There are plenty of cases of an infantry line fighting an opponent and finally (or suddenly) deciding to turn and flee. Question is, why would it do so? A typical battleline is probably at least 6 ranks deep and usually more. Only the front rank is actually putting its life on the line; the other ranks are there to supply support and prevent the front men precisely from running. The individuals who might feel things weren't going their way had to be the front rankers, and they were the ones who couldn't make a run for it. So what would motivate the rear ranks to bolt, allowing the front ranks to follow suit? There must have been some psychological signal that conveyed the message "We're not going to win." What was that signal? It wouldn't be a pile of corpses as battleline losses were very low until one side actually broke and was pursued.
This is different from a line that is flanked or rear-ended in which the back ranks, who can easily start running, realise it's all over for their unit and more importantly for them if they don't leg it.
I don't have a prefab answer ready to go BTW. I've been curious about this question for some time.
And to the floor.
one possibility is 'ripple effect' combined with lots of experience or very little experience of the troops turning to flee
if something bad happens on another side of the battlefield eg a breakthrough charge into a unit of infantry, there can be the transmission of a kind of shock wave that travels rapidly through the press of bodies especially if closely formed. Add to that shouts of dismay and the effect can be quite unnerving. If this happens and the unit is very experienced it could 'know' what was about to happen and choose to flee before trouble finds them. OR if the unit is very inexperienced it could just perceive something bad had happened and just didnt want to hang around to find out what it was
Any number of reasons, depending whether the break is sudden or comes after steadily losing - losing men and/or losing ground - for a while. But one obvious reason is losing a commander and/or a unit standard - the tribune of the cataphracts at Argentorate is one example specifically picked up in a written source.
Would it be worth looking for this phenomenon in particular battles and seeing if we can work out the likely contributory causes?
I can generalise about fear, fatigue and lack of enthusiasm/training/cohesion/esprit de corps, but looking at some historical examples might put things into better perspective.
Also ask re-enactment people.
db
Phil Sabin's "Mechanics of Battle in the Second Punic War" suggests the following:
QuoteThe sources highlight a wide range of factors which might trigger flight despite this paradoxical logic. Livy cites several instances where armies fighting desperately against odds finally panicked when they suffered the psychological shock of their general being killed. An even more powerful trigger for flight was the surprise caused by an unexpected enemy attack. At all three of Hannibal's great initial victories, a key role was played by concealed ambushers or pretended deserters taking the Roman forces by surprise. This could bypass the initial stand-off which I discussed earlier, and allow the attackers to charge straight in and begin butchering their unprepared opponents. Even where such complete surprise was not attained, the shock of an unexpected enemy attack could leave no time for troops to gird themselves for prolonged resistance.
This leads on to a further cause of flight in Punic War battles, namely loss of formation cohesion. Undisciplined bodies of men incapable of forming a proper battle order melted away at the first shock as at Victumulae and Herdonea, even if they had previously seemed eager to engage. More disciplined troops caught before they could form up properly, as at Lake Trasimene and Baecula, were at a similar disadvantage, though they might be able to resist for a while in small improvised groups. Even formed troops were liable to panic if their formation was disordered by retreating comrades or rampaging elephants. Disrupting enemy cohesion was a key aim during the initial contest between formed bodies, and Scipio took care to recall his pursuing hastati and principes at Zama lest they run into Hannibal's veterans while in a disordered state.
Du Picq wrote that in ancient battles between troops of similar morale, 'the least fatigued always won'. Livy and Polybius do indeed repeatedly highlight exhaustion and physical suffering as contributing to an army's defeat, whether it be due to crossing a freezing river while the enemy sat around camp fires as at the Trebia, going without breakfast as at the Trebia and Ilipa, or forced marching and drunken carousing as at the Metaurus. What is interesting is that the battle accounts do not give much sense in practice of the theoretically greater endurance which Roman armies enjoyed due to their line relief system. Instead, it is the Roman forces which are often said to have suffered from greater fatigue, even at Zama where the tired hastati and principes had to face Hannibal's veterans who had hitherto been held in reserve.
The final factor which could break the resistance of troops is one which I have already highlighted at some length, namely attacks in flank and rear.
Part of the answer must be whether the battle appears to be going according to expectation (with the obvious aside that inexperienced troops don't know what to expect). Appears because the actual understanding of what is happening at the rear of a formation is limited. You can't see much (except maybe your standard above everyones heads) but you can hear stuff, because battles were noisy. But what does all that shouting, screaming and clashing of arms mean? Perhaps some wounded men are falling back through the formation - are there more than we expect? What are they saying - are we winning or being slaughtered? In this sort of information vacuum, sudden happenings of any sort can cause panic.
Take for example this occurence at the Fight at Re (1164), where King Erling's army had a solid core of royal troops and a less enthusiastic local levy
Erling told his men to sing a Paternoster, and beg God to give them the victory who best deserved it. Then they all sang aloud "Kyrie Eleison", and struck with their weapons on their shields. But with this singing 300 men of Erling's people slipped away and fled.
We can also note the Battle of laupen in 1339 where the retreat of the Bernese skirmish screen through their main battle caused 2000 men from the rear ranks to flee, thinking that those at the front were running away.
Certainly the unpleasant and unexpected can unnerve troops and cause them to run: death of general, loss of standard, flank attack, sudden appearance of troops in the rear, even just a big bang. But I'm thinking of those cases where the unexpected doesn't happen, just two infantry lines slogging away at each other until one folds.
Would recoil be the deciding factor? One line is outfought by the other and gives ground. Eventually enough ground is given for the losing troops to realise they aren't going to win this fight and come to a conclusion about the better part of valour.
Soldiers run because:
1) What they expected to happen is not happening. They may have expected to win and are now losing, they may have thought they were going to have a hard time and now it has suddenly got worse. I wonder if this explains why some flank attacks are devastating, some are not. The Romans do not break at Carrhae or the Crusaders at Arsuf because they expect to be surrounded and factored that in , including taking a lot of casualties from an enemy they cannot hit back at. I'd see the Romans at Gergovia going from over confidence to panic when the Gauls who were running were suddenly fighting back.
2) Loss of the leader. This is somewhat irrational as the army could be doing quite well at the time. It says something about the perceived bond between the soldier and his leader and may represent something very deep in the human psyche. You can, of course lose a leader and nit notice like the Visigoths at Chalons, or fight on determinedly as the Ostrogoths did at Mons Lactarius, so we should be careful of what effect we ascribe to the loss of a model general figure.
3) Exhaustion, both physical and mental. The Germans of Ariovistus were supposedly so done in that they could only stand whilst their Roman opponents ripped away their shields and killed them. I firmly believe that Roman tactics were geared to exhausting and degrading opponents until the opponents lost their edge and becoming exhausted started to suffer disproportionate casualties.
Its not a question of the rear ranks just being spectators whilst the front ranks fight. The ranks behind the first have roles in the fighting team, certainly the second rank can actually fight, ranks two to four nay give pushing support, will prevent rank one being pushed bak or over, may well supply cover and shields, in a foulkon are clearly part of missile defence. We should not be led astray by the notion that rank one is fighting whilst the rear ranks watch. Casualties in the early phases of battle are few , but when a side tires its men become vulnerable and the tight teams at the front become disrupted.
Once the rear ranks see that the men in front of them are dying they have a choice to make, to step forward and take on a new role, or to fall back and try and get out of the danger zone. At this point junior leaders will attempt to rally the men and they may well succeed, more likely if it is a disviplined army. If the troops rally and push firward, but the enemy dies not give then cause (1) will apply .
As others will recall I am very pro the idea that troops fight not as individuals within a a unit with only a relationship to the unit leader and then up the command chain, but in small teams. So a man at the front is getting support from those behind and at either side of him. All are doing their jobs. To an extent others in the team are capable of taking on a more prominent role if the main fighter becomes a casualty. Hoever, this disrupts the team and it will not be as effective as it was. Hence, if the front rank of a unit becomes exhausted before the enemy do, loses edge and gets incapacitated or killed then a reduced team faces an elated enemy team and the likelihood is that one side becomes dominant , drives the oppisition back and men start to disencumber themselves and run.
Roy
Recoil certainly would have an effect. Like I said earlier there is the possibility of a palpable physical shockwaves that rolls out when something disastrous happens at one end of the line. If you want to see somethng of this ilk in modern terms watch any number of police horse charges into protesters
I agree , Holly, but I suggest that what is important is whether the receivers of the shock are expecting it. If they are they will discount it , if not it might well tip morale to the point where the faint hearted start to leave.
Thus, if an infantry body is charged by cavalry or Justin's favoured chariotry, the infantry will , hopefully be braced and ready. They will expect a transmitted shock and will hope to hold. Only when it becomes obvious that there is a break-through will they have morale drastically lowered.
Of course, if you can arrange for your cavakry to be hidden by your infantry until the last moment then tgere will be a greater surpise effect.
Looking back to 319 and Patrick's elephant article the elephants were much more effective when they soldiers who were not used to them. and so were surprised. Troops who had been briefed, perhaps acquainted and given tactics were able to deal with the elephants even though they were causing casualties.
Roy
Quote from: aligern on October 19, 2018, 09:20:23 AM
Soldiers run because:
1) What they expected to happen is not happening. They may have expected to win and are now losing, they may have thought they were going to have a hard time and now it has suddenly got worse. I wonder if this explains why some flank attacks are devastating, some are not. The Romans do not break at Carrhae or the Crusaders at Arsuf because they expect to be surrounded and factored that in , including taking a lot of casualties from an enemy they cannot hit back at. I'd see the Romans at Gergovia going from over confidence to panic when the Gauls who were running were suddenly fighting back.
In the case where one side is not surrounded by another, or is not subjected to a unexpected and clearly noticeable event like a flank attack, what could individual soldiers detect above the general battle noise and mayhem that would tell them they were losing?
Quote from: aligern on October 19, 2018, 09:20:23 AM2) Loss of the leader. This is somewhat irrational as the army could be doing quite well at the time. It says something about the perceived bond between the soldier and his leader and may represent something very deep in the human psyche. You can, of course lose a leader and nit notice like the Visigoths at Chalons, or fight on determinedly as the Ostrogoths did at Mons Lactarius, so we should be careful of what effect we ascribe to the loss of a model general figure.
Sure. This would enter the category of unexpected events like getting flanked - something clearly noticeable by a large number of soldiers that could be taken as an indication they were losing. But in the absence of such indications?
Quote from: aligern on October 19, 2018, 09:20:23 AM3) Exhaustion, both physical and mental. The Germans of Ariovistus were supposedly so done in that they could only stand whilst their Roman opponents ripped away their shields and killed them. I firmly believe that Roman tactics were geared to exhausting and degrading opponents until the opponents lost their edge and becoming exhausted started to suffer disproportionate casualties.
