;) )
Depends if 'our' culture is going to be the dominant one in the future- in 200 years the main school of history might agree with Narendi Modi and take Ganesh as proof of ancient plastic surgery.
My lady wife is at the moment helping somebody trade their family tree, they've discovered they've got a relative buried in our churchyard.
The man buried (before the second world war) had a father who was 'a gold miner'. The father married in South Africa and some of his children were born in South Africa and some back in Barrow in Furness. But from where they were born he obviously went out, came back and went out again. He was married out there in about 1905 but we're not sure when he went out, he missed rather a lot of censuses one way or another.
We've got other people buried in our church yard who got the boat from Cornwall to Barrow, worked in the mines here, in the US, in Canada, and back here. They seemed to think no more of travelling four or five thousand miles to get their next job than we would taking a job in a neighbouring town. They'd spend a couple of years, perhaps more, and move on. Do we understand these people? I mean, really understand them. I think most of them were literate but what education they'd had after the age of ten or twelve I wouldn't know
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 09:08:21 PM
As a final point about amphorae and then I am definitely dropping the subject, a shard-hill of 50+ million amphorae in Rome represents part of a regular import of something like 300 000 amphorae per year over, say, two centuries. That means that in the same period of time 800 million wine amphorae were also imported, enough for Rome's own mini-Everest. Where have those shards gone? If they've gone, why worry about a few hundred thousand amphorae per food dump along the Aegean coastline?
depends on the amphorae size and shape. the olive oil amphorae were probably dumped due to oil impregnation amongst other things
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 09:22:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 09:08:21 PM
As a final point about amphorae and then I am definitely dropping the subject, a shard-hill of 50+ million amphorae in Rome represents part of a regular import of something like 300 000 amphorae per year over, say, two centuries. That means that in the same period of time 800 million wine amphorae were also imported, enough for Rome's own mini-Everest. Where have those shards gone? If they've gone, why worry about a few hundred thousand amphorae per food dump along the Aegean coastline?
depends on the amphorae size and shape. the olive oil amphorae were probably dumped due to oil impregnation amongst other things
Does anyone do 28mm models of amphorae-?I can feel a Hordes of the Things army coming on.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 09:10:48 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 08:19:48 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 08:08:06 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 08:01:56 PM
.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 07:44:14 PM
I agree entirely, I just wonder how much we can step outside our own culture?
More so than Herodotus et al as at least in theory we recognise cultural and other bias as an issue which ancient historians and their target audience would not.
or is our recognition of cultural bias just a cultural hangup we have that future generations will point fingers at and mock us for
(I jest, honestly ;) )
Depends if 'our' culture is going to be the dominant one in the future- in 200 years the main school of history might agree with Narendi Modi and take Ganesh as proof of ancient plastic surgery.
My lady wife is at the moment helping somebody trade their family tree, they've discovered they've got a relative buried in our churchyard.
The man buried (before the second world war) had a father who was 'a gold miner'. The father married in South Africa and some of his children were born in South Africa and some back in Barrow in Furness. But from where they were born he obviously went out, came back and went out again. He was married out there in about 1905 but we're not sure when he went out, he missed rather a lot of censuses one way or another.
We've got other people buried in our church yard who got the boat from Cornwall to Barrow, worked in the mines here, in the US, in Canada, and back here. They seemed to think no more of travelling four or five thousand miles to get their next job than we would taking a job in a neighbouring town. They'd spend a couple of years, perhaps more, and move on. Do we understand these people? I mean, really understand them. I think most of them were literate but what education they'd had after the age of ten or twelve I wouldn't know
I suspect not.
Tangentially, I came across a review at Bryn Maw of a book that participants in this debate might find interesting: Brill's Companion to the Reception of Herodotus in Antiquity and Beyond (http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2018/2018-04-56.html)
Quote from: Holly on April 29, 2018, 07:05:52 PM
should I get my anorak now or later :-[
It's OK Dave. Real amphora geeks would look down their noses at such populist stuff :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 29, 2018, 08:08:06 PM
or is our recognition of cultural bias just a cultural hangup we have that future generations will point fingers at and mock us for
(I jest, honestly ;) )
Ah, many a true word etc. :) Yes, our idea of "objective history" is a cultural artefact, in the same way as Gibbon's or Churchill's was. It does have the advantage that it is more "self-aware" - to operate it you should be consciously looking for bias, rather than assuming you haven't got any.
On how much you can lay aside your culture, it depends a degree how much you try. But it is very difficult to unlearn stuff. So, I know about the existence of viruses and bacteria and how they can cause ill health. I know insects can vector disease. I cannot therefore take an explanation that malaria is caused by bad air at face value. I look up in the sky and I know that we are orbiting the sun, not it orbiting us. And so on.
We also need to be cautious. We can think we understand how someone in the past thought but we have actually a fairly limited sample of ancient thinking to go on. Not many Roman auxiliaries or Persian cavalrymen have left us their memoires, for example. We usually get the thoughts of an educated elite - generals, philosophers, jurists and so on. So there is a danger of thinking we can get closer than we can to the ancient mind set.
Anyone, its all getting off the topic. Let us bask in a rare consensus that we are trying to reduce our cultural biases.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on April 29, 2018, 09:08:21 PM
As a final point about amphorae and then I am definitely dropping the subject, a shard-hill of 50+ million amphorae in Rome represents part of a regular import of something like 300 000 amphorae per year over, say, two centuries. That means that in the same period of time 800 million wine amphorae were also imported, enough for Rome's own mini-Everest. Where have those shards gone? If they've gone, why worry about a few hundred thousand amphorae per food dump along the Aegean coastline?
I think maybe you are too focussed on Monte Testaccio, which is, as far as I know, unique. What you would be looking for is a pot scatter containing amphora fragments. In a depot handling thousands of amphorae you'd be breaking some. The fragments of these would be dumped somewhere or just left where they fell. I seriously doubt the Persian forces on campaign, passing from site to site daily, would be collecting up fragments to use as ostraca. Also, the most diagnostic bits - rims and handles - don't make good ostraca. They are also big and chunky and endure in archaeological contexts. Honestly, if a site is using amphorae in the ancient world, they will turn up. If they are handling lots, lots will turn up.
A slight digression in the direction of period grain storage possibilities: Leviticus 25 is interesting. The chapter deals with the provision for leaving the whole land fallow every seven years. To do this, a certain amount of productive and preservative activity is required.
Leviticus 25:20-22:20. And if ye shall say, what shall we eat in the seventh year?
Behold, we shall not sow, nor gather in our increase.
21. Then I will command my blessing upon you in the sixth year,
and it shall bring forth fruit* for three years.
22. And ye shall sow the eighth year, and eat of old fruit* until the ninth year;
until her fruits* come in ye shall eat of the old [store].
*
Not literally 'fruit' but the fruits of the land, i.e. grain.This was enshrined in Hebrew law. To make it work, there had to be some provision for tripling crops in the sixth year (how on Earth would they have done that?) and the crops harvested in Year 6 of the cycle would have to last through Years 7 and 8.
It seems unlikely this statute would have survived if it had been totally impracticable. Even if the sixth year tripling was replaced by accrual over the six years, the sixth year crop still has to last for years 7 and 8.
Intriguing. Unless the Hebrews had special knowledge they did not share with anyone, it implies that keeping grain usable over time was easier back then than it is now with our monoculture crops.
Quote from: Erpingham on April 30, 2018, 09:03:49 AM
I think maybe you are too focussed on Monte Testaccio, which is, as far as I know, unique. What you would be looking for is a pot scatter containing amphora fragments. In a depot handling thousands of amphorae you'd be breaking some. The fragments of these would be dumped somewhere or just left where they fell. I seriously doubt the Persian forces on campaign, passing from site to site daily, would be collecting up fragments to use as ostraca. Also, the most diagnostic bits - rims and handles - don't make good ostraca. They are also big and chunky and endure in archaeological contexts. Honestly, if a site is using amphorae in the ancient world, they will turn up. If they are handling lots, lots will turn up.
But would there be such an accumulation if they are being handled for only a day or a few days at any given site, as we would expect with an army on the move being periodically resupplied by sea? Or are we thinking of the collection and storage areas back in Asia Minor?
Breakages on campaign would occur on the beaches (which are no longer beaches) and the bits would be scavenged for ostraca, thrown into the sea or simply left there. The temporary stops along the route where resupply occurred are unlikely to have accrued noticeable amounts of fragments of amphorae. They should have accrued some, but not enough for the casual visitor to find himself stumbling over a heap of bits of rims and handles. Also, have they been looked for? Has anyone followed the then-coastal track looking for fragments of grain storage amphorae? I think probably not: even Peter Connolly, who pioneered the 'sharding' technique, used it to find settlements, not follow supply routes.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 30, 2018, 10:03:42 AM
A slight digression in the direction of period grain storage possibilities: Leviticus 25 is interesting. The chapter deals with the provision for leaving the whole land fallow every seven years. To do this, a certain amount of productive and preservative activity is required.
Leviticus 25:20-22:
20. And if ye shall say, what shall we eat in the seventh year?
Behold, we shall not sow, nor gather in our increase.
21. Then I will command my blessing upon you in the sixth year,
and it shall bring forth fruit* for three years.
22. And ye shall sow the eighth year, and eat of old fruit* until the ninth year;
until her fruits* come in ye shall eat of the old [store].
*Not literally 'fruit' but the fruits of the land, i.e. grain.
This was enshrined in Hebrew law. To make it work, there had to be some provision for tripling crops in the sixth year (how on Earth would they have done that?) and the crops harvested in Year 6 of the cycle would have to last through Years 7 and 8.
It seems unlikely this statute would have survived if it had been totally impracticable. Even if the sixth year tripling was replaced by accrual over the six years, the sixth year crop still has to last for years 7 and 8.
Not really difficult. I explained to you in post 65 on April 13th how it was done
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 30, 2018, 10:03:42 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 30, 2018, 09:03:49 AM
I think maybe you are too focussed on Monte Testaccio, which is, as far as I know, unique. What you would be looking for is a pot scatter containing amphora fragments. In a depot handling thousands of amphorae you'd be breaking some. The fragments of these would be dumped somewhere or just left where they fell. I seriously doubt the Persian forces on campaign, passing from site to site daily, would be collecting up fragments to use as ostraca. Also, the most diagnostic bits - rims and handles - don't make good ostraca. They are also big and chunky and endure in archaeological contexts. Honestly, if a site is using amphorae in the ancient world, they will turn up. If they are handling lots, lots will turn up.
But would there be such an accumulation if they are being handled for only a day or a few days at any given site, as we would expect with an army on the move being periodically resupplied by sea? Or are we thinking of the collection and storage areas back in Asia Minor?
Breakages on campaign would occur on the beaches (which are no longer beaches) and the bits would be scavenged for ostraca, thrown into the sea or simply left there. The temporary stops along the route where resupply occurred are unlikely to have accrued noticeable amounts of fragments of amphorae. They should have accrued some, but not enough for the casual visitor to find himself stumbling over a heap of bits of rims and handles. Also, have they been looked for? Has anyone followed the then-coastal track looking for fragments of grain storage amphorae? I think probably not: even Peter Connolly, who pioneered the 'sharding' technique, used it to find settlements, not follow supply routes.
you are now ignoring totally the fact that Herodotus mentions depots, or were they deep cleaned by the Persian army as it fled starving back to Asia?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 29, 2018, 07:37:34 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 29, 2018, 10:00:39 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on April 29, 2018, 09:28:40 AM
I think, is that we must endeavour to recognise our cultural biases and seek to minimise their impact.
Would that be an approach that Herodtus would recognise I wonder?
Yes. Herodotus travelled extensively during his research and spoke to many people from various different cultures. He did retain much of his Greek perspective, not least because he was a Greek writing for a Greek audience, but did not assume that Greek techniques were the answer to everything or that everyone had to operate using Greek systems.
Not sure that is quite the same as being aware of 'cultural bias' and actively seeking to minimise its impact - one could argue that depicting the slave owning Athenians or even Spartans as free societies as opposed to the unfree barbarian Persians shows a certain level of cultural based selective thinking. From a C21 perspective of course.
This looks to be an interesting article
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/pdfs/persians_just_non_greek.pdf (http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/pdfs/persians_just_non_greek.pdf)
I quite like the idea that the Persians have feeble heads due to turban wearing.
Very thought provoking article. I can see why it might rile a few people
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 30, 2018, 10:12:03 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 30, 2018, 10:03:42 AM
It seems unlikely this statute would have survived if it had been totally impracticable. Even if the sixth year tripling was replaced by accrual over the six years, the sixth year crop still has to last for years 7 and 8.
Not really difficult. I explained to you in post 65 on April 13th how it was done
True, you did. :) It was the statutory tripling of the Year 6 crop which surprised me, and the routine two-year preservation of the said crop which I found interesting.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 30, 2018, 10:13:44 AM
you are now ignoring totally the fact that Herodotus mentions depots, or were they deep cleaned by the Persian army as it fled starving back to Asia?
I would imagine so, given the description in Herodotus VIII.115:
"So the herald took that response and departed, but Xerxes left Mardonius in Thessaly. He himself journeyed with all speed to the Hellespont and came in forty-five days to the passage for crossing, bringing back with him as good as none (if one may say so) of his host. [2] Wherever and to whatever people they came, they seized and devoured its produce. If they found none, they would eat the grass of the field and strip the bark and pluck the leaves of the trees, garden and wild alike, leaving nothing—such was the degree of their starvation. [3] Moreover, pestilence and dysentery broke out among them on their way, from which they died. Some who were sick Xerxes left behind, charging the cities to which he came in his march to care for them and nourish them, some in Thessaly and some in Siris of Paeonia and in Macedonia."
If trees are being stripped of leaves, any depots are going to be thoroughly cleaned out. This does not mean the starving Persians devoured amphorae; rather I would have thought that when the ships unloaded onto the beaches (and into the occasional coastal cities) the grain would have been transferred into sacks for easier and more efficient transportation. Any depots on land might thus have acres of discarded (but biodegradable) sacks but probably no bits of amphorae.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on April 30, 2018, 12:36:49 PM
This looks to be an interesting article
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/pdfs/persians_just_non_greek.pdf (http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/pdfs/persians_just_non_greek.pdf)
Yes, the author correctly points out that in Greek 'barbaroi' simply means people who do not speak Greek. Up to Herodotus' time, this was simply a fact and not a value judgement. After Thermopylae, Salamis, Plataea, Mycale and Eurymedon, the Greeks in general and Athenians in particular were conscious of their superior military merit and appear to have associated it with their own culture. This resulted in Persians being less highly regarded (see the King's Eye 'Pseudo-Artabas' in Aristophanes'
The Acharnians.)
Intriguingly,
The Acharnians has the first hint of Persians using gold to influence events in Greece, a tendency which would take root in the Peloponnesian War and be a centrepiece of Persian policy afterwards. As Greece slipped further into internecine strife through Persian support for underdogs to topple the
hegemon (top dog), so attitudes began to emerge calling for Greece to overthrow Persia once and for all, as exemplified by Ismenias of Thebes.
QuoteI quite like the idea that the Persians have feeble heads due to turban wearing.
From Herodotus III.12, contrasting the effects, or assumed effects, of the Egyptian custom of going shaven-headed and hatless with the Persian custom of wearing turbans. Explanations in this period would not have involved theories based on genetics.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on April 30, 2018, 08:36:25 PM
Explanations in this period would not have involved theories based on genetics.
On that I think we can probably all agree.
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 30, 2018, 10:13:44 AM
you are now ignoring totally the fact that Herodotus mentions depots, or were they deep cleaned by the Persian army as it fled starving back to Asia?
OK, let me return to amphorae (last time, promise...)
The food depots sites can be justly compared with imperial Rome. We know that far more wine amphorae were shipped to Rome than olive oil amphorae, but there is no significant trace of these wine amphorae left anywhere, just shards here and there that might have been used for wine or for something else.
Now visualise a food depot. All these depots were set up at port towns of significant size along the Aegean coast. They would consist of temporary structures in which were bins for more recent grain and sealed amphorae for older harvests. The army arrives and all the grain is transferred from the bins/amphorae to sacks on the baggage mules. You now have a lot of empty amphorae of which a small percentage are broken (I'm going to assume that the workers who handled the amphorae took care not to break them when handling them - I work in a print shop where there are a thousand ways to get a job wrong and one way to get it right and getting a job wrong is a big deal, so it's a fair assumption).
What happens to the empty amphorae? They are perfectly reusable and so the local inhabitants reuse them. I suggest that the primary use would have been to export various food products of that port via ship to its clients around the Aegean and beyond. If the amphorae had been sealed with resin to keep the grain dry, they are perfect for wine as well as cereals. The amphorae could also have been taken in by the locals for domestic use. After a while they are all gone, with some shards left on the depot site which were partly used by the local Greeks and partly buried by time.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 09:20:51 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on April 30, 2018, 10:13:44 AM
you are now ignoring totally the fact that Herodotus mentions depots, or were they deep cleaned by the Persian army as it fled starving back to Asia?
OK, let me return to amphorae (last time, promise...)
The food depots sites can be justly compared with imperial Rome. We know that far more wine amphorae were shipped to Rome than olive oil amphorae, but there is no significant trace of these wine amphorae left anywhere, just shards here and there that might have been used for wine or for something else.
Now visualise a food depot. All these depots were set up at port towns of significant size along the Aegean coast. They would consist of temporary structures in which were bins for more recent grain and sealed amphorae for older harvests.
seriously no, grain has to be stored in very weather proof bins
And nobody has produced evidence of grain stored in Amphorae
Justin, please just read up on some amphora studies and think it through a bit. Yes, it's dull but it will stop some of the wilder speculation. Amphorae don't disappear - they are durable and lie around in bits on archaeological sites in quantity. Different commodoties used different types of amphorae - they often had a helpful label telling you what was in them and how much it weighed. There is little evidence of using amphorae for mass transport of grain (I haven't found any yet but I refuse to look at any more amphora articles) - grain amphorae are mentioned only in passing to allow you to get onto the exciting (?) stuff like typologies of fish sauce containers.
Is there any archaeological evidence for the several million man army?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 11:21:17 AM
Is there any archaeological evidence for the several million man army?
I remember one claim that the Galatian invasion of Greece left no archaeological trace at all. There's an interesting discussion here (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=oGXMMD5rXBQC&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41&dq=archaeological+evidence+galatian+invasion&source=bl&ots=hP52wYPepi&sig=t14FLxFpprZXlbt_1wNrzh5qF0w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjC0o-2puTaAhUBohQKHVbwAhQQ6AEIczAL#v=onepage&q=archaeological%20evidence%20galatian%20invasion&f=false) of the physical remains of the Persian invasion, which in passing says much the same about the Galatian invasion of Asia. So I am not sure if the absence of material traces pointing to the validity of the Persian "three million" counts for very much.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 11:21:17 AM
Is there any archaeological evidence for the several million man army?
They folded their tents, like the Arabs,
And as silently steal away.
;)
We have an Empire with an estimated population of 50 million
(So 25 million of them male and perhaps 17 million of them of working/military age)
And you take six million of them on a jaunt outside the empire, as well as employing 300,000 as extra labourers in Egypt, I forget how many thousand as amphorae manufacturers, we have men building ships, crewing extra merchant ships, we have untold thousands already on site, clearing roads and digging canals. If we call this another million, that gives us 7 million
In WW2 the Americans had 9% (approximately) of their population in the military. Germany hit 31% in some form of service, but that may include men who did their day job and served as firewatchers at night
Xerxes took 14% of his population, when the vast majority of them were involved in subsistence agriculture. He removed from the economy about 40% of men of working age.
Agriculture would have collapsed and you'd have had massed starvation in home provinces. Who was sowing the crop in Babylonia that was to be harvested whilst xerxes and his lads were in Northern Greece? Who was there left to harvest it?
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 01, 2018, 11:36:08 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 11:21:17 AM
Is there any archaeological evidence for the several million man army?
I remember one claim that the Galatian invasion of Greece left no archaeological trace at all. There's an interesting discussion here (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=oGXMMD5rXBQC&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41&dq=archaeological+evidence+galatian+invasion&source=bl&ots=hP52wYPepi&sig=t14FLxFpprZXlbt_1wNrzh5qF0w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjC0o-2puTaAhUBohQKHVbwAhQQ6AEIczAL#v=onepage&q=archaeological%20evidence%20galatian%20invasion&f=false) of the physical remains of the Persian invasion, which in passing says much the same about the Galatian invasion of Asia. So I am not sure if the absence of material traces pointing to the validity of the Persian "three million" counts for very much.
As the old saying taught to generations of archaeology students goes "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".
The problem we have in assessing this case is none of is is expert enough in the archaeology of Northern Greece to know what level of archaeological fieldwork has been done looking at things like pot scatters, whether any landscape work has been done on potential traces of campsites and so on. So we can't even say with certainty there is an absence of evidence. The five depots should have left the most trace - they were quite large and occupied for several years but has anyone looked?
The evidence on Asian shore for the giant magazine, stone built, enclosed with stone walls and apparently stocked at their peak with millions of amphorae, should be the easiest of all to locate. We ought to see some record tablets relating to the expedition somewhere in the Persian Empire but finding these caches seems hit and miss, so we may not have discovered them yet.
So, I don't think the absence of evidence is a deal breaker.
One last, last time, and then we can all agree to disagree.
Amphorae were universal storage containers and were used to store grain as well as wine, olive oil, etc. I read that everywhere.
Grain will keep for several years if its moisture level is kept below 10 - 15% and was in fact stored for several years without difficulty in dry climates like Egypt's. Silos or granaries in a wetter climate meant for short-term storage could store the grain loose or in sacks. What we need is something that works for long-term storage and sealed amphorae are perfect for that. Sealed bins also work. Sealed pits also work. The main point is that it is possible to make it work.
There is no evidence grain was transported by ship in amphorae, granted. Sacks or loose seems to be have been the standard method. I suggested that the grain from Egypt and the Mediterranean coastline could have been shipped in amphorae if the local Greeks could not manufacture enough in quantity, but on reflection it makes more sense to transplant the potters in Greece, have them make the amphorae there (if amphorae were used), and then just ship the grain loose or in sacks. Bear in mind you don't need a vast army of potters, just a few thousand. A potter can make 4 amphorae in a day. You would need 5000 - 6000 potters to make the necessary amphorae. 6000 potters x 4 amphorae a day x 250 days per year (I let them goof off for 4 months a year) x 4 years = 24 million amphorae, should be enough for storing the long-term grain. Given them just Sundays off and it's nearly 30 million amphorae.
A lot of amphorae brought together in one place do not have to all be broken up in shards, leaving a massive dump for archaeologists. Witness the lack of wine amphorae shards in Rome (800 million amphorae!). The amphorae can be reused which means spread around before they are finally broken and discarded.
Lets disagree about amphorae :) They are a bit peripheral to the question and we can't agree on their importance.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 11:38:34 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 11:21:17 AM
Is there any archaeological evidence for the several million man army?
They folded their tents, like the Arabs,
And as silently steal away.
;)
We have an Empire with an estimated population of 50 million
(So 25 million of them male and perhaps 17 million of them of working/military age)
And you take six million of them on a jaunt outside the empire, as well as employing 300,000 as extra labourers in Egypt, I forget how many thousand as amphorae manufacturers, we have men building ships, crewing extra merchant ships, we have untold thousands already on site, clearing roads and digging canals. If we call this another million, that gives us 7 million
In WW2 the Americans had 9% (approximately) of their population in the military. Germany hit 31% in some form of service, but that may include men who did their day job and served as firewatchers at night
Xerxes took 14% of his population, when the vast majority of them were involved in subsistence agriculture. He removed from the economy about 40% of men of working age.
Agriculture would have collapsed and you'd have had massed starvation in home provinces. Who was sowing the crop in Babylonia that was to be harvested whilst xerxes and his lads were in Northern Greece? Who was there left to harvest it?
I suppose it makes sense if you see the Persian Empire as a 'biblical ' society with a Hitler like leader able and willing to order such total lunacy as a vanity project.
I think Jim is a bit high on his percentage of population who are males who are of military age. I'd go for about 13 million out of 50 million, on the rule of thumb that only about 50% of an ancient society is over 15. What proportion of those were military capable, I don't know. Perhaps half, on the basis that half Xerxes army was supposed to be "support units"? So 38% of the military manpower of the Empire and 38% of the workers. We know that the Roman Republic often put 15% of its citizen manpower in the field (and is said to have put 66% in the field at the time of Cannae , which might be termed an existential event). Most ancient empires seem to have gone for smaller percentages as routine, I suspect in part because of the difficulty of projecting all your military potential on one front in a large empire but partly because of the economic disruption of removing too many people from a productive role.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 11:38:34 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 11:21:17 AM
Is there any archaeological evidence for the several million man army?
They folded their tents, like the Arabs,
And as silently steal away.
;)
We have an Empire with an estimated population of 50 million
(So 25 million of them male and perhaps 17 million of them of working/military age)
And you take six million of them on a jaunt outside the empire, as well as employing 300,000 as extra labourers in Egypt, I forget how many thousand as amphorae manufacturers, we have men building ships, crewing extra merchant ships, we have untold thousands already on site, clearing roads and digging canals. If we call this another million, that gives us 7 million
In WW2 the Americans had 9% (approximately) of their population in the military. Germany hit 31% in some form of service, but that may include men who did their day job and served as firewatchers at night
Xerxes took 14% of his population, when the vast majority of them were involved in subsistence agriculture. He removed from the economy about 40% of men of working age.
Agriculture would have collapsed and you'd have had massed starvation in home provinces. Who was sowing the crop in Babylonia that was to be harvested whilst xerxes and his lads were in Northern Greece? Who was there left to harvest it?
Don't quite see the problem Jim. Xerxes takes 6 million men and leaves behind 11 million of working age. The 11 million men (2/3 of the labour force) manage the farms possibly helped by the women. Is there any reason why this should be unmanageable?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 01:18:36 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 11:38:34 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 11:21:17 AM
Is there any archaeological evidence for the several million man army?
They folded their tents, like the Arabs,
And as silently steal away.
;)
We have an Empire with an estimated population of 50 million
(So 25 million of them male and perhaps 17 million of them of working/military age)
And you take six million of them on a jaunt outside the empire, as well as employing 300,000 as extra labourers in Egypt, I forget how many thousand as amphorae manufacturers, we have men building ships, crewing extra merchant ships, we have untold thousands already on site, clearing roads and digging canals. If we call this another million, that gives us 7 million
In WW2 the Americans had 9% (approximately) of their population in the military. Germany hit 31% in some form of service, but that may include men who did their day job and served as firewatchers at night
Xerxes took 14% of his population, when the vast majority of them were involved in subsistence agriculture. He removed from the economy about 40% of men of working age.
Agriculture would have collapsed and you'd have had massed starvation in home provinces. Who was sowing the crop in Babylonia that was to be harvested whilst xerxes and his lads were in Northern Greece? Who was there left to harvest it?
Don't quite see the problem Jim. Xerxes takes 6 million men and leaves behind 11 million of working age. The 11 million men (2/3 of the labour force) manage the farms possibly helped by the women. Is there any reason why this should be unmanageable?
Might the women be already fully engaged in socially useful/essential work and not be available to help out with farming, assuming they aren't already?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 01:18:36 PM
Don't quite see the problem Jim. Xerxes takes 6 million men and leaves behind 11 million of working age. The 11 million men (2/3 of the labour force) manage the farms possibly helped by the women. Is there any reason why this should be unmanageable?
Forgive me Justin, but this is a bit of a sweeping dismissal based on little apparent substance.
Do we have evidence that Persian agriculture was so inefficient, you could remove 1/3 of the workforce without effect? As Ian has already pointed out, were women all sitting around doing nothing waiting be called up to work in the fields?
I suspect that we (non-specialist non-academics) don't know enough about the way the Persian Empire worked to really answer these questions. So we are in danger of creating a Persian Empire which fits our image and provides the basis for our position.
Is it possible to refocus on the campaign, where our greater knowledge of military history may prove useful?
Quote from: Erpingham on May 01, 2018, 01:49:35 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 01:18:36 PM
Don't quite see the problem Jim. Xerxes takes 6 million men and leaves behind 11 million of working age. The 11 million men (2/3 of the labour force) manage the farms possibly helped by the women. Is there any reason why this should be unmanageable?
Forgive me Justin, but this is a bit of a sweeping dismissal based on little apparent substance.
Do we have evidence that Persian agriculture was so inefficient, you could remove 1/3 of the workforce without effect? As Ian has already pointed out, were women all sitting around doing nothing waiting be called up to work in the fields?
I suspect that we (non-specialist non-academics) don't know enough about the way the Persian Empire worked to really answer these questions. So we are in danger of creating a Persian Empire which fits our image and provides the basis for our position.
Is it possible to refocus on the campaign, where our greater knowledge of military history may prove useful?
Use the 4 years preparation to grow enough extra food so you can do without ⅓ of the labour force for the one year planting and harvesting, which adds up to ¼ of ⅓ extra of the annual harvest = 8% extra ground cultivated call it 11% if only three years' extra food is grown and problem solved.
But sure, I'm happy to leave food and amphorae aside and look at other aspects. :)
PS: think there's a chance we might actually make 100 pages?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 02:29:09 PMUse the 4 years preparation to grow enough extra food so you can do without ⅓ of the labour force for the one year planting and harvesting, which adds up to ¼ of ⅓ extra of the annual harvest = 8% extra ground cultivated call it 11% if only three years' extra food is grown and problem solved.
Except that you then have to build new granaries
all over the Empire to store it, of course.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 12:04:54 PM
ork.
There is no evidence grain was transported by ship in amphorae, granted. Sacks or loose seems to be have been the standard method. I suggested that the grain from Egypt and the Mediterranean coastline could have been shipped in amphorae if the local Greeks could not manufacture enough in quantity, but on reflection it makes more sense to transplant the potters in Greece, have them make the amphorae there (if amphorae were used), and then just ship the grain loose or in sacks. Bear in mind you don't need a vast army of potters, just a few thousand. A potter can make 4 amphorae in a day. You would need 5000 - 6000 potters to make the necessary amphorae. 6000 potters x 4 amphorae a day x 250 days per year (I let them goof off for 4 months a year) x 4 years = 24 million amphorae, should be enough for storing the long-term grain. Given them just Sundays off and it's nearly 30 million amphorae.
Justin, are you aware of the concept of Occam's razor.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 03:51:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 12:04:54 PM
ork.
There is no evidence grain was transported by ship in amphorae, granted. Sacks or loose seems to be have been the standard method. I suggested that the grain from Egypt and the Mediterranean coastline could have been shipped in amphorae if the local Greeks could not manufacture enough in quantity, but on reflection it makes more sense to transplant the potters in Greece, have them make the amphorae there (if amphorae were used), and then just ship the grain loose or in sacks. Bear in mind you don't need a vast army of potters, just a few thousand. A potter can make 4 amphorae in a day. You would need 5000 - 6000 potters to make the necessary amphorae. 6000 potters x 4 amphorae a day x 250 days per year (I let them goof off for 4 months a year) x 4 years = 24 million amphorae, should be enough for storing the long-term grain. Given them just Sundays off and it's nearly 30 million amphorae.
Justin, are you aware of the concept of Occam's razor.
I am indeed. And....?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 02:29:09 PM
PS: think there's a chance we might actually make 100 pages?
Absolutely, if the will to generate a theoretical framework to overcome all practical objections is there.
Cheers
Mick
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 01, 2018, 02:36:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 02:29:09 PMUse the 4 years preparation to grow enough extra food so you can do without ⅓ of the labour force for the one year planting and harvesting, which adds up to ¼ of ⅓ extra of the annual harvest = 8% extra ground cultivated call it 11% if only three years' extra food is grown and problem solved.
Except that you then have to build new granaries all over the Empire to store it, of course.
Or increase the storage capacity of current granaries by 33%. I'm making the hypothetical assumption existing granaries
already had that capacity in anticipation of bumper harvests or the odd military campaign (of which there had been quite a few from the inception of the empire). ;)
Back to the amphorae :)
Grain at less than 10% moisture is good less than 5% ideally
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:02:02 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 03:51:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 12:04:54 PM
ork.
There is no evidence grain was transported by ship in amphorae, granted. Sacks or loose seems to be have been the standard method. I suggested that the grain from Egypt and the Mediterranean coastline could have been shipped in amphorae if the local Greeks could not manufacture enough in quantity, but on reflection it makes more sense to transplant the potters in Greece, have them make the amphorae there (if amphorae were used), and then just ship the grain loose or in sacks. Bear in mind you don't need a vast army of potters, just a few thousand. A potter can make 4 amphorae in a day. You would need 5000 - 6000 potters to make the necessary amphorae. 6000 potters x 4 amphorae a day x 250 days per year (I let them goof off for 4 months a year) x 4 years = 24 million amphorae, should be enough for storing the long-term grain. Given them just Sundays off and it's nearly 30 million amphorae.
Justin, are you aware of the concept of Occam's razor.
I am indeed. And....?
You don't think it is more likely that Herodotus was wrong about the size of the Persian army than the alternative hypothesis which relies on a lot of supposition to make it even remotely plausible.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 04:23:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:02:02 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 03:51:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 12:04:54 PM
ork.
There is no evidence grain was transported by ship in amphorae, granted. Sacks or loose seems to be have been the standard method. I suggested that the grain from Egypt and the Mediterranean coastline could have been shipped in amphorae if the local Greeks could not manufacture enough in quantity, but on reflection it makes more sense to transplant the potters in Greece, have them make the amphorae there (if amphorae were used), and then just ship the grain loose or in sacks. Bear in mind you don't need a vast army of potters, just a few thousand. A potter can make 4 amphorae in a day. You would need 5000 - 6000 potters to make the necessary amphorae. 6000 potters x 4 amphorae a day x 250 days per year (I let them goof off for 4 months a year) x 4 years = 24 million amphorae, should be enough for storing the long-term grain. Given them just Sundays off and it's nearly 30 million amphorae.
Justin, are you aware of the concept of Occam's razor.
I am indeed. And....?
You don't think it is more likely that Herodotus was wrong about the size of the Persian army than the alternative hypothesis which relies on a lot of supposition to make it even remotely plausible.
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
Those who oppose Herodotus need to show not only that supporting and moving such a huge army is not feasible (which involves another range of suppositions), but must also make the assumption that a careful writer like Herodotus is wildly wrong on the biggest single fact of his account - the size of the Persian army. This makes for a rather complicated razor.
On a different tack, Askleipidotus affirms that the open file order of 2 cubits or 6 feet or 2 yards per file is natural, and doesn't have a special name. I used this open order when calculating the width of the hypothetical Persian column. Here is an article (https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/873645.sorokowska_et_al_2017.pdf) that establishes experimentally that people on average prefer about a metre of space between themselves and strangers or acquaintances (a little less for acquaintainces). Go to the tables on p585 (9 of 16). One more reason to respect the primary sources.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 01:18:36 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 11:38:34 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 11:21:17 AM
Is there any archaeological evidence for the several million man army?
They folded their tents, like the Arabs,
And as silently steal away.
;)
We have an Empire with an estimated population of 50 million
(So 25 million of them male and perhaps 17 million of them of working/military age)
And you take six million of them on a jaunt outside the empire, as well as employing 300,000 as extra labourers in Egypt, I forget how many thousand as amphorae manufacturers, we have men building ships, crewing extra merchant ships, we have untold thousands already on site, clearing roads and digging canals. If we call this another million, that gives us 7 million
In WW2 the Americans had 9% (approximately) of their population in the military. Germany hit 31% in some form of service, but that may include men who did their day job and served as firewatchers at night
Xerxes took 14% of his population, when the vast majority of them were involved in subsistence agriculture. He removed from the economy about 40% of men of working age.
Agriculture would have collapsed and you'd have had massed starvation in home provinces. Who was sowing the crop in Babylonia that was to be harvested whilst xerxes and his lads were in Northern Greece? Who was there left to harvest it?
Don't quite see the problem Jim. Xerxes takes 6 million men and leaves behind 11 million of working age. The 11 million men (2/3 of the labour force) manage the farms possibly helped by the women. Is there any reason why this should be unmanageable?
yes, what do you think the women are doing already? Painting their nails? They're already working
The 11 million men (which has been pointed out is probably an over estimate) have got enough to do as it is.
