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History => Ancient and Medieval History => Topic started by: Andreas Johansson on October 28, 2019, 05:47:25 AM

Title: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on October 28, 2019, 05:47:25 AM
We've on various points touched on the apparent contradiction that on the one hand there's the frequent observation in period sources that horses fear camels, which effect is credited with deciding some battles (Cyrus' defeat of Croesus, a Vandal defeat by Moors) and strongly influencing others (Byzantine cavalry having to dismount to attack Moorish cameleers at Mammes), and on the other that nobody seems to have chosen camels as battle mounts if horses were an option.

Relevant to this, I came across a passage (19§134) in the Taktika of Leo the Wise which recommends the Byzantine general to bring along camels to accustom the horses and men to them. The implication would seem to be that a little familiarity is all it takes for horses to get over their fear, and that the camel "trick" is likely to work only if camels are brought somewhere where they're not ordinarily found.

It does seem a little strange if the Vandals' horses were wholly unused to camels - they must have been born and raised in North Africa - but perhaps camels were only found towards the desert fringe in this period, not being used in the settled agricultural areas? The Byzantines at Mammes were relatively fresh arrivals from Constantinople.

Naturally, I found myself wondering what this should mean for wargames rules. Probably that camelry should be intrinsically inferior to cavalry, but inflict some penalty - disorder, -1 combat factor, or whatever makes sense within the rules - on cavalry whose horses are unused to them. The trick, then, would be how to determine which horses are familar with camels: Is a costed advantage that can be bought? That's probably impossible to cost fairly, as the advantage would be huge against Tuareg and minimal to nil against most else. Is it automatic if their army includes any friendly camels? That might lead to an unseemly rush for a single stand of dromedarii or baggage camels in any army that can have them - and anyway isn't it weird if a Mongol army is crippled or not against camelry depending on whether they left their bactrians behind? Automatic if the friendly army could have camels?
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on October 28, 2019, 07:27:37 AM
Oner might add to this the question of why Saracens lived in such fear of Crusader mounted charges if all that was needed was to deploy a few camels with their own cavalry.

My own understanding is that horses are upset by camels when encountering them for the first time; thereafter they will either accept them as part of the environment.

If employing this rule of thumb, then we might judge that all armies from camel-using areas (North Africa, Near East, Middle East, parts of Far East) have 'camel-proof' horses from the Achaemenid era onwards and in the Biblical period Egyptian, Babylonian and Assyrian armies, optionally also Philistine, Hebrew etc., are 'camel-proof' while European, Asian and Asia Minor armies are not.  The basic yardstick would be that any culture using camels for transport would have 'camel-proof' mounts while any not so blessed(?) would not.

Actually making use of camels is another matter: camels in the baggage would not affect an opponent on the battlefield.  In order to be effective they must deploy on the battlefield, so an Assyrian army with camels in the baggage train is not going to upset the mounts of a Scythian opponent whereas a Midianite army with camels actually in the battleline is.

Back in the days of WRG rules, horses were only affected by camelry when within 30 paces (25 yards) so it took quite a few camels to disrupt the cavalry wing of an army.  I would suggest that in most wargame systems this equates to base contact, so the cavalry would be adversely affected only when in melee (or in abstracted interaction of which melee conceptually forms part).

Regarding the relative effectiveness of cavalry and camelry, I think there is little in it when it comes to close combat, although the weight of the horses could make a significant difference.  The major difference between horses and camels is the much greater responsiveness and obedience of horses, not so much individually as collectively.  (Interestingly, the Bactrian camel seems to be a more responsive and trainable riding animal than the dromedary, although the latter is faster and a superior cavalry mount.)  This difference in discipline and responsiveness would, at unit level, in my estimation tend to degrade the relative effectiveness of camelry, not so much because of the different animals as because of the different level of attainable discipline and hence unit and subunit cohesion.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Nick Harbud on October 28, 2019, 09:32:03 AM
Slingshot 299 in 2015 included the attached observations on horse behaviour from Phil Barker.

Hope this helps...  8)
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on October 28, 2019, 12:28:30 PM
I think the question can be made more general. What frightens horses, or people come to that, is just a subset of the more general question of what decides the outcome of a battle (or some part of a battle). Army A meets Army B in battle. Army B is defeated and runs away, and Army A goes home happy. Now at some point, the events of the day need to make their way into a historical account. Maybe the commander of Army A (or less likely of Army B) will sit down to write his memoirs, a few years or decades later. Or maybe some historian, a similar period later, will set about writing an account and interview some participants in the battle (how many? Probably only a very few). Or maybe it will be a generation or two later, and the historian will be working from tales remembered from grandfathers, or from 'common knowledge'. At any rate, as Wellington said, nobody will remember all the events of the battle, but all will remember some incidents, and perhaps some incidents will stand out and be remembered in common. There will be excuses made (by Bs) for why they lost, and impressions (from As) of why they won. Horses being afraid of camels, standing to arms all night, not eating a proper breakfast, wind blown dust, the sun shining in their eyes, an unexpected ditch, divine intervention, greater manliness (of As) or effeminacy (of Bs), better weapons, better armour, better tactics. All sorts of stuff. Our historian may have one or two accounts, with one or two reasons, to choose from, or maybe, rarely, he will have dozens. Some factors will have made it into common knowledge, while others will remain personal recollections. The historian then has to make a more or less coherent account from what he has discovered, that fits his stylistic and didactic needs, and takes up not more than the two sentences or two paragraphs that he feels warranted by the importance of the event. And a couple of thousand years later, some other set of people have to take that account, and a few dozen others like it, and use them to make a general model of ancient combat, applicable to all cases, in which every possible factor is assigned a numerical value and given its 'proper' importance in deciding the result.

Specifically concerning horses and camels; as with men and camels, and as with most things, experience and familiarity seem to be the important thing, but where experience is missing then discipline or training may be a reasonable substitute. A horse may shy at a camel; I doubt a unit of cavalry will, still less that a cavalry wing will, but a commander of cavalry, defeated years ago in battle, may remember how horses shied when camels approached, and find that makes a better reason for why he lost than any failure on his part; and he may be right, that may have been the main reason they lost, on that occasion, or he may not. Some rules writer two thousand years later may then decide that cavalry will always lose against camels; or will be disadvantaged against camels but might still win; or will be unaffected if they have prior camel experience (however determined); or will be unaffected if they have high enough training and discipline. And he may be right also, in each case.

Not very helpful or to the point I know, I'm just in ruminating mood, like a camel.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on October 28, 2019, 01:25:20 PM
I've often wondered about this.  I've not made a deep study of online sources but there does seem to be a shortage of controlled testing of the idea.  A lot of what you find online is either Herodotus-derived or by wargamers asking why camels are a super weapon.  There are some anecdotes from the US Camel Corps which suggest that horses and mules did not get on well with camels on first introduction (along with the surprising fact that camels are good swimmers).

Although traditionally attributed to smell, PB's points that horses are not particularly perturbed by smells might suggest that the entire package of odd appearance, smell and sound were needed to spook horses.  There is a general understanding that horses become accustomed to camels but I've not really found anything which explains how long it takes for them to become familiar or what level or type of exposure is needed.

Then there is the question of how important it is in the big picture, which Richard has already explored.  Camels do seem to have found their strength as transport animals rather than cavalry mounts.  Rewarding them with great combat bonuses or giving them "zones of confusion"  which disorder cavalry seem exaggerated.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on October 28, 2019, 03:01:04 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on October 28, 2019, 01:25:20 PM
There is a general understanding that horses become accustomed to camels but I've not really found anything which explains how long it takes for them to become familiar or what level or type of exposure is needed.

