Gauls and Brawls

[Patrick Waterson]

Any thoughts from anyone at this point, or shall we move on to Caesar?

The chaining together of the Cimbri front ranks is distinctly unusual, and it is not clear whether it is meant to keep Romans out or Cimbri in.  One suspects that only about 800 would be chained, this equating to the front rank of the condensed formation once the hollow square finished its slow-motion implosion.  Given the unusual (as far as we know) nature of the manoeuvre, having a set number of men chain-linked together meant they would have acted as 'front markers' for everyone else.

They would also have imposed a more deliberate, steady advance on the whole mass, keeping cohesion.  This suggests that the Cimbri's natural mode of advance was not quite so deliberate, and probably more in keeping with the furious onset of the Teutones.  A chain-linked front rank goes at the speed of its slowest member, so it is a device for keeping men back rather than urging them forward.

Plutarch's description of the Cimbri infantry coming 'on to the attack like a vast sea in motion' shows they were not standing to receive, but if they had hoped that the depth of their column would make the Romans quail they rather undid the effect of that by kicking up masses of dust in the first place.  Catulus' infantry saw only the Cimbri front ranks and rushed into the attack themselves, not a whit dismayed.  Catulus, being mounted, from his vantage point probably had a better idea of the depth of the Cimbri formation, hence the description that has come down to us of 'a vast sea in motion'.  He must have been gratified to see his troops not only go in keenly but also cut their way effortlessly through masses of sweating, puffing barbarians.

One last comment on the Cimbri and Teutones: prior to the fight with the Teutones, Marius had to coddle his troops and sharpen their urge for battle (which started out very blunt indeed - that bit has not been quoted).  By the time he came to take on the Cimbri, Roman morale was sky-high and the only question troubling the Roman commanders was who would get the glory for the victory.

We see something of the same Roman morale process taking shape as Caesar works his way across Gaul.  This conquest will be the subject of the next few posts in this thread.

[Erpingham]

The chaining together of the Cimbri front ranks is distinctly unusual, and it is not clear whether it is meant to keep Romans out or Cimbri in.  One suspects that only about 800 would be chained, this equating to the front rank of the condensed formation once the hollow square finished its slow-motion implosion.  Given the unusual (as far as we know) nature of the manoeuvre, having a set number of men chain-linked together meant they would have acted as 'front markers' for everyone else.

I'm afraid the whole giant hollow square which contracts into a solid column seems highly improbable to me.  That the Cimbri started in a solid block which has been, by Plutarch's error or faulty transmission, made many times too big seems more likely.

On the Cimbri chaining men together in the attack, they were either stupid or in fact advanced and took up a position, which they intended to hold.  Attacking with men chained together will bog down as soon as the chained men take casualties and any impetus from the deep formation will be lost.  This is not a problem if the intention to win or fight where you stand.  Alternatively, the chained thing is a fiction, or a misunderstanding (the Celts used long slave chains, IIRC), and in fact they came on a deep but slow moving column and were met with a Roman counter attack.

Anyway, by all means move to Caesar, who may have had some idea of what Celtic cavalry did in battle

[Patrick Waterson]

Well, Caesar received an early lesson in this when he sent his own cavalry to shadow the Helvetii.

"On the following day they move their camp from that place; Caesar does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of four thousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province and from the Aedui and their allies), to observe toward what parts the enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated with this battle, because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from their rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar restrained his men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or six miles between the enemy's rear and our van." - Caesar, Gallic War, I.15

In chapter 21 Caesar catches up with them.

"Being on the same day informed by his scouts, that the enemy had encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp; he sent persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and of what kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back, that it was easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant with praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions, and with those as guides who had examined the road; he explains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all the cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very experienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterward in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts. " - idem I.21

Caesar makes a night march (the vigila, or 'watches', each comprised one quarter of the hours of darkness, so his advance force sets out half-way through the night and the main force three quarters of the way) and closes on his opponent's position.

Then he hits a snag.