Do you honestly think a subsistence agricultural economy can survive if you remove 40% of the manpower?
Actually it wouldn't happen, provinces would just rebel because they could see the writing on the wall. They at least would know what would happen if you took all those men away from agriculture.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
we're still waiting for you to do it.
Starting with how your economy survives with 40% of the manpower missing
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 04:38:15 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
we're still waiting for you to do it.
Starting with how your economy survives with 40% of the manpower missing
nick the grain off the invaded lands ;D
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 04:23:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:02:02 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 03:51:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 12:04:54 PM
ork.
There is no evidence grain was transported by ship in amphorae, granted. Sacks or loose seems to be have been the standard method. I suggested that the grain from Egypt and the Mediterranean coastline could have been shipped in amphorae if the local Greeks could not manufacture enough in quantity, but on reflection it makes more sense to transplant the potters in Greece, have them make the amphorae there (if amphorae were used), and then just ship the grain loose or in sacks. Bear in mind you don't need a vast army of potters, just a few thousand. A potter can make 4 amphorae in a day. You would need 5000 - 6000 potters to make the necessary amphorae. 6000 potters x 4 amphorae a day x 250 days per year (I let them goof off for 4 months a year) x 4 years = 24 million amphorae, should be enough for storing the long-term grain. Given them just Sundays off and it's nearly 30 million amphorae.
Justin, are you aware of the concept of Occam's razor.
I am indeed. And....?
You don't think it is more likely that Herodotus was wrong about the size of the Persian army than the alternative hypothesis which relies on a lot of supposition to make it even remotely plausible.
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
Those who oppose Herodotus need to show not only that supporting and moving such a huge army is not feasible (which involves another range of suppositions), but must also make the assumption that a careful writer like Herodotus is wildly wrong on the biggest single fact of his account - the size of the Persian army. This makes for a rather complicated razor.
Oh, and how many suppositions have you made to support your hypothesis ?
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 04:38:15 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
we're still waiting for you to do it.
Starting with how your economy survives with 40% of the manpower missing
Obvious answer- there are representation in Greek art of armed women wearing Persian style clothing which as we don't have evidence to the contrary we can only assume is an accurate depiction of reality. That would therefore mean that the Persian Empire, as it used women as troops ( they arent doing anything useful) would have the resources to run an agricultural based economy and deploy 5 million men/women as an invasion force. ;)
Quote from: Holly on May 01, 2018, 04:39:41 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 04:38:15 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
we're still waiting for you to do it.
Starting with how your economy survives with 40% of the manpower missing
nick the grain off the invaded lands ;D
that would work, Greece being such a major grain exporter and all ;)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 04:52:07 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 04:38:15 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
we're still waiting for you to do it.
Starting with how your economy survives with 40% of the manpower missing
Obvious answer- there are representation in Greek art of armed women wearing Persian style clothing which as we don't have evidence to the contrary we can only assume is an accurate depiction of reality. That would therefore mean that the Persian Empire, as it used women as troops ( they arent doing anything useful) would have the resources to run an agricultural based economy and deploy 5 million men/women as an invasion force. ;)
Funny Herodotus didn't mention it. must have slipped his mind
I think we can agree that the idea of an invasion force of six million produced by an empire with a population of 50 million is just silly and Herodotus, even if he didn't invent the figures, wrongly applied figures he'd found
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Those who oppose Herodotus need to show not only that supporting and moving such a huge army is not feasible (which involves another range of suppositions), but must also make the assumption that a careful writer like Herodotus is wildly wrong on the biggest single fact of his account - the size of the Persian army.
But as is often said, the burden of proof is really with those wishing to create a new paradigm. Numerous scholars and professional soldiers have concluded that Herodotus' figures are not practical and this is the orthodox position. Saying "My supposition which I have not seriously researched is an equal level of supposition" is misleading. The leaps of imagination so far have been dramatic - giant stores, massive organisational efficiency, huge densely occupied camps, enormously wide roads through the wilderness, dramatic fodder production, a mighty amphora industry, super mules. Against this, the mainstream has only to put the question "what if the army was very large rather than supersized"? So many issues resolve and we stop needing an unevidenced superiority over all other ancient societies. It doesn't make the Persian achievement any less in the context of its time, but it does reduce the need for huge imaginative constructions.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 04:59:06 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 04:52:07 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 04:38:15 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
we're still waiting for you to do it.
Starting with how your economy survives with 40% of the manpower missing
Obvious answer- there are representation in Greek art of armed women wearing Persian style clothing which as we don't have evidence to the contrary we can only assume is an accurate depiction of reality. That would therefore mean that the Persian Empire, as it used women as troops ( they arent doing anything useful) would have the resources to run an agricultural based economy and deploy 5 million men/women as an invasion force. ;)
Funny Herodotus didn't mention it. must have slipped his mind
I think we can agree that the idea of an invasion force of six million produced by an empire with a population of 50 million is just silly and Herodotus, even if he didn't invent the figures, wrongly applied figures he'd found
Its silly is the correct response - can you imagine as a messenger arriving at a camp of six million people and asking to be taken to Xerxes-' 'sorry mate I have no bloody idea where he is in this hellish multitude just head towards the sun and hope for the best..
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 04:41:18 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 04:23:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:02:02 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 03:51:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 12:04:54 PM
ork.
There is no evidence grain was transported by ship in amphorae, granted. Sacks or loose seems to be have been the standard method. I suggested that the grain from Egypt and the Mediterranean coastline could have been shipped in amphorae if the local Greeks could not manufacture enough in quantity, but on reflection it makes more sense to transplant the potters in Greece, have them make the amphorae there (if amphorae were used), and then just ship the grain loose or in sacks. Bear in mind you don't need a vast army of potters, just a few thousand. A potter can make 4 amphorae in a day. You would need 5000 - 6000 potters to make the necessary amphorae. 6000 potters x 4 amphorae a day x 250 days per year (I let them goof off for 4 months a year) x 4 years = 24 million amphorae, should be enough for storing the long-term grain. Given them just Sundays off and it's nearly 30 million amphorae.
Justin, are you aware of the concept of Occam's razor.
I am indeed. And....?
You don't think it is more likely that Herodotus was wrong about the size of the Persian army than the alternative hypothesis which relies on a lot of supposition to make it even remotely plausible.
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
Those who oppose Herodotus need to show not only that supporting and moving such a huge army is not feasible (which involves another range of suppositions), but must also make the assumption that a careful writer like Herodotus is wildly wrong on the biggest single fact of his account - the size of the Persian army. This makes for a rather complicated razor.
Oh, and how many suppositions have you made to support your hypothesis ?
Just one, that the Persian army marched cross-country. The rest was a feasibility study in economics and logistics where, taking the data we have, I try to demonstrate that the Persians
could have done it (as opposed to actually did it) whereas my worthy opponents argue that they couldn't. But that's not making suppositions.
Even the cross-country bit is not so much of a supposition since there are a couple of sources showing a Persian army doing just that - sure, in one case the army is nearing the enemy but it's too far away to face any threat marching in column until it gets close.
Something else came to mind whilst thinking about the manuals: Asklepiodotus describes a whole variety of
marching formations of which most do not involve following along a single track and many of those do not even involve keeping in column. It seems the Macedonian army at least was not the least bit bothered by marching off-road in nice, tight battle formations.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 05:14:18 PM
Just one, that the Persian army marched cross country. The rest was a feasibility study in economics and logistics where, taking the data we have, I try to demonstrate that the Persians could have done it (as opposed to actually did it) whereas my worthy opponents argue that they couldn't. But that's not making suppositions.
the economics and logistics breaks down spectacularly at the population level
Even when you look at it as Greece probably having about 12.5 million population. Xerxes is turning up with 50% of the population of Greece!
Xerxes would be attempting, with a population supported by subsistence agriculture, something which countries with modern 20th century manufacturing economies struggled to achieve.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 05:21:38 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 05:14:18 PM
Just one, that the Persian army marched cross country. The rest was a feasibility study in economics and logistics where, taking the data we have, I try to demonstrate that the Persians could have done it (as opposed to actually did it) whereas my worthy opponents argue that they couldn't. But that's not making suppositions.
the economics and logistics breaks down spectacularly at the population level
Even when you look at it as Greece probably having about 12.5 million population. Xerxes is turning up with 50% of the population of Greece!
Xerxes would be attempting, with a population supported by subsistence agriculture, something which countries with modern 20th century manufacturing economies struggled to achieve.
12,5 million is an interesting number. The land area of Greece is 131 957 km² which would give you 94 people per square kilometer. The land area of the Persian Empire was 5 500 000 km², which makes the Persian empire nearly 42 times larger than Greece. Greek land is not particularly arable or conducive to large populations, so even if we assume that Persian to Greek density was 1:4 that should still give a population of well over 100 000 000 people. Why are the estimates for the Persian population at 50 million or less? How reliable are these estimates?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 05:33:17 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 05:21:38 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 05:14:18 PM
Just one, that the Persian army marched cross country. The rest was a feasibility study in economics and logistics where, taking the data we have, I try to demonstrate that the Persians could have done it (as opposed to actually did it) whereas my worthy opponents argue that they couldn't. But that's not making suppositions.
the economics and logistics breaks down spectacularly at the population level
Even when you look at it as Greece probably having about 12.5 million population. Xerxes is turning up with 50% of the population of Greece!
Xerxes would be attempting, with a population supported by subsistence agriculture, something which countries with modern 20th century manufacturing economies struggled to achieve.
12,5 million is an interesting number. The land area of Greece is 131 957 km² which would give you 94 people per square kilometer. The land area of the Persian Empire was 5 500 000 km², which makes the Persian empire nearly 42 times larger than Greece. Greek land is not particularly arable or conducive to large populations, so even if we assume that Persian to Greek density was 1:4 that should still give a population of well over 100 000 000 people. Why are the estimates for the Persian population at 50 million or less? How reliable are these estimates?
a damned sight more reliable than Herodotus
Actually 50 million is on the high side of the estimates
Remember geographers tend to deduct deserts and major mountain ranges from the area before doing the estimates.
I've been reading this thread with interest, and it just struck me that all of the arguments for the size are premised on a one way trip, and a total lack of enemies around the Persian empire. Xerxes is not going to take the entire Persian army on a one way trip. He will have to provision their journey back. We know that Mardonius asked for 300,000 men to stay with him to conquer the Greeks.
"Therefore, since the Persians are in no way to blame, be guided by me; if you are resolved not to remain, march homewards with the greater part of your army. It is for me, however, to enslave and deliver Hellas to you with three hundred thousand of your host whom I will choose." Herodotus 8.100.5
This would mean feeding millions of men on the way back to Persia.
Of course, defence of the empire would also be paramount to Xerxes. With bulk of the military aged men in Greece, the empire would be easy targets for large scale invasions and raids from Scythians and other outsiders, not to mention internal revolts by the subject races.
David
Quote from: davidb on May 01, 2018, 05:41:03 PM
With bulk of the military aged men in Greece, the empire would be easy targets for large scale invasions and raids from Scythians and other outsiders, not to mention internal revolts by the subject races.
We-ell, to play devil's advocate, it's commonly supposed that part of the reason Xerxes brought representatives of so many different subject peoples was that if the warrior elite of, say, Hyrkania was with him invading Greece, they weren't back home stirring up trouble in his absence. I do submit that removing half or so of the military age manpower of a province would render it incapable of revolt (not to mention resisting foreign invasion or feeding itself).
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on May 01, 2018, 05:55:35 PM
Quote from: davidb on May 01, 2018, 05:41:03 PM
With bulk of the military aged men in Greece, the empire would be easy targets for large scale invasions and raids from Scythians and other outsiders, not to mention internal revolts by the subject races.
We-ell, to play devil's advocate, it's commonly supposed that part of the reason Xerxes brought representatives of so many different subject peoples was that if the warrior elite of, say, Hyrkania was with him invading Greece, they weren't back home stirring up trouble in his absence. I do submit that removing half or so of the military age manpower of a province would render it incapable of revolt (not to mention resisting foreign invasion or feeding itself).
Having raised, armed and trained half of the manpower of a province, it's going to make it awfully difficult to get them to do what you want without asking them nicely ;D
QuoteHe will have to provision their journey back.
I think we can assume that Xerxes expected the Greeks to give in confronted by his mighty forces. He would then have supplied them off the land until he could sort out an orderly evacuation of those not required for garrison duty. These, then, he would he evacuated back through Northern Greece, having restocked his depots. However, failing to achieve a workable base and also loosing naval superiority scuppered his plans.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:35:05 PM
On a different tack, Askleipidotus affirms that the open file order of 2 cubits or 6 feet or 2 yards per file is natural, and doesn't have a special name. I used this open order when calculating the width of the hypothetical Persian column. Here is an article (https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/873645.sorokowska_et_al_2017.pdf) that establishes experimentally that people on average prefer about a metre of space between themselves and strangers or acquaintances (a little less for acquaintainces). Go to the tables on p585 (9 of 16). One more reason to respect the primary sources.
Interesting correlation there. Did I miss someone disrespecting Askleipodotus? Or are you advocating the principle that if there is a reliable figure in one ancient source, the figures in all the others are correct? I don't see where you are going here.
BTW, you need to give thought to what spacing your units (presuming you have units ) have between them, both laterally and front to back. Those pictures of the march through Zululand showed quite wide spacings. I don't think we should think of them in serried ranks like a precursor to the Nuremberg rallies. Unless you've abandoned the wide road and gone for Patrick's swarming model?
QuoteEven the cross-country bit is not so much of a supposition since there are a couple of sources showing a Persian army doing just that - sure, in one case the army is nearing the enemy but it's too far away to face any threat marching in column until it gets close.
Just a reminder that one of patrick's examples comes from a different Persian era 800 + years later. I'm not going to rule out basic similarities but we should be careful. If we are to take them as an example of Persian practice, we perhaps should also see what Maurice (the Byzantine one) says about their camp practices. Were they as organised as the Romans, for example?
The other "swarm" is advancing against the enemy isn't it (before Cunaxa?) rather than route marching across country? It also seems to be crossing a wide flat plain.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 01, 2018, 06:27:45 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:35:05 PM
On a different tack, Askleipidotus affirms that the open file order of 2 cubits or 6 feet or 2 yards per file is natural, and doesn't have a special name. I used this open order when calculating the width of the hypothetical Persian column. Here is an article (https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/873645.sorokowska_et_al_2017.pdf) that establishes experimentally that people on average prefer about a metre of space between themselves and strangers or acquaintances (a little less for acquaintainces). Go to the tables on p585 (9 of 16). One more reason to respect the primary sources.
Interesting correlation there. Did I miss someone disrespecting Askleipodotus? Or are you advocating the principle that if there is a reliable figure in one ancient source, the figures in all the others are correct? I don't see where you are going here.
BTW, you need to give thought to what spacing your units (presuming you have units ) have between them, both laterally and front to back. Those pictures of the march through Zululand showed quite wide spacings. I don't think we should think of them in serried ranks like a precursor to the Nuremberg rallies. Unless you've abandoned the wide road and gone for Patrick's swarming model?
I'm keeping pretty open-minded about it. The Asklepiodotus mention does serve to make a 600 yard wide avenue slightly more plausible in that if you put a bunch of people in an area and tell them to start moving that is the spacing they would tend to adopt.
I think one can forget entirely about ranks and files when talking of the Persian army on the move, though the Macedonians and Romans (Crassus' square) seemed to have managed cross-country hiking in very organised formations. I would think the wide road is a preferable option since it requires the least amount of land clearing and gets the entire army from camp to camp. The wide, non columnar advance also works if the land is not too difficult to traverse to begin with.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 05:21:38 PM
Xerxes would be attempting, with a population supported by subsistence agriculture, something which countries with modern 20th century manufacturing economies struggled to achieve.
This is an important and fundamental point.
It should not be forgotten how utterly unprecedented Herodotus claim is.
A military mobilization of the size claimed by Herodotus would not happen until 1914 - more than two millennia later.
Relative to population size, as Jim suggests, it has probably never happened.
Relative to space, no military force so large has ever been pushed through such a small space in such a short time, at least until the invention of mass rail.
We are an order of magnitude higher than just about any precedent.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 05:14:18 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 04:41:18 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:28:47 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 04:23:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 04:02:02 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 03:51:54 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 01, 2018, 12:04:54 PM
ork.
There is no evidence grain was transported by ship in amphorae, granted. Sacks or loose seems to be have been the standard method. I suggested that the grain from Egypt and the Mediterranean coastline could have been shipped in amphorae if the local Greeks could not manufacture enough in quantity, but on reflection it makes more sense to transplant the potters in Greece, have them make the amphorae there (if amphorae were used), and then just ship the grain loose or in sacks. Bear in mind you don't need a vast army of potters, just a few thousand. A potter can make 4 amphorae in a day. You would need 5000 - 6000 potters to make the necessary amphorae. 6000 potters x 4 amphorae a day x 250 days per year (I let them goof off for 4 months a year) x 4 years = 24 million amphorae, should be enough for storing the long-term grain. Given them just Sundays off and it's nearly 30 million amphorae.
Justin, are you aware of the concept of Occam's razor.
I am indeed. And....?
You don't think it is more likely that Herodotus was wrong about the size of the Persian army than the alternative hypothesis which relies on a lot of supposition to make it even remotely plausible.
Not quite. Occam's razor means that the simplest explanation, requiring the fewest number of suppositions, is likely to be the right one.
In this discussion those advocating taking Herodotus at his word need show only that supporting and moving such a huge army is feasible.
Those who oppose Herodotus need to show not only that supporting and moving such a huge army is not feasible (which involves another range of suppositions), but must also make the assumption that a careful writer like Herodotus is wildly wrong on the biggest single fact of his account - the size of the Persian army. This makes for a rather complicated razor.
Oh, and how many suppositions have you made to support your hypothesis ?
Just one, that the Persian army marched cross-country. The rest was a feasibility study in economics and logistics where, taking the data we have, I try to demonstrate that the Persians could have done it (as opposed to actually did it) whereas my worthy opponents argue that they couldn't. But that's not making suppositions.
Even the cross-country bit is not so much of a supposition since there are a couple of sources showing a Persian army doing just that - sure, in one case the army is nearing the enemy but it's too far away to face any threat marching in column until it gets close.
Something else came to mind whilst thinking about the manuals: Asklepiodotus describes a whole variety of marching formations of which most do not involve following along a single track and many of those do not even involve keeping in column. It seems the Macedonian army at least was not the least bit bothered by marching off-road in nice, tight battle formations.
The feasibility study is full of suppositions from the methods of storage from grain, to the moving of large numbers of potters to Greece, to doubling the population of the Persian Empire so to make Xerxes army ever so slightly more believable etc.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 04:59:06 PM
I think we can agree that the idea of an invasion force of six million produced by an empire with a population of 50 million is just silly and Herodotus, even if he didn't invent the figures, wrongly applied figures he'd found
Why?
In the first place, the standard calculation for fit men of military age is 20% of the population. That makes 10 million out of 50 million. Around 5 million (not 6) were utilised in the invasion. That is 10% of the population, the prime military age category. And we need to get well away from any idea that the Achaemenid Empire was a
subsistence economy - it was not! It was the ruler of and heir to civilisations which habitually stocked up huge reserves of grain. As an example, the first thing the Hebrews were set to doing when they received Egyptian citizen status in place of their previous guest status was to build
store cities.
In the second place, these men are absent for a campaign - characteristically occupying the time span between sowing and harvest. They are not subtracted from the economy for years at a time. In 480 BC most of them would have missed the sowing - but how labour-intensive is that if one has already done the ploughing? This is one thing women and children could help with and not prejudice their normal activities.
In the third place, the manpower drain is unequal. The majority of the population is concentrated in the great breadbaskets of Mesopotamia and Egypt, but the fraction of the population conscripted from these areas seems minimal compared to the relatively heavy exactions from the less developed tribal areas. In the latter, the overage men and below-age boys could manage the herds for a few months while the women get on with their gardens.
What would cause a problem is if large numbers of men failed to return. This could have a severe impact on future years, and may well lie behind the feeble Persian activity in the 470's BC. Rather than famine from lack of food, they would have suffered a manpower breakdown among the tribal satrapies, rendering them unable to provide effective military contingents.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 07:50:15 PM
As an example, the first thing the Hebrews were set to doing when they received Egyptian citizen status in place of their previous guest status was to build store cities.
That is interesting what is the evidence for it?
Quote from: davidb on May 01, 2018, 05:41:03 PM
I've been reading this thread with interest, and it just struck me that all of the arguments for the size are premised on a one way trip, and a total lack of enemies around the Persian empire.
Which was pretty much the case in 480 BC. Nobody was looking to invade it; everyone seems to have been holding their breath waiting for the outcome of Xerxes' and Carthage's invasion of Hellas. But just in case there was a problem, given the 50 million population estimate, the stay-behind governors still had another 5 million (overage) potential conscripts scattered around the Empire to deal with adventurous intruders.
QuoteXerxes is not going to take the entire Persian army on a one way trip. He will have to provision their journey back.
As earlier noted, and as Herodotus mentions, Xerxes thought the campaign would be a show of force with fighting an optional extra. With Greece subdued, he would have left a garrison (augmented by the not inconsiderable number of Greeks who had sent earth and water) and taken the bulk of the army back, supplied in much the same way as it had arrived, i.e. by the fleet. Anthony pointed this out. With regard to timing, it took Xerxes 45 days to get back to Asia without supply. Going in and going out we are looking at a 90-day campaign, minimum, perhaps 120 days allowing for a month's worth of accumulated delays; stocking up for 180 days would have more than covered a leisurely invasion with room to spare.
Quote from: Dangun on May 01, 2018, 06:50:02 PM
This is an important and fundamental point.
It should not be forgotten how utterly unprecedented Herodotus claim is.
Which is precisely why Herodotus felt impelled to record what he could of it. As for his comments, they are remarkably similar to yours. ;)
"For full four years after the conquest of Egypt he was equipping his force and preparing all that was needed for it; before the fifth year was completed, he set forth on his march with the might of a great multitude. [2]
This was by far the greatest of all expeditions that we know of. The one that Darius led against the Scythians is
nothing compared to it;
neither is the Scythian expedition when they burst into Media in pursuit of the Cimmerians and subdued and ruled almost all the upper lands of Asia (it was for this that Darius afterwards attempted to punish them). According to the reports, the expedition led by the sons of Atreus against Troy is also
nothing by comparison;
neither is the one of the Mysians and Teucrians which before the Trojan war crossed the Bosporus into Europe, subdued all the Thracians, and came down to the Ionian sea, marching southward as far as the river Peneus." - Herodotus VII.20
It is erroneous to assume that just because an event is unique, it never happened.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 07:55:53 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 07:50:15 PM
As an example, the first thing the Hebrews were set to doing when they received Egyptian citizen status in place of their previous guest status was to build store cities.
That is interesting what is the evidence for it?
Exodus 1:11 and Manfred Bietak's excavations at el Daba.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 07:50:15 PMIn the second place, these men are absent for a campaign - characteristically occupying the time span between sowing and harvest. They are not subtracted from the economy for years at a time.
The dead ones are.
And this campaign lasted
two years - 480 and 479 - whether Xerxes bargained on that or not. And some of the men surely
are absent for years: how long does it take to march from India to Greece, fight a two-year campaign, and then march back? Assuming there were any Indians left to march home after Plataia, of course.
At the other end of the Empire, the Lydians were no doubt just out for a summer's walking holiday.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 07:50:15 PM
In the second place, these men are absent for a campaign - characteristically occupying the time span between sowing and harvest. They are not subtracted from the economy for years at a time. In 480 BC most of them would have missed the sowing - but how labour-intensive is that if one has already done the ploughing? This is one thing women and children could help with and not prejudice their normal activities.
Patrick, please, please learn a little about ancient agriculture, do you know how many times you had to plough? Also a lot of the troops from the Eastern Satrapies wintered in Sardis. They had to walk to get there. They could set off after the harvest but they'd have missed ploughing. So the ploughing had to be done. Sowing isn't just sprinking seed, there's field work necessary to create the tilth, which involves driven livestock and perhaps a plough, perhaps a harrow, and it involves rolling or whatever after sowing to aid establishment.
The battle of Salamis was fought in September. The troops from the Eastern Satrapies are going to struggle to get home in time for the next season's sowing.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 07:50:15 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 04:59:06 PM
I think we can agree that the idea of an invasion force of six million produced by an empire with a population of 50 million is just silly and Herodotus, even if he didn't invent the figures, wrongly applied figures he'd found
Why?
In the first place, the standard calculation for fit men of military age is 20% of the population. That makes 10 million out of 50 million. Around 5 million (not 6) were utilised in the invasion. That is 10% of the population, the prime military age category. And we need to get well away from any idea that the Achaemenid Empire was a subsistence economy - it was not! It was the ruler of and heir to civilisations which habitually stocked up huge reserves of grain. As an example, the first thing the Hebrews were set to doing when they received Egyptian citizen status in place of their previous guest status was to build store cities.
please show me a multiyear campaign which took 50% of the men of military age away from the country?
As for these fabulous huge reserves of grain, please show me the excavation of the massive granaries. Please show me some evidence rather than wild surmise.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 08:09:46 PM
Exodus 1:11 and Manfred Bietak's excavations at el Daba.
I don't remember seeing comments about massed granaries at these excavations, they were more interested in Minoan frescos
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 07:50:15 PM
In the third place, the manpower drain is unequal. The majority of the population is concentrated in the great breadbaskets of Mesopotamia and Egypt, but the fraction of the population conscripted from these areas seems minimal compared to the relatively heavy exactions from the less developed tribal areas. In the latter, the overage men and below-age boys could manage the herds for a few months while the women get on with their gardens.
more handwavium. I'm sorry Patrick but that's nonsense. If you leave overage men and below age boys looking after herds for knocking on for two years, you probably don't have any herds left. Your neighbours will have borrowed them.
Also have you a clue what the annual calving of a herd or lambing of a flock is like. It's every bit as labour intensive as harvest
You are making no sense at all
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 08:09:46 PM
Quote from: davidb on May 01, 2018, 05:41:03 PM
I've been reading this thread with interest, and it just struck me that all of the arguments for the size are premised on a one way trip, and a total lack of enemies around the Persian empire.
Which was pretty much the case in 480 BC. Nobody was looking to invade it; everyone seems to have been holding their breath waiting for the outcome of Xerxes' and Carthage's invasion of Hellas. But just in case there was a problem, given the 50 million population estimate, the stay-behind governors still had another 5 million (overage) potential conscripts scattered around the Empire to deal with adventurous intruders.
Do you honestly believe that?
Just asking
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 08:09:46 PM
.
Exodus 1:11 and Manfred Bietak's excavations at el Daba.
Am I right in thinking that in some versions of Exodus 1.11 store cities are translated as treasure cities or fortified cities?
If we work on the Persian economy being geared to manage the odd war (with several years preparation before each war) why should numbers be a problem? North Africa - using pretty much the same farming methods as Persia - was capable of producing enough excess grain to feed the greater part of 1 000 000 Romans annually. Was the Roman Empire a subsistence economy? If it wasn't a subsistence economy why should the Persian Empire be one? I think we can give the Persian administration the brains to foresee the same potential problems we have seen here, and Persian farming methods the ability to overcome them (in the same way the African farming methods met their own challenges). What is superhuman about laying up enough food to compensate for the absence of 5 million males for two years?
As a corollary, how many wars did the Persian Empire fight from its foundation in 550BC until the Greek campaign of 480? How long did they take and much preparation was spent on them? What portion were they of that 70-year period? This would give an indication of the extent to which the Persian economy was structured for war.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 05:39:42 AM
If we work on the Persian economy being geared to manage the odd war (with several years preparation before each war) why should numbers be a problem? North Africa - using pretty much the same farming methods as Persia - was capable of producing enough excess grain to feed the greater part of 1 000 000 Romans annually. Was the Roman Empire a subsistence economy? If it wasn't a subsistence economy why should the Persian Empire be one?... What is superhuman about laying up enough food to compensate for the absence of 5 million males for two years?
OK. Quite apart from Egyptian agriculture not being the same as Persian agriculture, or supplementing civilian Roman diets in peace time not being the same as supplying Persian armies in wartime...
If Rome is an appropriate comparable, why couldn't Rome do this for themselves? Why could Rome never field an army of over 3 million? Why was the entire military machine of the far more expansionary Roman Empire only a tenth of the size of the Herodotus number for Persia? Moreover, the Roman military was spread about the Empire such that no more than 5% of the Herodotus Persian number was ever fielded by the Romans in a single battle. Did the Persian military master some technology that failed to express itself in any other relic of their civilization?
Any comparison with Rome makes the Herodotus number for Persia look even more ridiculous.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 05:39:42 AM
If we work on the Persian economy being geared to manage the odd war (with several years preparation before each war) why should numbers be a problem? North Africa - using pretty much the same farming methods as Persia - was capable of producing enough excess grain to feed the greater part of 1 000 000 Romans annually. Was the Roman Empire a subsistence economy? If it wasn't a subsistence economy why should the Persian Empire be one? I think we can give the Persian administration the brains to foresee the same potential problems we have seen here, and Persian farming methods the ability to overcome them (in the same way the African farming methods met their own challenges). What is superhuman about laying up enough food to compensate for the absence of 5 million males for two years?
As a corollary, how many wars did the Persian Empire fight from its foundation in 550BC until the Greek campaign of 480? How long did they take and much preparation was spent on them? What portion were they of that 70-year period? This would give an indication of the extent to which the Persian economy was structured for war.
It's an interesting comparison. The Romans had, as you say a flourishing agriculture. Depending on various estimates the Empire had a population of about 70 million, perhaps higher (100,000 is mentioned). At the maximum under Constantine they had perhaps 645,000 although careful examination of evidence of unit returns suggest it might be nearer 500,000.
Even in civil wars (where the largest number of Roman troops was ever put into the field because they had to find both sides,) it's unlikely there were ever more that 300,000 men in the field.
So the claim is that Xerxes had 12% of his population on campaign with him outside the Empire. In comparison the Romans had less than 1% of their population in the Empire
One of the largest armies taken outside the Empire to campaign in Persia was Julian's which might have had 95,000 men, or 0.13 of the Empire's population
So that's how the Roman Empire managed to produce food to feed the city of Rome. It left it's people at home in agriculture rather than conscripting them into the army.
The more I look at the figures, the more I'm convinced that Xerxes might have managed to put an army together of 300,000 at the absolute maximum
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 10:18:11 PM
please show me a multiyear campaign which took 50% of the men of military age away from the country?
Look at the campaigns of Thutmose III, especially Years 6-8.
QuoteAs for these fabulous huge reserves of grain, please show me the excavation of the massive granaries. Please show me some evidence rather than wild surmise.
When archaeologists start getting excited over finding granaries rather than palaces and tombs, I shall have plenty to show you. For ther present we just have to be content with written accounts and such details as Egypt's historical ability to provide huge quantities of surplus grain during classical times.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 10:25:51 PM
If you leave overage men and below age boys looking after herds for knocking on for two years, you probably don't have any herds left. Your neighbours will have borrowed them.
Not if they also have contributed their young men to the Achaemenid war effort. Xerxes' universal mass mobilisation begins to make additional sense. The remaining male population will be older and less inclined to do anything except defend their own.
QuoteAlso have you a clue what the annual calving of a herd or lambing of a flock is like. It's every bit as labour intensive as harvest
With modern species, yes. Do you know how dependent upon human help the species of the period were?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 01, 2018, 11:08:15 PM
Am I right in thinking that in some versions of Exodus 1.11 store cities are translated as treasure cities or fortified cities?
The authoritative version is the original Hebrew, which has them as
ori msknuth, 'cities of provisions'.
Quote from: Dangun on May 02, 2018, 06:39:53 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 05:39:42 AM
If we work on the Persian economy being geared to manage the odd war (with several years preparation before each war) why should numbers be a problem? North Africa - using pretty much the same farming methods as Persia - was capable of producing enough excess grain to feed the greater part of 1 000 000 Romans annually. Was the Roman Empire a subsistence economy? If it wasn't a subsistence economy why should the Persian Empire be one?... What is superhuman about laying up enough food to compensate for the absence of 5 million males for two years?
OK. Quite apart from Egyptian agriculture not being the same as Persian agriculture, or supplementing civilian Roman diets in peace time not being the same as supplying Persian armies in wartime...Riaan Pretorius <riaan.pretorius@spilltech.co.za>
Egyptian agriculture may be been a little (but not much) different to Persian agriculture inasmuch as the Egyptians used irrigation - like the Babylonians, also part of the Persian Empire - whilst Persia proper relied on rain. This doesn't really matter though since Egypt was part of the Persian Empire.
Quote from: Dangun on May 02, 2018, 06:39:53 AMIf Rome is an appropriate comparable, why couldn't Rome do this for themselves? Why could Rome never field an army of over 3 million? Why was the entire military machine of the far more expansionary Roman Empire only a tenth of the size of the Herodotus number for Persia? Moreover, the Roman military was spread about the Empire such that no more than 5% of the Herodotus Persian number was ever fielded by the Romans in a single battle. Did the Persian military master some technology that failed to express itself in any other relic of their civilization?
Any comparison with Rome makes the Herodotus number for Persia look even more ridiculous.
A look at the progression of military doctrine from the earliest armies of the Fertile Crescent up to the Greeks, Macedonians and Romans shows that a reliance on numbers to intimidate one's enemy, as practised by Fertile Crescent armies, was replaced by trained and professional troops with superior arms and fighting methods, as practised by the Greeks and to a greater extent the Macedonians and Romans. Alexander's campaign in the Persian Empire in particular showed the uselessness of large numbers against quality troops. Henceforward armies would emphasise quality over quantity, and standing armies over temporary levies of mass conscripts.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 01, 2018, 10:14:02 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 01, 2018, 07:50:15 PMIn the second place, these men are absent for a campaign - characteristically occupying the time span between sowing and harvest. They are not subtracted from the economy for years at a time.
The dead ones are.
And this campaign lasted two years - 480 and 479 - whether Xerxes bargained on that or not. And some of the men surely are absent for years: how long does it take to march from India to Greece, fight a two-year campaign, and then march back? Assuming there were any Indians left to march home after Plataia, of course.
At the other end of the Empire, the Lydians were no doubt just out for a summer's walking holiday.
A valid observation. I was thinking more of the planning side prior to the campaign, and the experience of previous campaigns. Xerxes' 480 BC campaign of course did go drastically wrong, and with devastating losses. This was of course not what he had his officials had
planned ...
Quote from: Dangun on May 02, 2018, 06:39:53 AM
If Rome is an appropriate comparable, why couldn't Rome do this for themselves? Why could Rome never field an army of over 3 million?
Because Imperial Rome employed only paid professional soldiers and shied away from anything even hinting at mass mobilisation. The traditional maximum for a paid professional army is 1% of the population. For a compulsory levy, 10%. Therein lies your answer.
QuoteWhy was the entire military machine of the far more expansionary Roman Empire only a tenth of the size of the Herodotus number for Persia? Moreover, the Roman military was spread about the Empire such that no more than 5% of the Herodotus Persian number was ever fielded by the Romans in a single battle. Did the Persian military master some technology that failed to express itself in any other relic of their civilization?
The Roman Empire was actually far
less expansionist than the Achaemenid Empire, adding only Agri Decumates, Dacia and (temporarily) Mesopotamia to its territories (Trajan took Mesopotamia and died; Hadrian promptly gave it up). Dacia was abandoned during the 3rd century AD. Agri Decumates went around the same time.
The difference was not so much technology as system: the Romans used a small, paid, well-equipped professional army. The Achaemenids had one of these (it went around everywhere the King did) and supplemented it with a massive levy. This had effects on the quality and equipment of some of the troops; some of the Achaemenid contingents were stone age (Ethiopians, armed with palm-leaf bows, reed arrows with stone heads and spears with heads made from antelope horn) while one had not even reached the stone age (Libyans, who had only fire-hardened wooden javelins).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 05:39:42 AM
As a corollary, how many wars did the Persian Empire fight from its foundation in 550BC until the Greek campaign of 480? How long did they take and much preparation was spent on them? What portion were they of that 70-year period? This would give an indication of the extent to which the Persian economy was structured for war.
