Achaemenid Persian Army

[Mark]

Er, hang on. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_empires, in particular the column on percentage of world population. That doesn't feel like an ineffective military force.

Maybe the Greek/Persian wars were more about a world power built on land battles a) trying to fight and support a campaign in a complex isthmus/archipelago and b) organised in a way where it was difficult to concentrate its full economic force into a campaign army at its periphery. For all the statements below, you could substitute 19C Afghanistan and Britain for Greece and Persia but that doesn't prove the Afghans were militarily better.

[Patrick Waterson]

Er, hang on. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_empires, in particular the column on percentage of world population. That doesn't feel like an ineffective military force.

One of the persistent lessons of military history is that size matters, but quality and technique matter more: this is evident in campaigns involving not only Greeks and Macedonians vs Persians but also European powers in the Far East and the New World.  (One may also note the same lesson in 1904-5, when a really big power took on a quite small power and lost.)  An empire can contain an estimated 44.48% of the world's population and still be unable to defeat a small but skilled power even when bringing its maximum mobilisation capability to bear.

Maybe the Greek/Persian wars were more about a world power built on land battles a) trying to fight and support a campaign in a complex isthmus/archipelago and b) organised in a way where it was difficult to concentrate its full economic force into a campaign army at its periphery. For all the statements below, you could substitute 19C Afghanistan and Britain for Greece and Persia but that doesn't prove the Afghans were militarily better.

I think this derives from modern historians' misapprehensions about the Persian mobilisation in 480 BC: our sources are quite explicit that this was no peripheral activity at the corners of the empire but a complete mobilisation aiming at unbounded conquest (Greece was simply the first step if we are to believe Herodotus VII.50 and 53).

[Dave Beatty]

This is an outstanding discussion!

With regard to the presence or absence of cavalry at Marathon, I come down on the side of its absence.  The battlefield itself is suitable for the employment of cavalry ("the best ground for cavalry to maneuver in was at Marathon" – Herodotus, Histories, VI:104), and the Greek delay in attacking points to there being some trepidation in facing cavalry in the open (this concern was also of import at Plataea 10 years later as others have pointed out).  Herodotus states that the reason for the delay was that some feared "that the Athenian force was too small to stand a chance of success" (Histories¸ VI:110).  I postulate that the event that triggered the Athenian attack was a report that the Persian cavalry had departed. 

Keep in mind that the Persian mission was to "reduce Athens and Eretria to slavery and to bring the slaves before the king" (Histories, VI:95).  From an operational viewpoint, the Persians were no doubt reluctant to attack the Athenian phalanx frontally so two choices emerge, both involving maneuver directly against Athens itself.  The Persians enjoyed superior operational mobility with their cavalry and superior strategic mobility with their fleet.  Faced with the entire Athenian army blocking the roads from Marathon to Athens, the possibility of using Persian cavalry to threaten the city of Athens by land was limited... unless they took advantage of their strategic mobility.

I suggest that the elite of the Persian army had embarked in the night for a surprise strategic move from Marathon around Cape Sounion and a direct amphibious assault on Athens itself. Herodotus notes that there were elements within Athens in favor of surrendering to the Persians, so the mere appearance of the Persian army at Athens might have led to that. Included in that force would have been the cavalry and the best of their infantry, leaving what they deemed was a sufficient garrison of the Persian base at Marathon.

This theory might also explain the urgency of notifying Athens of the great victory at Marathon by sending Pheidippides on his epic death run with the news.  It was critical for the Athenian political leadership and for the people of Athens to know that the army was intact prior to the arrival of the Persian amphibious force at Phalerum thus precluding panic in the defenseless city and possible surrender without a fight.

This theory would answer Patrick's question, "where else would they be going?"  It also would clear up the mystery of why the Athenians captured so few ships on the beach at Marathon (only seven of the 600 vessels in the Persian fleet), and the mystery of why the Persian cavalry did not counterattack the Athenians after the battle - with the Persian logistic base gone, there was inadequate supply for such a large mounted force and no way to replenish it prior to winter. 

Thus, the only course remaining to the already-embarked Persians was to return to Asia and prepare for a renewed offensive the following spring, which was delayed 10 years by dynastic questions and the revolt in Egypt.

The major problem with this theory is that it is not discussed at all by Herodotus.  Indeed, Herodotus' report that the Persian survivors of Marathon got off by sea and attempted to sail to Athens hoping to reach it ahead of the Athenian army (Histories, VI:116) would imply that there was no earlier sailing which he surely he would have mentioned.  One way around this dilemma is that the Persians had already embarked their cavalry and were on the verge of sailing when the Athenian attack came.  This view would also explain the absence of any mention of the capture of horses by the victorious Athenians.  With the speed of the Athenian attack, there might also have not been time for the Persians to disembark their cavalry and prepare for combat.

Another question is raised by Herodotus' report that the Athenian center was broken at Marathon by Persians and Sacae.  The Sacae are noted for their cavalry, Herodotus stating that they fought best at Plataea (Histories, IX:74).  If the Sacae cavalry were not present at Marathon, were there Sacae infantry brigaded in the center with Persian infantry?  Unfortunately, Herodotus does not differentiate between infantry and cavalry in his order of battle for the second invasion in 480BC (Histories, Book VII).