Leo doesn't go into any detail, but he seems to assume that the mere presence of camels in the army will do the trick, without any need for special measures. So a fairly low level of exposure and, given the brevity of many campaigns, apparently not all that long. This would fit well with Patrick's "first encounter" idea, and Phil's suggestion not to expect the same expedient to work twice.

QuoteThen there is the question of how important it is in the big picture, which Richard has already explored.  Camels do seem to have found their strength as transport animals rather than cavalry mounts.  Rewarding them with great combat bonuses or giving them "zones of confusion"  which disorder cavalry seem exaggerated.

The catch, of course, is that camels occasionally seem to have had big effects. Can we model that without making them ahistorical super-troops?

I guess the Ricardian answer would be to assume Croesus rolled a string of ones, but those of a more Patrician mindset will undoubtedly find this unsatisfying.

There's also the fact that mentions of the effect seems to be rather more common than battles where it's said to have been important: the three I mentioned in the OP are the only ones I can think of. Leo claims the Byzantines had lost "many battles" because of it - which is why the general should take steps to avoid it - but doesn't exemplify. Can anyone think of further instances?

Both the battles were the camels are reported to have been decisive are ones where the accounts we have are rather distant, and one might suspect tales having grown with the telling. Regarding Mammes, it's not clear to me from Procopius' account if he was personally present, but at any rate he was an associate of the Byzantine commander, so his information should be at one remove at worst.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Nick Harbud on October 28, 2019, 03:53:11 PM
Quote from: RichT on October 28, 2019, 12:28:30 PM
I'm just in ruminating mood, like a camel.

...and there was me thinking it was the way you walked.      ;D
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Duncan Head on October 28, 2019, 03:59:06 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on October 28, 2019, 03:01:04 PM
Leo doesn't go into any detail, but he seems to assume that the mere presence of camels in the army will do the trick, without any need for special measures. So a fairly low level of exposure and, given the brevity of many campaigns, apparently not all that long. This would fit well with Patrick's "first encounter" idea, and Phil's suggestion not to expect the same expedient to work twice.
...
The catch, of course, is that camels occasionally seem to have had big effects. Can we model that without making them ahistorical super-troops?

In a DBMM context, would there be any mileage in making "Camel shock" some sort of Stratagem? Available to armies with camels, or armies with a certain number of camels, or armies known to have had success with camels; pay points for it; increases the factors of ?one group? of camels against horse-mounted troops, for one?two?a few? bounds, usable once? in a game? It puts the onus on the ca,el-using army to provide the stratagem, rather than the old WRG approach of making opponents pay to be proof against an enemy they may never encounter.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on October 28, 2019, 06:39:00 PM
Quote from: Duncan Head on October 28, 2019, 03:59:06 PM
In a DBMM context, would there be any mileage in making "Camel shock" some sort of Stratagem? Available to armies with camels, or armies with a certain number of camels, or armies known to have had success with camels; pay points for it; increases the factors of ?one group? of camels against horse-mounted troops, for one?two?a few? bounds, usable once? in a game? It puts the onus on the camel-using army to provide the stratagem, rather than the old WRG approach of making opponents pay to be proof against an enemy they may never encounter.

That strikes me as a very good idea.  Not only does it satisfy the historically-minded for spefific match-ups, it also disallows historically dubious generic camel-fright across the spectrum of non-camel-using armies. As a result, camels can be made useful for disrupting cavalry but are not automatically so.  Given that camel-based victories seem to have involved forethought on the part of the camel-users, the idea has my vote.

The next question would be: how much effect should it have DB-wise?  Would it be just a die roll adjustment of a higher/lower score, or a full -1 for affected cavalry (making LC frigteningly vulnerable to camelry) or +1 for the camels or (in the case of a camel laager) their human beneficiaries?
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on October 29, 2019, 05:44:49 AM
Quote from: Duncan Head on October 28, 2019, 03:59:06 PM
In a DBMM context, would there be any mileage in making "Camel shock" some sort of Stratagem? Available to armies with camels, or armies with a certain number of camels, or armies known to have had success with camels; pay points for it; increases the factors of ?one group? of camels against horse-mounted troops, for one?two?a few? bounds, usable once? in a game? It puts the onus on the ca,el-using army to provide the stratagem, rather than the old WRG approach of making opponents pay to be proof against an enemy they may never encounter.

It might get a bit silly if you can pull it off against the horsemen of a LPIA or Christian Nubian army, but I like the principle that the beneficiary pays for it, and that it may come as a surprise, as it seems to have in the accounts we have.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on October 29, 2019, 09:28:55 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on October 29, 2019, 05:44:49 AM
It might get a bit silly if you can pull it off against the horsemen of a LPIA or Christian Nubian army, but I like the principle that the beneficiary pays for it, and that it may come as a surprise, as it seems to have in the accounts we have.

We might wish to specify certain armies as immune to the stratagem.  Or we might think about having it affect only certain types of cavalry (historically it was cavalry in the heavy bracket - Lydians, Vandals, Byzantines - who were the principal victims).  Or something of both.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Dangun on November 07, 2019, 06:00:49 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on October 28, 2019, 01:25:20 PM
Although traditionally attributed to smell, PB's points that horses are not particularly perturbed by smells might suggest that the entire package of odd appearance, smell and sound were needed to spook horses.

PB said in that article: "one of the things that all ancient wargamers were told and firmly believed in the 50s was that horses were frightened by the small and noise of elephants and camels. This is another of those things that everyone knows is untrue." His evidence is an anecdote about two horses he once met .

But I wonder whether he has forgotten how clearly this comes out of the sources, because the way he writes about in this article suggests he thinks its a 50s-era wargaming fable. Now if the sources are getting that wron... we spend more time on othismos that its due.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Mark G on November 07, 2019, 06:26:24 AM
Mark fry wrote an interesting bit on elephants and horses a short while ago in slingshot after spending some time around Asian elephants and handlers.

I remember him concluding that elephants are just as unhappy around horses as vice versa.

Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 07, 2019, 07:44:51 AM
Quote from: Dangun on November 07, 2019, 06:00:49 AM
But I wonder whether he has forgotten how clearly this comes out of the sources, because the way he writes about in this article suggests he thinks its a 50s-era wargaming fable. Now if the sources are getting that wron... we spend more time on othismos that its due.
That we spend more time on othismos than it's worth is pretty much a given I think.

But returning to the spooking of horses by camels, for all that it's a commonplace evidence of its military effect seems to be rare. Again, can anyone think of any other actions beyond the three mentioned in the OP where its reported to have been important? Any examples outside our period, say in colonial warfare? Any ideas what Roman/Byzantine defeats Leo may have been thinking of?
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Justin Swanton on November 07, 2019, 08:03:11 AM
Quote from: RichT on October 28, 2019, 12:28:30 PM
I think the question can be made more general. What frightens horses, or people come to that, is just a subset of the more general question of what decides the outcome of a battle (or some part of a battle). Army A meets Army B in battle. Army B is defeated and runs away, and Army A goes home happy. Now at some point, the events of the day need to make their way into a historical account. Maybe the commander of Army A (or less likely of Army B) will sit down to write his memoirs, a few years or decades later. Or maybe some historian, a similar period later, will set about writing an account and interview some participants in the battle (how many? Probably only a very few). Or maybe it will be a generation or two later, and the historian will be working from tales remembered from grandfathers, or from 'common knowledge'. At any rate, as Wellington said, nobody will remember all the events of the battle, but all will remember some incidents, and perhaps some incidents will stand out and be remembered in common. There will be excuses made (by Bs) for why they lost, and impressions (from As) of why they won. Horses being afraid of camels, standing to arms all night, not eating a proper breakfast, wind blown dust, the sun shining in their eyes, an unexpected ditch, divine intervention, greater manliness (of As) or effeminacy (of Bs), better weapons, better armour, better tactics. All sorts of stuff. Our historian may have one or two accounts, with one or two reasons, to choose from, or maybe, rarely, he will have dozens. Some factors will have made it into common knowledge, while others will remain personal recollections. The historian then has to make a more or less coherent account from what he has discovered, that fits his stylistic and didactic needs, and takes up not more than the two sentences or two paragraphs that he feels warranted by the importance of the event. And a couple of thousand years later, some other set of people have to take that account, and a few dozen others like it, and use them to make a general model of ancient combat, applicable to all cases, in which every possible factor is assigned a numerical value and given its 'proper' importance in deciding the result.