Quite a few, in fact. In 547-6 BC Cyrus conquers Lydia. From 546 to 539 BC he is conquering Elam and Sogdia. In 539 he takes Babylon. Meanwhile Mazares and then Harpagus are conquering what remains of Asia Minor. In 530 BC Cyrus dies on campaign against the Massagetae.
Cambyses succeeds Cyrus and conquers Egypt in 525 BC. Attempts to subdue Ethiopia run foul of supply problems and the expedition against Siwa is lost in a sandstorm*, but Cambyses still managed to subdue Libya.
*
Some academics maintain it was actually wiped out by the rebel Pedubast III and the sandstorm story invented.
Darius I succeeds Cambyses (after eliminating the interim incumbent) and invades India in 516 BC. He also has to deal with revolts within the Empire, notably Babylon. By 513 BC he is campaigning against the Scythians with 700,000 men. Later in his reign Achaemenid armies are subduing parts of Thrace and deporting Paeonians to Asia. In 496-494 he has to deal with the Ionian Revolt, and sending a large army intimidates the rebels into breaking up (some fighting is still necessary, especially on Cyprus). In 492 Macedonia becomes an Achaemenid vassal. In 490 an expedition listed by some as 600,000 strong is moved across the Aegean to conquer Eritreia and Athens. It conquers Eritreia - temporarily.
Darius begins planning a larger expedition against Greece, to be led by himself. A revolt in Egypt forces a change of plan. Darius dies in 486 BC.
Then comes Xerxes, and the rest is history.
The Achaemenid Empire was on the whole pretty busy with its campaigning, and often on a large scale. It would be fair to conclude that it was configured for war.
Unless we genuinely trying to get to 100 pages, could we perhaps try to fix on something less nebulous? If the answer from the literalist side to every challenge is "things were different with the Persians" without providing any concrete evidence of this difference, there is no progress.
We talked of suppositions earlier. I suggested that a basic supposition of the mainstream is that the whole campaign works better with a large army rather than a gigantic one. Can I ask the literalists where they think the main obstacles to that supposition come within Herodotus' narrative? What no longer works with a force (for arguments' sake) one tenth the size? Maybe thinking at the problem from a different angle will take us to new avenues, establish fresh lines of enquiry, rather than tramping back and forth over the same field.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 09:45:40 AMThe Roman Empire was actually far less expansionist than the Achaemenid Empire, adding only Agri Decumates, Dacia and (temporarily) Mesopotamia to its territories
And some other place, island off the coast of Gaul, I forget the name...
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 09:04:44 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 10:18:11 PM
please show me a multiyear campaign which took 50% of the men of military age away from the country?
Look at the campaigns of Thutmose III, especially Years 6-8.
fine please quote the numbers and a source. I've been chasing round digging out agricultural stuff for you, the least you can do is provide some sources
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 09:04:44 AM
When archaeologists start getting excited over finding granaries rather than palaces and tombs, I shall have plenty to show you. For ther present we just have to be content with written accounts and such details as Egypt's historical ability to provide huge quantities of surplus grain during classical times.
so I take it that there aren't any
And please, I've said before, there was no surplus grain, all of it was used, I've explained it several times, so I'm not going to go spitting into the wind again
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 09:04:44 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 01, 2018, 10:25:51 PM
If you leave overage men and below age boys looking after herds for knocking on for two years, you probably don't have any herds left. Your neighbours will have borrowed them.
Not if they also have contributed their young men to the Achaemenid war effort. Xerxes' universal mass mobilisation begins to make additional sense. The remaining male population will be older and less inclined to do anything except defend their own.
we know the Persian Empire was full of wild hill tribes who never sent men. Also on the frontiers were plenty of nomads happy to acquire more livestock. Xerxes universal mass mobilisation remains fatuous I'm afraid
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 09:04:44 AM
QuoteAlso have you a clue what the annual calving of a herd or lambing of a flock is like. It's every bit as labour intensive as harvest
With modern species, yes. Do you know how dependent upon human help the species of the period were?
yes
It's pretty standard stuff,
QuoteThe traditional maximum for a paid professional army is 1% of the population. For a compulsory levy, 10%. Therein lies your answer.
As a matter of interest, I checked up a couple of other pre-modern empires with big populations and a military model based on a professional core and wider mass levy.
The Mughal Empire in the early 1600s could muster 900,000 men (contemporary estimate but disputed) from an estimated population of 115 million.
Han Dynasty China mustered a maximum of 1 million men (most estimates are less) in a population of 60 million.
So, although bulking out forces through levying nets a bigger percentage than the Romans, not that much bigger.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 09:59:27 AM
Unless we genuinely trying to get to 100 pages, could we perhaps try to fix on something less nebulous? If the answer from the literalist side to every challenge is "things were different with the Persians" without providing any concrete evidence of this difference, there is no progress.
We talked of suppositions earlier. I suggested that a basic supposition of the mainstream is that the whole campaign works better with a large army rather than a gigantic one. Can I ask the literalists where they think the main obstacles to that supposition come within Herodotus' narrative? What no longer works with a force (for arguments' sake) one tenth the size? Maybe thinking at the problem from a different angle will take us to new avenues, establish fresh lines of enquiry, rather than tramping back and forth over the same field.
Well sure, one can argue that an army of 200 000 men works well and is less much of a headache for the logistics team than an army of 1,7 million. The Macedonians and Romans worked that one out and created small professional armies that they could maintain on a permanent basis.
The principal problem with that is that Herodotus doesn't give figures of 200 000 men for the Persian army. He is categorical and detailed in his figures which are larger by order of a magnitude. If they're wrong they're fabrications, not simple exaggerations. To reject his numbers effectively reduces him to an incompetent and unscrupulous propagandist - along with every other writer of the time who quotes similar figures (and they all quote them). The question then is: can one feasibly reject Herodotus and the others to this extent?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 10:49:18 AM
The principal problem with that is that Herodotus doesn't give figures of 200 000 men for the Persian army. He is categorical and detailed in his figures which are larger by order of a magnitude. If they're wrong they're fabrications, not simple exaggerations. To reject his numbers effectively reduces him to an incompetent and unscrupulous propagandist - along with every other writer of the time who quotes similar figures (and the all quote them). The question then is: can one feasibly reject Herodotus and the others to this extent?
So, you see no impediment to a smaller but still very large force other than it involves assuming that Herodotus got his figures wrong?
As to rejecting Herodotus' figures and those of the swarming multitudes of the barbarians, surely that is why we are here? Conventional history states that the figures for " the other" are consistently over estimated. That Herodotus, having been told some tales about the size of the Persian army, believes them, because culturally he is conditioned to think of vast barbarian hordes. I don't think he fabricated his figures - I think he accepted some figures he was fed, because they fitted his pre-conceptions, then worked out from there, filling in gaps in a consistent manner. In this latter position, I confess I diverge from a lot of historians who do think he just made the numbers up.
Later writers produce figures which are consistent because they are from the same cultural outlook.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 10:46:57 AM
QuoteThe traditional maximum for a paid professional army is 1% of the population. For a compulsory levy, 10%. Therein lies your answer.
Han Dynasty China mustered a maximum of 1 million men (most estimates are less) in a population of 60 million.
But what kind of army? The Han military was composed of volunteers and was very well equipped. It was in fact a professional force with one year of training followed by one year of service.
Compare it to the armies of the Warring States that preceded it. According to this Wiki article (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warring_States_period#Increasing_scale_of_warfare), the states of Qin, Chu and Wei could muster between them 2 500 000 infantry, 25 000 horse and 2500 chariots. In addition the state of Han could muster 300 000 men in total and the state of Qi several hundred thousand. We're looking at something like 3 million infantry alone. These figures exclude the numbers for the state of Zhao.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 11:45:51 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 10:46:57 AM
QuoteThe traditional maximum for a paid professional army is 1% of the population. For a compulsory levy, 10%. Therein lies your answer.
Han Dynasty China mustered a maximum of 1 million men (most estimates are less) in a population of 60 million.
But what kind of army? The Han military was composed of volunteers and was very well equipped. It was in fact a professional force with one year of training followed by one year of service.
Quote
perhaps one of our Chinese specialists would like to reply? A chose the Han because we actually have a good population estimate.
Compare it to the armies of the Warring States that preceded it. According to this Wiki article (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warring_States_period#Increasing_scale_of_warfare), the states of Qin, Chu and Wei could muster between them 2 500 000 infantry, 25 000 horse and 2500 chariots.
Well,
If we are taking the wiki article as a source, don't you think some of the figures are a bit odd? Like
Qin
1,000,000 infantry, 1,000 chariots, 10,000 horses;
Chu
same numbers;
Also from the same wikipedia article, a few lines below
Many scholars think these numbers are exaggerated (records are inadequate, they are much larger than those from similar societies, soldiers were paid by the number of enemies they killed and the Han dynasty had an interest in exaggerating the bloodiness of the age before China was unified).And finally :
The various states fielded massive armies of infantry, cavalry, and chariots. Complex logistical systems maintained by efficient government bureaucracies were needed to supply, train, and control such large forces. The size of the armies ranged from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand men.Overall, that Wiki article could do with a lot more citation of sources.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 11:45:51 AM
Compare it to the armies of the Warring States that preceded it. According to this Wiki article (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warring_States_period#Increasing_scale_of_warfare), the states of Qin, Chu and Wei could muster between them 2 500 000 infantry, 25 000 horse and 2500 chariots. In addition the state of Han could muster 300 000 men in total and the state of Qi several hundred thousand. We're looking at something like 3 million infantry alone. These figures exclude the numbers for the state of Zhao.
A state having a big army is one thing. Assembling the whole lot in one place and marching it along a single route is a different thing altogether.
Cheers
Mick
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 12:08:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 11:45:51 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 10:46:57 AM
QuoteThe traditional maximum for a paid professional army is 1% of the population. For a compulsory levy, 10%. Therein lies your answer.
Han Dynasty China mustered a maximum of 1 million men (most estimates are less) in a population of 60 million.
But what kind of army? The Han military was composed of volunteers and was very well equipped. It was in fact a professional force with one year of training followed by one year of service.
Quote
perhaps one of our Chinese specialists would like to reply? A chose the Han because we actually have a good population estimate.
Compare it to the armies of the Warring States that preceded it. According to this Wiki article (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warring_States_period#Increasing_scale_of_warfare), the states of Qin, Chu and Wei could muster between them 2 500 000 infantry, 25 000 horse and 2500 chariots.
Well,
If we are taking the wiki article as a source, don't you think some of the figures are a bit odd? Like
Qin
1,000,000 infantry, 1,000 chariots, 10,000 horses;
Chu
same numbers;
Also from the same wikipedia article, a few lines below
Many scholars think these numbers are exaggerated (records are inadequate, they are much larger than those from similar societies, soldiers were paid by the number of enemies they killed and the Han dynasty had an interest in exaggerating the bloodiness of the age before China was unified).
And finally :
The various states fielded massive armies of infantry, cavalry, and chariots. Complex logistical systems maintained by efficient government bureaucracies were needed to supply, train, and control such large forces. The size of the armies ranged from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand men.
Overall, that Wiki article could do with a lot more citation of sources.
Yes of course, many scholars think that army sizes in Antiquity are exaggerated because experts like Maurice tell them. But the many scholars have to prove their case. Their case is not by default proven simply because they propose it.
It is also quite possible that these figures, even though rounded off, are substantially accurate. China at that time had a population just under 60 million people, which produces a nice correlation between Persia and China as regards population size and the size of mass conscript armies.
Re 'similar societies'. The warring states were in a time of maximum confrontation, where it was in their interest to raise the largest armies possible against their rivals. This was contemporary with the Achaemenid Empire, when size mattered. Notice the diminution of overall military strength during the Han dynasty: no enemies of equal strength to worry about hence no need for a huge army, just a modestly large one (1 million men!) that is trained and well-equipped. Or do we consider the size of the Han army to be an exaggeration?
I can find the sources if it will make any real contribution to this discussion - i.e. if I quote them, will they be put aside as exaggerations?
It might also be an idea to draw up a complete list of affirmations in the primary sources that are considered to be exaggerations by many scholars. It would save the effort of finding and quoting them.
Quotedo we consider the size of the Han army to be an exaggeration?
It could be - I don't know much about Chinese sources. I just went with the biggest estimate I could find with a quick Google search.
QuoteI can find the sources if it will make any real contribution to this discussion - i.e. if I quote them, will they be put aside as exaggerations?
Quite possibly - I don't know much about source criticism in Chinese studies. I will only note that when a state is recorded as having armies in neat multiples like those of Qin and Chu, I'm immediately suspicious.
It might be an interesting mental exercise to put together a picture of the Achaemenid army as per many scholars and an authority like Maurice. As far as I can see, nobody of the orthodox position on the thread doubts Maurice's reliability, with perhaps some cautious doubts - or rather curiosity - concerning his ability to gauge water flow in a river. For the rest no problem, he was a military man so knew what he was talking about.
The size of the army according to many scholars ranges from about 200 000 to 500 000. Let's choose a middle figure of 350 000 men. This army, as per Maurice, needs to march along the roads and tracks. It's a fair assumption that it can't generally march more than about 4 men abreast. Allow 2 metres per rank. Together that give a column 175 000 metres, or 175 km long. The horses and mules will probably double this figure to about 300 km. Naturally the men can't march 300 km from one campsite to the next in a single day, so we need to split it up in segments that can do about 20km in a day = about 15 segments. This means that the army cannot all reach the same campsite in less than 15 days. Does this conflict with anything Herodotus says? If it does I suppose one discounts Herodotus.
What would be the size of this common campsite following Maurice? His estimates make it 8 men per hectare for a compressed campsite (based on a British army corps huddled near a railway line as their only point of supply). At 350 000 men that equals 43 750 hectares or 437,5 square kilometres. The campsite, if in a square shape, would measure 21 x 21 km.
Does anyone have any problems with this reconstruction?
I thought I'd find a picture of what British army tented camps looked like at the time of Maurice
(http://www.nickmetcalfe.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Clandeboye-Camp.jpg)
Four regiments here, each in their regulation rows of bell tents. These were designed for between 8-12 men (it varied on which mark of tent) and were 12 ft in diameter. A little denser than 8 men per hectare, I think, though I've been unable to find the regulations on laying them out anywhere. Other than a couple of cars, I can't see any vehicle parks (the regiment will have had wagons) or horse lines (for the officers and wagon horses). So these would spread the camp out a bit. On the right is an exercise field - we can assume camps Maurice knew also had these and again they would decrease the density.
I suspect Persian camps would also need some of the features we see here, like roadways and mustering spaces, even if they didn't have drill squares and exercise fields.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 01:02:55 PMThe size of the army according to many scholars ranges from about 200 000 to 500 000.
Though not all scholars would favour such high numbers: Delbrueck went as low as 25,000 at one point, apparently. One Professor Livio Catullo Stecchini (http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Military/Persian_wars/persian_wars_persian_army.htm) has an interesting brief summary of the historiography of Xerxes' numbers.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 02:23:27 PM
I thought I'd find a picture of what British army tented camps looked like at the time of Maurice
(http://www.nickmetcalfe.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Clandeboye-Camp.jpg)
Four regiments here, each in their regulation rows of bell tents. These were designed for between 8-12 men (it varied on which mark of tent) and were 12 ft in diameter. A little denser than 8 men per hectare, I think, though I've been unable to find the regulations on laying them out anywhere. Other than a couple of cars, I can't see any vehicle parks (the regiment will have had wagons) or horse lines (for the officers and wagon horses). So these would spread the camp out a bit. On the right is an exercise field - we can assume camps Maurice knew also had these and again they would decrease the density.
I suspect Persian camps would also need some of the features we see here, like roadways and mustering spaces, even if they didn't have drill squares and exercise fields.
We need to keep to the rules and go with Maurice. He's the authority.
I actually made a mistake when citing him. Finding my original post he actually affirms 16 men per hectare:
QuoteHe also maintains that a British force of 72 000 men with 22 000 animals camped as close together as possible and occupied an area of 20 square miles. That's 45 square kilometers or 625 square metres per man excluding the animals. Let's give the beasties 16 square metres each. That leaves 620 square metres per man.
That makes the camp of our 350 000 men 21 875 hectares in size or 218, 75 km
2. The camp now measures 14.8 x 14.8 km. Still a good hike to the water source.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 02, 2018, 02:55:41 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 01:02:55 PMThe size of the army according to many scholars ranges from about 200 000 to 500 000.
Though not all scholars would favour such high numbers: Delbrueck went as low as 25,000 at one point, apparently. One Professor Livio Catullo Stecchini (http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Military/Persian_wars/persian_wars_persian_army.htm) has an interesting brief summary of the historiography of Xerxes' numbers.
Sure, but most from what I can see accept about 200 000 men and upwards to a limit of about half a million. Wikipedia sums it up thus:
| Herodotus doubles this number to account for support personnel and thus he reports that the whole army numbered 5,283,220 men.Other ancient sources give similarly large numbers. The poet Simonides, who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million; Ctesias gave 800,000 as the total number of the army that assembled in Doriskos.
An early and very influential modern historian, George Grote, set the tone by expressing incredulity at the numbers given by Herodotus: "To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible." Grote's main objection is the supply problem, though he does not analyse the problem in detail. He did not reject Herodotus's account altogether, citing the latter's reporting of the Persians' careful methods of accounting and their stockpiling of supply caches for three years, but drew attention to the contradictions in the ancient sources. A later influential historian, J. B. Bury, calls Herodotus's numbers "wholly fabulous" and judges that the Persian land forces may have been 180,000. A major limiting factor for the size of the Persian army, first suggested by Sir Frederick Maurice (a British transport officer) is the supply of water. Maurice suggested in the region of 200,000 men and 70,000 animals could have been supported by the rivers in that region of Greece. He further suggested that Herodotus may have confused the Persian terms for chiliarchy (1,000) and myriarchy (10,000), leading to an exaggeration by a factor of ten. Other early modern scholars estimated that the land forces participating in the invasion at 100,000 soldiers or less, based on the logistical systems available to the Ancients.
Munro and Macan note Herodotus giving the names of six major commanders and 29 myriarchs (leaders of a baivabaram, the basic unit of the Persian infantry, which numbered about 10,000-strong); this would give a land force of roughly 300,000 men. Other proponents of larger numbers suggest figures from 250,000 to 700,000. |
Though I have no reason to dispute his summary of scholarship, we should perhaps note Stecchini (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Livio_Catullo_Stecchini) was a controversial figure and not a mainstream historian of the conflict. I was unable to find the source of his view about a "table of organisation" of the Persian army at 300,000 infantry and 50,000 cavalry with equivalent numbers of hangers on.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 03:16:53 PM
We need to keep to the rules and go with Maurice. He's the authority.
If you say so. I don't remember making maurice a sole authority at any point.
Quote
That makes the camp of our 350 000 men 21 875 hectares in size or 218, 75 km2. The camp now measures 14.8 x 14.8 km. Still a good hike to the water source.
Why do you talk of a single camp? Surely, he talked of a number of formations spread across a concentration area? So, you'd place the on different roads to avoid clogging the roads to the supply point. You'd put each one near a water source, far enough from any sources of contamination from other camps, preferably completely different sources. You'd work round existing settlements, areas of woodland etc. To help visualise, here's a map of Etaples staging camp, home to 100,000 men. It is a permanent camp but there you go
(https://ecperkins.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/4564-etaples-training-camp.jpg)
I think before being too dismissive about Maurice, perhaps you should try to understand him on context?
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 03:42:15 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 03:16:53 PM
We need to keep to the rules and go with Maurice. He's the authority.
If you say so. I don't remember making maurice a sole authority at any point.
Quote
That makes the camp of our 350 000 men 21 875 hectares in size or 218, 75 km2. The camp now measures 14.8 x 14.8 km. Still a good hike to the water source.
Why do you talk of a single camp? Surely, he talked of a number of formations spread across a concentration area? So, you'd place the on different roads to avoid clogging the roads to the supply point. You'd put each one near a water source, far enough from any sources of contamination from other camps, preferably completely different sources. You'd work round existing settlements, areas of woodland etc. To help visualise, here's a map of Etaples staging camp, home to 100,000 men. It is a permanent camp but there you go
(https://ecperkins.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/4564-etaples-training-camp.jpg)
I think before being too dismissive about Maurice, perhaps you should try to understand him on context?
Interesting. Putting a scale on the map (with the help of Google maps) gives the total camp area the approximate dimensions of 3.6 x 2 km = 7,2 km
2Following Maurice's yardstick for 100 000 men, at 16 men per hectare that should be 62.5 km
2.
I'm afraid I'm going to remain a skeptic.
(https://i.imgur.com/bJlsR6q.jpg)
QuoteI'm afraid I'm going to remain a skeptic.
It is, of course, your privilege :) But at least I hope you have a less distorted view of the WWI British army, even if I can't help with the Persian one.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 02, 2018, 02:55:41 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 01:02:55 PMThe size of the army according to many scholars ranges from about 200 000 to 500 000.
Though not all scholars would favour such high numbers: Delbrueck went as low as 25,000 at one point, apparently. One Professor Livio Catullo Stecchini (http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Military/Persian_wars/persian_wars_persian_army.htm) has an interesting brief summary of the historiography of Xerxes' numbers.
Taking a low figure of 25 000 men does solve all the logistical problems but replaces them with other problems, among them the ability to conquer Greece.
Let's assume the army was between 30 000 and 50 000 men. A nice practical size, enabling the army to march from one campsite to another in a single day without having to do it cross-country or split up into separate corps. Also numerous enough to impress the Greeks who themselves usually fielded only a few thousand men for a battle.
The problem then is Herodotus. If the army is 50 000 strong, his account of the boat bridge over the Hellespont is clearly a fabrication, as no sensible general in command of an army that size would undertake such a risky venture. He would simply do what every other general with a comparable army did: ferry the men across by ship.
The food dumps are evidently another fabrication. 50 000 men need 50 tons of grain a day, which can be comfortably managed by two smallish cargo vessels, forming part of a conveyor belt system of 20 ships that would have no trouble keeping the army fed from the Hellespont to Greece.
The Thasian incident is another fabrication unless one accept that virtually all the 400 talents were spent to regale Xerxes and his officers in a style that matched or exceeded his birthday bashes at Persepolis.
At the end of it, practically the only thing we be sure of from reading Herodotus is that a Persian army marched to Greece and was beaten there (can we be sure even of that? :-\)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 10:44:52 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 09:04:44 AM
QuoteAlso have you a clue what the annual calving of a herd or lambing of a flock is like. It's every bit as labour intensive as harvest
With modern species, yes. Do you know how dependent upon human help the species of the period were?
yes
It's pretty standard stuff,
Jim, did this get posted incomplete? I shall hold off any response until you have had your say.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 11:06:24 AM
So, you see no impediment to a smaller but still very large force other than it involves assuming that Herodotus got his figures wrong?
Actually there are several impediments, beginning with the fact that Herodotus is not alone. If he had managed to get his figures wrong, we can be pretty sure that Thucydides, who delighted in proving Herodotus wrong on small points of detail, would have dropped some very heavy hints about the matter.
So we have consistency (at least in terms of Xerxes' army being really large) among our original sources. They would not all have been hypnotised by Herodotus' account because quite a few classical historians delighted in disparaging Herodotus for one reason or another.
QuoteAs to rejecting Herodotus' figures and those of the swarming multitudes of the barbarians, surely that is why we are here?
That sounds a bit
a priori: we are here to give him a fair trial - and then hang him! ;D
QuoteConventional history states that the figures for " the other" are consistently over estimated. That Herodotus, having been told some tales about the size of the Persian army, believes them, because culturally he is conditioned to think of vast barbarian hordes. I don't think he fabricated his figures - I think he accepted some figures he was fed, because they fitted his pre-conceptions, then worked out from there, filling in gaps in a consistent manner. In this latter position, I confess I diverge from a lot of historians who do think he just made the numbers up.
Although if he did this, we get the questions 1) why would he have any such preconceptions int he first place, 2) who fed him these numbers, and why would he believe them?* and 3) how is it that he still has minor inconsistencies in his arithmetic? If he were 'filling gaps in a consistent manner', why the inconsistencies (notably with regard to the number of smaller ships and auxiliary vessels)?
*
From his account, it is evident he had testimony from several highly-placed individuals, including Persians. One may recall that Persians were taught to do three things from boyhood: ride a horse, shoot a bow and tell the truth.QuoteLater writers produce figures which are consistent because they are from the same cultural outlook.
But some writers from the same cultural outlook, notably Thucydides and Plutarch, get their knives into Herodotus at every opportunity. Furthermore, a cultural outlook which compulsively over-estimates and/or overstates enemy numbers is not going to fare as well as did the Greeks in combat against the Persian Empire.
We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods. I think we are on much firmer ground with this assertion.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 01:02:55 PM
It's a fair assumption that it can't generally march more than about 4 men abreast.
sorry but where did the four men abreast come from?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 07:47:32 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 02, 2018, 02:55:41 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 01:02:55 PMThe size of the army according to many scholars ranges from about 200 000 to 500 000.
Though not all scholars would favour such high numbers: Delbrueck went as low as 25,000 at one point, apparently. One Professor Livio Catullo Stecchini (http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Military/Persian_wars/persian_wars_persian_army.htm) has an interesting brief summary of the historiography of Xerxes' numbers.
Taking a low figure of 25 000 men does solve all the logistical problems but replaces them with other problems, among them the ability to conquer Greece.
why?
If it's a professional army, properly trained with decent cavalry, it has the advantage that it will pick up allies, Macedonia and Thrace could provide decent auxiliary forces. Then there may well have been the promise of aid from Thessaly and perhaps even Thebes
Looked at from the Persian point of view, if you can get Thebes, they can pretty much neutralise the Athenians, so you're left with the Spartans and the various minor states. Only the Spartans are proper soldiers, the rest are city militia, undrilled and with little formal training.
I suspect that 25,000 is on the low side, but 25,000 quality infantry and 5000 good cavalry and some local auxilia I suspect most Persian generals would have fancied their chances
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 10:44:52 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 09:04:44 AM
QuoteAlso have you a clue what the annual calving of a herd or lambing of a flock is like. It's every bit as labour intensive as harvest
With modern species, yes. Do you know how dependent upon human help the species of the period were?
yes
It's pretty standard stuff,
Jim, did this get posted incomplete? I shall hold off any response until you have had your say.
no, it's complete, the ancient breeds still exist in many areas, largely unchanged. We know that from skeletal analysis and the ancient writers
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
Actually there are several impediments, beginning with the fact that Herodotus is not alone. If he had managed to get his figures wrong, we can be pretty sure that Thucydides, who delighted in proving Herodotus wrong on small points of detail, would have dropped some very heavy hints about the matter.
why would any Greek bother contradicting him? This was now their story.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
One may recall that Persians were taught to do three things from boyhood: ride a horse, shoot a bow and tell the truth.[/i]
Alas that our history was written by a Greek, had a Persian written it we might have got the correct numbers :-[
;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods.
Can you give examples of this?
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 11:01:54 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
Actually there are several impediments, beginning with the fact that Herodotus is not alone. If he had managed to get his figures wrong, we can be pretty sure that Thucydides, who delighted in proving Herodotus wrong on small points of detail, would have dropped some very heavy hints about the matter.
why would any Greek bother contradicting him? This was now their story.
But was it? Herodotus recorded it ''in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and Barbarians from losing their due meed of glory," which suggests it was
not 'their story' but rather one whose details needed to be set down before memories faded or were lost. And some Greeks were happy to contradict Herodotus in other matters purely to show what a bad historian he was (or rather, how good they were by comparison). They would not have missed an opportunity to trip him up over this.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 02, 2018, 11:48:39 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods.
Can you give examples of this?
Practically every book or article written about every battle involving forces of more than 20,000 men per side. Two egregious examples are Delbruck on Alexander's battles against the the Achaemenids and Robin Lane Fox following him. Even Cannae is not immune, as can be seen in the Wikipedia entry.
"
However, some have suggested that the destruction of an army of 90,000 troops would be impossible. They argue that Rome probably had 48,000 troops and 6,000 cavalry against Hannibal's 35,000 troops and 10,000 cavalry." - the reference cited is the Cambridge Ancient History volume VIII of 1965.
It is a pervasive disease, and not one which contributes to understanding.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 10:50:55 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 01:02:55 PM
It's a fair assumption that it can't generally march more than about 4 men abreast.
sorry but where did the four men abreast come from?
Width of a cart. Many tracks would probably be narrower than this, obliging the army (presuming it keeps to the track) to march 2 abreast.
On the logistical front, an interesting observation by Dr Brian Dobson on p.199 of Warfare in the Ancient World (ed. General Sir John Hackett):
"Polybius gives rations which work out to 1.6 kg per horse, and a papyrus from Oxyrhyncus attests to a similar weight in the 6th century. English cavalry horses, at an average height of 15 1/2 hands, and therefore much heavier than Roman, at about 14 1/2 - 15, received 5.4 to 6.3 kg of oats or equivalent (e.g. barley)a day, with about 5.4 kg of hay and some greenstuff when available. The protein content of grains in the ancient world was much higher than it is today."
This would transform logistical calculations involving mounted troops. It also means that a diet of bread for the soldiery was more balanced than we would suspect. These are good reasons to support a general principle of not retroimposing 20th century figures onto the 5th century BC.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 06:45:04 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 11:01:54 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
Actually there are several impediments, beginning with the fact that Herodotus is not alone. If he had managed to get his figures wrong, we can be pretty sure that Thucydides, who delighted in proving Herodotus wrong on small points of detail, would have dropped some very heavy hints about the matter.
why would any Greek bother contradicting him? This was now their story.
But was it? Herodotus recorded it ''in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and Barbarians from losing their due meed of glory,"
Of course it is, if it wasn't he wouldn't have bothered. Pretty much the same as Livy
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 11:03:06 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
One may recall that Persians were taught to do three things from boyhood: ride a horse, shoot a bow and tell the truth.[/i]
Alas that our history was written by a Greek, had a Persian written it we might have got the correct numbers :-[
;)
As it happens, we are in luck. We have a Greek writing down the numbers he was given by a Persian. Had it been the other way around, the Persian would have recorded the numbers he was given by the Greek. ;)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 06:54:37 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 10:50:55 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 02, 2018, 01:02:55 PM
It's a fair assumption that it can't generally march more than about 4 men abreast.
sorry but where did the four men abreast come from?
Width of a cart. Many tracks would probably be narrower than this, obliging the army (presuming it keeps to the track) to march 2 abreast.
Which is why it becomes more possible to get anywhere with an army of 25,000 and an army of several million. I seem to remember that was why Patrick came up with the swarm of locust movement technique
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 06:55:14 AM
On the logistical front, an interesting observation by Dr Brian Dobson on p.199 of Warfare in the Ancient World (ed. General Sir John Hackett):
"Polybius gives rations which work out to 1.6 kg per horse, and a papyrus from Oxyrhyncus attests to a similar weight in the 6th century. English cavalry horses, at an average height of 15 1/2 hands, and therefore much heavier than Roman, at about 14 1/2 - 15, received 5.4 to 6.3 kg of oats or equivalent (e.g. barley)a day, with about 5.4 kg of hay and some greenstuff when available. The protein content of grains in the ancient world was much higher than it is today."
This would transform logistical calculations involving mounted troops. It also means that a diet of bread for the soldiery was more balanced than we would suspect. These are good reasons to support a general principle of not retroimposing 20th century figures onto the 5th century BC.
But they're not a reason to support the discoveries of two thousand years.
A bread diet will not protect you against scurvey
Similarly please don't assume that others know as little about agriculture as you do. When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations
But for horse feeding I took a smaller horse. Also note I did my calculations on a man eating 3lb (not 1.5) and a horse eating twice that, so I was going on 2.7kg
I took 3lb for the man (as recommended by American civil war armies and also Rome) because 1.5lb is less that the bread ration in the gulags, and the bread ration in the gulags formed only half the prisoners daily calories (calculated at 1300)
So however much you tinker with horse rations, you've find you do not come a long way adrift of the huge figures needed for grain that I came up with
However if you accept that a state cannot put upwards of 40% of men of military age outside the state in an invading force and come down to something reasonable, you don't have to postulate superior ancient baking techniques, grain varieties, and a human ability to to metabolise their own vitamin C from sun light
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 07:05:47 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 11:03:06 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
One may recall that Persians were taught to do three things from boyhood: ride a horse, shoot a bow and tell the truth.[/i]
Alas that our history was written by a Greek, had a Persian written it we might have got the correct numbers :-[
;)
As it happens, we are in luck. We have a Greek writing down the numbers he was given by a Persian.
so because he wasn't a persian and taught to tell the truth he doesn't actually have the write down the same numbers as he was told.
But actually we're not saying Herodotus lied (Although Plutarch put it pretty much that bluntly), we're saying he got figures he didn't understand and quoted them in the wrong context.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 06:45:04 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 11:01:54 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
Actually there are several impediments, beginning with the fact that Herodotus is not alone. If he had managed to get his figures wrong, we can be pretty sure that Thucydides, who delighted in proving Herodotus wrong on small points of detail, would have dropped some very heavy hints about the matter.
why would any Greek bother contradicting him? This was now their story.
But was it? Herodotus recorded it ''in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and Barbarians from losing their due meed of glory," which suggests it was not 'their story' but rather one whose details needed to be set down before memories faded or were lost. And some Greeks were happy to contradict Herodotus in other matters purely to show what a bad historian he was (or rather, how good they were by comparison). They would not have missed an opportunity to trip him up over this.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 02, 2018, 11:48:39 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods.
Can you give examples of this?
Practically every book or article written about every battle involving forces of more than 20,000 men per side. Two egregious examples are Delbruck on Alexander's battles against the the Achaemenids and Robin Lane Fox following him. Even Cannae is not immune, as can be seen in the Wikipedia entry.
"However, some have suggested that the destruction of an army of 90,000 troops would be impossible. They argue that Rome probably had 48,000 troops and 6,000 cavalry against Hannibal's 35,000 troops and 10,000 cavalry." - the reference cited is the Cambridge Ancient History volume VIII of 1965.
It is a pervasive disease, and not one which contributes to understanding.
So there are two schools of though within the 'modern' study of ancient history- Patrick and those who are part of a disease which hobbles human knowledge. There are good reasons to doubt ancient/biblical sources;for example the Hebrew numbers in Exodus which you use as an argument for the size of Xerxes forces is predicated on supernatural intervention, and is taken from a source that doesn't seem to be contemporary to the events described.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 11:06:24 AM
So, you see no impediment to a smaller but still very large force other than it involves assuming that Herodotus got his figures wrong?
Actually there are several impediments, beginning with the fact that Herodotus is not alone. If he had managed to get his figures wrong, we can be pretty sure that Thucydides, who delighted in proving Herodotus wrong on small points of detail, would have dropped some very heavy hints about the matter.
So we have consistency (at least in terms of Xerxes' army being really large) among our original sources. They would not all have been hypnotised by Herodotus' account because quite a few classical historians delighted in disparaging Herodotus for one reason or another.
You did read the argument further on, didn't you? The one about a cultural artefact of the "barbarian horde" and how it affected the reporting of numbers?
QuoteConventional history states that the figures for " the other" are consistently over estimated. That Herodotus, having been told some tales about the size of the Persian army, believes them, because culturally he is conditioned to think of vast barbarian hordes. I don't think he fabricated his figures - I think he accepted some figures he was fed, because they fitted his pre-conceptions, then worked out from there, filling in gaps in a consistent manner. In this latter position, I confess I diverge from a lot of historians who do think he just made the numbers up.
Although if he did this, we get the questions 1) why would he have any such preconceptions int he first place, 2) who fed him these numbers, and why would he believe them?* and 3) how is it that he still has minor inconsistencies in his arithmetic? If he were 'filling gaps in a consistent manner', why the inconsistencies (notably with regard to the number of smaller ships and auxiliary vessels)?
