Another one of those 'what ifs' - Zama this time

[Dangun]

I am not sure that it is.  There is a tendency to view Carthage as a single city surrounded by a few fields and villages, but it held sway over about as much of northern Africa as Rome did over Italy.

While interesting, its tough to build up macro economic data this way.

I think we'll find estimates of population, or land under cultivation, or output measures will suggest Rome is far larger.
I haven't had time to find the best looking estimates, but just scanning a piece called "Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2006 AD" from the University of Groningen suggests that the population of Italy in 1AD was 1.92x, and the GDP 3.2x that of North Africa (ex-Egypt).

If we try to finesse the Groningen data and assume that, at the time, Rome controlled Italy + half of Spain and Carthage controlled what is now Tunisia and Libya, then the data suggests that the population of the Roman Empire in 1AD was 8.2x, and the GDP 11.2x that of Carthage.

Now obviously this or any other estimate is going to be awfully rough, but I think this gives a strong sense of the inevitability.

The economy quote I don't believe was mine.

Indeed it wasn't. My apologies.
It was Roy's and I don't know why the quote generator did that.

[Patrick Waterson]

In the the end what matters is that the Romans have the men, money and motivation to continue the death grapple until they win. they suffer losses. It is not necessary for them to have genius generals, only good ones.

That is what they thought in 149 BC, when they had just the city of Carthage to deal with.  For two years they got nowhere.  It took a Scipio to make headway and finally finish the job.

Carthage suffers from having  to put together armies from disparate nations that require a Hannibal to win great victories. Even  Hannibal cannot put Rome down after winning three stunning victories in the field. He cannot force them to terms and thus the Romans gain years to recuperate by avoiding battle, even whilst Hannibal is moving around Italy.

But he could have.  Marching on Rome straight after Cannae would have done the trick, and if Carthage, which after years of dragging its feet finally got around to sending him reinforcements in 215 BC, had actually sent the lot instead of dissipating most of them in secondary theatres, he could have finished the war that year.

Rome does not accept defeat, so a lost Zama is a pause in an inevitable rise.

But Rome still manages to be defeated, and unless one considers the gods had really marked the city out for world domination, its rise was not inevitable.

Very occasionally a great man diverts the course of history, but it is very occasional. The war for dominance in the Western mediterranean was one of those conflicts in which the large considerations dominated and so economy, manpower, motivation and a good enough fighting technique were always going to see Rome through.

Easy enough to say in retrospect, but I think it is fair to say that Rome did not win the war so much as Carthage lost it.  In the early part of the war, they dithered and failed to support Hannibal, and seem to have put very little effort into the war itself.  Like the Third Reich, they remained on a peacetime economy until things began to get really dire (following the Metaurus, 207 BC) at which point they moved into high gear and started habitually fielding armies the Romans were hard pressed to match: 70,000 at Ilipa, 93,000 in the combined Carthaginian-Numidian army under Hasdrubal and Syphax which Scipio destroyed with a night attack during a truce.  Put an average Roman general or two in Scipio's shoes and he would lose at Ilipa; Scipio knew that he himself could not succeed against the combined army he faced in Africa (which is why he cheated).

Interestingly, Cornelius Nepos mentions that following Zama, Hannibal managed to get yet another army together to face the Romans.  I think when it comes to organising and applying economy, manpower, motivation and a good enough fighting technique, it was Carthage and not Rome which had the edge.  Scipio, not economics, won the war for Rome.  Without him, and with Hannibal still in play, I do not see the Romans winning at all, however determined they may have been (and by 203 BC that determination was perceptibly slackening: there was no 'delenda est Carthago' in speeches in the senate).

On the subject of Carthaginian resources, we may remember the way they consistently and steadily put large armies into Sicily in earlier centuries.  This was before the Barcids conquered Spain.

I think we'll find estimates of population, or land under cultivation, or output measures will suggest Rome is far larger.
I haven't had time to find the best looking estimates, but just scanning a piece called "Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2006 AD" from the University of Groningen suggests that the population of Italy in 1AD was 1.92x, and the GDP 3.2x that of North Africa (ex-Egypt).

We can do better than this.  Strabo in Geographia VII.3.15 wrote that before its fall (in 146 BC) Carthage enjoyed a population of 700,000 and directed an alliance of 300 cities.  Since under the Roman empire its population (after being refounded by Julius Caesar in 49 BC) rose to 500,000, a figure of 700,000 does not seem too far off.  This of course is just Carthage, not its 300 cities and allied Numidian tribes.

Rome would struggle to be 'far larger'.

