Looking at war chariots as used by the Sumerians, Egyptian, Hittites, Assyrians, et al. it seems to me that they were designed principally as shock weapons, designed to plough through infantry and fragment their formations. Their role as mobile missile platforms and troop conveyors was IMHO a secondary one.
Trawling through YouTube I came across some videos that show that galloping horses are quite happy to ride over humans if trying to avoid them would slow them down. Examples here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvSS9MaVWlg), here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PbVIl7DRDo) and especially here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-0vzjTvesw).
Notice that the horses barely slow down after knocking the humans flat. This argues an impressive impact power.
I did some rough calculations on how many joules of energy are required to knock down a man weighing about 75kg with his legs standing 1 yard apart if he was hit in the pelvis - about 400J, and then how many joules of energy are contained in a horse (actually an onager for my calculations) that weighs 250KG and moves at about 55km/h - about 8000J. I don't have the maths in front of me right now but the upshot is that the onager could knock down about 20 men before being brought to a halt. Hitch 4 onagers together in front of a cart and they become a formidable shock weapon.
One question came to mind: chariots became very light in design - Egyptian models weighed as little as 35kg - yet they were never pulled by less than two horses. Why is that? A gig or whiskey, which weighs more, can get along at a good speed behind a single horse.
My working hypothesis is that two or more horses hitched firmly together to a cross-yoke find it difficult or impossible to swerve to avoid an obstacle. Each horse of a two-horse team would tend to go in an opposite direction (not wanting to collide with each other) and hence each would bring the other back in line. In a three-horse or four-horse team the middle horses would keep going straight, obliging the flanking horses to follow suite. This makes the chariot a perfect battering ram against enemy infantry. Also the horses would clear the way for the chariot itself, the large wheels of which could easily ride over prone enemy infantry.
As a final point, Napoleonic squares though only 4-deep worked (usually) against enemy cavalry since the horses could be killed by muskets before penetrating the square, and no cavalryman wanted to deliberately sacrifice his mount if he could help it. Were the spears of Fertile Crescent infantry as effective? I doubt it.
And now to the floor...
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PMTrawling through YouTube I came across some videos that show that galloping horses are quite happy to ride over humans if trying to avoid them would slow them down. Examples here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvSS9MaVWlg), here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PbVIl7DRDo) and especially here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-0vzjTvesw).
All of which show horses trampling over individuals, not groups of men - not even loosely-formed ones.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 16, 2018, 01:01:17 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PMTrawling through YouTube I came across some videos that show that galloping horses are quite happy to ride over humans if trying to avoid them would slow them down. Examples here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvSS9MaVWlg), here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PbVIl7DRDo) and especially here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-0vzjTvesw).
All of which show horses trampling over individuals, not groups of men - not even loosely-formed ones.
Sure. I included them to show how little a single human being slows down a galloping horse, which tends to support my working hypothesis that you would need an infantry line in the region of 20-deep to stop it if the infantry don't have weapons capable of killing the horse.
This of course is all heading towards numerically huge Fertile Crescent armies with a glance at their attendant logistical and movement problems. ::)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PM
As a final point, Napoleonic squares though only 4-deep worked (usually) against enemy cavalry since the horses could be killed by muskets before penetrating the square, and no cavalryman wanted to deliberately sacrifice his mount if he could help it. Were the spears of Fertile Crescent infantry as effective? I doubt it.
And now to the floor...
I don't have the details at hand, but at Waterloo didn't the French cavalry ride up to and around the British squares, indicating that being mown down from a distance wasn't the issue, more the lack of a gap to ride into?
Cheers
Mick
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PM
As a final point, Napoleonic squares though only 4-deep worked (usually) against enemy cavalry since the horses could be killed by muskets before penetrating the square, and no cavalryman wanted to deliberately sacrifice his mount if he could help it. Were the spears of Fertile Crescent infantry as effective? I doubt it.
I'm not sure muskets are the key thing.
Take this Roman anti-cavalry formation - so good that the Byzantines were still using it centuries later
If they do close in though, the first three ranks should lock their shields and press their shoulders and receive the charge as strongly as possible in the most closely ordered formation bound together in the strongest manner. The fourth rank will throw their javelins overhead and the first rank will stab at them and their horses with their spears without pause. Arrian : Array against the Alans
Indeed, it may not having needed all four ranks
Indeed, as our knights were fighting on their own with their swords and their short weapons, they would have feared attacking the foot soldiers equipped with lances: these, with their lances longer than knives and swords, and moreover lined up in an unbreachable formation of triple layers of walls, were so cleverly disposed that there was no way that they could be breached.William the Breton : The Phillipiad
I always thought, incidentally, that the theory that a horse would see a line of infantry like a hedge or wall it couldn't jump was a better one than horses won't stand on people. Individuals standing in the way of a galloping horse are more an analogy for going through a skirmish line, IMO.
I await your quotation of sources to back up your theory with interest.
Quote from: Mick Hession on August 16, 2018, 01:12:03 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PM
As a final point, Napoleonic squares though only 4-deep worked (usually) against enemy cavalry since the horses could be killed by muskets before penetrating the square, and no cavalryman wanted to deliberately sacrifice his mount if he could help it. Were the spears of Fertile Crescent infantry as effective? I doubt it.
And now to the floor...
I don't have the details at hand, but at Waterloo didn't the French cavalry ride up to and around the British squares, indicating that being mown down from a distance wasn't the issue, more the lack of a gap to ride into?
Cheers
Mick
Muskets are notoriously inaccurate at anything except virtually point blank range - hence the low casualties in infantry vs infantry volleys. But fire a volley just before the cavalry charge rides home and it is a different matter.
Quote
As a final point, Napoleonic squares though only 4-deep worked (usually) against enemy cavalry since the horses could be killed by muskets before penetrating the square, and no cavalryman wanted to deliberately sacrifice his mount if he could help it.
I think that is wrong in general and in detail, though going through why would be off topic, and would probably just end with the usual response in these sort of discussions - along the lines of 'Napoleonic examples are totally irrelevant, and everything was different'.
When we've talked about cavalry's ability to charge home before and Napoleonic squares came up, we have found a few examples of cavalry who did successfully charge into a square, but more (many more) when they didn't (which is why squares were used), and could never rule out (in those cases where they did charge home) that the cavalry weren't penetrating gaps (caused by men killed or fleeing or just flinching out of the way) rather than actually smashing into them. There are some examples of cavalry forcing their horses to collide with infantry, but the result is always bad for the horses, usually bad for the riders, and not necessarily efficacious in breaking the infantry.
The consensus is that a mounted charges is a terror tactic designed to make enemy infantry flinch, break or run away; if the infantry stood firm they were usually (but not always) safe (relatively). Evidence (rather than theorising) to contradict this consensus would be interesting.
The idea that yoked horses are less able to swerve aside is an interesting one too - no idea if it is true. Chariots designed to charge into contact (if possible) seem to be specially equipped for this (scythed chariots) - and even so the simple expedient of leaving gaps for them to pass through seems to have worked OK.
Still, at least this has woken people up. :)
Also - equine battering rams surely?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PM
One question came to mind: chariots became very light in design - Egyptian models weighed as little as 35kg - yet they were never pulled by less than two horses. Why is that? A gig or whiskey, which weighs more, can get along at a good speed behind a single horse.
The relevant number is surely the weight of the vehicle + crew and equipment, which is probably more like 150-200 kg for the Egyptian chariot, both crew and horses frequently being armoured.
What, anyway, gives you the impression that shock was the primary role of chariots? Egyptian reliefs mostly show their crew as shooting arrows, which
prima facie would suggest that to be their main role.
Also, as Rich alludes to, scythed chariots of later eras have a terrible track record. Why would conventional chariots be better shock weapons, and if they were why did the conventional ones disappear and the scythed ones be invented?
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 01:16:12 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PM
As a final point, Napoleonic squares though only 4-deep worked (usually) against enemy cavalry since the horses could be killed by muskets before penetrating the square, and no cavalryman wanted to deliberately sacrifice his mount if he could help it. Were the spears of Fertile Crescent infantry as effective? I doubt it.
I'm not sure muskets are the key thing.
Take this Roman anti-cavalry formation - so good that the Byzantines were still using it centuries later
If they do close in though, the first three ranks should lock their shields and press their shoulders and receive the charge as strongly as possible in the most closely ordered formation bound together in the strongest manner. The fourth rank will throw their javelins overhead and the first rank will stab at them and their horses with their spears without pause.
Arrian : Array against the Alans
Indeed, it may not having needed all four ranks
Indeed, as our knights were fighting on their own with their swords and their short weapons, they would have feared attacking the foot soldiers equipped with lances: these, with their lances longer than knives and swords, and moreover lined up in an unbreachable formation of triple layers of walls, were so cleverly disposed that there was no way that they could be breached.
William the Breton : The Phillipiad
Notice that this requires the infantry using interlocking shields that form a continuous wall and not just infantry trying to stand individually against charging horses (even if the infantry are in formation). Notice also that they have to 'max out' to have a chance of stopping the cavalry - "the strongest possible manner". Note finally that this is a formation designed to stop/deter
cavalry - individual horsemen - not chariots that are much heavier entities.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 01:16:12 PMI always thought, incidentally, that the theory that a horse would see a line of infantry like a hedge or wall it couldn't jump was a better one than horses won't stand on people. Individuals standing in the way of a galloping horse are more an analogy for going through a skirmish line, IMO.
My guess is that cavalry/chariotry horses were deceptively trained to think humans gave way easily before a charge or a simple advance at a walk, trot or canter. A horse would probably not take part in more than one full-scale battle in the course of a campaign, smaller skirmishes would be much looser affairs not involving infantry walls. By the time the horse learns that people aren't as easy as all that the battle is lost or won anyway.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 01:16:12 PMI await your quotation of sources to back up your theory with interest.
This from Patrick:
| But Abradatas plunged directly through them and hurled himself upon the Egyptian phalanx; and the nearest of those who were arrayed with him also joined in the charge. Now, it has been demonstrated on many other occasions that there is no stronger force than that which is composed of comrades that are close friends; and it was shown to be true on this occasion. For it was only the personal friends and mess-mates of Abradatas who pressed home the charge with him, while the rest of the charioteers, when they saw that the Egyptians with their dense throng withstood them, turned aside after the fleeing chariots and pursued them.
But in the place where Abradatas and his companions charged, the Egyptians could not make an opening for them because the men on either side of them stood firm; consequently, those of the enemy who stood upright were struck in the furious charge of the horses and overthrown, and those who fell were crushed to pieces by the horses and the wheels, they and their arms; and whatever was caught in the scythes—everything, arms and men, was horribly mangled.
As in this indescribable confusion the wheels bounded over the heaps of every sort, Abradatas and others of those who went with him into the charge were thrown to the ground, and there, though they proved themselves men of valour, they were cut down and slain. - Xenophon |
These are scythed chariots but the principle holds: the horses are quite happy to charge into infantry; it's only the less courageous drivers who flinch at the last minute, with the quite legitimate fear of dying when their horses and vehicles are finally stopped by the mass of foot.
And this I found:
| Proceeding cautiously along, to my horror I perceived my path again blocked up by a dense body of Afghans. Retreat was impossible; so, putting my trust in God, I charged into the midst of them, hoping that the weight of my horse would clear my way for me, and reserving my sword cut for the last struggle. It was well that I did so; for by the time I had knocked over some twenty fellows, I found that they were my own juzailchees. If you ever experienced sudden relief from a hideous nightmare, you may imagine my feelings for the moment. - Swordsmen of the British Empire |
The conclusion seems to be that infantry have to interlock together with shields or a closely-packed formation or something similar to stop horses quickly. Just standing in intermediate order doesn't cut it. Otherwise they need to deploy in great depth to slow the horses and eventually bring them to a halt.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 01:16:48 PM
Quote from: Mick Hession on August 16, 2018, 01:12:03 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PM
As a final point, Napoleonic squares though only 4-deep worked (usually) against enemy cavalry since the horses could be killed by muskets before penetrating the square, and no cavalryman wanted to deliberately sacrifice his mount if he could help it. Were the spears of Fertile Crescent infantry as effective? I doubt it.
And now to the floor...
I don't have the details at hand, but at Waterloo didn't the French cavalry ride up to and around the British squares, indicating that being mown down from a distance wasn't the issue, more the lack of a gap to ride into?
Cheers
Mick
Muskets are notoriously inaccurate at anything except virtually point blank range - hence the low casualties in infantry vs infantry volleys. But fire a volley just before the cavalry charge rides home and it is a different matter.
Yet infantry
lines, which were able to bring more firepower to bear, were notoriously vulnerable to being ridden down.
But, as Richard says, Napoleonic parallels rarely get us anywhere.
Cheers
Mick
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 01:10:11 PM
if the infantry don't have weapons capable of killing the horse.
Surely the rabbliest Bronze Age spear-carrier had weapon
capable of killing a horse. The skill and bravery on the part of the wielder to actually do so when faced by a charging horse might be in doubt, in particular as being hit by a dying horse is little if any better than being so by a live one, but the capability of the weapon can hardly be in doubt.
Quote from: RichT on August 16, 2018, 02:38:46 PM
Quote
As a final point, Napoleonic squares though only 4-deep worked (usually) against enemy cavalry since the horses could be killed by muskets before penetrating the square, and no cavalryman wanted to deliberately sacrifice his mount if he could help it.
I think that is wrong in general and in detail, though going through why would be off topic, and would probably just end with the usual response in these sort of discussions - along the lines of 'Napoleonic examples are totally irrelevant, and everything was different'.
Please go ahead. The thread is about the nature of the impact of a moving horse on stationary infantry and in that optic I think the Napoleonic era does offer useful input.
Quote from: RichT on August 16, 2018, 02:38:46 PMWhen we've talked about cavalry's ability to charge home before and Napoleonic squares came up, we have found a few examples of cavalry who did successfully charge into a square, but more (many more) when they didn't (which is why squares were used), and could never rule out (in those cases where they did charge home) that the cavalry weren't penetrating gaps (caused by men killed or fleeing or just flinching out of the way) rather than actually smashing into them. There are some examples of cavalry forcing their horses to collide with infantry, but the result is always bad for the horses, usually bad for the riders, and not necessarily efficacious in breaking the infantry.
The consensus is that a mounted charges is a terror tactic designed to make enemy infantry flinch, break or run away; if the infantry stood firm they were usually (but not always) safe (relatively). Evidence (rather than theorising) to contradict this consensus would be interesting.
That example of a British cavalryman smashing into an Persian infantry square - I forget the source. His horse was killed but it made a hole wide enough for the rest of the cavalry to pour through and break up the square. Are there other examples of this?
Quote from: RichT on August 16, 2018, 02:38:46 PMAlso - equine battering rams surely?
Equid, if you want to include onagers. I've changed the thread heading. :)
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:22:03 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 01:10:11 PM
if the infantry don't have weapons capable of killing the horse.
Surely the rabbliest Bronze Age spear-carrier had weapon capable of killing a horse. The skill and bravery on the part of the wielder to actually do so when faced by a charging horse might be in doubt, in particular as being hit by a dying horse is little if any better than being so by a live one, but the capability of the weapon can hardly be in doubt.
Methinks he would have to brace the spear against the ground to have any real effect. Just holding it pointed at the horse would probably not be sufficient. There's a lot to penetrate before his spear reaches any vital spots of the horse's anatomy.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:15:34 PM
| But Abradatas plunged directly through them and hurled himself upon the Egyptian phalanx... |
These are scythed chariots...
... in a work of
fiction.
QuoteAnd this I found:
| Proceeding cautiously along, to my horror I perceived my path again blocked up by a dense body of Afghans. Retreat was impossible; so, putting my trust in God, I charged into the midst of them, hoping that the weight of my horse would clear my way for me, and reserving my sword cut for the last struggle. It was well that I did so; for by the time I had knocked over some twenty fellows, I found that they were my own juzailchees. If you ever experienced sudden relief from a hideous nightmare, you may imagine my feelings for the moment. - Swordsmen of the British Empire |
Now I thought that might go some way to fulfilling my objection to your original post 3 in this thread, namely that it's a long way from "horses can trample individuals" to "you need 20-deep formed lines to stop horses". However, looking at the original (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BUEoAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA2-PA383&lpg=RA2-PA383&dq=%22Proceeding+cautiously+along,+to+my+horror+I+perceived+my+path+again+blocked+up+by+a+dense+body+of+Afghans.%22&source=bl&ots=SxXlobKAPp&sig=AX2awsnSC1R7iHEjPm8dy_rC9Oc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiPv5Da4vHcAhVNeawKHStoD0gQ6AEwAHoECAMQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Proceeding%20cautiously%20along%2C%20to%20my%20horror%20I%20perceived%20my%20path%20again%20blocked%20up%20by%20a%20dense%20body%20of%20Afghans.%22&f=false) it becomes clear that Eyre's "juzailchees" had got
ahead of him, so when he so boldly rode into them and knocked them over, he was probably coming at them
from behind (which would help explain why he mistook their identity). I think most of us accept that horses will happily charge into infantry from the rear, and to good effect.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:15:34 PM
The conclusion seems to be that infantry have to interlock together with shields or a closely-packed formation or something similar to stop horses quickly. Just standing in intermediate order doesn't cut it.
Accepting this as true, do we have any particular reason to believe chariot age infantry didn't adopt such expedients? It's hard to tell exactly how closely the Assyrian infantry in the reliefs discussed in this thread (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=3451.0), say, are supposed to be, but it looks fairly tight to me, and their shields are certainly large enough they could be interlocked.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:23:16 PM
That example of a British cavalryman smashing into an Persian infantry square - I forget the source. His horse was killed but it made a hole wide enough for the rest of the cavalry to pour through and break up the square. Are there other examples of this?
If I remember, Nosworthy discusses similar examples from the Napoleonic era in
Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:15:34 PM
Notice that this requires the infantry using interlocking shields that form a continuous wall and not just infantry trying to stand individually against charging horses (even if the infantry are in formation).
is the suggestion that infantry were unable to use interlocking shield formations prior to the classical era?
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9d/Stele_of_Vultures_detail_01-transparent.png/240px-Stele_of_Vultures_detail_01-transparent.png)
Quote
These are scythed chariots but the principle holds:
Assuming the principle is
"Looking at war chariots as used by the Sumerians, Egyptian, Hittites, Assyrians, et al. it seems to me that they were designed principally as shock weapons, designed to plough through infantry and fragment their formations." On what basis? Are scythed chariots constructed in the same way (scythes apart) to say, Sumerian battlewagons or Egyptian chariots? Do they have similar crew, armed in a similar way? If not, why should we assume they operated in the same way?
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 16, 2018, 03:29:05 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:15:34 PM
| But Abradatas plunged directly through them and hurled himself upon the Egyptian phalanx... |
These are scythed chariots...
... in a work of fiction.
Based on what real scythed chariots would do? Scythed chariots were scythed for a reason.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 16, 2018, 03:29:05 PMQuoteAnd this I found:
| Proceeding cautiously along, to my horror I perceived my path again blocked up by a dense body of Afghans. Retreat was impossible; so, putting my trust in God, I charged into the midst of them, hoping that the weight of my horse would clear my way for me, and reserving my sword cut for the last struggle. It was well that I did so; for by the time I had knocked over some twenty fellows, I found that they were my own juzailchees. If you ever experienced sudden relief from a hideous nightmare, you may imagine my feelings for the moment. - Swordsmen of the British Empire |
Now I thought that might go some way to fulfilling my objection to your original post 3 in this thread, namely that it's a long way from "horses can trample individuals" to "you need 20-deep formed lines to stop horses". However, looking at the original (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BUEoAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA2-PA383&lpg=RA2-PA383&dq=%22Proceeding+cautiously+along,+to+my+horror+I+perceived+my+path+again+blocked+up+by+a+dense+body+of+Afghans.%22&source=bl&ots=SxXlobKAPp&sig=AX2awsnSC1R7iHEjPm8dy_rC9Oc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiPv5Da4vHcAhVNeawKHStoD0gQ6AEwAHoECAMQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Proceeding%20cautiously%20along%2C%20to%20my%20horror%20I%20perceived%20my%20path%20again%20blocked%20up%20by%20a%20dense%20body%20of%20Afghans.%22&f=false) it becomes clear that Eyre's "juzailchees" had got ahead of him, so when he so boldly rode into them and knocked them over, he was probably coming at them from behind (which would help explain why he mistook their identity). I think most of us accept that horses will happily charge into infantry from the rear, and to good effect.
Nothing in the passage suggests the juzailchees were facing away from Eyre, quite the opposite. His decision to charge through them despite the risk implies IMHO that they were facing him and he felt he was in real danger of being cut down.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:36:12 PM
Scythed chariots were scythed for a reason.
One might be forgiven for thinking that said reason was that non-scythed chariots didn't do enough damage when hitting an enemy formation to justify the effort.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 03:34:25 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:15:34 PM
Notice that this requires the infantry using interlocking shields that form a continuous wall and not just infantry trying to stand individually against charging horses (even if the infantry are in formation).
is the suggestion that infantry were unable to use interlocking shield formations prior to the classical era?
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9d/Stele_of_Vultures_detail_01-transparent.png/240px-Stele_of_Vultures_detail_01-transparent.png)
I've seen this image but I'm not quite sure how to interpret it (commentators seem uncertain too). Are the infantry holding their spears with two hands and letting the shields stand up on their own? If so I suspect that would be an easy obstacle for a chariot to roll over. Sumerian perspective is rather odd - showing front and side views all on the same plane. Do each of those shields for example have six bosses or are we looking at six shields each?
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 03:34:25 PMQuoteThese are scythed chariots but the principle holds:
On what basis? Are scythed chariots constructed in the same way (scythes apart) to say, Sumerian battlewagons or Egyptian chariots? Do they have similar crew, armed in a similar way? If not, why should we assume they operated in the same way?
I mean that scythed chariots would be used in exactly the same way as regular chariots just with a rather more devastating effect.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:39:18 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:36:12 PM
Scythed chariots were scythed for a reason.
One might be forgiven for thinking that said reason was that non-scythed chariots didn't do enough damage when hitting an enemy formation to justify the effort.
Or that non-scythed chariots had other features that offset their lack of scythes.
Off the top of my head:
- less dangerous to neighbouring friendly troops (including each other)
- easier to drive through enemy infantry as less infantry are contacted (just those in front of the horses)
- more able to navigate over difficult terrain without their scythes getting fouled.
A bit like the differences between WW2 heavy and medium tanks. Both served their purpose.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:36:12 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 16, 2018, 03:29:05 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:15:34 PM
| But Abradatas plunged directly through them and hurled himself upon the Egyptian phalanx... |
These are scythed chariots...
... in a work of fiction.
Based on what real scythed chariots would do? Scythed chariots were scythed for a reason.
Xenophon never saw a scythed chariot charge against formed infantry, only against peltasts at Cunaxa and perhaps foragers in Anatolia, so he had no firm knowledge of how they would fare. The whole story's an optimistic guess.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 16, 2018, 03:29:05 PMNothing in the passage suggests the juzailchees were facing away from Eyre, quite the opposite. His decision to charge through them despite the risk implies IMHO that they were facing him and he felt he was in real danger of being cut down.
Can't say I agree. In any case, they do not seem to have been resisting him - the juzailchees were not likely to make Eyre's mistake, since a mounted British officer is unlikely to have been an enemy - so the most we can conclude is that horses can charge into and knock over a dense formation of
completely unresisting foot, whichever way they're facing.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:23:16 PM
That example of a British cavalryman smashing into an Persian infantry square - I forget the source. His horse was killed but it made a hole wide enough for the rest of the cavalry to pour through and break up the square. Are there other examples of this?
From wikipedia :
On 8 February 1857 at the Battle of Khushab, Persia, Lieutenant Moore who was Adjutant of the [3rd Bombay Cavalry] Regiment, was probably the first in the attack, but his horse, on leaping into the square, fell dead, crushing his rider and breaking his sword. Lieutenant Moore extricated himself, but he would almost certainly have lost his life had not Lieutenant John Grant Malcolmson fought his way to his dismounted comrade and carried him to safety. In this battle Lieutenant Moore also charged an infantry square of 500 Persians at the head of his regiment and jumped his horse over the enemy's bayonets.At the Battle of García Hernández in 1812, a French square was broken when a dying horse fell into it, making a gap through which KGL dragoons charged. That's the only Napoleonic one I know, but then I don't know an enormous amount about the period.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 03:34:25 PM
On what basis? Are scythed chariots constructed in the same way (scythes apart) to say, Sumerian battlewagons or Egyptian chariots? Do they have similar crew, armed in a similar way? If not, why should we assume they operated in the same way?
Since Sumerian battle-carts and Egyptian chariots are very different in construction (e.g. different numbers and kinds of wheels), traction animals, and crew armament, Justin presumably operates on the assumption that such differences matter very little.
Achaemenid non-scythed chariots, FWIW, are depicted as rather similar to Egyptian ones (and perforce as very different from Sumerian battle-carts), see e.g. the seal of Darius I here (http://www.livius.org/articles/person/darius-the-great/sources/darius-seal/) (you have to scroll down a bit) and the picture of Ramses II here (http://masculineepic.com/index.php/2016/05/28/how-an-ancient-pharaoh-warped-reality-the-tale-of-ramesses-ii-the-battle-of-kadesh/). Both are light vehicles with two spoked wheels, drawn by pairs of horses, and carrying bow-armed crew, very much unlike the Standard of Ur (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_of_Ur#/media/File:Standard_of_Ur_-_War.jpg) vehicles.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 16, 2018, 03:57:12 PM
Xenophon never saw a scythed chariot charge against formed infantry, only against peltasts at Cunaxa and perhaps foragers in Anatolia, so he had no firm knowledge of how they would fare. The whole story's an optimistic guess.
Can one posit that Xenophon, as one of the Ten Thousand who marched with Cyrus, was in a position to acquire fairly reliable knowledge of what Middle Eastern chariots
used to be capable of and were once used for?
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 16, 2018, 03:29:05 PMQuoteNothing in the passage suggests the juzailchees were facing away from Eyre, quite the opposite. His decision to charge through them despite the risk implies IMHO that they were facing him and he felt he was in real danger of being cut down.
Can't say I agree. In any case, they do not seem to have been resisting him - the juzailchees were not likely to make Eyre's mistake, since a mounted British officer is unlikely to have been an enemy - so the most we can conclude is that horses can charge into and knock over a dense formation of completely unresisting foot, whichever way they're facing.
So if the horses can get past the front rank infantry spears, which is something they did achieve fairly often, then they were down to knocking over a dense formation of infantry who did not have the means of effectively resisting them?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:59:16 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 03:34:25 PM
On what basis? Are scythed chariots constructed in the same way (scythes apart) to say, Sumerian battlewagons or Egyptian chariots? Do they have similar crew, armed in a similar way? If not, why should we assume they operated in the same way?
Since Sumerian battle-carts and Egyptian chariots are very different in construction (e.g. different numbers and kinds of wheels), traction animals, and crew armament, Justin presumably operates on the assumption that such differences matter very little.
Achaemenid non-scythed chariots, FWIW, are depicted as rather similar to Egyptian ones (and perforce as very different from Sumerian battle-carts), see e.g. the seal of Darius I here (http://www.livius.org/articles/person/darius-the-great/sources/darius-seal/) (you have to scroll down a bit) and the picture of Ramses II here (http://masculineepic.com/index.php/2016/05/28/how-an-ancient-pharaoh-warped-reality-the-tale-of-ramesses-ii-the-battle-of-kadesh/). Both are light vehicles with two spoked wheels, drawn by pairs of horses, and carrying bow-armed crew, very much unlike the Standard of Ur (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_of_Ur#/media/File:Standard_of_Ur_-_War.jpg) vehicles.
My own take is that the chariot vehicle itself had no effect on the efficacy of the chariot charge, which depended entirely on the horses'/onagers' ability to knock down opposing infantry before they themselves were brought to a halt. Hence the tendency of chariot construction to get lighter as time wore on.
The thick wheels of Assyrian chariots are interesting. Possibly to crush fallen enemies so they wouldn't get up again?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:48:48 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:39:18 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:36:12 PM
Scythed chariots were scythed for a reason.
One might be forgiven for thinking that said reason was that non-scythed chariots didn't do enough damage when hitting an enemy formation to justify the effort.
Or that non-scythed chariots had other features that offset their lack of scythes.
Off the top of my head:
- less dangerous to neighbouring friendly troops (including each other)
- easier to drive through enemy infantry as less infantry are contacted (just those in front of the horses)
- more able to navigate over difficult terrain without their scythes getting fouled.
A bit like the differences between WW2 heavy and medium tanks. Both served their purpose.
The implication would be that the purpose of non-scythed chariots was something else than that of scythed chariots, namely shock attack. I don't think this helps your case :)
I say "would be", because unlike heavy and medium tanks, I'm not sure any army used scythed and non-scythed chariots at the same time. Do you have an example? (A single non-scythed chariot for the king doesn't count; that's about prestige, not tactics.)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 04:12:21 PM
The thick wheels of Assyrian chariots are interesting. Possibly to crush fallen enemies so they wouldn't get up again?
More robust? More ground clearance? Gave more of a height advantage to the crew?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 04:06:24 PM
Can one posit that Xenophon, as one of the Ten Thousand who marched with Cyrus, was in a position to acquire fairly reliable knowledge of what Middle Eastern chariots used to be capable of and were once used for?
Xenophon says that before Cyrus the Elder, all Middle-Eastern chariots were of the Homeric style, as still used by the Libyans. I'd take that as evidence that no, he couldn't, but if you're happy to lump Sumerian and Egyptian vehicles as essentially the same thing, I guess you're happy to include Libyco-Homeric charioteering under the same umbrella too.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 04:14:08 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:48:48 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:39:18 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:36:12 PM
Scythed chariots were scythed for a reason.
One might be forgiven for thinking that said reason was that non-scythed chariots didn't do enough damage when hitting an enemy formation to justify the effort.
Or that non-scythed chariots had other features that offset their lack of scythes.
Off the top of my head:
- less dangerous to neighbouring friendly troops (including each other)
- easier to drive through enemy infantry as less infantry are contacted (just those in front of the horses)
- more able to navigate over difficult terrain without their scythes getting fouled.
A bit like the differences between WW2 heavy and medium tanks. Both served their purpose.
The implication would be that the purpose of non-scythed chariots was something else than that of scythed chariots, namely shock attack. I don't think this helps your case :)
I say "would be", because unlike heavy and medium tanks, I'm not sure any army used scythed and non-scythed chariots at the same time. Do you have an example? (A single non-scythed chariot for the king doesn't count; that's about prestige, not tactics.)
I think scythed and non-scythed chariots were both used for shock attack - for me the clincher is that the lightest chariot was pulled by at least two horses. No need for that if the chariot is just meant to run around the place whilst its crew lob arrows at the enemy from a safe distance. Non-scythed chariots were better than scythed chariots in other roles: safer, more manoeuvrable especially over difficult terrain. But their principal purpose was still to charge enemy foot or at least threaten to do so (which would fix the foot in place whilst archers decimated them).
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 04:19:15 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 04:06:24 PM
Can one posit that Xenophon, as one of the Ten Thousand who marched with Cyrus, was in a position to acquire fairly reliable knowledge of what Middle Eastern chariots used to be capable of and were once used for?
Xenophon says that before Cyrus the Elder, all Middle-Eastern chariots were of the Homeric style, as still used by the Libyans. I'd take that as evidence that no, he couldn't, but if you're happy to lump Sumerian and Egyptian vehicles as essentially the same thing, I guess you're happy to include Libyco-Homeric charioteering under the same umbrella too.
An oral or written record would probably give a more reliable account of ancient chariot usage than of the precise design of different chariots in different epochs. And yes, I lump them together in terms of how they were employed, just like Tigers, Panthers, Churchills, T34s and Shermans were all on the battlefield for the same reason.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 04:17:44 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 04:12:21 PM
The thick wheels of Assyrian chariots are interesting. Possibly to crush fallen enemies so they wouldn't get up again?
More robust? More ground clearance? Gave more of a height advantage to the crew?
The wheels aren't especially big, they just have thick rims. So I don't think it was about ground clearance or height. Maybe about being robust (though why weren't chariots of other nations equally beefed up if it gave a significant advantage?)
(https://i.imgur.com/uk2DUp3.jpg)
PS: Notice that the charioteer is shooting fleeing infantry as well as running them down - would killing off routed foot be an important reason for arming the charioteer with a bow?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 04:26:16 PM
An oral or written record would probably give a more reliable account of ancient chariot usage than of the precise design of different chariots in different epochs.
It's a long time since I read the Iliad, but I definitely didn't get the impression it portrayed chariots as shock weapons.
(Before anyone objects that the Iliad isn't a reliable account of Mycenaean warfare, recall the context: it should be a quite reliable guide to what Xenophon's readers understood by Homeric charioteering.)
Quote
Please go ahead. The thread is about the nature of the impact of a moving horse on stationary infantry and in that optic I think the Napoleonic era does offer useful input.
Is it though? The nature of the impact of a moving horse on a stationary infantryman is I think pretty clear - the man gets knocked aside or knocked over (depending exactly how the horse hits him), the horse maybe keeps going, maybe trips up (depending exactly what happens to its legs). But taking the interaction of one horse and one man, multiplying by 500 and assuming this is what happened to formed bodies is not valid.
On Napoleonics - yes Nosworthy gathers a lot of evidence on this and is pretty good I think. Going from memory, there was debate at the time (18th/19th C) about the correct way to use cavalry against infantry, and a school of thought that they could and should be ridden into full contact. However, actual examples where this was pulled off successfully are exceedingly rare, and then were often due to special circumstances, such as the dead horse making a gap. Of course, these special cases are what justified the full charge argument - cavalry could charge AT infantry in the hope that something would happen which would make the charge successful.
Musketry could be useful in stopping, slowing or deterring approaching cavalry, but is not the primary reason why squares were adopted - otherwise, a line would have been just as (or more) effective. Cavalry could approach to sword reach of a square, unharmed by musketry, and still be unable to penetrate if the infantry were steady.
I feel we've had this discussion a million times already. The Napoleonic angle usually ends with:
Napeolenic cavalry only failed because the infantry had muskets. Ancient infantry didn't have muskets. QED.
And at the same time:
Napoleonic cavalry charges sometimes broke squares. So cavalry can charge smack into infantry. QED.
We certainly have had the scythed chariot argument quite recently. And the rest of it sounds an awful lot like KTB. Chariot KTB? C-KTB?
Quote from: RichT on August 16, 2018, 04:40:59 PM
We certainly have had the scythed chariot argument quite recently. And the rest of it sounds an awful lot like KTB. Chariot KTB? C-KTB?
No, no. KTB is about horses sliding between infantry files like, well, a knife through butter. Chariots are about slamming into the infantry without any finesse whatsoever. So better as Club The
Bastards Blighters - CTB. There you go.
I don't believe I got any answers to the following questions from page one. I realize the thread's been moving at the speed of a charging chariot, but I'd still be interested in Justin's responses :)
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:14:36 PM
What, anyway, gives you the impression that shock was the primary role of chariots? Egyptian reliefs mostly show their crew as shooting arrows, which prima facie would suggest that to be their main role.
Also, as Rich alludes to, scythed chariots of later eras have a terrible track record. Why would conventional chariots be better shock weapons, and if they were why did the conventional ones disappear and the scythed ones be invented?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:31:38 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:15:34 PM
The conclusion seems to be that infantry have to interlock together with shields or a closely-packed formation or something similar to stop horses quickly. Just standing in intermediate order doesn't cut it.
Accepting this as true, do we have any particular reason to believe chariot age infantry didn't adopt such expedients? It's hard to tell exactly how closely the Assyrian infantry in the reliefs discussed in this thread (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=3451.0), say, are supposed to be, but it looks fairly tight to me, and their shields are certainly large enough they could be interlocked.
Can I, in the midst of this hurtling discussion, ask for a quick definitional check from Justin?
We understand that the main historical evidence for the equid panzer is Xenophon (though he may have been surprised to hear it). Yet Xenophon apparently says that there was another type of chariot - the Homeric - which was also used in Libya. Does Justin accept Xenophon on this? If so, why is the Egyptian chariot in the "panzer" category, yet the very similar Libyan in a different one? taking it further, do we assume that other European chariots e.g. Bronze Age Nordic, Celtic are also "Homeric" class?
Are the chariots of India, China and South-East Asia in the "panzer" class or do they have their own class(es)?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 01:10:11 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 16, 2018, 01:01:17 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 12:44:37 PMTrawling through YouTube I came across some videos that show that galloping horses are quite happy to ride over humans if trying to avoid them would slow them down. Examples here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvSS9MaVWlg), here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PbVIl7DRDo) and especially here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-0vzjTvesw).
All of which show horses trampling over individuals, not groups of men - not even loosely-formed ones.
Sure. I included them to show how little a single human being slows down a galloping horse, which tends to support my working hypothesis that you would need an infantry line in the region of 20-deep to stop it if the infantry don't have weapons capable of killing the horse.
or one man with a spear braced and with the butt spike sticking in the ground
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 05:25:47 PM
I don't believe I got any answers to the following questions from page one. I realize the thread's been moving at the speed of a charging chariot, but I'd still be interested in Justin's responses :)
OK, let me have a go. I'm very much in the exploratory phase at present so it's just possible I may not have all the answers. :o
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:14:36 PM
What, anyway, gives you the impression that shock was the primary role of chariots? Egyptian reliefs mostly show their crew as shooting arrows, which prima facie would suggest that to be their main role.
From what I can see, whenever Egyptian art shows charioteers using bows in a battle context, they are pursuing a routed enemy which they are simultaneously riding down:
(https://i.imgur.com/11VW6Vr.jpg)
(https://i.imgur.com/p7B7TkW.jpg)
(https://i.imgur.com/x17UFZr.jpg)
(https://i.imgur.com/ZZM1yuh.jpg)
Anyone know of any exceptions to this? If so how many?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 05:25:47 PMAlso, as Rich alludes to, scythed chariots of later eras have a terrible track record. Why would conventional chariots be better shock weapons, and if they were why did the conventional ones disappear and the scythed ones be invented?
My answer is that infantry got good at stopping conventional chariots but scythed chariots were sufficiently terrifying as shock weapons to retain a certain efficacity against foot. An earlier post described how infantry could stop charging horses. The formation is quite intricate, something only professional and experienced troops would be capable of, not levy conscripts called up for a summer campaign. Increasingly professional armies with trained infantry gradually negated the power of the chariot until the Romans could laugh at it in its final Pontic incarnation.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 03:31:38 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 03:15:34 PM
The conclusion seems to be that infantry have to interlock together with shields or a closely-packed formation or something similar to stop horses quickly. Just standing in intermediate order doesn't cut it.