1. Because he came from a culture with these preconceptions
2. I believe you said he spoke to Persian officials? He's believe them because they fed his cultural expectation.
3. You yourself have excused Herodotus' arithmetic errors as not undermining his narrative. He gets things in the right ball-park throughout but, when it comes to creating the details of lists, he makes arithmetic errors (like in the breakdown of ships - we can see easily how he creates an itemised list to back up the traditional figure of 1207 but slips in 50 ships he didn't need)
QuoteLater writers produce figures which are consistent because they are from the same cultural outlook.
But some writers from the same cultural outlook, notably Thucydides and Plutarch, get their knives into Herodotus at every opportunity.
But do they produce smaller numbers for the size of barbarian armies? You've said they don't earlier.
Quote
Furthermore, a cultural outlook which compulsively over-estimates and/or overstates enemy numbers is not going to fare as well as did the Greeks in combat against the Persian Empire.
I actually don't get what you mean here.
Quote
We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods. I think we are on much firmer ground with this assertion.
If we had known figures, we could test them against modern estimates. But all we have are the numbers in the Bible and classical sources, which is what we are trying to test against our knowledge of the wider world. So I doubt you could prove your assertion. Where I do think you have some point is something I said right at the beginning of this discussion - some historians automatically downsize ancient figures as a kind of reflex, without critical thought and that is a failure to engage with cultural preconceptions.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 02, 2018, 03:22:58 PM
I was unable to find the source of his view about a "table of organisation" of the Persian army at 300,000 infantry and 50,000 cavalry with equivalent numbers of hangers on.
Rereading this, its because he takes the list of officers in Herodotus and the number of men that rank would normally command and says this is the normal "table of organisation".
The inconsistency of the ranks and numbers does turn up in several rejections of Herodotus' numbers but I don't know if anyone else using them in the same way as Stecchini.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 03, 2018, 09:32:47 AMThe inconsistency of the ranks and numbers does turn up in several rejections of Herodotus' numbers but I don't know if anyone else using them in the same way as Stecchini.
Barkworth (https://www.azargoshnasp.net/300/xerxesorganizationarmy.pdf) points out that the next rank down from the six
archontes, commanding generals, of the Persian army appears to be the
myriarchs, commanders of 10,000. He therefore thinks that each of the 29 national infantry contingents,
ethnea as Herodotos calls them, was a myriad; there is no intervening rank between the myriarchs and the archons, but each contingent has a named commander, therefore the named contingent-commanders
are the myriarchs. This would give us 290,000 infantry (plus the Immortals and other guards) rather than the 1,700,000 which Herodotos was apparently told. He's not the first or the only scholar to opt for an infantry strength of 300,000 or so. This would appear to be the same as Stecchini's "normal table of organization" which
he thinks Xerxes doubled in 480.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 06:55:14 AM
On the logistical front, an interesting observation by Dr Brian Dobson on p.199 of Warfare in the Ancient World (ed. General Sir John Hackett):
"Polybius gives rations which work out to 1.6 kg per horse, and a papyrus from Oxyrhyncus attests to a similar weight in the 6th century. English cavalry horses, at an average height of 15 1/2 hands, and therefore much heavier than Roman, at about 14 1/2 - 15, received 5.4 to 6.3 kg of oats or equivalent (e.g. barley)a day, with about 5.4 kg of hay and some greenstuff when available. The protein content of grains in the ancient world was much higher than it is today."
This would transform logistical calculations involving mounted troops. It also means that a diet of bread for the soldiery was more balanced than we would suspect. These are good reasons to support a general principle of not retroimposing 20th century figures onto the 5th century BC.
I think you may have misunderstood this a bit. The 1.6 kg is not the total feed of the horse, it's the grain feed in addition to the fodder and/or grazing. If you look at the figures Haldon uses for the Byzantines, referred to earlier, he reckons a cavalry ration of 2.2 kg grain and 6.8 kg fodder per horse per day. All the figures on the internet I've seen on horse feeding reckon a horse eats 1-3% of its body weight a day, towards the higher end if working. We reckoned that the rule of thumb that Persian cavalry horses weighed 500kg was a bit high - say 400kg - so that means a minimum ration of 4kg up to 12 kg. I think if you went for the low ration, the horses would break down before they get to Greece, because it is for sedentary animals. Incidentally, for consistency, you can't use load weighting from large modern mules if you are breeding from a cavalry horse the size of a large pony.
Addendum : I did a bit more research on the figures.
Richard Duncan Jones
Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy p107 gives these figures in detail. The cavalry were issued 1/10 arbata (4 choinices) of barley a day for their horses. That's 3.2 litres - about 2 kg (weight conversions for barley volume vary a bit). He confirms the papyrus states there is a hay ration too. Ptolemaic cavalry rations are given at 3 choinices a day. Polybian cavalry received 8.6 litres if allied, 12.1 litres if Roman. The figures do not match at all. Southern and Dixon
The Roman Cavalry p.210 explain this by each cavalry man having three horses and an attendant, so each horse 1.5 kg a day, which roughly matches the Byzantine figure (presumably, allied cavalry had one less horse or no attendant). I guess the discrepancy is caused by the conversion factors for the weights and measures - Polybios is working in
medimnoi a month, the Byzantines in
arbata per day.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 07:22:49 AM
When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations
Actually I based my calculations on the legal limit for a late Roman military pack mule which was well below the theoretical limit the animal of that period could stand.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 11:20:31 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 07:22:49 AM
When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations
Actually I based my calculations on the legal limit for a late Roman military pack mule which was well below the theoretical limit the animal of that period could stand.
This means that the late Roman military pack mule was a better animal than the modern Indian and American army mules, even through it was bred from smaller horses. I honestly doubt it
Cannot help but feel that the only evidence that would persuade Patrick and possibly Justin is if a revised version of Herodotus work was found giving a different account as to the size of the Persian army.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 11:44:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 11:20:31 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 07:22:49 AM
When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations
Actually I based my calculations on the legal limit for a late Roman military pack mule which was well below the theoretical limit the animal of that period could stand.
This means that the late Roman military pack mule was a better animal than the modern Indian and American army mules, even through it was bred from smaller horses. I honestly doubt it
See post #768. I took Anthony's figure of 65.5kg stipulated for a Roman army pack mule and went with that.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 05:50:55 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 11:44:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 11:20:31 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 07:22:49 AM
When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations
Actually I based my calculations on the legal limit for a late Roman military pack mule which was well below the theoretical limit the animal of that period could stand.
This means that the late Roman military pack mule was a better animal than the modern Indian and American army mules, even through it was bred from smaller horses. I honestly doubt it
See post #768. I took Anthony's figure of 65.5kg stipulated for a Roman army pack mule and went with that.
i was remembering back to about 711/13, I perhaps hadn't noticed the bit with Anthony sorry
Just for fun, here is the US special forces mule packing guide (really) on loads
good load for most horses or mules (1,100- to 1,200-pound packhorses and 800- to 1,000-pound mules) is 160 to 170 pounds. However, if there are some small animals in the pack string, this amount could be too much for them. In extreme circumstances, the packer can load an animal with up to 250 pounds; however, this amount would limit his speed and endurance.
So, about 75 kg for the US army as normal, without major impact on speed and endurance. The pakistani army, according to wikipedia, load up to 72 kg. All not that far above Roman standards, with probably bigger animals.
I've read the next 10 pages since I last looked and all I will say is when looking at ancient sources always err on the side of caution and apply common sense to most things. Lastly we do tend to view things through the prism of the modern world for obvious reasons
Quote from: Erpingham on May 03, 2018, 09:26:47 AM
You did read the argument further on, didn't you? The one about a cultural artefact of the "barbarian horde" and how it affected the reporting of numbers?
If that is not imposing our preconceptions upon the past, I do not know what is. ;)
QuoteQuoteAlthough if he did this, we get the questions 1) why would he have any such preconceptions int he first place, 2) who fed him these numbers, and why would he believe them?* and 3) how is it that he still has minor inconsistencies in his arithmetic? If he were 'filling gaps in a consistent manner', why the inconsistencies (notably with regard to the number of smaller ships and auxiliary vessels)?
1. Because he came from a culture with these preconceptions
2. I believe you said he spoke to Persian officials? He's believe them because they fed his cultural expectation.
Now why would they even think of doing that?
Quote3. You yourself have excused Herodotus' arithmetic errors as not undermining his narrative. He gets things in the right ball-park throughout but, when it comes to creating the details of lists, he makes arithmetic errors (like in the breakdown of ships - we can see easily how he creates an itemised list to back up the traditional figure of 1207 but slips in 50 ships he didn't need)
True; the important consideration is whether such comparatively minor errors invalidate his overall numbering. I think not, as this seems to be evidence that where he gets numbers wrong it is not by an order of magnitude.
QuoteQuoteBut some writers from the same cultural outlook, notably Thucydides and Plutarch, get their knives into Herodotus at every opportunity.
But do they produce smaller numbers for the size of barbarian armies? You've said they don't earlier.
Then why ask? :) As it happens, no, they do not - apart from Ctesias, who asserts that Xerxes had 800,000 but gives no basis for how he or his presumed source arrives at this figure. 800,000 is about half of 1,700,000 so my suspicion is that Ctesias took the figure he received from his source and halved it thinking it would have included noncombatants. Conjectural, albeit it makes for easy reconciliation. What does stand out is that even Ctesias does not hold with 200,000 or so, but a rather larger number.
QuoteQuote
Furthermore, a cultural outlook which compulsively over-estimates and/or overstates enemy numbers is not going to fare as well as did the Greeks in combat against the Persian Empire.
I actually don't get what you mean here.
Sorry. If one is constantly over-estimating enemy numbers, one will see a modest enemy force and paralyse oneself with apprehension wondering where all the other enemies are hiding, and hence fail to act against the forces one does see. (Italian generals in North Africa in 1940 did this in a major way and the results speak for themselves - to be fair, this was not the sole reason for their spectacular defeats, but it was a significant contributor to their fatal inaction.) The result will be a consistent inability to obtain significant victories, perhaps to obtain victories at all.
QuoteQuote
We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods. I think we are on much firmer ground with this assertion.
If we had known figures, we could test them against modern estimates. But all we have are the numbers in the Bible and classical sources, which is what we are trying to test against our knowledge of the wider world. So I doubt you could prove your assertion. Where I do think you have some point is something I said right at the beginning of this discussion - some historians automatically downsize ancient figures as a kind of reflex, without critical thought and that is a failure to engage with cultural preconceptions.
While any attempt at conclusive proof is always going to run up against scepticism about the original sources, I do agree about the reflex. That is a perceptive observation.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 08:21:17 PM
Then why ask? :) As it happens, no, they do not - apart from Ctesias, who asserts that Xerxes had 800,000 but gives no basis for how he or his presumed source arrives at this figure. 800,000 is about half of 1,700,000 so my suspicion is that Ctesias took the figure he received from his source and halved it thinking it would have included noncombatants.
alternatively Herodotus could have taken the same figure Ctesias got and doubled it for effect. It's as likely as Ctesias halving a figure he received
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
We might also turn this argument on its head and say: our own culture produces writers who consistently under-estimate and under-state figures from the Biblical and classical periods. I think we are on much firmer ground with this assertion.
This is not equivalent.
You are attributing any non-literal interpretation to cultural bias. (Ironically this is a very modern strategy of argumentation.)
But aren't you giving away your own assumption when you say, "who consistently under-estimate and understate"? - the working assumption is that the literary source is correct.
Cultural bias is only one of many possible explanations of this difference in opinion.
But there are others, perhaps: logic, precedent, academic progress...
A more neutral way of saying this might be, "modern historians consistently argue that figures in literature from the classical and biblical period are overstated."
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 08:21:17 PM
Sorry. If one is constantly over-estimating enemy numbers, one will see a modest enemy force and paralyse oneself with apprehension wondering where all the other enemies are hiding, and hence fail to act against the forces one does see. (Italian generals in North Africa in 1940 did this in a major way and the results speak for themselves - to be fair, this was not the sole reason for their spectacular defeats, but it was a significant contributor to their fatal inaction.) The result will be a consistent inability to obtain significant victories, perhaps to obtain victories at all.
No one wouldn't because your troops are indoctrinated to see the enemy as useless-; if 7,000 of us can hold a pass for several days against millions of these whipped subhumans we can deal with the apprehension of wondering where the rest are, victory will be even easier as there are hundreds of thousands less of them than there are usually.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 06:18:11 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 05:50:55 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 11:44:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 11:20:31 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 07:22:49 AM
When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations
Actually I based my calculations on the legal limit for a late Roman military pack mule which was well below the theoretical limit the animal of that period could stand.
This means that the late Roman military pack mule was a better animal than the modern Indian and American army mules, even through it was bred from smaller horses. I honestly doubt it
See post #768. I took Anthony's figure of 65.5kg stipulated for a Roman army pack mule and went with that.
i was remembering back to about 711/13, I perhaps hadn't noticed the bit with Anthony sorry
Actually, looking back earlier I did use loads of 100kg when calculating how many mules would be needed for 5-day incursions inland by the army. The 65kg load (after Anthony supplied it) was used to calculate how long a grain caravan could travel and still have most of its grain. So I need to go back and redo the army calculations. Some day...
Only 36 pages to go! ;D
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 05:36:17 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 06:18:11 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 05:50:55 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 11:44:06 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 03, 2018, 11:20:31 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 07:22:49 AM
When I quoted figures of feeding horses and mules I did take the largest most modern mules, because they were the only ones that came near to being able to carry what Justin needed for his calculations
Actually I based my calculations on the legal limit for a late Roman military pack mule which was well below the theoretical limit the animal of that period could stand.
This means that the late Roman military pack mule was a better animal than the modern Indian and American army mules, even through it was bred from smaller horses. I honestly doubt it
See post #768. I took Anthony's figure of 65.5kg stipulated for a Roman army pack mule and went with that.
i was remembering back to about 711/13, I perhaps hadn't noticed the bit with Anthony sorry
Actually, looking back earlier I did use loads of 100kg when calculating how many mules would be needed for 5-day incursions inland by the army. The 65kg load (after Anthony supplied it) was used to calculate how long a grain caravan could travel and still have most of its grain. So I need to go back and redo the army calculations. Some day...
Only 36 pages to go! ;D
apparently we've got to keep going until we've got a page for every man we think was in the army. I'm seriously considering arguing for fifteen thousand ;D
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 11:00:12 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 07:52:18 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 02, 2018, 10:44:52 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 02, 2018, 09:04:44 AM
QuoteAlso have you a clue what the annual calving of a herd or lambing of a flock is like. It's every bit as labour intensive as harvest
With modern species, yes. Do you know how dependent upon human help the species of the period were?
yes
It's pretty standard stuff,
Jim, did this get posted incomplete? I shall hold off any response until you have had your say.
no, it's complete, the ancient breeds still exist in many areas, largely unchanged. We know that from skeletal analysis and the ancient writers
OK, thanks. However, herder cultures traditionally manage to free up a high proportion of their manpower for war, so I suspect they treated the multiplication season somewhat differently from present practice. My impression of past cultures is that they essentially left the animals to get on with it, which is not labour-intensive at all. Confirmation of this might be seen in US cattle-raising practices as recently as the 19th century, where the animals were pretty much left to their own devices all year round and the only real need for manpower (and not particularly intensive manpower) was when cattle were rounded up for branding or a drive.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 03, 2018, 09:33:21 PM
alternatively Herodotus could have taken the same figure Ctesias got and doubled it for effect. It's as likely as Ctesias halving a figure he received
What effect, pray? And why? (And why stop there?) In any event, Herodotus' reliability is quite high compared to that of Ctesias, which means Ctesias is the suspect here.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 04, 2018, 05:21:59 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 08:21:17 PM
Sorry. If one is constantly over-estimating enemy numbers, one will see a modest enemy force and paralyse oneself with apprehension wondering where all the other enemies are hiding, and hence fail to act against the forces one does see. (Italian generals in North Africa in 1940 did this in a major way and the results speak for themselves - to be fair, this was not the sole reason for their spectacular defeats, but it was a significant contributor to their fatal inaction.) The result will be a consistent inability to obtain significant victories, perhaps to obtain victories at all.
No one wouldn't because your troops are indoctrinated to see the enemy as useless-; if 7,000 of us can hold a pass for several days against millions of these whipped subhumans we can deal with the apprehension of wondering where the rest are, victory will be even easier as there are hundreds of thousands less of them than there are usually.
This is another reason one's troops would do poorly: having been indoctrinated to see the enemy as useless, they would go into action carelessly expecting simply to walk over the opposition and would instead receive a short, sharp shock. The Athenian expedition to Egypt in 460 BC may have been such an expression of over-confidence; that one turned out very badly indeed (nobody got back). Warfare has little room for vanity and misconception: only a good, strong appreciation of reality will help one prevail. High morale is obviously helpful, but high morale combined with delusion is a formula for overreaching oneself and going down as another historical disaster.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 07:09:20 AMapparently we've got to keep going until we've got a page for every man we think was in the army. I'm seriously considering arguing for fifteen thousand ;D
This the first time I've been obliged to seriously consider abandoning 1 700 000 men. :o
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 07:44:03 AM
OK, thanks. However, herder cultures traditionally manage to free up a high proportion of their manpower for war,
please can we have some figures here? Some examples. And be careful about Manpower figures. The Spartans could put a very high proportion of their Spartan manpower in the field, but a comparatively low proportion of their male population. A lot of herding cultures had numbers of slaves and semi-free males who would continue to work even when the warriors had left.
Also for a comparison can we have an example of one of these herder cultures who sent 41% of their manpower away for over a year
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 07:59:56 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 07:09:20 AMapparently we've got to keep going until we've got a page for every man we think was in the army. I'm seriously considering arguing for fifteen thousand ;D
This the first time I've been obliged to seriously consider abandoning 1 700 000 men. :o
;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 07:50:49 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 04, 2018, 05:21:59 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 08:21:17 PM
Sorry. If one is constantly over-estimating enemy numbers, one will see a modest enemy force and paralyse oneself with apprehension wondering where all the other enemies are hiding, and hence fail to act against the forces one does see. (Italian generals in North Africa in 1940 did this in a major way and the results speak for themselves - to be fair, this was not the sole reason for their spectacular defeats, but it was a significant contributor to their fatal inaction.) The result will be a consistent inability to obtain significant victories, perhaps to obtain victories at all.
No one wouldn't because your troops are indoctrinated to see the enemy as useless-; if 7,000 of us can hold a pass for several days against millions of these whipped subhumans we can deal with the apprehension of wondering where the rest are, victory will be even easier as there are hundreds of thousands less of them than there are usually.
This is another reason one's troops would do poorly: having been indoctrinated to see the enemy as useless, they would go into action carelessly expecting simply to walk over the opposition and would instead receive a short, sharp shock. The Athenian expedition to Egypt in 460 BC may have been such an expression of over-confidence; that one turned out very badly indeed (nobody got back). Warfare has little room for vanity and misconception: only a good, strong appreciation of reality will help one prevail. High morale is obviously helpful, but high morale combined with delusion is a formula for overreaching oneself and going down as another historical disaster.
This is a bit of a bizarre argument, even by normal standards. The Greeks are convinced of their superiority over the Persians. They think a small number of Greeks can beat any number of Persians because that is what they have grown up believing. The idea that, on meeting the enemy, they say lets do an accurate count of that big horde just to make sure its as big as we have been led to believe, is a bit fantastic.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 07:44:03 AM
What effect, pray? And why? (And why stop there?) In any event, Herodotus' reliability is quite high compared to that of Ctesias, which means Ctesias is the suspect here.
sorry but on what evidence to you base the claim that Herodotus is more reliable that Ctesias?
I noted the comment on the wiki, "Although many ancient authorities valued it highly, and used it to discredit Herodotus, a modern author writes that "(Ctesias's) unreliability makes Herodotus seem a model of accuracy"
Given that we don't actually have a text of Ctesias, merely abridgements and fragments used by ancient authors, a modern assessment isn't an assessment of the work, merely the bits the assessor has decided were originally the work of Ctesias
As far as I can see the only argument against Ctesias is that he was used to discredit Herodotus, which you can hardly use when you're using Herodotus to discredit Ctesias :D
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 08:01:30 AM
A lot of herding cultures had numbers of slaves and semi-free males who would continue to work even when the warriors had left.
Aha ... ;)
So there is actually no problem with mobilising the warrior population. This is what I wished to establish.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 08:07:02 AM
sorry but on what evidence to you base the claim that Herodotus is more reliable that Ctesias?
I noted the comment on the wiki, "Although many ancient authorities valued it highly, and used it to discredit Herodotus, a modern author writes that "(Ctesias's) unreliability makes Herodotus seem a model of accuracy"
Given that we don't actually have a text of Ctesias, merely abridgements and fragments used by ancient authors, a modern assessment isn't an assessment of the work, merely the bits the assessor has decided were originally the work of Ctesias
You have pretty much answered your own question. What we have of Ctesias is, for one reason or another, suspect. There is nothing to support his 800,000-man figure whereas Herodotus has the process by which the count was made and the final figure of 1.7 million arrived at, plus incidental details which correspond with a figure of this scale (e.g.
trans Hellespont crossing time).
Quote from: Erpingham on May 04, 2018, 08:05:24 AM
This is a bit of a bizarre argument, even by normal standards. The Greeks are convinced of their superiority over the Persians. They think a small number of Greeks can beat any number of Persians because that is what they have grown up believing. The idea that, on meeting the enemy, they say lets do an accurate count of that big horde just to make sure its as big as we have been led to believe, is a bit fantastic.
And is also not my point, which is rather that they did not have such elaborate fantasies derived from over-inflated historical portrayals. Had they done so, it would have impaired their military performance.
The Greeks understood, following Salamis, Plataea and Mycale, that they were militarily superior to the Persians. This derived from combat experience against superior numbers, not imagination ingrained by people telling them they could beat superior numbers. The idea that they beat relatively small numbers of Persians and derived from this a superiority complex that they could beat large numbers of Persians - which seems to be the esssential corollary of any contention that Herodotus inflated his figures - is just not on.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 08:21:17 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 03, 2018, 09:26:47 AM
You did read the argument further on, didn't you? The one about a cultural artefact of the "barbarian horde" and how it affected the reporting of numbers?
If that is not imposing our preconceptions upon the past, I do not know what is. ;)
No more so than treating (selected) ancient authors with almost religious reverence. For the umpteenth time, we are all imposing models of interpretation on the past, from Herodotus to us here now. Personally, I think the interpretive framework I'm offering, based on a critical approach, will get us near the truth.
Quote
Quote
2. I believe you said he spoke to Persian officials? He's believe them because they fed his cultural expectation.
Now why would they even think of doing that?
Are you seriously asking this? You have proposed that overawing the enemy with a display of strength is the Persian way. The power and glory of the Persian empire etc. Herodotus expects big numbers. Persian officials expect to elaborate to glorify the King.
QuoteQuoteBut some writers from the same cultural outlook, notably Thucydides and Plutarch, get their knives into Herodotus at every opportunity.
But do they produce smaller numbers for the size of barbarian armies? You've said they don't earlier.
Then why ask? :) As it happens, no, they do not - apart from Ctesias, who asserts that Xerxes had 800,000 but gives no basis for how he or his presumed source arrives at this figure. 800,000 is about half of 1,700,000 so my suspicion is that Ctesias took the figure he received from his source and halved it thinking it would have included noncombatants. Conjectural, albeit it makes for easy reconciliation. What does stand out is that even Ctesias does not hold with 200,000 or so, but a rather larger number.
Quote
So, despite being a member of the Persian Court, Ctesias has his figures wrong? Other than Simonides, who does give similar figures to Herodotus?
Quote
Furthermore, a cultural outlook which compulsively over-estimates and/or overstates enemy numbers is not going to fare as well as did the Greeks in combat against the Persian Empire.
I actually don't get what you mean here.
Quote
That is a perceptive observation.
Why, thank you :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 08:14:45 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 08:01:30 AM
A lot of herding cultures had numbers of slaves and semi-free males who would continue to work even when the warriors had left.
Aha ... ;)
So there is actually no problem with mobilising the warrior population. This is what I wished to establish.
no problem at all in mobilising the warrior population, for a short raid or two in which perhaps five percent of the male population (and perhaps a third of the warrior population) took part
You have still not provided any evidence whatsoever of a them mobilising 41% of their male population and sending them away for a couple of years.
So you've established nothing
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 08:21:48 AM
The Greeks understood, following Salamis, Plataea and Mycale, that they were militarily superior to the Persians. This derived from combat experience against superior numbers, not imagination ingrained by people telling them they could beat superior numbers.
And Xenophon's comrades and Alexander were at these battles? Of course not. They learned about them from older men or from books. There was a narrative of Greek military prowess and Persian vast but useless armies. So, when they arrive on the field and see a big Persian army, they just go on and beat it, because its what their ancestors have always done.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 08:14:45 AM
You have pretty much answered your own question. What we have of Ctesias is, for one reason or another, suspect. There is nothing to support his 800,000-man figure whereas Herodotus has the process by which the count was made and the final figure of 1.7 million arrived at, plus incidental details which correspond with a figure of this scale (e.g. trans Hellespont crossing time).
how do you know there is nothing to support his figures, we don't have his text!
As for Herodotus 'having a process'. Merely because a writer describes something doesn't mean it actually had to happen like that. He wasn't an eye witness, he was merely writing down something he'd been told, and the person who told him need not have been an eyewitness.
It may merely be recounted folk tradition, 'this is how Persians measure their armies'
If you're going to claim that Ctesias is suspect, please produce evidence. And the fact that he doesn't agree with Herodotus isn't evidence in a discussion as to whether herodotus is accurate. For some historians the fact that he differs from Herodotus might be taken as a sign that he's trustworthy.
So how is he suspect?
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 08:31:51 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 08:14:45 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 08:01:30 AM
A lot of herding cultures had numbers of slaves and semi-free males who would continue to work even when the warriors had left.
Aha ... ;)
So there is actually no problem with mobilising the warrior population. This is what I wished to establish.
no problem at all in mobilising the warrior population, for a short raid or two in which perhaps five percent of the male population (and perhaps a third of the warrior population) took part
You have still not provided any evidence whatsoever of a them mobilising 41% of their male population and sending them away for a couple of years.
So you've established nothing
Sorry, where does the 41% come from? If 5 million is 41 percent of all males in the empire, that gives a male population of 12.2 million and a total population of 24.4 million. Most estimates of the population range between 40 and 50 million, which means 20% to 25% of males took part in the campaign.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 08:36:18 AMIf you're going to claim that Ctesias is suspect, please produce evidence.
Quote from: Plutarch, "Artaxerxes"Ctesias, even if he has put into his work a perfect farrago of extravagant and incredible tales ...
Mind you, Plutarch was even harder on Herodotos. The only moral seems to be that even ancient historians thought that ancient historians were unreliable.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 04, 2018, 11:01:11 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 08:36:18 AMIf you're going to claim that Ctesias is suspect, please produce evidence.
Quote from: Plutarch, "Artaxerxes"Ctesias, even if he has put into his work a perfect farrago of extravagant and incredible tales ...
Mind you, Plutarch was even harder on Herodotos. The only moral seems to be that even ancient historians thought that ancient historians were unreliable.
Which also shows they set as high a store by reliability as we do. If you knew you were going to be attacked by your colleagues for any mistakes you checked your sources carefully. Just like contemporary academia.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:06:26 AMWhich also shows they set as high a store by reliability as we do. If you knew you were going to be attacked by your colleagues you checked your sources carefully.
Herodotos, being more or less the first historian, cannot have known that he'd be attacked by Plutarch 500 years later (or even by Ctesias 70 years or so later), so I don't think that is a very strong argument at all.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 04, 2018, 11:09:56 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:06:26 AMWhich also shows they set as high a store by reliability as we do. If you knew you were going to be attacked by your colleagues you checked your sources carefully.
Herodotos, being more or less the first historian, cannot have known that he'd be attacked by Plutarch 500 years later (or even by Ctesias 70 years or so later), so I don't think that is a very strong argument at all.
What it does show, at least from Ctesias onwards, is a critical approach to works like Herodotus's. They didn't suck it up with kind of reverent gullibility (which implies they wouldn't necessarily have sucked it up when he published it). Herodotus himself wanted to be accurate - he says so - which suggests that repeating old wives' tales was no longer an acceptable option for an intelligent writer like him.
It certainly suggests that later writers who give similarly enormous figures for the Persian army knew they needed to be on their toes. There was no captive audience.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 10:48:30 AM
Sorry, where does the 41% come from? If 5 million is 41 percent of all males in the empire, that gives a male population of 12.2 million and a total population of 24.4 million. Most estimates of the population range between 40 and 50 million, which means 20% to 25% of males took part in the campaign.
Population of males of military age. There was some feeling that I'd been too generous and the 41% figure should have been higher
Military age in the ancient world corresponds pretty closely to useful working age in agriculture as well
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 11:31:15 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 10:48:30 AM
Sorry, where does the 41% come from? If 5 million is 41 percent of all males in the empire, that gives a male population of 12.2 million and a total population of 24.4 million. Most estimates of the population range between 40 and 50 million, which means 20% to 25% of males took part in the campaign.
Population of males of military age. There was some feeling that I'd been too generous and the 41% figure should have been higher
Military age in the ancient world corresponds pretty closely to useful working age in agriculture as well
Oh I see. So the agricultural workforce will be at 59% strength whilst the army is away, which will vary in time depending on whether one started out nearer to Greece or further away. What we need then is a economic system that could grow enough food to offset that drop in labour for a 1 - 2 year period.
I'd like to return for a moment to the subject of subsistence agriculture. It is assumed the Persian Empire had a subsistence agricultural economy, in other words that the 80% or so of the population that worked the land could grow just enough in an average year to feed themselves, their families, and the 20% who didn't live on farms. In a good year they would have a small surplus which would feed everyone in a bad year.
Using Roman land measurements as a guide, 2 iugera (1.3 acres) was enough to feed a man for a year. Presuming a man had a wife who helped sometimes and several small children who couldn't help all that much, and he would probably have to cultivate 6 iugera (4 acres) to feed his family. Once the children grew older he would have help and he could probably count on the services of unmarried labourers, at least sometimes. But let's assume that 4 acres is the limit. Tack on the 20% he had to grow for non-farmers and he is stuck with 5 acres. This is the worst-case scenario.
Roman farms came in several sizes. Small farms ranged from 18–108 iugera (12 - 70 acres). These were family-owned. A family of 6 people would need to cultivate 12 iugera (8 acres) of land to meet minimum food requirements (without animals).
Cato the Elder describes a farm of 100 iugera. He claimed such a farm should have "a foreman, a foreman's wife, ten laborers, one ox driver, one donkey driver, one man in charge of the willow grove, one swineherd, in all sixteen persons; two oxen, two donkeys for wagon work, one donkey for the mill work." Exclude the ox and donkey driver and the wife and you have 13 men working 100 iugera = 65 acres. The farm can feed 65 adult or near-adults for a year. Not all the 16 adults mentioned have families so adding another 16 individuals (wives and children) seems reasonable. That brings it up to 32 people. This means the farm produces twice as much as the the needs of the people cultivating it. Notice that only 10 men actually work the land, each handling about 6 acres. This is not subsistence agriculture.
Presuming then that a typical family farm could produce a surplus of 33% to 50%, Persian farms, during the 4 year run-up period, would have to produce enough to offset the loss of labour during the campaign - and farm enough to produce a 20% surplus only. This means that for each of the 4 years, a labourer would have to cultivate 20% more than he normally would. If 5 acres produces the necessary surplus in normal times, then 6 acres will produce enough to offset the deficit of labour in the two years' campaign. This pretty much matches what an average Roman farm could handle in any event, so there is no reason to assume the Persian agricultural system would buckle under the strain.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:47:53 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 11:31:15 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 10:48:30 AM
Sorry, where does the 41% come from? If 5 million is 41 percent of all males in the empire, that gives a male population of 12.2 million and a total population of 24.4 million. Most estimates of the population range between 40 and 50 million, which means 20% to 25% of males took part in the campaign.
Population of males of military age. There was some feeling that I'd been too generous and the 41% figure should have been higher
Military age in the ancient world corresponds pretty closely to useful working age in agriculture as well
Oh I see. So the agricultural workforce will be at 59% strength whilst the army is away, which will vary in time depending on whether one started out nearer to Greece or further away. What we need then is a economic system that could grow enough food to offset that drop in labour for a 1 - 2 year period.
I'd like to return for a moment to the subject of subsistence agriculture. It is assumed the Persian Empire had a subsistence agricultural economy, in other words that the 80% or so of the population that worked the land could grow just enough in an average year to feed themselves,
the standard figure is 90%.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 12:10:52 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:47:53 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 11:31:15 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 10:48:30 AM
Sorry, where does the 41% come from? If 5 million is 41 percent of all males in the empire, that gives a male population of 12.2 million and a total population of 24.4 million. Most estimates of the population range between 40 and 50 million, which means 20% to 25% of males took part in the campaign.
Population of males of military age. There was some feeling that I'd been too generous and the 41% figure should have been higher
Military age in the ancient world corresponds pretty closely to useful working age in agriculture as well
Oh I see. So the agricultural workforce will be at 59% strength whilst the army is away, which will vary in time depending on whether one started out nearer to Greece or further away. What we need then is a economic system that could grow enough food to offset that drop in labour for a 1 - 2 year period.
I'd like to return for a moment to the subject of subsistence agriculture. It is assumed the Persian Empire had a subsistence agricultural economy, in other words that the 80% or so of the population that worked the land could grow just enough in an average year to feed themselves,
the standard figure is 90%.
Fine, that gives more leeway.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:17:08 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 04, 2018, 11:09:56 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:06:26 AMWhich also shows they set as high a store by reliability as we do. If you knew you were going to be attacked by your colleagues you checked your sources carefully.
Herodotos, being more or less the first historian, cannot have known that he'd be attacked by Plutarch 500 years later (or even by Ctesias 70 years or so later), so I don't think that is a very strong argument at all.
What it does show, at least from Ctesias onwards, is a critical approach to works like Herodotus's. They didn't suck it up with kind of reverent gullibility (which implies they wouldn't necessarily have sucked it up when he published it). Herodotus himself wanted to be accurate - he says so - which suggests that repeating old wives' tales was no longer an acceptable option for an intelligent writer like him.
Which is why Aristotle called Herodotus a great storyteller? Why Cicero, his greatest fan, thought he was too prone to including legends?
Quote
It certainly suggests that later writers who give similarly enormous figures for the Persian army knew they needed to be on their toes. There was no captive audience.
This doesn't follow. I think it is reasonable that Greeks thought that Persian armies were huge and therefore all histories, to be taken seriously, would have huge Persian armies in them. This does not mean that they were good at quantifying what really huge was.
I'm no means up on all this scholarship (Duncan is the only legitimate scholar of the Persian army here I think - Christopher Tuplin thinks Duncan's book on the subject is "one of the most useful publications on Achaemenid warfare" ) but, contra Patrick , it seems most ancient authors place their Persian hordes in the 100,000s, not the millions. Most of these were not effectives - they were poor quality infantry or support elements who were just estimated in line with expected literary convention. As I've already said, when it comes to specific corps of elites or critical troops, numbers are probably more accurate.
Incidentally, if we took Ctesias' figures and assumed he also believed there were as many hangers on as fighters, we would get 400,000 soldiers and a similar cast of supporters. His ship figures are similar to Herodotus (he has 1000 triremes) so around 200,000 men in the fleet. About 2% of the population. He leaves only 120,000 in Greece with Mardonius.
Addendum : Talking of Christopher Tuplin, I don't know if this article (https://archive.org/details/Tuplin2010AllTheKingsHorseInSearchOfAchaemenidPersianCavalry) on Achaemenid cavalry is of any use in the numbers game?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:47:53 AM
" Exclude the ox and donkey driver
why should they be excluded?
And what do you think the women were doing, sitting painting their nails? The wives will have productive tasks as well as handling details like child rearing. If you have a family of six, only the very youngest children will not work, their work is necessary. I started driving tractors at eight. Farming families all work
I'm sorry but your figures bear no relation to reality
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 12:17:47 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:47:53 AM
" Exclude the ox and donkey driver
why should they be excluded?