Its not a question of the rear ranks just being spectators whilst the front ranks fight. The ranks behind the first have roles in the fighting team, certainly the second rank can actually fight, ranks two to four nay give pushing support, will prevent rank one being pushed bak or over, may well supply cover and shields, in a foulkon are clearly part of missile defence. We should not be led astray by the notion that rank one is fighting whilst the rear ranks watch. Casualties in the early phases of battle are few , but when a side tires its men become vulnerable and the tight teams at the front become disrupted.
Once the rear ranks see that the men in front of them are dying they have a choice to make, to step forward and take on a new role, or to fall back and try and get out of the danger zone. At this point junior leaders will attempt to rally the men and they may well succeed, more likely if it is a disviplined army. If the troops rally and push firward, but the enemy dies not give then cause (1) will apply.
As others will recall I am very pro the idea that troops fight not as individuals within a a unit with only a relationship to the unit leader and then up the command chain, but in small teams. So a man at the front is getting support from those behind and at either side of him. All are doing their jobs. To an extent others in the team are capable of taking on a more prominent role if the main fighter becomes a casualty. Hoever, this disrupts the team and it will not be as effective as it was. Hence, if the front rank of a unit becomes exhausted before the enemy do, loses edge and gets incapacitated or killed then a reduced team faces an elated enemy team and the likelihood is that one side becomes dominant , drives the oppisition back and men start to disencumber themselves and run.
Exhaustion can apply only to the front rank who actually use their weapons to spar and parry. The ranks behind them cannot become exhausted just from watching them and urging them on.
Re casualties, for a line 8 ranks deep you could expect half the front rank to be killed or seriously wounded before a rout, which means only part of the second rank is committed to the fight and none of the ranks behind them. Most of the men will not have to worry about actually fighting the enemy.
This does suggest something though: if the front rank overall is losing the fight - more of one's own side are getting killed than those of the enemy - could that trigger a loss of confidence? The second rankers are reluctant to take the place of those fallen in the first rank and give way, or try to give way. This backward pressure (for sure if you feel you're going to be killed by your opponent you back up against the men behind you whether they're supposed to keep you in place or not) is communicated to the rear ranks who fall back and eventually turn and run.
On the subject of backing up, I've notice that in every single form of combat that involves hand-held weapons one absolutely needs space to fall back in at some point in order to avoid the opponent's blows. Check these videos. It's a constant:
Fencing (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fqZJtCLLFdk)
Rapier fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2q40nsbXZE)
Saber fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5w2Mh6CyXo)
Mediaeval swordfighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHIhMBCOc1A)
Polearm fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSJgPVQJGyk)
Polish spear fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mYf6FHbA04M)
Masai spear fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGz8uhuHmRc)
Quarterstaff fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMjsHE5p2vs)
Deprive a man of that space and he is at a critical disadvantage - his opponent can avoid his blows but he can't avoid his opponent's. This suggests that a file is
meant to fall back if the file leader needs sparring room. Question is whether too much falling back would necessarily precipitate a rout and - barring unpleasant surprises like getting flanked - it is the only thing that would precipitate a rout?
I think there is general agreement that expectation has something to do with it. Expectation can come from training or experience. Elephants are less frightening if someone has said "This is what an elephant is like. This is how they fight. This is how we kill them". I think there is an example of Romans greeting scythed chariots with derision, because they are prepared for them.
On the matter of leader casualties, reactions seem to vary from panic to unease. William at Hastings had to show himself to his army to prove that he wasn't dead, yet clearly the army hadn't panicked so much it was beyond his control. Part of this must be about how things communicate on battlefields. William is dealing with a rumour he is dead - most people won't have seen what happened but a report ripples outward somehow.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 19, 2018, 10:29:56 AM
Deprive a man of that space and he is at a critical disadvantage - his opponent can avoid his blows but he can't avoid his opponent's. This suggests that a file is meant to fall back if the file leader needs sparring room. Question is whether too much falling back would necessarily precipitate a rout and - barring unpleasant surprises like getting flanked - it is the only thing that would precipitate a rout?
true. Not enough space and file leaders being pushed back violently could start a ripple effect. Too much room and it could allow gaps to be generated and exploited.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 19, 2018, 10:29:56 AMOn the subject of backing up, I've notice that in every single form of combat that involves hand-held weapons one absolutely needs space to fall back in at some point in order to avoid the opponent's blows.
None of those examples involves a shield. Does having a wall of big shields to block your opponent's blows make a major difference? Is a spear-fighting hoplite
expected to fall back?
Quote from: Holly on October 19, 2018, 11:25:42 AM
true. Not enough space and file leaders being pushed back violently could start a ripple effect. Too much room and it could allow gaps to be generated and exploited.
Thank goodness nobody proposed a style of combat where you rammed into the back of the file leader, turning him into a human battering ram ::)
Quote from: Holly on October 19, 2018, 11:25:42 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 19, 2018, 10:29:56 AM
Deprive a man of that space and he is at a critical disadvantage - his opponent can avoid his blows but he can't avoid his opponent's. This suggests that a file is meant to fall back if the file leader needs sparring room. Question is whether too much falling back would necessarily precipitate a rout and - barring unpleasant surprises like getting flanked - it is the only thing that would precipitate a rout?
true. Not enough space and file leaders being pushed back violently could start a ripple effect. Too much room and it could allow gaps to be generated and exploited.
I'm thinking this is why surrounded troops were invariably slaughtered. They are in an unexpected situation and hence demoralised. This makes them more cautious in combat and they tend to give way, but being surrounded means the troops are soon jammed together and the front rankers can no longer fall back. Unable to recoil, they are at a critical disadvantage and are soon dispatched.
Quote from: Duncan Head on October 19, 2018, 11:30:56 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 19, 2018, 10:29:56 AMOn the subject of backing up, I've notice that in every single form of combat that involves hand-held weapons one absolutely needs space to fall back in at some point in order to avoid the opponent's blows.
None of those examples involves a shield. Does having a wall of big shields to block your opponent's blows make a major difference? Is a spear-fighting hoplite expected to fall back?
The shield doesn't protect your face or legs. See here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9u3w6LWKWI) and here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c81Oc0-jl7Q).
Quote from: Duncan Head on October 19, 2018, 11:30:56 AM
None of those examples involves a shield. Does having a wall of big shields to block your opponent's blows make a major difference? Is a spear-fighting hoplite expected to fall back?
Did some troops expect to fall back? Probably. Being pushed back a distance while absorbing impact may have been common. Only if you you were pushed back too far or didn't seem to be able to stop might panic set in.
A general point on individual combat skills is that they may not replicate group combat skills. For example, individual styles in medieval fight manuals allow for a lot of movement but how much that could be replicated fighting shoulder-to-shoulder in formation is debateable.
Surrounded troops need not be slaughtered if they are prepared for that event and form square or globus to deal with it. What kills people is the disruption of the fighting team which gives the enemy an advantage and the disrupted a disadvantage. Being disordered does for you because one of the disordered is fighting two three opponents.
Several of the contributions here make the assumption that files fight one on one. This is just not so. each man has the support of those to right and left and behind. Files cannot retire singly, they must together, as Duncan pointed out, the shield wall is important because shields do not protect one man only.
Roy
Assuming we have shieldwall formations of close packed infantry rather than looser troops with more emphasis on individual fighting styles
Even thise with looser fighting stykes have to depend on thise either side of and behind them when in close combat. In a loose formation withdrawal by obe file is still very difficult. I suspect that the Hollywood mixed melee woukd be abhoeprrent to either side in combat. Who wants their back ir head exposed to an opponent.
oh gawd, not the Hollywood mixed melee ;D
agreed that cover from ones neighbours in the line and behind is important. I wonder how more tribal formations managed files and 'cover' on multiple lines (as an aside)
Quote from: Duncan Head on October 19, 2018, 11:30:56 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 19, 2018, 10:29:56 AMOn the subject of backing up, I've notice that in every single form of combat that involves hand-held weapons one absolutely needs space to fall back in at some point in order to avoid the opponent's blows.
None of those examples involves a shield. Does having a wall of big shields to block your opponent's blows make a major difference? Is a spear-fighting hoplite expected to fall back?
we know that among hoplites there was a big thing about NOT falling back
But we read of other peoples who 'think it's no shame to run away' and would just fight for a while, then decide, 'Sod this for a game of soldiers' and just run away and hide and get on with real life
Remember a lot of ancient soldiers weren't soldiers, they were just men who were effectively fulfilling the equivalent of a tax obligation. When it came to motivation, they had no real expectation that the world after they won the battle would be particularly better for them and their families than the world if they lost a battle. (Provided they personally lived through the experience.)
The battle of Delium (Thucydides IV.96) is an interesting case. The Boeotians and Athenians have about the same number of hoplites. The Thebans form up 25 deep on their army's right, leaving their fellow Boeotians to be outflanked.
The Boeotian left, as far as the centre, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each other. [4] In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them further and further back, though gradually at first.
Outflanking had proven to be more effective than depth; the Athenian left, despite being driven back, had held together, presumably in expectation that their victorious right would sooner or later turn the tables. But the Theban commander had moved two cavalry squadrons from his right wing, and ...
... their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing of the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming against them. [6] At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic, and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole Athenian army took to flight.
The flight of the Athenian right was accompanied by the collapse of the Athenian left. Either the Theban pressure had proved too much, or the sight of the right in flight had broken the left's resolve. I suspect the latter. If so, the moral would seem to be that troops will hold out while there is hope, even if they are being forced backward. And discipline may substitute for hope.
With hoplites, where interlocking shields are a crucial part of the formation, any kind of falling back or recoiling is out of the question. Your shield edge, overlapping the edge of a neighbour's shield, makes it impossible for you to give ground. So hoplites don't fall back. The defeat of a hoplite line seems to depend on a) getting outflanked; b) physically being forced back by a deeper opponent; c) seeing fresh enemy appear at the flank/rear. Any exceptions to this?
The absence of falling back would make a hoplite line particularly effective as the interlocking shields cancels out a natural panic trigger: file leaders giving way before better opponents. But it does make me wonder how hoplites would manage against a looser formation like a legion where individual legionaries are able to fall back to avoid blows if need be. Could this be the reason why the legions were able to smash through Hannibal's centre at Trebia even though they were up against his hoplite-armed best troops (who had uphill advantage to boot)?
Isn't there some doubt that the Africans at the Trebia are equipped as hoplites?? They may very likely have been thureophoroi and more lije an armoured version of the Spanish scutati??
Roy.
I think its a good point re Roman flexibility that they can fall back gighting, but aren't there exampkes of hoplites and pije bearing phalangites doing this over a long distance.
Against Caesar the Helvetii appear to have locked shields and yet fallen back over a considerable distance against the Romans.
Being closely formed is no hindrance to falling back, often quite a considerable distance.
Roy
A thing I've noticed from being in contact sports teams such as rugby union or rugby league, from playing rougher games such as bullrush, from participating in mass playfights at school lunchtimes, acorn / clod wars as a kid, participating is mass tug-of-war bouts, or dealing with potentially dodgy situations in bars, is that there are always some people in a group who are more up for the aggressive stuff than others, and those who are not quite so full of fire tend to rely on those madder types to do the hard work for everyone. They are not necessarily the leaders, but they are the guys who set the tone.