Accepting this as true, do we have any particular reason to believe chariot age infantry didn't adopt such expedients? It's hard to tell exactly how closely the Assyrian infantry in the reliefs discussed in this thread (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=3451.0), say, are supposed to be, but it looks fairly tight to me, and their shields are certainly large enough they could be interlocked.
See above. It took a really professional infantry to create the kind of formation that could stop chariots, and Fertile Crescent armies only began to become professional with the advent of the Assyrians, who incidently gave cavalry a role as important as chariots, which role would subsequently grow.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 05:43:14 PM
Can I, in the midst of this hurtling discussion, ask for a quick definitional check from Justin?
We understand that the main historical evidence for the equid panzer is Xenophon (though he may have been surprised to hear it). Yet Xenophon apparently says that there was another type of chariot - the Homeric - which was also used in Libya. Does Justin accept Xenophon on this? If so, why is the Egyptian chariot in the "panzer" category, yet the very similar Libyan in a different one? taking it further, do we assume that other European chariots e.g. Bronze Age Nordic, Celtic are also "Homeric" class?
Are the chariots of India, China and South-East Asia in the "panzer" class or do they have their own class(es)?
At present I'm floating the hypothesis that all chariots were primarily or at least initially designed to ride down infantry, though they could be used in other secondary roles (sometimes no more significant than to indicate the status of a Gallic chieftain). This is based on the impressive hitting power of a galloping horse/onager, combined with the extreme instability of a standing human. Types of chariots are irrelevant, just as types of tanks are irrelevant.
Taking another look at the Stele of Vultures, it is clear the picture of the spearman can't be taken as a realistic portrayal. Notice that beside each shield (if it's meant to be only one shield) there are six pairs of hands each holding a spear that projects the same distance before the shield. That's anatomically impossible.
The best way to interpret this is as a stylistic representation of spearmen who formed 6 deep and held spears with two hands whilst a seventh front row of men held the shields. Which means that this was less than impressive as a chariot-stopper.
(https://i.imgur.com/CLIUanl.jpg)
Anthony's quote from the Roman anti-cavalry formation is interesting:
| If they do close in though, the first three ranks should lock their shields and press their shoulders and receive the charge as strongly as possible in the most closely ordered formation bound together in the strongest manner. The fourth rank will throw their javelins overhead and the first rank will stab at them and their horses with their spears without pause. |
This turns a man from an unstable biped into a far stabler six-legged beast that is much more difficult to knock over. I'm guessing that Fertile Crescent infantry finally got the idea to compress ranks when charged by cavalry or chariots. The infantry could not be knocked down and their combined mass became very difficult for the horse to shove aside. A theory.
BTW doesn't this passage describe the fulcum? If so the interlocking shields were one above the other, not side-by-side.
I do not know what tactical procedures were used by Indian and Chinese chariots, but would support Justin's conclusion that Biblical era chariots had primarily a shock role. The very few battle descriptions we have in any detail, namely Megiddo and Kadesh, are both decided by a massed chariot charge; at Megiddo this routs the opposing army wholesale, while at Kadesh it cuts through a marching contingent and the subsequent pursuit wraps up another contingent.
One counter to charging chariots is deep formations: a formation, as has correctly been pointed out, has different characteristics from a scattered collection of uncoordinated individuals. On a one-to-one basis, horses can keep knocking men over on a sustained schedule, but where men can buffer and/or support each other the dynamics change and the horse (with associated chariot) runs out of steam after bowling over a few ranks and becomes vulnerable. Ergo, deep formations inhibit 'direct action' by chariots and require softening up - by friendly archers or by the chariots themselves, or both - before they can be charged with success.
One observes in Xenophon's Cyropaedia that the 'Assyrian' (sic) chariots encountered by Cyrus and the Medes dismount their archers as a line of shooters when faced by infantry (Xenophon, perhaps erroneously, expands this tactic into a whole philosophy of chariot use). This I would see as the chariots attempting to soften up the infantry in the hope of making them chargeable at some later point in the battle. Cyrus' infantry, however, instead of sitting tight and taking it, advance and panic the Assyrians, who are not used to such behaviour. (One may note that some sources, e.g. the Book of Judith, refer to Neo-Babylonians as 'Assyrians'; the Neo-Babylonian Empire appears to have used much of the Assyrian military system.) Had Cyrus not advanced, the opposing chariot crews would have presumably conducted their shooting and then, when they saw or thought they saw signs of failure in the target's morale, mounted up for a decisive charge.
Scythed chariots appear to have differed in that they had no recourse but to charge, although even so at Thymbra some of the crews appear to have considered discretion the better part of valour when facing the very deep Egyptian formation. Xenophon's description indicates that Cyrus was more concerned about ensuring that opponents did not manage to evade around or under the chariot than about adding effectiveness to the charge per se, although the subsequent retention of the scythed chariot as a weapon system for five whole centuries indicates that its various upsets when meeting disciplined western armies were, in the context of its overall history, the exception rather than the rule.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 06:41:11 PM
From what I can see, whenever Egyptian art shows charioteers using bows in a battle context, they are pursuing a routed enemy which they are simultaneously riding down:
[snip images]
Anyone know of any exceptions to this? If so how many?
The Egyptians triumphing over routing enemy is pretty much the default for Egyptian reliefs. Do you know of any showing them attacking non-broken enemy without shooting?
Quote from: Erpingham on August 16, 2018, 05:43:14 PM
Yet Xenophon apparently says that there was another type of chariot - the Homeric - which was also used in Libya.
Here's the relevant excerpt from the Cyropaedia:
Quote from: Xenophon, Cyropaedia, VI.27-30(27) He [sc. Cyrus the Great] also procured chariots, taking them from the enemy or wherever he could find them. The old Trojan type of charioteering, still in use to this day among the Cyrenaeans, he abolished; before his time the Medes, the Syrians, the Arabians, and all Asiatics generally, used their chariots in the same way as the Cyrenaeans do now. (28) The fault of the system to his mind was that the very flower of the army, if the picked men were in the chariots, could only act at long range and so contribute little after all to the victory. Three hundred chariots meant twelve hundred horses and three hundred fighting-men, besides the charioteers, who would naturally be men above the common, in whom the warriors could place confidence: and that meant another three hundred debarred from injuring the enemy in any kind of way. (29) Such was the system he abolished in favour of the war-chariot proper, with strong wheels to resist the shock of collision, and long axles, on the principle that a broad base is the firmer, while the driver's seat was changed into what might be called a turret, stoutly built of timber and reaching up to the elbow, leaving the driver room to manage the horses above the rim. The drivers themselves were all fully armed, only their eyes uncovered. (30) He had iron scythes about two feet long attached to the axles on either side, and others, under the tree, pointing to the ground, for use in a charge. Such was the type of chariot invented by Cyrus, and it is still in use to-day among the subjects of the Great King. Beside the chariots he had a large number of camels, collected from his friends or captured from the enemy.
You will notice I slightly misremembered the terminology; he says "Trojan", not "Homeric", and specifically "Cyrenaean" rather than "Libyan". I don't believe this materially affects the argument, although one idly wonders if he perceived a difference in style between Trojan and Achaean charioteering.
With thanks to Jim Webster, whose article "Xenophon's Chariot" in SL264 is warmly recommended to anyone interested in scythed chariots.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 04:14:08 PM
... I'm not sure any army used scythed and non-scythed chariots at the same time. Do you have an example? (A single non-scythed chariot for the king doesn't count; that's about prestige, not tactics.)
Antiochus I's 'elephant victory', as narrated by Lucian, is a singular but noteworthy example:
Antiochus Soter had a somewhat similar experience about his battle with the Galatians. If you will allow me, I propose to give you an account of that event also. These people were good fighters, and on this occasion in great force; they were drawn up in a serried phalanx, the first rank, which consisted of steel-clad warriors, being supported by men of the ordinary heavy-armed type to the depth of four-and-twenty; twenty thousand cavalry held the flanks; and there were
eighty scythed, and twice that number of ordinary war chariots ready to burst forth from the centre ...
No differentiation of location or role is given for the different chariot types.
... Antiochus had sixteen elephants; Theodotas advised him to conceal these as well as he could for the present, not letting their superior height betray them; when the signal for battle was given, the shock just at hand, the enemy's cavalry charging, and their phalanx opening to give free passage to the chariots, then would be the time for the elephants. A section of four was to meet the cavalry on each flank, and the remaining eight to engage
the chariot squadron. 'By this means,' he concluded, 'the horses will be frightened, and there will be a stampede into the Galatian infantry.'
Again, no differentiation of, or even distinction between, scythed and non-scythed chariots is made; the formation including both is treated as a unitary contingent.
Caveats with this passage are 1) it is written by a poet and 2) it appears to be the only example of its kind. That said, there seems to be no reason for Lucian to lie about this, and one example is all we really need to observe the use of scythed and non-scythed chariots by the same army.
there are a couple of points which you do not seem to have considered yet.
the first is the development of infantry during the chariot period.
Assyrian, Persian and Hoplites all seem to be a different beast from earlier infantry. better drilled, better trained and working much more as we would expect infantry to do .
This goes hand in hand with the end of the chariot period - the Assyrians marking the cross over point where both are present at the same time.
I think you should look at the changes to chariotry in that light before drawing your conclusions - and be specific in your examples, rather than attempting to force your theory onto all circumstances.
You should also look at the change in design of chariots and their use - purpose.
two horse Egyptian chariots are almost always shown as light weight two man cabs- with wide axels - which are ideal for turning at high speed, and therefore fit much more clearly into the traditional model of 'light chariots, skirmishing missile platforms' as their primary role and the pursuit of fleeing enemies.
later chariots become heavier, with first more men and then later more horses as well. I would argue that this is as much a reaction to better infantry making them much more likely to stand in the charge, at which point the infantry gain the advantage over the chariot.
how would four hoses help that? have you ever seen horses running at you? all that earth trembling stuff is real. just take a moment to look at the old Waterloo movie, where the Russian infantry extras - who were told, stand there, don't move, the horse will run past - still buckle into triangles to get away from something that isn't actually trying to hurt them or even come near them.
if you are positing that the three man chariot (Hittite) is a change in design to improve its ability to impact infantry, then that is fine, but you need to make a specific case for that change as some form of piltdown man stage between two horse and four horse chariots.
(and that would be a case which I would disagree with, it looks far more likely to me that the change in axel position is simply to allow it to carry a third man as a runner and/or dedicated shield bearer by balancing his weight behind the middle axel thereby enabling the same two horses to carry the extra man at minimal cost to the horses themselves).
Put the napoleonic example to one side, as usual, it is completely missing the specifics.
if muskets were the factor, then why were squares not used on 18th century battlefields?
the important thing to understand there is that napoleonic infantry lines were comparatively isolated and therefore their flanks were exposed, which was why squares became a feature of the battlefield - its not about cavalry charging the front of the line, its about them getting on the open flank.
Ditto cavalry, charging not by regiment, but by squadron, lots of squadrons, each looking for an opening or flank, none looking to actually hit the 'wall' even when it is only two men deep.
if you want to read up on that, forget Waterloo. look at Auerstadt.
the morning cavalry charges under Blucher (which most poorly written books will tell you was Blucher 'wasting' the best cavalry in the world against Davout's squares, were in fact a very coherent delaying tactic which halted the French advance until the main army could deploy to crush it (or might have done, if the general hadn't been shot and the army command fell apart)).
those charges were all squadron by squadron. charge and not charge home, refrom behind the core of the regiment, repeat.
they kept doing this until either the infantry gave them an opening (which they didn't) or until they were told to re delopy elsewhere, (which they did)
that is the best massed example of the standard tactic of the time - squadrons, one directly behind the other, aiming for the corner (the threat comes to your side, slightly out of view), working on a feint and reform basis.
if you analyse the examples of squares which were penetrated, BTW, there are a couple of common factors. rain is one, the cavalry having lances is arguably another, and there is the accidental chance of the dying horse crushing a hole as it falls, but almost always, ther real thing is either the infantry being caught by surprise, or the infantry being raw/untried/poorly trained. which all comes back to them not sticking to formation, at which point the cavalry pounce. hence why alomst all examples of squares breaking are in 1813-14 when the armies were largely conscript, or spain where surprise was a feature of the battles and encounters.
if you look at the manuals of the time too - cavalry were told to charge at the corners, and to do so in waves of squadrons, looking for the break point, never to actually hit home on the formed unit.
infantry were told to form a square of any sort to protect the flank, and they were told to stand and take it, and never to fire (let the gunners run out and shoot back if they get a chance).
and cavalry were told to immediately charge at men reloading as the most likely to break.
and bascially, that era tells us the drill wins - which is what also seems to be the case for chariots too - infantry start to drill properly, so the chariots attempt to make themselves more frightneing by teaming up into fours, but that really doesn't work, and the chariot ends (after a brief failed swansong with some scyths attached)
Which raises the question - do we have any examples of Assyrian or similar chariots being used in combat?
we have plenty of Egyptians shooting and chasing routers
we have them against three man hittites too
we have gallic and galations
we have scythed chariots
but what have we on Assyrian (or any other) 4 horse chariots in the biblical era?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 07:08:52 PM
Taking another look at the Stele of Vultures, it is clear the picture of the spearman can't be taken as a realistic portrayal. Notice that beside each shield (if it's meant to be only one shield) there are six pairs of hands each holding a spear that projects the same distance before the shield. That's anatomically impossible.
The best way to interpret this is as a stylistic representation of spearmen who formed 6 deep and held spears with two hands whilst a seventh front row of men held the shields. Which means that this was less than impressive as a chariot-stopper.
I think your interpretatation is quite plausible. However, the intent clearly is to indicate massed spearmen in a formation of some kind. It is unclear why a massed formation at least seven ranks deep would be less than impressive as a chariot stopper, other than preconceptions.
Quote
BTW doesn't this passage describe the fulcum? If so the interlocking shields were one above the other, not side-by-side.
This predates the adoption of the term
fulcum but it is essentially the same as the defensive form of the
fulcum. In the latter formation, though, the flat shields of the late Romans/early Byzantines could be overlapped, where the semi-cylindrical
scutum couldn't. How significant that is, I don't know.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 06:46:00 PM
At present I'm floating the hypothesis that all chariots were primarily or at least initially designed to ride down infantry, though they could be used in other secondary roles (sometimes no more significant than to indicate the status of a Gallic chieftain). This is based on the impressive hitting power of a galloping horse/onager, combined with the extreme instability of a standing human. Types of chariots are irrelevant, just as types of tanks are irrelevant.
It is fine to float a hypothesis. But you backed it up with a quote from Xenophon, seemingly missing the fact that he said all the chariots you referred to in your opening statement were used differently. Perhaps some further examples of chariots in action might help us to know if all chariots were essentially impact weapons?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 05:31:31 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 06:41:11 PM
From what I can see, whenever Egyptian art shows charioteers using bows in a battle context, they are pursuing a routed enemy which they are simultaneously riding down:
[snip images]
Anyone know of any exceptions to this? If so how many?
The Egyptians triumphing over routing enemy is pretty much the default for Egyptian reliefs. Do you know of any showing them attacking non-broken enemy without shooting?
I get the point. If pictures almost exclusively show charioteers only shooting fleeing enemy then one could either argue that the chariot bow was primarily a pursuit weapon, or that Egyptian artists were only interested in showing their army at its moment of triumph. I would argue however that since the pictures show only the bow being used in pursuit of fleeing enemy the burden of proof lies in demonstrating that its principal use was before the enemy routed and hence that the chariot's principal use was as an archer transport.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 17, 2018, 06:31:12 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 16, 2018, 04:14:08 PM
... I'm not sure any army used scythed and non-scythed chariots at the same time. Do you have an example?
Antiochus I's 'elephant victory', as narrated by Lucian, is a singular but noteworthy example
Thanks :)
If memory were less imperfect, I might have thought of the Galatians myself: the DBX lists allow them both scythed and ordinary chariots. The DBMM list notes suggest that the scythed ones were "probably" captured Seleucid ones, which if true could explain the apparent exception: it may not have been a matter of using the two kinds for different purposes, but simply of wringing some use out of captured equipment.
(Obviously, said list itself takes the opposite view: the scythed ones are sacrificial shock weapons while the ordinary ones are javelin-chucking skirmishers. But I imagine it's possible to skirmish from a scythed chariot despite that not being what it's designed for. Justin didn't list any Celtic charioteers in the original post: given that they're probably the best-attested ones in terms of detailed battle accounts, should I assume they're not included in his shock scenario?)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 09:17:56 AM
I get the point. If reliefs almost exclusively show charioteers only shooting fleeing enemy then one could either argue that the chariot bow was primarily a pursuit weapon, or that Egyptian artists were only interested in showing their army at its moment of triumph.
Absent reliefs showing the chariots doing anything else before the enemy breaking, the latter seems the obvious conclusion.
Quoteshould I assume they're not included in his shock scenario?
Justin has said
Quoteall chariots were primarily or at least initially designed to ride down infantry
and
QuoteTypes of chariots are irrelevant
I had specifically included Celtic chariots in the question.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 17, 2018, 10:18:54 AM
Quoteshould I assume they're not included in his shock scenario?
Justin has said
Quoteall chariots were primarily or at least initially designed to ride down infantry
and
QuoteTypes of chariots are irrelevant
I had specifically included Celtic chariots in the question.
I seem to remember Nigel Tallis being a little sniffy about calling Celtic vehicles "chariots" at all.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 17, 2018, 10:18:54 AM
Quoteshould I assume they're not included in his shock scenario?
Justin has said
Quoteall chariots were primarily or at least initially designed to ride down infantry
and
QuoteTypes of chariots are irrelevant
I had specifically included Celtic chariots in the question.
Are there any examples of Celtic chariots charging infantry?
Quote from: Erpingham on August 17, 2018, 10:18:54 AM
Quoteshould I assume they're not included in his shock scenario?
Justin has said
Quoteall chariots were primarily or at least initially designed to ride down infantry
and
QuoteTypes of chariots are irrelevant
I had specifically included Celtic chariots in the question.
Well then, then it would probably be more productive to look at Caesar's descriptions of British chariots than to argue about what can or cannot be gleaned from Egyptian reliefs :)
On another tack, is anyone familiar with the Indian literature? Since their chariots too carried bows, they might be a better parallel to pre-Classical Near Eastern charioteering than Celtic javelin-chuckers or Achaemenid-Hellenistic scythed chariots.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 10:35:49 AM
I seem to remember Nigel Tallis being a little sniffy about calling Celtic vehicles "chariots" at all.
Given that Justin's repeatedly said that the form of the vehicle doesn't matter much, and that his idea is supposed to cover Sumerian battle-carts as well as "proper" chariots, that seems like excessive sniffiness in context.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 10:35:49 AM
I seem to remember Nigel Tallis being a little sniffy about calling Celtic vehicles "chariots" at all.
This seems a little harsh, given that the word ultimately derives from a gallic loan word into Latin. According to the OED, the consistent meaning is a wheeled vehicle, the number of wheels and the role varying.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 10:51:05 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 10:35:49 AM
I seem to remember Nigel Tallis being a little sniffy about calling Celtic vehicles "chariots" at all.
Given that Justin's repeatedly said that the form of the vehicle doesn't matter much, and that his idea is supposed to cover Sumerian battle-carts as well as "proper" chariots, that seems like excessive sniffiness in context.
My idea is that the chariot vehicle doesn't add its weight to the horses as it doesn't push them in the way infantry do infantry - the transfer of the chariot's mass via the central shaft to the cross-yoke just isn't going to do anything for the momentum the horses can bring to bear. If the chariot slams its weight forwards it's more likely to a) break the central shaft, b) upset the chariot and c) spill out the men in it.
"In chariot fighting the Britons begin by driving all over the field hurling javelins, and generally the terror inspired by the horses and the noise of the wheels are sufficient to throw their opponents' ranks into disorder. Then, after making their way between the squadrons of their own cavalry, they jump down from the chariot and engage on foot. In the meantime their charioteers retire a short distance from the battle and place the chariots in such a position that their masters, if hard pressed by numbers, have an easy means of retreat to their own lines. Thus they combine the mobility of cavalry with the staying power of infantry; and by daily training and practice they attain such proficiency that even on a steep incline they are able to control the horses at full gallop, and to check and turn them in a moment. They can run along the chariot pole, stand on the yoke, and get back into the chariot as quick as lightning" (Gallic War, IV.33).
So according to Caesar, British chariots had no shock role. Other Roman writers tend to agree, as does the Irish literature (the scythed chariot episode in the Tain is a late interpolation).
Nigel's sniffiness is a bit unjustified as Celtic chariots clearly were a fighting platform at least for skirmishing purposes, but they don't fit the shock model proposed by Justin.
Regards
Mick
Quote from: Erpingham on August 17, 2018, 08:35:25 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 16, 2018, 07:08:52 PM
Taking another look at the Stele of Vultures, it is clear the picture of the spearman can't be taken as a realistic portrayal. Notice that beside each shield (if it's meant to be only one shield) there are six pairs of hands each holding a spear that projects the same distance before the shield. That's anatomically impossible.
The best way to interpret this is as a stylistic representation of spearmen who formed 6 deep and held spears with two hands whilst a seventh front row of men held the shields. Which means that this was less than impressive as a chariot-stopper.
I think your interpretatation is quite plausible. However, the intent clearly is to indicate massed spearmen in a formation of some kind. It is unclear why a massed formation at least seven ranks deep would be less than impressive as a chariot stopper, other than preconceptions.
Fair enough. The image is way too stylised to determine what formation the infantry adopted. If they just lined up in regular intermediate-order files with, say, the second rank presenting spears whilst the front rank kept the shields upright, then I would say that a chariot could burst through them quite easily - an onager at full pelt isn't going to have a problem bowling over seven men one after another. If however they pack together like hoplites permitting several ranks to present spears then they have a much better chance of stopping a chariot.
Question: just how effective is a spear at physically stopping a galloping horse?
Quote from: Erpingham on August 17, 2018, 08:35:25 AMQuote
BTW doesn't this passage describe the fulcum? If so the interlocking shields were one above the other, not side-by-side.
This predates the adoption of the term fulcum but it is essentially the same as the defensive form of the fulcum. In the latter formation, though, the flat shields of the late Romans/early Byzantines could be overlapped, where the semi-cylindrical scutum couldn't. How significant that is, I don't know.
I would imagine that semi-cylindrical shields would present no problem since they overlap one above the other.
(https://i.imgur.com/0Oykicn.jpg)
Quote from: Mick Hession on August 17, 2018, 11:44:13 AM
"In chariot fighting the Britons begin by driving all over the field hurling javelins, and generally the terror inspired by the horses and the noise of the wheels are sufficient to throw their opponents' ranks into disorder. Then, after making their way between the squadrons of their own cavalry, they jump down from the chariot and engage on foot. In the meantime their charioteers retire a short distance from the battle and place the chariots in such a position that their masters, if hard pressed by numbers, have an easy means of retreat to their own lines. Thus they combine the mobility of cavalry with the staying power of infantry; and by daily training and practice they attain such proficiency that even on a steep incline they are able to control the horses at full gallop, and to check and turn them in a moment. They can run along the chariot pole, stand on the yoke, and get back into the chariot as quick as lightning" (Gallic War, IV.33).
So according to Caesar, British chariots had no shock role. Other Roman writers tend to agree, as does the Irish literature (the scythed chariot episode in the Tain is a late interpolation).
There's a bit of a giveaway in this passage:
generally the terror inspired by the horses and the noise of the wheels are sufficient to throw their opponents' ranks into disorder. If British chariots never, ever, ever charged formed foot then the infantry would have no reason to fear them. My own take is that if the charioteers saw that conditions were not optimal for a chariot charge they dismounted and fought on foot rather than just sit in their chariots doing nothing.
British horses were quite small: pony-sized according to this site (http://www.fellponymuseum.org.uk/fells/rom_dark/size.htm), which would have affected their ability to punch through infantry. They certainly weren't going to have any success against Roman legionaries (as Mithridates found out). Onagers are also small, about the size of a British horse/pony, but they can gallop as fast as a thoroughbred racing horse, which gives them tremendous energy on impact.
Several Roman sources speak of British and Caledonian scythed chariots:
They fight not only on horseback and on foot, but also in wagons and chariots [bigis et curribus], and are armed after the manner of the Gauls. They call those chariots covines which are set with scythes round about the naves [falcatis axibus] Pomponius Mela,
De Chorographia 3.43 - writing around AD43
[Britons, who paint their bodies with iron-red, drive]
scythed two-horse chariots [bigis curribusque falcatis] which they commonly call essedae - Jordanes,
Getica I.2.15
Bottom line is that some Britons/Caledonians at least used some scythed chariots but that British chariots weren't as effective in a shock role due to their poor pony-like horses, which meant that their drivers tended to employ them more for psychological intimidation (which hearkens back to their primary role) and a quick getaway.
QuoteQuestion: just how effective is a spear at physically stopping a galloping horse?
I'd say it depends what you do with it. Throwing it probably wouldn't stop a horse. Planting the end in the ground, braced with your foot and aiming the point at the horses chest would probably kill it but it would fall on top of you at speed. For a chariot crew or cavalryman, the risk of mutual destruction from such an encounter would be a powerful factor in the effectiveness of the spear, beyond its physical effect.
This article (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/britannia/boudica/chariot.html) has a lot of classical sources for the British chariot.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 12:21:07 PM
There's a bit of a giveaway in this passage: generally the terror inspired by the horses and the noise of the wheels are sufficient to If British chariots never, ever, ever charged formed foot then the infantry would have no reason to fear them. My own take is that if the charioteers saw that conditions were not optimal for a chariot charge they dismounted and fought on foot rather than just sit in their chariots doing nothingthrow their opponents' ranks into disorder. .
You're welcome to your own take but you are drawing a very specific inference from a very general statement. However all you've got is inference. Have you any instances of Celtic chariots being used in a shock role?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 12:21:07 PM
They fight not only on horseback and on foot, but also in wagons and chariots [bigis et curribus], and are armed after the manner of the Gauls. They call those chariots covines which are set with scythes round about the naves [falcatis axibus] Pomponius Mela, De Chorographia 3.43 - writing around AD43
[Britons, who paint their bodies with iron-red, drive] scythed two-horse chariots [bigis curribusque falcatis] which they commonly call essedae - Jordanes, Getica I.2.15
Jordanes is not a primary source for Celtic chariots. I'm aware of the Pomponius Mela quote but he also believed that people couldn't survive the heat at Tropical latitudes. There's no indication he ever visited Britain so I wouldn't attach the same weight to his writing as I would to Caesar or Tacitus.
Cheers
Mick
Quote from: Mick Hession on August 17, 2018, 01:02:55 PM
I'm aware of the Pomponius Mela quote but he also believed that people couldn't survive the heat at Tropical latitudes.
To be fair, that was the general opinion of ancient geographers.
Quote from: Mick Hession on August 17, 2018, 01:02:55 PM
I'm aware of the Pomponius Mela quote but he also believed that people couldn't survive the heat at Tropical latitudes. There's no indication he ever visited Britain so I wouldn't attach the same weight to his writing as I would to Caesar or Tacitus.
Cheers
Mick
Frontinus, governor of Britain from 76-78AD, wrote about the 4-horse scythed British chariot, the
falcatas quadrigas:
Gaius Caesar met the scythe-bearing chariots of the Gauls with stakes driven in the ground, and kept them in check. -
Stratagems, II.3.18
I think it's fair to conclude the British had scythed chariots and used them in a shock role, obliging Caesar to do something about them.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 12:21:07 PM
If British chariots never, ever, ever charged formed foot then the infantry would have no reason to fear them.
You are assuming that the infantry are aware of the history of British chariots in action.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 01:56:37 PM
Frontinus, governor of Britain from 76-78AD, wrote about the 4-horse scythed British chariot, the falcatas quadrigas:
Gaius Caesar met the scythe-bearing chariots of the Gauls with stakes driven in the ground, and kept them in check. - Stratagems, II.3.18
I think it's fair to conclude the British had scythed chariots and used them in a shock role, obliging Caesar to do something about them.
But where did Frontinus get this information, as Caesar seems to have forgotten to mention it?
Quote from: Erpingham on August 17, 2018, 01:59:47 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 01:56:37 PM
Frontinus, governor of Britain from 76-78AD, wrote about the 4-horse scythed British chariot, the falcatas quadrigas:
Gaius Caesar met the scythe-bearing chariots of the Gauls with stakes driven in the ground, and kept them in check. - Stratagems, II.3.18
I think it's fair to conclude the British had scythed chariots and used them in a shock role, obliging Caesar to do something about them.
But where did Frontinus get this information, as Caesar seems to have forgotten to mention it?
My mistake - Frontinus was talking about Gallic, not British, chariots. But Caesar may simply have omitted to mention them in his
Gallic Wars because they played no significant part in the fighting.
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on August 17, 2018, 01:59:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 12:21:07 PM
If British chariots never, ever, ever charged formed foot then the infantry would have no reason to fear them.
You are assuming that the infantry are aware of the history of British chariots in action.
Not quite: I conclude that since the infantry got the willies just from seeing chariots, they knew that those chariots were quite capable of charging them and had done so in the past.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 02:04:12 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on August 17, 2018, 01:59:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 12:21:07 PM
If British chariots never, ever, ever charged formed foot then the infantry would have no reason to fear them.
You are assuming that the infantry are aware of the history of British chariots in action.
Not quite: I conclude that since the infantry got the willies just from seeing chariots, they knew that those chariots were quite capable of charging them and had done so in the past.
But Caesar says "When our troops were thrown into confusion in this fashion
by the novel character of the fighting" (BG. IV.34) - in other words, the infantry got the willies specifically because they had
not fought chariots before.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 02:01:35 PM
But Caesar may simply have omitted to mention them in his Gallic Wars because they played no significant part in the fighting.
It is interesting that Caesar completely omitted four horsed scythed chariots (different from the usual Gallic chariot, still in use as transport, which was two-horsed) but spoke in detail about British military two horse chariots. Strange, too, that he didn't contrast them with the Gallic type.
Is it possible that Frontinus is garbling who was responsible for the stratagem, or even he's thinking of Galatian scythed chariots?
I must admit, I would be cautious building an operating model for British chariots by disregarding the evidence of Caesar and Tacitus and relying instead of passing references found elsewhere in Roman literature.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 02:15:06 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 02:04:12 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on August 17, 2018, 01:59:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 12:21:07 PM
If British chariots never, ever, ever charged formed foot then the infantry would have no reason to fear them.
You are assuming that the infantry are aware of the history of British chariots in action.
Not quite: I conclude that since the infantry got the willies just from seeing chariots, they knew that those chariots were quite capable of charging them and had done so in the past.
But Caesar says "When our troops were thrown into confusion in this fashion by the novel character of the fighting" (BG. IV.34) - in other words, the infantry got the willies specifically because they had not fought chariots before.
very much so.
The much maligned Newbury Ancient rules treated British chariots as dismounting elite skirmishers, which I suspect is closer to reality then the infamous 'Ancient British Panzer Division' which Phil Barker describes so eloquently in his 'purple primer'.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 02:15:06 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 02:04:12 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on August 17, 2018, 01:59:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 12:21:07 PM
If British chariots never, ever, ever charged formed foot then the infantry would have no reason to fear them.
You are assuming that the infantry are aware of the history of British chariots in action.
Not quite: I conclude that since the infantry got the willies just from seeing chariots, they knew that those chariots were quite capable of charging them and had done so in the past.
But Caesar says "When our troops were thrown into confusion in this fashion by the novel character of the fighting" (BG. IV.34) - in other words, the infantry got the willies specifically because they had not fought chariots before.
What exactly is the novel character of the fighting that throws the troops into confusion? Not the danger of being charged by chariots - which they knew about otherwise they wouldn't have feared them - but the way the Britons used a chariot-cavalry combination to surround the Roman infantry and attack them with a combination of the solidity of foot with the mobility of mounted troops.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 17, 2018, 02:24:44 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 02:01:35 PM
But Caesar may simply have omitted to mention them in his Gallic Wars because they played no significant part in the fighting.
It is interesting that Caesar completely omitted four horsed scythed chariots (different from the usual Gallic chariot, still in use as transport, which was two-horsed) but spoke in detail about British military two horse chariots. Strange, too, that he didn't contrast them with the Gallic type.
Is it possible that Frontinus is garbling who was responsible for the stratagem, or even he's thinking of Galatian scythed chariots?
I must admit, I would be cautious building an operating model for British chariots by disregarding the evidence of Caesar and Tacitus and relying instead of passing references found elsewhere in Roman literature.
It could be that Caesar mentions British 2-horse chariots because they gave him serious problems which 4-horse chariots (which one can posit were far less numerous) did not.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 02:28:44 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 02:15:06 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 02:04:12 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on August 17, 2018, 01:59:01 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 12:21:07 PM
If British chariots never, ever, ever charged formed foot then the infantry would have no reason to fear them.
You are assuming that the infantry are aware of the history of British chariots in action.
Not quite: I conclude that since the infantry got the willies just from seeing chariots, they knew that those chariots were quite capable of charging them and had done so in the past.
But Caesar says "When our troops were thrown into confusion in this fashion by the novel character of the fighting" (BG. IV.34) - in other words, the infantry got the willies specifically because they had not fought chariots before.
What exactly is the novel character of the fighting that throws the troops into confusion? Not the danger of being charged by chariots - which they knew about otherwise they wouldn't have feared them - but the way the Britons used a chariot-cavalry combination to surround the Roman infantry and attack them with a combination of the solidity of foot with the mobility of mounted troops.
No, it's the experience of being attacked by chariots, which they feared precisely because they
didn't know about them.
Being charged by large animals is, I dare say, one of those things all normal human beings are instinctively afraid of.
Interesting, BTW, that we seem to have a number of references to British scythed chariots en passant in various texts that don't go into any tactical detail, yet they're absent in Caesar and Tacitus who do get into some details (if not as deeply as wargamers might like). Literary topos transferred from Hellenistic contexts?
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 02:43:23 PM
No, it's the experience of being attacked by chariots, which they feared precisely because they didn't know about them.
The description of the battle makes it clear it went on for some time. What dismays the Romans isn't seeing chariots for the first time, but experiencing the peculiarly British chariot-cavalry mode of attack. If they feared a possible charge by chariots it was because they believed chariots could charge them - I don't see them manifesting the same fear in regards to cavalry. But what really puts them in a tiz is the ability of the British to form instant infantry lines anywhere around them, and then dissolve and withdraw those lines the moment the Romans tried to come to grips with them.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 02:53:16 PMInteresting, BTW, that we seem to have a number of references to British scythed chariots en passant in various texts that don't go into any tactical detail, yet they're absent in Caesar and Tacitus who do get into some details (if not as deeply as wargamers might like). Literary topos transferred from Hellenistic contexts?
A couple more references here (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/britannia/boudica/chariot.html), reinforcing Andreas' observation; none of the mentions of British or Gallic scythed chariots are by writers who give any impression of knowing what they're talking about.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 02:53:16 PM
Interesting, BTW, that we seem to have a number of references to British scythed chariots en passant in various texts that don't go into any tactical detail, yet they're absent in Caesar and Tacitus who do get into some details (if not as deeply as wargamers might like). Literary topos transferred from Hellenistic contexts?
I think we would need to see a bit more sophisticated reading of these texts and their interactions to work out origins of the topos, but a literary image of a Celtic scythed chariot seems well embedded among poets and familiar to the educated like Jordanes.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 03:04:41 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 02:43:23 PM
No, it's the experience of being attacked by chariots, which they feared precisely because they didn't know about them.
The description of the battle makes it clear it went on for some time. What dismays the Romans isn't seeing chariots for the first time, but experiencing the peculiarly British chariot-cavalry mode of attack. If they feared a possible charge by chariots it was because they believed chariots could charge them - I don't see them manifesting the same fear in regards to cavalry. But what really puts them in a tiz is the ability of the British to form instant infantry lines anywhere around them, and then dissolve and withdraw those lines the moment the Romans tried to come to grips with them.
"They had killed a few, throwing the rest into confusion before they could form up,
and at the same time surrounding them with horsemen and chariots."
The dismay and confusion is clearly caused by the initial chariot attack, and is explicitly separate from the being surrounded.
"
First of all they drive in all directions and hurl missiles, and so by the mere terror that the teams inspire and by the noise of the wheels
they generally throw ranks into confusion."
It's the chariots themselves that are frightening and confusing, largely because they are unfamiliar. The "instant infantry lines" play a part, but they are an integral part of unfamiliar chariot tactics - unfamiliar precisely because chariots are unfamiliar.
(And, of course, the "instant infantry" effect is because the chariots aren't being used to ride enemy infantrymen down, which I thought was supposed to be the main role of all Swantonian chariots?)
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 03:05:28 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 02:53:16 PMInteresting, BTW, that we seem to have a number of references to British scythed chariots en passant in various texts that don't go into any tactical detail, yet they're absent in Caesar and Tacitus who do get into some details (if not as deeply as wargamers might like). Literary topos transferred from Hellenistic contexts?
A couple more references here (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/britannia/boudica/chariot.html), reinforcing Andreas' observation; none of the mentions of British or Gallic scythed chariots are by writers who give any impression of knowing what they're talking about.
Fair enough, though I find it difficult to dismiss Frontinus' description of Gallic scythed chariots (and if Gallic, why not British?). As governor of Britain he had to be a practical, level-headed man who had ample access to any written records on the matter, and 76AD is just over a century after Caesar's invasion of Britain - too short a time for myth and legend to step into the picture.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 03:13:55 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 03:04:41 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 02:43:23 PM
No, it's the experience of being attacked by chariots, which they feared precisely because they didn't know about them.
The description of the battle makes it clear it went on for some time. What dismays the Romans isn't seeing chariots for the first time, but experiencing the peculiarly British chariot-cavalry mode of attack. If they feared a possible charge by chariots it was because they believed chariots could charge them - I don't see them manifesting the same fear in regards to cavalry. But what really puts them in a tiz is the ability of the British to form instant infantry lines anywhere around them, and then dissolve and withdraw those lines the moment the Romans tried to come to grips with them.
"They had killed a few, throwing the rest into confusion before they could form up, and at the same time surrounding them with horsemen and chariots."