"At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterward ascertained from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by the Gallic arms and ensigns [insignibus]. Caesar leads off his forces to the next hill: [and] draws them up in battle-order." - idem, I.22.1-2

Well, sometimes the flank march dice just do not work out.  However ...

"Labienus, as he had been ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned through spies, that the mountain was in possession of his own men, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck with fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp three miles from theirs." - ibid.3-5

And then again sometimes it is just an unreliable general.  Now logistics rear their ugly head - or is it second thoughts?

"The next day (as there remained in all only two day's space [to the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not more than eighteen miles from Bibracte , by far the largest and best-stored town of the Aedui), he thought that he ought to provide for a supply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced rapidly to Bibracte . This circumstance is reported to the enemy by some deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain, of the Gallic horse. The Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with terror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before, though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joined battle or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut of from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, began to pursue, and to annoy our men in the rear." - idem, I.23

The failed night march may have been destructive to Roman morale.  It seems to have boosted that of the Helvetii, who are prepared to accept battle even though the Romans hold a better position.

"Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of his four veteran legions in such a manner, that he placed above him on the very summit the two legions, which he had lately levied in Hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be brought together into one place, and the position be protected by those who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii having followed with all their wagons, collected their baggage into one place: they themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx [phalange facta = a phalanx, i.e. close formation, being formed], advanced up to our front line in very close order. [confertissima acie = 'closest-packed line of battle']" - idem, I.24

The Roman (mainly Gallic) cavalry screened the Roman deployment.  Caesar gives the impression that the Helvetii infantry rather than the cavalry drove off his horsemen, though as we have seen the Helvetii did possess cavalry.  We need not infer from Caesar's reference to a phalanx and very close order that the Helvetii employed the Macedonian art of war: they simply packed themselves close and tight.  Nor did they need a chain fetish to do so.  The sight does, however, seem to have worried the Romans.

"Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away with the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle." - idem, I.25.1

Is Caesar dismounting his possibly skittish cavalry in addition to his officers?  Is this his motive, or are his troops worried that he will ride away and leave them to their fate?  In any event, his dismounting reassures all involved and/or means that his cavalry lose the means to make a hasty exit if things look tough, so with the advantage of position if not morale it is time to open the battle.

"His soldiers hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily broke the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed [disjecta = taken apart, opened up], they made a charge on them with drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting, that, when several of their shields had been by one stroke of the (Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point of the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with their left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many, after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the shield from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected." - idem I.25.2-4

The Roman pilum was doing its work.  The Helvetii had made a steady advance in a formation we might describe as a shield wall: the Roman pilum proved to be effective at disrupting that shield wall.

"At length, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and, as there was in the neighbourhood a mountain about a mile off [mille passuum = 1,000 paces], to betake themselves thither." - ibid.5

Caesar and his army followed up - and received a surprise.

"When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii who had betaken themselves to the mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions [signa bipertito intulerunt = advanced their standards in two directions]; the first and second line, to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off the field [submotis = shaken, driven back]; the third to receive those who were just arriving." - ibid.6-7

To be continued ...

[Patrick Waterson]

And finally - the denouement.

"Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and wagons. For during the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh hour [i.e. 12 (noon) 1 P. M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till late in the night, for they had set wagons in the way as a rampart, and from the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came on, and some from between the wagons and the wheels kept darting their lances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight had lasted some time, our men gained possession of their baggage and camp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix was taken. After the battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, who marched incessantly during the whole of that night; and after a march discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of the Lingones on the fourth day, while our men, having stopped for three days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of the slain, had not been able to follow them." - Caesar, Gallic War I.26.1-5

We may note in passing that Caesar does not list Roman losses, but the number and nature of his wounded and the conduct of burials were sufficient to stop the Roman army in its tracks for three days.

If prizes were awarded for sheer endurance, grit and determination, the Helvetii would surely be among the leading contenders.  They are about as far removed from the standard mad dash/swift collapse template often associated with Gauls as one can get.  This perhaps reminds us that Gallic tribes, like the German tribes Tacitus describes in his Germania, have exceptions to any general rule.  How valid the general rule is will be the next question, as we shall bypass Ariovistus' Germans and follow Caesar into northern Gaul where he meets the real or supposed descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones: the Belgae.