From playing school and club rugby of various types you know that if your tougher guys are getting a battering and they can't contain the tougher guys on the other team then those who are not quite as into risking hurt for the cause start looking around and thinking oh-oh, we could be in for it here, and that attitude can get infectious. If something doesn't turn that around, rather than thinking of winning, people start thinking of damage limitation, so some guys start to stay out of the contact areas, shy away from making tackles, and basically don't really want to know. The earnest, middlingly aggressive guys who are kind of up for but can't turn the tide on their own have to do more work, get exhausted faster, and once they're exhausted too, it gets really messy.
In games like bullrush, once the number of tacklers reaches a certain point, less enthusiastic people start thinking they are going to get hurt, and those who are not keen on that idea might run towards a weaker tackler or fall over to avoid getting hammered by one of the more fearsome practitioners (ie, give up).
In tug of war, when your anchor guys are grimacing, running out of puff and getting pulled forward, the whole group can quickly lose it. In acorn or clod wars, the guys who keep coming tend to make everyone else run away, so if you don't have people to match their aggression it's a short battle.
I imagine armies probably have similar sorts of dynamics, and if you can see that their tough guys are getting the better of yours, and your tough guys start to go down or out, a sinking feeling probably sets in. As a group you can probably stick it out for while with your middlingly aggressive guys in the hope that events elsewhere might turn in your favour, but if it's apparent no one else is coming to bail you out, I imagine there would come a point when some shock will occur, and mental and physical exhaustion will cause some to go, and once they go a more general disintegration of morale. There would be some of the tougher / more stoic middling guys who through pride or bloodymindedness would still stand in place, and the earlier runners might feel those guys will give them a chance to get away, which, if the survival instinct suddenly trumps the social instinct, probably gives an incentive to be one of the earlier runners.
But this could be quite wrong - contact sports are very different from battles, and my imagined psychological parallels could be quite spurious!
That fits happily with my category of 'Things not going as expected' . You don't expect your tough guys to fail and the concern at seeing them relling back would spread.
However,armies have mechanisms to cooe with this. They have junior leaders whose job is to lead abd inspire. They have discipline which makes the consequences of running a lot less attractive. Who wants to be known as the man who abandoned his leader, loyalty group or tribe on the battlefield? They have a stoic sense of duty. If Justin were to see Patrick fall then he girds himself to step forward. into the breach :-)) .
The difficulty with spirts and childhood games analogies is that they have very different social mechanisms from a real battle. Turning up for a tax duty may be one way to characterise an ancient army's composition, but mostly the warriors are professional or semi professional and tied in by group and personal loyalty links and by a powerful social cohesion. These men are, as I said fighting as part of small teams that have roles within the team , that includes that the team know that if Patrick is stricken its Justin that comes forward and Holly that seconds him with Tim pushing forward to replace him .
Roy ( In a litter on a hill in the rear) .
True Roy: in professional armies the guys who really don't want to be there have probably either been weeded out or are back in camp digging. But there is still a pretty strong social code in sports and in school days (high school anyway, which is the period I'm thinking of). No one wants to get a reputation as a whuss, a sissy, or for being useless, so there are social costs, even as kids / or in social leagues.
Tough times at Dotheboys Hall Aaron. I was so bad at Rugby that the players welcomed my non attendance. There was no great animus against non participants, especially if you would run the line as a touch judge.
Roy
No, no animus if a person is off field, but if you were on field and didn't participate, it was different :D
Quote from: aligern on October 20, 2018, 10:23:17 AM
If Justin were to see Patrick fall then he girds himself to step forward. into the breach :-)) .
He who fights and runs away
Can count on his retirement pay. ::)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 20, 2018, 11:15:20 AM
Quote from: aligern on October 20, 2018, 10:23:17 AM
If Justin were to see Patrick fall then he girds himself to step forward. into the breach :-)) .
He who fights and runs away
Can count on his retirement pay. ::)
You just have to avoid mum and all that with it or on it shield nonsense :D
But the larger point is that Roy is right, and young people playing sport is probably not a good comparison.
Just the usual caveat that traditional British sporting behaviour is a cultural phenomenon and other cultures may do things differently.
However, the idea that some men are braver than others is probably not in question. How that manifests in war may depend on a lot of factors - as Roy has said, the unit (or the group) is key. So if your hero just dashes off and does his own thing he may not contribute a lot. But if there is a structure, not necessarily a formal hierarchy, the brave can motivate the less brave.
Part of the answer to the "why units rout under pressure" question is probably to be found in social nature of units. More modern psychological studies, for example, identify that not letting your mates down is a powerful motivator. So is not being seen to be a coward (which isn't the same as being seen as brave). So is playing the role expected of you, which may have been a more powerful motivator in some societies than our own.
which links nicely into the old mantra 'the family that plays together stays together' ie in terms of the unit 'family' if you train, eat sleep and fight with the same people for long enough you develop deep bonds with them and will fight more collectively than say newly raised units, unfamiliar troops banded together etc. This will also have a bearing on what certain units may or may not do when faced with unexpected battlefield traumas
Time for an in-period quote to demonstrate this isn't just a modern view
You love your comrade so much in war. When you see your quarrel is just and your blood is fighting well, tears rise to your eyes. A great sweet feeling of love and pity fills your heart on seeing your friend so valiantly exposing his body to execute and accomplish the command of our Creator. And then you prepare to go and live or die with him and for love not to abandon him. And out of that there arises such delectation, that he who has not tasted it is not fit to say what a delight is. Do you think that a man who does that fears death? Not at all: for he feels strengthened, he is so elated he does not know where he is. Truly he is afraid of nothing.
The Jouvencel by Jean de Bueil.
Sounds romantic but de Beuil was a career soldier and ultimately Admiral of France.
Quote from: Erpingham on October 20, 2018, 06:02:38 PM
Time for an in-period quote to demonstrate this isn't just a modern view
You love your comrade so much in war. When you see your quarrel is just and your blood is fighting well, tears rise to your eyes. A great sweet feeling of love and pity fills your heart on seeing your friend so valiantly exposing his body to execute and accomplish the command of our Creator. And then you prepare to go and live or die with him and for love not to abandon him. And out of that there arises such delectation, that he who has not tasted it is not fit to say what a delight is. Do you think that a man who does that fears death? Not at all: for he feels strengthened, he is so elated he does not know where he is. Truly he is afraid of nothing.
The Jouvencel by Jean de Bueil.
Sounds romantic but de Beuil was a career soldier and ultimately Admiral of France.
Nice quote, Anthony. It does seem to be a recurring theme. Does everyone feel this way though, or is it the preserve of those who love the fight, and the rest pay lip service to it?
Quote from: Prufrock on October 20, 2018, 06:13:02 PM
Does everyone feel this way though, or is it the preserve of those who love the fight, and the rest pay lip service to it?
It is, of course, hard to say, because not many other soldiers wrote their views down. But the chivalrous classes operated within a world view where their military function was fundamental and their expectations of themselves and others may have been along these lines, even if they thought them aspirational rather than practical.
Battlefields have always been and will remain nasty atrtional places and soldiers from any age soon learn that banding together and looking after each other is the best way to survive
The longer they were together the stronger this thought became
Quote from: Erpingham on October 20, 2018, 06:55:04 PM
Quote from: Prufrock on October 20, 2018, 06:13:02 PM
Does everyone feel this way though, or is it the preserve of those who love the fight, and the rest pay lip service to it?
It is, of course, hard to say, because not many other soldiers wrote their views down. But the chivalrous classes operated within a world view where their military function was fundamental and their expectations of themselves and others may have been along these lines, even if they thought them aspirational rather than practical.
Quote from: Holly on October 20, 2018, 07:40:48 PM
Battlefields have always been and will remain nasty atrtional places and soldiers from any age soon learn that banding together and looking after each other is the best way to survive
The longer they were together the stronger this thought became
Absolutely agree. But this is the stuff that keeps people in place: Justin's asking what it is that, despite all this, can make people such as these run. Quite a fascinating question.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but thus far the consensus seems to be that, in the absence of unexpected events like death of general, flank attack, etc., it is the performance of the file leader (and his second should he die) that determines whether the morale of the men behind them holds or cracks. If the first and second man of a file goes down before the gorilla(s) in the opposing enemy file(s), man No. 3 will be very reluctant to pitch in as he knows he will in all probability be outfought. In a looser formation like a legionary line, this translates into him falling back, seeking protection within his own line.
In a more compact formation like a shieldwall it translates into the same thing, breaking the shieldwall and leaving the files leaders on either side of him exposed - especially the file leader on his left. Those file leaders give way in their turn, falling back to the man who recoiled first in order to recreate the shieldwall. But then he falls back again.....and the soldiers start getting the idea that the line can't hold against the enemy.
With a phalanx engaged in othismos (presuming that othismos is a thing) none of this applies of course. The hoplites keep shoving until one phalanx is pushed back and becomes disordered, eventually breaking. Though there are some cases of phalanx lines getting pushed back quite a distance without breaking. I suppose in the other cases the men of a phalanx decide to cut and run if they see they're getting outpushed - no point carrying on.
QuoteCorrect me if I'm wrong, but thus far the consensus seems to be that, in the absence of unexpected events like death of general, flank attack, etc., it is the performance of the file leader (and his second should he die) that determines whether the morale of the men behind them holds or cracks. If the first and second man of a file goes down before the gorilla(s) in the opposing enemy file(s), man No. 3 will be very reluctant to pitch in as he knows he will in all probability be outfought.
Talking of files and positions in them may be too rigid. The key is the loss of the leaders and "figures of inspiration" - the men you would turn to in a crisis. A barbarian comitatus may not have files and file leaders but it would still have these. We have talked of surprise and the unexpected. We might also consider shock caused by casualties and the rate at which they were suffered. If we look at Captain Naumann's
Regiments Kriegspiel based on analysis of casualties in the FPW, the rate at which casualties are suffered has an impact. Rapid losses are harder to take than gradual ones.
good points Anthony. Not all formations are equal and we must take into account those differences and how they translate into reaction to battlefield pressure
Quote from: Erpingham on October 21, 2018, 01:37:38 PM
Talking of files and positions in them may be too rigid. The key is the loss of the leaders and "figures of inspiration" - the men you would turn to in a crisis. A barbarian comitatus may not have files and file leaders but it would still have these. We have talked of surprise and the unexpected. We might also consider shock caused by casualties and the rate at which they were suffered. If we look at Captain Naumann's Regiments Kriegspiel based on analysis of casualties in the FPW, the rate at which casualties are suffered has an impact. Rapid losses are harder to take than gradual ones.
Losses are still comparatively low so long as the line holds. Are there any examples of infantry getting slaughtered by enemy infantry before the rout?
Quote from: Erpingham on October 21, 2018, 01:37:38 PM
Rapid losses are harder to take than gradual ones.