And what do you think the women were doing, sitting painting their nails? The wives will have productive tasks as well as handling details like child rearing. If you have a family of six, only the very youngest children will not work, their work is necessary. I started driving tractors at eight. Farming families all work
I'm sorry but your figures bear no relation to reality
What I'm trying to do is establish how much labour the men were in for on a 100-iugera farm. Chuck in the women and some of the children and each man has
less work to do, not more, which makes the production of surplus even easier.
One thing I have difficulty establishing is exactly how much work is involved in making a success of a 65-acre farm. From what I understand, the major heavy-labour tasks are ploughing, sowing, harvesting, threshing and winnowing. An animal-pulled plough can plough one acre in a day so your ox on the Roman farm will be pulling the plough for 60 days. I take it ploughed land can still be sown with seed 2 months later? A man can reap one half to one acre a day, so the ten labours will manage about 7 acres a day and wrap up the harvesting in 9 days. I haven't a clue how long threshing and winnowing takes. And or course there are a host of other chores to do that don't spring to mind because I'm not a farmer.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 12:38:06 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 12:17:47 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 11:47:53 AM
" Exclude the ox and donkey driver
why should they be excluded?
And what do you think the women were doing, sitting painting their nails? The wives will have productive tasks as well as handling details like child rearing. If you have a family of six, only the very youngest children will not work, their work is necessary. I started driving tractors at eight. Farming families all work
I'm sorry but your figures bear no relation to reality
What I'm trying to do is establish how much labour the men were in for on a 100-iugera farm. Chuck in the women and some of the children and each man has less work to do, not more, which makes the production of surplus even easier.
What you forget is that the women and children are already factored into the labour force. If you have 10 men, 10 women and 20 children over 10, the labour force isn't ten men.
The labour force is probably in the region of 25 'labour units' which men counting as a nominal 1 each, and the women, with other responsibilities coming in about 0.7 and the children also build into the equation
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 12:38:06 PM
One thing I have difficulty establishing is exactly how much work is involved in making a success of a 65-acre farm. From what I understand, the major heavy-labour tasks are ploughing, sowing, harvesting, threshing and winnowing. An animal-pulled plough can plough one acre in a day so your ox on the Roman farm will be pulling the plough for 60 days. I take it ploughed land can still be sown with seed 2 months later? A man can reap one half to one acre a day, so the ten labours will manage about 7 acres a day and wrap up the harvesting in 9 days. I haven't a clue how long threshing and winnowing takes. And or course there are a host of other chores to do that don't spring to mind because I'm not a farmer.
Seriously it depends on the land, some was ploughed two or three times, once to just get rid of the weeds and stop water loss. Also the ox won't merely just plough, it'll be used as a general beast of burden with a cart, hauling manure, hay and everything else that needs shifting.
Whilst a man can reap a certain area a day, he does so as part of a team. He'll use the sickle or scythe, but he'll be followed by somebody else who gathers (often his wife) and ties the sheaves and then depending on the climate there might be a team with the ox loading sheaves into a cart. You might have ten men harvesting, but you're actually deploying twenty or more labour units, and that's without the gleaners
Also if you've got 65 acres, you haven't got sixty acres of grain. You cannot grow continuous cereals (except in Egypt which is different because there you effectively rotate the soil rather than the crop) so between a third and a half of your ground might be fallow. It might provide a little grazing for your donkey and oxen but it's not doing a lot. But it'll be ploughed a couple of times when it's fallow to plough in the weeds and conserve water
The best source for all this is Palladius agricultural manual (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WoAaAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false) (I used it when writing my novel on Roman Gaul). Must take some time to go through it again.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 02:23:05 PM
The best source for all this is Palladius agricultural manual (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WoAaAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false) (I used it when writing my novel on Roman Gaul). Must take some time to go through it again.
Palladius is good, but he's surprisingly late but borrows and he apparently had experience in Sardinia and Italy as well as probably Gaul
Quote from: Erpingham on May 04, 2018, 08:26:42 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 03, 2018, 08:21:17 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 03, 2018, 09:26:47 AM
You did read the argument further on, didn't you? The one about a cultural artefact of the "barbarian horde" and how it affected the reporting of numbers?
If that is not imposing our preconceptions upon the past, I do not know what is. ;)
No more so than treating (selected) ancient authors with almost religious reverence. For the umpteenth time, we are all imposing models of interpretation on the past, from Herodotus to us here now. Personally, I think the interpretive framework I'm offering, based on a critical approach, will get us near the truth.
The essential question being which imposition gets us nearer what actually happened. I am unconvinced that an 'interpretative framework' has anything to offer beyond an expression of preconceptions.
QuoteQuoteQuote
2. I believe you said he spoke to Persian officials? He's believe them because they fed his cultural expectation.
Now why would they even think of doing that?
Are you seriously asking this? You have proposed that overawing the enemy with a display of strength is the Persian way. The power and glory of the Persian empire etc. Herodotus expects big numbers. Persian officials expect to elaborate to glorify the King.
I would suggest otherwise. By the time Herodotus was collecting information, the King had been well and truly defeated, and inflating numbers would have an effect quite the opposite of glorifying him.
QuoteQuote
Then why ask? :) As it happens, no, they do not - apart from Ctesias, who asserts that Xerxes had 800,000 but gives no basis for how he or his presumed source arrives at this figure. 800,000 is about half of 1,700,000 so my suspicion is that Ctesias took the figure he received from his source and halved it thinking it would have included noncombatants. Conjectural, albeit it makes for easy reconciliation. What does stand out is that even Ctesias does not hold with 200,000 or so, but a rather larger number.
So, despite being a member of the Persian Court, Ctesias has his figures wrong? Other than Simonides, who does give similar figures to Herodotus?
Being a member of a court does not necessarily make a physician into a historian.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 02:32:42 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 02:23:05 PM
The best source for all this is Palladius agricultural manual (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WoAaAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false) (I used it when writing my novel on Roman Gaul). Must take some time to go through it again.
Palladius is good, but he's surprisingly late but borrows and he apparently had experience in Sardinia and Italy as well as probably Gaul
A shortcut to ascertaining how much surplus a Roman farm or agricultural estate could produce is to see how much the
tributum soli, or Roman land tax, took from the crop. According to second-century land-surveyor Hyginus Gromaticus: 'In some provinces they pay a part of the crop, in some a fifth, in others a seventh; in still others a money payment. The amount is assesse by a valuation of the land itself. Set values are established for types of land, as in Pannonia, where the categories are: first- and second-class arable; meadow-land; first- and second-class woodland; fruit-bearing trees and pasture. For all these different land types a rate is established on a per iugerum basis according to its productiveness.' -
De limitibusA fifth is 20%, a seventh 14,3%. This represents the Roman administration's assessment of the surplus (or part of it) available after the needs of the inhabitants of the land had been met. Since the tax was paid, one can assume that the assessment was accurate.
So, on average, a farm of that time could produce rather more than 17% of what was needed by those who cultivated it. Working on the assumption that 90% of the Persian population worked the land, this means that the farmers could produce, in 4 years, a surplus enough for 30% of the population for one year (over and above the 10% annual surplus necessary to feed the cities). Assuming that 5 million males - 10% of the population or 41% of the labour force, go off on a 2 year-campaign, this surplus will feed them and allow for a drop in grain production 10% for the year following that. This means the remaining active men (59%) helped by their women and children will need to work harder to grow at least 90% of the normal harvest, but nothing superhuman is required.
This all assumes that the Persian agricultural economy was not especially geared for war: i.e. with extra land lying fallow, ready to be cultivated to boost crop production in the years before the campaign.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 08:59:31 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 02:32:42 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 02:23:05 PM
The best source for all this is Palladius agricultural manual (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WoAaAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false) (I used it when writing my novel on Roman Gaul). Must take some time to go through it again.
Palladius is good, but he's surprisingly late but borrows and he apparently had experience in Sardinia and Italy as well as probably Gaul
A shortcut to ascertaining how much surplus a Roman farm or agricultural estate could produce is to see how much the tributum soli, or Roman land tax, took from the crop. According to second-century land-surveyor Hyginus Gromaticus: 'In some provinces they pay a part of the crop, in some a fifth, in others a seventh; in still others a money payment. The amount is assesse by a valuation of the land itself. Set values are established for types of land, as in Pannonia, where the categories are: first- and second-class arable; meadow-land; first- and second-class woodland; fruit-bearing trees and pasture. For all these different land types a rate is established on a per iugerum basis according to its productiveness.' - De limitibus
A fifth is 20%, a seventh 14,3%. This represents the Roman administration's assessment of the surplus (or part of it) available after the needs of the inhabitants of the land had been met. Since the tax was paid, one can assume that the assessment was accurate.
So, on average, a farm of that time could produce rather more than 17% of what was needed by those who cultivated it. Working on the assumption that 90% of the Persian population worked the land, this means that the farmers could produce, in 4 years, a surplus enough for 30% of the population for one year
again, it's not surplus. It's the states taxable income. It's already spent. To claim that a fifth of the produce of a farm was surplus and could be dedicated to a new project would be on a par with claiming that because the modern state takes 20% of income as income tax, all that money can now be dedicated to paying for some new project such as, for example mounting an invasion of Greece. The state has in reality 'spent' the money before it's ever collected.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 04, 2018, 08:59:31 PM
This all assumes that the Persian agricultural economy was not especially geared for war: i.e. with extra land lying fallow, ready to be cultivated to boost crop production in the years before the campaign.
Given that there is no evidence of this land whatsoever (nor any evidence that any state ever practiced this policy) I think we can discount it.
As far as I can tell ancient states seem to have encouraged the farming of every acre, because that maximized their tax income
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 07:40:11 PM
Being a member of a court does not necessarily make a physician into a historian.
Indeed, but it does give you unparalleled advantages with who you get to talk to. And Herodotus's degree was hardly from a prestigious institution :D
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 09:20:02 PM
again, it's not surplus. It's the states taxable income. It's already spent.
It was not 'spent'. The Achaemenid monarchs stocked up money and resources the way a squirrel does nuts.
QuoteTo claim that a fifth of the produce of a farm was surplus and could be dedicated to a new project would be on a par with claiming that because the modern state takes 20% of income as income tax, all that money can now be dedicated to paying for some new project such as, for example mounting an invasion of Greece. The state has in reality 'spent' the money before it's ever collected.
Sorry, but this is imposing the 20th/21st century on the past with a venegeance. The Achamenids saved what they acquired; they did not run deficit spending the way modern governments do. In fact, they did not run deficit spending at all. They stocked up their surpluses until they needed them - and they stocked up in anticipation of just such a need. Look at the amount of money Alexander found at Susa when he arrived there and that should give you an idea of the Achaemenid mentality and
modus operandi.
That the tax was over and above what the Achaemenid Empire needed to spend is indicated by Herodotus I.192:
"I shall show how great the power of Babylon is by many other means, but particularly by this. All the land that the great King rules
is parcelled out to provision him and his army, and pays tribute besides [
parex tou phorou = in addition to that which is brought in by way of payment]: now the territory of Babylon feeds him for four of the twelve months in the year, the whole of the rest of Asia providing for the other eight."
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 09:22:02 PM
As far as I can tell ancient states seem to have encouraged the farming of every acre, because that maximized their tax income
This is pretty much my impression, and would help to explain how they produced continual surpluses. Practices may have varied by region: Egypt, for example, was refreshed every year by the Nile so leaving any land fallow there was a waste of opportunity. The more peripheral hilly regions might have exchanged growing land and pasture every so often (I do not know). Judaea presumably left the land fallow every seven years. Babylonia was presumably still yielding two-hundred-fold as per Herodotus I.193.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 09:23:52 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 07:40:11 PM
Being a member of a court does not necessarily make a physician into a historian.
Indeed, but it does give you unparalleled advantages with who you get to talk to. And Herodotus's degree was hardly from a prestigious institution :D
Ah, if only academic advancement infallibly equated to truth ... ;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:21:06 AM
Sorry, but this is imposing the 20th/21st century on the past with a venegeance. The Achamenids saved what they acquired; they did not run deficit spending the way modern governments do. In fact, they did not run deficit spending at all. They stocked up their surpluses until they needed them - and they stocked up in anticipation of just such a need. Look at the amount of money Alexander found at Susa when he arrived there and that should give you an idea of the Achaemenid mentality and modus operandi.
yes, money. Not grain
Funny that given that apparently they could store grain for years, so why weren't there millions of amphorae stuffed with grain? ::)
So what happened to the grain that was how people paid their tax?
It was sold. Normally by the farmer who produced it, to his usual customers who ate it.
Then he would give the money to the tax collector.
This isn't surplus grain. it was grain grown to be eaten. The state decided that after selling his grain the farmer had surplus income and demanded their cut. But there wasn't any surplus grain
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:21:06 AM
Ah, if only academic advancement infallibly equated to truth ... ;)
I was merely pointing out that it seemed to be assumed by some that bumming around the eastern med gave a chap a better insight into Persian history than working as a doctor in the Persian court
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:21:06 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 09:22:02 PM
As far as I can tell ancient states seem to have encouraged the farming of every acre, because that maximized their tax income
This is pretty much my impression, and would help to explain how they produced continual surpluses.
for gods sake what surpluses!
We'd know about surpluses if they happened because it would lead to a collapse in agriculture. Please please read something which discusses the ancient grain market because now you're just making yourself look silly.
It's a simple as this.
If you produce food you turn up to the market to sell it. When the market is in balance everybody sort of knows the price.
But when there's a genuine surplus with more grain to sell than people want to buy, the price plummets. The seller needs cash, he's got his grain at home to feed his family but he needs the silver to pay his tax bill etc.
So the price falls and basically keeps falling.
Nobody bothers buying it, just buy enough for today because it'll be cheaper tomorrow.
There's no point in buying it for an investment, because the returns would be too low and wouldn't come for over a year, and next year where might be another surplus.
So you and now trying to sell year old grain onto a market that isn't willing to pay a lot for this years grain.
So that is why agriculture doesn't try to produce a surplus. You'll get minor structural surpluses and deficits anyway just because you're dealing with a biological system and weather happens.
It is a very old saying that farmers go bankrupt in times of plenty and make money in times of famine
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 04, 2018, 07:40:11 PM
The essential question being which imposition gets us nearer what actually happened. I am unconvinced that an 'interpretative framework' has anything to offer beyond an expression of preconceptions.
Whereas I feel failure to apply a critical approach just leaves us in a fantasy version of the past, equally based on a preconception of inerrancy. However, I don't think either of us will convince each other and, as we apply different criteria to "what really happened", we'll not agree here. Shall we drop the theory side?
QuoteBy the time Herodotus was collecting information, the King had been well and truly defeated, and inflating numbers would have an effect quite the opposite of glorifying him.
So, logically, they would have falsified the figures downwards? I suspect continuing to maintain the fiction of an Empire of bottomless military resources suited their purpose better.
QuoteQuote
So, despite being a member of the Persian Court, Ctesias has his figures wrong? Other than Simonides, who does give similar figures to Herodotus?
Being a member of a court does not necessarily make a physician into a historian.
Whereas being a travelling merchant does?
In considering this topic, I've been turning up various works on logistics. So much so that I thought we may be in need of a brief research guide or reading list. I'll see if I can start that off. But I thought it might help to mention John Roth's work on Roman Army logistics, online here (http://www.legioxxirapax.com/zasoby/The_Logistics_of_the_Roman_Army_at_War_%28264BC_-_235AD%29.pdf)
Roth has some interest because he pulls together lots of mentions of logistics in histories, regulations, record documents and so on. Some of this we've already seen e.g. in discussing Haldon, or sorting out Polybios. One thing worth noting is, unlike most people, he takes a bit of issue with Engels on ration rates. He notes Engels goes with a US army ration rate for the Vietnam period, which is for larger individuals than Romans. By using the same formula, he brings the daily ration rate down from 3,600 calories to 3,300 for a smaller Roman. He speculates that an army could survive on 3,000 or even 2,500 calories a day, though his ration tables reflect his 3,300 figure. This doesn't actually affect our rule of thumb of 1kg a day of grain as the basic ration very much - it reduces to .85 kg. He also notes the higher protein levels found in ancient grain varieties, though still feels the need to bring in a protein ration in the form of meat, cheese or lentils. He considers wine or vinegar essential for vitamin C levels - we have so far made no allowance for this.
One other subject, also raised by Haldon, is that Roman and Byzantine armies expected soldiers to carry part of their own rations as well as their kit. Cavalry carried some of their horses' grain fodder too. The usual level seems to have been 2-4 days. This would impact on the baggage train. Though, also reflecting the baggage train, our calculations have made no allowance for the non-food aspect of the baggage train. Even allowing for the fact that the men carried several days ration, the transport establishment of a legion provided for 1200-1400 mules.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 09:20:02 PM
again, it's not surplus. It's the states taxable income. It's already spent. To claim that a fifth of the produce of a farm was surplus and could be dedicated to a new project would be on a par with claiming that because the modern state takes 20% of income as income tax, all that money can now be dedicated to paying for some new project such as, for example mounting an invasion of Greece. The state has in reality 'spent' the money before it's ever collected.
You can't spend food. You eat it or you export it. If you do neither you store it. What I've tried to demonstrate is that nothing stopped the Persian economy from producing enough food during the preparation period not only to feed the army during its campaign but also to make up for the shortfall in farm labour during that time. Since the sources do affirm the Persians spent years preparing for this campaign, and part of that preparation was creating and filling huge food dumps around the Aegean, one can safely assume they stepped up their grain production by the simple expedient of asking farmers to grow, say 10% more grain, and then taking it as a tax. This could actually have been an ongoing institution.
It might be an idea to have a quick look at how money works. Before money there was barter, which meant Person A gave something to Person B who had to give something equivalent back to Person A. It was about an equitable exchange. Humans survive by helping each other stay alive.
Money extends this exchange system by allowing Person A to give something to Person B who then gives him the means of getting an equitable return from Person C, D or E. Money simply expands the barter system from two to many individuals.
Between a government like the Persian monarchy and its people the same fundamental barter system applied. The people gave grain to the government which then gave an intangible in return, which can be summed up as preservation of the social order: by military protection, enforcement of respect for the laws, and patronage of religion.
With any barter system the rate of exchange can vary as goods gain or lose value in people's estimation. For the Persian monarchy, expansion of the empire would be presented as part of the preservation of the social order, inasmuch as if the Persian state was winning it wasn't losing so everyone could feel confident, happy and secure. Since expansion was an additional service it required additional recompense, hence additional taxation in kind. That taxation in kind would translate as a grain surplus over and above the needs of the agricultural community and the cities, to be stored up in preparation for a campaign. If a campaign was not forthcoming, the grain could presumably be exported or cheaply sold.
This is all theoretical (except the fact the empire
did store up grain for campaigns) but seems reasonable enough.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 05, 2018, 11:06:16 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 04, 2018, 09:20:02 PM
again, it's not surplus. It's the states taxable income. It's already spent. To claim that a fifth of the produce of a farm was surplus and could be dedicated to a new project would be on a par with claiming that because the modern state takes 20% of income as income tax, all that money can now be dedicated to paying for some new project such as, for example mounting an invasion of Greece. The state has in reality 'spent' the money before it's ever collected.
You can't spend food. You eat it or you export it. If you do neither you store it. What I've tried to demonstrate is that nothing stopped the Persian economy from producing enough food during the preparation period not only to feed the army during its campaign but also to make up for the shortfall in farm labour during that time. Since the sources do affirm the Persians spent years preparing for this campaign, and part of that preparation was creating and filling huge food dumps around the Aegean, one can safely assume they stepped up their grain production by the simple expedient of asking farmers to grow, say 10% more grain, and then taking it as a tax. This could actually have been an ongoing institution.
An institution for which there is no evidence whatsoever
We do know how they did things
Please google Entrepreneurs and Empire, The MuraŠû Archive, the MuraŠû Firm,and Persian Rule in Babylonia
It'll come up with a free pdf download of the book which is over 300 pages and discusses many of these things
The Persian empire had no mechanism for instructing farmers to produce more grain, there is no evidence of any stores of grain other than that which is necessary to tide the population over the next poor harvest.
The sources may say that the Persian army spent years preparing for the campaign, all they say is "Reckoning from the recovery of Egypt, Xerxes spent four full years in collecting his host and making ready all things that were needful for his soldiers. It was not till the close of the fifth year that he set forth on his march, accompanied by a mighty multitude. "
There is no basis of assuming that this might mean massive agricultural preparations. Indeed given that apparently he spent a full four years collecting his host those who are claiming it involved moving five or six million men have to account for the dislocation incurred in years one, two, three and four when the host was collected and agricultural output would fall.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 05, 2018, 11:06:16 AM
It might be an idea to have a quick look at how money works. Before money there was barter, which meant Person A gave something to Person B who had to give something equivalent back to Person A. It was about an equitable exchange. Humans survive by helping each other stay alive.
I refer you to the The MuraŠû Archive again, where we have documents showing how the system really worked. We don't need theoretical models
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 05, 2018, 11:06:16 AM
This is all theoretical (except the fact the empire did store up grain for campaigns) but seems reasonable enough.
The issue isn't whether they stored up grain or even that they spent years preparing. They could do that to launch a much smaller force and, if they stored no food, the army wouldn't get out of Asia. It would either starve to death or more likely cause a rebellion because it stole its needs from the locals. What really is at issue is what proportion of available manpower could be mobilised for military expansion. For the Romans, with a professional emphasis, its about 0.5% of population. For "professional core plus massed levies" armies like the Mughals or the Han its 1-2%. If we take the high end of this figure, we use about 8% of the adult male manpower (by my estimate - 10% by Patrick's). Possible, I think. This gives us military strength of about a million to play with. A portion of this - maybe a fifth, is with the fleet. The other 800,000 are split between fighting forces, support troops, labour and lines of communication. It is an interesting question what the "teeth to tail" ratio is. Did persian armies really have one support person per fighting man as Herodotus suggests? Was Herodotus allowing for the depot staff and the labour corps as part of his support people? Or were they soldiers, each with their own support person? If we take of 1 in 8 of the personnel for the lines of communication and engineering units, we could be looking at invading Greece with 700,000 men.
Now, I think we are going to have great difficulties moving 700,000 through Northern Greece and I'd prefer a lower figure, but it does give a defensible "high" estimate.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 10:36:43 AM
He speculates that an army could survive on 3,000 or even 2,500 calories a day
I haven't looked at the book yet, but one notes in passing that "survive" and "maintain combat effectiveness" aren't the same thing.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 11:19:56 AMAn institution for which there is no evidence whatsoever
We do know how they did things
Please google Entrepreneurs and Empire, The MuraŠû Archive, the MuraŠû Firm,and Persian Rule in Babylonia
It'll come up with a free pdf download of the book which is over 300 pages and discusses many of these things
Fine, I'll look at it.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on May 05, 2018, 12:11:11 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 10:36:43 AM
He speculates that an army could survive on 3,000 or even 2,500 calories a day
I haven't looked at the book yet, but one notes in passing that "survive" and "maintain combat effectiveness" aren't the same thing.
As I say, he doesn't actually calculate on that basis, just notes that an army could be sustained at that level for a time if needs be. The British army ration in WWII was 3,700 calories but often dropped below 3,000 in action. US Army was similar. But in these cases (and similar in WWI) troops were rotated out of the line and receive better rations in rear areas to make up for the effects. This obviously couldn't happen for our Persian expeditionary force, though maybe the Thasos incident may suggest there were occassional high points in a mundane day-to-day existence.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:36:49 AM
It's a simple as this.
If you produce food you turn up to the market to sell it.
Not in the ancient Near East. The Persians did not even have markets. One should understand the society one is dealing with before imposing commercialism upon it. Or rather, instead of imposing commercialism upon it. :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:27:29 AM
yes, money. Not grain
Grain and money. The mass of the population never saw money unless there were mercenaries in town. Perhaps I need to be a bit more explicit about Herodotus I.192.
"I shall show how great the power of Babylon is by many other means, but particularly by this. All the land that the great King rules is parcelled out to provision him and his army, and pays tribute besides [
parex tou phorou = in addition to that which is brought in by way of payment]: now the territory of Babylon feeds him for four of the twelve months in the year, the whole of the rest of Asia providing for the other eight."
parex tou phorou is 'in addition to that [grain] which is brought in by way of payment'. Egypt feeds the army of occupation
and provides a tax in grain. Is this sufficiently clear? (It also contributes a heap of gold to the treasury but that is another matter.)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 11:22:09 AM
I refer you to the The MuraŠû Archive again, where we have documents showing how the system really worked. We don't need theoretical models
The Murashu Archive (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murashu_family) details the activity of a family of Jewish moneylenders. I hardly think it a valid basis for assessing the Achaemenid administrative system.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:07:11 PM
The Persians did not even have markets.
https://youtu.be/IdiaRUuDfSo (https://youtu.be/IdiaRUuDfSo)
sorry couldn't resist
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:07:11 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:36:49 AM
It's a simple as this.
If you produce food you turn up to the market to sell it.
Not in the ancient Near East. The Persians did not even have markets.
That would come as a shock to Xenophon
"As for the barbarians, they were terribly frightened; the Cilician queen took to flight in her carriage, and the people in the market27 left their wares behind and took to their heels;"
"As for the troops, their supply of grain gave out, and it was not possible to buy any except in the Lydian52 market attached to the barbarian army of Cyrus,53 at the price of four sigli for a capith of wheat flour or barley meal. "
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 12:08:35 PM
What really is at issue is what proportion of available manpower could be mobilised for military expansion. For the Romans, with a professional emphasis, its about 0.5% of population. For "professional core plus massed levies" armies like the Mughals or the Han its 1-2%. If we take the high end of this figure, we use about 8% of the adult male manpower (by my estimate - 10% by Patrick's). Possible, I think. This gives us military strength of about a million to play with.
My impression was that this percentage was of total population, not just adult male manpower. 8% of adult male manpower (8% of 20%) is about 1.6% of total population, which is only a little over the 1% considered to be sustainable as a full time professional army (although Frederick William I's Prussia by dint of dedicated effort maintained 4%). A comprehensive mobilisation of the Empire's male military manpower would net a somewhat higher figure. A significantly higher figure, in fact, whether one takes 8% or 10% of population.
And now onto the philosophy of history ...
QuoteQuoteThe essential question being which imposition gets us nearer what actually happened. I am unconvinced that an 'interpretative framework' has anything to offer beyond an expression of preconceptions.
Whereas I feel failure to apply a critical approach just leaves us in a fantasy version of the past, equally based on a preconception of inerrancy. However, I don't think either of us will convince each other and, as we apply different criteria to "what really happened", we'll not agree here. Shall we drop the theory side?
We might as well, although to me the 'critical approach' seems often to end up as more of a cultural smokescreen or (present company excepted) a cheap reputation-builder than a perceptive exercise. Please do not get me wrong: I do not advocate a completely uncritical approach; I just want to evaluate what the source actually says rather than just what we say about the source.
QuoteQuoteBy the time Herodotus was collecting information, the King had been well and truly defeated, and inflating numbers would have an effect quite the opposite of glorifying him.
So, logically, they would have falsified the figures downwards? I suspect continuing to maintain the fiction of an Empire of bottomless military resources suited their purpose better.
But as the 'military resources' concerned were already pushing up daisies, it is hard to see what this would achieve save to further discredit the Empire.
QuoteQuoteQuoteSo, despite being a member of the Persian Court, Ctesias has his figures wrong? Other than Simonides, who does give similar figures to Herodotus?
Being a member of a court does not necessarily make a physician into a historian.
Whereas being a travelling merchant does?
This is looking at the matter the wrong way round, not unlike hinting that a mere patent agent can never make a Nobel Prize-winning theoretical scientist. Individual merit (or lack of it) as a historian does not depend upon position, but on ability and judgement.
Found this article which might be of interest https://economics.mit.edu/files/7258 (https://economics.mit.edu/files/7258)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:07:11 PM
]
The Murashu Archive (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murashu_family) details the activity of a family of Jewish moneylenders. I hardly think it a valid basis for assessing the Achaemenid administrative system.
I suggest you read the book, not the wiki
The Business of the Murasu Firm
To a limited extend the Murasu firm belonged within the "feudal" order. A few texts refer to bow lands that seemingly belonged to members of the family or to agents of the firm. A place named Bit Murasu, "estate of Murasu", suggests an extended domain belonging to the family, but there is no outright confirmation of this suggestion. In at least one case, the Murasu family acquired ownership of a
share in a bow fief through an instrument of fictive adoption . In the great majority of its transactions, however, the Murasu house figured not as a participant in the system of land grants but as an accessory to it, undertaking the management of property which belonged, on a variety of titles, to others.
The primary enterprise of the firm was agricultural management. The firm leased land and water from their owners, paying out rents and taxes to the owners or to their representatives. The greater part of these properties was sublet in turn to tenants of the firm, usually along with livestock, equipment, and seed. This process of lease and sublease produced several classes of documents kept in the Archive:leases of property to the firm; formally similar leases to the firm's tenants; and receipts for rents and taxes paid out by the firm.
In addition, the firm provided a second regular service. The Murasus made loans to landholders against pledges of real property. This process accounts for the largest category of texts in the Archive, certificates of obligation (u'iltu) with real security; it also accounts for the occasional mention of pledged lands (bit maskaniiti) in other categories of texts.
A minority of documents deal with diverse transactions of other kinds, secondary to the main lines of the firm's business: work-contracts, redemptions of distrained debtors, litigations, and so on.
Another crucial sector of the Murasil house's business is entirely undocumented in the Archive. It must be inferred nevertheless. The greatest part of the firm's discernible income, from rentals drawn on its subleases and from repayments of loans, was in the form of produce. But the greatest part of the firm's discernible expenditures, in rents and taxes paid to landholders or their agents, was in the form of silver. The firm must therefore have had a means of converting produce into specie. Cardascia and others have postulated that the Murasils retailed their stores of crops to the urban populations of Nippur and its environs, receiving silver in payment for the sales . It is a plausible suggestion. The sources of demand and supply, and an organization well situated to intervene between them, are clearly inevidence; only the retail mechanism is unattested. If the guess is correct, then it is not surprising that this retail activity left no trace in the Archive: receipts or bills of sale, if any such documents were issued, would naturally have been kept by the buyers, not by the vendors; and inventories or memoranda of the sales business would not have been filed in an Archive consisting primarily of legal records. The Murasil firm, at any rate, whether by sales or by other means, served another function accessory to the system of land tenure, namely monetary exchange. The Murasils acquired silver and supplied it directly, in the form of rents, to landholders,
and indirectly, in the form of taxes, to the Persian crown.
This firm was at the core of our discussion
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:07:11 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:36:49 AM
It's a simple as this.
If you produce food you turn up to the market to sell it.
Not in the ancient Near East. The Persians did not even have markets. One should understand the society one is dealing with before imposing commercialism upon it. Or rather, instead of imposing commercialism upon it. :)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:27:29 AM
yes, money. Not grain
Grain and money. The mass of the population never saw money unless there were mercenaries in town. Perhaps I need to be a bit more explicit about Herodotus I.192.
"I shall show how great the power of Babylon is by many other means, but particularly by this. All the land that the great King rules is parcelled out to provision him and his army, and pays tribute besides [parex tou phorou = in addition to that which is brought in by way of payment]: now the territory of Babylon feeds him for four of the twelve months in the year, the whole of the rest of Asia providing for the other eight."
there are ancient authorities other than Herodotus, indeed there are archives from the time still available. I recommend you consult them
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:28:23 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 12:08:35 PM
What really is at issue is what proportion of available manpower could be mobilised for military expansion. For the Romans, with a professional emphasis, its about 0.5% of population. For "professional core plus massed levies" armies like the Mughals or the Han its 1-2%. If we take the high end of this figure, we use about 8% of the adult male manpower (by my estimate - 10% by Patrick's). Possible, I think. This gives us military strength of about a million to play with.
My impression was that this percentage was of total population, not just adult male manpower. 8% of adult male manpower (8% of 20%) is about 1.6% of total population, which is only a little over the 1% considered to be sustainable as a full time professional army (although Frederick William I's Prussia by dint of dedicated effort maintained 4%).
Given that Xerxes apparently put 12% of his population into the field, the prussians obviously weren't trying!
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 01:16:13 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on May 05, 2018, 12:11:11 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 10:36:43 AM
He speculates that an army could survive on 3,000 or even 2,500 calories a day
I haven't looked at the book yet, but one notes in passing that "survive" and "maintain combat effectiveness" aren't the same thing.
As I say, he doesn't actually calculate on that basis, just notes that an army could be sustained at that level for a time if needs be. The British army ration in WWII was 3,700 calories but often dropped below 3,000 in action. US Army was similar. But in these cases (and similar in WWI) troops were rotated out of the line and receive better rations in rear areas to make up for the effects. This obviously couldn't happen for our Persian expeditionary force, though maybe the Thasos incident may suggest there were occassional high points in a mundane day-to-day existence.
Having now looked at the relevant bits of the book, he makes a good case that a Roman army could remain effective more-or-less indefinitely on 3000 kcal/day, due to Roman soldiers on average being smaller and older than the Americans Engels based his figures on.
Xerxes' soldiers were surely more like Caesar's than Johnson's in terms of size.
If Herodotus' numbers are anywhere close to accurate their average age must also have been above Engels' late adolescents' simply because there wouldn't be enough men in the 16-19 age bracket. (Unless, I guess, we're to suppose the army included massive contingents of child soldiers.)
(If the true numbers were more Delbrückian, I expect the average age would still have been well above 20 but that's based on little but prejudice about how loosely "feudal" armies work.)
On the third appendage, Xerxes' expedition involved an awful lot of marching compared to what the typical Roman or American had to do, so presumably caloric requirements in this particular case were somewhat higher than normal. Acc'd to some numbers I saw somewhere*, marching for eight hours roughly doubles your caloric expenditure compared to sitting around all day, so this is a significant factor.
* One of my sister's biochem textbooks, specifically.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:38:39 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:28:23 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 12:08:35 PM
What really is at issue is what proportion of available manpower could be mobilised for military expansion. For the Romans, with a professional emphasis, its about 0.5% of population. For "professional core plus massed levies" armies like the Mughals or the Han its 1-2%. If we take the high end of this figure, we use about 8% of the adult male manpower (by my estimate - 10% by Patrick's). Possible, I think. This gives us military strength of about a million to play with.
My impression was that this percentage was of total population, not just adult male manpower. 8% of adult male manpower (8% of 20%) is about 1.6% of total population, which is only a little over the 1% considered to be sustainable as a full time professional army (although Frederick William I's Prussia by dint of dedicated effort maintained 4%).
Given that Xerxes apparently put 12% of his population into the field, the prussians obviously weren't trying!
Full time professional (
and equipped with 18th century weapons)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:26:30 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:07:11 PM
Not in the ancient Near East. The Persians did not even have markets.
That would come as a shock to Xenophon
"As for the barbarians, they were terribly frightened; the Cilician queen took to flight in her carriage, and the people in the market27 left their wares behind and took to their heels;"
"As for the troops, their supply of grain gave out, and it was not possible to buy any except in the Lydian52 market attached to the barbarian army of Cyrus,53 at the price of four sigli for a capith of wheat flour or barley meal. "
As I said, the Persians did not even have markets. And they ruled the Empire.
Many of their subjects, Lydians, Ionians, Cilicians and Babylonians, among others, did have markets, but these were local produce exchanges, not overwhelming driving forces of the economy.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:38:39 PM
Given that Xerxes apparently put 12% of his population into the field, the prussians obviously weren't trying!
More accurately, the Prussians did not have a universal military service obligation. Their army was a standing army (particularly during the Great Elector's numerous parades). The Achaemenids followed the Biblical period pattern of mobilising the mass of the population - or as much of it as they felt a need for - when going on campaign.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:34:01 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:07:11 PM
]
The Murashu Archive (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murashu_family) details the activity of a family of Jewish moneylenders. I hardly think it a valid basis for assessing the Achaemenid administrative system.