[aligern]

'Marching on Rome straight after Cannae would have done the trick.' Hannibal chose not to. Patrick's argument rather depends upon Hannibal being a military genius. Hannibal did not march, but Patrick tells us he should have and Rome would have geen brought down. Therefore Patrick is rather more of a military genius than Hannibal. 😉
The flaw in the argument that Carthage had much the same size of military economy as Rome is that the Carthaginians do not produce an army in Africa that can match Rome. At Zama Hannibal is reliant for 2/3 of his heavy infantry on imports of his old mercenaries or Celts and Spaniards. If Carthage had such power as 300 citiies must give then put forth that power. Why, when Hannibal was scuttling  around Italy for a decade hiding from Roman armies (and vice versa) and gradually seeing his allies peeled away, did not the Carthaginians send him another army by sea to overwhelm the Romans?

I looked back and cannot see that the quote on the economies was mine,but it does praphrase my view on the military economies of both states. The situation for Carthage is rather like that of the Japanese in WWII they royse a sleeping giant and the consequences are inevitable. Hannibal could win at Zama, its just a delay of five, ten years or twenty before the Romans come again because they cannot tolerate the Carthaginians either as a land power , knowing that Hannibal's feats could be reproduced from a Sanish base, or more scary still that a week out from Carthage a fleet full of mercenaries could be disembarking at the mouth of the Tiber.
A point Phil Barker made many years ago in the first AMPW, I recall, was that Rome had a man litary system that meant that they did not need a great general to win. There is also a saw that Strategy derives from tactics. If your strength is in a face to face grinding match then your strategy aims to bring that on. That was the Romans strength and it dictated their strategy. They had to confront Carthage face to face. Carthage was a city and that meant that the Romans had to go there to win. Once it became a matter of a siege the Romans would win if it took two years or ten.
Roy

[Dangun]

We can do better than this.  Strabo in Geographia VII.3.15 wrote that before its fall (in 146 BC) Carthage enjoyed a population of 700,000 and directed an alliance of 300 cities.  Since under the Roman empire its population (after being refounded by Julius Caesar in 49 BC) rose to 500,000, a figure of 700,000 does not seem too far off.  This of course is just Carthage, not its 300 cities and allied Numidian tribes.

Rome would struggle to be 'far larger'.

Again, the quote from Strabo is interesting.

But the modern academic estimates of the Roman Empire's population and GDP are [bF]AR[/b] larger.
The Groningen study for 1AD gives a population of almost 10million for what was the Roman Empire in 200BC and 1.2million for the area controlled by what was Carthage in 200BC. As I said above the GDP is given to be 11x times larger.

The estimates across studies vary, but Rome is always larger.
I think you'd have to mount a heroic all population/GDP estimates are wrong kind of argument to be persuasive here.
Best of luck.

This is entirely consistent with Rome's ability to continue to pump out new armies and civil works during this period.

PS: While the economic argument could be seen to be dry and colourless, its the exceptions that make things interesting - Greece perhaps.

[Patrick Waterson]

'Marching on Rome straight after Cannae would have done the trick.' Hannibal chose not to. Patrick's argument rather depends upon Hannibal being a military genius. Hannibal did not march, but Patrick tells us he should have and Rome would have geen brought down. Therefore Patrick is rather more of a military genius than Hannibal. 😉

And modest with it ...

The flaw in the argument that Carthage had much the same size of military economy as Rome is that the Carthaginians do not produce an army in Africa that can match Rome.

Actually they do: see Polybius XIV.1.14:

"For there were two camps, one that of Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from it of the Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty thousand infantry."

At Zama Hannibal is reliant for 2/3 of his heavy infantry on imports of his old mercenaries or Celts and Spaniards. If Carthage had such power as 300 citiies must give then put forth that power. Why, when Hannibal was scuttling  around Italy for a decade hiding from Roman armies (and vice versa) and gradually seeing his allies peeled away, did not the Carthaginians send him another army by sea to overwhelm the Romans?

Reading my previous post would have indicated that Carthage was not taking its support of Hannibal seriously.  It did nothing of note from 218-216 BC, only bestirring itself in 215 BC and then frittering away the army it raised on three separate ventures rather than sending it all to Hannibal.  Thereafter it languidly reinforced the armies in Spain and reluctantly sent occasional contingents to Hannibal in Italy; only after the fall of New Carthage did it begin taking the war seriously.  Once it did, its recruitment and outfitting machinery swung into action: 70,000 troops were raised for Ilipa (larger than any Roman army except that at Cannae) and three years later 93,000 to defend Africa against Scipio.