Yes, very true. And psychological shocks occurring in rapid succession are harder to take than those occurring separately, at intervals. In the Franco-Prussian war it was usually the troops who suffered the rapid casualties and the generals (almost exclusively on the French side) who suffered the psychological shocks. In between the two was the efficiency which represented German, and the muddle which passed for French, organisation and communication.
Even so, some troops would still choose to die in place: "Gurth saw the English around falling fast, and that there was no remedy."
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 22, 2018, 10:49:26 AM
Losses are still comparatively low so long as the line holds. Are there any examples of infantry getting slaughtered by enemy infantry before the rout?
The one which comes to my mind is the Nervii facing Caesar.
But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen short between [the armies]. - Caesar,
Gallic War, II.28
The Nervii's losses were taken in combat, not flight, and they were, according to Caesar's account of the figures provided by the surviving tribal leaders, considerable:
... in recounting the calamity of their state, said that their senators were reduced from 600 to three; that from 60,000 men they [were reduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear arms ...
The Nervii's allies in this battle, the Atrebates and Viromandui, had been much more conventional, in that the Viromandui took most, and the Atrebates practically all, of their casualties in their own rout and the Roman pursuit.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on October 22, 2018, 11:00:27 AMThe one which comes to my mind is the Nervii facing Caesar.
But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen short between [the armies]. - Caesar, Gallic War, II.28
The Nervii's losses were taken in combat, not flight, and they were, according to Caesar's account of the figures provided by the surviving tribal leaders, considerable:
... in recounting the calamity of their state, said that their senators were reduced from 600 to three; that from 60,000 men they [were reduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear arms ...
The Nervii's allies in this battle, the Atrebates and Viromandui, had been much more conventional, in that the Viromandui took most, and the Atrebates practically all, of their casualties in their own rout and the Roman pursuit.
This interesting. The first two ranks of the Nervii mix it up close and personal with the Romans. When they are slaughtered (= the losses we would expect for a formation that does rout) the remaining ranks stand off and indulge in a missile exchange - they
don't close for melee. There are a lot of Nervii fighting not a lot of legionaries so presumably the Nervii had a much deeper line which means only a small percentage of their men were killed in the melee phase of the battle. How did the rest go down? Were the surviving front ranks cut down because the rear ranks refused to run?
A very good point Justin and a good cite Patrick. Tyere might be something in how the Nervii arrive. Don't they come running in and thus the mass might be some way behind the leaders . Otherwise the mid and rear ranks have to have fallen back say 30 yardsvas they are returning darts that gave been thrown fromnthe Roman side and fallen short.
I just do not believe Caesar's casualty figures here. Shortly afterwards the Nervii are in revolt , who is going to be doing the fighting? 500 men?
Roy
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 22, 2018, 11:36:27 AM
This interesting. The first two ranks of the Nervii mix it up close and personal with the Romans. When they are slaughtered (= the losses we would expect for a formation that does rout) the remaining ranks stand off and indulge in a missile exchange - they don't close for melee. There are a lot of Nervii fighting not a lot of legionaries so presumably the Nervii had a much deeper line which means only a small percentage of their men were killed in the melee phase of the battle. How did the rest go down? Were the surviving front ranks cut down because the rear ranks refused to run?
But also interestingly, the Romans aren't keen to close for Melee again either
Quote from: Jim Webster on October 22, 2018, 05:50:47 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 22, 2018, 11:36:27 AM
This interesting. The first two ranks of the Nervii mix it up close and personal with the Romans. When they are slaughtered (= the losses we would expect for a formation that does rout) the remaining ranks stand off and indulge in a missile exchange - they don't close for melee. There are a lot of Nervii fighting not a lot of legionaries so presumably the Nervii had a much deeper line which means only a small percentage of their men were killed in the melee phase of the battle. How did the rest go down? Were the surviving front ranks cut down because the rear ranks refused to run?
But also interestingly, the Romans aren't keen to close for Melee again either
Actually, reading the Latin one gets a somewhat different picture:
| cum primi eorum cecidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus pugnarent, his deiectis et coacervatis cadaveribus qui superessent ut ex tumulo tela in nostros coicerent et pila intercepta remitterent
"when the first of them had fallen, those following the fallen stood and fought from their bodies; when these had fallen and been added to the bodies those who remained as it were from a mound threw spears at us and sent back pila they had intercepted." |
So the text is not clear about ranks - just the first batch (probably several ranks deep) going in and getting killed, then the next batch following suit, then the survivors fighting from a hill of dead men - obviously the previous ranks of men had died on top of each other - and throwing spears and javelins at the Romans below, who were just a few yards away. There's no actual mention of darts (pila) "which had fallen short". That's an invention of the translator. Why am I not surprised?
The Romans may not have closed immediately since they didn't need to: subjecting the survivors to volley after volley of pila seemed to be quite effective, more than trying to clamber up a hill of human flesh. I imagine though that they would have closed eventually.
Justin has done the sensible thing and gone back to the original Latin, and the Nervii do appear to have taken most of their losses in close combat. Once the accumulated bodies provided 'difficult terrain' the action reverted to missiles. The key aspect from the perspective of this thread is that the Nervii did not break and run, in keeping with their reputation as the most ferocious and dedicated warriors in Gaul, whereas the Atrebates and Viromandui did.
Quote from: aligern on October 22, 2018, 11:53:54 AM
I just do not believe Caesar's casualty figures here. Shortly afterwards the Nervii are in revolt , who is going to be doing the fighting? 500 men?
'Shortly afterwards' is actually 54 BC, Ambiorix of the Eburones having just given Sabinus' legion its Varian experience, so the Nervii have had three years for warriors to come of age. In 54 BC the Nervii took the field against Cicero's legion, or rather besieged his camp, in conjunction with their allies the Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, plus the Atuatuci and Eburones and their allies. Caesar defeats the entire force of 60,000 with about 7,000 men (Gallic War V.49).
So in conjunction with the Atuatuci, Eburones and various allies, the Nervii form part of a total of 60,000 - about equal to their strength as a single tribe prior to their initial encounter with Caesar. If we allow them about 2,000 warriors coming of age each year (1/30th of their original 60,000) then in 56 ands 55 BC they would have added 4,000 and in 54 BC another 2,000, allowing them to take the field with around 6,500. This looks like a suitably representative proportion of a 60,000-strong multi-tribal host. So Caesar's figures may after all be credible.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 20, 2018, 08:31:57 AM
With hoplites, where interlocking shields are a crucial part of the formation, any kind of falling back or recoiling is out of the question. Your shield edge, overlapping the edge of a neighbour's shield, makes it impossible for you to give ground. So hoplites don't fall back. The defeat of a hoplite line seems to depend on a) getting outflanked; b) physically being forced back by a deeper opponent; c) seeing fresh enemy appear at the flank/rear. Any exceptions to this?
Yes, many. Hoplites were known to break:
Just before contact- probably this was due to one side recovering from the charge and getting into cohesive formation faster. (with Spartans who marched to battle rather than ran, this was a constant hazard).
At "spear's length": Presumably after the initial bout of spear fencing. I once calculated how fast men converging at even 5mph passed through the reach of a spear and it was something like 0.3 seconds, so the words would have no meaning if there was a old orthodox style charge into othismos.
After some period of combat: Here I assume it was due to attrition breaking the nerve of the rear ranks watching, or rather feeling and hearing, the fight in front of them ( I think it goes without saying that all armies break from the rear). But with hoplites it could be from giving ground. Hoplites do not seem to have given ground easy for two main reasons. Tactically, it is hard enough to get hoplite militias to move forward in formation, never mind back. But more importantly, and somewhat unique to hoplites, the one rule of hoplite battle, the way you get to say you one and build a tropion, is to hold the real estate on the field where the dead bodies are. If your force is being pushed back from the intial site of the clash and the casualties, you are losing and it is obvious to those in the rear.
After othismos: Given the above, it is easy to see why physically moving the enemy back is a good idea. Either through attrition in the close quarters knife-fight or the perception of losing ground due to pushing as a unit, the result is as above.
There is a lot of communication within and between units locked in combat that is not well understood by us today. We just don't often find ourselves in crowded combat. Thucydides tells us that a hoplite knows only what is immediately around him. He forms his opinion on how the battle is going from things like how are the men swaying against him, how panicky do they seem, are they shouting. It is like a giant game of telephone where a front line fighter may have a panic level of X and as it gets passed back, each man in the file might add a +1 or a -1 depending on how brave they are, etc. The last guy in rank 8 could recieve X-6 in a file of panicky or exhausted men, or he could get X+6 in a veteran unit, or some combination of pluses and minuses. Then you have to add in information from the ranks laterally :). It gets complicated fast, but that is the basic calculus of routing.
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 05:31:13 AM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on October 20, 2018, 08:31:57 AM
With hoplites, where interlocking shields are a crucial part of the formation, any kind of falling back or recoiling is out of the question. Your shield edge, overlapping the edge of a neighbour's shield, makes it impossible for you to give ground. So hoplites don't fall back. The defeat of a hoplite line seems to depend on a) getting outflanked; b) physically being forced back by a deeper opponent; c) seeing fresh enemy appear at the flank/rear. Any exceptions to this?
Yes, many. Hoplites were known to break:
Just before contact- probably this was due to one side recovering from the charge and getting into cohesive formation faster. (with Spartans who marched to battle rather than ran, this was a constant hazard).
And green hoplites fleeing at the mere measured approach of Spartans. But that's a pre-battle rout rather than recoiling in the strict sense.
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 05:31:13 AMAt "spear's length": Presumably after the initial bout of spear fencing. I once calculated how fast men converging at even 5mph passed through the reach of a spear and it was something like 0.3 seconds, so the words would have no meaning if there was a old orthodox style charge into othismos.
Again, that would be a rout rather than a recoil. Can you quote examples of this?
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 05:31:13 AMAfter some period of combat: Here I assume it was due to attrition breaking the nerve of the rear ranks watching, or rather feeling and hearing, the fight in front of them ( I think it goes without saying that all armies break from the rear). But with hoplites it could be from giving ground. Hoplites do not seem to have given ground easy for two main reasons. Tactically, it is hard enough to get hoplite militias to move forward in formation, never mind back. But more importantly, and somewhat unique to hoplites, the one rule of hoplite battle, the way you get to say you one and build a tropion, is to hold the real estate on the field where the dead bodies are. If your force is being pushed back from the intial site of the clash and the casualties, you are losing and it is obvious to those in the rear.
So are there any cases of hoplites recoiling = giving ground outside of othismos?
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 05:31:13 AMAfter othismos: Given the above, it is easy to see why physically moving the enemy back is a good idea. Either through attrition in the close quarters knife-fight or the perception of losing ground due to pushing as a unit, the result is as above.
Othismos is not really recoiling since the backwards movement is not voluntary - the hoplites are shoved back by main force.