The dismay and confusion is clearly caused by the initial chariot attack, and is explicitly separate from the being surrounded.
"First of all they drive in all directions and hurl missiles, and so by the mere terror that the teams inspire and by the noise of the wheels they generally throw ranks into confusion."
It's the chariots themselves that are frightening and confusing, largely because they are unfamiliar. The "instant infantry lines" play a part, but they are an integral part of unfamiliar chariot tactics - unfamiliar precisely because chariots are unfamiliar.
(And, of course, the "instant infantry" effect is because the chariots aren't being used to ride enemy infantrymen down, which I thought was supposed to be the main role of all Swantonian chariots?)
Swantonian chariots pulled by scraggly British ponies would need to choose when to go into shock mode.
(if they'd had Rhodesian army horses there would have been no such hesitation)
(https://i.imgur.com/5R31hPx.jpg)
Notice that Caesar describes first their mode of fighting with chariots -
genus hoc ex essedis pugnae - and then how that mode, taken as a whole -
novitate pugnae - seriously bothers the legionaries, not just the fact they are seeing chariots for the first time (I grant they probably were seeing them for the first time).
Notice also that Caesar when describing the British mode of mounted combat uses the present tense, i.e. he is describing it in a general way which implies that chariots are intimidating whether their opponents are seeing them for the first time or not, which further implies that infantry feared the chariots' ability to charge them with an efficacy not matched by regular cavalry.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 03:33:55 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 03:13:55 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 03:04:41 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 17, 2018, 02:43:23 PM
No, it's the experience of being attacked by chariots, which they feared precisely because they didn't know about them.
The description of the battle makes it clear it went on for some time. What dismays the Romans isn't seeing chariots for the first time, but experiencing the peculiarly British chariot-cavalry mode of attack. If they feared a possible charge by chariots it was because they believed chariots could charge them - I don't see them manifesting the same fear in regards to cavalry. But what really puts them in a tiz is the ability of the British to form instant infantry lines anywhere around them, and then dissolve and withdraw those lines the moment the Romans tried to come to grips with them.
"They had killed a few, throwing the rest into confusion before they could form up, and at the same time surrounding them with horsemen and chariots."
The dismay and confusion is clearly caused by the initial chariot attack, and is explicitly separate from the being surrounded.
"First of all they drive in all directions and hurl missiles, and so by the mere terror that the teams inspire and by the noise of the wheels they generally throw ranks into confusion."
It's the chariots themselves that are frightening and confusing, largely because they are unfamiliar. The "instant infantry lines" play a part, but they are an integral part of unfamiliar chariot tactics - unfamiliar precisely because chariots are unfamiliar.
(And, of course, the "instant infantry" effect is because the chariots aren't being used to ride enemy infantrymen down, which I thought was supposed to be the main role of all Swantonian chariots?)
Swantonian chariots pulled by scraggly British ponies would need to choose when to go into shock mode.
(if they'd had Rhodesian army horses there would have been no such hesitation)
(https://i.imgur.com/5R31hPx.jpg)
Notice that Caesar describes first their mode of fighting with chariots - genus hoc ex essedis pugnae - and then how that mode, taken as a whole - novitate pugnae - seriously bothers the legionaries, not just the fact they are seeing chariots for the first time (I grant they probably were seeing them for the first time).
Notice also that Caesar when describing the British mode of mounted combat uses the present tense, i.e. he is describing it in a general way which implies that chariots are intimidating whether their opponents are seeing them for the first time or not, which further implies that infantry feared the chariots' ability to charge them with an efficacity not matched by regular cavalry.
As I look ahead to the future of this thread , I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see "the River Tiber foaming with much blood"
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 02:01:35 PM
My mistake - Frontinus was talking about Gallic, not British, chariots. But Caesar may simply have omitted to mention them in his Gallic Wars because they played no significant part in the fighting.
More likely that Caesar omitted them because they didn't exist. Are there any actual references to Gallic chariots
of any kind in a military context after Telamon in 225BC, three centuries before Frontinus?
Mick
To summarise the state of play on this thread so far (which incidentally must set a record for speed of posting):
- artistic evidence all shows early chariots being used as archery platforms or to pursue routers
- literary evidence all shows non-scythed chariots fought in a skirmishing role or as transports
- evidence from other periods suggests horses were not used as battering rams
- no evidence or examples of non-scythed chariots being used as battering rams has been presented
British chariots were probably not scythed chariots by the sounds of it. But if the British had had scythed chariots, how would that help the theory? Scythed chariots are shock weapons (hence the scythes), but:
- that doesn't mean that non-scythed chariots were also shock weapons (quite the contrary)
- it also doesn't mean that scythed chariots were used as battering rams
There is a well established theory about how shock cavalry, chariots etc functioned. They could ride through or amongst non-closed-up infantry (who were in that state either because that's how they fought anyway, or because through fear or indiscipline they lost their original order) but could not penetrate formed infantry who stood their ground. They could try, by a fearsome approach, to scare the infantry into losing ther order (by giving them the willies).
Nothing has been presented to suggest that this theory is not broadly correct (NB 'broadly correct' does not mean 'has not even one counter-example').
To go back to the tank analogy from a few pages earlier in this thread (this morning), the Swantonian Chariot Theory is equivalent to asserting that as jeeps and Shermans are both internal combustion engine powered wheeled vehicles they must have had the same battlefield function.
To summarise the summary ;):
Quote from: RichT on August 17, 2018, 04:43:30 PM
- artistic evidence all shows early chariots being used as archery platforms only when pursuing routers
- literary evidence all shows non-scythed chariots fought in a skirmishing role or as transports unless the evidence all shows chariots charging enemy in the context of a battle (with the exception of British chariots)
- evidence from other periods suggests horses were not used as battering rams or evidence shows horses were used with monotonous regularity to charge infantry
- no evidence or examples of non-scythed chariots being used as battering rams has been presented except the accounts of the battles that describe chariot action in any detail
There isn't any conclusive evidence the British used scythed chariots but none either that they didn't, and I prefer to accept a primary source if there is no compelling reason to reject it. It is also odd that Caesar never describes Gallic scythed chariots or Gallic chariots at all, but Diodorus Siculus says that some Gallic tribes employed them:
For the purposes of war they [the Britons] use chariots for the most part, just as some of the Celti do - Library of History, 4, 5, 2
I think the best way of resolving this is that Caesar saw too few or any Gallic chariots in his campaigns to bother writing about them, but they did exist, and probably a few individual scythed versions with them.
Quote from: RichT on August 17, 2018, 04:43:30 PM
- that doesn't mean that non-scythed chariots were also shock weapons (quite the contrary)
- it also doesn't mean that scythed chariots were used as battering rams
Chariots are much better suited to a shock role than cavalry and everything about them suggests that that is what they were primarily intended for. There is an example cited earlier of scythed and ordinary chariots being used for exactly the purpose in a battle - to charge enemy foot.
A scythed chariot was meant to plough into enemy infantry and kill/scatter them. This is how I conceive of a chariot being used as a battering ram.
Quote from: RichT on August 17, 2018, 04:43:30 PM
To summarise the state of play on this thread so far (which incidentally must set a record for speed of posting):
- artistic evidence all shows early chariots being used as archery platforms or to pursue routers
This is overstating the case a bit, I think. Most Egyptian reliefs show them being used as archery platforms
while pursuing routers. I'm not sure there's any showing them shooting at, or doing anything else to, enemy who is even momentarily successfully resisting. (There are examples showing them using other weapons against fleeing enemy.)
The Assyrian situation, I believe, is similar to the Egyptian one. Sumerian battle-carts do not seem to have been used as archery platforms because the crew are not depicted with bows.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 04:58:51 PM
There isn't any conclusive evidence the British used scythed chariots but none either that they didn't, and I prefer to accept a primary source if there is no compelling reason to reject it.
What compelling evidence do you have to reject Xenophon's statement that Cyrenaean chariots fought only at a distance?
Justin,
Caesar is describing the Gauls that he met ( similarly his Britons) . Diodorus is talking about generic Gauls . He is not an original source in the sense that Caesar is.Diodorus writes history in a Herodotean rather that Thucydidean manner, he incluses stories and interesting asides. We really cannot treat all ancient sources as equal. Diodorus likely conflates the scythed chariots of Persian design and style that were used by the Galatians with the light northern chariot drawn by ponies.
Had Caesar met scythed chariots in Gaul he would have said so, because it would emphasise the threats that he had to deal with c.f. his description of the ships of the Veneti or the soldurii bidyguards of the Aquitanians, or indeed the tactics of the Eburones or Vercingetorix' recruitment of archers to mingle with his cavalry.
Absence of evidence is not evidence. Find a source for a troop type before the period mentioned and after it and we might assume its existence between those points, without something rather better on the table .
Scythed chariots are a bogeyman weapon, they are the sort of thing that resurfaces from time to time, but are only believable when there is an associated tactic and a heavily built four horse chariot.
Xenephon!s Cyropaedia has an interesting view on the Persian devision to invent the svythed chariot. Its likely unfounded, but is plausible.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on August 17, 2018, 06:10:22 PM
Xenephon!s Cyropaedia has an interesting view on the Persian devision to invent the svythed chariot. Its likely unfounded, but is plausible.
I do believe you are refering to the passage I quoted in reply #43 in this thead. :)
As to analogies with Napoleonic warfare, the battle that informs me on what happens when horse meets formed infantry is Dresden. In most battles squares were not broken by horse without the help of artillery or in one case a horse that slid into the lines dead if I recall. Where lancers run down infantry, it is because they did not form square or mass together, but were caught in line and rolled up, as at Albuera. Squares were broken at Dresden and Katzbach river a few days later, in the rain. This removed the use of firearms from the equation. But the cavalry did not charge home into the square because the mud prevented a charge at speed. Instead lancers rode around the square and made use of their longer reach to pick off infantry. Historically most infantry had longer spears than cavalry, but cases where this was reversed are worth looking at. I think you will find that either the infantry break because they know they are outreached or the cavalry fights their way in at the walk.
As to what happens when you ride into a group of men, it depends on the spacing the men are maintaining. With enough space, you are simply riding down men as shown in those videos, but if the men are packed together a bit, you bleed energy packing them together in front of you and your force is absorbed by the crowd. It is probably impossible to set up, but if you hit a crowd packed as tight as possible, you would be stopped dead and the rear ranks of the formation would be launched off their feet like a fleshy Newton's cradle.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 05:59:26 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 04:58:51 PM
There isn't any conclusive evidence the British used scythed chariots but none either that they didn't, and I prefer to accept a primary source if there is no compelling reason to reject it.
What compelling evidence do you have to reject Xenophon's statement that Cyrenaean chariots fought only at a distance?
I think Xenophon was right on the money - in everything he said.
Notice that he describes the Cyrenaeans using 4-horse chariots.
Four horses to pull a driver and archer around on the battlefield? Why? One horse would be perfectly adequate for the job. Notice also that he finds the Cyrenaean chariot a huge waste of men and resources as it just adds up to one big mobile skirmisher archer. So he abolishes it and replaces it with a chariot capable of performing a shock role.
Xenophon is describing the state of affairs at the time of Cyrus, i.e. at the end of the 4th century, when the chariot had long since had its heyday as a shock weapon, but was still kept in existence for its secondary functions though its design retained its primary purpose of charging formed infantry with a tight pack of horses. Cyrus tweaks the design and restores the chariot to its original role.
Yes, you are right Andreas, Xenophon's genesis of the scythed chariot is described in your post #43.
we cannot, of course trust Xenophon here, he is writing something that would later be called 'a mirror fir princes' rather than a work of history. However, the scythed chariot had to be invented somewhere and most lijely by Persians and there is a seductive line of reasoning that the original chariots grew heavier and became four horse to enable the breaking of infantry formations and that as the infantry became better at resisting them something new was needed rather than a four horse chariot with four men which rode at the infantry , fircing them to flinch and open gaps. The scythed chariot abandons the mobile missile role of the four horsed chariot and concentrates on the shock role.
Like ancient authors and modern editors the militaries of the ancient middle east seem to have been obsessed by this militarily useless weapon . We should project back its lack of results to the chariots that preceded it. If chariots were ever intended to smash into infantry formations abd scythed chariots were better than their predecessors then we can only imagine how useless those preceding chariots must have been at shock action........abd how much better as missile platforms.
Well, seven pages in, and four of them are posted by Justin.
Justin, if your theory is already perfected, which it seems to be since your reject every counter point, correction or criticism of it, then why did you bother starting this thread?
And can you just post your conclusion and be done, please.
There is clearly no point in anyone responding to you on this topic, as there usually isn't when you have one of your ideas.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 06:44:54 PM
I think Xenophon was right on the money - in everything he said.
Notice that he describes the Cyrenaeans using 4-horse chariots. Four horses to pull a driver and archer around on the battlefield?
Point of order: he doesn't say anything about an "archer". Given that this mode of charioteering is described as "Trojan", we should rather assume javelineer, which would also fit with Herodotus' Libyan chariots with javelins.
QuoteWhy? One horse would be perfectly adequate for the job.
Bold assumption, given that
nobody used one-horse chariots.
QuoteNotice also that he finds the Cyrenaean chariot a huge waste of men and resources as it just adds up to one big mobile skirmisher archer. So he abolishes it and replaces it with a chariot capable of performing a shock role.
Nitpick: He didn't replace the Cyrenaean chariot, since that was till in use in Xenophon's time; he, allegedly, replaced similar chariots in use among the Asiatics.
QuoteXenophon is describing the state of affairs at the time of Cyrus, i.e. at the end of the 4th century, when the chariot had long since had its heyday as a shock weapon, but was still kept in existence for its secondary functions though its design retained its primary purpose of charging formed infantry with a tight pack of horses. Cyrus tweaks the design and restores the chariot to its original role.
The time of Cyrus is, of course, mid-sixth century.
But minor objections aside, I take it, then, that you accept that not
all chariots were used as shock weapons; Cyrenaean and, from some to-be-determined point in time until the reforms of Cyrus, Asiatic ones fought only at a distance. Correct?
The chariot as a missile platform has serious limitations compared to a massed archer formation. Deploying chariots in depth is possible, but coordinating their shooting would be difficult and it would be more effective to dismount the shooters and line them up as archers, in which case why do you really need the chariots in the first place?
I call attention to the two (semi-) detailed accounts of chariotry in action in Egyptian records: Megiddo and Kadesh. At Megiddo, the Egyptian chariotry charges and routs the opposing army. At Kadesh, the chariotry of Hatti charge and rout the division of Amun. It is hard to see any skirmishing role or practice in any of this.
Xenophon's description of Cyrenean chariot tactics may well be accurate (I see no reason to attempt to rubbish this particular source). When Merneptah took on opponents based in Libya he had his archers work them over for six hours, which is a long time in combat. This suggests that archery, or at least missilery, was the preferred mode for combatting whatever and whoever Merneptah and the Cyreneans fought, and this overt reliance on missiles may have been opponent-specific.
I don't know if anybody else has mentioned it, but if discussing Chariots and infantry, do we really need to take into account Drews, The End of the Bronze Age Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. - And other work that he's done
Jim
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 07:21:23 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 06:44:54 PM
I think Xenophon was right on the money - in everything he said.
Notice that he describes the Cyrenaeans using 4-horse chariots. Four horses to pull a driver and archer around on the battlefield?
Point of order: he doesn't say anything about an "archer". Given that this mode of charioteering is described as "Trojan", we should rather assume javelineer, which would also fit with Herodotus' Libyan chariots with javelins.
Fine.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 07:21:23 PMQuoteWhy? One horse would be perfectly adequate for the job.
Bold assumption, given that nobody used one-horse chariots.
Just so. Why?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 07:21:23 PMQuoteNotice also that he finds the Cyrenaean chariot a huge waste of men and resources as it just adds up to one big mobile skirmisher archer. So he abolishes it and replaces it with a chariot capable of performing a shock role.
Nitpick: He didn't replace the Cyrenaean chariot, since that was till in use in Xenophon's time; he, allegedly, replaced similar chariots in use among the Asiatics.
OK.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 07:21:23 PMQuoteXenophon is describing the state of affairs at the time of Cyrus, i.e. at the end of the 4th century, when the chariot had long since had its heyday as a shock weapon, but was still kept in existence for its secondary functions though its design retained its primary purpose of charging formed infantry with a tight pack of horses. Cyrus tweaks the design and restores the chariot to its original role.
The time of Cyrus is, of course, mid-sixth century.
Right.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 17, 2018, 07:21:23 PMBut minor objections aside, I take it, then, that you accept that not all chariots were used as shock weapons; Cyrenaean and, from some to-be-determined point in time until the reforms of Cyrus, Asiatic ones fought only at a distance. Correct?
Well (and this is also in answer to Mark), I've changed my mind about half a dozen times so far in this thread and am on a learning curve. Britons didn't, habitually at least, use their chariots in a shock role and neither obviously did the Cyrenaeans
et al. during the time of Xenophon and Cyrus the Younger. The chariot's effectiveness as a shock weapon declined over time but it was still retained long past its sell-by date, as evinced by the Pontics fielding it against the Romans. Essentially, once it had become completely useless as a shock weapon, even if just a psychological one, it was abandoned.
I think though that something like a chariot took a long time to go out of fashion in Antiquity - much longer than would be the case in modern times - because its actual use on the battlefield was so brief and rare, battles themselves being brief and rare. It could take decades or even a century or two before enough battles had accumulated to convince military thinkers that a particular weapon or tactic no longer worked.
"One question came to mind: chariots became very light in design - Egyptian models weighed as little as 35kg - yet they were never pulled by less than two horses. Why is that?"
Speed. It is proverbial that two horses running together run faster, and the added weight to put another horse on is negligible. The classic racing chariots were 4 horse chariots with ultra-light woven frames.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 17, 2018, 10:50:14 PM
"One question came to mind: chariots became very light in design - Egyptian models weighed as little as 35kg - yet they were never pulled by less than two horses. Why is that?"
Speed. It is proverbial that two horses running together run faster, and the added weight to put another horse on is negligible. The classic racing chariots were 4 horse chariots with ultra-light woven frames.
Why the speed? Chariots were by far and away the fastest means of transport in Antiquity and I suspect that they were, at least initially, faster than cavalry. A one-horse chariot could easily outpace any man on foot. And if speed mattered in chariot vs chariot combat then why weren't
all chariots pulled by a 4-horse team?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 08:02:58 PM
Well (and this is also in answer to Mark), I've changed my mind about half a dozen times so far in this thread and am on a learning curve. Britons didn't, habitually at least, use their chariots in a shock role and neither obviously did the Cyrenaeans et al. during the time of Xenophon and Cyrus the Younger. The chariot's effectiveness as a shock weapon declined over time but it was still retained long past its sell-by date, as evinced by the Pontics fielding it against the Romans. Essentially, once it had become completely useless as a shock weapon, even if just a psychological one, it was abandoned.
It might be worth pointing out that scythed chariots seem to have been integral to the Pontic army during much of the 1st century BC and not just conjured up for a last hurrah at Zela; in 89 BC Mithridates' vanguard defeated the Bithynian army by following up a scythed chariot charge (albeit against cavalry); prior to Zela Mithridates had defeated Triarius on that selfsame battleground and more recently Pharnaces had defeated Domitius' composite Roman/Romanised Galatian army as one of his 'forty-two victories'. One can draw a line between 89 BC and 47 BC and assume that the scythed chariot remained in service throughout (it also appears at Orchomenus in 86 BC, albeit unsuccessfully), providing Pharnaces with at least some of the numerous successes about which he boasted. Such a track record would account for the extreme confidence with which he fielded the things at Zela.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 11:04:02 PM
And if speed mattered in chariot vs chariot combat then why weren't all chariots pulled by a 4-horse team?
A valid question. When on the battlefield rather than the racing circuit, 4-horse chariots seem to have been more robustly built. This suggests (at least to me) that the extra horsepower was needed to achieve decent performance with the heavier chariot body.
What the four-horse chariot did seem to have was relative unstoppability. I am sure we have al encountered Sargon II on his eighth campaign against Urartu, when he is on the march through the mountains, turns a corner and there is the Urartian army deployed before him. He attacks straight off the march with his chariot and accompanying cavalry, the rest of the army following, and cleaves the line of his foes asunder, putting them to flight. Whether or not his chariot was at the apex of the charge it was intimately involved and appears to have been effective in making or assisting the initial penetration which determined the course of the battle.
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 17, 2018, 07:54:23 PM
I don't know if anybody else has mentioned it, but if discussing Chariots and infantry, do we really need to take into account Drews, The End of the Bronze Age Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. - And other work that he's done
Jim
Got it. :)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 18, 2018, 09:06:49 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 17, 2018, 07:54:23 PM
I don't know if anybody else has mentioned it, but if discussing Chariots and infantry, do we really need to take into account Drews, The End of the Bronze Age Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. - And other work that he's done
Jim
Got it. :)
I think you'll find it interesting 8)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 11:04:02 PM
Why the speed? Chariots were by far and away the fastest means of transport in Antiquity and I suspect that they were, at least initially, faster than cavalry. A one-horse chariot could easily outpace any man on foot. And if speed mattered in chariot vs chariot combat then why weren't all chariots pulled by a 4-horse team?
Multiple horses make chariots faster. Why you need speed in battle is a different question. Speed would seem to be important in any mobile missile platform- as we see with tanks. Why were all chariots were not 4 horses? You can have twice as many chariots if they are pulled by 2 horses and still be fast enough. If you move to 4 one horse chariots, you are not faster than a horse alone. A one horse chariot can outpace a man when it gets going on level ground, but it cannot out-accelerate a man. More importantly, your single horse gets blown fast when pulling a chariot by itself.
Are you familiar with "chariot runners"? That they exist seems to indicate that chariots did not usually go much faster that a man could follow. They would have functioned much like the Greek runners who accompanied horse. I don't remember if it is Drews, but someone suggested the sword and shield men we see at the time of the sea peoples originated as a troop type as chariot runners. I am not a fan of that theory.
Isn't the oroper adversary of missile armed chariots other missile armed chariots. The infabnptry of Egyptian,nHittite , Mitanni and earlbAssyria is a refuge and suppirt for the chariot force, ut is not socially or tactically the queen if the battlefield.
Likeliest the chariots manoeuvred against each other, well spaced and exploiting the natural advantage of carrying large amounts of ammunition. When one supudes chariots aredefeatedit retires to the peotection if its footmen, but if it does not reorganise, reemerge and win then that army is doomed. The opposing army tgat loses the chariot battle is trapped.
Patrick's normally fertile imagination has failed him on why chariots are superior to infantry. Obce the infantry have lost their chariot arm they are in the situation if Crassus' men at Carrhae. Chariots are armed with better bows than footmen abd they are emerging from and retiring into a cloud of dust. The infantry are surrounded, arrows are coming in from their shieldless side. After a while fatigue and thirst do their work and the infantry arrempt to retire, as cohesion fails the chariots race in shooting , oeros forming a Cantabrian style formation to deliver fire shock. Eventually tge infantry run and the chariots hunt them down.
We have to look at the cgariot as a weapon system, in conjunction with its infantry cover abd ask ourselves why so much time and money would be spent on large chariot forces if they could be outfaced by cheap infantry spearmen. The charioteer has a really expensive suit of armour and a shieldbearer, his horses are armoured. Training as Ian R-L showed us is long and intensive. The charioteers are an elite , Pharaoh is not shown on one because its a suitable cartiage, he is shown fighting from his chariot with his bow.
I submit that the rather passive infantry of the Middle Eastern states was not the primary concern of the charioteer, it was other chariots that he fought and then dispising of the infantry would be a routine matter...ask the Mongols.
Hi there
You've go to love a long debate about chariots.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Like ancient authors and modern editors the militaries of the ancient middle east seem to have been obsessed by this militarily useless weapon . We should project back its lack of results to the chariots that preceded it. If chariots were ever intended to smash into infantry formations abd scythed chariots were better than their predecessors then we can only imagine how useless those preceding chariots must have been at shock action........abd how much better as missile platforms.
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I take the view that scythed chariots were probably successful in every battle except those few where they came back against their own side.
The only real metric for success or fail would be if they did not do the job their owner intended, and that evidence is not really with us.
I reckon their intended job was simply to be scary and halt the enemy's line (or a decent part of it) - so that the other guy is now responding to your other threats. If they cause casualties, open localised gaps for your other troops to exploit, then this is a bonus. Keep in mind they expend only a few hundred horses and some brave / stupid / lovelorn drivers and a bit of kit - which if you win the battle is probably salvageable.
For those evaluating Xenophon, remember that he served in an army that both included them and opposed them. You'd think that his Persian confederates would have some idea of their strengths, weaknesses and capacity.
David F Brown
(For those interested in 'expendable' animal weapons more generally, I read the other week about an Indian minor potentate that opposed the Brits in 1800-10. When the redcoats had stormed the city and were street-fighting the Rajah's menagerie of lions and tigers was unloosed at them. Without much success.)
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 18, 2018, 04:52:56 PM
Are you familiar with "chariot runners"? That they exist seems to indicate that chariots did not usually go much faster that a man could follow. They would have functioned much like the Greek runners who accompanied horse. I don't remember if it is Drews, but someone suggested the sword and shield men we see at the time of the sea peoples originated as a troop type as chariot runners. I am not a fan of that theory.
'Chariot runners' do rather seem to load the scale against chariots skirmishing, particularly against other chariots (avoiding running over your own runners is added to all the other problems of manoeuvring large numbers of vehicles in limited spaces). As supports for shock chariots they make more sense, following up, clearing up and guarding the rear of the chariots against impromptu attackers.
And I agree about the sword-and-shield men, who are depicted as close combat infantry or in close combat against infantry with never a chariot in sight. :)
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 19, 2018, 06:53:34 AM
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 18, 2018, 04:52:56 PM
Are you familiar with "chariot runners"? That they exist seems to indicate that chariots did not usually go much faster that a man could follow. They would have functioned much like the Greek runners who accompanied horse. I don't remember if it is Drews, but someone suggested the sword and shield men we see at the time of the sea peoples originated as a troop type as chariot runners. I am not a fan of that theory.
'Chariot runners' do rather seem to load the scale against chariots skirmishing, particularly against other chariots (avoiding running over your own runners is added to all the other problems of manoeuvring large numbers of vehicles in limited spaces). As supports for shock chariots they make more sense, following up, clearing up and guarding the rear of the chariots against impromptu attackers.
And I agree about the sword-and-shield men, who are depicted as close combat infantry or in close combat against infantry with never a chariot in sight. :)
From memory Drews doesn't quite see it like that
Remember that unless biblical era warfare was like an early version of cod-Arthurian medieval where knights rode down the other side's peasants and then went home, at some point the chariot superweapons on each side would have to face off, if only to protect their infantry from being butchered.
So any model of the use of chariots has to be able to cope with chariot v chariot combat
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 18, 2018, 07:40:26 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 08:02:58 PM
Well (and this is also in answer to Mark), I've changed my mind about half a dozen times so far in this thread and am on a learning curve. Britons didn't, habitually at least, use their chariots in a shock role and neither obviously did the Cyrenaeans et al. during the time of Xenophon and Cyrus the Younger. The chariot's effectiveness as a shock weapon declined over time but it was still retained long past its sell-by date, as evinced by the Pontics fielding it against the Romans. Essentially, once it had become completely useless as a shock weapon, even if just a psychological one, it was abandoned.
It might be worth pointing out that scythed chariots seem to have been integral to the Pontic army during much of the 1st century BC and not just conjured up for a last hurrah at Zela; in 89 BC Mithridates' vanguard defeated the Bithynian army by following up a scythed chariot charge (albeit against cavalry); prior to Zela Mithridates had defeated Triarius on that selfsame battleground and more recently Pharnaces had defeated Domitius' composite Roman/Romanised Galatian army as one of his 'forty-two victories'. One can draw a line between 89 BC and 47 BC and assume that the scythed chariot remained in service throughout (it also appears at Orchomenus in 86 BC, albeit unsuccessfully), providing Pharnaces with at least some of the numerous successes about which he boasted. Such a track record would account for the extreme confidence with which he fielded the things at Zela.
Patrick has pretty much said what I was going to write.
Additionally, we have a case of a general who has fought against scythed chariots (Seleucus) deciding that it is worth the expense of using (and perhaps even building up) a substantial corps of them and using them in battle.
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 19, 2018, 07:14:44 AM
So any model of the use of chariots has to be able to cope with chariot v chariot combat
I quite agree. As Roy pointed out, dealing with the other side's chariots tended to be an essential prerequisite for winning the battle.
This thread, as far as I can determine, has primarily been interested in what happens next, after the opposing chariots have been seen off the field. We can of course expand the scope to the question of how one side sees off the other side's chariots.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 19, 2018, 07:57:43 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 19, 2018, 07:14:44 AM
So any model of the use of chariots has to be able to cope with chariot v chariot combat
I quite agree. As Roy pointed out, dealing with the other side's chariots tended to be an essential prerequisite for winning the battle.
This thread, as far as I can determine, has primarily been interested in what happens next, after the opposing chariots have been seen off the field. We can of course expand the scope to the question of how one side sees off the other side's chariots.
The problem lies in how chariots dealt with chariots. If they were solely a battering ram then they'd have to act like a battering ram against other chariots with appropriately horrendous casualties
If on the other hand they had other tactics which they used against chariots, they may have used them against other troop types as well
Any Chinese experts here? Their manuals had something to say about chariot use and could add to the discussion.
Regards
David F Brown
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 19, 2018, 08:23:25 PM
The problem lies in how chariots dealt with chariots. If they were solely a battering ram then they'd have to act like a battering ram against other chariots with appropriately horrendous casualties
If on the other hand they had other tactics which they used against chariots, they may have used them against other troop types as well
The Kadesh reliefs show Egyptian chariots lining up close together and charging in unison against opposing chariots, which falter and give back, taking casualties from the Egyptian chariot archers.
Nestor's Trojan War advice is to form a cohesive line and advance together, then, as the opposing chariot comes within reach, give its warrior the business end of one's spear. (This would accord with the long spears seen in depictions of Mycenaean chariots.)
Not shown or stated is whether gaps were left for opposing chariots to plunge through, or whether the advancing chariots drew their line sufficiently tight as to leave no gaps. The latter would be in accordance with appearance of the Kadesh reliefs, and also far more intimidating morale-wise.
So would there be a huge messy chariot crunch? On the Kadesh reliefs we do not see chariot lines colliding; rather, the less-disciplined Asiatics are falling back and disintegrating before the impeccable Egyptian chariot charge. In this case at least, morale appears to have played an important part.
What if both sides' morale had held? (This I think would be the exception rather than the rule, but might have happened often enough to influence chariot design.) Then there
would be a crunch, and one suspects four-horse chariots would come out of it better than their two-horse counterparts. It is of course possible that both sides would slow down, or try to, once impact became inevitable, but this would hand the impact advantage to a faster opponent, so the question now becomes: what harm do opposing horse teams do to each other if they make solid head-to-head contact? I think we may be a bit short of data on that point, but I imagine it would be somewhat similar to close-formation cavalry colliding.
Adding Achaemenid-style scythes to chariots would massively bump up the lethality rate inflicted on opposing horses.
Quote from: evilgong on August 20, 2018, 12:48:30 AM
Any Chinese experts here? Their manuals had something to say about chariot use and could add to the discussion.
From archaeology channel.org (https://www.archaeologychannel.org/tac-events/international-film-festival/219-tac-fest-2018-pages/2018-film-pages/2694-chinese-chariot):
Ancient war manuals reveal much about the importance of the chariot in Chinese warfare, but no details are given as to how to use them or how effective they were.If they are right about this we could be disappointed.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 20, 2018, 07:25:16 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 19, 2018, 08:23:25 PM
The problem lies in how chariots dealt with chariots. If they were solely a battering ram then they'd have to act like a battering ram against other chariots with appropriately horrendous casualties
If on the other hand they had other tactics which they used against chariots, they may have used them against other troop types as well
The Kadesh reliefs show Egyptian chariots lining up close together and charging in unison against opposing chariots, which falter and give back, taking casualties from the Egyptian chariot archers.
Nestor's Trojan War advice is to form a cohesive line and advance together, then, as the opposing chariot comes within reach, give its warrior the business end of one's spear. (This would accord with the long spears seen in depictions of Mycenaean chariots.)
Not shown or stated is whether gaps were left for opposing chariots to plunge through, or whether the advancing chariots drew their line sufficiently tight as to leave no gaps. The latter would be in accordance with appearance of the Kadesh reliefs, and also far more intimidating morale-wise.
So would there be a huge messy chariot crunch? On the Kadesh reliefs we do not see chariot lines colliding; rather, the less-disciplined Asiatics are falling back and disintegrating before the impeccable Egyptian chariot charge.
If chariots could fall back there had to be gaps wide enough to allow them to turn, because whilst it is technically possible to back a horse and cart, it isn't something you do at speed
So whilst the 'lines' might have collided, the chariots didn't. The gaps between chariots, wide enough to turn a chariot in, were plenty wide enough to allow lines to pass through each other, but shoot each other with arrows or like Nestor prod somebody with a spear
Patrick mentioned the Kadesh reliefs of chariot v chariot combat
(http://antikforever.com/Syrie-Palestine/Divers/Images/kadesh03b.jpg)
With the usual caveat that the conventionalisation of Egyptian art makes interpretation of depth difficult, here we see the disciplined Egyptians defeat the disorganised foreigners. The Egyptians advance in a well-spaced line, relying on shooting to kill the horses of the opposing side before contact.
It's guesswork what this actually shows, but suicidal wheel to wheel attack seems less likely than a bow-based manoeuver strategy, IMO.
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 20, 2018, 07:37:47 AM
If chariots could fall back there had to be gaps wide enough to allow them to turn, because whilst it is technically possible to back a horse and cart, it isn't something you do at speed
So whilst the 'lines' might have collided, the chariots didn't. The gaps between chariots, wide enough to turn a chariot in, were plenty wide enough to allow lines to pass through each other, but shoot each other with arrows or like Nestor prod somebody with a spear
In another thread, Duncan was quoting the
Arthashastra X.v to the effect that the gap between chariots should be four
samas, or about 4'8". Not that there's any reason Egyptian tactics have to have been the same as Indian, but this is surely too tight to allow turning or threading.
Trying to sum up the thread a little:
i) We all agree that Achaemeno-Hellenistic scythed chariots were suicidal shock weapons. If Lucian's account of the Elephant Victory is reliable, the Galatians' may have been a bit of an exception as they're not differentiated from the regular vehicles.
ii) We all (except Patrick?) agree that at least some Iron Age chariots - notably British and Cyrenaean - were skirmishers.
iii) There's, as ever, a major disagreement about LBA Near Eastern chariots.
iv) There's a similar disagreement about later Assyrian etc. vehicles, with the added complication that some historians don't believe the latest, heaviest, Assyrian vehicles had a proper tactical role at all, being for display and royal hunting. People who think these were shock weapons don't necessarily think the same of earlier, lighter versions.
v) Sumerian battle-carts are also subject to such disagreement. Nobody really cares about the "straddle-cars" that turn up in army lists but which I don't recall seeing any contemporary illustration of.
vi) Nobody feels they know enough to have strong opinions about how Indian or Chinese chariots were used, altho some would consider certain roles unlikely on general principles.
Is that about right? :)
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 20, 2018, 04:05:47 PM
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 20, 2018, 07:37:47 AM
In another thread, Duncan was quoting the Arthashastra X.v to the effect that the gap between chariots should be four samas, or about 4'8". Not that there's any reason Egyptian tactics have to have been the same as Indian, but this is surely too tight to allow turning or threading.
This article (https://www.academia.edu/28122000/On_Typical_Tactics_of_Oriental_Chariot_Battle) by Alexander Nefedkin may be useful. Just glancing, I note a different translation of the passage above as a gap of 11.5m. Nefedkin seems to have written a lot on chariots but I have no idea if he has any reputation.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 20, 2018, 04:43:00 PM
v) Sumerian battle-carts are also subject to such disagreement. Nobody really cares about the "straddle-cars" that turn up in army lists but which I don't recall seeing any contemporary illustration of.
I think this is one, though it has four horses and wargames ones have two.
(http://sumerianshakespeare.com/media/9e52fba4c8055a72ffff8134ffffe415.jpg)
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 20, 2018, 04:43:00 PM
Trying to sum up the thread a little:
i) We all agree that Achaemeno-Hellenistic scythed chariots were suicidal shock weapons. If Lucian's account of the Elephant Victory is reliable, the Galatians' may have been a bit of an exception as they're not differentiated from the regular vehicles.
Shock weapons, yes, but not necessarily suicidal unless unsupported. Regarding the Galatians, their attack was interrupted by the emergence of Antiochus' elephants before any distinction in chariot roles became apparent, so we are reduced to guessing what those roles were. The one clear feature is that the chariots were expected to go to work before the infantry did.
Quoteii) We all (except Patrick?) agree that at least some Iron Age chariots - notably British and Cyrenaean - were skirmishers.
Possibly so. Patrick's reservations are that Cyrenean tactics described by Xenophon resemble dragoon activity rather than skirmishing, and British chariots seem to have been opportunists who, for example, do the following:
"The horse and charioteers of the enemy contended vigorously in a skirmish with our cavalry on the march; yet so that our men were conquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods and hills; but, having slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost some of their men. But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men were off their guard, and occupied in the fortification of the camp, rushed out of the woods, and making an attack upon those who were placed on duty before the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohorts being sent by Caesar to their relief, and these severally the first of two legions, when these had taken up their position at a very small distance from each other, as our men were disconcerted by the new mode of battle,
the enemy broke through [perruperunt] the middle of them most courageously, and retreated thence in safety." - Caesar,
Gallic War V.15
The chariots broke through 'per medios' as opposed to 'inter eos', i.e. through rather than between the cohorts. So if looks as if even British chariots had a shock role (albeit not exclusively a shock role: they did plenty of raiding and skirmishing in addition).
Quoteiii) There's, as ever, a major disagreement about LBA Near Eastern chariots.
Interesting that such disagreement seems to have endured for almost as long as the study of LBA Near Eastern chariots.
Quoteiv) There's a similar disagreement about later Assyrian etc. vehicles, with the added complication that some historians don't believe the latest, heaviest, Assyrian vehicles had a proper tactical role at all, being for display and royal hunting. People who think these were shock weapons don't necessarily think the same of earlier, lighter versions.
Sargon's 8th campaign account should have laid to rest the display/hunting school. The paucity of information about battlefield employment for earlier, lighter models hinders drawing conclusions about these. What can be said is that they had impact potential, whether or not this was tactically realised.