[Patrick Waterson]

First, Caesar, like any good general, asks around to find out what he can about his would-be opponents.  He learns the following:

"When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful they were, and what they could do, in war, he received the following information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung, from the Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had settled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and had driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were the only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was overrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their territories; the effect of which was, that, from the recollection of those events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness in military matters." - Caesar, Gallic War II.4.1-3

Here, far from being descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones, the Belgae are Germans who saw off the Cimbri and Teutones.  We shall nevertheless look at them in action because Belgae are generally classed with Celts rather than Germans and do not fight quite the same way as Ariovistus' men or Tacitus' Germans.

I omit the Remi estimate of the numbers of the Belgic tribes except to note:

"the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans [had promised], they thought, to the number of 40,000." - idem II.4.10

Observe that the Eburones were considered Germans, at least by the Remi.  We shall meet them later.

The Belgae attack Bibrax, a Remi town.

"The Gauls' mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae: when after having drawn a large number of men around the whole of the fortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on all sides, and the wall has been stripped of its defenders, [then], forming a testudo [testudine facta], they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which was easily effected on this occasion; for while so large a number were casting stones and darts [iaci], no one was able to maintain his position upon the wall." - idem II.6.1-3

Gauls are differentiated from Belgae but they share some common techniques, notably for assaulting a town.  Caesar goes to the rescue.

"Thither, immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the same persons who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends some Numidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearic slingers as a relief to the towns-people, by whose arrival both a desire to resist together with the hope of [making good their] defense, was infused into the Remi, and, for the same reason, the hope of gaining the town, abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after staying a short time before the town, and laying waste the country of the Remi, when all the villages and buildings which they could approach had been burned, they hastened with all their forces to the camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles of it; and their camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more than eight miles in breadth." - idem, II.7

Two miles is close: when one sees camps set up, it is usually five miles away from the enemy (against the Helvetii it was eight miles).  We may note how the Numidians are misidentified as archers (the Latin is: Numidas et Cretas sagittarios, which could be 'Numidians, and Cretan archers' or 'Numidian and Cretan archers'.  A further reference in II.10.1 confirms the former.)

Battle follows, but note how diffident Caesar is until he has tested the opposition, and then how he insures against mishap by putting up some serious fortifications in support of his army.

"Caesar at first determined to decline a battle, as well on account of the great number of the enemy as their distinguished reputation for valor: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove to ascertain by frequent trials, what the enemy could effect by their prowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men were not inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally convenient and suitable for marshaling an army (since the hill where the camp was pitched, rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth as far as the space which the marshaled army could occupy, and had steep declines of its side in either direction, and gently sloping in front gradually sank to the plain); on either side of that hill he drew a cross trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities of that trench built forts, and placed there his military engines, lest, after he had marshaled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful in point of number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, while fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legions which he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they might be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order of battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their forces which they had brought out of the camp." - idem II.8

Meanwhile, both sides draw up to fight, and ...

"There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that of the enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this; our men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, if the first attempt to pass should be made by them. In the mean time battle was commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neither army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse [proving] favorable to our men, led back his forces into the camp." - idem II.9.1-2

What an anticlimax.  The great battle against the Belgae is a damp squib.

"The enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it has been; stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they endeavored to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design, that, if they could, they might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant, commanded, and might cut off the bridge." - idem II.9.3

The Belgae recognise a bad deal when they see one, and move to create a better opportunity for themselves.  However Caesar anticipates them.

"Caesar, being apprised of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and hastens toward them. There was a severe struggle in that place. Our men, attacking in the river the disordered enemy, slew a great part of them. By the immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest, who, in a most courageous manner were attempting to pass over their bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who had first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their hopes had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town by storm and also their passing the river, and did not see our men advance to a more disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when provisions began to fail them, having called a council, determined that it was best for each to return to his country." - idem II.10.1-4

Numidians, slingers and archers are clearly differentiated here.  They and the cavalry suffice to repel the disadvantaged assault.