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 05:31:13 AMThere is a lot of communication within and between units locked in combat that is not well understood by us today. We just don't often find ourselves in crowded combat. Thucydides tells us that a hoplite knows only what is immediately around him. He forms his opinion on how the battle is going from things like how are the men swaying against him, how panicky do they seem, are they shouting. It is like a giant game of telephone where a front line fighter may have a panic level of X and as it gets passed back, each man in the file might add a +1 or a -1 depending on how brave they are, etc. The last guy in rank 8 could recieve X-6 in a file of panicky or exhausted men, or he could get X+6 in a veteran unit, or some combination of pluses and minuses. Then you have to add in information from the ranks laterally :). It gets complicated fast, but that is the basic calculus of routing.
My own take is that the biggest single signal the individual soldier has that his formation is not doing well is if it starts falling back. If the formation falls back that means the file leaders can't cope with the enemy - and they are the best fighters in the formation. Being able to fall back is a crucial aspect of hand-to-hand combat. In every single kind of close-quarter fighting I've been able to find all require that a combatant be able to cede ground to evade the blows of his opponent. A combatant backed against a wall is at a major disadvantage: he can't avoid his opponent's blows whilst his opponent can avoid his. But giving too much ground signals defeat - he can't give as good as he gets.
Hence the need to counteract this natural recoil. The Greek phalanx did it by physically locking the hoplite in place: as part of a shieldwall he couldn't go backwards without compromising his own safety - he would need to angle his shield sideways to disengage from the shieldwall, thus exposing himself. The rank behind him was locked in a similar shieldwall and couldn't fall back to accommodate him. And everything he had learned told him
not to fall back. It was the height of shame.
The Romans handled recoil by allowing it to happen - one line falls back through the next which takes up the fight. This gave the Romans initally five then three fresh lines of troops to throw against an enemy before their army would finally rout. Unlike the Greeks this system permitted the individual Roman soldier to recoil as necessary to avoid the blows of his adversary, which means that if the Roman advanced into shield contact with a Greek he was at an advantage in the subsequent sword fight. Which perhaps explains why the Romans dropped hoplite warfare for their own brand of combat.
QuoteOthismos is not really recoiling since the backwards movement is not voluntary - the hoplites are shoved back by main force.
Just a reminder from many threads on this topic - othismos is not recoiling at all - it is a combat state which both sides are in, regardless of how exactly we picture it. So one side may be advancing and the other falling back but both be in a state of othismos. Also, surely "recoil" is an involuntary reaction, not a voluntary retirement?
Quote from: Erpingham on December 04, 2018, 12:22:17 PM
QuoteOthismos is not really recoiling since the backwards movement is not voluntary - the hoplites are shoved back by main force.
Just a reminder from many threads on this topic - othismos is not recoiling at all - it is a combat state which both sides are in, regardless of how exactly we picture it. So one side may be advancing and the other falling back but both be in a state of othismos. Also, surely "recoil" is an involuntary reaction, not a voluntary retirement?
I define recoil as a voluntary ceding of ground before a superior opponent, 'voluntary' in the sense that the soldier does it out of an instinct of self-preservation, but is not physically forced back.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 11:46:08 AM
Again, that would be a rout rather than a recoil.
Which was what this thread was originally about, of course. I'm not sure when the goalposts moved.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 02:24:16 PM
I define recoil as a voluntary ceding of ground before a superior opponent, 'voluntary' in the sense that the soldier does it out of an instinct of self-preservation, but is not physically forced back.
It does help to know when we are using the same word in different ways :)
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 11:46:08 AM
And green hoplites fleeing at the mere measured approach of Spartans. But that's a pre-battle rout rather than recoiling in the strict sense.
Ok, I too am confused now. Are you talking about intentionally giving ground-vs-being herded back-vs being pushed back?
I will give you an example. One could argue, and I do, that many hoplite battles ended with one side being physically pushed back. This also seems to have happened in some manner at Zama. But the crowded conditions I describe also happened at Cannae, and in that battle no one was pushing the Romans. Instead the Romans were being herded closer together, made to move by threat of violence, and they were pushing each other into a tight mass. Were the Romans at Pydna being herded back by sarissa or where they intentionally breaking off to trade space for time? Given that many had their shields pinned by sarissa, there may have been an element of push as well.
The big difference is tactical doctrine. Light infantry, of which hastatii were at heart, are expected to give ground and maintain cohesion. This is why light troops are often better trained that line troops. The 5th/4th C hoplite was not trained to give ground, thought they could. Something you have to remember is that in no ordered line formation can a man break off contact with the enemy and run away. This has nothing to do with overlapping shields or the danger of doing so, but with the mass of men behind him. This is why all such armies must break from the rear. If a hoplite panicked and turned away in the front line, he would simply be stuck there unless he fought his way through the men behind.
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 05:31:13 AMAt "spear's length": Presumably after the initial bout of spear fencing. I once calculated how fast men converging at even 5mph passed through the reach of a spear and it was something like 0.3 seconds, so the words would have no meaning if there was a old orthodox style charge into othismos.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 11:46:08 AM
Again, that would be a rout rather than a recoil. Can you quote examples of this?
Off the top of my head, that line comes from the Athenians at Mantinea.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 11:46:08 AM
So are there any cases of hoplites recoiling = giving ground outside of othismos?
That is hard to say because many will tell anytime hoplites are "pushed" back it is figurative and not from othismos. But a non-hoplite example that avoids this is Sellasia, where the Spartans beat the Macedonians down a whole hill side, only to have the bastards double their depth (or halve their file frontage) and advance again. It seems to me that your "recoiling", if you do not mean being herded back, would be more like what some see Phillip doing at Chaironea, a feigned retreat. For what it is worth I do not believe it. I find it great propaganda for: " we got our asses kick and broke, but rallied and the overzealous Athenians ran into our reformed phalanx in poor order.
It is important to note that routing is routing. A rout that occurs prior to contact, at contact, or mid battle are essentially the same process.
Quote from: Duncan Head on December 04, 2018, 02:53:31 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 11:46:08 AM
Again, that would be a rout rather than a recoil.
Which was what this thread was originally about, of course. I'm not sure when the goalposts moved.
Well, we're kind of wandering into a recoil leading to a rout, which I suppose is on topic.
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 06:53:37 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 11:46:08 AM
And green hoplites fleeing at the mere measured approach of Spartans. But that's a pre-battle rout rather than recoiling in the strict sense.
The big difference is tactical doctrine. Light infantry, of which hastatii were at heart, are expected to give ground and maintain cohesion. This is why light troops are often better trained that line troops. The 5th/4th C hoplite was not trained to give ground, thought they could. Something you have to remember is that in no ordered line formation can a man break off contact with the enemy and run away. This has nothing to do with overlapping shields or the danger of doing so, but with the mass of men behind him.
Unless his file was trained to
allow him to give ground when necessary, keeping in mind that being unable to give ground puts him at a distinct disadvantage in hand-to-hand combat unless he is well armoured and part of a well-protected line that is a phalanx (and even then). Most hoplite wounds didn't come from clever spear/sword fencing, but by spears being rammed right through the shield and/or cuirasse. For Romans it was about finding the weak points in the enemy's armour and shoving a sword into them. That means sparring which means giving ground and coming back, to and fro.
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 06:53:37 PMOk, I too am confused now. Are you talking about intentionally giving ground-vs-being herded back-vs being pushed back?
I will give you an example. One could argue, and I do, that many hoplite battles ended with one side being physically pushed back. This also seems to have happened in some manner at Zama. But the crowded conditions I describe also happened at Cannae, and in that battle no one was pushing the Romans. Instead the Romans were being herded closer together, made to move by threat of violence, and they were pushing each other into a tight mass. Were the Romans at Pydna being herded back by sarissa or where they intentionally breaking off to trade space for time? Given that many had their shields pinned by sarissa, there may have been an element of push as well.
Let me explain. Soldiers on a battlefield go in to reverse gear for one of three reasons:
a) they are routing and are running for it (green hoplites fleeing Spartans, etc.)
b) they are being physically pushed back (othismos)
c) they are voluntarily giving ground. At Cannae this was done by Hannibal's Gauls and Spaniards, with their wedge gradually flattening into a line then a bow before the Roman advance. This voluntary ceding of ground isn't a deliberated, calculated decision, but natural result of melee combat, in which one side outfights the other. See these examples of fighters giving ground without actually being pushed back:
Fencing (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fqZJtCLLFdk)
Rapier fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2q40nsbXZE)
Saber fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5w2Mh6CyXo)
Mediaeval swordfighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHIhMBCOc1A)
Polearm fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSJgPVQJGyk)
Polish spear fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mYf6FHbA04M)
Masai spear fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGz8uhuHmRc)
Quarterstaff fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMjsHE5p2vs)
It's an absolute constant with hand-to-hand combat.
Each line of triplex acies legion would give ground in this way, retiring through the line behind it which then took up the fight (bearing in mind the lines didn't always give ground and execute line relief). IMHO this voluntary ceding of ground was common to infantry with the exception of Greek and Macedonian phalanxes, which were designed precisely to counter it. Giving ground was usually the precursor to defeat but the Romans used it as a clever psychological ploy: hitting a tired enemy with fresh principes and then, if he was persistent, heartening him by withdrawing the principes and then unexpectedly hitting him with fresh triarii who had kept out of sight until then.
I doubt that hastati ever acted as light troops. Velites were, and fought as light troops - chucking missiles at an enemy from a distance and hightailing it when the enemy drew near. The hastati at Zama fought all three of Hannibal's lines without executing line relief. Pretty impressive for light infantry.
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 04, 2018, 06:53:37 PMQuote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 11:46:08 AM
So are there any cases of hoplites recoiling = giving ground outside of othismos?
That is hard to say because many will tell anytime hoplites are "pushed" back it is figurative and not from othismos. But a non-hoplite example that avoids this is Sellasia, where the Spartans beat the Macedonians down a whole hill side, only to have the bastards double their depth (or halve their file frontage) and advance again. It seems to me that your "recoiling", if you do not mean being herded back, would be more like what some see Phillip doing at Chaironea, a feigned retreat. For what it is worth I do not believe it. I find it great propaganda for: " we got our asses kick and broke, but rallied and the overzealous Athenians ran into our reformed phalanx in poor order.
Good examples, and I like your take on Chaeronea. Just possibly: the Macedonian phalanx wasn't handling the rough ground on the Greek left very well, and had to pull back. Once on level ground it came into its element. The Athenians, who had followed it up, fought at a disadvantage but, like true Greeks, had no idea of retiring to their former advantageous position and lost the fight where they stood.
You probably need four categories:
a) Routing - running away (before, during or after fighting).
Examples - lots.
b) Pushed back - physically shoved back (if en masse, scrum othismos or crowd othismos)
Examples - as individuals, Zama. En masse - never happened :)
c) Forced back - giving ground due to being outfought in a fight with weapons
Examples - Sellasia, most infantry battles
d) Recoiling - more or less voluntarily backing off in an attempt to avoid contact as much as possible
Examples - Gauls/Spaniards at Cannae, Romans at Pydna
Now what was the question?