Quotev) Sumerian battle-carts are also subject to such disagreement. Nobody really cares about the "straddle-cars" that turn up in army lists but which I don't recall seeing any contemporary illustration of.
The 'straddle cars' have gone unmentioned thus far; crew vulnerability to missiles is likely to be a question if assigning them any battlefield role.
Quotevi) Nobody feels they know enough to have strong opinions about how Indian or Chinese chariots were used, altho some would consider certain roles unlikely on general principles.
Seems to be pretty much the general opinion here. The one time Indian chariots discernibly encountered the Western historical sphere, Alexander disposed of them so effectively they never even had a chance to show whether they had a role.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 20, 2018, 09:31:26 AM
Patrick mentioned the Kadesh reliefs of chariot v chariot combat
[image subtracted]
With the usual caveat that the conventionalisation of Egyptian art makes interpretation of depth difficult, here we see the disciplined Egyptians defeat the disorganised foreigners. The Egyptians advance in a well-spaced line, relying on shooting to kill the horses of the opposing side before contact.
It's guesswork what this actually shows, but suicidal wheel to wheel attack seems less likely than a bow-based manoeuver strategy, IMO.
Questions: why would a wheel-to-wheel (or close, e.g. 3-4' between vehicles) attack be 'suicidal', and what, in plain English, is a 'bow-based manoeuvre strategy'? :)
I would agree that shooting to kill opposing horses looks like an integral part of Egyptian chariot warfare (good observation), and reliefs emphasise the large arrows from the powerful Egyptian bows dropping opponents. If they can drop enough foes and horses to disrupt an opposing formation, their own undisrupted formation should prevail, routing a shaken foe or defeating a stubborn one piecemeal.
Did anybody go to the conference?
db
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
First International Chariot Conference - AbstractsPalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 9(2) (2012)
© PalArch Foundation
2
Friday, 16.00 - 18.30 Registration at Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC)30 November 1, Dr. Mahmoud Azmi Street, Zamalek. 19.00 Key-note lecture by
Prof. Dr. Joost Crouwel
(Professor Emeritus of Aegean Archaeology at the University of Amsterdam): Studying the Six Chariots from the Tomb of Tutankhamun.Saturday, 08.30 Registration 1 December 09.00 Welcome 09.30
Salima Ikram
: The 'Tano' Chariot and the Egyptian Museum Chariot Project. 10.00
André J. Veldmeijer
: The 'Tano' Chariot: The Near Complete Leatherwork from an Ancient Egyptian Chariot. 10.30
Lucy Skinner
: Conservation of an Ancient Egyptian Chariot Cover: Its Secrets Revealed. 11.00 Break 11.30
Edgar B. Pusch
: Qantir/Pi-Ramesse "... Headquarters of Thy Chariotry ...". 12.00
Silvia Prell
: The Workshops of the Chariotry of Qantir- Piramesse. 12.30
Bela Sandor
: Chariots' Inner Dynamics: Springs and Rota- tional Inertias. 13.00 Lunch 14.30
Heidi Köpp
: The Chariot as a Mode of Locomotion in Civil Contexts. 15.00
Hermann Genz
: The Introduction of the Light, Horse-Drawn Chariot and the Role of Archery in the Near East. At the Tran- sition from the Middle to the Late Bronze Ages: Is there a Connection? 15.30
Samantha L. Cook
: Cultural Implications of the Chariot and Composite Bow in New Kingdom Egypt. 16.00 Break 16.30
Arianna Sacco
: The Depiction of Chariots on Wall Reliefs in New Kingdom Egypt and Neo-Assyrian Empire. 17.00
Lisa Sabbahy
: Gendering Chariot Use in New Kingdom Egypt. 17.30 Sunday, 09.00
Mattia Raccidi
: The 3rd Millenium BC Chariots in Syria: A 2 December Study through the Documentation. 09.30
Edwin C. Brock
: A Possible Chariot Canopy for Tutankhamun. 10.00
Yukiko Sasada
: An Alternative Theory for 'Bit-Wear' found on the Second Premolar Teeth of the Buhen Horse. 10.30
Fernando Quesada-Sanz
: Physical Limits of Horses and Men and the Military Employment of Light Chariots in the Near Eastern Late Bronze Age. 11.00 Break 11.30
Roberto Díaz Hernández
: The Role of the War Chariot in the Formation of the Egyptian Empire in the Early 18th Dynasty. 12.00
Colleen Manassa
: The Chariot that Plunders Foreign Lands: Paronomasia and Chariots in New Kingdom Literature. 12.30
Ole Herslund
: Chariots in the Daily Life of New Kingdom Egypt.
First International Chariot Conference - AbstractsPalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 9(2) (2012)
© PalArch Foundation
3
13.00
Mohamed Raafat Abbas
: The Diplomatic Role of the Chari- oteers in the Ramesside Period. 13.30 Lunch 15.00
Anthony Spalinger
: Egyptian Chariots: Departing for War. 15.30
Ian Shaw
: Ballistic Missiles and Electric Cars: The Differing Aims and Trajectories of Egyptian and Syro-Hittite Chariots. 16.00 Discussion
Quote from: evilgong on August 21, 2018, 12:46:51 AM
Did anybody go to the conference?
On the assumption that nobody did, the papers can be read online here (https://www.sidestone.com/books/chasing-chariots).
The general thrust of the papers is on details rather than techniques; expect emphasis on such things as paronomasia in the 'Hymn to the Royal Chariot' and discussion of the atropotaic focus of the scenes on the chariot body of Thutmose IV. All in all, expect to add to one's knowledge of chariot details and representations of chariots but little if any to one's knowledge of chariot warfare.
Amy Calvert (p.45) does comment in passing:
"
Earlier theories on the effectiveness of the chariot in battle have tended to exaggerate, comparing the weapons to modern tanks (Faulkner, 1953: 43), while others have considered them taxis for archers who would fire [sic], mount the chariot, move to another spot, dismount and fire again (Schulman, 1979: 125). If that were the case, then there would be no need to have both a driver and an archer: the six chariots of Tutankhamun (1335-1325 BC), that of Yuya, and the chariot body found in the tomb of Thutmose IV were all designed to accommodate two people (Littauer & Crouwel, 1985:70)."
As a side note, it is observable that directly after a major war, academic opinion greatly favours shock tactics, while as temporal distance from such an event increases, so do academic pretexts for avoidance of shock tactics.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 20, 2018, 04:43:00 PM
v) Sumerian battle-carts are also subject to such disagreement. Nobody really cares about the "straddle-cars" that turn up in army lists but which I don't recall seeing any contemporary illustration of.
Perhaps the best ancient rendering of the straddle car is the Tell Agrab model (https://www.researchgate.net/figure/2-Copper-model-of-a-Mesopotamian-welded-vehicle-Tell-Agrab-Iraq-2800-BC-Frankfort_fig2_321977309).
QuoteIn this same time period there was another wheeled vehicle that might have had military applications: a two wheeled car commonly referred to as "straddle car". It consisted of a main log, to which the wheels were attached, where the driver (single occupant) would sit astraddle, thus justifying the name. The wheels were the same type as the ones used on regular four wheel wagons. These vehicles, despite being armed with javelin sheaths, were never depicted in a strictly military context, and thus might have been used only for hunting
- https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/5485/1/Elias%20Pinheiro%20-%20The%20Origin%20and%20Spread%20of%20the%20War%20Chariot.pdf
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 18, 2018, 04:52:56 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 17, 2018, 11:04:02 PM
Why the speed? Chariots were by far and away the fastest means of transport in Antiquity and I suspect that they were, at least initially, faster than cavalry. A one-horse chariot could easily outpace any man on foot. And if speed mattered in chariot vs chariot combat then why weren't all chariots pulled by a 4-horse team?
Multiple horses make chariots faster. Why you need speed in battle is a different question. Speed would seem to be important in any mobile missile platform- as we see with tanks. Why were all chariots were not 4 horses? You can have twice as many chariots if they are pulled by 2 horses and still be fast enough. If you move to 4 one horse chariots, you are not faster than a horse alone. A one horse chariot can outpace a man when it gets going on level ground, but it cannot out-accelerate a man. More importantly, your single horse gets blown fast when pulling a chariot by itself.
Are you familiar with "chariot runners"? That they exist seems to indicate that chariots did not usually go much faster that a man could follow. They would have functioned much like the Greek runners who accompanied horse. I don't remember if it is Drews, but someone suggested the sword and shield men we see at the time of the sea peoples originated as a troop type as chariot runners. I am not a fan of that theory.
Would a chariot need out-accelerate a man if it was meant to be used exclusively for a missile role? The chariot wouldn't need to get closer than about 30 yards from the infantry it was skirmishing, and if the infantry charged it, it would reach full speed long before the infantry were close enough to attack it. And why
would infantry charge? That would get them out of formation, making them vulnerable targets for a chariot counter-charge.
Patrick pointed out that even pony-pulled British chariots would charge Roman infantry if the circumstances were right. Thinking about it, I suspect Cyrenaean chariots would also charge foot in the right situation, but right situations were getting increasingly rare, even for 4-horse chariots, hence Cyrus' decision to make over the entire design.
So the present state of the hypothesis: the moment chariots could not effectively charge infantry, at least on occasion, they were dumped. Their role as skirmisher taxi wasn't enough on its own to keep them in existence.
QuoteQuestions: why would a wheel-to-wheel (or close, e.g. 3-4' between vehicles) attack be 'suicidal', and what, in plain English, is a 'bow-based manoeuvre strategy'? :)
A wheel to wheel attack between two lines of chariots, using the horses as equid battering rams, would inevitable mean mutual destruction of the vehicles and, effectively, the animals. Some of the crew might survive, possibly with major injuries. The military advantage of using your elite military personnel and expensive technology in this way escapes me.
"Bow-based" - the bow is central to the function of chariot as a weapon system. In simple terms, shooting is more important than crashing.
"manoeouvre" - about using the mobility of the chariot, rather than just its kinetic energy. In simple terms, turning and moving is more important than crashing.
"strategy" - admittedly incorrect in this context - I should have said tactics.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 20, 2018, 09:31:26 AM
Patrick mentioned the Kadesh reliefs of chariot v chariot combat
(http://antikforever.com/Syrie-Palestine/Divers/Images/kadesh03b.jpg)
With the usual caveat that the conventionalisation of Egyptian art makes interpretation of depth difficult, here we see the disciplined Egyptians defeat the disorganised foreigners. The Egyptians advance in a well-spaced line, relying on shooting to kill the horses of the opposing side before contact.
It's guesswork what this actually shows, but suicidal wheel to wheel attack seems less likely than a bow-based manoeuver strategy, IMO.
Notice that the foreigners break before being contacted by the Egyptians, who are a small distance from them and still in a neat formation. The implication seems to be that the foreigners rout from a combination of arrow fire and steely eye, rather than the free-for-all confusion of melee combat. Or this whole picture is just fanciful propaganda.
I can't imagine opposing charioteers actually driving their charge home as it would be an instant lose-lose, nor can I imagine horses running into each other if they can't see gaps to run between or can't head for any gaps. Horses might think (or rather know) that humans are pushovers, but they would hardly think the same of other horses.
Somewhat to my surprise, I think we largely agree here. Egyptian military reliefs usually show disciplined bodies of Egyptians, which we must assume is the image they wished to project. But what else can we tell? Here the Egyptians deploy in a spaced line and attack head on. We don't know what they would do if the enemy don't break - some have suggested "dog-fighting" would take place as a set of individual combats broke out. Or perhaps they passed through, exchanging short range archery, javelins, spear thrusts etc. Or maybe the Egyptians would execute a turn and try to draw their opponents into a chase, breaking up their formation and allowing the Egyptians to turn and get in among their now disordered line? This picture doesn't tell us anything about that.
As an example of speculation based on conventionalised images, see this (http://www.warfare.it/tattiche/carri_antichi.html)Italian example. As far as I can tell, this evolves from a reading of the original image as intending to show the chariots in tight echeloned column and goes from there.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 20, 2018, 08:29:36 PM
Sargon's 8th campaign account should have laid to rest the display/hunting school.
I don't have access to my library to check what timetables have been argued for, but Sargon II reigned about a century before the fall of Assyria, so doesn't necessarily count as "latest" Assyrian.
Thanks, BTW, to Anthony and Duncan for the info on straddle-cars. :)
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 21, 2018, 02:36:41 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 20, 2018, 08:29:36 PM
Sargon's 8th campaign account should have laid to rest the display/hunting school.
I don't have access to my library to check what timetables have been argued for, but Sargon II reigned about a century before the fall of Assyria, so doesn't necessarily count as "latest" Assyrian.
He reigned from 722-705 BC and his style of chariot is of the same massive kind as Ashurbanipal's.
Sargon (http://teachmiddleeast.lib.uchicago.edu/historical-perspectives/empires-to-nation-states/before-islam/images/empires-nations-before-islam-11.jpg) 722-705 BC
Ashurbanipal (https://www.louvre.fr/sites/default/files/imagecache/235x196/medias/medias_images/images/louvre-roi-assurbanipal-sur-son_0.jpg?1527822038) 668-627 BC
(Apologies for the small size of the Ashurbanipal image, but that is the Louvre for you.)
Quote from: Erpingham on August 21, 2018, 10:31:36 AM
A wheel to wheel attack between two lines of chariots, using the horses as equid battering rams, would inevitable mean mutual destruction of the vehicles and, effectively, the animals. Some of the crew might survive, possibly with major injuries. The military advantage of using your elite military personnel and expensive technology in this way escapes me.
But would it? Assuming we get one of the seemingly very rare cases of one side not chickening out beforehand (I think we may be broadly in agreement that one side usually would), we get horses coming together at speed, but does this actually kill or even maim the horses? I would imagine it would produce some bruising, but how sure are we about crippling injuries and/or deaths? The chariot crews themselves are safe from the initial impact and only have to worry about inertia vs safety straps and the inherent strength of chariot frames (if either fails they go headfirst into the rear of a horse - a relatively soft landing, considering, provided there is no follow-up with the rear hooves.) The chariots I think would survive an instant deceleration from 15 mph to zero (maybe some day someone can try a chariot 'crash dummies' test).
Quote"Bow-based" - the bow is central to the function of chariot as a weapon system. In simple terms, shooting is more important than crashing.
"manoeouvre" - about using the mobility of the chariot, rather than just its kinetic energy. In simple terms, turning and moving is more important than crashing.
OK, thanks, although I would suggest substituting 'charging' for 'crashing' for a more accurate tactical picture. Does this 'bow-based tactic' require a shoot-and-scoot system and complete avoidance of melee in any shape or form? Or would it permit something of each, depending upon circumstances?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 20, 2018, 08:29:36 PM
The one time Indian chariots discernibly encountered the Western historical sphere, Alexander disposed of them so effectively they never even had a chance to show whether they had a role.
Not my period. So I have an obvious question.
Do we know how or why they were disposed of?
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 21, 2018, 09:17:46 AM
Would a chariot need out-accelerate a man if it was meant to be used exclusively for a missile role? The chariot wouldn't need to get closer than about 30 yards from the infantry it was skirmishing, and if the infantry charged it, it would reach full speed long before the infantry were close enough to attack it. And why would infantry charge? That would get them out of formation, making them vulnerable targets for a chariot counter-charge.
So the present state of the hypothesis: the moment chariots could not effectively charge infantry, at least on occasion, they were dumped. Their role as skirmisher taxi wasn't enough on its own to keep them in existence.
Infantry could surely swarm a chariot, this is why they had chariot runners. Just as elephants were best accompanied by a light infantry screen to keep light troops from mobbing them, a chariot too would be vulnerable to being mobbed if it came too close to infantry prior to turning. In fact I think it was elephants that put the nail in the chariot coffin. With chariots, you had missile platforms OR later scythed chariots that did damage by driving along the edges of formations or through mobs of broken troops at a swift pace. With elephants you had a much more elevated missile platform AND a means of doing great damage along the front ranks of your foes or through mobs of broken ranks. Neither the chariot, nor the elephant crashed into deep formed ranks like a bulldozer, because to do so was suicidal. Both require mobility to defend their flanks. With chariots this is obvious, but if you know your book of Maccabees, or have ever seen an African pygmy kill and elephant with a spear to the gut, you know that elephants too are highly vulnerable from the flanks. This is most obviously shown by the tactics used against both elephants and scythed chariots. You clear a lane for them to go down, chariots at Cunaxa, Elephants at Zama, then either kill them as they stall from flank attack, or shunt them off behind your ranks to be driven off by light troops. It is often overlooked that in neither case would this tactic work if chariots or elephants regularly charged directly into massed men, rather than along the front and flanks of formations or expected to slaughter broken troops.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 04:37:25 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 21, 2018, 09:17:46 AM
Would a chariot need out-accelerate a man if it was meant to be used exclusively for a missile role? The chariot wouldn't need to get closer than about 30 yards from the infantry it was skirmishing, and if the infantry charged it, it would reach full speed long before the infantry were close enough to attack it. And why would infantry charge? That would get them out of formation, making them vulnerable targets for a chariot counter-charge.
So the present state of the hypothesis: the moment chariots could not effectively charge infantry, at least on occasion, they were dumped. Their role as skirmisher taxi wasn't enough on its own to keep them in existence.
Infantry could surely swarm a chariot, this is why they had chariot runners. Just as elephants were best accompanied by a light infantry screen to keep light troops from mobbing them, a chariot too would be vulnerable to being mobbed if it came too close to infantry prior to turning. In fact I think it was elephants that put the nail in the chariot coffin. With chariots, you had missile platforms OR later scythed chariots that did damage by driving along the edges of formations or through mobs of broken troops at a swift pace. With elephants you had a much more elevated missile platform AND a means of doing great damage along the front ranks of your foes or through mobs of broken ranks. Neither the chariot, nor the elephant crashed into deep formed ranks like a bulldozer, because to do so was suicidal. Both require mobility to defend their flanks. With chariots this is obvious, but if you know your book of Maccabees, or have ever seen an African pygmy kill and elephant with a spear to the gut, you know that elephants too are highly vulnerable from the flanks. This is most obviously shown by the tactics used against both elephants and scythed chariots. You clear a lane for them to go down, chariots at Cunaxa, Elephants at Zama, then either kill them as they stall from flank attack, or shunt them off behind your ranks to be driven off by light troops. It is often overlooked that in neither case would this tactic work if chariots or elephants regularly charged directly into massed men, rather than along the front and flanks of formations or expected to slaughter broken troops.
But that's just it - infantry
couldn't swarm a chariot. Chariots could turn on a dime and be off long before the infantry could reach them. My own theory on chariot runners is that they were there to dispatch infantry that had been knocked over by the chariot but had survived. Elephants don't have anything like the speed of a chariot and were not employed to charge through infantry formations, but rather disrupt them from the front, killing many infantry in the process, as at Bagradas.
My take is that chariots did crash into deep formations because horses were able to knock down infantry that weren't properly disposed to stop them, hence the need for specific formations like the anti-cavalry fulcum, which involved turning shields into an overlapping wall and making the first three ranks bunch together into a compact mass, much stabler than a man standing alone.
Clearing lanes was a trick that required trained and disciplined troops to pull off, and it worked the same way as the punctuated Roman lines at Zama - elephants and horses will naturally follow the line of least resistance and go down inviting spaces, keeping clear of a mass of men making terrific racket. But notice that it was only at Zama that the Romans finally caught on to the tactic, as it was only at Gaugamela that someone tried it against scythed chariots for the first time.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 06:58:11 AM
But that's just it - infantry couldn't swarm a chariot. Chariots could turn on a dime and be off long before the infantry could reach them.
I think the idea is that chariot runners support their chariot when their chariot is in combat with the other chariots
I think the idea is that the two lines of chariots 'clash' by passing through each other, and then the chariot runners mug those weakened by the clash
Given the fact that a chariot has a far larger turning circle than a man on foot or a horse, especially when moving at speed (or with one horse or driver wounded) then this would give the chariot force with chariot runners a big advantage over the chariot force without chariot runners
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 22, 2018, 07:20:19 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 06:58:11 AM
But that's just it - infantry couldn't swarm a chariot. Chariots could turn on a dime and be off long before the infantry could reach them.
I think the idea is that chariot runners support their chariot when their chariot is in combat with the other chariots
I think the idea is that the two lines of chariots 'clash' by passing through each other, and then the chariot runners mug those weakened by the clash
Given the fact that a chariot has a far larger turning circle than a man on foot or a horse, especially when moving at speed (or with one horse or driver wounded) then this would give the chariot force with chariot runners a big advantage over the chariot force without chariot runners
That makes sense. Chariots brought to standstill would also be very vulnerable to infantry, in the same way infantry supported cavalry for cavalry vs cavalry engagements.
Quote from: Dangun on August 22, 2018, 12:12:21 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 20, 2018, 08:29:36 PM
The one time Indian chariots discernibly encountered the Western historical sphere, Alexander disposed of them so effectively they never even had a chance to show whether they had a role.
Not my period. So I have an obvious question.
Do we know how or why they were disposed of?
I was referring to a specific event, the Battle of the Hydaspes, in which Alexander's men trounced the Indian chariots without the latter doing anything discernible except being subtracted from the Indian order of battle. There were two clashes involving Indian chariots: the first, when Porus' son was sent to intercept Alexander's crossing, went thus (all quotes from Arrian Book V):
"Aristobulus says that the son of Porus arrived with about sixty chariots, before Alexander made his later passage from the large island, and that he could have hindered Alexander's crossing (for he made the passage with difficulty even when no one opposed him); if the Indians had leaped down from their chariots and assaulted those who first emerged from the water. But he passed by with the chariots and thus made the passage quite safe for Alexander; who on reaching the bank discharged his horse-archers against the Indians in the chariots, and these were easily put to rout, many of them being wounded."
Or thus:
"But Ptolemy, son of Lagus, with whom I agree, gives a different account. This author also says that Porus despatched his son, but not at the head of merely sixty chariots ... Ptolemy says that the son of Porus arrived at the head of 2000 cavalry and 120 chariots; but that Alexander had already made even the last passage from the island before he appeared."
and then:
"Ptolemy also says that Alexander in the first place sent the horse-archers against these, and led the cavalry himself, thinking that Porus was approaching with all his forces, and that this body of cavalry was marching in front of the rest of his army, being drawn up by him as the vanguard. But as soon as he had ascertained with accuracy the number of the Indians, he immediately made a rapid charge upon them with the cavalry around him. When they perceived that Alexander himself and the body of cavalry around him had made the assault, not in line of battle regularly formed, but by squadrons, they gave way; and 400 of their cavalry, including the son of Porus, fell in the contest. The chariots also were captured, horses and all, being heavy and slow in the retreat, and useless in the action itself on account of the clayey ground."
So on this occasion the chariots were essentially stuck in the mud, and did not shine against either horse archers or shock cavalry. On to the battle itself: Arrian notes Porus' deployment of his remaining chariots, this time on sandy ground where they would not get stuck.
"... on both sides of the infantry he had posted the cavalry, in front of which were placed the chariots on both wings of his army."
Alexander dealt with them in a similar way to previously.
"But when they came within range of missiles, he launched the horse-archers, 1000 in number, against the left wing of the Indians, in order to throw those of the enemy who were posted there into confusion by the incessant storm of arrows and by the charge of the horses. He himself with the Companion cavalry marched along rapidly against the left wing of the barbarians, being eager to attack them in flank while still in a state of disorder, before their cavalry could be deployed."
The Indian cavalry, we remember, was behind the Indian chariots, which to Ptolemy's mind meant 'undeployed'. From this point, there is no further mention of Indian chariots, only cavalry, and it would appear that the combination of horse archery and Companions attacking in flank prised the Indian cavalry away from the chariots and left the latter, already troubled by the horse archers, easy pickings for the Macedonian cavalry (the Indian cavalry were then reinforced by the horse from their right and the battle proceeded without further mention of the chariots).
Your question also set me thinking about when Indian armies did finally abandon chariots, and what I can glean of the picture is as follows (others may be able to improve on this). Online sources are minimal, so I ended up going back to army lists, and it looks as if the 2-horse Indian chariot vanishes around 320 BC, with the four-horse chariot lasting until about AD 50. Around then the Kushan Empire was on the rise, and this horse-archer-using culture apparently considered chariots superfluous.
The overall picture would seem to be that Indian chariots met their match in horse archers, but this may be a simplistic conclusion.
[Edit: corrected a few typos in the quotes(!)]
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 21, 2018, 07:50:40 PM
But would it? Assuming we get one of the seemingly very rare cases of one side not chickening out beforehand (I think we may be broadly in agreement that one side usually would), we get horses coming together at speed, but does this actually kill or even maim the horses? I would imagine it would produce some bruising, but how sure are we about crippling injuries and/or deaths? The chariot crews themselves are safe from the initial impact and only have to worry about inertia vs safety straps and the inherent strength of chariot frames (if either fails they go headfirst into the rear of a horse - a relatively soft landing, considering, provided there is no follow-up with the rear hooves.)
I think you have a very optimistic view of the survivability of horses in this situation. As to the survivability of vehicles when a horse is lost at speed, I direct you to Egyptian art, where chariot crashes (of non-Egyptians) are handled with some animation.
Quote
OK, thanks, although I would suggest substituting 'charging' for 'crashing' for a more accurate tactical picture.
We have one person in this discussion who is quite keen on chariots crashing into each other and another who is keen on chariots crashing into bodies of infantry, so I think the contrast was warranted in this case :)
Quote
Does this 'bow-based tactic' require a shoot-and-scoot system and complete avoidance of melee in any shape or form? Or would it permit something of each, depending upon circumstances?
It does not require an avoidance of close-combat. Some of the options are given in my earlier post in reply to Justin.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 21, 2018, 07:50:40 PM
Assuming we get one of the seemingly very rare cases of one side not chickening out beforehand...
How do we know that is rare?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 21, 2018, 07:50:40 PM
... we get horses coming together at speed, but does this actually kill or even maim the horses? I would imagine it would produce some bruising, but how sure are we about crippling injuries and/or deaths?
Chariots are very fragile. You don't need an outright death.
You have 8 legs and 2 wheels, and if you lose any of them the vehicle is lost, and the passengers much more likely to be killed.
This is a neat fit with your explanation that Alexander's horse archers dominated the chariots.
This fragility is partly why I think we are overestimating the willingness of a driver to put his chariot into dense infantry. Sure you might main half a dozen enemies, but you also die.
The other reason is of course the complete lack of evidence :)
Perhaps part of the reason for the chariot runners is to defend and possibly rescue/ extract the crews of immobilized chariots?
So, where are we now?
Discussions of chariot/infantry interaction seem to have stalled a bit, with a transfer of interest to chariot/chariot combat, with a bit of chariot/cavalry stuff for good measure.
A few questions that have arisen for me are :
Is the vulnerability of Middle Eastern Infantry to chariots entirely based on a belief in the uselessness of said infantry? I'm reminded that there used to be such a similar view about Early medieval knights and infantry, which would not be held today.
What was the role of chariot-accompanying infantry? How did they maintain contact in the proposed chariot charges? Or did the charges move at lower speeds? Or perhaps the charges were short and the infantry would catch up in time for a slower speed melee between opposing chariots?
What is the difference between the effectivness of horse archers against chariots and that of bow-equipped light chariots?
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on August 22, 2018, 02:26:38 PM
Perhaps part of the reason for the chariot runners is to defend and possibly rescue/ extract the crews of immobilized chariots?
It is certainly possible. But some armies had lots of chariot support infantry. According to this (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chariots_in_ancient_China)wikipedia article, Chinese chariots had between 10 and seventy attached infantry. I'd be interested in one of the Chinese-aware members comments on this.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 02:39:12 PM
Quote from: Flaminpig0 on August 22, 2018, 02:26:38 PM
Perhaps part of the reason for the chariot runners is to defend and possibly rescue/ extract the crews of immobilized chariots?
It is certainly possible. But some armies had lots of chariot support infantry. According to this (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chariots_in_ancient_China)wikipedia article, Chinese chariots had between 10 and seventy attached infantry. I'd be interested in one of the Chinese-aware members comments on this.
It probably varies from army to army, in some armies they might be a dedicated professional support force in others they might be servants or feudal followers.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 02:30:20 PM
So, where are we now?
Discussions of chariot/infantry interaction seem to have stalled a bit, with a transfer of interest to chariot/chariot combat, with a bit of chariot/cavalry stuff for good measure.
A few questions that have arisen for me are :
Is the vulnerability of Middle Eastern Infantry to chariots entirely based on a belief in the uselessness of said infantry? I'm reminded that there used to be such a similar view about Early medieval knights and infantry, which would not be held today.
My own take at present is that Middle Eastern infantry for a long time didn't have an effective anti-cavalry formation other than great depth, as horses can happily smash through a regular line of infantry (say 8 deep) that isn't properly disposed to repulse them. So long as the horses can knock the men down one after the other and not all together (quite doable if the men are in intermediate order with 3 feet per rank) they can bash through lines up to, say, 20 men deep before running out of momentum. Notice in the three videos at the beginning of the thread how the people are immediately knocked flat when contacted by the horses. The later uselessness of chariots is due to infantry finally adopting effective dispositions, for example compressing the first few ranks together, though I'm not aware of any explicit references in the sources on how exactly they eventually learned to stop chariots (besides opening gaps in the line).
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 02:30:20 PMWhat was the role of chariot-accompanying infantry? How did they maintain contact in the proposed chariot charges? Or did the charges move at lower speeds? Or perhaps the charges were short and the infantry would catch up in time for a slower speed melee between opposing chariots?
I thought about that. Evidently the chariots approach enemy infantry at a pace the accompanying infantry could match, getting up to charge speed only over the last couple of dozen yards or so, which would also keep the horses fresh until the last moment.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 02:30:20 PMWhat is the difference between the effectivness of horse archers against chariots and that of bow-equipped light chariots?
Horse archers are cheaper than chariots so an army can field more of them, and horse archers supply more firepower per square dekametre than chariots - you can probably fit two or more horse archers into the area occupied by one chariot.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 02:39:12 PMAccording to this (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chariots_in_ancient_China)wikipedia article, Chinese chariots had between 10 and seventy attached infantry. I'd be interested in one of the Chinese-aware members comments on this.
Damn. that's the second time a reply has completely disappeared.
Chinese accounts give widely different figures. Some Western Zhou inscriptions IIRC give strengths of 10 infantry per chariot, but not necessarily supporting infantry. At Xuge in 707 the Zheng centre had squadrons of 25 chariots supported by five files (squads, groups) of five infantry "to maintain a close and unbroken front" - but whether this is 25 men per chariot or per squadron is not clear. Sunzi, in maybe the 5th century, says an army of 1,000 chariots involves 1,000 heavy wagons and 100,000 armoured infantry - no indication of how they work together.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 22, 2018, 03:33:59 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 02:39:12 PMAccording to this (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chariots_in_ancient_China)wikipedia article, Chinese chariots had between 10 and seventy attached infantry. I'd be interested in one of the Chinese-aware members comments on this.
Damn. that's the second time a reply has completely disappeared.
Chinese accounts give widely different figures. Some Western Zhou inscriptions IIRC give strengths of 10 infantry per chariot, but not necessarily supporting infantry. At Xuge in 707 the Zheng centre had squadrons of 25 chariots supported by five files (squads, groups) of five infantry "to maintain a close and unbroken front" - but whether this is 25 men per chariot or per squadron is not clear. Sunzi, in maybe the 5th century, says an army of 1,000 chariots involves 1,000 heavy wagons and 100,000 armoured infantry - no indication of how they work together.
Would there be more than two possible ways for infantry to support chariots?
1. In chariot vs chariot or chariot vs cavalry combat, the chariots stop the enemy chariots/cavalry and static melee ensues, in which the supporting infantry can slip between the enemy chariots/cavalry and do bad things to them.
2. In chariot vs infantry combat, the chariots ride over the enemy infantry and keep going (they dare not stop), whilst the supporting infantry attack and finish off the disorganised enemy infantry that has just been ridden over/through by the chariots.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 06:58:11 AM
But that's just it - infantry couldn't swarm a chariot. Chariots could turn on a dime and be off long before the infantry could reach them. My own theory on chariot runners is that they were there to dispatch infantry that had been knocked over by the chariot but had survived. Elephants don't have anything like the speed of a chariot and were not employed to charge through infantry formations, but rather disrupt them from the front, killing many infantry in the process, as at Bagradas.
On a dime? have you seen recreation chariots wheel? Wide turning radius.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 06:58:11 AMMy take is that chariots did crash into deep formations because horses were able to knock down infantry that weren't properly disposed to stop them, hence the need for specific formations like the anti-cavalry fulcum, which involved turning shields into an overlapping wall and making the first three ranks bunch together into a compact mass, much stabler than a man standing alone.
I am sorry, because I know you like this vision, but this is simply not how the mechanics work. You could far easier put a chariot through three overlapped ranks than 8 close-order ranks. For a chariot to get through ranks without stalling you need to catch men in opened order at the least, and routing is even better.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 06:58:11 AMClearing lanes was a trick that required trained and disciplined troops to pull off, and it worked the same way as the punctuated Roman lines at Zama - elephants and horses will naturally follow the line of least resistance and go down inviting spaces, keeping clear of a mass of men making terrific racket. But notice that it was only at Zama that the Romans finally caught on to the tactic, as it was only at Gaugamela that someone tried it against scythed chariots for the first time.
Yes, but you have to see that the "line of least resistance" when coming up to close formed men is to wheel sideways. Clearly Scythed chariots were intended to break up battle-lines, but the expectation is that the infantry will flinch. The same holds true for cavalry charges, it the infantry does not flinch, you are not going to break them unless you wade into the formation and fight your way through. Scythed chariots would work well against a crowd of light troops, or a Persian style shield wall with only a rank or two of shield-men in front of light troops, but as we see they did not work against hoplites. You need to have the tight formed ranks that are perceived as too strong to plunge into in order to create a "path of least resistance" beside it. If you are a loose swarm or a fragile wall, then there is no resistance essentially anywhere.
Not at Guagamela, but at Cunaxa:
Xen anabasis 1.8.10 In front of them were the so-called scythe-bearing chariots, at some distance from one another; and the scythes they carried reached out sideways from the axles and were also set under the chariot bodies, pointing towards the ground, so as to cut to pieces whatever they met; the intention, then, was that they should drive into the ranks of the Greeks and cut through the line.
20] As for the enemy's chariots, some of them plunged through the lines of their own troops, others, however, through the Greek lines, but without charioteers. And whenever the Greeks saw them coming, they would open a gap for their passage; one fellow, to be sure, was caught, like a befuddled man on a race-course, yet it was said that even he was not hurt in the least, nor, for that matter, did any other single man among the Greeks get any hurt whatever in this battle, save that someone on the left wing was reported to have been hit by an arrow.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 03:22:41 PM
My own take at present is that Middle Eastern infantry for a long time didn't have an effective anti-cavalry formation other than great depth, as horses can happily smash through a regular line of infantry (say 8 deep) that isn't properly disposed to repulse them. So long as the horses can knock the men down one after the other and not all together (quite doable if the men are in intermediate order with 3 feet per rank) they can bash through lines up to, say, 20 men deep before running out of momentum. Notice in the three videos at the beginning of the thread how the people are immediately knocked flat when contacted by the horses. The later uselessness of chariots is due to infantry finally adopting effective dispositions, for example compressing the first few ranks together, though I'm not aware of any explicit references in the sources on how exactly they eventually learned to stop chariots (besides opening gaps in the line).
Your final lines suggest you have evidence of the initial ineffectiveness of infantry, if all you lack are explicit references to how later infantry became effective against chariots. You haven't yet shared this, or is it in reserve for a future article?
While we wait for said evidence, here is a theory built on analogy with other periods. What if the role of infantry was to provide a solid base from which chariots could attack enemy chariots? Friendly chariots could regroup behind their infantry, protected from their opposite numbers. Once chariot supremacy has been won, infantry and chariots together can deal with the enemy infantry, who will struggle to withdraw any distance against a mobile foe and if they make a stand could be hit by supported chariot attacks, archery barrages or even infantry assaults.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 04:26:41 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 06:58:11 AM
But that's just it - infantry couldn't swarm a chariot. Chariots could turn on a dime and be off long before the infantry could reach them. My own theory on chariot runners is that they were there to dispatch infantry that had been knocked over by the chariot but had survived. Elephants don't have anything like the speed of a chariot and were not employed to charge through infantry formations, but rather disrupt them from the front, killing many infantry in the process, as at Bagradas.
On a dime? have you seen recreation chariots wheel? Wide turning radius.
I based that on chariot racing, specifically quadriga (https://sp88k.home.xs4all.nl/Coin/Traveler/Objects/Quadriga.htm) (four-horse) chariot racing which involved incredibly tight turns around the ends of the spina at full speed. The point about a chariot is that unlike a 4-wheeled vehicle it doesn't have to move forwards whilst turning. It can turn in place or even move backwards a little if necessary.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 04:26:41 PMQuote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 06:58:11 AMMy take is that chariots did crash into deep formations because horses were able to knock down infantry that weren't properly disposed to stop them, hence the need for specific formations like the anti-cavalry fulcum, which involved turning shields into an overlapping wall and making the first three ranks bunch together into a compact mass, much stabler than a man standing alone.
I am sorry, because I know you like this vision, but this is simply not how the mechanics work. You could far easier put a chariot through three overlapped ranks than 8 close-order ranks. For a chariot to get through ranks without stalling you need to catch men in opened order at the least, and routing is even better.
But horses regularly crashed through formed infantry lines 8 or more deep (that's how mid-Republican Roman armies routinely won their battles). The enemy infantry weren't in open order as they were about to engage the Roman foot. Hence the need for a special formation to stop them. Chariots worked on the same principle. The point about the fulcum is that it specifically required the three front ranks to bunch together in close order, shoulder to shoulder - which made it impossible to knock the men over - whilst the shields overlapped to supply sufficient protection against a 400kg horse hitting at full speed. In one of the videos at the beginning of the thread the man knocked down was killed.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 04:26:41 PMQuote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 06:58:11 AMClearing lanes was a trick that required trained and disciplined troops to pull off, and it worked the same way as the punctuated Roman lines at Zama - elephants and horses will naturally follow the line of least resistance and go down inviting spaces, keeping clear of a mass of men making terrific racket. But notice that it was only at Zama that the Romans finally caught on to the tactic, as it was only at Gaugamela that someone tried it against scythed chariots for the first time.
