Thracians

[Patrick Waterson]

Its interesting if you look at the data for Japan or Germany, because they didn't mobilize much more, and distinctly damaged the home front.

The damage to the home front was inflicted more by British and American strategic bombing and naval blockade; Germany did not begin total war production until mid-1944, at which point manpower mobilisation also increased steeply.  Japan began to feel the pinch from 1943, when American submarine commanders finally managed to get their torpedoes to work, and with its merchant marine being sunk in bulk suffered a raw materials crisis from mid-1944 and a food crisis from late 1944 (a significant proportion of Japan's food was imported).

It may be noted that Nazi Germany adopted a very traditional solution to the demands of their armed services for manpower: they brought in slaves from conquered countries to replace the men mobilised.

Just a quick example, but Japan's mobilization peaked at about 6mn (excluding the factory and agriculture jobs which were classified as draftees to eliminate the employees ability to leave.) which is 8.3% of a 1939 72mn home island population.

In 1945, the Japanese also mobilised a militia numbered at 28 million.  While its combat capabilities were extremely limited (there is only so much you can do with a handbook and a bamboo spear) and its organisation often more theoretical than real, when added to the 6 million or so then in the regular armed services this was actualy well in excess of 20% of the total Japanese population which they rated as 80 million in January 1945.  As Chuck says, "if an invasion is imminent that percentage can skyrocket dramatically and probably exceed the 20% mentioned previously".  The Japanese mobilisation, (or mobilisation plans, as implementation was spotty,) represented a commitment of about 40% of population, practically the entire national manpower of all age groups.

Incidentally, in 1945 the Japanese estimated the USA had put 11,700,000 men into its armed services, with a further 60,000,000 (including women) in the labour force.

The US experience in WW II demonstrates that a mobilization of 10% of the total population is probably the maximum that a society can endure without harming the home front.

This seems to confirm the general wisdom for sustained campaigning.  Seasonal campaigning can go higher manpower percentage wise provided it stays seasonal.

There is some dispute whether the mobilisation potential of all societies was the same, or whether social organisation and  technology play a part. So, for example, if Germany in WWI could mobilise an army in 1914 of 10% of the population, based on industrial technology and sophisticated laws on universal military service, could ancient Thrace do the same?  We have not yet (in this thread at least) demonstrated enough knowledge of Thracian social structures to answer the question.  Truly, I'd prefer to know more about Thracians than argue hypothetical mobilisation rates.

From about 470 BC the history of Thrace is to a significant extent that of the Odrysian kingdom.  This suffered its ups and downs, but was noted for its mobilisation of 150,000 men for an invasion of Macedonia in 429 BC.  This figure is given by the sombrely conservative Thucydides, who is in the opinion of present-day historians not noted for exaggeration.  The occasion also gives us a brief look at Sitalces' Thracian army.

"Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian tribes subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine and Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled south of the Danube in the neighborhood of the Euxine, who, like the Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same manner, being all mounted archers. [2] Besides these he summoned many of the Hill Thracian independent swordsmen [makhairophorōn], called Dii and mostly inhabiting Mount Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others as volunteers; [3] also the Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the Paeonian tribes in his empire, at the confines of which these lay, extending up to the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianes and Laeaeans; there the empire of Sitalces ends and the territory of the independent Paeonians begins." - Thucydides II.96.1-3

It makes quite an interesting wargames army.   Thucydides also has this to say about the Odrysian kingdom:

"The tribute from all the barbarian districts and the Hellenic cities, taking what they brought in under Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, who raised it to its greatest height, amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and silver. There were also presents in gold and silver to a no less amount, besides stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made not only for the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles ...  It was thus a very powerful kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe between the Ionian gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians." - idem 97.3,5

[aligern]

Just a point on archaeological evidence, using what might be an apocryphal, but illuminating story. In WW2 Someone's expert was asked to look at the armouring of 'planes. Research was under way and an analysis of damaged aircraft  showed where they had taken hits. However one of those who was examining the problem surmised that the evidence was showing the danage to planes that got back to base and a look at those that did not return drew different conclusions ( don't lose the glycol buddy the plane goes diwn in minutes).  A similar illumination was provided, possibly in these pages, with reference to bayonet wounds. These are generally classified as very infrequent, but the claim was that the wound data was based upon hospital returns and thus misreported bayonet wounds as after a close combat, having had a foot of steel stuck into them, no one was going to hospital to be categorised. ( Though I still doubt that bayonets woud be crossed it looks like too easy a way to kill both combatants) That's the problem, there is a selectivity imposed by life that may not be easily apparent in the evidence.
Roy