By now readers will be wondering what has happened to the glorious headlong charge of the Nervii that put Caesar's right into dire difficulties and gave him a really tough fight before succumbing.  Patience!  The above sections are included to give a fuller picture of the actions of the Belgae during the campaign, and to show there was rather more to it than a simple I came, I saw, I was fanatically charged, I conquered.

The Belgae agree to reassemble in the territory of whichever tribe Caesar invades.  Meanwhile, Caesar pursues their retiring army and by his account does it noticeable damage.

"That matter being determined on, marching out of their camp at the second watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor under any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place in the journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departure appear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through his scouts, [but] fearing an ambuscade, because he had not yet discovered for what reason they were departing, kept his army and cavalry within the camp. At daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed by the scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass their rear; and gave the command of it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. He ordered T. Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to follow them closely with three legions. These, attacking their rear, and pursuing them for many miles, slew a great number of them as they were fleeing; while those in the rear with whom they had come up, halted, and bravely sustained the attack of our soldiers; the van, because they appeared to be removed from danger, and were not restrained by any necessity or command, as soon as the noise was heard, broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their safety in flight. Thus without any risk [to themselves] our men killed as great a number of them as the length of the day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betook themselves into the camp, as they had been commanded." - idem II.11

Exit the Belgae.  Caesar then subdues the Suessiones and Bellovaci, and subsequently marches into the territory of the Nervii.

[Patrick Waterson]

And so Caesar marches.  He begins by questioning some locals and learning that the Nervii, Atrebates, Viromandui and Atuatuci are concentrating.

"Having learned these things, he sends forward scouts and centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learned from the prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and that there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare to stand their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those who reported that circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by these things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected by them." - Caesar, Gallic War II.17

Here we have step 1, the cunning plan.  Were this an extract from Livy, it would probably be limited to: "... and the Gauls attempted an ambush ..."

Meanwhile ...

"The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extending to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a [second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to the former, and open for about 200 paces at the lower part; but in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see through it into the interior. Within these woods the enemy kept themselves in concealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The depth of the river was about three feet." - idem II.18

And now step 2, the deceptive lure (just a few cavalry, honest, Caesar).  This sets the scene for the upcoming battle.

"Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, led on as the van six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the baggage-trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy." - idem II.19.1-4

Caesar has by now learned that the cavalry and missile troops together make a useful combination, especially where rivers are involved.  However this occasion does not go quite like the others.

"While they [the Belgic cavalry] from time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the mean time the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp." - idem II.19.5

Now the Nervii spring their cunning plan.

"When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the works." - idem II.19.6-8

Like Pharnaces at Zela, the Nervii achieved tactical surprise.  We may note the speed of the onset.  Does this signify keenness, impetuousness, or even fanaticism?  It can hardly signify reluctance.

"Caesar had every thing to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy." - idem II.20.1

The Romans formed up under their subordinate officers as Caesar nipped along the line spreading encouragement.

"Caesar, having given the necessary orders, hastened to and fro into whatever quarter fortune carried him, to animate the troops, and came to the tenth legion. Having encouraged the soldiers with no further speech than that "they should keep up the remembrance of their wonted valour, and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assault of the enemy;" as the latter were not further from them than the distance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for commencing battle." - idem II.21.1

The Roman lineup faced a number of problems.

"The army having been marshalled, rather as the nature of the ground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, than as the method and order of military matters required; while the legions in the different places were withstanding the enemy, some in one quarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by the very thick hedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could proper reserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in each part, nor could all the commands be issued by one person. Therefore, in such an unfavorable state of affairs, various events of fortune followed." - idem II.22

On the Roman left ...

"The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them,) who were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were opposing them." - idem II.23.1-2

In the centre ...

"In like manner, in another quarter two different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Veromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of the river." - idem II.23.3

And on the right ...

"But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body [confertissimo agmine], with Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened toward that place; and part of them began to surround the legions on their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment." - idem II.23.4-5

The overlapping Nervii swarmed into the Roman camp.