Yes, but you have to see that the "line of least resistance" when coming up to close formed men is to wheel sideways. Clearly Scythed chariots were intended to break up battle-lines, but the expectation is that the infantry will flinch. The same holds true for cavalry charges, it the infantry does not flinch, you are not going to break them unless you wade into the formation and fight your way through. Scythed chariots would work well against a crowd of light troops, or a Persian style shield wall with only a rank or two of shield-men in front of light troops, but as we see they did not work against hoplites. You need to have the tight formed ranks that are perceived as too strong to plunge into in order to create a "path of least resistance" beside it. If you are a loose swarm or a fragile wall, then there is no resistance essentially anywhere.
Scythed chariots were meant to plough through formed heavy infantry, not just light troops, hence their use by Darius at Gaugamela against the phalanx. A Persian style shield wall is no 'lighter' than regular heavy infantry in that the men are as close together as heavy foot (they are the Persian version of heavy foot) and the rear ranks not having shields doesn't in any way facilitate the horses' ability to punch through them.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 04:26:41 PMNot at Guagamela, but at Cunaxa:
Xen anabasis 1.8.10 In front of them were the so-called scythe-bearing chariots, at some distance from one another; and the scythes they carried reached out sideways from the axles and were also set under the chariot bodies, pointing towards the ground, so as to cut to pieces whatever they met; the intention, then, was that they should drive into the ranks of the Greeks and cut through the line.
20] As for the enemy's chariots, some of them plunged through the lines of their own troops, others, however, through the Greek lines, but without charioteers. And whenever the Greeks saw them coming, they would open a gap for their passage; one fellow, to be sure, was caught, like a befuddled man on a race-course, yet it was said that even he was not hurt in the least, nor, for that matter, did any other single man among the Greeks get any hurt whatever in this battle, save that someone on the left wing was reported to have been hit by an arrow.
True.
As a curiosity, I was reading this (http://www.mikeloades.com/wp-content/uploads/British_Chariot.pdf) report by Mike loades on reconstructing a British chariot and came across this :
Livy, writing of the battle of Sentino in 295BC cites that the Romans "were
terrified by a new method of warfare". The Gauls had arrived in chariots and
"great was the noise of the horses and the wheels and the Roman mounts
were thrown into panic by that fearful din to which they were unaccustomed."
Note the similarity to Caesar's account of fighting British chariots (and, for that matter, Tacitus'). Can our classicists tell us whether Livy's account contains anything more of interest?
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 05:55:46 PM
As a curiosity, I was reading this (http://www.mikeloades.com/wp-content/uploads/British_Chariot.pdf) report by Mike loades on reconstructing a British chariot and came across this :
Livy, writing of the battle of Sentino in 295BC cites that the Romans "were
terrified by a new method of warfare". The Gauls had arrived in chariots and
"great was the noise of the horses and the wheels and the Roman mounts
were thrown into panic by that fearful din to which they were unaccustomed."
Note the similarity to Caesar's account of fighting British chariots (and, for that matter, Tacitus'). Can our classicists tell us whether Livy's account contains anything more of interest?
Definitely. :)
Livy X.28.5-10:
"Decius, as a younger man, possessing more vigour of mind, showed more dash; [6] he made use of all the strength he possessed in opening the attack, and as the infantry battle developed too slowly for him, he called on the cavalry. [7] Putting himself at the head of a squadron of exceptionally gallant troopers, he appealed to them as the pick of his soldiers to follow him in charging the enemy, for a twofold glory would be theirs if victory began on the left wing and, in that wing, with the cavalry. Twice they swept aside the Gaulish horse."
So far, just a bit of orientation. Now the interesting bit, as the Roman cavalry overreach themselves in a third charge. Here is the bit Mike Loades refers to, with an interesting twist.
"Making a third charge, they were carried too far, and whilst they were now fighting desperately in the midst of the enemy's cavalry they were thrown into consternation by a new style of warfare. Armed men mounted on chariots [
essedis] and baggage wagons [
carris] came on with a thunderous noise of horses and wheels, and the horses of the Roman cavalry, unaccustomed to that kind of uproar, became uncontrollable through fright; the cavalry, after their victorious charges, were now scattered in frantic terror; horses and men alike were overthrown in their blind flight. Even the standards of the legionaries were thrown into confusion,
and many of the front rank men were crushed [
obtriti = bruised, trampled, crushed, broken]
by the weight of the horses and vehicles [
impetu equorum ac vehiculorum]
dashing [
raptorum = tearing]
through the lines."
So whether intentionally or otherwise, the Gallic chariots found themselves performing a shock role in this battle, very much along the lines Justin has suggested. Livy has two types of vehicle used by the Gauls: 'essedis', typically used by Roman authors for British chariots and scythed chariots, and 'carris', usually meaning carts or carriages of some sort (cf. use of
harmata in Greek). Given the unlikelihood of baggage wagons making a charge on anyone, what we appear to have are two types of Gallic chariot, one perhaps scythed but in any event different, and both engaging in a shock role. One is reminded of the Galatian lineup at the 'elephant victory' less than two decades later.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 22, 2018, 08:07:36 PM
and many of the front rank men were crushed [obtriti = bruised, trampled, crushed, broken] by the weight of the horses and vehicles [impetu equorum ac vehiculorum] dashing [raptorum = tearing] through the lines."[/color]
Why single out the front rank as trampled if the chariot blasted through the ranks from front to back? Unless of course the rear ranks high tailed it and split to make room for the chariot to pass, leaving the front ranks unsupported to get run over. The front ranks are the last that can run away. This is what I think is the key to all cavalry charges. The defeated men waivered. If any type of cavalry hits men in the process of breaking, they can cut through them, if not they cannot cut through them at speed. They have to stop and fight their way through.
I should be clear. I believe that chariots, definitely scythed chariots, were designed for shock combat. I just think shock combat does not work the way many think. Often the psychological "shock" is what breaks the unit moments before the physical shock occurs.
As an ancients newbie I'd like to thank the various posters for placing so many views and a good deal of evidence online for me to peruse. Also, a couple of excellent links to good reads on this subject.
For what it's worth, my personal view is that Justin's idea that chariots were primarily shock weapons misses the light/heavy divide, a divide similar to that amongst cavalry. Surely it is not too odd to conclude that light chariots (e.g. Egyptian) were intended to act like light cavalry in a skirmishing role, with the added value of chasing off and riding down fleeing enemy, whilst heavier chariots with 4 horses and heavier construction had a shock role, at least in part? No one would say ancient heavy cavalry could ride down formed, disciplined heavy infantry, but that doesn't negate the fact that the shock role was part of their function - if they found some heavy infantry who weren't quite so formed and disciplined (for example, as a result of receiving shooting casualties, or as a result of being poorly trained), they might give a frontal charge a go. Of course, flanks and rear would be the preferred targets.
Bows and javelins carried by the heavier chariots would, it seems to me, be likely to be useful in disrupting enemy infantry to the extent that a charge might become possible. I also find Justin's point about teams of horses making charging in more possible convincing. Paul's point just made about psychological intimidation is, I reckon, also very useful. Any mounted charge is a very chancy and dangerous thing for the chargers - but they seem to have happened
So, heavy chariots obviously have their limitations, but a shock role seems viable, with very similar caveats to heavy cavalry.
Does any of that make sense? Answers on a postcard please.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 05:23:43 PM
But horses regularly crashed through formed infantry lines 8 or more deep (that's how mid-Republican Roman armies routinely won their battles). The enemy infantry weren't in open order as they were about to engage the Roman foot. Hence the need for a special formation to stop them. Chariots worked on the same principle. The point about the fulcum is that it specifically required the three front ranks to bunch together in close order, shoulder to shoulder - which made it impossible to knock the men over - whilst the shields overlapped to supply sufficient protection against a 400kg horse hitting at full speed. In one of the videos at the beginning of the thread the man knocked down was killed.
Again, this is simply not how the physics works. If you take a dead horse and throw it at a fulcum and 20mph, it will knock everyone in the 3 ranks over. Take the same horse and throw it at 8 ranks of men in close order and it will be stopped as each rank it hits is carried into the next and the aggregate bleeds off velocity of the horse. Throw the dead horse into men in opened order, with room to collapse, and the horse will knock over 8 men in order, only partially losing velocity. Am I throwing or beating a dead horse? The reason a fulcum works is that cavalry does not charge into formed men at speed. It tries to plough through slowly. To counter that you need a solid wall in opposition that cannot give ground. If men, even in close order, shy from the horse, then the horseman can "herd" them back and plough through the line. Obviously the closer the order, the harder it is to shy away.
I have never read an account of cavalry hitting close formed troops at speed where it was not likely that the men broke just prior to contact. this happens so fast that it would be very hard to describe as a separate action. The closest would be Kirkholm, when the Pole's lances probably outreached the Swedes pikes.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 05:23:43 PM
Scythed chariots were meant to plough through formed heavy infantry, not just light troops, hence their use by Darius at Gaugamela against the phalanx. A Persian style shield wall is no 'lighter' than regular heavy infantry in that the men are as close together as heavy foot (they are the Persian version of heavy foot) and the rear ranks not having shields doesn't in any way facilitate the horses' ability to punch through them.
A Persian shield wall is much lighter than a Greek phalanx. Essentially all you have to do is topple one line of shields on kick stands or at worst buried in the ground. Shieldless archers are not likely form up in close support, but to break. But even this is no easy task, and the whole point of the Persian tactic was to deter cavalry from getting their hands on all those archers. Most horses will not crash through a line of whicker shields. Presumably a scythed chariot would, or perhaps swerve and knee cap the whole front rank with their scythes.
Take a look at this. Granted these men are not trying to kill anyone, so they are not going at it as hard as they could, but the protesters are showing the natural human reaction to being charged by a horse. I have been charged in mock combat and it scared the crap out of me- and it was not that big a horse. If you are in the front rank in front of me, I got your back....Waaaaay back! good luck not getting run over.
https://youtu.be/_qhUTF4hOp8 (https://youtu.be/_qhUTF4hOp8)
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 02:30:20 PM
What is the difference between the effectivness of horse archers against chariots and that of bow-equipped light chariots?
A couple of thoughts.
Economic efficiency - twice as many bows per horse and no expensive, fragile chariot.
Utility - chariots don't like off-road, horses turn faster.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 22, 2018, 03:33:59 PM
Chinese accounts give widely different figures.
Some of the generic battle/army descriptions give what looks like a chariot/infantry ratio and we are left to infer, or not, how closely they cooperated.
Given the differences in speed, I think we may be over estimating the ability of the two types to cooperate?
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 09:12:58 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 05:23:43 PM
But horses regularly crashed through formed infantry lines 8 or more deep (that's how mid-Republican Roman armies routinely won their battles). The enemy infantry weren't in open order as they were about to engage the Roman foot. Hence the need for a special formation to stop them. Chariots worked on the same principle. The point about the fulcum is that it specifically required the three front ranks to bunch together in close order, shoulder to shoulder - which made it impossible to knock the men over - whilst the shields overlapped to supply sufficient protection against a 400kg horse hitting at full speed. In one of the videos at the beginning of the thread the man knocked down was killed.
Again, this is simply not how the physics works. If you take a dead horse and throw it at a fulcum and 20mph, it will knock everyone in the 3 ranks over. Take the same horse and throw it at 8 ranks of men in close order and it will be stopped as each rank it hits is carried into the next and the aggregate bleeds off velocity of the horse. Throw the dead horse into men in opened order, with room to collapse, and the horse will knock over 8 men in order, only partially losing velocity. Am I throwing or beating a dead horse? The reason a fulcum works is that cavalry does not charge into formed men at speed. It tries to plough through slowly. To counter that you need a solid wall in opposition that cannot give ground. If men, even in close order, shy from the horse, then the horseman can "herd" them back and plough through the line. Obviously the closer the order, the harder it is to shy away.
Our problem is that we don't have a crew of willing volunteers ready to line up and be charged by a horse so we can see what exactly happens. I can only work from the sources that have a number of accounts of cavalry charging through a line of heavy infantry (mid-Republican Rome) and the composition of the fulcum designed specifically to stop this happening. The former tells me horses have no problem knocking down men in intermediate order one after the other.
Perhaps we need to clarify our terms. By 'intermediate order' I mean that the
ranks are about three feet apart, permitting the horse to knock down one man before reaching the next. By close order I mean something like a Greek phalanx bunched up for othismos. Open order means about six feet between ranks. It doesn't matter how close together the files are.
If a fulcum discourages a cavalryman from charging it, that can only be because the cavalryman knows he won't get through - it's a physical (near) impossibility. Not just because it looks like a wall. A line of men in intermediate rank order also look like a wall.
One thing we do know for sure is that horses will charge into people at speed - the videos demonstrate that.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 09:12:58 PMI have never read an account of cavalry hitting close formed troops at speed where it was not likely that the men broke just prior to contact. this happens so fast that it would be very hard to describe as a separate action. The closest would be Kirkholm, when the Pole's lances probably outreached the Swedes pikes.
I'm at work right now but I'll give you the references later from Livy for Roman cavalry charging through Italian infantry.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 09:12:58 PMQuote from: Justin Swanton on August 22, 2018, 05:23:43 PM
Scythed chariots were meant to plough through formed heavy infantry, not just light troops, hence their use by Darius at Gaugamela against the phalanx. A Persian style shield wall is no 'lighter' than regular heavy infantry in that the men are as close together as heavy foot (they are the Persian version of heavy foot) and the rear ranks not having shields doesn't in any way facilitate the horses' ability to punch through them.
A Persian shield wall is much lighter than a Greek phalanx. Essentially all you have to do is topple one line of shields on kick stands or at worst buried in the ground. Shieldless archers are not likely form up in close support, but to break. But even this is no easy task, and the whole point of the Persian tactic was to deter cavalry from getting their hands on all those archers. Most horses will not crash through a line of whicker shields. Presumably a scythed chariot would, or perhaps swerve and knee cap the whole front rank with their scythes.
Any kind of infantry did not necessarily close up ranks to stop the horses. For this to work you need bodies not shields (besides the one shield in the front) and the bright idea of compacting body against body to create a stable mass the horse can't punch through. Again, there are plenty of examples of horses crashing through a line of shields, wicker and otherwise.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 09:12:26 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 21, 2018, 07:50:40 PM
But would it? Assuming we get one of the seemingly very rare cases of one side not chickening out beforehand (I think we may be broadly in agreement that one side usually would), we get horses coming together at speed, but does this actually kill or even maim the horses? I would imagine it would produce some bruising, but how sure are we about crippling injuries and/or deaths? The chariot crews themselves are safe from the initial impact and only have to worry about inertia vs safety straps and the inherent strength of chariot frames (if either fails they go headfirst into the rear of a horse - a relatively soft landing, considering, provided there is no follow-up with the rear hooves.)
I think you have a very optimistic view of the survivability of horses in this situation. As to the survivability of vehicles when a horse is lost at speed, I direct you to Egyptian art, where chariot crashes (of non-Egyptians) are handled with some animation.
But losing a horse at speed is a different matter to bumping into an enemy chariot team at speed: you get shear forces not present in a direct impact.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 08:50:46 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 22, 2018, 08:07:36 PM
and many of the front rank men were crushed [obtriti = bruised, trampled, crushed, broken] by the weight of the horses and vehicles [impetu equorum ac vehiculorum] dashing [raptorum = tearing] through the lines."[/color]
Why single out the front rank as trampled if the chariot blasted through the ranks from front to back?
Because it is not the front rank. It is the
antesignani, which it seems the translator has rendered in misleading fashion. Perhaps I should have picked up on this: the antesignani ('before the standards') as of 295 BC represented the hastati and principes of a Polybian legion (as in the preceding Livian legion; contrast Caesar's legion in his
Civil Wars, where they instead represent just the light troops, the standards having moved forward in the meantime).
QuoteThis is what I think is the key to all cavalry charges. The defeated men wavered. If any type of cavalry hits men in the process of breaking, they can cut through them, if not they cannot cut through them at speed. They have to stop and fight their way through.
But they do stop and fight. :) The point about the infantry opposition mostly breaking just before impact looks to me to be a good one; this puts the training and tradition as much as the tactics of the infantry at a premium, and may explain why Asiatic armies needed great depth to avoid such breakage and/or ameliorate the consequences of infirmity at the front, whereas formed Greek hoplites appear never to have been frontally charged with success by pre-Macedonian cavalry (Delium I do not count as the Theban cavalry were believed to be precursors of a fresh new army) and even peltasts could open a gap in disciplined fashion to let Persian heavies through, as at Cunaxa.
QuoteI should be clear. I believe that chariots, definitely scythed chariots, were designed for shock combat. I just think shock combat does not work the way many think. Often the psychological "shock" is what breaks the unit moments before the physical shock occurs.
I would agree here. However the focus of discussion here has tended to be on what happens when such a break does not occur, and then (unless I am somehow misrepresenting general opinion) tending to assume for discussion purposes that such a situation was the infantry norm and arguing from this that shock combat for chariots was unviable.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 22, 2018, 09:19:13 PM
Take a look at this. Granted these men are not trying to kill anyone, so they are not going at it as hard as they could, but the protesters are showing the natural human reaction to being charged by a horse. I have been charged in mock combat and it scared the crap out of me- and it was not that big a horse. If you are in the front rank in front of me, I got your back....Waaaaay back! good luck not getting run over.
https://youtu.be/_qhUTF4hOp8 (https://youtu.be/_qhUTF4hOp8)
I would suggest that this isn't really a relevant example. The crowds are not trying to stand up to the horses and feel no need to stay where they are. Infantry in a battlefield are in a very different position (excuse the pun). An infantryman knows that if he breaks and runs he will probably be ridden down by the cavalry/chariots and so his best chance is to stand his ground. In any case his orders are to stay put, and the men behind him ensure he obeys that order.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 23, 2018, 07:02:21 AM
Because it is not the front rank. It is the antesignani, which it seems the translator has rendered in misleading fashion. Perhaps I should have picked up on this: the antesignani ('before the standards') as of 295 BC represented the hastati and principes of a Polybian legion (as in the preceding Livian legion; contrast Caesar's legion in his Civil Wars, where they instead represent just the light troops, the standards having moved forward in the meantime).
Another mistranslation of a crucial word. Fancy that. ::)
Quote from: Erpingham on August 22, 2018, 02:30:20 PM
What is the difference between the effectivness of horse archers against chariots and that of bow-equipped light chariots?
Egyptian chariot archers used a more powerful bow, which would penetrate horse (and crew) armour; I am not sure if Indian chariot horses were armoured, but suspect not (figure manufacturers appear to think not, anyway). Ergo, it would seem that Egyptian chariots would be more effective against their standard (and often protected) opponents while Alexander's horse archers were optimal for dealing with their unarmoured chariot foes.
Quote from: Keith on August 22, 2018, 09:10:13 PM
For what it's worth, my personal view is that Justin's idea that chariots were primarily shock weapons misses the light/heavy divide, a divide similar to that amongst cavalry.
[
scribes on postcard] This apparent divide has been considerably eroded in earlier discussions about, for example, Parthians.
QuoteSurely it is not too odd to conclude that light chariots (e.g. Egyptian) were intended to act like light cavalry in a skirmishing role, with the added value of chasing off and riding down fleeing enemy, whilst heavier chariots with 4 horses and heavier construction had a shock role, at least in part?
If this were the case, one would expect armies to field two types of chariot as standard: one for skirmishing and one for the decisive blow. Instead, national armies only ever seem to field one chariot type at any one time - apart from Gauls, who seem to use two types quite happily in the same role. Our light/heavy distinction may work for size but rapidly bogs down when applied to role.
QuoteNo one would say ancient heavy cavalry could ride down formed, disciplined heavy infantry, but that doesn't negate the fact that the shock role was part of their function - if they found some heavy infantry who weren't quite so formed and disciplined (for example, as a result of receiving shooting casualties, or as a result of being poorly trained), they might give a frontal charge a go. Of course, flanks and rear would be the preferred targets.
Formed, disciplined heavy infantry appear to have been the exception in the Biblical Near East (formed, yes; disciplined, hmmm ...); even Ashurnasirpal's quirky two-horse cavalry teams seem to have been able to ride down infantry of the ordinary sort, according to his reliefs (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_the_Neo-Assyrian_Empire#/media/File:Assyrian_cavalry_charge_the_enemy,_dating_back_to_the_reign_of_Ashurnasirpal_II,_865-860_BCE._In_this_period,_cavalry_was_relatively_new._Detail_of_a_gypsum_wall_relief_from_Nimrud,_Iraq,_currently_housed_in_the_British_Museum.jpg) - that said, this may be a pursuit rather than an actual charge.
QuoteBows and javelins carried by the heavier chariots would, it seems to me, be likely to be useful in disrupting enemy infantry to the extent that a charge might become possible. I also find Justin's point about teams of horses making charging in more possible convincing. Paul's point just made about psychological intimidation is, I reckon, also very useful. Any mounted charge is a very chancy and dangerous thing for the chargers - but they seem to have happened
Bows carried by light chariots would similarly be useful, naturally. We may be in danger of overrating the 'chancy' and 'dangerous' aspects of a charge: the physics of inertia generally favour mounted chargers, and both sides knew it. While the missile output of attacking chariots would certainly help to disrupt the defenders, the noise and general vibration of a lot of chariots heading in (irrespective of size) would do at least as much damage, if not more, to morale. It all stacks up against the target, and at the end of the day two two-horse 'light' chariots have the same missile, morale and shock impact capability as one four-horse heavy chariot.
I had to rethink the traditional light/heavy distinction when I began looking into chariots on the battlefield. It would be nice if someone could prove that 'light' chariots were intended and used for skirmishing, but the evidence seems to be heading in the other direction. [
runs out of postcard space]
QuoteBut losing a horse at speed is a different matter to bumping into an enemy chariot team at speed: you get shear forces not present in a direct impact.
So, not only do the lines meet head on but the drivers ensure that they are perfectly aligned with each other so each horse meets head-to-head? Even if this were to happen, the two chariots would meet at about 30mph. And everyone dusts themselves off and walks away? Here's an experiment we could try. Have someone stand up in the back of a open topped car and drive into a wall at 30mph. Any speculation what happens to the passenger? Sorry, this is a really silly line of reasoning, Patrick.
the cavalry, after their victorious charges, were now scattered in frantic terror; horses and men alike were overthrown in their blind flight. Even the standards of the legionaries were thrown into confusion, and many of the front rank men were crushed [obtriti = bruised, trampled, crushed, broken] by the weight of the horses and vehicles [impetu equorum ac vehiculorum] dashing [raptorum = tearing] through the lines.
I would be tempted to reconstruct this as the chariots break the cavalry and drive them back on the infantry. The infantry are disordered and because of that their lines are broken by the chariots. Disordered or unformed infantry are the natural prey of chariots and cavalry.
I see no sign here of the Gallic chariots launching a deliberate ramming attack on formed legionaries. Rather this is an exploitation or continuation from their earlier defeat of the cavalry.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 22, 2018, 08:07:36 PM
Livy X.28.5-10:
"Making a third charge, they were carried too far, and whilst they were now fighting desperately in the midst of the enemy's cavalry they were thrown into consternation by a new style of warfare. Armed men mounted on chariots [essedis] and baggage wagons [carris] came on with a thunderous noise of horses and wheels
So whether intentionally or otherwise, the Gallic chariots found themselves performing a shock role in this battle, very much along the lines Justin has suggested. Livy has two types of vehicle used by the Gauls: 'essedis', typically used by Roman authors for British chariots and scythed chariots, and 'carris', usually meaning carts or carriages of some sort (cf. use of harmata in Greek).
Ooooh, thanks for that reference, Patrick! Reminds me of Polybios' use of two words in the Telamon description, "hamaxas kai sunoridas" as discussed elsewhere (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=3328.msg41034#msg41034).
Whether this means two vehicle types, or literary "elegant variation", it's apparently not a one-off.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 23, 2018, 07:00:44 AM
Our problem is that we don't have a crew of willing volunteers ready to line up and be charged by a horse so we can see what exactly happens. I can only work from the sources that have a number of accounts of cavalry charging through a line of heavy infantry (mid-Republican Rome) and the composition of the fulcum designed specifically to stop this happening. The former tells me horses have no problem knocking down men in intermediate order one after the other.
Perhaps we need to clarify our terms. By 'intermediate order' I mean that the ranks are about three feet apart, permitting the horse to knock down one man before reaching the next. By close order I mean something like a Greek phalanx bunched up for othismos. Open order means about six feet between ranks. It doesn't matter how close together the files are.
If a fulcum discourages a cavalryman from charging it, that can only be because the cavalryman knows he won't get through - it's a physical (near) impossibility. Not just because it looks like a wall. A line of men in intermediate rank order also look like a wall.
The fulcum, by this I mean the 2 or 3 tiered overlap of shields did not exist to stop cavalry. We know this because Maurice tells us that you need to form it if your men are unarmored and lack greaves. The multi-tiered business is to defend against missiles, not shock. In fact they broke down the tiers when they advanced to shock combat. Any group of close packed men with pointy sticks will deter horse. An advantage that the fulcum does have against cavalry is that when ad fulco it is much harder to pull apart and run.
The physics is just physics. With a dead horse we have no need to test this. Now what happens when a live horse meets an immovable mass, that is horse behavior and human psychology and needs testing. The focus of your argument on the physical collision is what is causing me to object, because the mechanics are incorrect. I had to do a similar analysis on the old-school charging hoplite collision rigamarole, so I am somewhat expert at this point is the study of colliding particle swarms. If we pare back a bit on the notion of the physical battering ram, and focus on the fact that all the shock victories you describe really did happen, just through a more subtle interplay of physical force and psychology, then I am completely on board.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 23, 2018, 07:00:44 AM
One thing we do know for sure is that horses will charge into people at speed - the videos demonstrate that.
Horses will charge persons, there is a crucial difference.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on August 23, 2018, 07:00:44 AM
Any kind of infantry did not necessarily close up ranks to stop the horses. For this to work you need bodies not shields (besides the one shield in the front) and the bright idea of compacting body against body to create a stable mass the horse can't punch through. Again, there are plenty of examples of horses crashing through a line of shields, wicker and otherwise.
Yes, but men with shields are much more likely to compact than missile infantry, for whom close order is anathema.
To be clear, I see one of two things happening when a group of horses charge formed infantry.
A) The infantry lose their nerve in the moments before impact would occur. It starts at the rear, as men break away, or in the case of a single chariot, compress laterally into the files next to them as well to get out of the way. If all the men clear a path, then the horse charges right through. If most of the men clear enough to be a bit more opened than your intermediate order (I think 1m spacing may still be to close), then the horse collides with a moving crowd of men. At this density the horse slows and wades through the crowd of men. If enough men flee, then any not fast enough to get out of the way are run over.
B) The infantry does not lose its nerve and stays formed close. Now the horse balks. This can be a swerve if there is room, or a slowing down before contact, or a complete and abrupt (and comical) halt, like horses that balk in show jumping. This does not mean combat is over unless the cavalry break off and run away to regroup and try again. What it means is a fight. If you are Persian cavalry facing hoplites, you now have to fight a dude with a 9 foot spear with your second javelin. If you are Alexander, you are fighting a 9 foot spear with a longer spear. Persians lose, Macedonians have a chance. Of course it usually does not play out this way, because cavalry will not charge home in the first place if they do not see signs of waivering in the infantry.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 23, 2018, 08:19:23 AM
QuoteBut losing a horse at speed is a different matter to bumping into an enemy chariot team at speed: you get shear forces not present in a direct impact.
So, not only do the lines meet head on but the drivers ensure that they are perfectly aligned with each other so each horse meets head-to-head? Even if this were to happen, the two chariots would meet at about 30mph. And everyone dusts themselves off and walks away? Here's an experiment we could try. Have someone stand up in the back of a open topped car and drive into a wall at 30mph. Any speculation what happens to the passenger? Sorry, this is a really silly line of reasoning, Patrick.
The chariot runners are really there to act as stretcher bearers.
Rather than writing anything to this thread, I'll just link to what I wrote last time.
http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=2557.msg30371#msg30371
I don't think there's anything new this time around.
I find it interesting that when I asked the difference between horse archers combatting chariots and bow-armed light chariots doing so, I got two economic answers and one terrain-capability one. The only tactical answer was that horse archers would be more effective because they had greater formation density. I can see a logic to this in that skirmishing chariots would need more manoeuvre room than horses but do we have anything on the relative densities e.g. in manuals? And would this be critical?
The example provided by Patrick of Alexander v. Indians suggested that the horse archers pinned the chariots who were then charged in the flank by shock cavalry before their own cavalry supports could intervene, rather than the archery took out the chariots.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 23, 2018, 04:47:36 PM
I find it interesting that when I asked the difference between horse archers combatting chariots and bow-armed light chariots doing so, I got two economic answers and one terrain-capability one. The only tactical answer was that horse archers would be more effective because they had greater formation density. I can see a logic to this in that skirmishing chariots would need more manoeuvre room than horses but do we have anything on the relative densities e.g. in manuals? And would this be critical?
The example provided by Patrick of Alexander v. Indians suggested that the horse archers pinned the chariots who were then charged in the flank by shock cavalry before their own cavalry supports could intervene, rather than the archery took out the chariots.
Horse archers are superior, but they require an advanced set of skills and technology in order to be so. This is why we see horse archers as initially inferior, but ultimately more successful over time.
A successful horse archer requires:
1) A horse that can carry him by itself rather than in a team.
2) A short bow (at least the bottom half) that can be handled on horseback to fire from all angles and yet be powerful.
3) A level of riding skill that allows the archer to compensate for the motion of the horse and ride without using the hands to guide the horse. We usually think of advancements in technology as physical instruments, but riding styles play a big part in this. Of course physical technology helps here too. You will usually see stirrups mentioned in conjunction with shock cavalry, but one of the best things about them is that you can stand up off the horse and use your legs to compensate for its bouncing. It takes a lot of muscle to do this riding bareback and gripping with the thighs.
A man in a chariot is standing, using an infantry bow. The bouncing of a chariot is less than on a galloping horse. You don't need to spend time learning fancy riding skills- hell you are not even driving. This is a much more attractive option for the elites of an agricultural rather than pastural society.
Is it a rule that armies only ever have one type of chariot on the field, Patrick?
I have a few lists that beg to differ, so I wonder where you got that idea from.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 23, 2018, 08:19:23 AM
QuoteBut losing a horse at speed is a different matter to bumping into an enemy chariot team at speed: you get shear forces not present in a direct impact.
So, not only do the lines meet head on but the drivers ensure that they are perfectly aligned with each other so each horse meets head-to-head? Even if this were to happen, the two chariots would meet at about 30mph. And everyone dusts themselves off and walks away? Here's an experiment we could try. Have someone stand up in the back of a open topped car and drive into a wall at 30mph. Any speculation what happens to the passenger? Sorry, this is a really silly line of reasoning, Patrick.
Whoa there a moment! The fact that two chariots might meet at a combined speed of 30 mph does not mean that each crew is doing 30 mph. Each crew is still doing 15 mph. Only if they sail over the top and meet in the middle would they experience a mutual 30 mph impact.
In the absence of chariots, a better experiment would be to line up a row of horses and have them charge another row of quadrupeds at a combined closing speed of 30 mph or thereabouts. Adding carts, traps or gigs would be a bonus. I mention this because our old friend T E Lawrence took part in a camelry charge against Turkish cavalry in which several camels impacted against horses and bowled them over - with the horses and riders apparently emerging intact, at least until the Arabs got to them (TEL's participation was less than glorious, as he accidentally managed to shoot his own camel and was precipitated onto the ground at a fair speed, surviving intact bar a few bruises).
I do not maintain that chariot drivers deliberately sought to ram their opponents (Ramses II would never have got away from Kadesh if they did), but rather I am questioning the assumption that a chariot team-chariot team collision would result in a splattery mess of gore and matchwood.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 23, 2018, 08:37:27 AM
the cavalry, after their victorious charges, were now scattered in frantic terror; horses and men alike were overthrown in their blind flight. Even the standards of the legionaries were thrown into confusion, and many of the front rank men were crushed [obtriti = bruised, trampled, crushed, broken] by the weight of the horses and vehicles [impetu equorum ac vehiculorum] dashing [raptorum = tearing] through the lines.
I would be tempted to reconstruct this as the chariots break the cavalry and drive them back on the infantry. The infantry are disordered and because of that their lines are broken by the chariots. Disordered or unformed infantry are the natural prey of chariots and cavalry.
This requires the departing Roman cavalry to have done some formation-breaking against their own legionaries, which is unusual behaviour for routed troops with room to avoid friendly units (the cavalry were on the flank, not ahead of the legionaries). In any event, our source says the cavalry was 'scattered' by this point and it was the 'weight of the horses and vehicles', not the fleeing cavalry, which did the damage.
QuoteI see no sign here of the Gallic chariots launching a deliberate ramming attack on formed legionaries. Rather this is an exploitation or continuation from their earlier defeat of the cavalry.
Whatever their intent, the Gallic chariots ploughed into - or through - the leading lines of Roman infantry. They did not make any attempt to avoid them. The point of interest here is that they did not engage in skirmisher-like behaviour at any point in this particular battle, but did engage in 'assault behaviour', both against the Roman cavalry and the infantry. Granted the legionaries may have been unnerved at seeing their cavalry galloping hell-for-leather to the rear, but we do see the Gallic chariotry in a shock role, and that should give us pause about assigning them to an exclusive 'light/skirrmisher' bracket.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 23, 2018, 09:01:18 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 22, 2018, 08:07:36 PM
Livy X.28.5-10 ...
Ooooh, thanks for that reference, Patrick! Reminds me of Polybios' use of two words in the Telamon description, "hamaxas kai sunoridas" as discussed elsewhere (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=3328.msg41034#msg41034).
Whether this means two vehicle types, or literary "elegant variation", it's apparently not a one-off.
Yes, it seems to be interestingly consistent where Gallic chariot-using armies of the 3rd century BC are concerned.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 23, 2018, 04:47:36 PM
I find it interesting that when I asked the difference between horse archers combatting chariots and bow-armed light chariots doing so, I got two economic answers and one terrain-capability one. The only tactical answer was that horse archers would be more effective because they had greater formation density. I can see a logic to this in that skirmishing chariots would need more manoeuvre room than horses but do we have anything on the relative densities e.g. in manuals? And would this be critical?
Hard to tell. The Assyrians fielded both chariots and horse archers, so they would have been in a position to make comparisons.
QuoteThe example provided by Patrick of Alexander v. Indians suggested that the horse archers pinned the chariots who were then charged in the flank by shock cavalry before their own cavalry supports could intervene, rather than the archery took out the chariots.
In Porus' lineup, the Indian cavalry are stated to have been deployed
behind the chariots, so I think what happened was that while the horse archers made the chariots' lives miserable, Alexander's cavalry hit the Indian
cavalry in flank and drove it off, leaving the chariots vulnerable to having the crews picked off from the rear. Arrian (via Ptolemy's account) makes much of Alexander hitting the Indian cavalry before it could redeploy to face him and driving it off, but is silent about the exact details of how the chariots were eliminated, merely noting at the end of the battle that all the chariots had become casualties. Reading between the lines, it looks as if Alexander's initial success against the Indian cavalry left the chariots on that wing high, dry and vulnerable. Exactly how he dealt with the chariots from the other wing, assuming they transferred over with their cavalry, is anyone's guess.
Quote from: Mark G on August 23, 2018, 06:07:52 PM
Is it a rule that armies only ever have one type of chariot on the field, Patrick?
I do not know about it being a 'rule', but Egyptian and Assyrian reliefs show only one type of chariot in their army at any one time.* The point is that these and other major chariot-using Near Eastern nationalities did not field one type of chariot for skirmishing and another for shock (or two different types for skirmishing, for that matter).**
Gauls, at least in the 3rd century BC, seem to have been a consistent exception, but even so appear to have preferred using their dimorphic chariots in a shock role.
*Later Assyrian reliefs do show Elamite or Elamite-style vehicles along with the characteristic Assyrian heavy chariots; their exact role is the subject of conjecture but the Assyrians appear to have built only one type of chariot for themselves in any particular era.
**Someone is bound to ask: what about Ramses II's opponents at Kadesh, with their 2-man and 3-man chariots? These were in a confederation or coalition of several nationalities, so variant types should not be too surprising; we do however note that they were all the same basic pattern of two-horse vehicles.
Patrick, thanks for taking the time to respond to my points.
"If this were the case, one would expect armies to field two types of chariot as standard: one for skirmishing and one for the decisive blow."
Not sure about this. Army composition was surely the result of many factors, some of them not entirely logical (at least militarily) - perhaps to do with cultural influences, or how a particular army developed over time, or what allied or associated troops were available. I wouldn't necessarily 'expect' any 'standard' rule governing how an army was composed.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 23, 2018, 04:47:36 PM
I find it interesting that when I asked the difference between horse archers combatting chariots and bow-armed light chariots doing so, I got two economic answers and one terrain-capability one. The only tactical answer was that horse archers would be more effective because they had greater formation density. I can see a logic to this in that skirmishing chariots would need more manoeuvre room than horses but do we have anything on the relative densities e.g. in manuals? And would this be critical?
The Arthashastra passage previously mentioned has cavalry and chariots with respectively 3 and 4 samas spacing. I haven't found time yet to read the paper you mentioned as contradicting Duncan's assertion that a sama is about 14 inches, but the proportional difference should be unchanged.
(Now bear in mind that those are spacings, not frontages per file, so it wouldn't follow cavalry had a third more firepower per frontage, even if Indian cavalry of the time had been horse archers, which I don't believe they were. If they were, the difference in firepower would be greater as a horse with rider would take up less than 3/4 the frontage of a chariot.)
Quote from: Keith on August 23, 2018, 09:09:24 PM
Patrick, thanks for taking the time to respond to my points.
Thank you, Keith. :)
Quote"If this were the case, one would expect armies to field two types of chariot as standard: one for skirmishing and one for the decisive blow."
Not sure about this. Army composition was surely the result of many factors, some of them not entirely logical (at least militarily) - perhaps to do with cultural influences, or how a particular army developed over time, or what allied or associated troops were available. I wouldn't necessarily 'expect' any 'standard' rule governing how an army was composed.
Then again, if an army uses a particular tactic, one would expect it to make an effort to optimise its relevant troops for that tactic, so it should configure the 'hardware' (chariots) for their intended role. Hence, if there were two differing combat roles, one better fulfilled by a light, and one by a heavy, chariot, one would expect two types of chariot to appear in reliefs, each doing their own thing.