I looked back and cannot see that the quote on the economies was mine, but it does paraphrase my view on the military economies of both states.

And I have to disagree: in 480 BC Carthage launched a 300,000-man expedition by sea to conquer Sicily.  Rome never managed anything like that.

The situation for Carthage is rather like that of the Japanese in WWII they rouse a sleeping giant and the consequences are inevitable.

Not really - it is more like Nazi Germany vs the British Empire in WW2: Britain, like Rome, went into total war production almost immediately whereas Nazi Germany, like the Carthaginians, left it too late - mid-1944 in the Nazis' case and around 206 BC for the Carthaginians.

A point Phil Barker made many years ago in the first AMPW, I recall, was that Rome had a military system that meant that they did not need a great general to win.

The irony is that they did need a great general to win when up against anyone of any quality: the system by itself was not enough.  Regulus easily defeated Carthage's military amateurs in Africa until he came up against Xanthippus, at which point Xanthippus eliminated the Roman army as a fighting force, system or no.  During the Second Punic War they lost a succession of armies against Hannibal plus a pair of armies in Spain (at Castulo and Ilorca).  It took a great general to retrieve the situation.

There is also a saw that Strategy derives from tactics. If your strength is in a face to face grinding match then your strategy aims to bring that on. That was the Romans strength and it dictated their strategy. They had to confront Carthage face to face. Carthage was a city and that meant that the Romans had to go there to win. Once it became a matter of a siege the Romans would win if it took two years or ten.

Once it becomes a matter of a siege the besieger will win whether or not he is Roman unless he plans things so badly as to run out of supplies, or he gets hit by a plague or a destroying angel.  'Confronting face to face' means what in practical terms?  Seeking battle?  How did that work out at Cannae?

Interestingly enough, Polybius' explanation for Rome's eventual success is not economic, but political:

"But about the period of its entering on the Hannibalian war the political state of Carthage was on the decline, that of Rome improving. For whereas there is in every body, or polity, or business a natural stage of growth, zenith, and decay; and whereas everything in them is at its best at the zenith; we may thereby judge of the difference between these two constitutions as they existed at that period. For exactly so far as the strength and prosperity of Carthage preceded that of Rome in point of time, by so much was Carthage then past its prime, while Rome was exactly at its zenith, as far as its political constitution was concerned. In Carthage therefore the influence of the people in the policy of the state had already risen to be supreme, while at Rome the Senate was at the height of its power: and so, as in the one measures were deliberated upon by the many, in the other by the best men, the policy of the Romans in all public undertakings proved the stronger; on which account, though they met with capital disasters, by force of prudent counsels they finally conquered the Carthaginians in the war." - Polybius VI.51

[aligern]

Yes Patrick it is a particularly Hellenic mindset to see constitutions as major drivers of a successful state and this continues on into Roman thought, where they Parthians are all the slaves of one man, wheread Roman citizens are free men, even though the Roman emperors are every bit as unbridled as the Parthian kings. So no surprises that Polybius sees, in effect, that Fortuna has passed from Carthage to Rome.  Myself I can see the point that Polybius is aiming at. Doubtless geography and economics are the main discriminators in successful warfare, we can add in martial tradition and the relative effectiveness of the opposing armaments, but there is also something about 'animal spirits' . Just as the Macedonians have a tremendous will to win which drives them onwards and then fades so that, despite having much larger resources none of the successors has the drive of a Philip or an Alexander. Similarly, in the nineteenth century the Austrian Empire does not have the spirit of the Prussian kingdom, but theoretically it has the resources to match it. The British Empire is a good example, where small numbers of daring men conquered an area and then mobilised its resources to bring neighbouring areas under control, or we might cite the Conquistadors whose lust for Gold and God drove them to conquer empires that, on a balance sheet basis, should have easily been able to cope.
Carthage may have lost to Rome because of the different psychologies of the ruling classes, but both sides knew that this was a death grapple because only one could control the Western Mediterranean basin. The Roman mindset may have given them an advantage, but Carthage knew that bith sides were playing for keeps.
As to Patrick!s numbers, we will never agree on something as fundamental as Carthage sending 300,000 men to Sicily. Similarly I don't buy the idea that there were 50,000 Numidian troops.  We differ so deeply on ancient numbers that it is not worth going round the houses again on it.
Cheers
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Polybius certainly has a point, and one can see its effects when one contrasts the fits-and-starts Carthaginian commitment to their war effort with the steady if largely unimaginative determination of the Roman senate.  I am less sure that Carthage and Rome saw each other as irreconcilable last-man-standing opponents; they had been allies as late as 275 BC and could have been so again had, for example, an unusually successful Macedonian monarch seized Sicily. Only Hannibal and Cato advocated all-out destruction for the other side.