Quote from: RichT on December 05, 2018, 08:58:44 AM
Now what was the question?
The extent to which going backwards is a prequel to routing.
I like your c) and d).
Thanks - I expect c) and d) could often merge into each other but even so it's a valid distinction. I also think d) was what Roman 'line relief' involved.
Quote
The extent to which going backwards is a prequel to routing.
The extent to which going backwards is a
necessary prequel to routing? I would say not at all, as routs can happen eg before contact, or due to factors other than being outfought from the front (as discussed in the rest of this thread).
The extent to which going backwards was
frequently followed by routing? I would say, assuming backwards types b) or c), very often, as it would take great discipline not to rout after being much pushed or forced back - and IMHO the whole purpose of the closed up phalanx formation, file closers pushing etc was to prevent type b) or c) backwards movement.
Hoplites wouldn't do type d) for cultural as well as military reasons - though maybe it's what the Macedonians did at Chaeronea (maybe).
Quote from: RichT on December 05, 2018, 02:12:23 PM
The extent to which going backwards was frequently followed by routing? I would say, assuming backwards types b) or c), very often, as it would take great discipline not to rout after being much pushed or forced back - and IMHO the whole purpose of the closed up phalanx formation, file closers pushing etc was to prevent type b) or c) backwards movement.
It depends a bit on the duration too. Being driven back a spears length on contact didn't prevent the English at Agincourt from stopping the enemy and ultimately defeating them.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 09:10:14 PM
Unless his file was trained to allow him to give ground when necessary, keeping in mind that being unable to give ground puts him at a distinct disadvantage in hand-to-hand combat unless he is well armoured and part of a well-protected line that is a phalanx (and even then). Most hoplite wounds didn't come from clever spear/sword fencing, but by spears being rammed right through the shield and/or cuirasse. For Romans it was about finding the weak points in the enemy's armour and shoving a sword into them. That means sparring which means giving ground and coming back, to and fro.
I am not sure where you picked up this notion, maybe from accounts of sarissa going through shields? But I am as certain as I am about anything related to hoplite combat that this is not the case. Intentionally hitting a shield with a dory is the fastest way to lose a combat. Even the prodding of shields, done by many in mock combat, cannot be done with a sharp spear without getting your point stuck. If your point is stuck in my shield, I control it and you die. Marozzo has a whole set of rules for how to kiss a foe with rotella and partisan if he manages to get his spear stuck in your shield. You should see how poplar wood grips a spear head.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 09:10:14 PM
c) they are voluntarily giving ground. At Cannae this was done by Hannibal's Gauls and Spaniards, with their wedge gradually flattening into a line then a bow before the Roman advance. This voluntary ceding of ground isn't a deliberated, calculated decision, but natural result of melee combat, in which one side outfights the other. See these examples of fighters giving ground without actually being pushed back:
Fencing (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fqZJtCLLFdk)
Rapier fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2q40nsbXZE)
Saber fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5w2Mh6CyXo)
Mediaeval swordfighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHIhMBCOc1A)
Polearm fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSJgPVQJGyk)
Polish spear fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mYf6FHbA04M)
Masai spear fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGz8uhuHmRc)
Quarterstaff fighting (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMjsHE5p2vs)
It's an absolute constant with hand-to-hand combat.
All of the examples above are Individual combat. This is hugely different. In a duel, individuals dance forward and back, is a formation, unless the front rank is a few meters ahead of the men behind, this cannot happen. Instead the whole line surges forward and back. This is not the same thing. A file cannot move forward or back with the front line fighter fast enough to be part of individual fighting movement.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 09:10:14 PM
Each line of triplex acies legion would give ground in this way, retiring through the line behind it which then took up the fight (bearing in mind the lines didn't always give ground and execute line relief). IMHO this voluntary ceding of ground was common to infantry with the exception of Greek and Macedonian phalanxes, which were designed precisely to counter it. Giving ground was usually the precursor to defeat but the Romans used it as a clever psychological ploy: hitting a tired enemy with fresh principes and then, if he was persistent, heartening him by withdrawing the principes and then unexpectedly hitting him with fresh triarii who had kept out of sight until then.
I agree with this in principle, but I would reverse the polarity. What you are describing as recoiling, in most historical armies I would call breaking off contact and re charging. This probably happened all the time, and someone cited Sabin's work, which I would as well for Lulls in combat. Look at the lull at Zama, where it is hard to see why Hannibal passively watched the romans reorganize their whole line and protect its flanks. What Roman's did with line relief is incompletely break off. By cycling through stacked units, they did not allow the enemy the respite of a lull. So, it is not the breaking off and giving ground that is unique, it is the not re-attacking with the same men, but with fresh troops behind them.
I doubt that hastati ever acted as light troops. Velites were, and fought as light troops - chucking missiles at an enemy from a distance and hightailing it when the enemy drew near. The hastati at Zama fought all three of Hannibal's lines without executing line relief. Pretty impressive for light infantry.
This is a matter of perspective. Compared to Hoplites, Hastatii fought under a doctrine that was not that of heavy infantry. Thureophroi, the closest greek equivalent, though they were even more reliant on linear formations, clearly fought in a manner that was more like light infantry that hoplites (see Polybius describing the problem with thureophoroi in the context of Phillipoemen's switch to sarissa and the way the mercenaries fought in his battle with Machanidas of Sparta)
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 05, 2018, 03:01:07 PM
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 04, 2018, 09:10:14 PM
Unless his file was trained to allow him to give ground when necessary, keeping in mind that being unable to give ground puts him at a distinct disadvantage in hand-to-hand combat unless he is well armoured and part of a well-protected line that is a phalanx (and even then). Most hoplite wounds didn't come from clever spear/sword fencing, but by spears being rammed right through the shield and/or cuirasse. For Romans it was about finding the weak points in the enemy's armour and shoving a sword into them. That means sparring which means giving ground and coming back, to and fro.
I am not sure where you picked up this notion, maybe from accounts of sarissa going through shields?
From Homer:
| When they had thus armed, each amid his own people, they strode fierce of aspect into the open space, and both Trojans and Achaeans were struck with awe as they beheld them. They stood near one another on the measured ground, brandishing their spears, and each furious against the other. Alexandrus aimed first, and struck the round shield of the son of Atreus, but the spear did not pierce it, for the shield turned its point. - Book 3
He poised his spear as he spoke, and hurled it at the shield of Alexandrus. Through shield and cuirass it went, and tore the shirt by his flank, but Alexandrus swerved aside, and thus saved his life. - ditto
He poised his spear as he spoke and hurled it from him. It struck the shield of the son of Tydeus; the bronze point pierced it and passed on till it reached the breastplate. - Book 5
The spear of King Agamemnon struck his shield and went right through it, for the shield stayed it not. It drove through his belt into the lower part of his belly, and his armour rang rattling round him as he fell heavily to the ground. - ditto
He poised his spear as he spoke, and hurled it from him. It struck the sevenfold shield in its outermost layer—the eighth, which was of bronze—and went through six of the layers but in the seventh hide it stayed. Then Ajax threw in his turn, and struck the round shield of the son of Priam. The terrible spear went through his gleaming shield, and pressed onward through his cuirass of cunning workmanship; it pierced the shirt against his side, but he swerved and thus saved his life. They then each of them drew out the spear from his shield, and fell on one another like savage lions or wild boars of great strength and endurance: the son of Priam struck the middle of Ajax's shield, but the bronze did not break, and the point of his dart was turned. Ajax then sprang forward and pierced the shield of Hector; the spear went through it and staggered him as he was springing forward to attack; - Book 7
With these words he struck the shield of Ulysses. The spear went through the shield and passed on through his richly wrought cuirass, tearing the flesh from his side, but Pallas Minerva did not suffer it to pierce the entrails of the hero. - Book 11
Meanwhile Ajax sprang on him and pierced his shield, but the spear did not go clean through, though it hustled him back that he could come on no further. - Book 12
Many a man's body was wounded with the pitiless bronze, as he turned round and bared his back to the foe, and many were struck clean through their shields – ditto
Meriones took aim at him with a spear, nor did he fail to hit the broad orb of ox-hide; but he was far from piercing it for the spear broke in two pieces long ere he could do so; moreover Deiphobus had seen it coming and had held his shield well away from him. - Book 13
Deiphobus then came close up to Idomeneus to avenge Asius, and took aim at him with a spear, but Idomeneus was on the look-out and avoided it, for he was covered by the round shield he always bore—a shield of oxhide and bronze with two arm-rods on the inside. He crouched under cover of this, and the spear flew over him, but the shield rang out as the spear grazed it - ditto
As he was thus aiming among the crowd, he was seen by Adamas, son of Asius, who rushed towards him and struck him with a spear in the middle of his shield, but Neptune made its point without effect, for he grudged him the life of Antilochus. One half, therefore, of the spear stuck fast like a charred stake in Antilochus's shield, while the other lay on the ground. - ditto
When the two were hard by one another the spear of the son of Atreus turned aside and he missed his aim; Pisander then struck the shield of brave Menelaus but could not pierce it, for the shield stayed the spear and broke the shaft nevertheless he was glad and made sure of victory - ditto
Harpalion son of King Pylaemenes then sprang upon him; he had come to fight at Troy along with his father, but he did not go home again. He struck the middle of Menelaus's shield with his spear but could not pierce it, and to save his life drew back under cover of his men, looking round him on every side lest he should be wounded. - ditto
He then struck the middle of the son of Phyleus' shield with his spear, setting on him at close quarters, but his good corslet made with plates of metal saved him – Book 15
And Meriones answered, 'Aeneas, for all your bravery, you will not be able to make an end of every one who comes against you. You are only a mortal like myself, and if I were to hit you in the middle of your shield with my spear, however strong and self-confident you may be, I should soon vanquish you, and you would yield your life to Hades of the noble steeds.' - Book 16
As he spoke he struck Menelaus full on the shield, but the spear did not go through, for the shield turned its point. - Book 17
He poised and hurled as he spoke, whereon the spear struck the round shield of Aretus, and went right through it for the shield stayed it not, so that it was driven through his belt into the lower part of his belly. - ditto
As he spoke he drove his spear at the great and terrible shield of Achilles, which rang out as the point struck it. The son of Peleus held the shield before him with his strong hand, and he was afraid, for he deemed that Aeneas's spear would go through it quite easily, not reflecting that the god's glorious gifts were little likely to yield before the blows of mortal men; and indeed Aeneas's spear did not pierce the shield, for the layer of gold, gift of the god, stayed the point. It went through two layers, but the god had made the shield in five, two of bronze, the two innermost ones of tin, and one of gold; it was in this that the spear was stayed. - Book 20
Asteropaeus failed with both his spears, for he could use both hands alike; with the one spear he struck Achilles' shield, but did not pierce it, for the layer of gold, gift of the god, stayed the point; with the other spear he grazed the elbow of Achilles' right arm drawing dark blood, but the spear itself went by him and fixed itself in the ground, foiled of its bloody banquet. - Book 21
He poised his spear as he spoke and hurled it. His aim was true for he hit the middle of Achilles' shield, but the spear rebounded from it, and did not pierce it. - Book 22
Ajax pierced Diomed's round shield, but did not draw blood, for the cuirass beneath the shield protected him; - Book 23 |
In most of these examples the spear is thrown, true, but I count seven instances where one or both combatants drive the spear at the shield of their opponent rather than throw it. How tough is a shield made of 4 - 7 layers of ox hide covered with a layer of bronze, compared to a shield made of wood? I suspect that a Homeric hero could penetrate a wooden shield just as easily as a leather one. And I think these are descriptions of real Archaic pre-hoplite combat rather than impossible exaggerations. The details of the fighting are convincing - the nature and gravity of the wounds, how armour does or doesn't protect its wearer, etc. Homer (or whoever wrote the Iliad) knew all about fighting.