Much better to leave history alone and analyze why the Springboks are the greatest rugby team in the world.  8)
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 07, 2019, 08:26:26 AM
QuoteMuch better to leave history alone and analyze why the Springboks are the greatest rugby team in the world. 

Sadly, Justin, we are governed by barrack room rules - no religion, no politics, no sport.  Otherwise, I'm sure all English members would love to chat about it with you. :)
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Dangun on November 07, 2019, 09:29:38 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 07, 2019, 07:44:51 AM
But returning to the spooking of horses by camels, for all that it's a commonplace evidence of its military effect seems to be rare. Again, can anyone think of any other actions beyond the three mentioned in the OP where its reported to have been important?

But 3 pieces of corroborating evidence across multiple authors and multiple theatres is pretty good as far as literary evidence goes for the period. Consider by contrast how many of our "facts" are single source.

Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Duncan Head on November 07, 2019, 10:08:41 AM
Baladhuri (http://www.medievalnubia.info/dev/index.php/Al-Baladhuri) and others have Beja camels fleeing from noisy horses:
QuoteArriving in al-Ma'din, he [Al-Qummī] conveyed provisions in ships from al-Qulzum to the land of the Beja. He then proceeded to a sea-coast, called 'Aydhāb, where the ships met him. With these provisions he and his followers were strengthened and fed until they came to the castle (qal'ah) of the king of the Beja (malik al-bujah). Al-Qummī attacked his numerous men on camels fastened with girths. Al-Qummī brought bells and put them on his horses. As soon as the camels heard the bell sounding, they ran away with the Beja men over hills and valleys.

At Qadisiyyah (https://kalamullah.com/Books/The%20History%20Of%20Tabari/Tabari_Volume_12.pdf), Persian horses flee from camels disguised as elephants:
QuoteAl-Qa'qa's kinsmen attacked on that day in groups of ten footmen, on camels that were covered and veiled and with their horses surrounding and protecting the camels. Al-Qa'qa ordered them to attack the Persian horses between the two battle lines, simulating elephants. The Muslims did to the Persians on the Day of Aghwath what the Persians had done to them on the Day of Armath. These camels were not able to withstand anything, yet the Persian horses took  fright and fled. The horses of the Muslims pursued them, and when the other Muslim troops saw this they followed their example. On the Day of Aghwath, the Persians suffered from the camels  more than the Muslims had suffered on the Day of Armath from the elephants.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 07:24:12 AM
Thanks Duncan. I think Qadisiyyah has to count against the idea that camels should generally defeat or discomfit horses, though, as the elephant disguise was apparently necessary.

Maybe we should have a more general horse-spooking stratagem that can be differently realized?

Quote from: Dangun on November 07, 2019, 09:29:38 AM
But 3 pieces of corroborating evidence across multiple authors and multiple theatres is pretty good as far as literary evidence goes for the period. Consider by contrast how many of our "facts" are single source.

I don't think Xenophon counts as a separate source for Cyrus v. Croesus, so I make that two authors and two theatres rather than multiple.

More importantly, though, evidence of exactly what? I see no particular reason to doubt Prokopios that Byzantine horses were spooked by camels at Mammes, but was this a typical thing, the sort we should make the most probable to happen on the tabletop? Solomon's army was neither the first nor the last shipped in from Europe to North Africa, but it's apparently the only one we hear of having its horses spooked by camels to a battle-relevant extent.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 08, 2019, 08:42:06 AM
QuoteThanks Duncan. I think Qadisiyyah has to count against the idea that camels should generally defeat or discomfit horses, though, as the elephant disguise was apparently necessary.

On the subject of fake elephants, this legendary battle might be of interest

A strange story of camels at war is reported by Ctesias of Cnidus, a 5th century B.C. Greek. Legendary Assyrian queen Semiramis (ruled 824 B.C. to 811 B.C.) sought to conquer India. Knowing that Indian rajahs fielded powerful war elephants (not available in Assyria) she ordered the secret construction of hundreds of dummy elephants made of stuffed ox hide. Inside each was a man to work the artificial trunk, and a camel to move it. Indian cavalry horses, familiar with elephants, charged them boldly, but were spooked by the unfamiliar camel scent. When real Indian elephants advanced, they tore the dummy elephants apart.  The army of Semiramis was crushed and she fled in disgrace.

I'm sure the classicists can turn up the actual reference in Ctesias.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 08, 2019, 09:18:17 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on November 08, 2019, 08:42:06 AM
I'm sure the classicists can turn up the actual reference in Ctesias.

Ctesias' story is known (AFAIK) through Diodorus:

Diod. 2.16.8 "Observing that she was greatly inferior because of her lack of elephants, Semiramis conceived the plan of making dummies like these animals, in the hope that the Indians would be struck with terror because of their belief that no elephants ever existed at all apart from those found in India." Followed by details of their construction.

Diod. 2.17.1. f. "When the boats and the beasts had been prepared in the two allotted years, on the third she summoned her forces from everywhere to Bactriana. And the multitude of the army which was assembled, as Ctesias of Cnidus has recorded, was three million foot-soldiers, two hundred thousand cavalry, and one hundred thousand chariots. There were also men mounted on camels, carrying swords four cubits long, as many in number as the chariots. And river boats which could be taken apart she built to the number of two thousand, and she had collected camels to carry the vessels overland. Camels also bore the dummies of the elephants, as has been mentioned; and the soldiers, by bringing their horses up to these camels, accustomed them not to fear the savage nature of the beasts. A similar thing was also done many years later by Perseus, the king of the Macedonians, before his decisive conflict with the Romans who had elephants from Libya. But neither in his case did it turn out that the zeal and ingenuity displayed in such matters had any effect on the conflict, nor in that of Semiramis, as will be shown more precisely in our further account."

Diod 2.18.6. f. Semiramis wins an initial battle; "and then she left sixty thousand men to guard the pontoon bridge, while with the rest of her army she advanced in pursuit of the Indians, the dummy elephants leading the way in order that the king's spies might report to the king the multitude of these animals in her army. Nor was she deceived in this hope; on the contrary, when those who had been despatched to spy her out reported to the Indians the multitude of elephants among the enemy, they were all at a loss to discover from where such a multitude of beasts as accompanied her could have come. However, the deception did not remain a secret for long; for some of Semiramis' troops were caught neglecting their night watches in the camp, and these, in fear of the consequent punishment, deserted to the enemy and pointed out to them their mistake regarding the nature of the elephants. Encouraged by this information, the king of the Indians, after informing his army about the dummies, set his forces in array and turned about to face the Assyrians.