As far as I can tell there were no specific 'ordonnances' of the period governing army composition; it seemed to be more a matter of field what you have, but to give the officers and nobles (and workshops) a good idea of what you want. While we do not have the precise paperwork, we do have the royal reliefs, and at any given time these show one and only one type of chariot in use by Egypt or Assyria (reliefs from other nationalities are too few and far between, or too enigmatic, to draw clear conclusions from). So while I would agree that there was probably no standard rule, there was nevertheless probably just the one standardised, optimised design with the royal blessing current at any one time. Hence we find Assyrians starting out with two-horse chariots, moving to apparent complete replacement with three-horse chariots around the time of Ashurnasirpal II (883-859 BC) and then four-horse chariots replace them entirely in reliefs of Tiglath-pileser III (745-727 BC) and subsequent monarchs. (The chariot-to-other-arms ratio also drops, suggesting that provision and training of chariot horses and/or crews may have been limiting factors.)
Egyptian chariots are not depicted until about half-way through the 18th Dynasty (in reliefs on the body of Thutmose IV's chariot and then in tombs and on furniture), and are not depicted on wall reliefs until the later 19th Dynasty, with the 20th Dynasty also featuring them on wall reliefs. Apart from a change in the number of spokes in the wheel (from 8 to 6) during the 18th Dynasty, the Egyptian chariot seems to be pretty much the same vehicle throughout, and there is just the one type.
Of course we could be missing part of the 'fossil record', but what we have seems pretty clear: at any given time, there is one type of chariot in the national inventory.
This of course raises the question of how allies fit in. Egyptian practice seemed to be to use only their own chariots alongside allied (or subject) infantry in addition to their own, but when assembling a coalition of their subjects to oppose Assyria in 853 BC they accepted chariots from everyone, although one power (Israel) fielded most of them. Since we know of this battle only from Shalmaneser III, who gives the lineup of forces opposing him and tells us no more than that he (probably mendaciously) claims he won, we have no details about tactial use. It is left to the imagination whether the disparate contingents at Qarqar each had their own divergent tactical doctrines or followed the same general approach. From the standpoint of logic (and force controllability) I would argue for the latter.
Thanks again Patrick.
I've also just come across Richard Taylor's post above, and the linked post is very useful. I'm relieved to see it fits in with my assumptions!
On the subject of expecting skirmish and shock chariots to be fielded together, this paragraph from Armies of the Ancient Near East (WRG) illustrates what I was thinking:
"The large, four-horse Assyrian chariot was primarily used in a 'shock-charge' capacity. It was a development from the earlier, lighter vehicles which had to be multi-purpose reconnaissance, despatch and shock-charge vehicles. The first two roles had been increasingly taken over by the developing cavalry arm since the 10th century B.C., cavalry being both cheaper and more efficient in these roles. With these limitations on weight removed, the chariot could become far more specialised to meet the purpose for which it was best suited, to deliver an attack by heavily armed elite troops with speed and mobility. As cavalry began to become effective as mobile missile troops, and, to a limited extent, close combat troops, the number of the crew, the amount of protection and the size of the chariot were increased to the detriment of manoeuvrability, and limited further the terrain on which it could be used" (p.60).
So the work of the light chariots (recce, despatch, mobile missile troops) has been taken over by cavalry as the army developed.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 23, 2018, 07:37:28 PM
Whoa there a moment! The fact that two chariots might meet at a combined speed of 30 mph does not mean that each crew is doing 30 mph. Each crew is still doing 15 mph. Only if they sail over the top and meet in the middle would they experience a mutual 30 mph impact.
fair enough, I should have two cars travelling at 15mph colliding head on.
Quote
In the absence of chariots, a better experiment would be to line up a row of horses and have them charge another row of quadrupeds at a combined closing speed of 30 mph or thereabouts.
I don't think the RSPCA would approve
Quote
I do not maintain that chariot drivers deliberately sought to ram their opponents (Ramses II would never have got away from Kadesh if they did), but rather I am questioning the assumption that a chariot team-chariot team collision would result in a splattery mess of gore and matchwood.
Well that's a result. The key thing is that ramming tactics weren't the preferred model. Any accidentally collisions we can imagine in our own way.
Quote
In any event, our source says the cavalry was 'scattered' by this point and it was the 'weight of the horses and vehicles', not the fleeing cavalry, which did the damage.
I was rather thinking that the cavalry horses were included here, unless it specifically uses a word meaning chariot horse ?
Quote
Whatever their intent, the Gallic chariots ploughed into - or through - the leading lines of Roman infantry. They did not make any attempt to avoid them. The point of interest here is that they did not engage in skirmisher-like behaviour at any point in this particular battle, but did engage in 'assault behaviour', both against the Roman cavalry and the infantry. Granted the legionaries may have been unnerved at seeing their cavalry galloping hell-for-leather to the rear, but we do see the Gallic chariotry in a shock role, and that should give us pause about assigning them to an exclusive 'light/skirrmisher' bracket.
We see gallic chariots in shock mode against over-extended cavalry, which shouldn't surprise us. Was there a point in the action where skirmishing would be the obvious tactic? If we take the analogy several times stated with light cavalry, would they have skirmished or charged in a similar situation?
I still think that opportunistic exploitation against a confused or disordered infantry line, rather than a separate assault against formed troops, is a likelier explanation.
As a small point of fact 'weight of the horses and vehicles' is a poor translation; 'impetus' means 'attack'.
Latin: "turbata hinc etiam signa legionum multique impetu equorum ac vehiculorum raptorum per agmen obtriti antesignani;"
Spillan and Evans (1849): "Hence also the battalions of the legions were thrown into disorder: through the impetuosity of the horses, and of the carriages which they dragged through the ranks, many of the soldiers in the van were trodden or bruised to death"
Roberts (1912): "Even the standards of the legionaries were thrown into confusion, and many of the front rank men were crushed by the weight of the horses and vehicles dashing through the lines"
Foster (1926): "from them the disorder was communicated to the standards of the legions, and many of the first line were trodden underfoot, as horses and chariots swept through their ranks."
I don't have a more recent one to hand.
Me (2018): "Even the standards of the legion were disordered by this, and many antesignani were crushed/trampled/destroyed by the attack of the horses and the drawn vehicles through the line".
'Impetuosity', 'weight' and - what - 'sweeping'? - are various goes at 'impetus' but Koon's Infantry Combat in Livy's Battle Narratives shows it is a general word for 'attack' in Livy.
And in passing - Anthony is right, it's clear that the legion is disordered 'by this' ie the flight of the cavalry, so the chariots are attackng a disordered line - as we'd expect. Also presumably from the flank.
QuoteSo the work of the light chariots (recce, despatch, mobile missile troops) has been taken over by cavalry as the army developed.
If patrick is right and heavy and light chariots don't co-exist in armies, there could be something to this. I recall a theory of mounted warfare evolution that cavalry were initially supplementary to chariotry with limited capabilities. Gradually, cavalry became more effective and could handle some of the mobile warfare roles as well, and cheaper, than light chariotry. Scout, patrol, driving off annoying skirmishers. This left chariotry to carry out the attack mission and they specialised by becoming heavier. Cavalry could protect them as they positioned and waited for the enemy to be weakened or disorganised by other arms, then delivered the coup-de-grace. Eventually cavalry became sufficiently developed to replace them in even this role, leaving them to hang on only as disruptive sacrificial weapon. It's an idea but as we have discovered there is little solid evidence available to say yay or nay to it. Certainly, it only goes part way to explaining Celtic chariotry tactics, in which cavalry do seem to have taken on many of the mobile warfare roles but chariots remained lighter and more mobile (I am not yet convinced of patrick's theory of light and heavy Celtic chariots).
In summarising where we are so far, I think we have demonstrated that chariots and chariot tactics were much more sophisticated than "equid battering rams" and have confirmed that, like WWII tanks, there were different types with different roles.
What we haven't fully laid out, I think, is how the various elements of a chariot army combined as a fighting force.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 24, 2018, 01:16:29 PM
In summarising where we are so far, I think we have demonstrated that chariots and chariot tactics were much more sophisticated than "equid battering rams" and have confirmed that, like WWII tanks, there were different types with different roles.
I remain unconvinced by the latter. Near as I can tell, Patrick is basically right that different sorts of chariots were not fielded alongside one another by the same army, so while I do believe different types of chariots were used in different ways, I don't believe the situation is analoguous to the WWII one where different types were fielded alongside one another for different missions.
Apparent exceptions to the one-type-per-army rule:
Sumarian battle-carts and straddle cars: we don't even know if the latter had a military role at all, so can't say if they were tactically differentiated from the former.
Hittites with 2-man and 3-man vehicles: It's disputed whether the latter are a "thing" or just infantry catching a ride, but in any case they appear in different national contingents. I rather doubt the Hittite kings made particular vassal rulers specialize in particular tactical roles: more likely the difference simply reflects different national habits.
Galatians with scythed and normal vehicles at the Elephant Victory. Hard to say much about, but Lucian doesn't seem to have perceived a tactical difference.
Other Celts with allegedly scythed chariots: no writer yet cited says they had a different tactical role from the regular version: they seem to be assuming all Celtic chariots were scythed.
Gauls with two kinds of vehicles: Haven't really gotten around to forming an opinion on this yet.
Late Achaemenids with scythed chariots and a regular one for the king: the latter is not properly tactical.
Indian bullock-carts: If this was ever used, it was a desperate attempt to make up for a shortage of proper chariots, not deliberately employed means to achieve a different tactical objective.
Any I'm missing?
QuoteI don't believe the situation is analoguous to the WWII one where different types were fielded alongside one another for different missions.
I was contrasting with Justin's view that all tanks essentially had the same role in WWII. Even if they never inhabited the same battlefield, doctrine defining roles would have led to design decisions that created different vehicles. I simply think that there were different chariots for different roles. I'm happy for others to present evidence about whether, across the wide ranging history of the chariot, no power except possibly the Gauls and Galatians, fielded two types at once.
Quote from: Keith on August 24, 2018, 08:40:00 AM
On the subject of expecting skirmish and shock chariots to be fielded together, this paragraph from Armies of the Ancient Near East (WRG) illustrates what I was thinking:
"The large, four-horse Assyrian chariot was primarily used in a 'shock-charge' capacity. It was a development from the earlier, lighter vehicles which had to be multi-purpose reconnaissance, despatch and shock-charge vehicles. The first two roles had been increasingly taken over by the developing cavalry arm since the 10th century B.C., cavalry being both cheaper and more efficient in these roles. With these limitations on weight removed, the chariot could become far more specialised to meet the purpose for which it was best suited, to deliver an attack by heavily armed elite troops with speed and mobility. As cavalry began to become effective as mobile missile troops, and, to a limited extent, close combat troops, the number of the crew, the amount of protection and the size of the chariot were increased to the detriment of manoeuvrability, and limited further the terrain on which it could be used" (p.60).
So the work of the light chariots (recce, despatch, mobile missile troops) has been taken over by cavalry as the army developed.
Looks good on the whole, assuming the Assyrians thought the same way as we do and relied upon light chariots (and subsequently cavalry) for reconnaisance rather than guides and spies as Ramses II was doing at Kadesh (with 1,200 light chariots to hand he had not one of them out on reconnaissance).
The reservation I would have is that we do not seem to have a single reference anywhere to light chariots acting as scouts, anywhere, ever, in the records of Egypt and Assyria (not sure about anyone else, either). From the occasions when Egyptian armies walked flat-footed into an ambush it is evident that they did not use their 'light' chariots as scouts, and Sargon II, complete with theoretically scouting-capable cavalry in addition to his specialised heavy chariots, entered in blissful ignorance into his surprise encounter with the Urartian army in his eighth campaign (this kind of approach is probably what got him killed by the Cimmerians in 705 BC). So while the theory sounds good and logical, it does not seem to accord with the practice. And that is why I am being fussy about what might otherwise seem to be a cut-and-dried topic. :)
Quote from: Erpingham on August 24, 2018, 10:06:42 AM
We see gallic chariots in shock mode against over-extended cavalry, which shouldn't surprise us. Was there a point in the action where skirmishing would be the obvious tactic? If we take the analogy several times stated with light cavalry, would they have skirmished or charged in a similar situation?
Hard to tell if there was such an occasion, but in this case the chariots appear to have charged successful albeit probably unformed attackers as opposed to 'over-extended cavalry', and light skirmishing cavalry would probably have either evaded or been caught up in the general Gallic cavalry reverse.
QuoteI still think that opportunistic exploitation against a confused or disordered infantry line, rather than a separate assault against formed troops, is a likelier explanation.
This I think is half correct: it was what some wargame rules would call a 'converted charge', in that the flight of the original target (the Roman cavalry) brought the chariots to within striking distance (charge reach) of the legions, and the 'impetuous' chariots went straight into the new target. I am a bit sceptical about the Roman cavalry having caused any physical disruption to the legions; morale disruption, yes, but the 'horses and chariots' ripping through the Roman infantry lines are not 'cavalry and chariots' but specifically animals with vehicles.
The fact that the chariots were held back from the cavalry action, not once but twice, suggests they may have been intended to swoop on the flank and/or wing of the Roman infantry once the Gallic cavalry had defeated their Roman counterparts. However the Gallic cavalry did
not defeat their Roman counterparts, and hence the chariots were committed to the cavalry fight; I am inclined to think Richard may be right about them hitting the Roman infantry line in flank, at least partly, especially if this was their original intention.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 24, 2018, 01:16:29 PM
What we haven't fully laid out, I think, is how the various elements of a chariot army combined as a fighting force.
This might merit a separate thread. I for one have some ideas about this, albeit largely conjecturally erected on a small amount of actual information.
Leaving aside chariot runners for a moment, because their role is unclear, the line-breaking chariot begs the question of what was supposed to happen once they did break the line. I am unaware of a battle description that suggest a force of infantry or cavalry that were deployed to specifically follow a scythed chariot through the line and exploit such a breach. I have a few answers to my own questions, but I wondered if this troubles anyone else.
I think the short answer is that the enemy were supposed to run, and the chariots, plus any accompanying troops, could then indulge in a glorious pursuit and slaughter.
QuoteThis I think is half correct: it was what some wargame rules would call a 'converted charge', in that the flight of the original target (the Roman cavalry) brought the chariots to within striking distance (charge reach) of the legions, and the 'impetuous' chariots went straight into the new target. I am a bit sceptical about the Roman cavalry having caused any physical disruption to the legions; morale disruption, yes, but the 'horses and chariots' ripping through the Roman infantry lines are not 'cavalry and chariots' but specifically animals with vehicles.
Oddly enough, the follow-on charge is exactly what I had in mind. Contact with routing friends has caused a "stand disordered" result on the legionaries' reaction test :)
Seriously, I think we do have a similar view of what is being described, we are just filling in the blanks differently based on our different understandings of chariot warfare.
Quote from: PMBardunias on August 24, 2018, 08:57:01 PM
Leaving aside chariot runners for a moment, because their role is unclear, the line-breaking chariot begs the question of what was supposed to happen once they did break the line. I am unaware of a battle description that suggest a force of infantry or cavalry that were deployed to specifically follow a scythed chariot through the line and exploit such a breach. I have a few answers to my own questions, but I wondered if this troubles anyone else.
On a line-breaking chariot attack, I think Patrick is probably correct when it comes to the original conception of line-breaking poor quality or disordered foot. Images of Pharaoh riding through piles of enemy shooting them in the back is doubtless symbolic but also aspirational for the chariot corps. A bit like 19th and early 20th century cavalry holding the successful charge as the pinnacle of military achievement, even if what they mostly did was more ordinary.
When it comes to scythed chariots, I'm unsure. The Xenophon quote we looked at many posts back suggests in origin the scythed chariot corp s was not seen as a suicide weapon but capable of fighting its way through. Perhaps a stripped back version of heavy chariot tactics? If so, it doesn't work like that and the familiar "disposable" chariot appears. Were later chariots just weapons of disruption? If so, as Paul has said, it would only make sense if their was a follow-up force to exploit the situation. Have we records of that? I recall Xenophon has a story of Spartans v. scythed chariots, where the persians supported their chariots with cavalry.
Don't forget the cock up at magnesia, where it seems clear that the scythes were supposed to break up the Roman cavalry, and the macedonian cavalry then exploit the disorder.
Kind if worked in reverse, but still.
One could postulate a similar intention behind the Indian deployments, but I think that is a stretch for a battle that makes more sense as a hasty Indian redeployment, than a coherent plan, to me
But if so, it would build to a theory that chariots frighten horses, and can therefore gain an advantage frontally against formed cavalry, which they lose once their flanks become exposed.
Scythed chariots were indeed formation breakers; to paraphrase Anthony, 'weapons of mass disruption'. :) In their debut at Thymbra, they act uncannily like the Gallic chariots at Sentinum.
"
As soon as Artagerses saw Cyrus in action, he delivered his attack on the enemy's left, putting forward the camels, as Cyrus had directed. But while the camels were still a great way off, the horses gave way before them; some took fright and ran away, others began to rear, while others plunged into one another; for such is the usual effect that camels produce upon horses. And Artagerses, with his men in order, fell upon them in their confusion; and at the same moment the chariots also charged on both the right and the left. And many in their flight from the chariots were slain by the cavalry following up their attack upon the flank, and many also trying to escape from the cavalry were caught by the chariots.
And Abradatas also lost no more time, but shouting, "Now, friends, follow me," he swept forward, showing no mercy to his horses but drawing blood from them in streams with every stroke of the lash. And the rest of the chariot-drivers also rushed forward with him. And the opposing chariots at once broke into flight before them; some, as they fled, took up their dismounted fighting men, others left theirs behind.
But Abradatas plunged directly through them and hurled himself upon the Egyptian phalanx; and the nearest of those who were arrayed with him also joined in the charge." - Xenophon,
Cyropaedia VII.1.27-30
[A quick Who's Who: Abradatas is in charge of Cyrus' scythed chariots. Cyrus commands one wing of 'ambushers'; Artagerses the other. Each 'ambush' wing has taken in flank one of the Lydian wings, Croesus having just tried to 'wrap around' the Medo-Persian army.]
The role of the chariots at Thymbra is remarkably similar to the actual, whether or not the intended, role of the chariots at Sentinum. They begin by charging the enemy's cavalry (and, at Thymbra, also his chariotry) and putting it to rout. Then they move straight into an attack on the enemy's infantry (at Thymbra, that part which is still standing). Cyrus' scythed and decidedly 'heavy' chariots at Thymbra are thus acting in a very similar way to the presumably unscythed and allegedly 'light' Gallic chariots at Sentinum. It is activity patterns like this which induce me to conclude that every chariot, no matter how small or humble, is at heart a formation-breaker.
Quote from: Mark G on August 25, 2018, 12:18:22 PM
But if so, it would build to a theory that chariots frighten horses, and can therefore gain an advantage frontally against formed cavalry, which they lose once their flanks become exposed.
Could be a very good observation, and it is more or less supported by the actions of chariots at Thymbra and Sentinum, not to mention Mithridates' success against the Bithynians in 89 BC (if interested, see here (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0230%3Atext%3DMith.%3Achapter%3D3) for details, especially section 18, where the scythed chariots see action against the Bithynian cavalry).
I will be guided by the classicists here but should we be putting so much weight on Xenophon's Thymbra description? It is taken from a fantasy work, not a historical one. I accept that fictionalised accounts can contain useful references to practices in the author's time, especially if that author is an experienced soldier, but surely we must be cautious in the weight we apply?
This article (https://www.academia.edu/28154364/On_the_Origin_of_the_Scythed_Chariots) by Alexander Nefedkin (or Nefiodkin - he seems to spell his latinised name both ways) may be of interest for the sources he assembles, though I don't know if his views have been challenged by others.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 26, 2018, 08:06:40 AM
I will be guided by the classicists here but should we be putting so much weight on Xenophon's Thymbra description? It is taken from a fantasy work, not a historical one.
The label 'fantasy' seems a little excessive: Xenophon appears to be regurgitating a (possibly idealised and conceivably simplified) version of tales he would have picked up as a member of Cyrus' entourage. He is not making it up out of whole cloth (the allies of Croesus are, for example, confirmed by Herodotus, as is the use of camelry to disrupt Lydian cavalry).
QuoteI accept that fictionalised accounts can contain useful references to practices in the author's time, especially if that author is an experienced soldier, but surely we must be cautious in the weight we apply?
Again, Xenophon's account is probably sieved and filtered through a peripherally acquainted Greek mind as opposed to being 'fictionalised'. If he is by any chance imagining and/or fictionalising anything, then his account of the use and behaviour of Median scythed chariots (the elder Cyrus was technically a Median monarch) accords surprisingly well with the behaviour and use of the Gallic chariots at Sentinum a century later; all the more amazing if Xenophon was hypothetically the world's first fantasy author. (The chance of the Gauls basing their essentially successful chariot tactics on Xenophon's
Cyropaedia seems impossibly remote.)
So whatever the provenance of Xenophon's information, what he describes accords with the actions of chariotry in a solid historical example from a later period, i.e. one he could not crib from. This makes him either remarkably prescient or properly informed. Given the presence and operation of scythed chariots in his own time, and his acquaintance with Cyrus the Younger, I would incline to the latter.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 26, 2018, 07:20:25 PM
The label 'fantasy' seems a little excessive: Xenophon appears to be regurgitating a (possibly idealised and conceivably simplified) version of tales he would have picked up as a member of Cyrus' entourage. He is not making it up out of whole cloth (the allies of Croesus are, for example, confirmed by Herodotus, as is the use of camelry to disrupt Lydian cavalry).
This is less reassuring than it could've been, as Xenophon might simply have lifted those details from Herodotus.
But I can agree that "fantasy" is excessive: in modern generic terms, "historical novel" is probably closer to the mark.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 26, 2018, 07:20:25 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 26, 2018, 08:06:40 AM
I will be guided by the classicists here but should we be putting so much weight on Xenophon's Thymbra description? It is taken from a fantasy work, not a historical one.
The label 'fantasy' seems a little excessive: Xenophon appears to be regurgitating a (possibly idealised and conceivably simplified) version of tales he would have picked up as a member of Cyrus' entourage. He is not making it up out of whole cloth (the allies of Croesus are, for example, confirmed by Herodotus, as is the use of camelry to disrupt Lydian cavalry).
QuoteI accept that fictionalised accounts can contain useful references to practices in the author's time, especially if that author is an experienced soldier, but surely we must be cautious in the weight we apply?
Again, Xenophon's account is probably sieved and filtered through a peripherally acquainted Greek mind as opposed to being 'fictionalised'. If he is by any chance imagining and/or fictionalising anything, then his account of the use and behaviour of Median scythed chariots (the elder Cyrus was technically a Median monarch) accords surprisingly well with the behaviour and use of the Gallic chariots at Sentinum a century later; all the more amazing if Xenophon was hypothetically the world's first fantasy author. (The chance of the Gauls basing their essentially successful chariot tactics on Xenophon's Cyropaedia seems impossibly remote.)
So whatever the provenance of Xenophon's information, what he describes accords with the actions of chariotry in a solid historical example from a later period, i.e. one he could not crib from. This makes him either remarkably prescient or properly informed. Given the presence and operation of scythed chariots in his own time, and his acquaintance with Cyrus the Younger, I would incline to the latter.
Remember Cyrus the Great died about 530BC, about 130 years before Xenophon was mingling too much with Persians.
However he may have seen them in action against Spartan forces in Asia minor later. It's more likely he'll be extrapolating from that than from earlier evidence.
With the rest of the Persian army in the Cyropedia he basically has Cyrus create a hoplite force, not Sparabara. So his knowledge of Persian infantry might be more relevant to what we think of as Takabara. The question has to be asked, if he was so well informed about the Persian army of the 560's BC, why did he get the infantry wrong? And if he got the infantry wrong, why should his chariots be any better?
Remember that Cyrus the Younger's army had some chariots too. So X could see them from both sides.
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 26, 2018, 08:10:20 PM
Remember Cyrus the Great died about 530BC, about 130 years before Xenophon was mingling too much with Persians.
Xenophon could be wrong about Cyrus's Persians, but is so, the error is in projecting backward the scythed, shock-chariots that were a real thing in his own day. Higher in the thread I posted the quote from Cunaxa where chariots he would have seen, rode directly at the front ranks and into gaps created by the hoplites. At Thymbara he describes the same thing, only this time the "hoplites" can't get out of the way:
Xen. Cyrop. 7.30 "For it was only the personal friends and mess-mates of Abradatas who pressed home the charge with him, while the rest of the charioteers, when they saw that the Egyptians with their dense throng withstood them, turned aside after the fleeing chariots and pursued them. [31] But in the place where Abradatas and his companions charged, the Egyptians could not make an opening for them because the men on either side of them stood firm; consequently, those of the enemy who stood upright were struck in the furious charge of the horses and overthrown, and those who fell were crushed to pieces by the horses and the wheels, they and their arms; and whatever was caught in the scythes—everything, arms and men, was horribly mangled. [32]"
and
"The scythe-bearing chariots also won extraordinary distinction, so that this military device also has been retained even to our day by each successive king. [48]""
It could well be something along the lines of "I don't know what Cyrus did with his chariots, but what would have happened to us is we did not get out of the way?" Xenophon's whole goal in the description is to show why the Theban ultra-deep column tactics were a one trick pony- as they turned out to be. He hits that poor formation with everything in the books- thin ranks in front to just delay them long enough for the cavalry envelopment, Missile towers showering down, and scythed chariots cutting it up.
QuoteSo whatever the provenance of Xenophon's information, what he describes accords with the actions of chariotry in a solid historical example from a later period, i.e. one he could not crib from. This makes him either remarkably prescient or properly informed. Given the presence and operation of scythed chariots in his own time, and his acquaintance with Cyrus the Younger, I would incline to the latter.
Just to be clear, I don't have an argument with the idea that Xenophon is basing his description on how scythed chariots were supposed to work. Even then I don't know if he ever saw a successful charge against hoplites. My issue is whether we can treat his account of Thymbra as factual and draw conclusions from it.
I have read of it being a "historical novel" and also a work of fiction numerous times. I am not aware of serious scholarship treating it as detailed history. I apologise if the word "fantasy" upset people - I was thinking of it in terms of what the OED defines as "a product of imagination, fiction, figment" not in the modern genre sense.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 26, 2018, 07:38:32 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 26, 2018, 07:20:25 PM
The label 'fantasy' seems a little excessive: Xenophon appears to be regurgitating a (possibly idealised and conceivably simplified) version of tales he would have picked up as a member of Cyrus' entourage. He is not making it up out of whole cloth (the allies of Croesus are, for example, confirmed by Herodotus, as is the use of camelry to disrupt Lydian cavalry).
This is less reassuring than it could've been, as Xenophon might simply have lifted those details from Herodotus.
And were they identically expressed, I would suspect him of doing so. But they are coincident threads in a larger tapestry, which either exonerates him or identifies him as a very deft weaver.
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 26, 2018, 08:10:20 PM
Remember Cyrus the Great died about 530BC, about 130 years before Xenophon was mingling too much with Persians.
However he may have seen them in action against Spartan forces in Asia minor later. It's more likely he'll be extrapolating from that than from earlier evidence.
With the rest of the Persian army in the Cyropedia he basically has Cyrus create a hoplite force, not Sparabara.
In Cyropaedia II.1.16 Cyrus describes this force as follows:
"Now, up to this time you have been bowmen [toxotai] and lancers [akontistai = javelinmen], and so have we; and if you were not quite our equals in the use of these arms, there is nothing surprising about that; for you had not the leisure to practise with them that we had. But with this equipment we shall have no advantage over you. In any case, every man will have a corselet [thorax] fitted to his breast, upon his left arm a shield [gerrhon], such as we have all been accustomed to carry, and in his right hand a sabre [makhaira] or scimitar [sagaris] with which, you see, we must strike those opposed to us at such close range that we need not fear to miss our aim when we strike. [17] In this armour, then, how could any one of us have the advantage over another except in courage?
These troops are closer to Roman legionaries than they are to hoplites and are reminiscent of Assyrian
quradu sans spears; dedicated close fighters. They are also, weaponry apart, very close to Heorodotus'
sparabara.
Herodotus (VII.61.1) describes the Persians in the army of Xerxes thus:
... the Persians were equipped in this way: they wore on their heads loose caps called tiaras, and on their bodies embroidered sleeved tunics, with scales of iron like the scales of fish in appearance, and trousers on their legs; for shields they had wicker bucklers [gerra], with quivers hanging beneath them; they carried short spears, long bows, and reed arrows, and daggers [egkheiridia] that hung from the girdle by the right thigh.
The essential changes are the addition of missile weapons and the downgrading of the
makhaira to an
egkheiridia now that the spear has come back into fashion. The changes are easy to understand in the context of a people which has now come into possession of the world's greatest empire and no longer needs to be deprived of missile weapons in order to be able to overcome opponents in close combat.
QuoteSo his knowledge of Persian infantry might be more relevant to what we think of as Takabara.
Xenophon's Persians, with their
gerrha, do not resemble takabara. The only point of similarity is the ocasional sagaris, and that is not really enough to put them near the takabara bracket, at least to my thinking.
QuoteThe question has to be asked, if he was so well informed about the Persian army of the 560's BC, why did he get the infantry wrong? And if he got the infantry wrong, why should his chariots be any better?
If we think he got the infantry wrong, it could easily reflect changes in the infantry between the times of the elder and younger Cyrus. It also incidentally means he did not lift the details from Herodotus, but was sufficiently confident of his own source.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 27, 2018, 08:07:14 AM
Just to be clear, I don't have an argument with the idea that Xenophon is basing his description on how scythed chariots were supposed to work. Even then I don't know if he ever saw a successful charge against hoplites. My issue is whether we can treat his account of Thymbra as factual and draw conclusions from it.
I think we can, or at least sufficiently factual to draw conclusions from. The fact this his chariots, fictional or otherwise, behave just like factual chariots at Sentinum indicates that even if he was spaced out on magic mushrooms at the time of writing, his output actually works in the same way as real chariotry in real history and hence can be considered reliable.
QuoteI have read of it being a "historical novel" and also a work of fiction numerous times. I am not aware of serious scholarship treating it as detailed history. I apologise if the word "fantasy" upset people - I was thinking of it in terms of what the OED defines as "a product of imagination, fiction, figment" not in the modern genre sense.
Nice of you. :) I get the sense that a number of details in the
Cyropaedia are Grecised (e.g. making libations to the gods at the end of a meal) and I am not sure how far we can trust things like the small unit organisation Xenophon has for Cyrus the Elder's Persians (he has Spartanesque files of twelve whereas the Persians used a decimal system), but on the whole I would see the Cyropaedia as 'flavoured' rather than 'fictionalised'. People who dislike large armies and imaginative gadgets in this particular period have a vested interest in undermining Xenophon; I prefer to make up my own mind.
There is of course the possibility others have alluded to, namely that Xenophon is sending disguised mesages to his Greek audience (Paul in particular mentions the highlighting of the deficiencies of the Theban 50-deep formation), and he may well be doing this. I do not think this need detract from the essential validity of his account, as to point a moral or adorn a tale, especially to a Greek, you do really need a valid pointer and a valid pointee.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 27, 2018, 08:54:47 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 27, 2018, 08:07:14 AM
Just to be clear, I don't have an argument with the idea that Xenophon is basing his description on how scythed chariots were supposed to work. Even then I don't know if he ever saw a successful charge against hoplites. My issue is whether we can treat his account of Thymbra as factual and draw conclusions from it.
I think we can, or at least sufficiently factual to draw conclusions from. The fact this his chariots, fictional or otherwise, behave just like factual chariots at Sentinum indicates that even if he was spaced out on magic mushrooms at the time of writing, his output actually works in the same way as real chariotry in real history and hence can be considered reliable.
We continue to talk at cross purposes but I don't think anything will be gained by repetition.
The bigger issue is whether the Cyropaedia is a reliable historical work, based on lost sources, or a work of fiction on a historical framework . Perhaps a separate thread could consider that, as we've already drifted into discussions of Persian infantry, a long way from our actual theme of chariot tactics.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 27, 2018, 09:05:15 AM
We continue to talk at cross purposes ...
Oh dear. What purposes are we crossing here?
QuoteThe bigger issue is whether the Cyropaedia is a reliable historical work, based on lost sources, or a work of fiction on a historical framework . Perhaps a separate thread could consider that, as we've already drifted into discussions of Persian infantry, a long way from our actual theme of chariot tactics.
Maybe so. The essential question will of course be: by what criteria do we judge?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 27, 2018, 06:46:15 PM
Maybe so. The essential question will of course be: by what criteria do we judge?
Is this a trick question? We examine the evidence presented for the two conclusions and assess it to our satisfaction. This is way beyond my knowledge of ancient literature, so it would be up to others to do that if they so wished. I suspect most will accept the general consensus on the matter in the meantime.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 27, 2018, 08:54:47 AM
I think we can, or at least sufficiently factual to draw conclusions from. The fact this his chariots, fictional or otherwise, behave just like factual chariots at Sentinum indicates that even if he was spaced out on magic mushrooms at the time of writing, his output actually works in the same way as real chariotry in real history and hence can be considered reliable.
I have read this paragraph 4 times now.
It seems to boil down to, "because the fiction is realistic, we can consider his fiction to be reliable (history)."
Do you really mean that?
Quote from: Dangun on August 28, 2018, 11:55:25 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 27, 2018, 08:54:47 AM
I think we can, or at least sufficiently factual to draw conclusions from. The fact this his chariots, fictional or otherwise, behave just like factual chariots at Sentinum indicates that even if he was spaced out on magic mushrooms at the time of writing, his output actually works in the same way as real chariotry in real history and hence can be considered reliable.
I have read this paragraph 4 times now.
It seems to boil down to, "because the fiction is realistic, we can consider his fiction to be reliable (history)."
Do you really mean that??
As somebody who has what, in a less cruel world, would be a professional interest in fiction I'd like to chip in on this.
It is my experience that when discussing 'realistic' what we're really saying is 'plays to our preconceptions' :-[
By this I'm not taking a swing at any individual, it's just a general phenomenon.
"did you really mean that"
He almost certainly did.
There are a couple of folk who view Ancient sources as always 100% accurate unless directly contradicted by another ancient source.
You will pick up which pretty quickly once you look for it.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 27, 2018, 08:54:47 AMPeople who dislike large armies and imaginative gadgets in this particular period have a vested interest in undermining Xenophon; I prefer to make up my own mind.
The self-delusion made manifest.
"People who like large armies and imaginative gadgets have a vested interest in believing Xenophon; I prefer to make up my own mind."
I was hunting around for something about the historicity of the Cyropaedia and ran across this.
Just thought I'd flag it in case anyone is interested.
Can't vouch for it, haven't read it...
RECONSIDERING THE ORIGIN OF THE SCYTHED CHARIOT (ROP. J., 2013)
Abstract: This article challenges the current scholarly consensus that the scythed c veloped by the Persiansfor use against Greek hoplites. Closer examination ofthe his reveals that the scythed chariot was a specialized device deployed only under spéci conditions and used against ali types ofinfantry and cavalry. Reviewing the informatio Xenophon 's Cyropaedia and Ctesias ' Persica in the context ofthe évolution ofehariotry i Near East, I argue that the most plausible origin for the scythed chariot is in the Neo Assyrian period.
QuoteAs somebody who has what, in a less cruel world, would be a professional interest in fiction I'd like to chip in on this.
It is my experience that when discussing 'realistic' what we're really saying is 'plays to our preconceptions' :-[
The issue actually goes back a stage - what shapes our preconceptions? Surely, it relates to our accumulated knowledge about the subject or context? The risk is that lack of a reflective approach to our preconceptions leads to an abandonment of evidence-based analysis in favour of a dogmatic approach.
To go back to the case in question, as Xenophon had seen scythed chariots up close in his own army and fought against them, his description of their operation is probably "realistic", if not absolutely accurate, even if the context is made up.
QuoteI was hunting around for something about the historicity of the Cyropaedia
For those who haven't already read it, this article (http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cyropaedia-gr) in Encyclopaedia Iranica is a good place to start.
Quote from: Dangun on August 28, 2018, 11:55:25 AM
I have read this paragraph 4 times now.
It seems to boil down to, "because the fiction is realistic, we can consider his fiction to be reliable (history)."
Do you really mean that?
Um ... not quite. I mean that the passage about chariotry at Thymbra is not 'fiction' but an accurate portrayal of chariot warfare. Whatever his inspiration when he wrote, he achieved accuracy, and that is what essentially concerns (or should concern) us. I am not bothered about the rest of the work; it is this particular bit which is relevant for chariotry, and it is validated courtesy of the Senones at Sentinum.
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 28, 2018, 01:02:19 PM
As somebody who has what, in a less cruel world, would be a professional interest in fiction I'd like to chip in on this.
It is my experience that when discussing 'realistic' what we're really saying is 'plays to our preconceptions' :-[
Astute observation, Jim. However in this case (Xenophon's description of chariot activities at Thymbra) we have a different criterion, namely that it essentially matches the attested behaviour of Gallic chariots at Sentinum.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 28, 2018, 01:35:51 PM
To go back to the case in question, as Xenophon had seen scythed chariots up close in his own army and fought against them, his description of their operation is probably "realistic", if not absolutely accurate, even if the context is made up.
Indeed, although he does not seem to draw from experience with regard to this passage. It is noteworthy that some of the scythed chariot drivers at Thymbra did not fancy their chances and so flinched away from impact - this detail alone is an indication that Xenophon did not extrapolate from his own time; his
Anabasis and
Hellenica have no references to scythed chariots chickening out of a charge against infantry, or at least none that I have been able to find.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 28, 2018, 01:43:53 PM
QuoteI was hunting around for something about the historicity of the Cyropaedia
For those who haven't already read it, this article (http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cyropaedia-gr) in Encyclopaedia Iranica is a good place to start.
It is worth noting the point made there about Xenophon showing his Persian tradition roots. Everything about the Cyropaedia points to his having acquired his information from Cyrus and his table companions, notably from the Šāh-nāma traditions, with possible supplemental details from Antisthenes.
However the fictionality or otherwise of the Cyropaedia is something of a red herring. What is noteworthy is how the use of chariots by Cyrus at Thymbra effectively matches the use of chariotry by the Gauls at Sentinum. This, as Mark pointed out, suggests a role for chariots as an anti-cavalry force, subsequently operating against enemy infantry once the enemy cavalry is out of the way.