[Dangun]

In 1945, the Japanese also mobilised a militia numbered at 28 million.  While its combat capabilities were extremely limited (there is only so much you can do with a handbook and a bamboo spear) and its organisation often more theoretical than real, when added to the 6 million or so then in the regular armed services this was actualy well in excess of 20% of the total Japanese population which they rated as 80 million in January 1945.  As Chuck says, "if an invasion is imminent that percentage can skyrocket dramatically and probably exceed the 20% mentioned previously".  The Japanese mobilisation, (or mobilisation plans, as implementation was spotty,) represented a commitment of about 40% of population, practically the entire national manpower of all age groups.

I don't think this is really relevant? Firstly, Russia was invaded and didn't achieve this level of mobilization. Secondly, Germany, was invaded and didn't achieve this level of mobilization.
Lastly, bamboo spears are so irrelevant as to stretch the meaning of the word mobilization to meaninglessness.

The home front in Japan was already very damaged even before the US started bombing. Japan had introduced rationing in 1938! Metal rationing began at about the same time - melting down garden fences etc. They had also, I believe it was 1937, maybe in 1938, reduced the height limit for conscription from 5' to 4'9". 4'9"?? Things were already quite damaged.

But this is all off topic. Back to Thrace! 

[RichT]

A second front in the numbers war? Going for 76 pages on the size of Thracian armies?

I hope not, but just for anyone interested in the Thucydidean number under discussion, which is:

Thuc 2.98.2-3 "Passing ever these mountains, with the Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations, many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder; so that the whole is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty thousand."

Note 'is said to' - legetai in Greek. This is one of those signal words to indicate (broadly speaking) that the author does not personally vouch for the accuracy of what he is reporting. Herodotus uses the word very frequently for the various stories he reports. Thucydides uses it less - for those interested and able to access it, see H. D. Westlake, 'LEGETAI in Thucydides', Mnemosyne 30 (1977), 345–62. To quote a summary from this:

"He [Thucydides] expresses his uncertainty in different ways, which vary in accordance with the circumstances of each case. Where he is dealing with a major event, or series of events, about which there was considerable dispute, such as the mutilation of the Hermae and the profanation of the Mysteries (VI 27-8 and 60-I), he discusses the problem fully and refers in explicit terms to the deficiencies of the evidence (cf. VI 27, 2; 60, 2 and 5) 3). There are, however, many cases where he has misgivings, or at least is unwilling to commit himself, on some more or less subsidiary point which does not appear, in his view, to call for detailed discussion. Occasionally he qualifies a statement by an admission that he is only giving his personal opinion (hos emoi dokei). Much more commonly, however, he uses the passive of lego in phrases such as hos legetai or hos elegeto with a dependent infinitive. Modern scholars have tended to regard these phrases as though they present no problems, being more or less uniform and merely conveying a feeling of uncertainty. In the following investigation I hope to show they are diverse and that, while almost all suggest some degree of uncertainty, there may be other shades of meaning which are in some cases equally or more important. Although Thucydides doubtless found them convenient, his partiality for them is unfortunate because it may engender obscurity or ambiguity and may lead his readers to regret that he has not been more explicit."

Specifically on this passage: "II 98, 3: the entire expeditionary force mobilised by Sitalces is reported to have amounted to at least 150,000 men.
Thucydides is well informed about the Odrysian kingdom, but it was clearly impossible for him to obtain an accurate figure for the strength of this ill-organised army: he describes part of it as homilos xummeiktos ['mixed multitude'] (ibid. 4), and its size can only have been roughly known even to its leaders. He might have used here his favourite term malista which so often denotes an approximation, but he evidently prefers a more emphatic expression of uncertainty. [Note] This is a passage where the use of a past tense elegeto might seem more appropriate than that of the present, but the size of the army may have continued for some years to be a subject for discussion."

So far as the logistics of the Thracians are concerned, we should note the outcome of this invasion:

Thuc 2.101.4-6: "finding that he [Sitalces] was not succeeding in any of the objects of his invasion, and that his army was without provisions and was suffering from the severity of the season, he listened to the advice of Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew and highest officer, and decided to retreat without delay. ... In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as quickly as he could."