Diod. 2.19.1. f. "Semiramis likewise marshalled her forces, and as the two armies neared each other Stabrobates, the king of the Indians, despatched his cavalry and chariots far in advance of the main body. But the queen stoutly withstood the attack of the cavalry, and since the elephants which she had fabricated had been stationed at equal intervals in front of the main body of troops, it came about that the horses of the Indians shied at them. For whereas at a distance the dummies looked like the actual animals with which the horses of the Indians were acquainted and therefore charged upon them boldly enough, yet on nearer contact the odour which reached the horses was unfamiliar, and then the other differences, which taken all together were very great, threw them into utter confusion. Consequently some of the Indians were thrown to the ground, while others, whence their horses would not obey the rein, were carried with their mounts pell-mell into the midst of the enemy. Then Semiramis, who was in the battle with a select band of soldiers, made skilful use of her advantage and put the Indians to flight. But although these fled towards the battle-line, King Stabrobates, undismayed, advanced the ranks of his foot-soldiers, keeping the elephants in front, while he himself, taking his position on the right wing and fighting from the most powerful of the beasts, charged in terrifying fashion upon the queen, whom chance had placed opposite him. And since the rest of the elephants followed his example, the army of Semiramis withstood but a short time the attack of the beasts; for the animals, by virtue of their extraordinary courage and the confidence which they felt in their power, easily destroyed everyone who tried to withstand them. Consequently there was a great slaughter, which was effected in various ways, some being trampled beneath their feet, others ripped up by their tusks, and a number tossed into the air by their trunks. And since a great multitude of corpses lay piled one upon the other and the danger aroused terrible consternation and fear in those who witnessed the sight, not a man had the courage to hold his position any longer."

Opinions as to the historical veracity of this account vary (well to be honest they don't vary much...). The dummies are said to have been built to frighten the Indians rather than their horses, and to train the Assyrian horses - frightening the Indian horses was a happy accident.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 08, 2019, 09:41:32 AM
QuoteOpinions as to the historical veracity of this account vary (well to be honest they don't vary much...). The dummies are said to have been built to frighten the Indians rather than their horses, and to train the Assyrian horses - frightening the Indian horses was a happy accident.

I don't think anyone thinks this is anything but legend (but we have not heard from Patrick yet :) ) but it does help us build the picture of a widespread belief in the ancient world about camels and horses (and in this instance, elephants).  Semiramis and Perseus use camels in disguise to familiarise horses to elephants.  This won't work because, as the Indians show, horses can tell the difference between disguised camels and elephants. But a model of familiarisation in camp leading to reduced problems on the battlefield seems to underlie the thinking.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on November 08, 2019, 09:58:05 AM
Semiramis appears to equate to Queen Sammuramat, wife of Shamshi-Adad V of Assyria (r.809-792 BC*), who after his death ruled Assyria in her own right, or at least through her own charisma, much like Zenobia of Palmyra.

*Or 811-808 BC.  Assyriologists are still unsure exactly when Shamshi-Adad V died or Adad-Nirari III succeeded.

Little survives from her reign, but it is noteworthy that subsequent Assyrian rulers adopt large four-horse chariots and parasols, both indicating Indian influence.

In the city of Ashur she raised an obelisk, inscribed:

Stele of Sammuramat, queen of Shamshi-Adad, King of the Universe, King of Assyria, Mother of Adad Nirari, King of the Universe, King of Assyria, Daughter-in-Law of Shalmaneser, King of the Four Regions of the World.

Note how between generations šar kibrāti erbetti (king of the four quarters) is replaced by šar kiššati (king of the universe).

These details suggest a flowering of Assyrian expansion under her reign and a campaign as far as India.  The lack of a subsequent triumphal inscription proclaiming world conquest suggests the Indian expedition did not go well.  So Diodorus' account contains an apparent kernel of historical fact.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 08, 2019, 09:41:32 AM
Semiramis and Perseus use camels in disguise to familiarise horses to elephants.  This won't work because, as the Indians show, horses can tell the difference between disguised camels and elephants. But a model of familiarisation in camp leading to reduced problems on the battlefield seems to underlie the thinking.

Surprise (or preparation) seems to be the key to the stratagem.  Once Semiramis' deserters let the cat out of the bag, or the elephant out of the room, the Indians were well able to deal with it (apart from their impulsive cavalry, but then nobody had yet worked out a way of telling the horses).
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 08, 2019, 10:11:51 AM
Yup so there are two features to model, if you really want to model this nonsense :)

- horse-scaring ability of camels and elephants
- camel and elephant proofing of horses

The first is built in and gives all camels and elephants +1 (or forced morale test, or whatever is appropriate) against cavalry in their vicinity (defined however you like) by default.
The second is a trait or attribute that must be purchased at a points cost, and represents either horses already familiar with camels/elephants, or trained by some means to become familiar. It could be limited by army list. So you can choose to upgrade your cavalry (all or some) to 'camel trained' or 'elephant trained', but at a cost in points.

Downside being as mentioned earlier that this might require (in competitions etc) camel-proofing cavalry when they may never meet camels, but that's just a choice you have to make, and the cost and effect should both be low.

Non points based rules like DBA require a different approach (like stratagems, as mentioned).
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 08, 2019, 11:14:33 AM
But this does plunge us into the "what are army lists for/what do they represent?" set of questions.  I suppose they can be seen as a set of constraints on army composition based on knowledge of their historical prototype.  If so, we might perhaps approach the question by looking at the historical evidence and placing armies into three camel proofing categories

Endemic - horses and camels co-exist in the culture, so are familiar with one another
Trained - a special familiarisation training is recorded
Untrained - there is no evidence that the army ever met a camel or, if they did, took measures against them

Endemic would be free - its not a quality sought, bought, consciously developed.  Trained could be paid for and might be limited only to a model of a historical army that had it, rather than a generic version of that army.  Untrained its tough but you grin and bear it and try to avoid camels.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Dangun on November 08, 2019, 12:11:22 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 07:24:12 AM
I see no particular reason to doubt Prokopios that Byzantine horses were spooked by camels at Mammes, but was this a typical thing, the sort we should make the most probable to happen on the tabletop?

No idea.  :)
I have ridden horses and I have ridden camels. I am not fond of either and have no idea how they might interact.
It just seems like hard work to try and refute something for which we have at least two, maybe more, corroborating pieces of evidence.
Single sources make easier targets.

I'd agree it does feel a bit scenario-rule-like.

Perhaps another line of attack is to look for examples of engagements where horse and camel got a long happily?
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 08, 2019, 03:29:22 PM
Quote
Endemic would be free - its not a quality sought, bought, consciously developed.  Trained could be paid for and might be limited only to a model of a historical army that had it, rather than a generic version of that army.  Untrained its tough but you grin and bear it and try to avoid camels.

Historically I agree - either you have the ability (or effect) or you don't. But in game terms, I think advantages should always carry a cost or a corresponding disadvantage, so as to produce fair competition and to provide player choice. It would be reasonable though to make camel-proofing built in (though costed) for camel-using and camel-exposed armies, optional for historically camel-proofed ones, and not an option for others.

Having dealt with camel-proofing there are then all the other myriad factors (dust, sun, breakfast, eclipses etc etc) that may have slightly affected the course of a battle to be factored in...

I'm not a chrome fan (as may be obvious), but in this case the simple solution seems to be to give all elephants and camels bonuses against all cavalry, and to give superior quality units bonuses against all enemies; then the quality bonus cancels the camel penalty, thus representing, abstractly, camel-proofing.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 03:59:17 PM
Quote from: RichT on November 08, 2019, 03:29:22 PM
I'm not a chrome fan (as may be obvious), but in this case the simple solution seems to be to give all elephants and camels bonuses against all cavalry, and to give superior quality units bonuses against all enemies; then the quality bonus cancels the camel penalty, thus representing, abstractly, camel-proofing.