I suggest you read the book, not the wiki
The Business of the Murasu Firm
To a limited extend the Murasu firm belonged within the "feudal" order. A few texts refer to bow lands that seemingly belonged to members of the family or to agents of the firm. A place named Bit Murasu, "estate of Murasu", suggests an extended domain belonging to the family, but there is no outright confirmation of this suggestion. In at least one case, the Murasu family acquired ownership of a share in a bow fief through an instrument of fictive adoption . In the great majority of its transactions, however, the Murasu house figured not as a participant in the system of land grants but as an accessory to it, undertaking the management of property which belonged, on a variety of titles, to others.
The primary enterprise of the firm was agricultural management. The firm leased land and water from their owners, paying out rents and taxes to the owners or to their representatives. The greater part of these properties was sublet in turn to tenants of the firm, usually along with livestock, equipment, and seed. This process of lease and sublease produced several classes of documents kept in the Archive:leases of property to the firm; formally similar leases to the firm's tenants; and receipts for rents and taxes paid out by the firm.
In essence, they were taking the day-to-day running of estates out of the hands of the owners, leaving these to get on with what they felt was important in life. This kind of thing seems to have been par for the course for Jewish families who did not return to Judah (see the Book of Tobit for a not dissimilar arrangement operated at a higher level by Israelite families under Sargon, Sennacherib and Esarhaddon of Assyria).
QuoteIn addition, the firm provided a second regular service. The Murasus made loans to landholders against pledges of real property. This process accounts for the largest category of texts in the Archive, certificates of obligation (u'iltu) with real security; it also accounts for the occasional mention of pledged lands (bit maskaniiti) in other categories of texts.
A minority of documents deal with diverse transactions of other kinds, secondary to the main lines of the firm's business: work-contracts, redemptions of distrained debtors, litigations, and so on.
"
In that day Tobit remembered the money which he had committed to Gabael in Rhages in Media ..." this is all very familiar.
QuoteAnother crucial sector of the Murasil house's business is entirely undocumented in the Archive. It must be inferred nevertheless. The greatest part of the firm's discernible income, from rentals drawn on its subleases and from repayments of loans, was in the form of produce. But the greatest part of the firm's discernible expenditures, in rents and taxes paid to landholders or their agents, was in the form of silver. The firm must therefore have had a means of converting produce into specie.
A reasonable and logical deduction. The question then arises: what was the origin of this silver?
QuoteCardascia and others have postulated that the Murasils retailed their stores of crops to the urban populations of Nippur and its environs, receiving silver in payment for the sales. It is a plausible suggestion. The sources of demand and supply, and an organization well situated to intervene between them, are clearly in evidence; only the retail mechanism is unattested.
I note the Murasus have become the Murasils, but that triviality aside I would agree there seems to be no good reason why they should not transfer food to city authorities on a regular basis in return for remuneration. Or that they might sell to another Jewish concern which ran retail operations in the cities.
QuoteIf the guess is correct, then it is not surprising that this retail activity left no trace in the Archive: receipts or bills of sale, if any such documents were issued, would naturally have been kept by the buyers, not by the vendors; and inventories or memoranda of the sales business would not have been filed in an Archive consisting primarily of legal records. The Murasil firm, at any rate, whether by sales or by other means, served another function accessory to the system of land tenure, namely monetary exchange. The Murasils acquired silver and supplied it directly, in the form of rents, to landholders,
and indirectly, in the form of taxes, to the Persian crown.
All of which is of genuine interest, although I do not see how it does anything other than indicate that Jews filled many of the financial niches in the Achaemenid Empire, at least in Mesopotamia, and arranged trades, probably with each other, to keep food moving to cities for day-to-day consumption as a means of ensuring the estate met its money obligations.
What none of this demonstrates, at least to my mind, is any suggestion that the entire output of grain was spoken for
consumption-wise before it was even planted. It may well have had its destiny planned, but there is nothing to suggest that the destiny of the whole crop excluded long-term (relatively speaking) storage.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2018, 07:34:32 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:38:39 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:28:23 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 12:08:35 PM
What really is at issue is what proportion of available manpower could be mobilised for military expansion. For the Romans, with a professional emphasis, its about 0.5% of population. For "professional core plus massed levies" armies like the Mughals or the Han its 1-2%. If we take the high end of this figure, we use about 8% of the adult male manpower (by my estimate - 10% by Patrick's). Possible, I think. This gives us military strength of about a million to play with.
My impression was that this percentage was of total population, not just adult male manpower. 8% of adult male manpower (8% of 20%) is about 1.6% of total population, which is only a little over the 1% considered to be sustainable as a full time professional army (although Frederick William I's Prussia by dint of dedicated effort maintained 4%).
Given that Xerxes apparently put 12% of his population into the field, the prussians obviously weren't trying!
Full time professional (and equipped with 18th century weapons)
Given that a lot of them could have been away from home for more than a year that makes them full time and professional in anybodies book
They were hardly going to stop and eke out their incomes with a bit of basket weaving ;)
As for 18th century weapons, cheap mass produced clothing and a massed produced musket is no big deal, Xerxes would have hard it harder because he didn't have mass production
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 07:35:25 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:26:30 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:07:11 PM
Not in the ancient Near East. The Persians did not even have markets.
That would come as a shock to Xenophon
"As for the barbarians, they were terribly frightened; the Cilician queen took to flight in her carriage, and the people in the market27 left their wares behind and took to their heels;"
"As for the troops, their supply of grain gave out, and it was not possible to buy any except in the Lydian52 market attached to the barbarian army of Cyrus,53 at the price of four sigli for a capith of wheat flour or barley meal. "
As I said, the Persians did not even have markets. And they ruled the Empire.
Many of their subjects, Lydians, Ionians, Cilicians and Babylonians, among others, did have markets, but these were local produce exchanges, not overwhelming driving forces of the economy.
That is frankly silly, I'm not wasting time with it.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 07:35:25 AM
More accurately, the Prussians did not have a universal military service obligation. Their army was a standing army (particularly during the Great Elector's numerous parades). The Achaemenids followed the Biblical period pattern of mobilising the mass of the population - or as much of it as they felt a need for - when going on campaign.
Please read some of the documentation they left. We find men who have an obligation to serve, and we find other individuals or institutions who have an obligation to provide men, normally as part deal involving the granting of land. The Persians didn't just sweep up men who got in the way of the press gangs
None of this should be new to you, I even did a slingshot article about it a couple of years back. Babylonian infantry were paid the same as Greek mercenaries. (There is a vague possibility that it might be Babylonian cavalry but either way it means that these were properly recruited men paid sensible money, not hordes recruited by the whip)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 07:35:25 AM
A reasonable and logical deduction. The question then arises: what was the origin of this silver?
apparently you dig it out of the ground
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 07:35:25 AM
I note the Murasus have become the Murasils, but that triviality aside I would agree there seems to be no good reason why they should not transfer food to city authorities on a regular basis in return for remuneration. Or that they might sell to another Jewish concern which ran retail operations in the cities.
There is also no reason why they should not sell it to Babylonians in the market, (after all you've graciously granted the Babylonians a market)
What evidence have you that the city authorities (and if you read the book you'd realise how vague a term that really was) actually wanted to acquire grain other than to feed their own staff (many of whom would be paid by being granted lands anyway)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 07:35:25 AM
All of which is of genuine interest, although I do not see how it does anything other than indicate that Jews filled many of the financial niches in the Achaemenid Empire, at least in Mesopotamia, and arranged trades, probably with each other, to keep food moving to cities for day-to-day consumption as a means of ensuring the estate met its money obligations.
What none of this demonstrates, at least to my mind, is any suggestion that the entire output of grain was spoken for consumption-wise before it was even planted. It may well have had its destiny planned, but there is nothing to suggest that the destiny of the whole crop excluded long-term (relatively speaking) storage.
This is the giddy limit, now you're arguing that a book you've never read, is wrong.
How on earth can you say that it doesn't demonstrate something if you've never read it?
You have completely and utterly missed the entire point of the book. Perhaps you really ought to read it
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:28:23 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 12:08:35 PM
What really is at issue is what proportion of available manpower could be mobilised for military expansion. For the Romans, with a professional emphasis, its about 0.5% of population. For "professional core plus massed levies" armies like the Mughals or the Han its 1-2%. If we take the high end of this figure, we use about 8% of the adult male manpower (by my estimate - 10% by Patrick's). Possible, I think. This gives us military strength of about a million to play with.
My impression was that this percentage was of total population, not just adult male manpower. 8% of adult male manpower (8% of 20%) is about 1.6% of total population, which is only a little over the 1% considered to be sustainable as a full time professional army (although Frederick William I's Prussia by dint of dedicated effort maintained 4%). A comprehensive mobilisation of the Empire's male military manpower would net a somewhat higher figure. A significantly higher figure, in fact, whether one takes 8% or 10% of population.
You've argued in a circle here. 8% x 25% = 2%. 10% x 20% is 2 %.
As to whether a "mass mobilisation" will generate a larger percentage is, surely, back to speculation?
Quote
QuoteQuoteThe essential question being which imposition gets us nearer what actually happened. I am unconvinced that an 'interpretative framework' has anything to offer beyond an expression of preconceptions.
Quote
So, logically, they would have falsified the figures downwards? I suspect continuing to maintain the fiction of an Empire of bottomless military resources suited their purpose better.
But as the 'military resources' concerned were already pushing up daisies, it is hard to see what this would achieve save to further discredit the Empire.
But Herodotus wrote a generation after Xerxes expedition, not a few weeks later. The Persians would have every reason to maintain the image of a huge, powerful empire which could put huge armies in the field. Sorry, I don't there is a killer argument for you in this.
Quote
Individual merit (or lack of it) as a historian does not depend upon position, but on ability and judgement.
This is true. But it also depends on knowledge. And Ctesias certainly had access at high level.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 07:39:05 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2018, 07:34:32 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 05, 2018, 07:38:39 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 05, 2018, 07:28:23 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 05, 2018, 12:08:35 PM
What really is at issue is what proportion of available manpower could be mobilised for military expansion. For the Romans, with a professional emphasis, its about 0.5% of population. For "professional core plus massed levies" armies like the Mughals or the Han its 1-2%. If we take the high end of this figure, we use about 8% of the adult male manpower (by my estimate - 10% by Patrick's). Possible, I think. This gives us military strength of about a million to play with.
My impression was that this percentage was of total population, not just adult male manpower. 8% of adult male manpower (8% of 20%) is about 1.6% of total population, which is only a little over the 1% considered to be sustainable as a full time professional army (although Frederick William I's Prussia by dint of dedicated effort maintained 4%).
Given that Xerxes apparently put 12% of his population into the field, the prussians obviously weren't trying!
Full time professional (and equipped with 18th century weapons)
Given that a lot of them could have been away from home for more than a year that makes them full time and professional in anybodies book
They were hardly going to stop and eke out their incomes with a bit of basket weaving ;)
Cf. #982
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 07:39:05 AMAs for 18th century weapons, cheap mass produced clothing and a massed produced musket is no big deal, Xerxes would have hard it harder because he didn't have mass production
One needs to bear in mind there was no such thing as mass production in the 18th century. The use of machine tools to make parts in quantity only began from the beginning of the 19th century. See here (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_production#Pre-industrial). Muskets were individually hand-made by craftsmen, and there is a great deal more that goes into manufacturing a musket, with it concomitant supply of balls and gunpowder, than goes into a spear - or just a fire-hardened sharpened stick.
So yes, keeping 4% of the population permanently in military service, wearing complicated hand-made uniforms and bearing complex hand-made weapons, was an achievement for the Prussian state, and makes keeping 14% in military service for a couple of years without uniforms or complex weapons quite easy by comparison.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2018, 10:53:58 AM
makes keeping 14% in military service for a couple of years without uniforms or complex weapons quite easy by comparison.
I beg to differ
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 12:25:34 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2018, 10:53:58 AM
makes keeping 14% in military service for a couple of years without uniforms or complex weapons quite easy by comparison.
I beg to differ
Vive la différence! :)
Patrick- please tell me you aren't basing your claims of mass biblical mobilisations on the Bible and in particular the Hebrews.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2018, 12:43:34 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 12:25:34 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 06, 2018, 10:53:58 AM
makes keeping 14% in military service for a couple of years without uniforms or complex weapons quite easy by comparison.
I beg to differ
Vive la différence! :)
;)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 06, 2018, 12:45:52 PM
Patrick- please tell me you aren't basing your claims of mass biblical mobilisations on the Bible and in particular the Hebrews.
I advise against going there. Patrick has particular views about this period of history which would take quite a lot of explanation. We could be seriously distracted.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 06, 2018, 01:51:21 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 06, 2018, 12:45:52 PM
Patrick- please tell me you aren't basing your claims of mass biblical mobilisations on the Bible and in particular the Hebrews.
I advise against going there. Patrick has particular views about this period of history which would take quite a lot of explanation. We could be seriously distracted.
We don't need to, the Persian armies weren't merely conscripted hordes. There were men who had a duty to serve if summoned because they held land or were on the books of an institution which had a duty to provide men. It was a system which might well provide men with as much military training and experience as the hoplites recruited from a small Greek city state
QuoteOn the third appendage, Xerxes' expedition involved an awful lot of marching compared to what the typical Roman or American had to do, so presumably caloric requirements in this particular case were somewhat higher than normal. Acc'd to some numbers I saw somewhere*, marching for eight hours roughly doubles your caloric expenditure compared to sitting around all day, so this is a significant factor.
I think this would be the conclusion of modern militaries. However, it isn't easily detectable in what we know of ancient ration scales, which seem to be higher in a settled location than on the march. But then, we know very little for sure.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 06, 2018, 02:00:28 PM
QuoteOn the third appendage, Xerxes' expedition involved an awful lot of marching compared to what the typical Roman or American had to do, so presumably caloric requirements in this particular case were somewhat higher than normal. Acc'd to some numbers I saw somewhere*, marching for eight hours roughly doubles your caloric expenditure compared to sitting around all day, so this is a significant factor.
I think this would be the conclusion of modern militaries. However, it isn't easily detectable in what we know of ancient ration scales, which seem to be higher in a settled location than on the march. But then, we know very little for sure.
in an ancient context that might merely have been due to ease of supply. We know that the Greeks and some Persian armies had markets with them from which the troops could buy, and these traders would probably do things like 'buying ahead' so they had supplies waiting for them at the next town, rather than just hauling stuff behind the army. Certainly when it's marching through an area which isn't actively hostile
Quotein an ancient context that might merely have been due to ease of supply.
Agreed.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 07:44:23 AM
Please read some of the documentation they left. We find men who have an obligation to serve, and we find other individuals or institutions who have an obligation to provide men, normally as part deal involving the granting of land. The Persians didn't just sweep up men who got in the way of the press gangs
They did not have press gangs: you are right about there being a military service obligation, although only temples and the like seem to have been able to make arrangements to provide manpower for campaigns in order to exempt their own staff. Otherwise the obligation was pretty much universal and it was just a question of how many men up to the prescribed limit the authorities wanted. Xerxes went right to the limit; Artaxerxes more or less went to the limit; Darius (III) did the same. As I mentioned some time previously, there does seem to be a pattern whereby each of six mega-subdivisions in the Achaemenid Empire was responsible for providing 300,000 men (cf. Abrocomas at the time of Cunaxa), and it would have been up to the satraps to ensure their current arrangements covered that number.
QuoteNone of this should be new to you, I even did a slingshot article about it a couple of years back. Babylonian infantry were paid the same as Greek mercenaries. (There is a vague possibility that it might be Babylonian cavalry but either way it means that these were properly recruited men paid sensible money, not hordes recruited by the whip)
Is this based upon a temple document recording the issue of a quanitity of silver in respect of a contingent of about 30 or so men who had just returned from campaign? (Sorry cannot remember the reference/desingation for this one.)
Quote from: Erpingham on May 06, 2018, 10:43:05 AM
You've argued in a circle here. 8% x 25% = 2%. 10% x 20% is 2 %.
As to whether a "mass mobilisation" will generate a larger percentage is, surely, back to speculation?
I do not follow. Just to recap, the standard accepted percentage for a full-time professional army (e.g. Roman) is
1% of population. For an army which spends most of its time doing civilian things but is turned out for war under conscription or similar the standard accepted figure is
10% of population. This is an order of magnitude difference, not speculation.
Quote
But Herodotus wrote a generation after Xerxes expedition, not a few weeks later. The Persians would have every reason to maintain the image of a huge, powerful empire which could put huge armies in the field. Sorry, I don't there is a killer argument for you in this.
But why? Herodotus was not interested in current propaganda but in what had already happened.
Herodotus: "I am interested to learn how many men Xerxes had in his invasion."
Persian: "Oh, millions and millions! We are a great Empire, you know."
Herodotus: "So Greece with about 100,000 troops all told defeated a Persian army in the millions?"
Persian: "Yes; this shows the greatness of our Empire!"Somehow I do not see it. In any event, by the time of Cimon's victories at Eurymedon, any attempt to maintain an image of Persian greatness would have been a total waste of time and a source of nothing but embarrassment.
QuoteQuote
Individual merit (or lack of it) as a historian does not depend upon position, but on ability and judgement.
This is true. But it also depends on knowledge. And Ctesias certainly had access at high level.
Which overall suggests that he wasted a potentially good opportunity.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 06, 2018, 12:45:52 PM
Patrick- please tell me you aren't basing your claims of mass biblical mobilisations on the Bible and in particular the Hebrews.
Those who actually read my posts would have noted the Egyptian and Assyrian references. ;)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 07:50:00 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 07:35:25 AM
I note the Murasus have become the Murasils, but that triviality aside I would agree there seems to be no good reason why they should not transfer food to city authorities on a regular basis in return for remuneration. Or that they might sell to another Jewish concern which ran retail operations in the cities.
There is also no reason why they should not sell it to Babylonians in the market, (after all you've graciously granted the Babylonians a market)
Apart from the absence of records, which to me suggests a Hebrew-Hebrew transaction.
QuoteWhat evidence have you that the city authorities (and if you read the book you'd realise how vague a term that really was) actually wanted to acquire grain other than to feed their own staff (many of whom would be paid by being granted lands anyway)
Because of the way Biblical period armies campaigned. They simply requisitioned supplies from the nearest city. Why did the city have supplies available? 1) Because it needed its own reserve and 2) Because handing out a heap of grain was cheaper and easier to recover from than being sacked.
Interestingly, this supply method persisted into the classical period. Plutarch records how the Battle of Actium saved Chaeronea from being stripped of its food stocks for Anthony's forces - I forget the exact reference, but he states that the citizens had been lined up carrying the city's grain ready to take to Antony's camp when news of the battle came, Antony's officers departed and the citizens thankfully put the grain back into storage.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:31:44 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 07:44:23 AM
Please read some of the documentation they left. We find men who have an obligation to serve, and we find other individuals or institutions who have an obligation to provide men, normally as part deal involving the granting of land. The Persians didn't just sweep up men who got in the way of the press gangs
They did not have press gangs: you are right about there being a military service obligation, although only temples and the like seem to have been able to make arrangements to provide manpower for campaigns in order to exempt their own staff.
No there were individual allotments, parcels of land held by one man. They appear to have been gathered together with other allotments providing men of the same type which seem to have been called Hatru. Sometimes they were men of the same ethnic identifier and somethings it was bow-land, or the men were all army scribes. These men were not affiliated to any institution but might be linked to a private landlord who would collect their tax and pass it on
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:31:44 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 07:44:23 AM
Please read some of the documentation they left. We find men who have an obligation to serve, and we find other individuals or institutions who have an obligation to provide men, normally as part deal involving the granting of land. The Persians didn't just sweep up men who got in the way of the press gangs
Otherwise the obligation was pretty much universal and it was just a question of how many men up to the prescribed limit the authorities wanted. Xerxes went right to the limit;
this is a circular argument, it appears the only evidence for universal obligation is that universal obligation is necessary to produce an army the size that Herodotus gives Xerxes, but of course if Herodotus's figures were wrong, suddenly the need for an otherwise undocumented universal obligation goes
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:31:44 PM
Is this based upon a temple document recording the issue of a quanitity of silver in respect of a contingent of about 30 or so men who had just returned from campaign? (Sorry cannot remember the reference/desingation for this one.)
The temple document provided figures for the pay the men received. This is mainly because we still have temple archives, the foremen of the Hatru would doubtless have been responsible for the same task (they were responsible for collecting taxes or at least some of them) but we don't have any of their archives.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:46:13 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 06, 2018, 10:43:05 AM
You've argued in a circle here. 8% x 25% = 2%. 10% x 20% is 2 %.
As to whether a "mass mobilisation" will generate a larger percentage is, surely, back to speculation?
I do not follow. Just to recap, the standard accepted percentage for a full-time professional army (e.g. Roman) is 1% of population. For an army which spends most of its time doing civilian things but is turned out for war under conscription or similar the standard accepted figure is 10% of population. This is an order of magnitude difference, not speculation.
please give examples of this conscripted army of 10% of the population
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:53:58 PM
There is also no reason why they should not sell it to Babylonians in the market, (after all you've graciously granted the Babylonians a market)
Apart from the absence of records, which to me suggests a Hebrew-Hebrew transaction.
[/quote]
there are records, it wasn't a Hebrew-Hebrew transaction.
Mind you, with names like Enlil-sum-iddin, Enlil-hatin, Rimut-Ninurta and Naqqitu they look pretty well integrated 8)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:53:58 PM
Because of the way Biblical period armies campaigned. They simply requisitioned supplies from the nearest city. Why did the city have supplies available? 1) Because it needed its own reserve and 2) Because handing out a heap of grain was cheaper and easier to recover from than being sacked.
That's a brilliant idea. The Children of Israel turn up at Jericho, the site was about 12 acres in their day, which means using the archaeologists rule of thumb, a population of 2,400. But people from the villages could have flooded in. So say it's population was 4,000.
Along come the children of Israel, all 601,730 fighting men, plus one assumes women and children, plus other males, so perhaps two million of them.
'Hand over your grain reserves or we'll sack you'
'Certainly, Here's our three years grain reserve we keep specially even though we've no facilities to do so.'
"Thank-you, unfortunately that will barely last us two days."
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:53:58 PM
Interestingly, this supply method persisted into the classical period. Plutarch records how the Battle of Actium saved Chaeronea from being stripped of its food stocks for Anthony's forces - I forget the exact reference, but he states that the citizens had been lined up carrying the city's grain ready to take to Antony's camp when news of the battle came, Antony's officers departed and the citizens thankfully put the grain back into storage.
Chaeronea isn't the nearest city, it is 305 km away but a lot of that trip can be made by boat.
Interestingly Antony's army and fleet were perhaps 150,000 strong. Might be 200,000 depending on allied contingents etc. After a couple of months in Greece even a tiny army like Anthony's was stripping everything up to 300km away just to stay alive.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:47:26 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 06, 2018, 12:45:52 PM
Patrick- please tell me you aren't basing your claims of mass biblical mobilisations on the Bible and in particular the Hebrews.
Those who actually read my posts would have noted the Egyptian and Assyrian references. ;)
My mental health training would advise me not to encourage you. :P
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 09:36:35 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:31:44 PM
Otherwise the obligation was pretty much universal and it was just a question of how many men up to the prescribed limit the authorities wanted. Xerxes went right to the limit;
this is a circular argument, it appears the only evidence for universal obligation is that universal obligation is necessary to produce an army the size that Herodotus gives Xerxes, but of course if Herodotus's figures were wrong, suddenly the need for an otherwise undocumented universal obligation goes
If.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 09:38:40 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:31:44 PM
Is this based upon a temple document recording the issue of a quanitity of silver in respect of a contingent of about 30 or so men who had just returned from campaign? (Sorry cannot remember the reference/desingation for this one.)
The temple document provided figures for the pay the men received. This is mainly because we still have temple archives, the foremen of the Hatru would doubtless have been responsible for the same task (they were responsible for collecting taxes or at least some of them) but we don't have any of their archives.
It is just that I remember running into something like this elsewhere in which a document detailing the expenditure of a one-time sum in respect of a returning contingent of cavalry under the aegis of the temple was proclaimed as 'evidence' that Babyonian troops 'received pay' and were thus 'mercenaries'. On examination, this assertion fell apart because if the troops concerned had been mercenaries, a) they had the wrong paymaster (the temple instead of the state), b) the amount of money was not divisible by the number of soldiers in any shape or form and c) the payment was issued after not during the campaign. The transaction actually made more sense as a one-off payment to replace missing/defective equipment in order to bring the contingent up to scratch for next time.
In a discussion elsewhere, someone sought to prove that the Achaemenids had mercenaries other than Greeks by taking references to tribal 'mercenaries' from Thucydides. This was misleading: tribal troops could be (and were) acquired for a payment, but they were not mercenaries in the sense we understand the term. What happened was that the hirer made a present to the tirbal chief and the chief sent some of his men to do the hirer's bidding. We incidentally see this kind of process in Tacitus
Annals VI.33 except the Sarmatians refine the process by accepting rival bids and keeping the sums bestowed by both winer and loser.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 09:44:40 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:53:58 PM
Apart from the absence of records, which to me suggests a Hebrew-Hebrew transaction.
there are records, it wasn't a Hebrew-Hebrew transaction.
Mind you, with names like Enlil-sum-iddin, Enlil-hatin, Rimut-Ninurta and Naqqitu they look pretty well integrated 8)
Erm ... "
Cardascia and others have postulated that the Murasils retailed their stores of crops to the urban populations of Nippur and its environs, receiving silver in payment for the sales. It is a plausible suggestion. The sources of demand and supply, and an organization well situated to intervene between them, are clearly in evidence; only the retail mechanism is unattested."
I thought 'postulated' and 'unattested' signified an absence of records in respect of this aspect. ;)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 09:57:24 PM
That's a brilliant idea. The Children of Israel turn up at Jericho, the site was about 12 acres in their day, which means using the archaeologists rule of thumb, a population of 2,400. But people from the villages could have flooded in. So say it's population was 4,000.
Along come the children of Israel, all 601,730 fighting men, plus one assumes women and children, plus other males, so perhaps two million of them.
'Hand over your grain reserves or we'll sack you'
'Certainly, Here's our three years grain reserve we keep specially even though we've no facilities to do so.'
"Thank-you, unfortunately that will barely last us two days."
Which shows how even a modest population can sustain a really sizeable army on the move - provided it stays on the move. Given the density of cities in the Fertile Crescent, the average Egyptian or Assyrian army would have had little difficulty remaining in supply. They would have numbered in the hundreds of thousands (at most) rather than millions, and would have been drawing from major cities rather than pocket-size settlements.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 10:07:16 PM
After a couple of months in Greece even a tiny army like Anthony's was stripping everything up to 300km away just to stay alive.
Or it was stripping cities in rotation, quite possibly in advance, and had got as far as Boeotia. In fact Octavian's army and fleet were also present and presumably stripping the near side of northern Greece, and Greece itself had been pretty thoroughly combed in 49-8 BC by Pompey and Caesar following a century of less-than-happy existence under Roman rule, so the Greece of 31 BC may have compared very poorly with the Greece of 480 BC. That said, it was sustaining Antony's and Octavian's forces and apparently neither had yet touched Thessaly, so there was still plenty of potential remaining - at least from the viewpoint of the Romans. The inhabitants probably saw it differently!
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 06, 2018, 10:43:57 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:47:26 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 06, 2018, 12:45:52 PM
Patrick- please tell me you aren't basing your claims of mass biblical mobilisations on the Bible and in particular the Hebrews.
Those who actually read my posts would have noted the Egyptian and Assyrian references. ;)
My mental health training would advise me not to encourage you. :P
Ian, if you have a substantive point to make, please make it.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:46:40 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 06, 2018, 09:36:35 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:31:44 PM
Otherwise the obligation was pretty much universal and it was just a question of how many men up to the prescribed limit the authorities wanted. Xerxes went right to the limit;
this is a circular argument, it appears the only evidence for universal obligation is that universal obligation is necessary to produce an army the size that Herodotus gives Xerxes, but of course if Herodotus's figures were wrong, suddenly the need for an otherwise undocumented universal obligation goes
If.
of course, that is what the discussion is about, so you cannot produce a supposition to claim Herodotus's figures are right if that supposition is based on Herototus's figures
If you claim that there was universal obligation to serve, then you should produce evidence of that universal obligation. My comments about how the army was recruited are based on original records from the time.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:46:40 AM
It is just that I remember running into something like this elsewhere in which a document detailing the expenditure of a one-time sum in respect of a returning contingent of cavalry under the aegis of the temple was proclaimed as 'evidence' that Babyonian troops 'received pay' and were thus 'mercenaries'.
it was not my example
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:46:13 PM
Just to recap, the standard accepted percentage for a full-time professional army (e.g. Roman) is 1% of population. For an army which spends most of its time doing civilian things but is turned out for war under conscription or similar the standard accepted figure is 10% of population. This is an order of magnitude difference, not speculation.
Quote
Could you quote the source of this standard? Does it apply only to the ancient period or a general rule?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:46:40 AM
Erm ... "Cardascia and others have postulated that the Murasils retailed their stores of crops to the urban populations of Nippur and its environs, receiving silver in payment for the sales. It is a plausible suggestion. The sources of demand and supply, and an organization well situated to intervene between them, are clearly in evidence; only the retail mechanism is unattested."
I thought 'postulated' and 'unattested' signified an absence of records in respect of this aspect. ;)
good you've now read something other than Herodotus, so you'll now be in a position to answer your own question as to where the silver came from.
Note the reason that Cardascia and others suggested this is that there is no evidence of direct sales to institutions either. This is for two reasons, one is explained by the nature of the archive, the second is that institutions tended to have their own lands to feed their own people
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:46:40 AM
Which shows how even a modest population can sustain a really sizeable army on the move - provided it stays on the move. Given the density of cities in the Fertile Crescent, the average Egyptian or Assyrian army would have had little difficulty remaining in supply. They would have numbered in the hundreds of thousands (at most) rather than millions, and would have been drawing from major cities rather than pocket-size settlements.
Provided that these modest populations habitually stored three years supplies (for which we have no evidence whatsoever, especially given the level of excavation in Jericho)
Also provided they kept moving. Having to sit in front of Jericho for seven days rather screws the business model.
Also not that Jericho was a major city. In 1800BC even a great city such as Babylon is estimated at only 65,000 and Memphis at 30,000
Given that Egypt had a population of about 3 to 3.5 million (mid point of estimates) in the New Kingdom armies of millions are most unlikely
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:46:40 AM
Or it was stripping cities in rotation, quite possibly in advance, and had got as far as Boeotia. In fact Octavian's army and fleet were also present and presumably stripping the near side of northern Greece, and Greece itself had been pretty thoroughly combed in 49-8 BC by Pompey and Caesar following a century of less-than-happy existence under Roman rule, so the Greece of 31 BC may have compared very poorly with the Greece of 480 BC. That said, it was sustaining Antony's and Octavian's forces and apparently neither had yet touched Thessaly, so there was still plenty of potential remaining - at least from the viewpoint of the Romans. The inhabitants probably saw it differently!
Sorry but what do you mean by stripping cities in rotation? By definition, once you've stripped a city you're unlikely to be able to go back to it to strip it again
The reason they hadn't touched Thessaly was because they couldn't get to it. Remember, unless you can use water transport, your convoys eat their load
Quote from: Erpingham on May 07, 2018, 09:20:42 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:46:13 PM
Just to recap, the standard accepted percentage for a full-time professional army (e.g. Roman) is 1% of population. For an army which spends most of its time doing civilian things but is turned out for war under conscription or similar the standard accepted figure is 10% of population. This is an order of magnitude difference, not speculation.
Quote
Could you quote the source of this standard? Does it apply only to the ancient period or a general rule?
It is a general rule, and I had hitherto thought a universally-known one. Of all the points in this discussion, I had not expected this one to be questioned by anybody.
But since we now have two people questioning it, try this (https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/12/ACF1396.pdf).
The key extract:
"
The World War II armed forces represented about 12 percent of the population and included about
56 percent of the men eligible for military service on the basis of age, health, and mental aptitude."
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 07, 2018, 09:18:34 AM
of course, that is what the discussion is about, so you cannot produce a supposition to claim Herodotus's figures are right if that supposition is based on Herototus's figures
That cuts both ways, the difference in weight of evidence being that we have Herodotus' account but not a contrary one.
QuoteIf you claim that there was universal obligation to serve, then you should produce evidence of that universal obligation. My comments about how the army was recruited are based on original records from the time.
But from specific (temple) records giving a rather incomplete picture. Or are you claiming that the entire Achaemenid army consisted of small contingents raised by temples? (I trust not.)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 07, 2018, 09:33:12 AM
Given that Egypt had a population of about 3 to 3.5 million (mid point of estimates) in the New Kingdom armies of millions are most unlikely
Can you produce actual evidence for a population of this size? ;)
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 07, 2018, 09:35:29 AM
Sorry but what do you mean by stripping cities in rotation? By definition, once you've stripped a city you're unlikely to be able to go back to it to strip it again
Apologies, I used a vague expression: I meant stripping them in turn, one by one. Last week Thebes, this week Orchomenus, next week Chaeronea, that sort of thing.
QuoteThe reason they hadn't touched Thessaly was because they couldn't get to it. Remember, unless you can use water transport, your convoys eat their load
There is that, although they could get to it if they wanted, the same way as Caesar. It would have meant sending the fleets (and Agrippa and Cleopatra) elsewhere, though. This would presumably have been 'Plan B' had they not engaged at Actium.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:46:51 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 07, 2018, 09:20:42 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 06, 2018, 08:46:13 PM
Just to recap, the standard accepted percentage for a full-time professional army (e.g. Roman) is 1% of population. For an army which spends most of its time doing civilian things but is turned out for war under conscription or similar the standard accepted figure is 10% of population. This is an order of magnitude difference, not speculation.
Quote
Could you quote the source of this standard? Does it apply only to the ancient period or a general rule?
It is a general rule, and I had hitherto thought a universally-known one. Of all the points in this discussion, I had not expected this one to be questioned by anybody.
But since we now have two people questioning it, try this (https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/12/ACF1396.pdf).
The key extract:
"The World War II armed forces represented about 12 percent of the population and included about
56 percent of the men eligible for military service on the basis of age, health, and mental aptitude."
The ancient world worked differently. As far as I can see, Soldiers were drawn from certain social classes which had a specific obligation to serve if called. Other classes had no such obligation, indeed the state had a vested interest in keeping them unarmed. Perhaps you could give an example of an ancient state that maintained a force of 12% of the population on active service outside their country
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:57:35 PM
But from specific (temple) records giving a rather incomplete picture. Or are you claiming that the entire Achaemenid army consisted of small contingents raised by temples? (I trust not.)
do you actually bother reading what I write? I specifically pointed out that various groups were formed into hatru that did not report to institutions.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:57:35 PM
Can you produce actual evidence for a population of this size? ;)
yes but be damned if I'm going to produce it twice
I'm abandoning this thread as a waste of time. The more research I do the more fatuous the claimed size of the Persian army seems and life is to short to be bothered. If Patrick wants to believe it, that's entirely up to him
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 07, 2018, 08:03:58 PM
The ancient world worked differently. As far as I can see, Soldiers were drawn from certain social classes which had a specific obligation to serve if called. Other classes had no such obligation, indeed the state had a vested interest in keeping them unarmed. Perhaps you could give an example of an ancient state that maintained a force of 12% of the population on active service outside their country
This, although impeccably Hellenistic, to me looks incorrect for the Biblical period and Achamenid Empire: everyone was armed at need, and only the Egyptians are attested (by Herodotus) as maintaining a separate warrior class - which did not prevent peasants from being mobilised in, for example, the three-sided civil war which Agesilaus ("It is not their numbers I fear but their ignorance") won for his patron pretender.
Since the state controlled the armouries, keeping the bulk of the population unarmed was the ground state of being. It also meant that weapons were not neglected, sold, passed to outlaws etc. and by combining the census with the armoury lists one knew how many armed men (I hesitate to use the term 'soldiers') one could field.
Charioteers and royal guards were of course permanently maintained, requiring as they did skill levels in excess of those required to move in a group and carry a spear. Archers would have needed, and Egyptian archers certainly received, regular training and practice.