Doubtless geography and economics are the main discriminators in successful warfare, we can add in martial tradition and the relative effectiveness of the opposing armaments, but there is also something about 'animal spirits' . Just as the Macedonians have a tremendous will to win which drives them onwards and then fades so that, despite having much larger resources none of the successors has the drive of a Philip or an Alexander. Similarly, in the nineteenth century the Austrian Empire does not have the spirit of the Prussian kingdom, but theoretically it has the resources to match it.

A good observation, Roy.  The essence of the matter seems to be that resources are all very well, and allow one to redeem losing bets in the casino of history, but it is the effective direction and use of those resources which wins wars (one may further adduce the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 to demonstrate this point), together with a spirit of commitment which is usually found on the side of the victor.

As to Patrick's numbers, we will never agree on something as fundamental as Carthage sending 300,000 men to Sicily. Similarly I don't buy the idea that there were 50,000 Numidian troops.

'Patrick's numbers' ...   These figures are from Herodotus and Diodorus on the one hand, and Polybius on the other.  Arbitrary rejection of such material is generally the first step in misjudging history.  Out of interest, any problem with Polybius' 80,000 Romans at Cannae?

[aligern]

No great problem with Cannae. The numbers fit around the structure of the Roman army. No great problem with 50,000 Carthaginians, but great problems with 300,000 of them. I am not alone in not trusting ancient numbers and not alone in not seeing their numbers as essentially linked to the veracity of other statements they might make. Herodotus guesses or lies about the numbers of Persians ( he has plenty of motive to exaggerate)  and no doubt other enemies of the Greeks, I see that as quite different from say his description of Persian armament or the tactics of Marathon. I and others have a long history of maintaining that simple faith in ancient numbers is a mistake, largely because they are often not believable in terms of logistics as understood by later periods where we have sensible numbers from more trustworthy observers and comparisons with other ancient sources. I understand that Patrick's opinion on numbers is by way of an outlier. I claim no originality in doubting the counting of ancient historians.
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

No great problem with Cannae. The numbers fit around the structure of the Roman army. No great problem with 50,000 Carthaginians, but great problems with 300,000 of them.

And what are these problems?

Herodotus guesses or lies about the numbers of Persians ( he has plenty of motive to exaggerate)  and no doubt other enemies of the Greeks,

His number structure seems consistent, associated effects seem consistent - and fibbing usually results in inconsistency.  Funnily enough, the inconsistency problems arise from efforts to downsize Xerxes' army (one of the first being squeezing down the army to 100,000 men and then finding the fleet still had 250,000).

I and others have a long history of maintaining that simple faith in ancient numbers is a mistake, largely because they are often not believable in terms of logistics as understood by later periods where we have sensible numbers from more trustworthy observers and comparisons with other ancient sources.

Hence drawing conclusions by comparing like with unlike.  Hitler did the same with estimates of Soviet troop build-ups in 1944-45: any numbers he did not like, he disbelieved.  It was a bluff, a trick, a logistical impossibility (and Gehlen ought to be shot for being taken in by such an outrageous bluff).  Of course, in WW2 there was an empirical way of finding out the truth about the numbers ...

And I would advise not confusing 'simple faith' with objective analysis.

[Mark G]

Given that we do this argument every year, can we move the ancient numbers posts to a different theead.

Then we can just ignore it and refer back to it when it comes up again.

Or a sticky poll.

Do you believe we should accept all ancient numbers as literally true.

Anything to avoid pat reposting half of Herodotus again .

[Jim Webster]

I don't think the Carthaginian/Punic wars figures need to be lumped in with Herodotus

We have a pretty good idea of fleet sizes, from a number of sources and they seem to be accepted. Once you take that into account and assume the Carthaginian force includes men serving in the fleet, then the land component isn't too ridiculous.
In fact, assuming the land component arrived on 'merchant shipping' or its equivalent rather than being carried as marines on warships, then it could well be that the Land component includes the seamen etc needed to get them there.

It was a legitimate way for the writer to provide an inflated figure for the forces of the bad guys 

[Patrick Waterson]

It is a thought, Jim: in our accounts of this Carthaginian expedition there is no division into fighting effectives and camp followers* or equivalents.

*or should that be camp-followers?

[Jim Webster]

It is a thought, Jim: in our accounts of this Carthaginian expedition there is no division into fighting effectives and camp followers* or equivalents.

*or should that be camp-followers?

When you think about it, they might be two very different types of people