I have two problems with this:

1) The reason Cyrus felt he needed the camel trick was, or so we're told, that the Lydian cavalry was superior to his. If we're to reproduce this battle (other than as a sequence of bad dice splits for Croesus), camels need to be able to defeat superior cavalry.

2) We're back at the question why, if camels were reliably excellent against horse, why their usage is so rare. Nobody seems to have even tried to reproduce Cyrus' trick. Almoravids conquering Morocco quickly enough abandoned camelry for cavalry, despite keeping camels as pack animals. The Arabs Qadisiyyah evidently thought disguising the camels was necessary to spook the Persian horses.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 08, 2019, 04:22:48 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 03:59:17 PM
camels need to be able to defeat superior cavalry.

Every time, or just with greater likelihood? Camels will be better against superior cavalry than inferior cavalry are. Again it comes down to what 'reproducing a battle' means - if it means having all the same events in the same sequence, then it's not a game. As a simulation it might be worth doing, but no existing rules are even vaguely close to a simulation (at least not a bottom up design for cause one).

Quote
We're back at the question why, if camels were reliably excellent against horse, why their usage is so rare.

So two possibilities - it didn't happen, or at least it didn't happen in the way described. Camels sometimes had some success against horse and some historian later wrote an account stressing the cameliness of the camels as the cause of the chaos. Doesn't mean this is necessarily the real, only or most improtant explanantion, and the whole truth is irretirevably lost to us.

Or other possibility - cultural, economic, geographical etc factors mean adopting camels wasn't as easy as picking them from an army list. Lots of apparently brilliant weapons systems in antiquity weren't widely adopted by their enemies, or only ineffectively. If legions are so brilliant against phalanx, why didn't Hellenistic kingdoms all immediately re-equip their armies as legions (there were only a few half hearted efforts)? Camels are I imagine (knowing little abut it, but having seen them on TV) considerably less amenable and convenient creatures than horses, even if they are available, which they usually aren't.

Or short answer, dunno...
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 08, 2019, 05:07:43 PM
There are plenty of anecdotes out there about camels on the internet - arab, North African, Australian.  Perhaps if people are truly interested in the pros and cons they could do a trawl.  From my quick reading, camels are considered quite bright and have a good memory (forget elephants - for desert users, the camel is the animal that never forgets).  They are complicated animals that have to be treated correctly to get the best out of them.  They are very good at long distance endurance and can "cruise" at a steady pace but are slower than horses at full speed and can only sustain it for a short time.  Horses are considered more agile.    These may contribute some ideas to why horses were the prefered cavalry mount, or maybe not.

Overall, though, I think we can see a general underlying belief that the smell of camels upset horses in the ancient world but how much that was actually tested as opposed to assumed is a different question.  The scattered anecdotes may hide a wider set of occurences which had no perceived effect on the course of battles, or there could have been unrecorded camel familiarisation training going as routine in areas where camel and horse units coincided which meant it wasn't an issue.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Mark G on November 08, 2019, 06:14:41 PM
If it is the smell of camels that is significant, then any rule applying to mounted camels must also apply to knelt and hobbled camels, such as were used by occasional Arabian associated armies,

While I would be pleased to include such a rule to benefit my midianites ( who really suck without it) I have yet to convince any opponent of the validity of my claim, especially for a retrospective claim when the dice fail to roll well up, again.

Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 06:16:24 PM
Quote from: RichT on November 08, 2019, 04:22:48 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 03:59:17 PM
camels need to be able to defeat superior cavalry.

Every time, or just with greater likelihood?

Most of the time, if the battle is supposed to be the sort of average outcome we should reflect as the most likely in our rules. If Croesus (and Solomon, and the Vandal commander) simply threw a bunch of ones the whole problem goes away, and we can let camelry be the inferior troop-type the general preference for cavalry even among camel-using cultures suggests them to be.

(A third option, of course, would be that camels should generally beat cavalry unused to them, but generally lose to others.)

Quote
Or other possibility - cultural, economic, geographical etc factors mean adopting camels wasn't as easy as picking them from an army list. Lots of apparently brilliant weapons systems in antiquity weren't widely adopted by their enemies, or only ineffectively. If legions are so brilliant against phalanx, why didn't Hellenistic kingdoms all immediately re-equip their armies as legions (there were only a few half hearted efforts)? Camels are I imagine (knowing little abut it, but having seen them on TV) considerably less amenable and convenient creatures than horses, even if they are available, which they usually aren't.
This won't fly. Plenty of armies used camels on a massive scale - they just overwhelmingly deployed them as pack-animals rather than battle-steeds.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 06:20:30 PM
Quote from: Mark G on November 08, 2019, 06:14:41 PM
If it is the smell of camels that is significant, then any rule applying to mounted camels must also apply to knelt and hobbled camels, such as were used by occasional Arabian associated armies,

While I would be pleased to include such a rule to benefit my midianites ( who really suck without it) I have yet to convince any opponent of the validity of my claim, especially for a retrospective claim when the dice fail to roll well up, again.
DBMM does have a rule along those lines, although the Midianites can't benefit from it.

It would perhaps be timely to remember that of our three examples, only one involves ridden camels. The two others involve standing on foot behind a line of camels.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on November 09, 2019, 08:46:34 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 06:20:30 PM
It would perhaps be timely to remember that of our three examples, only one involves ridden camels. The two others involve standing on foot behind a line of camels.

Good observation.  And at Mammes the stand-behind-a-line-of-camels trick did not really work against Solomon (the Byzantine general); or rather it did, but he annulled it by dismounting his cavalry and having them hack their way in, which they did without trouble.  In game terms, on Turn 1 the Byzantines approach and dismount, presumably just outside camel effect range; on Turn 2 they close and engage on foot.  The camel stratagem 'works' but a simple countermeasure turns it into wasted points.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 09, 2019, 10:06:04 AM
Historical examples of the tactic being used are small compared with the number of camels in military use - as already noted, the camel is a very good transport animal, and armies in the areas with access to them seem to have used them freely.  If the tactic was simply applied and universally successful, wouldn't we expect to see more?  Also, what evidence do we have of camel cavalry in action?  I recall the Sassanids had camel cataphracts in one battle but used these to attack Roman infantry, rather than cavalry.  They clearly weren't thought of as primarily an anti-horse weapon.

Turning back to depicted the smelly camel phenomenon in rules.  The problem I see in terms of points cost is that smelliness isn't a bought or trained characteristic.  Wherever there are camels, there is camel smell.  So you can't expect to ask a player to pay to turn it on, or turn it off if points aren't paid.  You can pay for immunity, and some armies, as discussed,  might have a compulsory immunity, just because of their historical prototype.  Whether that compulsory immunity is free or a compulsory cost (as Richard, following a logic of paying for advantage, suggests) is up to the rule or list writers.  I have some more difficulties with it being a paid-for strategem.  Yes, it was used as a stratagem but the stratagem was in the deployment, not the turning on of the anti-horse property.

If we do model the effect, we then have to be careful how certain the effect will be.   Should there be a negative in each combat when non-immune cavalry face camels?  Should it always decisive - the historical record suggests it was only worth mentioning three times in hundreds of years.  Or perhaps a special test when a non-immune cavalry unit first encounters camels (throw a 1 and cavalry are disordered, or similar as appropriate to the rules)? 
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 09, 2019, 10:26:10 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on November 09, 2019, 10:06:04 AM
I recall the Sassanids had camel cataphracts in one battle but used these to attack Roman infantry, rather than cavalry.