We can probably backtrack from this to the days when chariotry's first task was to defeat opposing chariotry and then deal with, or help to deal with, enemy infantry. Noteworthy is the manner in which this was done: by shock, or by the imminent threat of shock collapsing the opponent's morale.
[
Edit: corrected spelling of 'sugests' to 'suggests']
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 28, 2018, 07:28:37 PM
... his Anabasis and Hellenica have no references to scythed chariots chickening out of a charge against infantry, or at least none that I have been able to find.
Apart, of course, from the big one at Cunaxa:
"As for the enemy's chariots, some of them plunged through the lines of their own troops, others, however, through the Greek lines, but without charioteers. And whenever the Greeks saw them coming, they would open a gap for their passage; one fellow, to be sure, was caught, like a befuddled man on a race-course, yet it was said that even he was not hurt in the least, nor, for that matter, did any other single man among the Greeks get any hurt whatever in this battle, save that some one on the left wing was reported to have been hit by an arrow." - Xenophon
Anabasis I.8.20
This, interestingly, differs from the charge at Thymbra in some important respects, indicating that Xenophon was using a source other than his Cunaxa experience. The Greeks, instead of standing in deep formation, are advancing in shallow formation and furthermore making noise to scare the horses (Diodorus has Alexander's infantry do this at Gaugamela; whether it actually worked is anybody's guess; Tissaphernes' cavalry were apparently not bothered at Cunaxa). The scythed chariots which penetrate the Greek line at Cunaxa are those from which the crews have already departed, whereas at Thymbra they are those whose crews are best motivated.
The essential point that Xenophon is using a source for Thymbra other than his own experience remains; Cunaxa does however give us an instance of Persian scythed chariots declining combat with opposing infantry, the opposing infantry being Greeks they were encountering for the first time. 'Greek fright' was a major consideration at Cunaxa, and subsequent Achaemenid monarchs began using Greeks as the cutting edge of their armies.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 28, 2018, 07:28:37 PM
Astute observation, Jim. However in this case (Xenophon's description of chariot activities at Thymbra) we have a different criterion, namely that it essentially matches the attested behaviour of Gallic chariots at Sentinum.
But is it anything like Sentinum?
"Making a third charge, they were carried too far, and whilst they were now fighting desperately in the midst of the enemy's cavalry they were thrown into consternation by a new style of warfare. Armed men mounted on chariots and baggage wagons came on with a thunderous noise of horses and wheels, and the horses of the Roman cavalry, unaccustomed to that kind of uproar, became uncontrollable through fright; the cavalry after their victorious charges, were now scattered in frantic terror; horses and men alike were overthrown in their blind flight. Even the standards of the legionaries were thrown into confusion, and many of the front rank men were crushed by the weight of the horses and vehicles dashing through the lines. "
https://archive.org/stream/remainsofoldlati02warmuoft#page/552/mode/2up doesn't mention the infantry confusion
we do get hints of a very different battle http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Florus/Epitome/1C*.html#XII
It's perfectly possible reading Livy that the Romans were disorganised by their own routing cavalry.
Also if vehicles are 'dashing through the lines' but only crush front rank men, then they're not going that far through the lines. It sounds more like runaway baggage wagons side-swiping them as panicked drivers bail out and the animals pulling the wagons try to turn to avoid the infantry but at the last minute. It's also possible that Livy, not being an eyewitness, not talking to eye witnesses and forced to rely on earlier sources since lost, got carried away with the purple prose. After all he wants things to look bad so that the general's dedication looks even more spectacular
Certainly it sounds like nothing described by Xenophon
I did outline the essentials a few posts back, but there is no harm reiterating them here.
Stage 1
At Sentinum, the Gallic chariots are in reserve, and they stay out of the initial cavalry fight, which suggests they are intended to hook into the Roman infantry (perhaps its flank, as suggested by Richard) once the Gallic cavalry have chased off their Roman counterparts. Except they do not manage to chase off their Roman counterparts, so the chariots are released into the fray and duly see off the mounted Romans.
At Thymbra, the Persian chariots are in reserve, and they stay out of the initial cavalry fight, but then are committed to see off the opposing cavalry and chariotry, which they duly perform.
Stage 2
At Sentinum, the Gallic chariots, with the Roman cavalry in full flight, plough into the Roman infantry.
At Thymbra, the Persian chariots, with the Lydian army in flight, plough into the Egyptian infantry.
In each case, the chariotry serves as a means of dispersing the opposing mounted and then goes on to attack the opposing foot - with not a trace of skirmishing in sight. This is particularly interesting in the case of the Gallic chariotry, which, as at Telamon and the 'elephant victory', comes in two flavours.
The translator's 'front rank men' are, in Latin, as previously mentioned, actually 'antesignani', the 'men before the standards'. The standards were with the triarii, so the Gallic chariots made holes in quite a bit of the Roman formation. I did check the possibility of Roman cavalry doing the disruption, but in Livy's text the legionaries are definitely disorganised by the 'horses and vehicles' crashing through their formation, not by 'cavalry and vehicles' or just 'cavalry'.
I would not use porphyric prose as an excuse for dismissing a battle description; what matters are the events. Nor would I oppose Accius' superficial Fabulae Praetextae to Livy's account. While playwrights sometimes let drop snippets of useful information (Aristophanes is quite handy in this regard), this does not appear to be one of those occasions.
[Edit: Adjusted incorrect 'Cunaxa' to correct 'Thymbra' - got up too late this morning!]
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 29, 2018, 08:01:17 AM
I did outline the essentials a few posts back, but there is no harm reiterating them here.
Stage 1
At Sentinum, the Gallic chariots are in reserve, and they stay out of the initial cavalry fight, which suggests they are intended to hook into the Roman infantry (perhaps its flank, as suggested by Richard) once the Gallic cavalry have chased off their Roman counterparts. Except they do not manage to chase off their Roman counterparts, so the chariots are released into the fray and duly see off the mounted Romans.
if you are going to use the example, use all the example, remember the baggage wagons
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 29, 2018, 08:22:50 AM
if you are going to use the example, use all the example, remember the baggage wagons
Except they are not 'baggage wagons' - they are
essedis carrisque - and as previously explained the
essedum is a war chariot (and often used by later Roman authors to signify a scythed chariot) while a
carrus is usually considered to be a transport cart or carriage but at Sentinum they are occupied by armed men and keep pace with the
essedi, which is unusual for a baggage wagon.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 29, 2018, 08:33:33 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 29, 2018, 08:22:50 AM
if you are going to use the example, use all the example, remember the baggage wagons
Except they are not 'baggage wagons' - they are essedis carrisque - and as previously explained the essedum is a war chariot (and often used by later Roman authors to signify a scythed chariot) while a carrus is usually considered to be a transport cart or carriage but at Sentinum they are occupied by armed men and keep pace with the essedi, which is unusual for a baggage wagon.
no more unusual than mixing scythed and and unscythed chariots
After all the use or war wagons in combat is actually pretty common and the Hussites managed to use them offensively.
The problem with comparing the two battles is that both are disputed
One as to whether it actually happened at all, and one as to whether what was said to happen did happen as described by somebody who was born some centuries later
At least Xenophon had seen chariots in action and knew what they were like, Livy doesn't even have that. Technically he might have talked to somebody who had been at the Battle of Zela
I do get frustrated when we "forget" previous discussions and have to repeat them.
At Sentinum, the gauls charged the Roman cavalry and followed up into the disordered infantry. In the Cyropaedia account, they attack infantry. There is no mention of scythed chariots at Sentinum. Essedum is a standard latin word for a light chariot (Celtic in origin) - there is no reason to assume it has scythes.
As to where Xenophon got his description of scythed chariots from, it seems far more likely that they came from his own experience of working with, and fighting against, the weapon than some mysterious "lost source". The difference between the actual performance and the fictional one is more likely to fit the idealising nature of the description - this is how it should have been, with better crews.
In pursuit of sources, I noted this article (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/miscellanea/chariots/scythedchariots.html) in a blog referenced in the concurrent discussion of scythed chariots. Not much for analysis but useful for its references to classical descriptions.
Yes everything worth saying has been said, several times.
Quote
I did check the possibility of Roman cavalry doing the disruption, but in Livy's text the legionaries are definitely disorganised by the 'horses and vehicles' crashing through their formation, not by 'cavalry and vehicles' or just 'cavalry'.
That is incorrect, the Roman infantry lines are disordered by the flight of the Roman cavalry, see my post #180 in this thread. The sequence is clear:
- Roman cavalry chase off Gallic cavalry
- Gallic chariots (and wagons? or two types of chariot? or one type of chariot described artistically?) chase off Roman cavalry
- rout of Roman cavalry disorders legions
- Gallic chariots attack disordered legions (maybe from the flank?) and cause losses
I see no similarities between Sentinum and Thymbra, other than both involving chariots v. infantry in some form. Abradatas' chariots at Thymbra are scythed, are in front of the centre, charge enemy chariots, in most cases pursue them, and just a few ("it was only the personal friends and mess-mates of Abradatas who pressed home the charge with him") crash into the Egyptian infantry, where they are destroyed after causing some losses. At Sentinum, the chariots rout the Roman cavalry, whose flight disorders the legions, which the chariots exploit by attacking them. There are really no similarities at all.
Maybe if we defined 'skirmishing' to mean not just 'shooting from a distance' but also 'shooting or threatening from a distance until disorder or weak points present themselves, at which point optionally charging into the weak points to exploit' then we could all agree that chariots skirmish, and wind this thread up?
Quote from: RichT on August 29, 2018, 09:48:06 AM
Maybe if we defined 'skirmishing' to mean not just 'shooting from a distance' but also 'shooting or threatening from a distance until disorder or weak points present themselves, at which point optionally charging into the weak points to exploit' then we could all agree that chariots skirmish, and wind this thread up?
I think we can wind up the main thread topic. The "horses as battering rams" is based on a misunderstanding that, as a horse will usually come off best in an accidental collision with an individual human at speed, two or four horses will be unhurt ploughing into a tight crowd of people armed and intent on doing harm. Or that any chariot driver could manage to drive horses into other horses flat out without them straying off line, or that such a collision would just lead to a little light bruising and an exchange of strong words.
I think we have explored the role of lighter chariots quite well (once we disposed of the fallacy that they were just smaller battering rams) and may have gone as far as we can on scythed chariots. Where I think we may still have work to do is on the heavy chariot and on chariot tactics outside Europe and the Middle East, though they are doubtless worthy of their own threads another time.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 29, 2018, 08:56:34 AM
At Sentinum, the gauls charged the Roman cavalry and followed up into the disordered infantry.
Although it is by no means clear, Richard's insistence notwithstanding, that they followed Roman cavalry into the infantry. I did at first think it was a 'converted charge', but considering further why the chariots abstained from combat for two clashes of both sides' cavalry, it became apparent they were being retained specifically for an anti-infantry role. Hence, once they had helped to see off the Roman cavalry, they went ahead with their anti-infantry activities. The rout of the Roman cavalry does seem to have worried the Roman infantry, but not to have created any ready-made gaps.
We may note in passing that had Roman maniples fought with gaps in between, the chariots (and any Roman cavalry heading by preference through their own lines) would simply have passed through the gaps rather than tearing their way through the antepilani (hastati and principes). So here is another passage which indirectly indicates that Roman infantry fought with gapless lines.
QuoteIn the Cyropaedia account, they attack infantry. There is no mention of scythed chariots at Sentinum. Essedum is a standard latin word for a light chariot (Celtic in origin) - there is no reason to assume it has scythes.
More or less what I was going to say, although for a different reason. The Thymbra account deserves mention, though, because there, as at Sentinum, the chariots attack cavalry and then move on to attacking infantry.
QuoteAs to where Xenophon got his description of scythed chariots from, it seems far more likely that they came from his own experience of working with, and fighting against, the weapon than some mysterious "lost source".
If that were so, his supposedly fictionalised account of Thymbra would have the Egyptians beating their spears against their shields to scare the chariot horses.
QuoteThe difference between the actual performance and the fictional one is more likely to fit the idealising nature of the description - this is how it should have been, with better crews.
First point, there is no reason to suppose his account of Thymbra is fictional. Second point, the chariots at Cunaxa which went through the Greek lines were the crewless ones, so if he is extrapolating from experience the chariots crashing into the Egyptians would be those whose crews had managed a 'preliminary athletic departure'.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 29, 2018, 10:23:29 AM
I think we can wind up the main thread topic. The "horses as battering rams" is based on a misunderstanding that, as a horse will usually come off best in an accidental collision with an individual human at speed, two or four horses will be unhurt ploughing into a tight crowd of people armed and intent on doing harm.
Which somewhat over-represents the average capability of Asiatic infantry in general. 1) They were not necessarily a 'tight crowd' and 2) their intent was often more influenced by the question of apprehending rather than inflicting harm.
QuoteOr that any chariot driver could manage to drive horses into other horses flat out without them straying off line, or that such a collision would just lead to a little light bruising and an exchange of strong words.
We do not know that they were going 'flat out'. Those of us paying attention to past posts would have remebered that the existence of chariot runners suggests a pace somewhat less than breakneck speed.
QuoteI think we have explored the role of lighter chariots quite well (once we disposed of the fallacy that they were just smaller battering rams) ...
We have not realy explored the role of light chariots at all, and if there was any such disposal activity, where is it? And what fallacy? All this expostulation began when the lighter chariotry at Sentinum was shown to have acted as 'smaller battering rams' and not as skirmishers in any shape or form.
Quote from: RichT on August 29, 2018, 09:48:06 AM
Yes everything worth saying has been said, several times.
Quote
I did check the possibility of Roman cavalry doing the disruption, but in Livy's text the legionaries are definitely disorganised by the 'horses and vehicles' crashing through their formation, not by 'cavalry and vehicles' or just 'cavalry'.
That is incorrect, the Roman infantry lines are disordered by the flight of the Roman cavalry, see my post #180 in this thread.
Let us examine the text. I am using Benjamin Oliver Foster's Latin for Livy's X.28.11:
turbata hinc etiam signa legionum multique impetu equorum ac vehiculorum raptorum per agmen obtriti antesignaniBen Foster renders this as:
from them the disorder was communicated to the standards of the legions, and many of the first line were trodden underfoot, as horses and chariots swept through their ranks.OK, strictly speaking the
hinc (from which disorder arose) does indeed refer to the preceding 'improvida fuga' of the Roman cavalry, but there is nothing I can see in the text or its sense to suggest any penetration of the Roman infantry by the Roman cavalry. (If there is, please point it out.) The disordering effect was moral rather than physical; the physical penetration - and the level of disorder which encouraged the Gallic infantry to attack - came from the 'impetu equorum ac vehiculorum raptorum per agmen' which 'obtriti' the 'antesignani', i.e. the impetus of the horses and vehicles tearing through the 'agmen' (formation) crushing the hastati and principes (not all of them obviously, as there were plenty left for the Gallic infantry to attack).
QuoteMaybe if we defined 'skirmishing' to mean not just 'shooting from a distance' but also 'shooting or threatening from a distance until disorder or weak points present themselves, at which point optionally charging into the weak points to exploit' then we could all agree that chariots skirmish, and wind this thread up?
Except that the Gallic chariots at Sentinum do not do this. The impression Livy gives is that they move straight into the assault on the Roman infantry without pause once the Roman cavalry is out of the way. This is reminiscent of the kind of approach we see in the 'elephant victory', where the chariots head straight for Antiochus' line without hesitation, deviation or repetition (and then tragicomically back again into their own lines once they see the elephants).
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 29, 2018, 07:32:20 PM
turbata hinc etiam signa legionum multique impetu equorum ac vehiculorum raptorum per agmen obtriti antesignani
Ben Foster renders this as:
from them the disorder was communicated to the standards of the legions, and many of the first line were trodden underfoot, as horses and chariots swept through their ranks.
OK, strictly speaking the hinc (from which disorder arose) does indeed refer to the preceding 'improvida fuga' of the Roman cavalry, but there is nothing I can see in the text or its sense to suggest any penetration of the Roman infantry by the Roman cavalry. (If there is, please point it out.) The disordering effect was moral rather than physical; the physical penetration - and the level of disorder which encouraged the Gallic infantry to attack - came from the 'impetu equorum ac vehiculorum raptorum per agmen' which 'obtriti' the 'antesignani', i.e. the impetus of the horses and vehicles tearing through the 'agmen' (formation) crushing the hastati and principes (not all of them obviously, as there were plenty left for the Gallic infantry to attack).
I think Patrick is undoubtedly correct - there is nothing to suggest explicitly that the routing Roman cavalry
physically disrupted their own infantry - but so is Rich: Livy is clear that the Roman infantry
were disordered by the flight of the cavalry, even if it was solely caused by morale failure, so the result was that the Roman line was already in disorder when the chariots hit them. I forget what the original point at issue was (no, actually, I haven't been following this thread closely enough to care) but if it's about Celtic chariots charging into a solid line, this incident is not evidence for them hitting an infantry line in good order.
QuoteIf that were so, his supposedly fictionalised account of Thymbra would have the Egyptians beating their spears against their shields to scare the chariot horses.
Why? He hasn't made his chariots the same - why make his infantry identical?
Quote
First point, there is no reason to suppose his account of Thymbra is fictional.
This is the general consensus. It appears to be based on reason.
Quote
Second point, the chariots at Cunaxa which went through the Greek lines were the crewless ones, so if he is extrapolating from experience the chariots crashing into the Egyptians would be those whose crews had managed a 'preliminary athletic departure'.
Didn't I mention something on better crewed? He is of a mind that the weapon would do better with determined crewing.
Quote
Which somewhat over-represents the average capability of Asiatic infantry in general. 1) They were not necessarily a 'tight crowd'
True, and we all agree that loose order or disordered infantry were the natural prey of chariots. I think, though, we have been concentrating on the ones here that were a tight crowd.
Quote
their intent was often more influenced by the question of apprehending rather than inflicting harm.
In which case, why bring them to the battlefield? Any evidence for this view, or is it drawn
a priori from theory? Again, the effectiveness of Asiatic infantry might make a better topic on its own
Quote
We do not know that they were going 'flat out'.
I'm sure it was you who said they were going at 15mph - you even corrected my proposed experiment on this basis. Justin envisages a gallop, based on his choice of video evidence.
Quote
We have not realy explored the role of light chariots at all, and if there was any such disposal activity, where is it? And what fallacy? All this expostulation began when the lighter chariotry at Sentinum was shown to have acted as 'smaller battering rams' and not as skirmishers in any shape or form.
If we can't agree what we have discussed, it probably time to stop. I recall determining differences between two modes of chariotry in Xenophon, a brief discussion of Egyptian chariots, some thoughts on whether light chariots acted like light cavalry within an army (you were unhappy about assigning them a scouting role), some detail on the use of chariots by the Britons and Caledonians. A suggestion was made that, except in Gallic and Galatian armies, light and heavy chariots didn't co-exist, which may imply an evolution of roles (or not). No evidence has been provided that light chariots were used to crash into formed enemy units. Nor that they were used sacrificially to ram other chariots.
While it has proved valuable of Justin to raise the question and it has led to a useful exploration of the chariot topic (and has spawned a number of other themes to explore like the nature of Near Eastern infantry) we know we are no longer moving forward when we have to keep repeating what has gone before.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 20, 2018, 04:58:50 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 20, 2018, 04:05:47 PM
In another thread, Duncan was quoting the Arthashastra X.v to the effect that the gap between chariots should be four samas, or about 4'8". Not that there's any reason Egyptian tactics have to have been the same as Indian, but this is surely too tight to allow turning or threading.
This article (https://www.academia.edu/28122000/On_Typical_Tactics_of_Oriental_Chariot_Battle) by Alexander Nefedkin may be useful. Just glancing, I note a different translation of the passage above as a gap of 11.5m. Nefedkin seems to have written a lot on chariots but I have no idea if he has any reputation.
The inscrutable workings of memory brought this to my mind again. Checking the Nefedkin passage I'm a bit confused, because he attributes intervals of both 11.5 m and "four
iama [sic], about one meter" to
Arthashastra 10.5. Since he latter equates a distance between lines of "five bows" with "about eleven and a half meters", I suspect that the longer interval is between ranks, the shorter between files. The difference between Nefedkin's "about one meter" and Duncan's
ca 4'8" can probably be ascribed to the inexact nature of ancient units of measurement.
Also, if the longer interval were between files, the passage would also be prescribing intervals of over five meters between infantry files (2
samas as opposed to the chariots' 4
samas), which is surely unlikely.
Nefedkin's
iama must be a typo for
sama - it doesn't look like a possible Sanskrit word.
QuoteChecking the Nefedkin passage I'm a bit confused, because he attributes intervals of both 11.5 m and "four iama [sic], about one meter" to Arthashastra 10.5.
Maybe just a typo? 1.15m instead of 11.5m?
Quote from: Erpingham on August 30, 2018, 01:57:27 PM
QuoteChecking the Nefedkin passage I'm a bit confused, because he attributes intervals of both 11.5 m and "four iama [sic], about one meter" to Arthashastra 10.5.
Maybe just a typo? 1.15m instead of 11.5m?
If so it must be a typo in Nefedkin's source, because he makes a point of it being close to the
ca 10 m he says is required for turning.
The citation given is P. C. Chakravarti,
The Art of War in Ancient India (Dacca 1941) 116.
BTW, he compares the
Arthashastra here to a Chinese treatise he calls "Lu Tao" (pinyin Lu Dao?). Anyone know what this is? It's apparently one of the Seven Military Classics, but I can't recognize it in WP's listing of those.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 30, 2018, 02:10:32 PMBTW, he compares the Arthashastra here to a Chinese treatise he calls "Lu Tao" (pinyin Lu Dao?). Anyone know what this is? It's apparently one of the Seven Military Classics, but I can't recognize it in WP's listing of those.
Liu Tao - the
Six Secret Teachings attributed to the Taigong.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 30, 2018, 02:35:02 PM
Liu Tao - the Six Secret Teachings attributed to the Taigong.
Thanks :)
I see, BTW, that Kobo has an ebook edition of the Seven Military Classics available for $4.99. I feel an acquisition coming ...
(Altho, bizarrely, one which apparently uses Wade-Giles for Chinese names in
The Art of War but pinyin in the rest. What the?)
I imagine they've probably just recycled an existing translation of Sunzi. Giles' own 1910 translation is presumably out of copyright.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 30, 2018, 03:02:30 PM
I imagine they've probably just recycled an existing translation of Sunzi.
No doubt - but how hard could it be to go through it and bring it into line with the rest? It does raise a little worry about how well-edited the thing may be.
Anthony,
Just to clear up (I hope) a few points:
Xenophon's Chariot Experience
What I am attempting to convey is that Xenohpon does not seem to have derived his Thymbra scythed chariots or their behaviour from his Cunaxa experiences.
Is Thymbra Fictional?
Academic consensus considers it so. This unfortunately is not a reliable guide (if academic consensus were a reliable guide, who would need sources?), especially given Xenophon's opportunities for exposure to Persian historical tradition.
Asiatic Infantry
Perhaps the best indication of their overall morale and combat fitness is what happened when they encountered Greeks.
The 15 mph chariot
One of the curious features of Biblical era chariotry was the way the horses were attached to the chariots: the band around the front of the horse, with which the animal provides pulling power, was arranged not across the chest but across the lower part of the neck. General modern opinion is that this would gradually strangle the horse at high speeds; perhaps this was the intention, and if so it would be a built-in speed limiter.
The arithmetic correction was simply that if one vehicle at 15 mph hits another at 15 mph the deceleration of each vehicle is 15-to-0 not 30-to-0. That was all. It does of course make a big difference to the severity of impact.
Overall
Re-reading Justin's posts, I do not think he was insisting that chariots would charge at full gallop; he was simply pointing out that horses travelling at speed have a lot of knockdown power in them, rather more than we might expect, and hence even a 'light' chariot could be expected to crunch its way through lines of infantry without too much trouble.
That statement needs a little more precision: infantry in great depth (as Biblical formations seem to have been, at least on occasion) would not be fully penetrable by chariots, and hence great depth (cf. the 100-deep Egyptians at Thymbra) conferred deterrence if not immunity. Cohesive infantry capable of file support (hoplites) would be much more resistant to attempted chariot penetration. Such infantry could operate with shallower depths and still be significantly chariot resistant (it is perhaps noteworthy that in Greece the decline of the chariot seems to be parallelled by the rise of the hoplite).
I suppose what is ultimately at issue here is the cherished (including by myself until recently) precept whereby 'light' chariots (our designation, not that of the original owners) were built for skirmishing and were intended to skirmish. The more I look into the sources, the less tenable this viewpoint appears to be.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 30, 2018, 07:02:59 PM
Anthony,
Just to clear up (I hope) a few points:
Xenophon's Chariot Experience
What I am attempting to convey is that Xenohpon does not seem to have derived his Thymbra scythed chariots or their behaviour from his Cunaxa experiences.
Xenophon's experience may not have been limited to Cunaxa. After all he might have been present to see a genuine success.
Hellenica iv 1 17
"In these quarters the Spartan king passed the winter, collecting supplies for the army either on the spot or by a system of forage. On one of these occasions the troops, who had grown reckless and scornful of the enemy through long immunity from attack, whilst engaged in collecting supplies were scattered over the flat country, when Pharnabazus fell upon them with two scythe-chariots and about four hundred horse. Seeing him thus advancing, the Hellenes ran together, mustering possibly seven hundred men. The Persian did not hesitate, but placing his chariots in front, supported by himself and the cavalry, he gave the command to charge. The scythe-chariots charged and scattered the compact mass, and speedily the cavalry had laid low in the dust about a hundred men, while the rest retreated hastily, under cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites, who were fortunately near."Firstly the infantry were not formed up at the start of the action, and may not have been properly organised when the chariots hit. Also some people have commented that the infantry may have been light troops, perhaps peltasts. This would make sense in that hoplite armies would use their light troops to pillage and forage, and keep their hoplites back in support, especially in hostile territory.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 30, 2018, 07:02:59 PM
Is Thymbra Fictional?
Academic consensus considers it so. This unfortunately is not a reliable guide (if academic consensus were a reliable guide, who would need sources?), especially given Xenophon's opportunities for exposure to Persian historical tradition.
Given how often parallel sources differ in detail, and how often unique sources err, I doubt the utility of assuming all literary sources are factually correct on all points.
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 30, 2018, 08:21:07 PM
Xenophon's experience may not have been limited to Cunaxa. After all he might have been present to see a genuine success.
And whether or not he saw it, he certainly knew of it. Well noted. :) Less easy is extrapolating his Thymbra chariot account from this incident and his Cunaxa experiences.
Quote from: Dangun on August 31, 2018, 12:35:20 AM
Given how often parallel sources differ in detail, and how often unique sources err, I doubt the utility of assuming all literary sources are factually correct on all points.
Well, they are not. But they do seem more reliable as providers of basic information than the chewed-over leavings after such information has been through several generations of academics, the received academic wisdom not only drifting ever further from the original sources but also changing approximately once per generation*. Jim's comment about 'reality' being made to fit perceptions of itself would seem to be at the root of the process. And if people do not like the information a source provides, they do noticeably try to undermine the source. Also, occasional attempted reputation-making by assault on a defenceless source has been known. I am not saying that our sources are sacrosanct, omniscient or infallible; rather, that they are the basic starting-point for our historical information and as such should be treated with more consideration than is generally the case - and read more closely to see what they actually say.
*
It is called 'progress' but resembles spontaneous mutation.FYI, in the coming months you will see me pointing out serious flaws in one of our key historical sources - Manetho, or what remains of his writings in Josephus, Eusebius and Africanus. Paradoxically, although Manetho is in many details grumbled at as unreliable (and rightly so), his dynastic scheme is followed with the iron rigour of fanaticism. The result is a forced incompatibility between Egyptian history and the history of surrounding lands - but that is beyond the scope of this thread (unless you count the chariots).
I shall be interested to see if anyone insists upon the inviolability of Manetho's scheme of dynasties.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 31, 2018, 07:06:45 AM
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 30, 2018, 08:21:07 PM
Xenophon's experience may not have been limited to Cunaxa. After all he might have been present to see a genuine success.
And whether or not he saw it, he certainly knew of it. Well noted. :) Less easy is extrapolating his Thymbra chariot account from this incident and his Cunaxa experiences.
Not really, he's been in the same army as people who commanded and deployed scythed chariots. So he would doubtless have known what they wanted the chariots to do
He could extrapolate from their opinions and perhaps even experience in the east
Quote from: Jim Webster on August 31, 2018, 07:23:44 AM
Not really, he's been in the same army as people who commanded and deployed scythed chariots. So he would doubtless have known what they wanted the chariots to do
He could extrapolate from their opinions and perhaps even experience in the east
maybe Patrick will accept it if you say it :)
Quotes Thymbra Fictional?
Academic consensus considers it so. This unfortunately is not a reliable guide (if academic consensus were a reliable guide, who would need sources?), especially given Xenophon's opportunities for exposure to Persian historical tradition.
Firstly, the issue is really whether Cyropaedia is a detailed and accurate portrayal of history or an instructive fiction? The battle of Thymbra could have taken place without it having any effect on the question, in the same way as King Arthur could have existed without that making
Morte d'Arthur a true history.
Did Xenophon have access to persian stories about Cyrus? Possibly, though of course we don't know what or how reliable. Ditto, written history. It's not impossible. Does this mean he set out to write a detailed accurate history? No. The longstanding consensus is was writing a reflection on leadership, or benevolent kingship, destined for a Greek audience but placed outside Greek literary tradition. It could be wrong but an critical, evidence-based rejection is needed to overturn it, not just a statement that "academics are unreliable".
Quote from: Erpingham on August 31, 2018, 08:56:58 AM
Quotes Thymbra Fictional?
Academic consensus considers it so. This unfortunately is not a reliable guide (if academic consensus were a reliable guide, who would need sources?), especially given Xenophon's opportunities for exposure to Persian historical tradition.
Firstly, the issue is really whether Cyropaedia is a detailed and accurate portrayal of history or an instructive fiction? The battle of Thymbra could have taken place without it having any effect on the question, in the same way as King Arthur could have existed without that making Morte d'Arthur a true history.
Did Xenophon have access to persian stories about Cyrus? Possibly, though of course we don't know what or how reliable. Ditto, written history. It's not impossible. Does this mean he set out to write a detailed accurate history? No. The longstanding consensus is was writing a reflection on leadership, or benevolent kingship, destined for a Greek audience but placed outside Greek literary tradition. It could be wrong but an critical, evidence-based rejection is needed to overturn it, not just a statement that "academics are unreliable".
P.S. I don't think this thread would be the place - it is on a different topic and is winding up.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 31, 2018, 08:56:58 AM
QuoteIs Thymbra Fictional?
Academic consensus considers it so. This unfortunately is not a reliable guide (if academic consensus were a reliable guide, who would need sources?), especially given Xenophon's opportunities for exposure to Persian historical tradition.
Firstly, the issue is really whether Cyropaedia is a detailed and accurate portrayal of history or an instructive fiction? The battle of Thymbra could have taken place without it having any effect on the question, in the same way as King Arthur could have existed without that making Morte d'Arthur a true history.
Surely that's not "the issue", but a side-issue; the subject of this thread is chariots, and the general nature of the
Cyropaedia is relevant only in so far as it bears on the accuracy of the battle account.
Thymbra is almost certainly a battle that did take place: Herodotos described two battles between Cyrus and Croesus, and the second one, which Herodotos does not name but which took place not far from Sardis, involved Persian camels scaring the Lydian cavalry horses. Thymbra must be a version of this historical battle - the question is, how accurate a version is it? Can we trust its account of chariots (and towers, and Egyptians), which Herodotos' earlier version does not mention, and for which there seem to be no other surviving sources? Or did Xenophon just lift the camels from Herodotos and weave them into an instructive fiction?
So much for winding up - this is another zombie thread.
More alarming though:
Quote
FYI, in the coming months you will see me pointing out serious flaws in one of our key historical sources - Manetho
Does this mean that we can look forward to a Slingshot article from Patrick on Egyptian chronology? There was always a danger of things turning in this direction - I suspect this Society is heading toward a crisis. I hope someone is aware of this and working to avert it.
Egyptian chronology is somewhat peripheral to the subject matter of Slingshot, isn't it? I mean, you could argue that Ramessides and Achaemenids should be listed as historical enemies, or whatever, but it's not really military history.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 31, 2018, 10:09:36 AM
Egyptian chronology is somewhat peripheral to the subject matter of Slingshot, isn't it? I mean, you could argue that Ramessides and Achaemenids should be listed as historical enemies, or whatever, but it's not really military history.
In fairness to Patrick, I'm sure he will focus on the military dimension. I'm also sure if Justin thinks there is a problem relevance-wise, he will ask for changes when he receives the article.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 31, 2018, 10:25:42 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 31, 2018, 10:09:36 AM
Egyptian chronology is somewhat peripheral to the subject matter of Slingshot, isn't it? I mean, you could argue that Ramessides and Achaemenids should be listed as historical enemies, or whatever, but it's not really military history.
In fairness to Patrick, I'm sure he will focus on the military dimension. I'm also sure if Justin thinks there is a problem relevance-wise, he will ask for changes when he receives the article.
I don't think Patrick has yet even said whether he intends to write a Slingshot article, so my post was meant less as a criticism than a philosophical musing. :)
Actually, if he's confident in his ideas, I think he should at least try submitting them to an actual egyptological venue.
The Slingshot article notion was my inference, and I may be totally wrong. If so, I'm glad. Maybe he meant he would be able to point us to an article in an actual Egyptological venue (peer reviewed perchance?) in which case, that would be great.
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 31, 2018, 11:13:15 AM
Actually, if he's confident in his ideas, I think he should at least try submitting them to an actual egyptological venue.
Academia.edu would be another option. I know Steven James, another radical thinker on ancient military history, publishes stuff there.
Quote from: Erpingham on August 31, 2018, 11:27:59 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 31, 2018, 11:13:15 AM
Actually, if he's confident in his ideas, I think he should at least try submitting them to an actual egyptological venue.
Academia.edu would be another option. I know Steven James, another radical thinker on ancient military history, publishes stuff there.
There is also the Fortean Times an article in that would give publicity to the society and perhaps encourage a new group of members.
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 31, 2018, 09:10:40 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on August 31, 2018, 08:56:58 AM
Firstly, the issue is really whether Cyropaedia is a detailed and accurate portrayal of history or an instructive fiction? The battle of Thymbra could have taken place without it having any effect on the question, in the same way as King Arthur could have existed without that making Morte d'Arthur a true history.
Surely that's not "the issue", but a side-issue; the subject of this thread is chariots, and the general nature of the Cyropaedia is relevant only in so far as it bears on the accuracy of the battle account.
My thinking also.
QuoteThymbra is almost certainly a battle that did take place: Herodotos described two battles between Cyrus and Croesus, and the second one, which Herodotos does not name but which took place not far from Sardis, involved Persian camels scaring the Lydian cavalry horses. Thymbra must be a version of this historical battle - the question is, how accurate a version is it? Can we trust its account of chariots (and towers, and Egyptians), which Herodotos' earlier version does not mention, and for which there seem to be no other surviving sources? Or did Xenophon just lift the camels from Herodotos and weave them into an instructive fiction?
Herodotus actually has two battles: one in I.77, which he does not detail except to say that neither side wins, but after which the Lydians retreat and dismiss their allies, and another in I.79-80 in which the Lydians fight alone and Cyrus uses his camels against them. Given the presence of Lydia's allies in Xenophon's account of Thymbra, this would make Thymbra the first of the two battles described by Herodotus and hence there is no discrepancy between them (apart from the acute brevity of Herodotus' account).
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on August 31, 2018, 11:13:15 AM
I don't think Patrick has yet even said whether he intends to write a Slingshot article, so my post was meant less as a criticism than a philosophical musing. :)
Actually, if he's confident in his ideas, I think he should at least try submitting them to an actual egyptological venue.
Any suggestions? :)
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 31, 2018, 09:10:40 AM
Thymbra is almost certainly a battle that did take place: Herodotos described two battles between Cyrus and Croesus, and the second one, which Herodotos does not name but which took place not far from Sardis, involved Persian camels scaring the Lydian cavalry horses. Thymbra must be a version of this historical battle - the question is, how accurate a version is it? Can we trust its account of chariots (and towers, and Egyptians), which Herodotos' earlier version does not mention, and for which there seem to be no other surviving sources?
Does Xénophon's description of the second battle line up with Herodotus?
We should be deeply suspicious of later sources with greater detail than earlier sources.
A trivial example, but all the pre-battle conversation is surely Xénophon fiction.
Quote from: Dangun on September 02, 2018, 03:02:23 AM
Does Xénophon's description of the second battle line up with Herodotus?
An intelligent question: intriguingly, Xenophon does not seem to realise there was a second battle. While Herodotus has the Lydians dismiss their (remaining) allies between the two battles, Xenophon appears to conflate the two, in that after his battle,
"When Cyrus and his men had finished dinner and stationed guards, as was necessary, they went to rest. As for Croesus and his army, they fled straight towards Sardis, while the other contingents got away, each man as far as he could under cover of the night on his way toward home.
When daylight came, Cyrus led his army straight on against Sardis."
Xenophon thus gives the impression that the battle was fought almost within sight if Sardis instead of near the border. This would seem to confirm that Herodotus is not part of his source material. It also makes one wonder about Persian tradition, whether two battles (one 'winning draw' and one outright success) were conflated into a single, successful battle. The evident lack of pursuit by Cyrus' forces would seem more in keeping with the aftermath of a drawn battle than a successful one. We can conjecture that Croesus was defeated in the first battle and perhaps his Egyptian contingent lost, but in Herodotus the degree of Median success was not such as to make him think the campaign would continue. Hence Xenophon's source appears to have merged the two battles, unthinkable for someone using Herodotus as his source, but not inconceivable from someone who took his material directly from Persians.
QuoteWe should be deeply suspicious of later sources with greater detail than earlier sources.
This is an apparently worthy principle, but it can be misleading. The later source may have tapped a new vein of information not available to the earlier source, and/or the earlier source may have had contemporary motivation to misrepresent matters (see Polybius on Timaeus and Fabius Pictor, for example, and compare Velleius Paterculus with Tacitus). I would prefer to look at the source in terms of
what sort of pattern does this give us, and what else does it imply? This allows us to tie it in with other knowledge we may possess, while leaving us free to check for internal inconsistencies and for implications which do not fit our other information.
It is a bit like putting together an intelligence picture.
QuoteA trivial example, but all the pre-battle conversation is surely Xénophon fiction.