"At the same time our horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who had been with those, who, as I have related, were routed by the first assault of the enemy, as they were betaking themselves into the camp, met the enemy face to face, and again sought flight into another quarter; and the camp-followers who from the Decuman Gate, and from the highest ridge of the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors, when, after going out for the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw the enemy parading in our camp, committed themselves precipitately to flight; at the same time there arose the cry and shout of those who came with the baggage-train: and they (affrighted), were carried some one way, some another." - idem II.24.1-3

To the experienced eyes of Caesar's Treveri allies, the battle looked lost.

"By all these circumstances the cavalry of the Treveri were much alarmed, (whose reputation for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls, and who had come to Caesar, being sent by their state as auxiliaries), and, when they saw our camp filled with a large number of the enemy, the legions hard pressed and almost held surrounded, the camp-retainers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing on all sides divided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs, hastened home, and related to their state that the Romans were routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy were in possession of their camp and baggage-train." - idem II.24.4-5

Denouement next post.

[Patrick Waterson]

Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself - Caesar, Gallic War II.25.1

Baculus conveniently snapshots for us the tendency of valiant men to stick it in the fighting line until pain and blood loss render them unable to continue.  Whether they just sink to the ground and pass out, to be found and attended to afterwards, or are dragged out to a temporary 'casualty clearing station' is not clear.

The problem with the twelfth legion seems to be that one standard was lost to the aggressive close-fighting Nervii (which rather suggests ferocity was flourishing undimmed) which caused the legion commander to issue the questionable order to pull back the standards - which meant that the troops also pulled back.  As the standards had been collected in one place, the troops were not unnaturally doing the same.  The casualties among centurions indicate a hard-fighting and aggressive - and competent - opponent.

he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy [on the other hand] though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve which could be brought up ... - idem

'Avoiding the weapons' is tela vitare (for 'tela vitarent') - if javelins and other missiles were coming over from the Nervii, dodging them would be expected rather than remarked upon.  One suspects rather that Caesar meant troops were dropping their own weapons and leaving.

In any event, the 12th Legion is in serious trouble: for once they have found an opponent too hard to handle.  So - Caesar to the rescue.

... having therefore snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, and addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored, while every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked. - Gallic War II.25.2-3

Caesar is un-bunching the bunched troops by ordering the standards to be brought back to their usual positions and telling the centurions to get the troops back into their usual formation.  It would seem that the appearance of Caesar also put a damper on the 'impetuosity' (impetus = attack) of the Nervii, which would have slackened the pressure enough to allow the 12th Legion to sort itself out.  Handy.

Caesar, when he perceived that the seventh legion, which stood close by him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes of the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions gradually, and make their charge upon the enemy with a double front [conversa signa in hostes inferrent = turned the standards around against the enemy]; which having been done, since they brought assistance the one to the other, nor feared lest their rear should be surrounded by the enemy, they began to stand their ground more boldly, and to fight more courageously. - idem II.26.1-2

Evidently both legions were suffering from having met a rather fiercer and more determined opponent than those to which they were accustomed, but Caesar's appearance provided some anticipatory blunting of the Nervii's effort ("Look out: it's Caesar!") and some effective direction to that of the Romans.

Now Caesar drew - and played - his ace.

In the mean time, the soldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear of the army, as a guard for the baggage-train, upon the battle being reported to them, quickened their pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the hill; and Titus Labienus, having gained possession of the camp of the enemy, and observed from the higher ground what was going on in our camp, sent the tenth legion as a relief to our men, who, when they had learned from the flight of the horse and the sutlers in what position the affair was, and in how great danger the camp and the legion and the commander were involved, left undone nothing [which tended] to despatch.  - idem II.26.3-5

Enter the Tenth Legion with all despatch.