I believe you're thinking of the Battle of Nisibis, AD 217, where the Parthians used camelry against the Romans.

We had a big thread (http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=2554.0) about that battle about three years ago. It's not entirely clear the camels were "cataphract" in the sense the beasts themselves, and not only their riders, were armoured.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 09, 2019, 11:00:35 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 08, 2019, 06:16:24 PM
This won't fly. Plenty of armies used camels on a massive scale - they just overwhelmingly deployed them as pack-animals rather than battle-steeds.

What won't fly - camels? I agree :)

But doesn't this just demonstrate what I was trying to say? Camels are better as pack animals than as steeds for whatever reason (which may be to do with camel nature, or that sitting on a camel is undignified, or any number of other reasons, not necessarily strictly military) and this outweighed any effect their smell may have had on horses, the vast majority of times.

In terms of paying for camel smell, I'm working from the assumption that in a game, advantages either need to be balanced by disadvantages, or paid for by points or equivalent - that's a basic game design principle. The smell should come with the camel, by default, but you still have to 'pay' for it (either explicitly, in points, or by a corresponding disadvantage like slower speed or lower manoeuvrability than horse cavalry).
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 09, 2019, 11:56:15 AM
Quote from: RichT on November 09, 2019, 11:00:35 AM
But doesn't this just demonstrate what I was trying to say?

It doesn't demonstrate what I thought you were trying to say, but I apparently misunderstood you.

(I'm skeptical, though, of explanations of the "it's undignified" type when we're dealing with a preference for cavalry over cavalry that appears consistent across thousands of years from Morocco to Manchuria.)
QuoteIn terms of paying for camel smell, I'm working from the assumption that in a game, advantages either need to be balanced by disadvantages, or paid for by points or equivalent - that's a basic game design principle. The smell should come with the camel, by default, but you still have to 'pay' for it (either explicitly, in points, or by a corresponding disadvantage like slower speed or lower manoeuvrability than horse cavalry).

Agreed in principle, although it gets hard to do right if we decided on the only-affects-unaccustomed-horses route; since few armies use fighting (as opposed to baggage) camels, the value of the immunity is presumably low - but it may make a huge difference the day you do face Tuareg. In a competition context I guess it should eventually balance out in the sense that proportions of camel armies, camel-proof armies, camel-vulnernable armies, and foot armies find an equilibrium (which may involve no armies of one or more of the types), but it doesn't seem very satisfying.

(Obviously, similar problems beset any other rock-paper-scissors type interaction.)
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on November 10, 2019, 09:18:39 AM
The smell of camels is pretty much a constant (unless someone works out a way of giving them a bath and surviving the process) but employing it effectively in battle requires forethought and preparation.  This is why I like Andreas' idea of making it a stratagem, because while camels spat, ruminated and stank much the same the whole world over*, mobilising them for effective action on the field required directed and purposeful activity.

*Except those parts uninhabited by camels.

Adding to this a more general thought ...

Going out of period (simply because the information is there): during the First World War, Colonel T E Lawrence was involved in a few mounted camelry actions, including one which involved a melee against Turkish cavalry.  The latter seemed unworried by the smell of the camels (how far does a smell actually precede a charging camel?) but when the rangy Arab camels bumped into the diminutive Turkish cavalry steeds, the latter went down under the impact.  (The Turks lost the action.)

Can we meaningfully read anything from this back into our own period?  Should ridden camels have a melee advantage against lighter cavalry types, or at least those on smaller horses?
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 10, 2019, 11:43:53 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 10, 2019, 09:18:39 AM
This is why I like Andreas' idea of making it a stratagem

That was Duncan's idea actually - credit where credit's due :)
QuoteGoing out of period (simply because the information is there): during the First World War, Colonel T E Lawrence was involved in a few mounted camelry actions, including one which involved a melee against Turkish cavalry.  The latter seemed unworried by the smell of the camels (how far does a smell actually precede a charging camel?) but when the rangy Arab camels bumped into the diminutive Turkish cavalry steeds, the latter went down under the impact.  (The Turks lost the action.)

Can we meaningfully read anything from this back into our own period?  Should ridden camels have a melee advantage against lighter cavalry types, or at least those on smaller horses?

It would seem to demonstrate that camelry can beat cavalry "legitimately", as in without benefitting from any disordering or panicking before contact.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 10, 2019, 12:51:17 PM
QuoteIt would seem to demonstrate that camelry can beat cavalry "legitimately", as in without benefitting from any disordering or panicking before contact.

Except we have no details of the circumstances, other than some camels knocked over some smaller horses.  The Turks should have been camel proof anyway, but we don't know if otherwise it was a balanced fight.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 10, 2019, 04:17:17 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on November 10, 2019, 12:51:17 PM
QuoteIt would seem to demonstrate that camelry can beat cavalry "legitimately", as in without benefitting from any disordering or panicking before contact.

Except we have no details of the circumstances, other than some camels knocked over some smaller horses.  The Turks should have been camel proof anyway, but we don't know if otherwise it was a balanced fight.

We don't, so I wouldn't suggest using it as the baseline for what the typical outcome of a fair contest between camelry and cavalry should be. Actually, I'm pretty confident it can't be typical of that - if it were, bedouin wouldn't generally have preferred horses for fighting. But as an actual account of combat between camelry and (presumedly) camel-proof cavalry - something which to the best of my knowledge is entirely lacking in period sources - it has to count for something.

Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on November 10, 2019, 07:27:51 PM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 10, 2019, 04:17:17 PM
We don't, so I wouldn't suggest using it as the baseline for what the typical outcome of a fair contest between camelry and cavalry should be. Actually, I'm pretty confident it can't be typical of that - if it were, bedouin wouldn't generally have preferred horses for fighting. But as an actual account of combat between camelry and (presumedly) camel-proof cavalry - something which to the best of my knowledge is entirely lacking in period sources - it has to count for something.

Agreed.  It was not an entirely 'fair' contest, as the Arabs poured out from behind a dune and so had 'impetus', but the action quickly became a not-very-ordered swirling melee which then became a short pursuit when the Turks felt they had had enough (men on camels trying to catch men on horses soon get left behind).  The main point of interest is that when camels bumped into small-to-medium-size horses, the horses went down (complete with rider).  The secondary point of interest is that these collisions took place, as opposed to the animals getting out of each other's way.  There is presumably something transferrable to earlier eras therein.

The Arabs under Lawrence's influence (they had their own tortuous and touchy chains of command) did not use horses because horses could not withstand the rigours of desert travel, and desert travel was necessary to get from point A to point B without being intercepted by the Turks, who mainly clung to the coastal areas and railways.  Anyone operating outside desert areas tended to ride horses, which are easier and quicker to mount, better at manoeuvring, more tractable and more responsive.

Whether camelry would have been effective against cavalry in a wider context can perhaps be answered by Constantine's countermeasures against Maxentius' cataphracts: Constantine's cavalry induced their heavier opponents to charge, and then retired before them until disorder and exhaustion reduced the cataphracts to ineffectiveness, then attacked and defeated them.  I suspect much the same process would have taken place when camel-mounted tribes tried to take on, for example, Assyrian cavalry, or for that matter any cavalry which knew what it was doing.  There would have been an initial success through unfamiliarity followed by effective countermeasures and an end to the camel-riders' temporary supremacy.