PS: on how tough a leather shield is read the first post here (http://myarmoury.com/talk/viewtopic.24741.html) (forget about the remarks on the bronze shield).
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 05, 2018, 03:30:49 PM
From Homer:
In most of these examples the spear is thrown, true, but I count seven instances where one or both combatants drive the spear at the shield of their opponent rather than throw it. How tough is a shield made of 4 - 7 layers of ox hide covered with a layer of bronze, compared to a shield made of wood? I suspect that a Homeric hero could penetrate a wooden shield just as easily as a leather one. And I think these are descriptions of real Archaic pre-hoplite combat rather than impossible exaggerations. The details of the fighting are convincing - the nature and gravity of the wounds, how armour does or doesn't protect its wearer, etc. Homer (or whoever wrote the Iliad) knew all about fighting.
PS: on how tough a leather shield is read the first post here (http://myarmoury.com/talk/viewtopic.24741.html) (forget about the remarks on the bronze shield).
Ah, I see. A couple points. The aspis can be penetrated. We have images on vases of such as well as the famous incident where Brasidas's shield "turned traitor". But the question is whether I would do this in battle. I can put mt spear through a slab of wood of shield thickness. I have not tried it through a properly made shield with two layers of thick linen or a bronze face, but I will bet I could even then. I would never do this in battle. The chances of me getting through the shield and actually hitting you are astronomically low, the chances of me getting through the shield deep enough to kill you, even more so. What will most assuredly happen is that my spear will be stuck in your shield face and I will not be able to remove it with out a sawing motion to get it out. You will not let me do this, but rather simply kill me while you control the point of my spear and have huge leverage advantages. As to Homer, let us leave aside that this is semi-fantastical, it is crucial that the spears are thrown. No one is throwing the spear at the shield, rather the men are catching the spear on the shield and it is piercing it. To me as the attacker, if the throw does not go through the shield, no problem, I have lost it anyway. It is not the same with a strike. A similar problem exists for penetrating armor, but presumably I have wounded you so severely that yo are no threat. Getting my spear out of your body anywhere I stab you is a problem. If you roll you swill snap my shaft (which was common and I think what prompted othismos). But at least you are dead and I can draw my sword.
All props to Renfrew, but I do not believe their findings. I ran tests on the latigo leather that I made my spolas from with a spear head that was right out of the box and "factory sharp". My armor kicked ass! I was stopping really hard strikes, and my overhand strikes are far stronger than most dory strikes that have been tested because I am a big dude and my spear is a 9' monster. Woo Hoo! I got ready to post all about this. Then I made a mistake. I took the spear head to my grinding wheel and sharpened it to a razor. The thing when right through my armor like the proverbial knife through butter. It was almost nauseating to see it go through the way it did. So my learned opinion is that their points were not sharp enough.
Quote from: PMBardunias on December 05, 2018, 05:18:39 PM
Ah, I see. A couple points. The aspis can be penetrated. We have images on vases of such as well as the famous incident where Brasidas's shield "turned traitor". But the question is whether I would do this in battle. I can put mt spear through a slab of wood of shield thickness. I have not tried it through a properly made shield with two layers of thick linen or a bronze face, but I will bet I could even then. I would never do this in battle. The chances of me getting through the shield and actually hitting you are astronomically low, the chances of me getting through the shield deep enough to kill you, even more so. What will most assuredly happen is that my spear will be stuck in your shield face and I will not be able to remove it with out a sawing motion to get it out. You will not let me do this, but rather simply kill me while you control the point of my spear and have huge leverage advantages. As to Homer, let us leave aside that this is semi-fantastical, it is crucial that the spears are thrown. No one is throwing the spear at the shield, rather the men are catching the spear on the shield and it is piercing it. To me as the attacker, if the throw does not go through the shield, no problem, I have lost it anyway. It is not the same with a strike. A similar problem exists for penetrating armor, but presumably I have wounded you so severely that yo are no threat. Getting my spear out of your body anywhere I stab you is a problem. If you roll you swill snap my shaft (which was common and I think what prompted othismos). But at least you are dead and I can draw my sword.
All props to Renfrew, but I do not believe their findings. I ran tests on the latigo leather that I made my spolas from with a spear head that was right out of the box and "factory sharp". My armor kicked ass! I was stopping really hard strikes, and my overhand strikes are far stronger than most dory strikes that have been tested because I am a big dude and my spear is a 9' monster. Woo Hoo! I got ready to post all about this. Then I made a mistake. I took the spear head to my grinding wheel and sharpened it to a razor. The thing when right through my armor like the proverbial knife through butter. It was almost nauseating to see it go through the way it did. So my learned opinion is that their points were not sharp enough.
Very interesting. So a really sharp spearhead and a big dude will get through hoplite armour, which (I presume) includes wooden as well as leather shields.
Christopher Matthew mentions BTW that most injuries sustained in hoplite combat in the classical period were in the chest:
| As in Homer, the chest appears to have been the most commonly targeted area in the phalanx warfare of the Classical Age. Euripides' Phoenician Women describes weapon strikes aimed at the face and chest while his Heraclea details strikes aimed at the shield. Epaminondas received a wound to the chest through the breastplate at Mantinea that was not fatal and is even described as not being incapacitating. Chares was able to display his battle scars and his shield, which had been pierced by a spear, in a boastful gesture to the Athenians; suggesting wounds to the chest and arms. The numerous injuries Agesilaus sustained at Coronea in 394BC are said to have pierced his armour and he was in great pain as a result of them. Brasidas was wounded by a spear that pierced his shield but the wound was so minor that he simply pulled the spear out and kept fighting. There are many other references to chest or abdominal wounds, or attacks directed against the chest or shield, including those on Dion and Timoleon. Plutarch relates that Epaminondas was killed at Mantinea while he was turned about encouraging his troops, the blow most likely delivered to the back. Similarly, Plutarch relates the account of a fallen man who, about to be stabbed in the back, pleads to be stabbed in the chest to avoid the shame. This suggests that the chest, and not the throat, was the regular injury sustained in hoplite combat. |
Penetrating armour it seems was not such a big deal.
Quote from: Justin Swanton on December 05, 2018, 05:40:18 PM
Very interesting. So a really sharp spearhead and a big dude will get through hoplite armour, which (I presume) includes wooden as well as leather shields.
Christopher Matthew mentions BTW that most injuries sustained in hoplite combat in the classical period were in the chest:
| As in Homer, the chest appears to have been the most commonly targeted area in the phalanx warfare of the Classical Age. Euripides' Phoenician Women describes weapon strikes aimed at the face and chest while his Heraclea details strikes aimed at the shield. Epaminondas received a wound to the chest through the breastplate at Mantinea that was not fatal and is even described as not being incapacitating. Chares was able to display his battle scars and his shield, which had been pierced by a spear, in a boastful gesture to the Athenians; suggesting wounds to the chest and arms. The numerous injuries Agesilaus sustained at Coronea in 394BC are said to have pierced his armour and he was in great pain as a result of them. Brasidas was wounded by a spear that pierced his shield but the wound was so minor that he simply pulled the spear out and kept fighting. There are many other references to chest or abdominal wounds, or attacks directed against the chest or shield, including those on Dion and Timoleon. Plutarch relates that Epaminondas was killed at Mantinea while he was turned about encouraging his troops, the blow most likely delivered to the back. Similarly, Plutarch relates the account of a fallen man who, about to be stabbed in the back, pleads to be stabbed in the chest to avoid the shame. This suggests that the chest, and not the throat, was the regular injury sustained in hoplite combat. |
Penetrating armour it seems was not such a big deal.
The hopite aspis is not made of leather. We don't even have evidence of it being faced is leather, but rather when not bronze it seems to have been faced in textile- probably linen. I this suprised me to learn because I would have guessed rawhide facings, but in fact the only leather found is a thin kid skin on the inside of the bowl and cosmetic, not structural.
Careful with the Mathew quote. He is trying to show that throat wounds were not common because he used an odd form of overhand strike that has to descend from above and for which the throat would be a major target. Overhand strikes do not have a descending trajectory when done correctly- or at least my way- so this is irrelevant. But shots to the face are very common.
Be careful as well in looking at recorded injuries and assuming that the frequency of recording equals the frequency of occurrence. We do not know that. But I know for a fact that men could be injured through armor, because I have pierced reproductions, but also because the Greeks showed us this, see below.
It is worth looking at Euripides Phoenissae to see how men are: protected behind a shield, stabbed in the exposed shoulder, and how both dorys break.
"When the Tuscan trumpet, like a torch, blew the signal for the bloody battle, they darted wildly against one another; [1380] like boars whetting their savage tusks, they joined battle, their beards wet with foam. They kept shooting out their spears, but crouched beneath their shields to let the steel glance off in vain; but if either saw the other's eye above the rim, [1385] he would aim his lance there, eager to outwit him with the point. But both kept such careful outlook through the spy-holes in their shields, that their weapons found nothing to do; while from the onlookers far more than the combatants trickled the sweat caused by terror for their friends.
[1390] Eteocles, in kicking aside a stone that rolled beneath his tread, exposed a limb outside his shield, and Polyneices, seeing a chance of dealing him a blow, aimed at it, and the Argive shaft passed through his leg; [1395] the Danaid army, one and all, cried out for joy. And the wounded man, seeing Polyneices' shoulder bare in this effort, plunged his spear with all his might into his breast, restoring gladness to the citizens of Thebes, though he broke off the spear-head. [1400] And so, at a loss for a weapon, he retreated step by step, till catching up a splintered rock he let it fly and broke the other's spear in the middle; and now the combat was equal, for each had lost his lance.
Then clutching their sword-hilts [1405] they closed, and round and round, with shields clashing, they fought a wild battle. And Eteocles introduced the crafty Thessalian trick, having some knowledge of it from his association with that country. Disengaging himself from the immediate contest, [1410] he drew back his left foot but kept his eye closely on the pit of the other's stomach from a distance; then advancing his right foot he plunged the weapon through his navel and fixed it in his spine. Down fell Polyneices, dripping with blood, [1415] ribs and belly contracting in his agony. But the other, thinking his victory now complete, threw down his sword and began to despoil him, wholly intent on that, without a thought for himself. And this indeed tripped him up; for Polyneices, who had fallen first, was still faintly breathing, [1420] and having in his grievous fall kept his sword, he made a last effort and drove it through the heart of Eteocles. They both lie there, fallen side by side, biting the dust with their teeth, and they have not decided the mastery."