If we had reliable population figures for the ancient states, it would be possible to show what percentage of the population was maintained on campaigns of conquest: here, Thutmose III, with his extended campaigns and impressive naval logistical support, would probably take the prize, but if there is anything in Diodorus' description of Semiramis' invasion of India, Thutmose might find himself eclipsed. We do however need
reliable figures for these ancient populations, and right now we do not have them. This is why the 1% full-time professional, 10% optimal and 20% maximum available manpower figures are taken from other, more recent, societies for which we do have reliable population records. There would seem to be no good reason why these would not retrofit into previous civilisations.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 07, 2018, 08:07:58 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:57:35 PM
Can you produce actual evidence for a population of this size? ;)
yes but be damned if I'm going to produce it twice
Then if we use the figures we have, Tacitus' 700,000 soliders for Thutmose III is 20% of Jim's 3.5 million population for 18th Dynasty Egypt and QED we have the perfect example of a Biblical period state maintaining up to 20% of its population on extended campaigns outside its borders. That a significant part of the army would have consisted of Libyans and Ethiopians (Kushites) is why I put 'up to'.
Quote from: Jim Webster on May 07, 2018, 08:11:12 PM
I'm abandoning this thread as a waste of time. The more research I do the more fatuous the claimed size of the Persian army seems and life is to short to be bothered. If Patrick wants to believe it, that's entirely up to him
While I am impressed by Jim's research, I do feel it is dragged into erroneous conclusions. However neither of us are to be moved so we may as well conclude matters here.
Only 70 pages Jim, your slacking...
You cannot debate facts with faith, they only accept facts supporting their faith position.
Quite why they need facts to support their faith baffles me, but still they keep starting arguments to prove their faith, and folk join in.
At 70 pages, it looks like Herodotus outlasts othismos.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 07, 2018, 07:46:51 PM
But since we now have two people questioning it, try this (https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/12/ACF1396.pdf).
The key extract:
"The World War II armed forces represented about 12 percent of the population and included about
56 percent of the men eligible for military service on the basis of age, health, and mental aptitude."
Thanks for finding this - I'd used this in one of our earlier versions of an army size debate and lost the reference. As you can clearly see, it does not support your contention, for only once does the US army reach 10% of the population and even then in the text, not the graph, which has 9%. This isn't too surprising - there are lots of estimates of the US forces in WWII on the internet and they vary from 9-12 % . Interestingly, there are some much higher estimates of the Civil War percentage elsewhere. You could have gone with WWI mobilisations in Europe - they come in around 10%. Napoleon's Grand Armee has about 850,000 Frenchmen out of 38 million, so about 2%. But where are all these modern examples taking us, except for the fact that armies of 10% were rare and belong to industrial states? Why not stick with a more like-for-like comparison?
Having read through, I'm happy to wind up. I think we made some progress on this round because Justin was keen to try to explore the mechanics of the operation, which provided some interest in how ancient logistics worked. It is a shame he didn't in the end produce a coherent idea of how he thought the Persians might have carried out the operation but at least he put the bare bones out there - the advanced labour corps, the Great 600m Road, the depots, the prebuilt camps with their stacked forage every 20km or so, the occassional corporate hospitality sessions that overcame the monotony of the basic rations. Nor did we quite bottom the integration with the fleet. And there are still more aspects which we haven't entirely covered, like the nature of the Persian army (Patrick and Jim, for example, have completely different models of how it worked), or how the army was led (there is an implication of a high degree of organisation, yet suggestions of organised "whip-men", a sort of commissar/provost function) and, of course, the perennial - How could an army of such a assumed high level of discipline and organisation not transfer this to the battlefield? Plenty there for another thread or another time :)
Quote from: Erpingham on May 08, 2018, 09:04:32 AM
Thanks for finding this - I'd used this in one of our earlier versions of an army size debate and lost the reference. As you can clearly see, it does not support your contention, for only once does the US army reach 10% of the population and even then in the text, not the graph, which has 9%.
I would like to clear up this point as the goalposts appear to be moving.
What I thought was at issue was whether or not the conventional wisdom was that potential prime military manpower was 10% of population or not. An example was demanded, so an example was provided. Where the idea emerged that 10% must be mustered every time, I do not know.
QuoteThis isn't too surprising - there are lots of estimates of the US forces in WWII on the internet and they vary from 9-12 % . Interestingly, there are some much higher estimates of the Civil War percentage elsewhere. You could have gone with WWI mobilisations in Europe - they come in around 10%. Napoleon's Grand Armee has about 850,000 Frenchmen out of 38 million, so about 2%. But where are all these modern examples taking us, except for the fact that armies of 10% were rare and belong to industrial states? Why not stick with a more like-for-like comparison?
Where they take us is to the realisation that prime military manpower is generally accepted to be 10% of population. A polity making a mass levy as opposed to relying upon a permanent professional army will field a proportion of population closer to 10% than 1% - if it can organise its manpower. If it can organise and control its manpower well enough, has the weaponry and feels the need, it might field more than 10% of the population.
I suggest that if this subject is to be pursued we might make it a separate topic. We could then look at any number of attested period forces and make educated guesses about their populations.
Can you class conscripts' as prime ?
I doubt it, and the actual examples are all of conscripts' in times of extreme
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 08, 2018, 07:35:10 PMWhat I thought was at issue was whether or not the conventional wisdom was that potential prime military manpower was 10% of population or not. An example was demanded, so an example was provided.... We could then look at any number of attested period forces and make educated guesses about their populations.
I am confused by this particular interest in precedents, because it does not directly address the problem of Herodotus' number.
While the data would be fascinating, looking at precedent mobilizations, only gives us an estimate of what the Persian empire might have been able to mobilize. It does not address the problem at hand.
More directly relevant to the problem of Herodotus' number would be a precedent for any state, moving such a massive number of soldiers, through such a small space, in such a small amount of time.
I don't think that any state has ever moved so many soldiers, through such a small space, in such a small amount of time. It is without precedent. I concede that this is a sweeping statement, but its a succinct claim and therefore falsifiable... if we can come up with a relevant pattern of precedents.
Quote from: Mark G on May 08, 2018, 09:20:41 PM
Can you class conscripts' as prime ?
Absolutely: this is to do with age category, not level of training. I thought people knew all this.
Quote from: Dangun on May 09, 2018, 01:54:02 AM
I am confused by this particular interest in precedents, because it does not directly address the problem of Herodotus' number.
Which is why I suggest continuing any manpower-as-a-percentage-of-population discussion in a different thread.
QuoteMore directly relevant to the problem of Herodotus' number would be a precedent for any state, moving such a massive number of soldiers, through such a small space, in such a small amount of time.
Which particular small space would that be? We actually have a quantifiable 'small space' in the bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, as previously discussed. Nowhere else do we have such a reliable and quanitifiable restricted transit route or a firm timing for its transit by Xerxes' army.
And I wonder what use it may be seeking a precedent for an event contemporaries considered to be unprecedented.
We'll Patrick, if you class the Marie Louise's as prime fighting men, it really says all there is to say about your opinions
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 09, 2018, 07:21:03 AM
Which particular small space would that be?
Take your pick really.
I have no view on Xerxes' route.
Pick a bridge or a campsite or a valley they passed through, whatever you prefer.
I think it will be difficult to find any pre-modern example, let alone a pattern of examples, whereby so many soldiers, passed through such a small space in such a short period of time.
So it would be compelling if we could!
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 08, 2018, 07:35:10 PM
Where the idea emerged that 10% must be mustered every time, I do not know.
Could it be statements like
Quote
Where they take us is to the realisation that prime military manpower is generally accepted to be 10% of population.
You seem to flip between a "generally accepted" rule and the idea it didn't apply every time. In fact, from the example given, it applied once is over 200 years and that in the mature industrial age.
I think part of the problem is the concept of a super organised Persian state. What evidence, other than the circular argument from Herodotus' figures, do we have for this?
Quote from: Mark G on May 09, 2018, 07:49:18 AM
We'll Patrick, if you class the Marie Louise's as prime fighting men, it really says all there is to say about your opinions
To be fair to Patrick, his 10% does include a full 50% of support forces who clearly weren't thought of as prime fighting anything.
QuoteThis is why the 1% full-time professional, 10% optimal and 20% maximum available manpower figures are taken from other, more recent, societies for which we do have reliable population records. There would seem to be no good reason why these would not retrofit into previous civilisations.
How about a totally different social structure and level of technology?
I suspect our lack of solid figures will take us nowhere with this line of argument. But, having had to look at comparative figures as part of the argument, using internet available examples, a working hypothesis that ancient empires could mobilise 1-2% of their population for war seems justified.
Addendum : I've looked again at the Roman Republic figures, which, according to some, show much greater mobilisations. Part of the problem is that Roman Republican figures are often quoted as % of citizens and that as a percentage of the population needs to be estimated. Approximately a third of Rome's population were slaves, presumably in higher than natural proportions of adults, which throws us off on the rules of thumb. However, it can be said Rome often had 25% of male citizens under arms. This may be up to 4% of the total population.
It seems also we will have some problems in generally applying these percentages just using an Empire population estimate, because population densities of the individual parts varied but many of the representives of the outer reaches of the Empire only supplied symbolic contingents, not proportional to their manpower. Overall, I think we have taken this as far as it can be stretched, which frankly isn't that far.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 09, 2018, 08:57:52 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 08, 2018, 07:35:10 PM
Where the idea emerged that 10% must be mustered every time, I do not know.
Could it be statements like
Quote
Where they take us is to the realisation that prime military manpower is generally accepted to be 10% of population.
You seem to flip between a "generally accepted" rule and the idea it didn't apply every time. In fact, from the example given, it applied once is over 200 years and that in the mature industrial age.
There is a difference between prime military manpower being available and being used. It is always available; it will only be fully used if the person in charge a) sees a compelling need and b) has the authority and organisation to reach and retain everyone in that category (which was definitely not the case in many of the American instances, which are also complicated by a high rate of desertion).
The generally accepted rule is that 10% of your population is prime military manpower. Another 10% is usable as military manpower but wil be challenged by anything more demanding than garrison work. This does not mean that every time there is a fight everyone in these categories wil be called up - indeed, full mobilisation, especially for an expedition outside one's own borders, is likely to be the exception rather than the rule (as far as we know, the Achaemenids did it only once).
QuoteI think part of the problem is the concept of a super organised Persian state. What evidence, other than the circular argument from Herodotus' figures, do we have for this?
There is a lot of evidence of Achaemenid bureaucracy lying around, whether hides in Egypt or clay tablets in Babylon. We also have, for example, Diodorus' accounts of the attempts to reconquer Egypt, involving significant numbers (220,000 men and 600 triremes first time round; 330,000 men and 600 triremes the second time)and extensive preparations over more than one year. This suggests a high level and degree of organisation.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 09, 2018, 09:25:43 AM
QuoteThis is why the 1% full-time professional, 10% optimal and 20% maximum available manpower figures are taken from other, more recent, societies for which we do have reliable population records. There would seem to be no good reason why these would not retrofit into previous civilisations.
How about a totally different social structure and level of technology?
This would, if anything, work in favour of a higher mobilisation percentage because nobody is needed to man all the technology (factories, power stations, railways, etc.).
QuoteI suspect our lack of solid figures will take us nowhere with this line of argument. But, having had to look at comparative figures as part of the argument, using internet available examples, a working hypothesis that ancient empires could mobilise 1-2% of their population for war seems justified.
That depends upon the empire. What percentage of their population did Mongols mobilise, for example? And how did the Romans run so short of manpower after Cannae as to be mobilising slaves if they only put around 2% of their men in their army?
Our friends in Livescience (https://www.livescience.com/9732-ancient-rome-real-population-revealed.html) estimate that
"
From the middle of the third to the end of the second centuries B.C., the adult male population was estimated to have risen from about 200,000 to 400,000 individuals."
A Roman census covered only adult males. This would give a total population of 500,000 (c.250 BC) increasing to 1,000,000 (c.101 BC). By 218 BC it might have been c.625,000 giving a prime manpower figure of 65,000. 4% of this population (625,000) is, incidentally, 25,000 men or the equivalent of five legions.
In 218 BC Rome loses the Battle of the Trebia and perhaps 8,000 legionaries (10,000 of 18,000 get away). In 217 BC it loses at Trasimene with another c.15,000 killed or captured. That is 23,000 out of the potential 65,000. In 217 BC Fabius avoids any significant loss, but in 216 BC eight legions are committed - and lost - at Cannae, for about 30,000 further casualties (if Livy is right about 10,000 getting back to Rome one way or another).
Rome has thus lost the services of c.53,000 men in four years, exclusive of another perhaps 10,000 or so in another army wiped out by Gauls in 216 BC. So of the prime military manpower with which Rome began 218 BC, it is now down to scrapings. In theory there are only about 2,000 men left; in practice, four years worth of youngsters will have grown up to boost the total somewhat. Rome is still desperately short of men, so it is no real surprise that unprecedented methods of recruitment are used to tap into the non-prime category to fill out the numbers.
What may be misleading is that Rome rarely if ever fielded its entire manpower at any one time: it instead decided upon the number of legions to be enrolled for a particular year and a particular purpose, the default being four legions divided between two consuls (which would be c.20,000 men or slightly under 4% of the population). As the Second Punic War continued, this total rose to six, eight or even more in any given year - which blows the 4% figure (let alone 2%) out of the water; the eight legions at Cannae make it at least 8% and the other two in Gallia Cisalpina the same year bring it up to 10%.
QuoteI suspect our lack of solid figures will take us nowhere with this line of argument.
If you feel that point has been reached, we can call it a day.
Quote from: Dangun on May 09, 2018, 08:53:44 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 09, 2018, 07:21:03 AM
Which particular small space would that be?
Take your pick really.
I have no view on Xerxes' route.
Pick a bridge or a campsite or a valley they passed through, whatever you prefer.
I think it will be difficult to find any pre-modern example, let alone a pattern of examples, whereby so many soldiers, passed through such a small space in such a short period of time.
So it would be compelling if we could!
Let us take a bridge, specifically the bridge of boats Xerxes' army used to cross the Hellespont. This is measurable because it was one trireme (or pentekonter) wide, and triremes and pentekonters had very similar dimensions, of which the important one is a length of c.120 feet. This would be about the width of the bridge. Screens were erected on both sides, which may or may not have constricted slightly the available width for passage.
We can try 120 feet (maximum) and 90 feet (minimum) for the width of the bridge. We have to get 1,700,000 soldiers across it in a specific time interval, which Herodotus gives as seven days and seven nights of continuous operation.
I am going to assume half normal walking speed to cater for organisational slackness and muddle, intervals between units and other potential sources of delay and hindrance. This gives a speed of advance of 1.5 miles per hour, or 2,640 yards per hour. Herodotus mentions the troops crossed 'under the lash' so they presumably did not dawdle.
I shall further assume that the men moved across with an individual depth and frontage of six feet. This may be over-generous but at least we know that whatever number passes through is not being over-estimated.
With a 120-foot wide bridge we get 120/6 = 20 men abreast. The rate of advance is 2,640/2 = 1,320 men per hour per file. The bridge allows 20 files abreast. This brings 1,360x20 or 26,400 men over the bridge every hour.
There are 24 hours in the day and Herodotus tells us the crossing was non-stop. 26,400x24 = 633,600 men per day. In three days 1,900,800 men could have crossed under these circumstances, i.e. the bridge had the capacity to pass
double the force given by Herodotus in the time period specified.
Assuming a bridge only 90 feet wide brings 3/4 of that total, i.e. 1,425,600 men, across in this same three-day period.
The baggage crossed by its own separate bridge, so does not need to be reckoned into this calculation.
What this demonstrates is that given the details in Herodotus, Xerxes' army could have been a lot larger than Herodotus mentions. Specifically, as it took seven days and seven nights to cross, it could have been
double the size Herodotus gives.
Xerxes' army thus passes with flying colours the only time-and-motion constriction study for which we have any sort of figures. Indeed, there is much potential slack in their throughput, which allows for a considerable level of sloth in the process. Adding in 100,000 mounted troops including a number of chariots adds little to the timing: allowing horses 20 wide with 6' frontage per animal and 9' of depth per animal and crossing at the same speed (e.g. if the men are leading their mounts) brings over 880x20 = 17,600 cavalry per hour so about six hours to clear the lot. Add another two hours for a 90' wide bridge. Everyone is still over in about half the stipulated time.
We can even drop the average rate of advance to a sluggish three quarters of a mile per hour and everyone still makes it over within the time limit.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 09, 2018, 09:53:55 PM
Xerxes' army thus passes with flying colours the only time-and-motion constriction study for which we have any sort of figures.
While that is interesting, it is not what I meant. I apologise for being unclear.
I was asking whether there were
different examples from history, where so many soldiers, passed through such a small space (as your bridge), in such a small amount of time.
A pattern of comparable examples will mitigate incredulity.
To repeat a previous question.
.what is your basis for this generally accepted 10% + 10% man power rule?
Quote from: Mark G on May 10, 2018, 06:24:37 AM
To repeat a previous question.
.what is your basis for this generally accepted 10% + 10% man power rule?
The same as those who habitually employ it.
Since this is not explained with every use, it goes something like this. Traditionally, in most populations, men from 16 to 60 can be expected to perform military service with at least some effect. Everyone else is too young, too old or too female to be considered (except among Amazons). Given the usual population distributions by age and gender demographers have come to expect throughout history, this means that 20% of the population is usually male and 16 to 60. Those best capable of military service are the 18 to 40 year olds, who are about equal in number to the 16-17 year olds plus the 41-60 year olds.
These numbers will not be true of absolutely every society everywhere, but they are good enough for the societies normally studied in a military context.
Quote from: Dangun on May 09, 2018, 11:53:09 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 09, 2018, 09:53:55 PM
Xerxes' army thus passes with flying colours the only time-and-motion constriction study for which we have any sort of figures.
While that is interesting, it is not what I meant. I apologise for being unclear.
I was asking whether there were different examples from history, where so many soldiers, passed through such a small space (as your bridge), in such a small amount of time.
A pattern of comparable examples will mitigate incredulity.
There were, although the problem is that historians need to have taken the trouble to record them. We have, for example, no figures for how many of Maxentius' soldiers managed to rout across the Milvian Bridge (AD 312) before it collapsed, or the bridge's dimensions. If we could find the campaign archives of Thutmose III we might have firm figures for his army size and transit time for the Beth-horon pass; this was also traversed (under opposition) by Cestius' army of occupation in AD 66 but we lack the strength of his army and the time of transit. What we do get is:
"Now the Jews did not so much press upon them when they were in large open places; but when they were penned up in their descent through narrow passages, then did some of them get before, and hindered them from getting out of them; and others of them thrust the hinder-most down into the lower places; and
the whole multitude extended themselves over against the neck of the passage, and covered the Roman army with their darts." - Josephus,
Jewish War II.19 [547] (Whiston)
Not sure if that particularly helps.
Usually what we get is something like:
"Learning that the enemy were near, Marius
rapidly crossed the Alps, and built a fortified camp along the river Rhone. Into this he brought together an abundance of stores, that he might never be forced by lack of provisions to give battle contrary to his better judgment." - Plutarch,
Caius Marius 15.1-2
Not ideal for analysis, but at least a substantial force 'rapidly crossing' a restricted transit point. As for the opposition, who are given as at least 300,000 fighting men plus women, children etc.
"The Barbarians divided themselves into two bands, and it fell to the lot of the Cimbri to proceed through Noricum in the interior of the country against Catulus, and force a passage there, while the Teutones and Ambrones were to march through Liguria along the sea-coast against Marius." -
idem 15.4
"On the part of the Cimbri there was considerable delay and loss of time, but the Teutones and Ambrones
set out at once, passed through the intervening country, and made their appearance before Marius. Their numbers were limitless, they were hideous in their aspect, and their speech and cries were unlike those of other peoples. They covered a large part of the plain, and after pitching their camp challenged Marius to battle." -
idem 15.5
Again, our parameters are 'the Ligurian sea coast', 'set out at once, passed through the intervening country' and 'limitless numbers'. This gives effect rather than information.
So while we can say that there are other recorded cases of large armies moving through small or seemingly small spaces (and these are not the only ones), they are not properly quantified. If this is satisfactory, all well and good. If not, we shall probably need a time machine. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 09, 2018, 09:25:44 PM
There is a lot of evidence of Achaemenid bureaucracy lying around, whether hides in Egypt or clay tablets in Babylon. We also have, for example, Diodorus' accounts of the attempts to reconquer Egypt, involving significant numbers (220,000 men and 600 triremes first time round; 330,000 men and 600 triremes the second time)and extensive preparations over more than one year. This suggests a high level and degree of organisation.
Well, assuming Diodorus has the correct figures, these armies deploy 5-10% of Xerxes army. The issue isn't that the Achaemenids could organise or that they had big armies. Your belief in Herodotus' figures demands a level of organisation above all pre-modern armies.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 09, 2018, 09:25:43 AM
How about a totally different social structure and level of technology?
Quote
This would, if anything, work in favour of a higher mobilisation percentage because nobody is needed to man all the technology (factories, power stations, railways, etc.).
Exactly - to get 10% you need a different society and/or more technology
Quote
Our friends in Livescience (https://www.livescience.com/9732-ancient-rome-real-population-revealed.html) estimate that
"From the middle of the third to the end of the second centuries B.C., the adult male population was estimated to have risen from about 200,000 to 400,000 individuals."
The best study I found was this paper (https://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/110502.pdf). The military is specifically refered to on p11-14. I think the weak point is he only addresses citizen numbers, so if you want to get a percentage of the population as a whole, as opposed to the militarily qualified population, you need to add those slaves in, which I did based on a general consensus that about 1/3 of the population were unfree.
QuoteI suspect our lack of solid figures will take us nowhere with this line of argument.
If you feel that point has been reached, we can call it a day.
[/quote]
Certainly.
QuoteSo while we can say that there are other recorded cases of large armies moving through small or seemingly small spaces (and these are not the only ones), they are not properly quantified. If this is satisfactory, all well and good. If not, we shall probably need a time machine. :)
I think the question is not whether ancient armies could move through passes or on coast roads but whether 4.5 million men could do this. We lack a precedent. When armies approaching this size were deployed in later history, they were spread over much larger fronts.
Ok, thanks Pat.
So no evidence but you're going to keep repeating it as an established truth, even though you can't provide other people using those numbers either.
Fine, carry on.
Just wanted to be clear on that.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 10, 2018, 08:18:45 AM
Well, assuming Diodorus has the correct figures, these armies deploy 5-10% of Xerxes army.
And they appear to involve only one mobilisation area, Syria-Phoenicia, rather than the six areas I have identified within the Empire. Xerxes used all six. Each area appears to supply 300,000 men when called upon, or some portion thereof (the 373 BC invasion of Egypt used 200,000 while the 343 BC invasion appears to have used the full 300,000). We may note that in Xenophon's
Anabasis Cyrus the Younger breaks with tradition and brings only the best 100,000 from Asia Minor - he is met by 900,000 of the 1,200,000 Artaxerxes pulled together from four of the six areas.
QuoteThe issue isn't that the Achaemenids could organise or that they had big armies. Your belief in Herodotus' figures demands a level of organisation above all pre-modern armies.
Is there a problem with this?
One may note that during the classical period men were very conscious that mankind and civilisation were declining as time went on, a golden age having been succeeeded by a silver age, then a bronze age, then an iron age. This impression is interesting given that our historians think that mankind and civilisation were progressing during this period.
The sticking-point many people seem to have about Xerxes' army is its uniqueness (well, almost uniqueness). It was the largest army the Achaemenids ever fielded. It also suffered the most catastrophic consequences of any Achaemnid campaign. Is it really so surprising that it was never repeated?
Quote from: Erpingham on May 09, 2018, 09:25:43 AM
How about a totally different social structure and level of technology?
Quote
This would, if anything, work in favour of a higher mobilisation percentage because nobody is needed to man all the technology (factories, power stations, railways, etc.).
Exactly - to get 10% you need a different society and/or more technology
Less technology. The more technology you have, the more people are tied down keeping it going and are not free for military service. Low technology societies can mobilise a greater proportion of their manpower. As you rightly observed, mobilisation is essentially a matter of organisation.
Quote
The best study I found was this paper (https://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/110502.pdf). The military is specifically refered to on p11-14. I think the weak point is he only addresses citizen numbers, so if you want to get a percentage of the population as a whole, as opposed to the militarily qualified population, you need to add those slaves in, which I did based on a general consensus that about 1/3 of the population were unfree.
Actually addressing just citizen numbers is much better than trying to count in slaves. Slaves will tend to distort age groups and are not usually available for military service (they are in some cultures but not usually the ones we tend to be interested in). Besides, slaves are replaceable after a successful camapign whereas military manpower is more of a constant (occasional major disasters aside).
I observe that the assumed free population for Italy under Republican Rome (3-3.5 million) ties in very nicely with Polybius' 700,000 men of military age in Italy during the same period. The writer does issue caveats about consistency not necessarily meaning accuracy, but that is just covering himself. Where one finds consistency accuracy (insofar as one can obtain such at this remove in time) is rarely far away.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 10, 2018, 08:29:25 AM
I think the question is not whether ancient armies could move through passes or on coast roads but whether 4.5 million men could do this. We lack a precedent. When armies approaching this size were deployed in later history, they were spread over much larger fronts.
The 'later history' is about 2,500 years later and the greater frontages a function of ranged breech-loading firepower more than anything else. By 1914, long gone were the days when depth meant stability on the battlefield - as of the gunpowder era, great depth essentially meant extra casualties. (One could point out that deeper formations, e.g. the Napoleonic column, did add stability, and this is true; and that they increased casualties, which is also true. The battlefield attack column died a natural death in AD 1866 and has not been seen since.) The change in combat technique over the intervening period means we are not comparing like with like.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 10, 2018, 09:14:30 PM
Less technology. The more technology you have, the more people are tied down keeping it going and are not free for military service
The conventional view is that technology generally makes individuals more productive and thus modern societies have a large number of individuals not directly employed in producing food stuffs etc.
18th century columns were not deep as you convey them.
They were a series of parallel lines with space between for linear deployment.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 10, 2018, 07:12:29 AM
So while we can say that there are other recorded cases of large armies moving through small or seemingly small spaces (and these are not the only ones), they are not properly quantified. If this is satisfactory, all well and good. If not, we shall probably need a time machine. :)
Agreed. The sources are not entirely cooperative.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 10, 2018, 07:12:29 AM
There were, although the problem is that historians need to have taken the trouble to record them. We have, for example, no figures for how many of Maxentius' soldiers managed to rout across the Milvian Bridge (AD 312) before it collapsed, or the bridge's dimensions. If we could find the campaign archives of Thutmose III we might have firm figures for his army size and transit time for the Beth-horon pass; this was also traversed (under opposition) by Cestius' army of occupation in AD 66 but we lack the strength of his army and the time of transit.
These are interesting precedents, and perhaps equivalent in terms of density. I will certainly google Beth-horon now.
But they don't have the scale. At least 1, maybe 2 orders of magnitude smaller.
Herodutus' number pushes me to the wrong end of the credulity continuum, because it is such an unprecedented combination of density and scale.
Quote from: Dangun on May 11, 2018, 01:31:50 AM
Herodutus' number pushes me to the wrong end of the credulity continuum, because it is such an unprecedented combination of density and scale.
Again, it is the 'unprecedented' aspect which seems to be the sticking-point. If I provide a precedent, will that make credibility easier?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 10, 2018, 11:49:33 PM
The conventional view is that technology generally makes individuals more productive and thus modern societies have a large number of individuals not directly employed in producing food stuffs etc.
This is something of a six-of-one-half-dozen-of-the-other consideration given that many of those not involved in producing foodstuffs are usually involved in manufacture, infrastructure and other exempted occupations.
The point about a low-technology army is that in classical societies (Greco-Roman), and in the preceding period, once you have done the important agricultural things during the spring, your manpower, or at least the bulk of it, is available for campaigning until harvest time. Furthermore, low-tech societies tend to acquire slave manpower (or person power) for the less desirable jobs and this frees up more men for seasonal military activity.
And military activity by low-tech societies does tend to be seasonal, not the year-round campaigning of higher technology societies. This is partly to do with preserving manpower, as campaigning in winter tends to inflict serious discomfort and attrition, and partly being tied to the cycles of agriculture, which simply must be sustained unless one has another source of supply.
Quote from: Mark G on May 11, 2018, 01:22:43 AM
18th century columns were not deep as you convey them.
And how deep did I convey them? I do not incidentally recall even mentioning the 18th century.
The point was that the wider deployments of the chemical propellant era were because the kind of depth favoured in the Biblical and (sometimes) classical period was no longer viable. (It was more or less viable up to the 1640s after which the tercio fell out of fashion.) Even Napoleonic 'columns', which only once (at Waterloo, under D'Erlon) were 'a series of parallel lines with space between for linear deployment', fell victim to superior firepower.
Quote from: Dangun on May 11, 2018, 01:31:50 AM
Herodutus' number pushes me to the wrong end of the credulity continuum, because it is such an unprecedented combination of density and scale.
For scale we have the combined armies of the Chinese Warring States which together were about double the size of Xerxes' host. Here is the size of the Persian Empire compared to China of that period. What is interesting is the fact there seems to have been a cross-cultural pollination in military thinking. Chariot design for example appears quite similar between the Fertile Crescent, India and China.
(https://i.imgur.com/cIuxGkR.png)
I suppose one could always discount the Chinese sources as wild exaggerations.... ::)
I thought we said we were calling it a day on this? I'll be brief, because a lot is repetition.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 10, 2018, 09:14:30 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on May 10, 2018, 08:18:45 AM
Well, assuming Diodorus has the correct figures, these armies deploy 5-10% of Xerxes army.
And they appear to involve only one mobilisation area, Syria-Phoenicia, rather than the six areas I have identified within the Empire. Xerxes used all six. Each area appears to supply 300,000 men when called upon, or some portion thereof (the 373 BC invasion of Egypt used 200,000 while the 343 BC invasion appears to have used the full 300,000). We may note that in Xenophon's Anabasis Cyrus the Younger breaks with tradition and brings only the best 100,000 from Asia Minor - he is met by 900,000 of the 1,200,000 Artaxerxes pulled together from four of the six areas.
But now you are relying on numbers which have been described above as potentially tainted by the same systematic bias. No wonder we go in circles.
QuoteQuoteThe issue isn't that the Achaemenids could organise or that they had big armies. Your belief in Herodotus' figures demands a level of organisation above all pre-modern armies.
Is there a problem with this?
Yes - that's what the whole debate is about ::)
Quote
The sticking-point many people seem to have about Xerxes' army is its uniqueness (well, almost uniqueness). It was the largest army the Achaemenids ever fielded. It also suffered the most catastrophic consequences of any Achaemnid campaign. Is it really so surprising that it was never repeated?
This works without recourse to huge numbers
Quote
Actually addressing just citizen numbers is much better than trying to count in slaves. Slaves will tend to distort age groups and are not usually available for military service (they are in some cultures but not usually the ones we tend to be interested in). Besides, slaves are replaceable after a successful camapign whereas military manpower is more of a constant (occasional major disasters aside).
I partly agree here, because we actually have the military manpower figures and we are estimating populations out from them. However, as we have been dealing with population percentages previously for comparison, it is useful to make a direct comparison, lest we make a slip found in some places on the internet that the percentage citizens mustered is equal to the percentage of population mustered.
It is utterly irrelevant whether slaves are available for military service or that they could be replaced. They are people and therefore part of the population. They perform roles in society that would otherwise be performed by other free people in non-slave societies.
QuoteQuote from: Erpingham on May 10, 2018, 08:29:25 AM
I think the question is not whether ancient armies could move through passes or on coast roads but whether 4.5 million men could do this. We lack a precedent. When armies approaching this size were deployed in later history, they were spread over much larger fronts.
The 'later history' is about 2,500 years later and the greater frontages a function of ranged breech-loading firepower more than anything else.
Actually no. You are confusing tactical frontage with strategic frontage. Armies advanced over a wide front for various reasons but one of them was logistic - how many men could effectively use one axis of advance for movement and supply. Which is directly relevant here. It's part of the thinking that real staff officers rather than armchair pundits do.
OK, that's it for me now on this as I'll be away for a few days.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 11, 2018, 06:42:10 AM
Again, it is the 'unprecedented' aspect which seems to be the sticking-point. If I provide a precedent, will that make credibility easier?
In 73 pages, a precedent of equal density and scale hasn't come up yet.
So best of luck. But undeniable, it would help.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 11, 2018, 06:42:10 AM
For scale we have the combined armies of the Chinese Warring States which together were about double the size of Xerxes' host.
Agreed.
Now if we can just find an instant where they were all hanging about in the same valley/campsite/defile/bridge, we would have a precedent.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 11, 2018, 07:17:13 AM
Quote from: Dangun on May 11, 2018, 01:31:50 AM
Herodutus' number pushes me to the wrong end of the credulity continuum, because it is such an unprecedented combination of density and scale.
For scale we have the combined armies of the Chinese Warring States which together were about double the size of Xerxes' host.
I suppose one could always discount the Chinese sources as wild exaggerations.... ::)
Well, when we discussed this earlier, the only figures available were unsourced ones from Wikipedia, so its hard to judge. But I said at the time the figures looked suspiciously rounded. "How many infantry did they have?" "A million". What about them "Same". The figures are also considerably higher than periods in China we do have figures for as far as I can tell.
You could try the Mauryan Empire. 50-60 Million population so comparable to Persia. Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurya_Empire)has
According to Megasthenes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megasthenes), the empire wielded a military of 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 8,000 chariots and 9,000 war elephants besides followers and attendants.I suspect we are in "hordes of barbarians" territory again with regard to the infantry, but it is another Empire from our era of interest.
We have discussed that out of period issue of columns in the 18th and early 19th century before Patrick.
I have directed you to multiple respected books on the subject which you have continued to ignore, which would be fine if you just stopped repeating the thoroughly discredited notion that columns in this era were in anyway comparable to ancient dense formations.
As with your persistent repetition of the unproven 10% man power truth, just stop .
Quote from: Erpingham on May 11, 2018, 08:07:52 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 11, 2018, 07:17:13 AM
Quote from: Dangun on May 11, 2018, 01:31:50 AM
Herodutus' number pushes me to the wrong end of the credulity continuum, because it is such an unprecedented combination of density and scale.
For scale we have the combined armies of the Chinese Warring States which together were about double the size of Xerxes' host.
I suppose one could always discount the Chinese sources as wild exaggerations.... ::)
Well, when we discussed this earlier, the only figures available were unsourced ones from Wikipedia, so its hard to judge. But I said at the time the figures looked suspiciously rounded. "How many infantry did they have?" "A million". What about them "Same". The figures are also considerably higher than periods in China we do have figures for as far as I can tell.
You could try the Mauryan Empire. 50-60 Million population so comparable to Persia. Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurya_Empire)has
According to Megasthenes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megasthenes), the empire wielded a military of 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 8,000 chariots and 9,000 war elephants besides followers and attendants.
I suspect we are in "hordes of barbarians" territory again with regard to the infantry, but it is another Empire from our era of interest.
I realise we need to look at the Chinese sources, ideally in original Mandarin or whatever the language is. It's just a question of time and energy, both of which I lack.
Notice however that the sources for this period all wildly exaggerate ( ::) ::) Alert: irony warning ::) ::) ) at about the same numbers: 600 000 -1 million, around that mark. This does suggest that huge armies were the norm at that time (or the writers of the sources all had the same inflated imagination).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 11, 2018, 09:14:52 AM
Notice however that the sources for this period all wildly exaggerate ( ::) ::) Alert: irony warning ::) ::) ) at about the same numbers: 600 000 -1 million, around that mark. This does suggest that huge armies were the norm at that time (or the writers of the sources all had the same inflated imagination).