And apologies to Duncan for failing to credit him properly with the stratagem idea.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 11, 2019, 10:02:54 AM
Digging around, I came across this MPhil thesis (https://orca.cf.ac.uk/17728/1/2011beattiemphil.pdf.pdf) about Roman operations in the east.  It contains quite a bit on camelry (pp53-60).  I noted this remark

With regard to camelry in combat, we do have some information from literary sources. Appian's Syrian Wars 6.32 and Livy 37.40 both describe an Arabian contingent of camelry fighting with Antiochus against the Romans.  We are told that they were  archers who fought while mounted,and that they also had a long sword (gladius or μάχαιρα) for close quarters fighting.  Livy also says that they were positioned in front of the cavalry.

Once more, the classicists may be able to tell us more about the battle described and any wider relevance it may have.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Duncan Head on November 11, 2019, 10:10:51 AM
It's not very helpful. The long swords attributed to the Seleucid camel-men suggest that they expected to fight from camel-back rather than dismount, but in the end they didn't fight, they were broken through by fleeing scythed chariots:

Quote from: Livy 37.40-41In front of this mass of cavalry were scythe chariots and the camels which they call dromedaries. Seated on these were Arabian archers provided with narrow swords four cubits long so that they could reach the enemy from the height on which they were perched.  ...

The chariots thus armed were stationed, as I have already said, in front of the line for had they been in the rear or the centre they must have been driven through their own men. When he saw this, Eumenes, who was quite familiar with their mode of fighting, and knew how much their assistance would be worth when once the horses were terrified, ordered the Cretan archers, the slingers and javelin men, in conjunction with some troops of cavalry, to run forward, not in close order but as loosely as possible, and discharge their missiles simultaneously from every side. What with the wounds inflicted by the missiles and the wild shouts of the assailants, this tempestuous onslaught so scared the horses that they started to gallop wildly about the field as though without bit or bridle. The light infantry and slingers and the active Cretans easily avoided them when they dashed towards them, and the cavalry increased the confusion and panic by affrighting the horses and even the camels, and to this was added the shouts of those who had not gone into action. The chariots were driven off the field, and now that this silly show was got rid of the signal was given, and both sides closed in a regular battle.

It is another instance of horses allegedly frightening camels rather than vice versa, though...
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 11, 2019, 10:21:30 AM
Interestingly, the Diodorus/Ctesias story we discussed earlier also had camel riders with swords four cubits long.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 11, 2019, 11:38:11 AM
Just long enough to reach the ground, presumably. Like the correct length for a man's legs.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 11, 2019, 11:58:15 AM
Quote from: RichT on November 11, 2019, 11:38:11 AM
Just long enough to reach the ground, presumably. Like the correct length for a man's legs.

Indeed.  One might, however, wonder at this weapon.  How was it used?  Was it used like a lance ( I can't imagine effectively swinging a sword 4 cubits long from animal back )?  Was it constructed with a long handle like a falx or rhomphaia?

P.S. Apologies for the changes and additions but I am struggling to express what I'm getting at.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 11, 2019, 12:41:31 PM
Yes it's hard to imagine the purpose of such a weapon. Four cubits is about 1.8 m so this is a mighty sword. Why not just use a spear? Are Arabs noted for their use of enormous swords at other times?

Some possibilities:
- Livy or Appian or their shared source had read Ctesias, thought camels, thought four cubits swords, added some colour to their account. Ctesias' account is just a fantasy ('inspired by true events' as they say in the movies). Four cubit swords never existed. Quite possible if not entirely satisfactory.
- a 1.8 m sword really is useful when on camelback, or is a traditional weapon among camel users, or is used in some way we armchair camel speculators can't imagine. Also quite possible if not entirely satisfactory.
- 'sword' in the sources is used loosely of some other weapon - as you say, maybe like a falx or rhomphaia, a blade on a stick, which is sort of the obvious thing to do to increase reach from camelback. This gets my vote, slightly reluctantly.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Duncan Head on November 11, 2019, 01:00:30 PM
Quote from: RichT on November 11, 2019, 12:41:31 PMSome possibilities:
- Livy or Appian or their shared source had read Ctesias, thought camels, thought four cubits swords, added some colour to their account.

- Antiochos III's quartermaster had read Ctesias, knew the boss had hired some camels, and thought four-cubit swords sounded really neat.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 11, 2019, 01:56:55 PM
If we're speculating wildly, here's a couple more possibilities:

- the original source said something like "long swords to reach down", which someone interpreted to mean "reach the ground" (4 cubits is roughly the shoulder height of a dromedary), but what was actually meant was to reach men on foot.
- The number or unit got garbled in transmission - it was originally 2 cubits, or 4 feet, or something.

Both work best if Appian and Livy are dependent on Ctesias, of course.

ETA: On a completely different tack, extremely long swords would be less odd in the hands of footmen, so perhaps they tell us that these camel men did expect to dismount to fight.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 11, 2019, 02:12:01 PM
Leaving aside exactly what was meant, we appear to have mounted archers equipped with anti-infantry weapons.  They seem neither equipped for, nor specially deployed as, a cavalry killer, unless their deployment alongside scythed chariots suggests they are part of some (unsuccessful) disruption operation.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 11, 2019, 02:48:06 PM
I guess there are also at least two possibilities for Seleucid recruitment:

1: The army list approach: "We're going to need some camels to stink out the Roman cavalry and tilt the odds in our favour a bit, the way Xenophon says Cyrus did. Where can we get camels from? Ah, the Arabs can provide them. Then let's give them enormous swords like Ctesias says camel riders should have."

2. The big empire approach: "Big battle coming up with the Romans - tell all the subject peoples to send their finest to take part." Three months later - "Right, Arab contingent coming in. WTF are those? Camels? WTF will we do with 500 camels? And WTF are those things they're carrying? OK, put them in advance of the left somewhere, they can't do any harm there".

It's interesting that at Magnesia the cavalry frightened the camels. Going back to games, that's the trouble with the camels +1 v. cavalry way of doing things, it gives the player the sort of hard information no real general ever had. In the context of a game that's fair enough of course.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on November 11, 2019, 05:41:08 PM
Would the camel riders have been equipped by the Seleucid monarch or would they have brought their own?  I have a hard time imagining them turning up thinking, "Oh, His Majesty will provide us with such lucky dip weapons as he thinks fit," rather than, "I'm bringing my favourite bow and sword, which I am well practised with and accustomed to using."

So maybe they did have four-cubit swords; it did not do them any good in the circumstances, but they had been expecting a different set of circumstances, namely that they follow or accompany scythed chariots in a victorious charge whcih breaks up the Pergamene cavalry and then rides down their supporting light infantry.  A  six-foot sword has considerable potential as a smiter of routing or simply disordered opponents, and saves on javelins, particularly if the launch platform is a bit bumpy.

Presumably care would have to be taken not to behead one's own camel.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 11, 2019, 05:47:30 PM
QuotePresumably care would have to be taken not to behead one's own camel.

T.E. Lawrence once accidentally shot his camel in the head in a charge (the one dramatised in the film, but they missed that be out).
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Jim Webster on November 11, 2019, 09:10:38 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 11, 2019, 05:41:08 PM
Would the camel riders have been equipped by the Seleucid monarch or would they have brought their own?  I have a hard time imagining them turning up thinking, "Oh, His Majesty will provide us with such lucky dip weapons as he thinks fit," rather than, "I'm bringing my favourite bow and sword, which I am well practised with and accustomed to using."

So maybe they did have four-cubit swords; it did not do them any good in the circumstances, but they had been expecting a different set of circumstances, namely that they follow or accompany scythed chariots in a victorious charge whcih breaks up the Pergamene cavalry and then rides down their supporting light infantry.  A  six-foot sword has considerable potential as a smiter of routing or simply disordered opponents, and saves on javelins, particularly if the launch platform is a bit bumpy.