Interesting, gentlemen.
Just out of curiosity, and apologies for the slight drift off-topic, but did Greeks have spy-holes in their shields?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 10, 2018, 06:39:12 PM
Interesting, gentlemen.
Just out of curiosity, and apologies for the slight drift off-topic, but did Greeks have spy-holes in their shields?
No, not that I have ever seen. He is probably referring to looking over the rim and the translation is garbled somehow. We have many images of this.
Thanks, Paul.
The reason I ask is because a spy hole in the shield is characteristic of 18th Dynasty Egypt, so it may be less a matter of garbled translation than cultural transfer of the original story. One notes the 'coats of brazen mail' donned by both combatants, which is also characteristically albeit not uniquely Egyptian. The wounds suffered by Eteocles, incidentally, are precisely consistent with those discovered on the mummy of Tutankhamun in 2005.
But please do not let me interrupt you further. :)
QuoteHe is probably referring to looking over the rim and the translation is garbled somehow.
I don't think so. They are explicitly watching for each other to peer over the rim in order to attack with the spear but using the spy hole avoids this, so their weapons "have nothing to do".
but if either saw the other's eye above the rim, [1385] he would aim his lance there, eager to outwit him with the point. But both kept such careful outlook through the spy-holes in their shields, that their weapons found nothing to do;Given that they are Thebans, is it possible that the idea is they are equipped with the legendary (?) Boeotian shield and Euripedes is interpretting the holes in the edge as spy holes?
I don't know anything about the play but the plot seems based in Greek rather than Egyptian legend. Presumably, Patrick is aware of theory of an Egyptian origin? As to theories about Tutankamun's death, there is a whole other thread (or more) there .
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 14, 2018, 06:03:38 PMOne notes the 'coats of brazen mail' donned by both combatants, which is also characteristically albeit not uniquely Egyptian.
Especially not when they are just
chalkeois ... hoplois.
Quote from: Erpingham on December 14, 2018, 06:28:03 PM
I don't know anything about the play but the plot seems based in Greek rather than Egyptian legend. Presumably, Patrick is aware of theory of an Egyptian origin?
Oh yes. Everything in the Oedipus story from the
sphinx outside
Thebes to the custom of burial instead of cremation smacks of Egypt.
There is also a remarkable correspondence between the leading figures in the Oedipus story and the royal family of Egypt's Amarna period - not just the characters, but their actions. Some of the material has gone through the wash of cross-cultural transfer, but a remarkable amount of detail has been preserved.
Take the duel in
Phoenissae, as quoted by Paul. Look closely at what happens with Eteocles.
1)
Eteocles, in kicking aside a stone that rolled beneath his tread, exposed a limb outside his shield, and Polyneices, seeing a chance of dealing him a blow, aimed at it, and the Argive shaft passed through his leg ...
The self-moving stone may be a poet's interpolation, but Tutankhamun did have a defective left foot which, with or without the aid of a stone, could have caused him to stumble and expose a leg. The traces of gold leaf in Tutankhamun's leg wound are consistent with being struck by a gilded spear - as would have been used by Egyptian royalty (in this case his brother 'Polyneices' - Smenkhare).
2)
And the wounded man, seeing Polyneices' shoulder bare in this effort, plunged his spear with all his might into his breast ...
The mummy of Smenkhare is poorly preserved and only the bones remain, so we only have the pathology of one side of the duel. We note in passing how easily weapon thrusts go through the
chalkeois ... hoplois, which seems more consistent with it being permeable Egyptian scale than a solid Greek thorax.
3)
Disengaging himself from the immediate contest, [Eteocles/Tutankhamun] drew back his left foot but kept his eye closely on the pit of the other's stomach from a distance; then advancing his right foot he plunged the weapon through his navel and fixed it in his spine. Down fell Polyneices, dripping with blood ..
The thrust would have been awkward with a standard khepesh, but was eminently suited to the kind of sword carried by Ahmose and presumably used by Eighteenth Dynasty royalty. Again, the poor state of preservation of Smenkhare's remains means we can confirm nothing from his mummy. Tutankhamun's is a different story.
4)
Polyneices, who had fallen first, was still faintly breathing, and having in his grievous fall kept his sword, he made a last effort and drove it through the heart of Eteocles.This article (http://heritage-key.com/blogs/owenjarus/king-tut-suffered-massive-chest-injury-new-research-reveals) on a serious chest wound revealed by Tutankhamun's 2005 CT scans is most relevant in this regard.
Interesting is that the ribs were neatly cut, perhaps indicating a desperate attempt at heart surgery to save the life of the young king.
Eteocles is wounded twice, in the left leg and in the chest, the latter affecting the heart. Tutankhamun's mummy bears two wounds; one in the left leg and one in the chest; the heart is missing, as if damaged and removed. The one in the left leg bears traces of gold leaf, as if left there by a royally decorated spear blade.
And then there are the burials. We move to Sophocles'
Antigone, lines 195-205, where the new king, Creon (Ay) is pronouncing on the now-deceased duellists.
"Eteocles, who fell fighting in behalf of our city and who excelled all in battle, they shall entomb and heap up every sacred offering that descends to the noblest of the dead below. But as for his brother, Polyneices, I mean, who on his return from exile wanted to burn to the ground the city of his fathers and his race's gods, and wanted to feed on kindred blood and lead the remnant into slavery—it has been proclaimed to the city that no one shall give him funeral honors or lamentation, but all must leave him unburied and a sight of shame, with his body there for birds and dogs to eat."
One brother is sumptuously buried (in KV62); the other is denied funeral rites, but is later clandestinely buried by his sister (in KV55). Tutankhanum, Smenkhare, Meritaten. The sister who buried her brother contrary to decree is sentenced:
"I will take her where the path is deserted, unvisited by men, and entomb her alive in a rocky vault, setting out a ration of food, but only as much as piety requires so that all the city may escape defilement." -
idem lines 774-776
KV 54. Meritaten's stay there was not long.
"... in the furthest part of the tomb we saw her hanging by the neck, fastened by a halter of fine linen threads ..."
idem lines 1220-22
Part of that halter of fine linen strips was found around the neck of Meritaten's mummy in KV35, where it resides with the other two Amarna period royal suicides, Queen Tiy (Jocasta) and Prince Thutmose (Chrysippus), and was clearly visible when the mummy appeared on Dr Joanne Fletcher's documentary in quest of Nefertiti several years ago.
And this is just the start of the correspondences between the Amarna period and the Oedipus legend.
If we are to consider this further, I suggest a new thread.
So this is speculation based on perceived similarities rather than a theory based on evidence of an actual connection between Egyptian history and Greek legend? I must say, given the uncertainties about Tutankhamuns death, it is a brave man who reconstructs it in detail as a single combat. However, as you say, this thread isn't really the place for it and it deserves its own place.
Quote from: Erpingham on December 15, 2018, 11:16:53 AM
So this is speculation based on perceived similarities rather than a theory based on evidence of an actual connection between Egyptian history and Greek legend?
Well ... no. I am highlighting pattern recognition from details in source evidence, which is neither speculation nor theory, just identity of patterns. There is incidentally plenty of Egyptian artistic evidence for close connections between 18th Dynasty Egypt and the Mycenaean world, including a) reliefs/tomb paintings of Mycenaeans bringing tribute and b) the British Museum Amarna papyrus Duncan referred to in another thread, showing Myceneans and Egyptians fighting with or against each other, depending upon whom you read. Ergo, there is no difficulty in positing that Greeks knew of the events and significant people of the Amarna period and were sufficiently impressed by them to record them, albeit in poetry (and drama) rather than history as they had not yet got around to writing history. The connection is not a problem. The interesting part is the extensive series of close correspondences through three generations (Laius/Amenhotep III to Eteocles/Tutankhamun), showing that someone took the trouble to note quite a bit of detail.
For example, the three royal suicides in the Oedipus legend (Chrysippus, Jocasta and Antigone) correspond exactly in age group and gender to the three 18th Dynasty royal suicides in KV35 (Thutmose, Tiy and Meritaten). We can conclude that they also correspond in cause, i.e. the reasons for their respective suicides, unexplained in Egyptian sources, are revealed in the Greek story.
Is the subject of Oedipus, Amarna and Tutankhamun's civil war worth a discussion thread? Would anyone be interested?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 15, 2018, 07:04:21 PM
Is the subject of Oedipus, Amarna and Tutankhamun's civil war worth a discussion thread? Would anyone be interested?
The problem with Oedipus is that you have to look at the various sources were have, Sophocles and others and decide what they, as writers, added to the story from their own experience, and what was passed down originally
After all Sophocles wrote some of his Theban plays after the Athenian expedition to Egypt
QuoteErgo, there is no difficulty in positing that Greeks knew of the events and significant people of the Amarna period and were sufficiently impressed by them to record them, albeit in poetry (and drama) rather than history as they had not yet got around to writing history. The connection is not a problem. The interesting part is the extensive series of close correspondences through three generations (Laius/Amenhotep III to Eteocles/Tutankhamun), showing that someone took the trouble to note quite a bit of detail.
I don't think the problem is a connection between Thebes and Egypt in the Mycenaean period, or even that the Greeks recorded information about Egyptian affairs. It is the leap of saying that a Greek myth is lifted in detail from Egyptian events and that somehow that detailed original survived to appear in drama hundreds of years later. You have no evidence for this except that you have noted "similarities", some of which (e,g. the death of Tutankhamun) are subject to multiple interpretations already. Anyway, this is taking us a very long way from our original topic. The
Phoenecian Women was introduced as a description of hoplite combat, albeit with the "heroic" element we might expect in a drama setting. I can no longer remember how this related to the topic, but it did seem to have some value.
Quote from: Erpingham on December 16, 2018, 10:23:52 AM
Anyway, this is taking us a very long way from our original topic. The Phoenecian Women was introduced as a description of hoplite combat, albeit with the "heroic" element we might expect in a drama setting. I can no longer remember how this related to the topic, but it did seem to have some value.
It related after a fashion to Justin's thoughts about the element of sparring and manoeuvre in frontal infantry combat, and the extent to which armour provided protection from weapon penetration.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on December 16, 2018, 10:29:13 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on December 16, 2018, 10:23:52 AM
Anyway, this is taking us a very long way from our original topic. The Phoenecian Women was introduced as a description of hoplite combat, albeit with the "heroic" element we might expect in a drama setting. I can no longer remember how this related to the topic, but it did seem to have some value.
It related after a fashion to Justin's thoughts about the element of sparring and manoeuvre in frontal infantry combat, and the extent to which armour provided protection from weapon penetration.
Thank you - I recall now :)