Fair point. It does seem to support the idea of a consistent
topos :)
I'm actually trying hard to be open minded about what the military potential of an ancient empire, rather than an industrial age modern state might be. What are the sorts of bounds we should be looking at? It looks like our sources run between 1-4%, with larger empires at the lower end (although this could be co-incidence). This would mean for Persian 500,000 to 2 million, probably around 1 million. That's higher than a lot of estimates. How much of a force they could place in one place at one time is another matter. The Northern Greece theatre of operations would be particularly difficult for them and would restrict what they could deploy. But, despite the title of the thread, has been the thing we have been arguing about. If we could shake off the shackles of Herodotus' numbers, there is an interesting campaign to be discussed, as are many of the other campaigns. We could even make an attempt to understand the nature of the Persian military - was it a swarming horde driven by whips or something much more organised based on social obligation. If we were to discuss that, ditching the numbers debate, separately, we may find an interested audience.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 11, 2018, 10:20:22 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 11, 2018, 09:14:52 AM
Notice however that the sources for this period all wildly exaggerate ( ::) ::) Alert: irony warning ::) ::) ) at about the same numbers: 600 000 -1 million, around that mark. This does suggest that huge armies were the norm at that time (or the writers of the sources all had the same inflated imagination).
Fair point. It does seem to support the idea of a consistent topos :)
I'm actually trying hard to be open minded about what the military potential of an ancient empire, rather than an industrial age modern state might be. What are the sorts of bounds we should be looking at? It looks like our sources run between 1-4%, with larger empires at the lower end (although this could be co-incidence). This would mean for Persian 500,000 to 2 million, probably around 1 million. That's higher than a lot of estimates. How much of a force they could place in one place at one time is another matter. The Northern Greece theatre of operations would be particularly difficult for them and would restrict what they could deploy. But, despite the title of the thread, has been the thing we have been arguing about. If we could shake off the shackles of Herodotus' numbers, there is an interesting campaign to be discussed, as are many of the other campaigns. We could even make an attempt to understand the nature of the Persian military - was it a swarming horde driven by whips or something much more organised based on social obligation. If we were to discuss that, ditching the numbers debate, separately, we may find an interested audience.
Herodotus' numbers are what make the thread fun. Imagine we were all politely discussing the logistics systems of ancient empires and pretty much agreeing with each other. :-\
BTW I'm reminded of an account of a meeting of the Inklings (The Oxford discussion group with C S Lewis, J R R Tolkien, etc.). When a newcomer heard them at one session for the first time, he thought they were going to attack one another.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 11, 2018, 07:00:41 AM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 10, 2018, 11:49:33 PM
The conventional view is that technology generally makes individuals more productive and thus modern societies have a large number of individuals not directly employed in producing food stuffs etc.
The point about a low-technology army is that in classical societies (Greco-Roman), and in the preceding period, once you have done the important agricultural things during the spring, your manpower, or at least the bulk of it, is available for campaigning until harvest time. Furthermore, low-tech societies tend to acquire slave manpower (or person power) for the less desirable jobs and this frees up more men for seasonal military activity.
And military activity by low-tech societies does tend to be seasonal, not the year-round campaigning of higher technology societies. This is partly to do with preserving manpower, as campaigning in winter tends to inflict serious discomfort and attrition, and partly being tied to the cycles of agriculture, which simply must be sustained unless one has another source of supply.
Would that apply to the Persians do you think?
Arguing over the numbers is (and has proved to be) a sterile business. The trouble with talking about the real nature of the army (eg whip-driven horde v warrior caste) is that it will be hard to do so without straying into numbers.
I think some of the stuff around where numbers come from and how we know can be more interesting than the numbers themselves - thinking of the type of things talked about by Sean Manning here (http://bookandsword.com/2017/02/04/the-size-of-achaemenid-armies/").
Incidentally has anyone read the Christopher Tuplin article (http://www.academia.edu/4251336/Achaemenid_arithmetic_numerical_problems_in_Persian_history") he links to? It's one of those upside down scans which I can't be bothered to right...
Quote from: RichT on May 11, 2018, 03:50:40 PMIncidentally has anyone read the Christopher Tuplin article (http://www.academia.edu/4251336/Achaemenid_arithmetic_numerical_problems_in_Persian_history") he links to? It's one of those upside down scans which I can't be bothered to right...
Here's a right-way-up version.
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 11, 2018, 04:11:12 PM
Here's a right-way-up version.
Excellent - thank you!
Quote from: Mark G on May 11, 2018, 08:32:25 AM
I have directed you to multiple respected books on the subject which you have continued to ignore, which would be fine if you just stopped repeating the thoroughly discredited notion that columns in this era were in anyway comparable to ancient dense formations.
And where exactly do I do that, pray? I think you are imagining this.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 11, 2018, 07:52:14 AM
But now you are relying on numbers which have been described above as potentially tainted by the same systematic bias.
This assumes the existence of a systemic bias. Is there any actual evidence for one?
QuoteQuoteQuoteThe issue isn't that the Achaemenids could organise or that they had big armies. Your belief in Herodotus' figures demands a level of organisation above all pre-modern armies.
Is there a problem with this?
Yes - that's what the whole debate is about ::)
If we look at the 'level of organisation' of 'all pre-modern armies', it is not actually very impressive once the Romans drop out of the picture, so this is not a particularly high bar to worry about.
QuoteQuote
The sticking-point many people seem to have about Xerxes' army is its uniqueness (well, almost uniqueness). It was the largest army the Achaemenids ever fielded. It also suffered the most catastrophic consequences of any Achaemenid campaign. Is it really so surprising that it was never repeated?
This works without recourse to huge numbers
And even better with. The real question is why we have this compulsion to try and savage large numbers.
QuoteI partly agree here, because we actually have the military manpower figures and we are estimating populations out from them. However, as we have been dealing with population percentages previously for comparison, it is useful to make a direct comparison, lest we make a slip found in some places on the internet that the percentage citizens mustered is equal to the percentage of population mustered.
True; citizen populations are available from census figures whereas total populations involve a lot of guesswork.
QuoteIt is utterly irrelevant whether slaves are available for military service or that they could be replaced. They are people and therefore part of the population.
Only by our ethical standards. Slaves were the programmable ovens, washing machines and domestic robots of their day. You could get a new one at market. They were, sad to say, accessories rather than population.
QuoteActually no. You are confusing tactical frontage with strategic frontage. Armies advanced over a wide front for various reasons but one of them was logistic - how many men could effectively use one axis of advance for movement and supply. Which is directly relevant here. It's part of the thinking that real staff officers rather than armchair pundits do.
I would suggest considering the logistical implications of a 'broad front' as opposed to 'single thrust' advance - it was very relevant in late 1944, as supplying multiple lines of advance proved to be a much greater logistical strain than supplying one.
Multiple axes of advance increase rather than diminish supply problems unless one is living off the land. This is why, for example, Shapur's Sassanid army as described by Ammianus advances in a single 'swarm' on a wide tactical frontage rather than invading by several separate routes.
Quote from: Erpingham on May 11, 2018, 10:20:22 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 11, 2018, 09:14:52 AM
Notice however that the sources for this period all wildly exaggerate ( ::) ::) Alert: irony warning ::) ::) ) at about the same numbers: 600 000 -1 million, around that mark. This does suggest that huge armies were the norm at that time (or the writers of the sources all had the same inflated imagination).
Fair point. It does seem to support the idea of a consistent topos :)
A most remarkable one as it appears to be identical in Greek and Chinese sources.
Quote from: Dangun on May 11, 2018, 07:55:36 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 11, 2018, 06:42:10 AM
Again, it is the 'unprecedented' aspect which seems to be the sticking-point. If I provide a precedent, will that make credibility easier?
In 73 pages, a precedent of equal density and scale hasn't come up yet.
So best of luck. But undeniable, it would help.
It would be a long passage to quote, but check out Diodorus II (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/2A*.html#7) chapters 16-19 inclusive. Interestingly enough, this also involves getting a large army across a bridge.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 11, 2018, 11:28:53 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 11, 2018, 07:00:41 AM
The point about a low-technology army is that in classical societies (Greco-Roman), and in the preceding period, once you have done the important agricultural things during the spring, your manpower, or at least the bulk of it, is available for campaigning until harvest time. Furthermore, low-tech societies tend to acquire slave manpower (or person power) for the less desirable jobs and this frees up more men for seasonal military activity.
And military activity by low-tech societies does tend to be seasonal, not the year-round campaigning of higher technology societies. This is partly to do with preserving manpower, as campaigning in winter tends to inflict serious discomfort and attrition, and partly being tied to the cycles of agriculture, which simply must be sustained unless one has another source of supply.
Would that apply to the Persians do you think?
Yes, in both respects. Achaemenid campaigning does appear to have been seasonal, and Xerxes' 480 BC campaign, although the King of Kings talked about subduing all Europe, was designed simply to conquer Greece, effectively by overawing it.
On the subject of campaign seasonality, it may be worth noting that temperate zone powers seem to prefer to get the harvest in first and
then go campaigning, whereas Mediterranean powers seemed to go campaigning early in the year and then return for the harvest.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 11, 2018, 08:40:12 PM
And even better with. The real question is why we have this compulsion to try and savage large numbers.
Cultural Marxism? ;)
The polite response would be I suspect it is due to the realisation that there is a natural human tendency to exaggerate when attempting to make a point plus the understanding that many of the texts were written in more credulous times. Then there is the introduction of sociology and economics into history which for many people, not you and Justin, undermines the plausibility of these huge armies- what impact on Persian society would the strain of fielding such a force have? This has been mentioned on this thread at some length but has got a little bit buried under the width of marching columns etc. Then there is a sort of post-modernist idea that the text is unreliable as the narrator cant be separated from their culture/weltanschauung as well as the idea that ancient historians do not operate in the same way as a modern historian. Their work isn't peer reviewed nor do they have the benefit of a couple of thousand years of philosophical discourse on ontology and epistemology, they are also as much public entertainers, philosophers, social commentators, religious propagandists or political activists as 'pure' historians. Michael Grants book 'Greek and Roman Historians' covers the latter point at some length. Then there is Occam's Razor, a huge number of suppositions have been created to defend Herodotus's numbers and for me it is much more likely that Herodotus for reasons unknown was in error. Oh, and Justin that doesn't mean his work is completely valueless or that he was a 'member of some type of Goebbels type propaganda machine'.
However, for me the real question would be why you have a 'compulsion' to believe in these large numbers? Genuine question- give us a clue!
re read your personal messages Patrick.
we talked about this in 2013.
plenty of time to have taken action if you actually were interested in learning something, instead of simply repeating the comfortable falsehoods you seem to prefer
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 12, 2018, 04:57:58 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 11, 2018, 08:40:12 PM
And even better with. The real question is why we have this compulsion to try and savage large numbers.
Cultural Marxism? ;)
Then there is a sort of post-modernist idea that the text is unreliable as the narrator cant be separated from their culture/weltanschauung as well as the idea that ancient historians do not operate in the same way as a modern historian. Their work isn't peer reviewed
Oh, but it is, albeit perforce post-publication. Read what classical historians have to say about classical historians. ;) And inseperability from cultures works both ways - we do not understand theirs, as is evidenced by this curious idea that they suffered from endemic compulsive exaggeration. Our analysts get into something of a flat spin when, having accused Herodotus
et. al. of exaggerating the size of barbarian armies in order to pander to Greek vanity, they then begin accusing them of exaggerating the size of the
Greek army at Plataea.
Funny thing about peer review. Michael Crichton, one of the more intelligent and perceptive novelists, was a great fan around 2004 when he was writing
State of Fear. By 2017 he had become thoroughly disillusioned with it, and in
Next he writes: "Many studies have shown that peer review does not improve the quality of scientific papers. Scientists themselves know it doesn't work." Crichton cites the case of Hwang Woo Suk (http://stemcellbioethics.wikischolars.columbia.edu/The+Cloning+Scandal+of+Hwang+Woo-Suk) and points out that "All of Hwang's papers in
Science were peer-reviewed. If we ever needed evidence that peer review is an empty ritual, this episode provides it."
While the majority of academia retains faith in the concept of peer review, principally on the basis that it is 'better than no quality control whatsoever', it may not live up to expectations.
Quotenor do they have the benefit of a couple of thousand years of philosophical discourse on ontology and epistemology
Neither, it seems, do we. All we have ended up with is a bundle of (inaccurate and seemingly arbitrary) prejudices about the way the ancient world worked.
Quotethey are also as much public entertainers, philosophers, social commentators, religious propagandists or political activists as 'pure' historians.
The more things change, the more they remain the same ...
QuoteMichael Grants book 'Greek and Roman Historians' covers the latter point at some length. Then there is Occam's Razor, a huge number of suppositions have been created to defend Herodotus's numbers and for me it is much more likely that Herodotus for reasons unknown was in error.
Actually it is the other way around: a huge number of suppositions have been created in order to
attack Herodotus' numbers; the simplest course is just to stay with them.
QuoteHowever, for me the real question would be why you have a 'compulsion' to believe in these large numbers? Genuine question- give us a clue!
I have no 'compulsion' to 'believe' any large numbers; the picture has to include population, supply, organisation and the military tradition and system of the power involved. (You might have observed that I do not accept, for example, a certain chronicler's 2.4 million English at Hastings.) The Achaemenid Empire was the last of the Biblical armies. These were characterised by very large numbers (in the sources; modern estimates try to degrade them down to a fraction of that for no apparent reason), extensive logistical arrangements and deep formations.
And if one ceases to be hypnotised by scholars'
a priori insistence that older armies must be smaller, one can see that all the elements are there. (Unintentional wargaming pun.) Store cities, chariot cities - the Biblical powers had a degree of organisation that even today western powers (or for that matter anyone) only manages to attain occasionally in wartime. (The USSR had, for example, 'academic cities' and 'tankograd' showing similar concentration of purpose but without the expertise.)
Quote from: Mark G on May 12, 2018, 06:57:49 AM
re read your personal messages Patrick.
we talked about this in 2013.
plenty of time to have taken action if you actually were interested in learning something, instead of simply repeating the comfortable falsehoods you seem to prefer
Mark, if you read those books the same way you read my posts then I am not surprised at your conclusions. If you seriously want to discuss Napoleonic formations I suggest we do it off-forum.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 12, 2018, 04:57:58 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 11, 2018, 08:40:12 PM
And even better with. The real question is why we have this compulsion to try and savage large numbers.
Cultural Marxism? ;)
The polite response would be I suspect it is due to the realisation that there is a natural human tendency to exaggerate when attempting to make a point plus the understanding that many of the texts were written in more credulous times. Then there is the introduction of sociology and economics into history which for many people, not you and Justin, undermines the plausibility of these huge armies- what impact on Persian society would the strain of fielding such a force have? This has been mentioned on this thread at some length but has got a little bit buried under the width of marching columns etc. Then there is a sort of post-modernist idea that the text is unreliable as the narrator cant be separated from their culture/weltanschauung as well as the idea that ancient historians do not operate in the same way as a modern historian. Their work isn't peer reviewed nor do they have the benefit of a couple of thousand years of philosophical discourse on ontology and epistemology, they are also as much public entertainers, philosophers, social commentators, religious propagandists or political activists as 'pure' historians. Michael Grants book 'Greek and Roman Historians' covers the latter point at some length. Then there is Occam's Razor, a huge number of suppositions have been created to defend Herodotus's numbers and for me it is much more likely that Herodotus for reasons unknown was in error. Oh, and Justin that doesn't mean his work is completely valueless or that he was a 'member of some type of Goebbels type propaganda machine'.
However, for me the real question would be why you have a 'compulsion' to believe in these large numbers? Genuine question- give us a clue!
Let me give several clues:
QuoteThe polite response would be I suspect it is due to the realisation that there is a natural human tendency to exaggerate when attempting to make a point plus the understanding that many of the texts were written in more credulous times
Exaggerating to an extent is understandable, but making an army ten or twenty times larger than its actual size isn't exaggeration - it's pure fabrication. And these weren't actually credulous times as the contemporary critics of Herodotus show: if they could catch him out on a point of fact they did so. Human beings two thousand years ago weren't naive fools.
QuoteThen there is the introduction of sociology and economics into history which for many people, not you and Justin, undermines the plausibility of these huge armies- what impact on Persian society would the strain of fielding such a force have?
The thread spent some time looking at the ability of the Persian empire to field a force of several million men and grow and store enough food to feed that force. Nowhere can I see any compelling reason for it being unable to do so. The population was large enough. Agriculture, using the methods of that time (which were compared with Roman agricultural production for which we have figures) was capable enough, and transport, especially waterborne transport, was developed enough.
QuoteThen there is a sort of post-modernist idea that the text is unreliable as the narrator cant be separated from their culture/weltanschauung as well as the idea that ancient historians do not operate in the same way as a modern historian
Herodotus does evince the same regard for truth a contemporary historian would have, and this has nothing to do with culture/weltanschauung. If you say you want to give an objective fact-driven account and then give what adds up to an objective fact-driven account, you can be credited with being objective and fact-driven, whether you live in 450 BC or 2018 AD.
QuoteTheir work isn't peer reviewed nor do they have the benefit of a couple of thousand years of philosophical discourse on ontology and epistemology, they are also as much public entertainers, philosophers, social commentators, religious propagandists or political activists as 'pure' historians.
His book was certainly peer-reviewed - see my first comment. If Herodotus had made up his figures for the Persian army sure as eggs contemporary or near-contemporary writers would have jumped on it as they jumped on other perceived errors in his work. Again, the BC folks weren't naive fools. A writer like Herodotus was perfectly capable of distinguishing between public entertainment (limited in this case to good literary style), philosophy (which didn't yet exist in pre-Socratic Greece), social commentary (also non-existent at that time), religious propaganda (see below) and political activism (nothing shows that Herodotus was a political activist: he had no political cause to be active about).
On the subject of religious propaganda, I very much suspect that the principal reason contemporary academics are so ready to discredit someone like Herodotus is because he incorporates religion into his account - or more accurately, natural events like the dolphin episode which people assigned to religious causes. He is not a sensible, intelligent atheist who believes only in what the scientific method can demonstrate as being true. The implication here is that anyone who has a religious belief automatically drops several notches in credibility. Without getting into what would be a contentious discussion that is off-topic, here is a list (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Christians_in_science_and_technology#1901%E2%80%932000_A.D._(20th_century)) of prominent scientists who were also religious men. Bottom line: on can believe in a divinity and have perfect intellectual integrity.
QuoteThen there is Occam's Razor, a huge number of suppositions have been created to defend Herodotus's numbers and for me it is much more likely that Herodotus for reasons unknown was in error.
Occam's Razor works on the explanation with the fewest assumptions probably being the true one. If we accept that Xerxes did actually send 5 million men to Greece how many assumptions are made? The only one I know of is this:
The army would have to march wide cross-country as it was too large to stick to tracks.Read Asklepiodotus, Aelian and Arrian on march formations. Marching cross-country isn't an assumption; it was a military science. An army could form multiple columns, squares, half squares, lines, oblique lines, crescents and more besides. Marching could be in open or intermediate formation. There were various ways of accompanying the baggage of which only one was to form a column with it. Certainly the Macedonian and Seleucid armies - who didn't bother preparing a cleared avenue to march along - had no problem with cross-country travel.
Nothing else is AFAIK an assumption. We have a rough idea of the Persian Empire's population. We know that growing the necessary food and shipping it to Greece was not beyond the Empire's capabilities. We know that it is possible to store grain for several years, at least in a dry climate like Egypt's. We know there were no real chokepoints before Thermopylae that would force the army to advance on a narrow front a few men wide. And so on. Nothing has been assumed.
If one posits a much smaller Persian army then one immediately has to make the assumption that Herodotus was lying, pure and simple - not only about the size of the army, but also about the bridge of boats (unnecessary) the 400 talent dinner, the size of the Persian encampment in Thessalay, and so on. As a historian Herodotus is finished. One then has to go on from there and assume that all the primary sources were lying when they gave huge numbers for Persian armies. One has to assume that the Chinese sources likewise lied when they gave huge numbers for Warring States armies, and that the numbers for the army of the Mauryan Empire was also a lie. Since these are spectacular lies, one has to assume that ancient sources are utterly untrustworthy. If one wants to do history one has to stick to archaeology and numismatology. Good luck with that.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 12, 2018, 07:34:15 AM
I very much suspect that the principal reason contemporary academics are so ready to discredit someone like Herodotus is because he incorporates religion into his account - or more accurately, natural events like the dolphin episode which people assigned to religious causes. He is not a sensible, intelligent atheist who believes only in what the scientific method can demonstrate as being true. The implication here is that anyone who has a religious belief automatically drops several notches in credibility. Without getting into what would be a contentious discussion that is off-topic, here is a list of prominent scientists who were also religious men. Bottom line: on can believe in a divinity and have perfect intellectual integrity.
Everything in Justin's and Patrick's response has been covered at length in the thread and I see no reason not to refer them back to previous comments, I will comment on the religious straw man argument that has been raised. No one has said that a belief in a divinity precludes intellectual integrity perfect or otherwise, I would however question anyone who had a literalist interpretation of the bible or which ever holy text they choose to believe in. It is also naive to believe that scientists always display perfect intellectual integrity anymore than long dead historians.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 12, 2018, 09:42:54 AM
I would however question anyone who had a literalist interpretation of the bible or which ever holy text they choose to believe in. It is also naive to believe that scientists always display perfect intellectual integrity anymore than long dead historians.
Personally I have a nuanced approach to the Bible - the creation of the universe in seven days is clearly poetry since there is evening and morning on the days before the sun is created. And so on. Vast topic.
Re scientists I totally agree.
Happy to leave it at that. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 11, 2018, 08:40:12 PM
The real question is why we have this compulsion to try and savage large numbers.
This must be rhetorical, because the answer is obvious: basic statistics / scientific method.
Outliers must be critically examined, because they are either errors or feed back to modify theories.
On what basis would we savage normal?
We tried this earlier in the thread. But I think we can walk backwards from consensus to reveal where we all sit on the credulity continuum. I am guessing that we'll get consensus that King Cuang of Lan Na's 117million man army or Constantine's aerial crucifix over Malvin Bridge is probably bogus. Herodotus' number is not as obviously bogus as that, but how much less obviously bogus? Where is it between 4mn Persians and 177mn Thais that you would begin to doubt?
Quote from: Dangun on May 12, 2018, 03:34:35 PM
But I think we can walk backwards from consensus to reveal where we all sit on the credulity continuum. I am guessing that we'll get consensus that King Cuang of Lan Na's 117million man army or Constantine's aerial crucifix over Malvin Bridge is probably bogus.
What is interesting is to examine the reasons for such conclusions. Leaving aside
in hoc signo vinces for now (albeit remmbering that the 'trinity sign' triple sun at Barnet has lately acquired a scientific explanation), Cuang*'s army is a non-starter on account of being well above the conceivable population for the whole of Indochina at that time. The kingdom itself had by popular designation only a million rice fields, so unless they were very big rice fields one can see something of a supply problem.
*
Is this incidentally the individual whose army is said to have had a celebration on the Plain of Jars?So yes, 117 million men for that particular army - a force present-day communist China might envy - looks a bit wrong. Xerxes' army, however, looks quite possible on the basis of population estimates for the Achaemenid Empire. The range I have seen is 17 million to 55 million, and even at the lower end (which looks a bit parsimonious) it could have been done.
Thee real question seems to be whether we think it could have been organised.
QuoteOn what basis would we savage normal?
On the basis that it does not correspond to our sense of normality.
QuoteOutliers must be critically examined, because they are either errors or feed back to modify theories.
This is indeed true, although I would say 'rationally and dispassionately examined' as 'critically examined' implies
malice prepense. We might however be aware that it is often the outliers which contain vital information: chimpanzees share 96% (or as much as 98.8% depending upon whiom you read) of our DNA so the differences are statistically insignificant and maybe should be critically examined in order to eliminate the anomalies and make the overall correspondence wholly consistent ... ;)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 12, 2018, 08:59:50 PM
[
What is interesting is to examine the reasons for such conclusions. Leaving aside in hoc signo vinces for now (albeit remembering that the 'trinity sign' triple sun at Barnet has lately acquired a scientific explanation),
The "triple sun" appeared at Mortimer's Cross, ten years earlier than Barnet. Not a lot of sun at Barnet, which was fought on a foggy April morning.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 12, 2018, 08:59:50 PM
Leaving aside in hoc signo vinces for now
Agreed, its not an appealing topic.
But Eusebius is an interesting source on this event, not because of the religious content, but because he wrote a history of this event
twice - once in the
Ecclesiastical History and once in the
Life of Constantine.
And whenever we get two histories the comparison is revealing. Not surprisingly, it is the later of Eusebius two versions, the one with more hagiographical intent, that has much more of the silly unbelievable stuff in it. (As it happens there are also inconsistencies with Lactanious and Zosimos.)
We don't have a parallel history to Herodotus on most of the topics he covered. But if we did, we can say with near certainty that it would show all sorts of errors, ommissions, exaggerations etc. etc. because
everytime we are lucky enough to get parallel literary sources that's what happens.
I am not suggesting for a minute that we throw something out just because it contains errors. If we do that we have nothing.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 12, 2018, 08:59:50 PMSo yes, 117 million men for that particular army - a force present-day communist China might envy - looks a bit wrong. Xerxes' army, however, looks quite possible on the basis of population estimates for the Achaemenid Empire.
I won't rehash the thread, but clearly there is no consensus on this point, at least not in this forum.
But if 117 million Thais is too many, how many would have been too many Persians? Would you have believed double - 7 million? What about 14 million? This question is not meant to be parody. But it might be interesting to put a number on what would be the maximum number at which we would get unanimity.
Quote from: John GL on May 12, 2018, 11:09:48 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 12, 2018, 08:59:50 PM
[
What is interesting is to examine the reasons for such conclusions. Leaving aside in hoc signo vinces for now (albeit remembering that the 'trinity sign' triple sun at Barnet has lately acquired a scientific explanation),
The "triple sun" appeared at Mortimer's Cross, ten years earlier than Barnet. Not a lot of sun at Barnet, which was fought on a foggy April morning.
Yes, quite correct, my apologies - moral: check before posting!
Barnet was the occasion of the radiant sun - a similarlty in shield devices which, combined with repositioning of wings during fog, led to serious mistaken identity for the Lancastrians (and no hint of divine signalling).
Quote from: Dangun on May 13, 2018, 01:23:40 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 12, 2018, 08:59:50 PM
Leaving aside in hoc signo vinces for now
Agreed, its not an appealing topic.
But Eusebius is an interesting source on this event, not because of the religious content, but because he wrote a history of this event twice - once in the Ecclesiastical History and once in the Life of Constantine.
And whenever we get two histories the comparison is revealing. Not surprisingly, it is the later of Eusebius two versions, the one with more hagiographical intent, that has much more of the silly unbelievable stuff in it. (As it happens there are also inconsistencies with Lactanious and Zosimos.)
It is very noticeable that once Christian authors start to write history it becomes hagiography. That said, if one looks into, say, the two priestly dynastic lists we have for the early Libyan Dynasty in Egypt, which are used to try and establish the succession of pharaohs in this dynasty, one finds they contradict each other. Beware a priest with a legacy claim to prove! (Herodotus, incidentaly, helps to solve the Libyan Dynasty succession question - he treeats this dynasty is some detail with, crucially, the deeds of the respective rulers, which provides identification points.)
Historical sources are not all contradictory; for example, matching the Bible with the Amarna letters shows a remarkable degree of correspondence. (It also raises many niggling details which are still not quite resolved to everyone's satisfaction, notably who was Rib-Addi? Even this can be sorted out by careful use of context.)
Herodotus himself can often be seen sifting contradictory accounts. I have earlier described his evaluation methods, which are unexceptionable.
QuoteWe don't have a parallel history to Herodotus on most of the topics he covered. But if we did, we can say with near certainty that it would show all sorts of errors, omissions, exaggerations etc. etc. because everytime we are lucky enough to get parallel literary sources that's what happens.
We cannot say such things 'with near certainty'. What we can say is that such a parallel history would agree or differ over points of importance, and in the latter event we would be making assessments of reliability. These would perforce be based principally on the respective sources' track record. Over the past few years, a number of Herodotus' stories (e.g. Scythian recreational practices) have been substantiated by archaeology, which is encouraging.
While we lack a parallel history, we do have a near-contemporary, Thucydides, who was keen to show up what he perceived as any error or weakness in Herodotus: "
For instance the notion that the Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each, the fact being that they have only one; and that there is a company of Pitane, when there is no such thing." - Thucydides I.20. He makes a general swipe at "...
the lays of a poet displaying the exaggerations of his craft" and "the compositions of the chroniclers that are attractive at truth's expense; the subjects they treat being out of the reach of evidence and time having robbed most of them of historical value by enshrining them in legend." -
idem I.21
Perhaps significantly, Thucydides specifically does not lambast anyone for over-egging the Persian pudding. He simply says:
"The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land."
And that is the limit of his excursion into commentary on and disparagement of Herodotus'
magnum opus apart from his remarks on Spartan kings' votes and the Pitanes. (The latter were the company commanded by Amompharetus at Plataea.) Given the prominence he assigns to minor details of Spartan institutions, would he really have passed over a potential opportunity to cut Herodotus off at the knees for exaggeration of Achaemenid numbers?
QuoteI am not suggesting for a minute that we throw something out just because it contains errors. If we do that we have nothing.
But if 117 million Thais is too many, how many would have been too many Persians?
This is one way to calculate such a figure.
Population estimates for the Achaemenid Empire range from 17 million to 55 million (at least those I have seen). Ergo, the full potential military manpower (20% of population) would range from 3.4 million to 11 million. Prime age military manpower would be half that, 10% of population, so 1.7 million to 5.5 million. So 12 million Persians would have been too many under any circumstances, and 6 million would be pushing the effective enevelope. Herodotus' figure (partly estimated, but on a rational basis) is 5,283,220. Of this, perhaps 600,000 (300,000 fighting troops plus an equal number of support individuals) is contributed by the Thracians and Medising Greeks, leaving 4,683,220 as the total Achaemenid manpower involved, half of which was rated as combatant.
4,683,220 falls well within an acceptable mobilisation figure for the Achaemenid Empire based on population estimates. (This figure is strenuous but not impossible for an average population estimate of 35 million, crippling at the lowest estimate of 17 million and has room to spare at the highest estimate of 55 million - of itself, and bearing in mind this may involve some circularity, it suggests a population of about 47 million.) Xerxes appears to have been the first Achaemenid monarch to want to put such a huge force in the field for conquest (his predecessors had been content with, or limited to, numbers in the hundreds of thousands) - and, after what happened to it and to him, he was the last. Future full mobilisations approaching this scale occurred only in defence against an invader.
On the psychological front, had Greek historians harboured an endemic exaggeration complex, one might expect later Achaemenid armies to be recorded as being even larger than Xerxes'. This is not in fact the case.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 13, 2018, 09:00:03 AM
On the psychological front, had Greek historians harboured an endemic exaggeration complex, one might expect later Achaemenid armies to be recorded as being even larger than Xerxes'. This is not in fact the case.
Possibly because they realised that Herodotus's numbers were absurd?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 13, 2018, 05:55:09 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 13, 2018, 09:00:03 AM
On the psychological front, had Greek historians harboured an endemic exaggeration complex, one might expect later Achaemenid armies to be recorded as being even larger than Xerxes'. This is not in fact the case.
Possibly because they realised that Herodotus's numbers were absurd?
And didn't say so?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on May 13, 2018, 06:48:46 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 13, 2018, 05:55:09 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 13, 2018, 09:00:03 AM
On the psychological front, had Greek historians harboured an endemic exaggeration complex, one might expect later Achaemenid armies to be recorded as being even larger than Xerxes'. This is not in fact the case.
Possibly because they realised that Herodotus's numbers were absurd?
And didn't say so?
Possibly because they weren't commenting directly on Herodotus or Xerxes but on another topic.?
There is a question that does occur and that is if we take the numbers in these sources as accurate just how large would a Persian army need to be to beat the Greeks or Macedonians?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 13, 2018, 06:57:33 PM
There is a question that does occur and that is if we take the numbers in these sources as accurate just how large would a Persian army need to be to beat the Greeks or Macedonians?
Mardonius reckoned 300,000 - the best 300,000 in Xerxes' army. He almost succeeded, too: following a couple of standoffs against the Greek army which resulted in neither side committing to battle, he successfully harassed them with his cavalry to the point where they felt compelled to shift base. It was when he mistakenly thought they were fleeing instead of repositioning and brought his army out in pursuit without even waiting to don armour that he ran into terminal trouble.
Which Macedonians are we considering here? The 480 BC variety who had already become Achaemenid subjects and hence were already 'beaten' or Alexander's army? If the latter, the answer is 100,000 crack troops, consisting of 30,000 Greek mercenaries and the best 70,000 Achaemenid troops, as proposed by Charidemus in 333 BC. Darius III hedged his bets and brought 600,000 to Issus with the Greek mercenaries, but deployed them in such a way as to give Alexander a quick route to the royal chariot via the kardakes. It is not just numbers but generalship which needs to be considered.
Xerxes thought that with his army he would not even need to fight anyone. In Herodotus VII.101 he asks Demaratus:
"So tell me: will the Greeks offer battle and oppose me? I think that even if all the Greeks and all the men of the western lands were assembled together, they are not powerful enough to withstand my attack, unless they are united."
Demaratus politely points out that the Spartans will fight against any odds. Xerxes does not believe him.
"Let us look at it with all reasonableness: how could a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, if they are all equally free and not under the rule of one man, withstand so great an army as mine? If you Greeks are five thousand, we still would be more than a thousand to one. If they were under the rule of one man according to our custom, they might out of fear of him become better than they naturally are, and under compulsion of the lash they might go against greater numbers of inferior men; but if they are allowed to go free they would do neither. I myself think that even if they were equal in numbers it would be hard for the Greeks to fight just against the Persians." - Herodotus VII.103
In 496-494 BC the Persians had successfully suppressed the Ionian revolt. How different could the mainland Greeks be? (Xerxes found out at Thermopylae.)
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 13, 2018, 05:55:09 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 13, 2018, 09:00:03 AM
On the psychological front, had Greek historians harboured an endemic exaggeration complex, one might expect later Achaemenid armies to be recorded as being even larger than Xerxes'. This is not in fact the case.
Possibly because they realised that Herodotus's numbers were absurd?
This would be the death-knell of the idea that Greek historians suffered from an endemic compulsion to exaggerate Achaemenid numbers - now they are being accused of accuracy! And if it can be admitted or even suggested that they wrote the truth about Achaemenid numbers, why not Herodotus also?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 13, 2018, 08:21:04 PM
This would be the death-knell of the idea that Greek historians suffered from an endemic compulsion to exaggerate Achaemenid numbers - now they are being accused of accuracy! And if it can be admitted or even suggested that they wrote the truth about Achaemenid numbers, why not Herodotus also?
Stop being so silly!
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on May 13, 2018, 09:00:56 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on May 13, 2018, 08:21:04 PM
This would be the death-knell of the idea that Greek historians suffered from an endemic compulsion to exaggerate Achaemenid numbers - now they are being accused of accuracy! And if it can be admitted or even suggested that they wrote the truth about Achaemenid numbers, why not Herodotus also?
Stop being so silly!
Eh?
If there's anything in Patrick's line of argument that seems silly feel free to point it out. It would be interesting to read your refutation of his point.
Indeed, I look forward to Ian's reasoned argument.
More irony, the two who refute science calling for reason...
Is this thread still going? Are you trying to overtake "Currently Reading" as our longest thread?
Quote from: Duncan Head on May 14, 2018, 02:51:03 PM
Is this thread still going? Are you trying to overtake "Currently Reading" as our longest thread?
Not much chance of that, methinks; 'Currently Reading' will last as long as there are books (and members). I think this thread will happily settle for second place.
Quote from: Duncan Head on April 16, 2018, 10:50:54 AM
Things like the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury archives suggest that they had a developed bureaucracy very much on Mesopotamian lines. The use of Elamite, particularly, indicates that the homeland of Persis/Parsa itself was at least partially a Near Eastern bureaucratic society. But this administration was in the service of an Iranian warrior aristocracy, and it is not entirely clear (to me, at least) how far into the hinterlands of the Empire the bureaucratic habit penetrated.
This post was brought to my mind by something I read the other day: it turns out that Elamite administrative tablets have been found in Achaemenid Kandahar.