One must ask why: in antiquity, a
bon mot by a highly-placed individual rapidly gained wide currency, and there is no reason why memorable elements of a pre-battle discussion should not to the same. One can see a 'Socratic' element in the dialogue, but one should consider how a bright young Medo-Persian would have explained ideas for new practices to tradition-reared contemporaries. The essential points Xenophon has Cyrus make would have to have been made; whether they were made differently is a question we are unlikely to be able to answer at this remove in time and culture.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 31, 2018, 07:42:17 PM
Any suggestions? :)
Not really, tho WP's Category:Egyptology journals (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Egyptology_journals) might be a starting point. Note that the German-language ones seem to accept English-language submissions.
Returning to chariots and their impact potential, we have not yet looked at Mons Graupius, Agricola's victory over the Caledones. It should be noted there are some translation issues which I have endeavoured to overcome; they do not materially affect the conclusions to be drawn (if anything, the Church and Brodribb and Thompson translations have more enthusiastic and vandalistic chariots than my own rendering).
The battle opens with (all references from Tacitus, Agricola 35 et. seq.):
"The enemy, to make a formidable display, had posted himself on high ground; his van was on the plain, while the rest of his army rose in an arch-like form up the slope of a hill. The plain between resounded with the noise and with the rapid movements of chariots and cavalry."
'Chariots and cavalry' (covinnarius eques, but without a conjunction) may be a mis-rendering. The literal translation is 'the chariot driver rider', and the later course of the action casts doubt on the presence of Caledonian cavalry. Be that as it may, the presence of chariotry is clear and their actions are interesting.
They begin the battle by driving around in the plain, filling it with strepitu (noise) and discursu (running about, travelling to and fro). However there is a curious absence of chariot skirmishing: Agricola's auxilia and the infantry of the Caledones proceed to what looks like a form of infantry skirmishing as if the chariots were not present.
"The action began with distant fighting. The Britons with equal steadiness and skill used their huge swords and small shields to avoid or to parry the missiles of our soldiers, while they themselves poured on us a dense shower of darts, till Agricola encouraged three Batavian and two Tun-grian cohorts to bring matters to the decision of close fighting with swords. Such tactics were familiar to these veteran soldiers, but were embarrassing to an enemy armed with small bucklers and unwieldy weapons. The swords of the Britons are not pointed, and do not allow them to close with the foe, or to fight in the open field. No sooner did the Batavians begin to close with the enemy, to strike them with their shields, to disfigure their faces, and overthrowing the force on the plain to advance their line up the hill, than the other auxiliary cohorts joined with eager rivalry in cutting down all the nearest of the foe."
So where are the chariots? What happened to them? Tacitus merely states:
"Meanwhile our cavalry had routed the enemy's charioteers and mingled in the engagement of the infantry. But although they at first spread panic, they were soon impeded by the close array of the enemy ranks [densis ... hostium agminibus] and by the inequalities of the ground. With the least bit of level ground our men made a fight, while the slightest slope threw men and horses together, and often chariots, destitute of guidance, their terrified horses without drivers, dashed as panic urged them, sideways, or in direct collision against the ranks."
'Direct collision' is obvios, a meeting or stright-line encounter. And the effect of these 'collisions'?
Tacitus does not say. He merely goes on to state that the Caledones on the hill split and flowed down in an outflanking movement, and Agricola countered this effectively with his cavalry reserve. Then he sent the cavalry which he had ordered withdrawn from the fight round the Caledonian rear (Tacitus having missed this bit in his narrative) and all was over bar the pursuit.
So what do we learn from this episode? Two points stand out: 1) the absence of any skirmishing by the Caledonian chariots; 2) the fact that horses, admittedly driverless and frightened out of their wits, carried their chariots into direct impacts with the Roman lines. We get no description of splintered chariots and/or piles of broken bodies from these impacts, so all we can really say is that these 'light' chariots are not recorded as skirmishing but are recorded as driving into battlelines. Whether they would have done the former if under command is open to question, but given that animals tend to follow their training, the fact that some did drive into the battle lines suggests they had received training to do so.
We may wonder why the Caledonian chariots proved so ineffectual against the Roman cavalry. The Romans had had two generations to become accustomed to chariots of the British persuasion and devise effective counters to them., and reading between the lines, it looks as if they attacked the chariots while the latter were still driving around out of formation and picked off the crews, precipitating a flight. This would have cleared the way for the infantry skirmish with which Tacitus opens the battle and is readily consistent with how once the action became general it was joined by the Roman cavalry and the occasional fleeing chariot.
This gives us another case of 'skirmishing' chariots not doing any actual skirmishing, but when they individually put in an appearance they act in an (admittedly involuntary) shock role. To my mind, this raises serious questions about our categorisation of chariots and their effect in battle (specifically on the tabletop). Just how far did 'skirmishing' chariots actually skirmish, and do we need to adopt something like Richards Taylor's concept of 'skirmishing' being a cover term for activities while awaiting an opportunity for effective shock action? And did the 'light' chariots of the Ancient Near East actually do anything other than charge?
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on September 02, 2018, 08:12:49 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 31, 2018, 07:42:17 PM
Any suggestions? :)
Not really, tho WP's Category:Egyptology journals (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Egyptology_journals) might be a starting point. Note that the German-language ones seem to accept English-language submissions.
My thanks. The JEA would be an obvious starting point although it is by nature more interested in archaeology than history.
Thanks patrick for the re-interpretation of Mons Graupius. Nice to have some new material, rather than repeating ourselves.
I think one of the issues is you clearly have a definition of skirmishing which involves throwing missiles and not much else. Others (me for example) may use a different definition. This could explain why we disagree - we are defining terms differently.
"Meanwhile our cavalry had routed the enemy's charioteers and mingled in the engagement of the infantry. But although they at first spread panic, they were soon impeded by the close array of the enemy ranks [densis ... hostium agminibus] and by the inequalities of the ground. With the least bit of level ground our men made a fight, while the slightest slope threw men and horses together, and often chariots, destitute of guidance, their terrified horses without drivers, dashed as panic urged them, sideways, or in direct collision against the ranks."
I presume the key is in the Latin, but why do you assume the ranks in the last sentence are different to those in the first? Also, if the ranks are specifically Roman, why it refers to infantry? The previous sentence refers to the problems of the ground gave the cavalry, while the second explains the effect in more detail, doesn't it?
I think it is a real stretch here to read a ramming tactical model into the behaviour of the Caledonians on the basis of what driverless chariots did in a confined space.
I look forward to the views of people who have track record on Britons and Caledonians comments on your ideas.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 02, 2018, 07:57:46 AM
The later source may have tapped a new vein of information not available to the earlier source, and/or the earlier source may have had contemporary motivation to misrepresent matters (see Polybius on Timaeus and Fabius Pictor, for example, and compare Velleius Paterculus with Tacitus).
It is certainly possible.
And in this specific case, "Thymbra," must have come from somewhere.
But... at such great temporal distance, the accumulation of new detail is normally more suspect, than a reflection of better sources.
Whether this bears on chariots, is a different matter.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 02, 2018, 09:53:02 AM
I think one of the issues is you clearly have a definition of skirmishing which involves throwing missiles and not much else. Others (me for example) may use a different definition. This could explain why we disagree - we are defining terms differently.
I tend to regard skirmishing as attemtping to wear down the opponent by use of missiles; there is obviouysly more to it than a simple missile exchange, i.e. use of evasion, cover, loose formations and generally getting out of harm's way if possible. Would you like to expound your defintion so we can see whether our wavelengths are coinciding, interfering or jamming? ;)
Quote"Meanwhile our cavalry had routed the enemy's charioteers and mingled in the engagement of the infantry. But although they at first spread panic, they were soon impeded by the close array of the enemy ranks [densis ... hostium agminibus] and by the inequalities of the ground. With the least bit of level ground our men made a fight, while the slightest slope threw men and horses together, and often chariots, destitute of guidance, their terrified horses without drivers, dashed as panic urged them, sideways, or in direct collision against the ranks."
I presume the key is in the Latin, but why do you assume the ranks in the last sentence are different to those in the first?
Mainly because the infantry on both sides are now enaged in close combat on the hill, so the ranks which would have been engaged by the Roman cavalry would be the front (and to an extent flanks) of the Caledonian infantry, whereas the driverless chariots would have been starting on or around the plain, so when they get to the hill where the action is they would almost certainly have to encounter Romans.
QuoteAlso, if the ranks are specifically Roman, why it refers to infantry? The previous sentence refers to the problems of the ground gave the cavalry, while the second explains the effect in more detail, doesn't it?
Yes, and then introduces the driverless chariots. Whether this is specific to the Roman cavalry (whom Agricola seems to withdraw prior to the next stage of the battle) is another matter; the general view seems to be that the chariots went through the infantry of both sides.
QuoteI think it is a real stretch here to read a ramming tactical model into the behaviour of the Caledonians on the basis of what driverless chariots did in a confined space.
The chariots do not seem to have been in a confined space. As mentioned, they were on the plain and that is where they were tackled and defeated by the Roman cavalry. While this was going on, skirmishing began between the infantry of both sides and Agricola ordered an advance. This indicates the chariots had pulled out to the wings on the plain, leaving a line of advance clear for the Roman infantry.
The Roman auxilia close and make contact uphill, so they are already off the plain. Then the cavalry join in, it being unclear whether on the wings (as I would guess) or just piling in along the front (less likely, in my estimation). This leaves the driverless chariots still careering around on the plain until they bolt (presumably away from the legions, the Roman cavalry reserve and perhaps also the Caledones' downhill flanking movement) up the hill. Going up the hill would introduce them to the back end of the Romans fighting on the hill.
QuoteI look forward to the views of people who have track record on Britons and Caledonians comments on your ideas.
That will be interesting, especially given the translation issues concerning this battle. What does seem clear is the absence of skirmishing behaviour by allegedly skirmish-type chariots. Whether they did skirmish and Tacitus has omitted the details is a theoretical possibility, but so far the only attested skirmish-like behaviour by any chariots outside Ireland seems to be that faced by Julius Caesar's troops in Britain in 55 BC.
If anyone has any other source material to demonstrate skirmishing by any chariots, please feel free to mention it.
Finally, the behaviour of the driverless chariots at Mons Graupius seems to reinforce the idea that chariots can hit and plough through (or into) enemy lines without disabling themselves. I say 'seems to' because it is a conclusion from absence of evidence - Tacitus does not make any reference to disintegrating or even damaged chariots - as opposed to clear positive information that the chariots passed through the battling troops leaving flattened soldiery in their wake.
Quote from: Dangun on September 02, 2018, 02:19:16 PM
But... at such great temporal distance, the accumulation of new detail is normally more suspect, than a reflection of better sources.
As a historian of sorts, I would disagree. The accumulation of new detail is in my experience more a factor of the diligence of the historian than of temporal distance relating to reliability. Polybius, for example, was writing well after such writers as the egregious Fabius Pictor, but unlike the latter, who presented every engagement between Roman and Carthaginian armies as a Roman success (for Cannae he gave the Romans a smaller army and botched the casualty count), Polybius went around finding out exact details from as many reliable or apparently reliable sources as possible (his discovery of Hannibal's bronze tablet in Bruttium being a case in point). So Polybius added new detail and composed a more accurate account than the earlier Fabius P.
Given that Xenophon gives every indication of attention to detail, I would put his extra details down to diligent collection, not attempted fabrication.
Historical reliability is not a linear phenomenon like radioactive decay. It depends at least as much on the quality of the historian as the quality of the material.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 02, 2018, 09:19:57 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on September 02, 2018, 09:53:02 AM
I think one of the issues is you clearly have a definition of skirmishing which involves throwing missiles and not much else. Others (me for example) may use a different definition. This could explain why we disagree - we are defining terms differently.
I tend to regard skirmishing as attemtping to wear down the opponent by use of missiles; there is obviouysly more to it than a simple missile exchange, i.e. use of evasion, cover, loose formations and generally getting out of harm's way if possible. Would you like to expound your defintion so we can see whether our wavelengths are coinciding, interfering or jamming? ;)
I would go for a wider definition . The OED has "To engage in a skirmish or irregular encounter; to fight in small parties." To me skirmishing is something not done in formal battlelines, being more irregular and less rigid, perhaps more individual. Following from these, it is often more mobile and fluid. Now, it follows that a type of fight where the engagement of the two sides isn't rigid will often involve missiles but I say that was a consequence rather a defining trait. In the light of that definition, the mobile warfare of Caesar's British chariots seem essentially skirmishing, using mobility against the enemy and hit-and-run delivery of dismounted crew, who rapidly disengage if things get too hot.
For anyone more interested in fact than fantasy, Mons Graupius is a nice illustration of the problems with constructing detailed models of combat from a translation or even from an original text. Tacitus is known for his highly condensed language - as it says in the Loeb introduction, "Tacitus condenses to a degree so great that a literal English translation in the same number of words is almost unintelligible; and his condensations not merely obscure but sometimes distort his meaning."
As a result there are some spectacular variations in the translations. This isn't due to lack of skill on the part of the translators, they are just trying to construct a coherent narrative given the highly condensed original and - what's worse - the dubious state of the text (ch. 36 contains some well known problems in the manuscripts). There are two particular problem passages - 'ut fugere covinnarii' and 'minimeque aequa nostris iam pugnae facies erat' with the latter being an emendation (which is why the older translations talk about 'not the least appearance was left of an engagement of cavalry' or similar) from the original text 'minimeq equestres ea enim pugnae facies erat' which is not in the modified Latin text to be found on Perseus. Having the charioteers mingle with the infantry was the general view of these older translations (by punctuating and excluding 'ut', as 'interim equitum turmae fugere; covinnarii peditum se proelio miscuere', though I tend to think it's the turmae equitum (these being Roman - 'interim equitum turmae, ut fugere covinnarii, peditum se proelio miscuere') but I could certainly be wrong. Note the uncertainty about who is doing what to whom, and which side is being referred to - not just with the driverless chariots but in most sentences.
Here's my attempt at a very literal translation of the Perseus version of the text (though it's a poor attempt as I've forgotten too much of Tacitus' usage to be sure of several clauses. I did Agricola as a set text, but that was over 30 years ago...):
"Meanwhile the squadrons of cavalry, as the charioteers to flee, mingled with the battle of infantry. And although recently they induced terror, however the density of the enemy line and unevenness of ground impeded them; and it was not at all an equal fight for ours, with standing on uneven slopes while driven by the bodies of horses; and often empty chariots, terrified riderless horses, wherever fear drove them, ran in sideways or full on."
Who, what or how the empty chariots and riderless (or driverless) horses ran into is not defined, nor is the result.
Quote from: RichT on September 03, 2018, 01:33:21 PM
Here's my attempt at a very literal translation of the Perseus version of the text (though it's a poor attempt as I've forgotten too much of Tacitus' usage to be sure of several clauses. I did Agricola as a set text, but that was over 30 years ago...):
"Meanwhile the squadrons of cavalry, as the charioteers to flee, mingled with the battle of infantry. And although recently they induced terror, however the density of the enemy line and unevenness of ground impeded them; and it was not at all an equal fight for ours, with standing on uneven slopes while driven by the bodies of horses; and often empty chariots, terrified riderless horses, wherever fear drove them, ran in sideways or full on."
Who, what or how the empty chariots and riderless (or driverless) horses ran into is not defined, nor is the result.
Thanks for that, Richard; I think you have the essence of the passage. As you mention, Tacitus' tight style can be enigmatic at times; familiarity with it does help.
I would suggest that
ac saepe vagi currus, exterriti sine rectoribus equi be rendered:
and often a stray driverless chariot with terrified horses, as literally it is: 'and often a stray chariot, terrified without drivers horses'. There is no conjunction to distinguish the horses from the chariots as different travelling entities.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 03, 2018, 08:41:19 AM
I would go for a wider definition . The OED has "To engage in a skirmish or irregular encounter; to fight in small parties." To me skirmishing is something not done in formal battlelines, being more irregular and less rigid, perhaps more individual. Following from these, it is often more mobile and fluid. Now, it follows that a type of fight where the engagement of the two sides isn't rigid will often involve missiles but I say that was a consequence rather a defining trait. In the light of that definition, the mobile warfare of Caesar's British chariots seem essentially skirmishing, using mobility against the enemy and hit-and-run delivery of dismounted crew, who rapidly disengage if things get too hot.
As described by Caesar, it does indeed contain such elements.
"Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generally break the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. The charioteers in the mean time withdraw some little distance from the battle, and so place themselves with the chariots that, if their masters are overpowered by the number of the enemy, they may have a ready retreat to their own troops. Thus they display in battle the speed of horse, [together with] the firmness of infantry ..." - Gallic War IV.33
The delivery of dismounted crew appears to be more hit than run (they only leave in adverse circumstances, a term generally considered as 'withdrawal'), but the initial driving about throwing weapons seems to fall within the skirmishing category. Is it, though? Movement and missile use need not involve skirmishing, as in the caracole, where files of missile cavalry circulate before an enemy formation with each man discharging his weapon in turn and reloading while in the movement cycle. Arrian's description of Roman cavalry exercises reveals a similar technique which owes at least part of its repertoire to Gallic cavalry.
In wargaming, we tend to assume that any formation not standing still to shoot is defined as skirmishing (shooting while charging being an exception). This works well enough in most cases, but raises questions when a skirmishing unit wishes to charge. The generality of pre-gunpowder mounted formations seem to have been able to move straight into a charge from their missile-using status without a discernible formation change. There are exceptions, for example the 'circulating' Scythians Alexander routed at the Jaxartes, and, formation change or no, Numidians exhibit behaviour that we would all agree constitutes 'skirmishing': the darting forth to use missiles, the shoal-like evasion if attacked, the prompt return to harassment once pursuit ceases and the ability to maintain cohesion throughout such manoeuvres.
Taking Numidians as our basic model, do we see British chariots exhibiting these characteristics? Maybe. In the following year, Caesar brings a cavalry contingent of his own and it acts as his vanguard. In Gallic War V.16, the Roman cavalry, having helped to repulse the Britons' chariots and cavalry in what resembles a regular engagement, have their own troubles:
"... the horse also fought with great danger, because they [the Britons] generally retreated even designedly, and, when they had drawn off our men a short distance from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry engagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat and to those who pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close order*, but in small parties and at great distances, and had detachments placed [in different parts], and then the one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded the wearied."
*
conferti, side-by-side, packed together
This lure-away-and-dismounted-counterattack technique attested by Caesar seems unique to British chariotry; the Gallic chariots at Sentinum just charged. The behaviour of British chariots does not resemble the shoal-like reactivity of Numidian cavalry, but it is flexible and involves relief of participants by reserves. We can indeed say (as previously) that British chariots indulged in skirmishing, but this simply highlights the dearth of indications or references to other chariots doing anything except routing opponents by a charge and/or driving into/through them as part of an attack.
When I, some pages back, referred to British chariots as "skirmishers", I really only meant they weren't Swantonian shock weapons. I'm happy to concede that dismounting to display "the firmness of infantry" doesn't sound like skirmishing in any strict sense :)
(I similarly characterized Xenophon's Cyrenaeans: this too was meant loosely, as all I know of their tactics is Xenophon's statement that they fought only at a distance, in "Trojan" style. Judging by the Iliad, this might have involved plenty of dismounting too, albeit apparently not closing to hand-strokes while on foot.)
Swerving for a movement into wargaming, the Triumph! rules I've written about elsewhere (SL review forthcoming) perhaps interestingly divide chariots into two classes, "Chariots" and "Battle Taxis". The former include Near Eastern, Indian, Chinese, etc. chariots and are functionally shock cavalry light, less likely to ride down formed foot than Knights, but also less likely to get themselves killed trying. The letter include Mycenaean, Trojan, and Celtic vehicles and are something like skirmishers on wheels, not very strong but able to to evade heavier enemy when things go wrong. This apparently reflects a sort of Watersonian-Swantonian-light view of things.
(Scythed chariots are not dealt with by the base rules. An expansion will apparently treat them as a one-shot fire-and-forget weapon, sort of like an ancient guided missile.)
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on September 04, 2018, 09:36:00 AM
When I, some pages back, referred to British chariots as "skirmishers", I really only meant they weren't Swantonian shock weapons. I'm happy to concede that dismounting to display "the firmness of infantry" doesn't sound like skirmishing in any strict sense :)
(I similarly characterized Xenophon's Cyrenaeans: this too was meant loosely, as all I know of their tactics is Xenophon's statement that they fought only at a distance, in "Trojan" style. Judging by the Iliad, this might have involved plenty of dismounting too, albeit apparently not closing to hand-strokes while on foot.)
I don't think I'd disagree but, as I've already said, it depends how you conceive of skirmishing. I'm not convinced that Caesar's opponents formed rigid close order phalanxes when they dismounted, for example.
I'm not entirely convinced by the "battle taxi" idea. It seems to me that there has been some forgetting that cavalry dismounted in certain circumstances in Ancient combat and this might be a more appropriate comparison.
As to the "Waterson-Swintonian" model, it originally only allowed for ramming chariots. Justin has been quiet recently, so we don't know how his thinking is developing, but I think Patrick now allows some flexibility for light chariots, in that they don't just ram things.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 04, 2018, 10:40:11 AM
I don't think I'd disagree but, as I've already said, it depends how you conceive of skirmishing. I'm not convinced that Caesar's opponents formed rigid close order phalanxes when they dismounted, for example.
I wouldn't expect particularly tight and rigid formations either - it would be hard to get out of them and onto the chariots in a hurry - but Caesar implies they possessed a firmness generally lacking in cavalry, which has to imply some degree of "heaviness".
QuoteI'm not entirely convinced by the "battle taxi" idea. It seems to me that there has been some forgetting that cavalry dismounted in certain circumstances in Ancient combat and this might be a more appropriate comparison.
I think the class is primarily based on Homeric (and Irish?) literature, where champions are driven to battle and jump off to do heroic stuff. It's probably a bad fit for say Gallic chariots, which seem to have been for fighting, rather than dismounting, from.
QuoteAs to the "Waterson-Swintonian" model, it originally only allowed for ramming chariots. Justin has been quiet recently, so we don't know how his thinking is developing, but I think Patrick now allows some flexibility for light chariots, in that they don't just ram things.
I brought it up in part because I thought it might be interesting if the gentlemen in question opined whether they thought it sounded like a good model. :)
(Perhaps needless to say, I have some major reservations about it myself.)
Might I take the opportunity to point out that chariots never 'just ram things', but if in the course of their demolition of enemy infantry formations they encounter men who stay put, they have sufficient advantage in size, weight and impact to bowl over individuals without appreciable hindrance, and only deep formations or tight, cohesive ones will cause them any problems.
The Brito-Irish chariot tradition appears to be distinct from anywhere else (at least on such information as we have at present), and my own interest is mainly with the mainstream. What emerges from the said mainstream is that there seems to be no apparent corelation between chariot weight and chariot role. Justin's initial examples indicate how easily horses flatten individual humans, and two pairs of horses pulling two light chariots would seem to have similar impact potential to one set of four horses pulling a heavy chariot.
The British chariot tradition also has chariots bursting through formations on occasion, as previously referred to. What we lack, and feel the lack of, is how British chariots were normally employed in battles between British tribes. All we have on them is how they acted against Romans, who were not the kind of opponents or military tradition they were designed to face.
Like Andreas and Anthony, I am unconvinced by the 'battle taxi' concept. Nestor's speech about chariot fighting in the Iliad is very much about straight lines and fighting mounted, and Homer's heroic encounters are usually of the hero-throws-something-which-strikes-down-warrior-or-driver variety, with occasional dismounted action, the latter usually when someone is down and it is a question of finishing him off and stripping his armour (others on his side sometimes object and interfere). The Britons in Caesar's account use their chariot crews in a dismounted role as part of their repertoire, but by no means is this their exclusive or even primary modus operandi. Like Andreas, I see them as assembling into coherent formations to fight, this being particularly necessary for their tactics of luring Roman cavalry away from the main army and then dismounting to fight them; this would fail spectacularly if they dismounted in loose skirmishing formation.
Justin is currently finishing Issue 319 to make sure Slingshot gets back on schedule.
So how much thought have you given the the location and shape of the axel in your theory, Patrick?.
It seems pretty fundamental to the designed use, and features in a lot of other studies.
What effect do you think that has, why was it changed over time, what does that tell us about the intended use?
Quote from: Mark G on September 05, 2018, 07:14:47 AM
So how much thought have you given the the location and shape of the axel in your theory, Patrick?.
It seems pretty fundamental to the designed use, and features in a lot of other studies.
What effect do you think that has, why was it changed over time, what does that tell us about the intended use?
A single isolated form-to-function argument cannot override the united evidence of such historical data as we possess. Just because chariots had a wide enough axle base to avoid tipping over during a turn does not mean they were intended to spend their entire time turning, or that it should form the basis of their battlefield tactics.
In any event, the chariots with really wide axle bases were the scythed chariots of Cyrus the Elder..
"... he had chariots of war constructed with strong wheels, so that they might not easily be broken,
and with long axles; for anything broad is less likely to be overturned. The box for the driver he constructed out of strong timbers in the form of a turret; and this rose in height to the drivers' elbows, so that they could manage the horses by reaching over the top of the box; and, besides, he covered the drivers with mail, all except their eyes. On both sides of the wheels, moreover, he attached to the axles steel scythes about two cubits long and beneath the axles other scythes pointing down toward the ground; this was so arranged
with the intention of hurling the chariots into the midst of the enemy." - Xenophon,
Cyropaedia VI.1.29-30
And that rather finishes off the wide axles = skirmishing argument.
Moving on to the central vs rear axle, this would seem to be mainly a load-bearing consideration. Rear axles are optimal for speed, while a central axle is optimal for load-bearing. Larger chariots tend to move the axle to the mid-point under the chariot. A consideration of the forces exerted on the point where the pole joins the chariot indicates why this was the case: in deceleration, the force is the mass of the crew and chariot body multiplied by the distance between the front of the chariot and its axle. This distance, interestingly, seems pretty much constant whatever the size of the chariot; in larger (and heavier) chariots the axle is moved more centrally (and a shock absorber mounted above the chariot pole) to minimise the moment of decelerative force.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on September 04, 2018, 07:23:33 PM
Might I take the opportunity to point out that chariots never 'just ram things', but if in the course of their demolition of enemy infantry formations they encounter men who stay put, they have sufficient advantage in size, weight and impact to bowl over individuals without appreciable hindrance, and only deep formations or tight, cohesive ones will cause them any problems.
Ramming is, of course, Justin's take (the clue is in the thread title). Though referring to the first sentence of the first post, Justin only said this was their primary role and they had other secondary roles like troop transport. We all accept that, in the right circumstances, light chariots would be amongst infantry (and cavalry) like a shot. But this is only part of their repetoire and may not be their main role.
[/quote]
Quote
The Brito-Irish chariot tradition appears to be distinct from anywhere else (at least on such information as we have at present),
You could, of course, postulate an entire pan-European chariot culture of which the British and Irish examples were the final flourishing. Or perhaps just a "Celtic" chariot culture. The archaeological evidence we have for British chariots at least points to a similar vehicle to earlier Gallic chariots, though the only Gallic battle description we have discussed doesn't allow straightforward comparison of tactics. Are there other descriptions out there we haven't seen?
Quote from: Erpingham on September 05, 2018, 09:44:33 AM
Ramming is, of course, Justin's take (the clue is in the thread title).
Justin can doubtless tell us if he meant that chariot tactics would have involved deliberate driving into opponents or whether he was just pointing out their impact potential, which would leave them unafraid to do so and effective if they did.
Quote
You could, of course, postulate an entire pan-European chariot culture of which the British and Irish examples were the final flourishing. Or perhaps just a "Celtic" chariot culture. The archaeological evidence we have for British chariots at least points to a similar vehicle to earlier Gallic chariots, though the only Gallic battle description we have discussed doesn't allow straightforward comparison of tactics. Are there other descriptions out there we haven't seen?
The only examples we have of Gallic chariot use, or at least those of which yours truly is presently aware, are 1) Sentinum and 2) the 'elephant victory'; in each case, the Gallic chariots either deploy with intent or go in all the way; in neither case do they even hint at skirmishing. Gallic chariots were present at Telamon, but appear to have done precisely nothing in that particular battle.
Gallic chariots presumably featured at the Allia in 390 BC, but are ignored by our sources who content themselves with describing the Roman collapse in general terms. They are clearly mentioned at Sentinum in 295 BC, and their actions there we have already examined. The Gallic tribe concerned is the same in each of these cases: the Senones.
Postulating a pan-European chariot culture seems plausible, but if so, which path did it follow? Or would it have been one culture with several differing tactical tribal traditions? Unfortunately we only get tactical information (and not much of that) when pan-European chariots encounter literary cultures on the European fringes, and what we have suggests that Gauls and Britons used their fundamentally similar vehicles in fundamentally different ways.
It all seems so clear, it makes you wonder why no one else agrees with your radical new theory
Quote from: Mark G on September 05, 2018, 09:28:57 PM
It all seems so clear, it makes you wonder why no one else agrees with your radical new theory
Perhaps they will. Give them time and a chance to look up sources and think things over.
You will have to get published first.
Any plans?
I must admit that, while I know Justin's conjecture, I am less clear what the theory Patrick will publish is. Patrick has presented a lot of ideas around the fact that light and heavy chariots were used the same way but I'm not sure they have come together in a theory. Perhaps publication would facilitate that process, however.
Going back to Celtic chariots again, Patrick states the only descriptions of Gallic chariots are Sentinum and the "Elephant Victory". Do we have the evidence that Galatian chariot use mirrored that of their European brethren, or was it influenced by Near Eastern use?
Quote from: Erpingham on September 06, 2018, 08:52:20 AMGoing back to Celtic chariots again, Patrick states the only descriptions of Gallic chariots are Sentinum and the "Elephant Victory". Do we have the evidence that Galatian chariot use mirrored that of their European brethren, or was it influenced by Near Eastern use?
The "Elephant Victory" took place only about three years after the Galatians crossed to Asia. It's probably a bit too soon for any Near Eastern influence.
Quote from: Duncan Head on September 06, 2018, 09:02:51 AM
The "Elephant Victory" took place only about three years after the Galatians crossed to Asia. It's probably a bit too soon for any Near Eastern influence.
I guess that leaves us with a choice of improbabilities: Either the Galatians had picked up scythed chariots within just three years in Asia, or they'd independently invented them back home in Europe, or Lucian was wrong about them using them.
(Actually, given the sort of writer he was and how much later he was writing, I'm not sure the last counts as an improbability.)
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on September 06, 2018, 09:35:14 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on September 06, 2018, 09:02:51 AM
The "Elephant Victory" took place only about three years after the Galatians crossed to Asia. It's probably a bit too soon for any Near Eastern influence.
I guess that leaves us with a choice of improbabilities: Either the Galatians had picked up scythed chariots within just three years in Asia, or they'd independently invented them back home in Europe, or Lucian was wrong about them using them.
(Actually, given the sort of writer he was and how much later he was writing, I'm not sure the last counts as an improbability.)
I had previously assumed option A, local acquisition. It fits with Lucian's describing the Galatian front ranks as bronze-cuirassed - which is only likely to have been true if they acquired local loot in significant amounts - and Livy's brief description of them rampaging all over Asia Minor defeating everyone in sight and extracting tribute in the years immediately after the crossing.
But I am now wondering about the last option.
So, just to clarify my understanding, because I'm not familiar with this stuff, the two front runners are either the Galatians have captured some scythed chariots but are using them according to some Celtic model (not having absorbed the tactical use because they haven't been in Asia Minor long enough) or Lucian is applying poetic licence?
Quote from: Erpingham on September 06, 2018, 11:56:23 AM
So, just to clarify my understanding, because I'm not familiar with this stuff, the two front runners are either the Galatians have captured some scythed chariots but are using them according to some Celtic model (not having absorbed the tactical use because they haven't been in Asia Minor long enough)
I'm not sure if there is necessarily any "Celtic model" to the way the scythed chariots are used. At Sentinum and Telamon the Gallic chariots are deployed on the wings, in the first case at least along with the cavalry; but at the Elephant Victory the chariots (scythed and otherwise) were initially deployed behind the centre, to attack through lanes opened in the infantry phalanx.
Given that the chariots (scythed or otherwise) at the Elephant Victory all ran away before they even got within bowshot of the elephants, it's a bit hard to guess what their intended role would have been. If the Galatians acquired Seleucid scythed chariots in AM (which doesn't seem that unlikely in three years) it's fair to assume they would use them in the way they were designed to be used, by driving them at the enemy. Deploying them behind their own infantry and driving through them (assuming for the sake of argument that Lucian's account is accurate) is innovative (or foolish) but bears no relation either to Sentinum or to Achaemenid or Seleucid usage (so far as they are known) either. The only similarity to Sentinum would be that chariots are deployed behind someone else, but that's pretty tenuous.
It seems reasonable to guess that the Galatians' intent (assuming Lucian's accuracy) would be to drive the scythed chariots at the Seleucids to break up their order, then exploit the gaps with their regular chariots and infantry. Now this is similar in outline to what happened at Sentinum except there the role of initial line breakers went (by chance) to the Roman cavalry and fear rather than scythed chariots. It is also exactly what we would expect from chariots (or cavalry) - attacking and exploiting a broken and disordered infantry force - and fits perfectly well with the 'skirmishing plus' model of chariots that, so far as I am aware, everyone has always agreed on.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 06, 2018, 11:56:23 AM
So, just to clarify my understanding, because I'm not familiar with this stuff, the two front runners are either the Galatians have captured some scythed chariots but are using them according to some Celtic model (not having absorbed the tactical use because they haven't been in Asia Minor long enough) or Lucian is applying poetic licence?
As Duncan says, there does not appear to be a 'Celtic model' for scythed chariot use. The non-scythed chariots at Sentinum were, judging by their deployment position and lack of participation in the cavalry action until the Gallic cavalry had twice failed against their Roman counterparts, intended to attack the Roman infantry and only the Roman infantry. We can safely assume that every Gallic chariots ('Galatian' is from the Greek for Gallic) in the 'elephant victory' was, whether or not it had scythes, similarly intended to attack the Seleucid infantry. They all deployed at the same time and in the same way.
Quote from: RichT on September 06, 2018, 01:47:57 PM
It is also exactly what we would expect from chariots (or cavalry) - attacking and exploiting a broken and disordered infantry force - and fits perfectly well with the 'skirmishing plus' model of chariots that, so far as I am aware, everyone has always agreed on.
This is redefinition with a vengeance. The problem with any 'skirmishing plus' model (which itself sits poorly with the devotees of pure skirmishing unless and until the enemy routs) is that the attested behaviour of Gallic chariots at both Sentinum and the 'elephant victory' shows only 'plus' and no skirmishing.
Actually, it is interesting to see how the concept of chariot use changes over time. Game designers SPI published two games on Biblical period warfare:
Armageddon and
Chariot. In the first, chariots (of all nations) were unequivocally shock weapons; in the second, published about a decade later, they were uncompromisingly skirmish platforms. Fashion changes, sometimes quite radically. The only things which do not change are our original sources.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 06, 2018, 08:52:20 AM
I must admit that, while I know Justin's conjecture, I am less clear what the theory Patrick will publish is. Patrick has presented a lot of ideas around the fact that light and heavy chariots were used the same way but I'm not sure they have come together in a theory.
Patrick thinks what he has presented has been mainly source information plus thoughts on the implications of such information. He hesitates to compile a theory on account of the information being scanty and hence not necessarily presenting a full picture. His main focus thus far has been to dispense with any ideas that chariots would never drive into/through infantry formations (or would disintegrate if they tried) and to point out that chariot lightness seems not to correlate with role. We have under consideration several different cultures and time periods, and attempting to wrap them all up in a single all-embracing theory could easily be wrong. At present the best he can do is point to trends and point out which assumptions are and are not supported by such information as we have.
But he is working on it. If he gets as far as a conjectural chariot manual he will doubtless let everyone know.
Thanks patrick for your explanation of your "non-theory". I suppose we must leave it to others to assess that. I think the one thing we can agree on is that the lack of evidence making it hard to make definitive statements. Although this has not stopped others like Drews or Ferrill writing books about the subject.
I find I can't agree with your summation of Celtic chariotry. It seems to me to work more in support of cavalry in most instances we have - the "Elephant victory" seems to be the exception, perhaps prompted by the opportunities afforded by (or adoption of traditional tactics for) scythed chariots. But with such a small sample, separated by such a great geographic and time spread, a clear pattern eludes us.
Quote from: Erpingham on September 07, 2018, 10:14:15 AM
I find I can't agree with your summation of Celtic chariotry.
But are we of the same mind as to what constitutes 'Celtic', and are we looking for a single common tactical doctrine?
QuoteIt seems to me to work more in support of cavalry in most instances we have - the "Elephant victory" seems to be the exception, perhaps prompted by the opportunities afforded by (or adoption of traditional tactics for) scythed chariots.
What information we have concerning Sentinum demonstrates that in this particular battle the Gallic chariotry did not work in support of cavalry until it absolutely had to, i.e. it had been assigned a role which had nothing to do with supporting cavalry, and hence sat tight while the Gallic cavalry was defeated by the Romans not once, but twice. Had it been in a cavalry support role, it would havce been committed either at the outset or at the very latest imediately after the first failed attempt by the Gallic cavalry to deal with their Roman counterparts. So we can strike Sentinum off the cavalry support role doctrine shortlist. The chariots did so, of course, but not by design.
The Britons are recorded as using their chariots and cavalry together, although the Roman cavalry seems quickly to get the measure of both in open fight. Patrol and foraging work is another matter; Caesar's cavalry tend to get the worst of being lured off by subsequently dismounting chariotry (exactly how this worked I am not sure). One feature to bear in mind about Britons is that they do not seem to have had good Gallic-style cavalry horses, but rather smaller pony types. One could have effective period cavalry on small horses (Germans) but in a straight fight against Roman cavalry Britons on ponyback would be at a disadvantage. In Caesar's accounts it seems to be more a matter of British cavalry supporting chariots than chariots supporting cavalry. That said, the inadequacy of British cavalry in a shock role could explain why the Britons retained chariots when the Gauls had already dispensed with them.
QuoteBut with such a small sample, separated by such a great geographic and time spread, a clear pattern eludes us.
Yes, we have a set of isolated seemingly one-off patterns and from this we attempt to extract some sort of cohesive common factor(s). The difficulty we face is missing link syndrome: we lack parts of the story.