Presumably care would have to be taken not to behead one's own camel.

I think we can assume that Arabs being more allied/mercenary would have been expected to fetch their own kit
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2019, 07:44:01 AM
Quote from: Erpingham on November 11, 2019, 05:47:30 PM
QuotePresumably care would have to be taken not to behead one's own camel.

T.E. Lawrence once accidentally shot his camel in the head in a charge (the one dramatised in the film, but they missed that be out).

I think he gave up using a pistol from camelback after that; it was an accident waiting to happen.  At least when the camel dropped it threw him forwards and its body acted as a breakwater (breakherd?) which prevented him from being trampled by waves of successive riders.

Quote from: Jim Webster on November 11, 2019, 09:10:38 PM
I think we can assume that Arabs being more allied/mercenary would have been expected to fetch their own kit

That is what I would assume.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 12, 2019, 10:20:58 AM
I note, BTW, that Magister Militum sells  a pack of ten two handed swords designed to be used from a camel's back or by a very large man (https://www.magistermilitum.com/w28-two-handed-sword.html).

There's also one pose in their Bedouin Camel Riders (https://www.magistermilitum.com/as13-bedouin-camel-riders.html) code who seems to be wielding a very long sword, although the picture is not of the best quality.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 12, 2019, 10:32:30 AM
Quote from: Andreas Johansson on November 12, 2019, 10:20:58 AM
I note, BTW, that Magister Militum sells  a pack of ten two handed swords designed to be used from a camel's back or by a very large man (https://www.magistermilitum.com/w28-two-handed-sword.html).

There's also one pose in their Bedouin Camel Riders (https://www.magistermilitum.com/as13-bedouin-camel-riders.html) code who seems to be wielding a very long sword, although the picture is not of the best quality.

The assumption by the sculpter seems to be it was swung one handed, a bit like a polo mallet perhaps?  Would it be used two-handed against cavalry?  Or just use the reach like a spear?  One wonders how effective it was, as later camelry seem to have been equipped with normal length swords.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 12, 2019, 11:27:24 AM
Of course my levity in this matter should not obscure the great historical truth that Hellenistic subject, allied or mercenary forces usually supplied their own kit (though not always).

Quote
particularly if the launch platform is a bit bumpy.

Or humpy, in this case.

Concerning the camel longswords:

Livy 37.40: gladios tenues habentes longos quaterna cubita - "slender swords four cubits long"
Appian Syr 32: μαχαίραις ... ἐπιμήκεσι καὶ στεναῖς - machairas epimekesi kai stenais - "very long thin knives [swords]" 

If true does this suggest something more like a long rapier than a Medieval greatsword or longsword?
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 12, 2019, 11:45:47 AM
QuoteIf true does this suggest something more like a long rapier than a Medieval greatsword or longsword?

Or an estoc perhaps?  If so, we would be thinking thrusting weapon.

BTW, is there any significance to the fact that the word rhomphaia isn't used? 
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 12, 2019, 12:00:22 PM
Doesn't makhaira typically mean a cutting sword?

*****

If I may return to the original inspiration of the thread, Leo's Taktika is in many parts based on Maurice's Strategicon, but the advice about accustoming horses to camels is one of the new bits, and AFAIK it doesn't recur in any of the later manuals (though I haven't read all of them). Should we suspect Leo - who was more of a scholarly type than a soldier-emperor like Maurice or Nikephoros Phokas - of having included it more for showing off his erudition than out of any practical need? If it were valuable practical advice one might have thought it should have been repeated in the Praecepta Militaria or the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos.

(I can't but help feel it unhelpful of Leo not to give even one example of the "many battles" the Byzantines had supposedly lost due to horses being spooked by camels.)
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: RichT on November 12, 2019, 12:45:56 PM
I think machaira is just a sword or knife or blade without any particular shape, though Xenophon does use it for a cutting sword:

Xen. Horse 12.11 "for harming the enemy we recommend the machaira rather than the xiphos, because, owing to his lofty position, the rider will find the cut with the kopis more efficacious than the thrust with the xiphos."

Thanks Xenophon - so are a kopis and a machaira the same thing? cf. Xen. Cyrop. 1.2.13 (of Persians) "and in their right hands a machaira or kopis."

An even more lofty camel rider should find a cutting blade useful, but then why 'thin'?

As usual, Greek writers are not strong on technical words. Rhomphaia is another word used for several things - famously by Plutarch for the Thracian weapon (taken to mean the falx-like one we are familiar with), but used by Josephus apparently just to mean sword. I don't think, sadly, much can be read into the word used. Diod.17.2.1 also uses machaira for Semiramis' camelswords, FWIW.

Concerning Leo - yes I'd buy that Leo is showing that he knows that horses are traditionally afraid of camels, rather than giving any real practical measures.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 12, 2019, 01:10:03 PM
Isn't machaira also used for the big swords wielded by Celts?
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Duncan Head on November 12, 2019, 01:11:40 PM
Quote from: Erpingham on November 12, 2019, 01:10:03 PM
Isn't machaira also used for the big swords wielded by Celts?
And for Roman swords, and Indian two-handers... as Rich says, it's pretty generic in most usages.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Duncan Head on November 12, 2019, 01:18:05 PM
By the way this  (https://research.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=275767&page=1&partId=1&peoA=32931-3-4&people=32931)is the only ancient representation ofa camel-rider with a sword that I can immediately think of - and four cubits long it isn't.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Erpingham on November 12, 2019, 01:29:00 PM

But then, who needs a four cubit sword? :)

(https://academyofdefence.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/image-3-768x579.png)

An Egyptian camel soldier of the mid 19th century, one of a series of sketches compiled for the US Army on camel operations.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2019, 08:24:21 PM
From the descriptions given, the weapon was thin, probably for reasons of weight, but lacking an account of its use we do not know whether it was for slashing, piercing (a sort of substitute lance) or both.  I would suggest the latter, i.e. it would have had both point and edge (perhaps singular) and be used both for thrusting, probably mainly against attackers, and for shrewd hacks, perhaps principally at fleeing opponents.

Association with defeat may have meant the weapon went out of fashion, or the acquisition of camels with a smoother ride than old humpy-bumpy may have made javelin use more effective and hence preferable.  Conjecture, but my best guess.

QuoteIt's interesting that at Magnesia the cavalry frightened the camels.

Yes, and it could perhaps have been the cavalry rather than the horses per se, i.e. it may have been the onset of what amounted to a controlled stampede which caused a surge of dromedarian dread which was maybe less species-related and more not-wanting-to-be-barged-and-trampled related.  Just a thought.

The ongoing hasty all-out departure of the scythed chariots next in line probably did not help.

Quote from: Erpingham on November 12, 2019, 01:29:00 PM

But then, who needs a four cubit sword? :)

He who hath an insecure saddle. ;)
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Swampster on November 21, 2019, 07:56:42 AM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on November 12, 2019, 08:24:21 PM

Quote from: Erpingham on November 12, 2019, 01:29:00 PM

But then, who needs a four cubit sword? :)

He who hath an insecure saddle. ;)

There may be something in this. I think the modern saddle may have been invented by then but I'm sure I've seen that it did not get adopted by everyone for a while. The position astride the hump would make the leaning pose in that 19th century picture much harder than the front of hump saddle.
Title: Re: The camel paradox again
Post by: Andreas Johansson on November 21, 2019, 08:35:05 AM
If I recall from Bulliet's The Camel and the Wheel, the Arabs of Antiochus' day would indeed have ridden at the top of the hump.

The front-of-hump seat hadn't been adopted by everyone even when he was writing in the 1970s.