By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leaned on their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked armed foes; the horsemen too, that they might by their valour blot the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle. - idem II.27.1

Up to this point, despite the poor to indifferent performance of their allies, the Nervii have been doing really well: they have beaten back two legions, taken two standards and put Caesar's right under what could easily have been terminal pressure had the great man not intervened.  The arrival of the Tenth Legion took the heart out of them, though the surprise is perhaps that they had not thought to provide a force to delay the two-legion Roman rearguard and prevent it from interfering on the battlefield.  Caesar's understanding or belief that they thought it would be his main body makes this the more puzzling.

In any event, the action was now decided, but the Nervii were very hard to convince that they had been beaten.

But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen short between [the armies]; so that it ought not to be concluded, that men of such great courage had injudiciously dared to pass a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very disadvantageous place; since their greatness of spirit had rendered these actions easy, although in themselves very difficult. - idem II.27.3-5

And that, basically, was that: from 60,000 warriors the Nervii were down to 500, and in Vercingetorix's rebellion contribute or agree to contribute a mere 5,000 - presumably four years' worth of maturing teenagers.  For courage and combat capability the Nervii seem to have been the cream of the Gallic crop, while their allies and cousins the Atrebates and Viromandui, while displaying equal keeness, do not display anything like equal fighting ability or courage.

The hanging question remains: what would have happened on the Roman right had Caesar not moved across to turn the battle around in that sector?  Would the 12th and 7th legions have had their chestnuts pulled out of the fire by the arrival of the 10th, or would they have had their goose cooked rather than just their fingers burnt?  And given that the defending Romans had the advantage of the slope, what would have happened had they met on level ground?

[aligern]

Must look , but aren't the Nervii mentioned as having warriors shortly after the battle??

Isn't this likely to be an example of Caesar bigging up his role a bit. He is here following the example of Sulla who dismounted to put himself into danger, but one just wonders if  Caesar is not taking an opportunity to make the most of his timely intervention.
It looks like a close run thing, but did the Romans really pursue that hard?
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

I am sure the noble Julius would not overstate his role in bringing about a victory, particularly if a triumph were at stake. 

In Gallic War II.28, Caesar states that the Nervii told him they had only three councillors left out of fifty, and 'scarcely' 500 warriors remaining out of 60,000.  Caesar's account relies on the veracity of the Nervii, who might or might not have overstated their losses to prevent him looking for any more slaves, but the real test would seem to be Vercingetorix's revolt.

Caesar beat the Nervii in 57 BC and Vercingetorix revolted in 52 BC.  During 56-53 BC four years' worth of Nervii teenagers would have attained warrior status, so the number fielded, or at least promised, in Vercingetorix's mass mobilisation of 52 BC is the key indicator.

In 52 BC the Nervii fielded 5,000 warriors (Gallic War VII.75).  They come way down the scale that the Aedui (and allies) and Arverni (and allies) come top of with 35,000 each.  We might hazard that the Nervii's reduced population added some 900 warriors per year.

Did the Romans pursue the Nervii?  Caesar has them mostly die on the field, which rather negates the need for pursuit.  The Viromandui and Atrebates seem to have been less inclined to fight to the last, though Caesar refers to his cavalry as having "scoured the whole battlefield and tried to outdo the legionaries in gallantry," which suggests a lot of action on the battlefield but no extended pursuit as such.  For all that, the Atrebates are down to 4,000 in 52 BC and the Viromandui do not appear at all.

[aligern]

That's good Patrick, you'll be explaining to us why the Nervii are an active threat just a couple of years after the Sambre then :-))

caes.gal.5.38":    [5.38] Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his cavalry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Having related the exploit and roused the Aduatuci, the next day he arrived among the Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away the opportunity of liberating themselves forever and of punishing the Romans for those wrongs which they had received from them;" [he tells them] "that two lieutenants have been slain, and that a large portion of the army has perished; that it was not a matter of difficulty for the legion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenly assaulted; he declares himself ready to cooperate in that design. He easily gains over the Nervii by this speech.