[Erpingham]

Thanks Richard.  The obvious question with Thucydides and the 150,000 Thracians was "how would he personally know in detail the breakdown of this barbarian army?".  The answer is he didn't but he had heard estimates, of unknown accuracy.

We are back to testing the figures by other means (those of us from the orthodox school anyway).  As we seem to be short of detail e.g. on population density, or social organisation, or movement networks we will probably have to leave it as uncertain.

The breakdown of army detailed by Patrick does suggest a widespread mustering of forces, some of which had travelled a considerable way to join up.  How were these troops supported on the march to the muster point, I wonder?  We might ask a similar question of other barbarian musters in widespread territory I suppose.  We must assume they didn't live of the land (or not excessively so) or inter-tribal warfare would break out as they traversed other territories.  I am reminded of the Frankish rule (much loved of the Bachrachs) - troops moving to a muster were entitled to grass and water.  Everything else, they carried or bought en route.  With a reasonable population density and and a market for surplus, this would support moderate forces quite well.  Ironically, when the army breaks into enemy territory and has to live off the land, the lack of co-operation of the locals by hiding their grain and herds and, where available, holding their stores behind city walls, soon caused shortages.

[Patrick Waterson]

How were these troops supported on the march to the muster point, I wonder?  We might ask a similar question of other barbarian musters in widespread territory I suppose.  We must assume they didn't live of the land (or not excessively so) or inter-tribal warfare would break out as they traversed other territories.  I am reminded of the Frankish rule (much loved of the Bachrachs) - troops moving to a muster were entitled to grass and water.  Everything else, they carried or bought en route.  With a reasonable population density and and a market for surplus, this would support moderate forces quite well.  Ironically, when the army breaks into enemy territory and has to live off the land, the lack of co-operation of the locals by hiding their grain and herds and, where available, holding their stores behind city walls, soon caused shortages.

Also important is whether the contingent, or army, is static or on the move.  If static (as the Odrysian army was while the Macedonians were negotiating), it will soon consume supplies in the locality, and the larger it is, the faster it will consume them.  In this particular campaign the Macedonians were especially uncooperative, secreting their supplies in towns and using their cavalry for raids.  One would imagine Thracian foraging parties being a favourite target.

On Thucydides' legetai - evidently he had no way of validating the figure, but records this as being the common report.

"Passing ever these mountains, with the Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, [3] losing none of his army on the march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations, many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder; so that the whole is said [legetai] to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty thousand. [4] Most of this was infantry, though there was about a third cavalry, furnished principally by the Odrysians themselves and next to them by the Getae. The most warlike of the infantry were the independent swordsmen who came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him being chiefly formidable by their numbers." - Thucydides II.98.2-4

The proportion of cavalry (1/3) is quite high, especially as Thucydides notes that the majority was furnished by the Odrysians and Getae.  From Xenophon we know that cavalry were the favoured army of the Odrysians, and Thucydides further narrates that the most warlike infantry were not Odrysians but the 'makhairophoroi' (swordsmen or falx-men) from the region of Mount Rhodope.  Fielding this army for battle could have been an interesting challenge.

Unlike Westlake, I would not read disbelief into the use of legetai - Thucydides uses the word simply to report what was said, e.g. in II.18.5:

"Such were the feelings entertained towards Archidamus by his troops during the halt. He is said [legetai] to have held back in the belief that the Athenians, while their lands were still unravaged, would yield, and that the thought of allowing them to be devastated would be too much for them."

Thiis does not mean Thucydides necessarily disbelieved this motive attributed to Archidamus, or the figure for Sitalces' army; it was rumour, and he reported it as such.

It may be worth noting that the advice of Seuthes to abandon the campaign was not entirely disinterested.

"This Seuthes had been secretly gained by Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a rich dowry. [6] In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised." - ibid. II.101.5-6

The Macedonians had fought an excellent campaign, avoiding open battle, engaging in effective harassment and suborning the chief advisor of the invading monarch with wealth and feminine pulchritude.  This was combined strategy at its most effective.

[Dangun]

Nice post Richard.
And if anyone wants a copy of Westlake's Legetai in Thucydides, I have a copy.

[Patrick Waterson]

I think Westlake misses the point in this particular instance.  As ever in history, we need to look at the context.

"It was thus a very powerful kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe between the Ionian gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom indeed no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course they are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and the arts of civilized life.

It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the field ... his army ... is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty thousand." - Thucydides II.97.5-98.

If anything, Thucydides' buildup and tone are endorsing, not doubting, the figure of 150,000.