"caes.gal.5.39":    [5.39] Accordingly, messengers having been forthwith dispatched to the Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all of whom are under their government, they assemble as large bodies as they can, and rush unexpectedly to the winter-quarters of Cicero, the report of the death of Titurius not having as yet been conveyed to him. That also occurred to him, which was the consequence of a necessary work-that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for the purpose of procuring timber and therewith constructing fortifications, were intercepted by the sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. These having been entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatici and all their allies and dependents, begin to attack the legion: our men quickly run together to arms and mount the rampart; they sustained the attack that day with great difficulty, since the enemy placed all their hope in dispatch, and felt assured that, if they obtained this victory, they would be conquerors forever.

"caes.gal.5.40":    [5.40] Letters are immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewards being offered [to the messengers] if they carried them through. All these passes having been beset, those who were sent are intercepted. During the night as many as 120 towers are raised with incredible dispatch out of the timber which they had collected for the purpose of fortification: the things which seemed necessary to the work are completed. The following day the enemy, having collected far greater forces, attack the camp [and] fill up the ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the same manner as the day before; this same thing is done afterward during the remaining days. The work is carried on incessantly in the night: not even to the sick, or wounded, is opportunity given for rest: whatever things are required for resisting the assault of the next day are provided during the night: many stakes burned at the end, and a large number of mural pikes are procured: towers are built up, battlements and parapets are formed of interwoven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he was in very weak health, did not leave himself the night-time for repose, so that he was forced to spare himself by the spontaneous movement and entreaties of the soldiers.

"caes.gal.5.41":    [5.41] Then these leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy and grounds of friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer with him. When permission was granted, they recount the same things which Ambiorix had related to Titurius, namely, "that all Gaul was in arms, that the Germans had passed the Rhine, that the winter-quarters of Caesar and of the others were attacked." They report in addition also, about the death of Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for the purpose of obtaining credence; "they are mistaken," say they, "if they hoped for any relief from those who distrust their own affairs; that they bear such feelings toward Cicero and the Roman people that they deny them nothing but winter-quarters, and are unwilling that the practice should become constant; that through their [the Nervii's] means it is possible for them [the Romans] to depart from their winter-quarters safely and to proceed without fear into whatever parts they desire." To these Cicero made only one reply: "that it is not the custom of the Roman people to accept any condition from an armed enemy: if they are willing to lay down their arms, they may employ him as their advocate and send embassadors to Caesar: that he believed, from his [Caesar's] justice, they would obtain the things which they might request."

"caes.gal.5.42":    [5.42] Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surround the winter-quarters with a rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen feet in depth. These military works they had learned from our men in the intercourse of former years, and, having taken some of our army prisoners, were instructed by them: but, as they had no supply of iron tools which are requisite for this service, they were forced to cut the turf with their swords, and to empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks, from which circumstance, the vast number of the men could be inferred; for in less than three hours they completed a fortification of ten miles in circumference; and during the rest of the days they began to prepare and construct towers of the height of the ramparts, and grappling irons, and mantelets, which the same prisoners had taught them.

[Patrick Waterson]

The Nervii are not an active threat until 54 BC and then only because the Eburones have just annihilated Sabinus' legion and are out and about spreading encouragement.  Caesar describes the Nervii sitting at home minding their own business until Ambiorix drops in and says: hey, lads, how about it?

Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his cavalry to the Atuatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Having related the exploit and roused the Atuatuci, the next day he arrived among the Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away the opportunity of liberating themselves forever and of punishing the Romans for those wrongs which they had received from them;" [he tells them] "that two generals have been slain, and that a large portion of the army has perished; that it is not a matter of difficulty for the legion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, if suddenly assaulted;" he declares himself ready to cooperate in that design. He easily gains over the Nervii by this speech.  - Caesar, Gallic War V.38

One does observe their much-reduced scope: in 57 BC they and their allies take on Caesar's eight legions, but in 54 BC it is all they and their allies can do to blockade a single legion.  When Caesar marches to the relief of Cicero's legion, he does so with a force of 7,000 men (Gallic War V.49) which proves adequate for the purpose.  The Gauls opposed to him, Eburones apparently included, can muster, united, no more than 60,000 fighting men - which in 57 BC was the strength of the Nervii alone.

[aligern]

Patrick, no one doubts that the Nervii had been substantially damaged by the action at the Sambre. They may have once been able to field 30,000 warriors, but they won't have been reduced to 500 that casualty rate does not accord with common sense. Losing armies suffer casualties up to 20%, not 90% unless they are trapped against a natural feature and massacred. At the Sambre there is ample opportunity to get away and disappear into the forest. If 30,000 men fought I bet 10,000 escaped.

I don't buy the 60,000 number for an original strength either. It is another of Caesar's inflated numbers.  To have 60,000 warriors the Nervii would have either 250,000 population if all men fought or half a million if they have a substantial class of unfree land workers. Either way it is too huge a number for the Nervii who do not appear to have a huge territory.
However, Patrick we agree that we will almost never agree on numbers.:-))
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

While ample opportunity for a getaway may have existed, it does not seem to have been taken.  Caesar describes the Nervii as scorning flight and fighting practically to the last man and the last gasp.

Heroic though this was, and greatly though it earned Caesar's admiration and respect, it was obviously not a winning strategy, a point which was immediately grasped by the Nervii's neighbours and allies, the Atuatuci.  These descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones completely abandoned any idea of facing Romans in the open field (or even wooded slope) and tucked themselves into their well-situated, well-defended (by Gallic standards) principal town.

The Romans swiftly reduced it to the point of surrender through their superior siege techniques.  The Atuatuci tried one last cunning plan: they surrendered, yielded up their weapons and shields, or enough of them to look convincing, and then attacked in the dead of night.  Unfortunately for them the Romans took it all in their stride and the surviving Atuatuci (of all ages and genders) were sold as slaves in one job lot of 53,000.

Over the next few years (56-52 BC) we see the Gauls gradually coming to terms with the fact that their traditional approaches do not work against Romans and instead developing new methods of dealing with the hitherto invincible invader.

[Patrick Waterson]

Caesar spends the rest of 57 and 56 BC subduing the remainder of Gaul, including the maritime Veneti.  Then he encounters the first real change in Gallic military technique.

About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearly past, yet, since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii alone remained in arms, and had never sent embassadors to him [to make a treaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war might soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very different method from the rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived that the greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routed and overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests and morasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. - Gallic War III.28

Essentially, the Morini had decided upon a strategy of hiding and ambush.  Now they tried the ambush.

When Caesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had began to fortify his camp, and no enemy was in the mean time seen, while our men were dispersed on their respective duties, they suddenly rushed out from all parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latter quickly took up arms and drove them back again to their forests; and having killed a great many, lost a few of their own men while pursuing them too far through those intricate places. - idem III.28

With the ambush defeated, Caesar could now seek out the hiders.  He adopted a new form of fortification to cover his progress into the woods.

During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down the forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the soldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed together (opposite to the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on either flank. - idem III.29

Caesar's fortified road penetrated into the heart of the Morini forest.  Then rain stopped play.

When a great space had been, with incredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy] and the rear of their baggage train were already seized by our men, and they themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests, storms of such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended, and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers could not any longer remain in their tents. - idem III.29

Naturally it was the weather, not the evasive Morini tactics, that rendered the campaign a non-success.

Therefore, having laid waste all their country, [and] having burned their villages and houses, Caesar led back his army and stationed them in winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lexovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last.

This was not an ideal result for either side, but for the first time a Gallic tribe had survived the attentions of a Roman army and remained unsubdued.

Three Caesarian campaigns later (against Germania, Britannia and Britannia) another Gallic tribe would do even better - they would wipe out a legion.

[aligern]

Interesting how Gauls and Germans (Ariovistus) try out Caesar frontally and then decide that face o face is not a viable  tactic and so move on to ambush. Later the Eburones will try ambush more successfully and Vercingetorix  will opt for a scorched earth policy and using cavalry to cut off Caesar's supplies. Then he will try entangling Caesar in a seige that enables the Gauls to attack from two sides and none of these tactics will work. It will be educative to see how often in the battles to come the Gauls  suffer because they make uncontrolled advances. Of course we might encounter an example of the Romans doing just that!

Roy