As for the quality of Persian cavalry, Xenophon was impressed enough to advocate for the inclusion of a properly trained and equipped cavalry force into the Athenian military structure, and elite Persian cavalry very nearly killed Alexander at the Granicus (see Peter Green's excellent resolution of the conflicting Greek reports of that battle in his historical biography of Alexander).  Note also that the Persian army actually broke the Athenian center at Marathon (Herodotus, Histories, VI:115) which argues for some skill irrespective of being mounted or on foot.

Over the years I have had reasonable luck with Achaemenid armies on the tabletop.  I find them very flexible in all manner of terrain but vulnerable to heavy infantry in the open unless supported by mercenary hoplites in their own ranks.

The absence of Persian cavalry in the Suda is supported by the absence of mention of Persian cavalry at Marathon in Herodotus.  In essence, the theories boil down to a) the Persian cavalry had not been brought yet; b) it had been brought but had then been re-embarked (curious as Marathon was selected on account of its suitability for cavalry, so where else would they be going?)

[Patrick Waterson]

Let us discuss things a little further. 

The idea of embarking the cavalry for a direct 'amphibious invasion' of Athens is an interesting one, David, but raises the question of why this approach was not adopted in the first place.  One reason is that contested amphibious invasions a) were extremely rare in this period (the only one I can think of is the Spartan attempt to retake Pylos, in 425 BC) and b) did not involve cavalry - the Persians, like the Carthaginians, used specialised horse-transports, and these took quite a while and a fair bit of bother to load and unload because one had to unseal and open, or close and seal, the doors - and painting the door-cracks with heated tar and resin or chipping them free is not something you can really do in mid-battle, so embarking and debarking the cavalry was something you did while the enemy was elsewhere.  Herodotus notes that when the Persians landed on Euboea:

"The Persians sailed holding their course for Temenos and Choereae and Aegilea, all in Eretrian territory.  Seizing control of [kataskhontes = making themselves masters of] these places, they immediately unloaded their horses and made preparation to attack their enemies." - Herodotus VI.101

The key point here is that control of the landing site precedes the unloading of horses and preparations to attack the enemy.  This is why it made sense - from the dilatory point of view of Datis and Artaphernes - to send Histaeus on with an advance force to seize the landing-ground at Marathon so the cavalry could safely be disembarked - but although Herodotus notes the landing of the cavalry at Eretria, he never tells us that it was re-embarked from Eretria, or disembarked at Marathon.

Hence if the Persian fleet was intending an 'amphibious invasion' then it would do so without the cavalry in any event.

One reason for the Persian cavalry delaying on Euboea might have been to gather supplies of grain and forage, because although the plain of Marathon was considered ideal for cavalry operations, it was by no means a 'logistic base'.  That would have been at Eretria, with ships ready to take the supplies to Marathon.

The next aspect is: who ordered the Persian fleet to try and touch at Athens, in the hope of possible inside assistance while the Athenian army was still at or near Marathon?  This kind of flexible thinking is rarely seen among Persian comanders - only Datames, who flourished a century later, seems to have qualified.  However this kind of opportunism would fit the aging, exiled and now desperate Athenian ex-tyrant Hippias to a 't'.

At the actual battle of Marathon, the Persians and Sacae would be infantry.  Persian deployments that we know of tend to put the cavalry on the wings, where can take advantage of any room for manoeuvre, with the only cavalry contingent in the centre of the army being the Royal Guard, possibly by extension the satrapal guard if the satrap is commanding an army - but Herodotus mentions neither Datis nor Artaphernes at Marathon.  The reason for the Persian (and Sacaean) success would be the reduced depth of the Athenian centre: four deep is just not sufficient to prevent dedicated opponents in great depth from pushing back a formation and wrecking its cohesion, whereas eight deep seems much better able to hold its own - and the Persians and Sacae were the cream of the invading forces.

Had they been cavalry, it is difficult to see the following Athenian manoeuvre being successful:

"The foreigners prevailed there and broke through in pursuit inland, but on each wing the Athenians and Plataeans prevailed. [2] In victory they let the routed foreigners flee, and brought the wings together to fight those who had broken through the center. The Athenians prevailed, then followed the fleeing Persians and struck them down." - Herodotus VI.113

The hoplites would have had to be very swift-footed indeed in order to engage and successfully pursue Persian cavalry!

What triggered the Athenian attack, according to the Byzantine Suda (an encyclopaedia equivalent), is that Ionian Greeks among the Persian contingent made contact with the Athenians and told them the Persian cavalry were not present.  This is not quite the same as 'departed', but the end result was the same - the Athenians decided to attack, knowing they were safe from Persian mounted troops.  As at Plataea in 479 BC, Greek hoplites shone when Persian cavalry was not able to intervene, at Marathon because they were not present, and at Plataea because they seem to have drifted away from persecuting the Spartans once the Persian infantry had come up, probably moving off to hunt down the other Greek contingents.

Persian cavalry was of good quality, but tended to go around in large and inflexible contingents: at Plataea they went around as a single grouping rather than detach some to keep the Spartans pinned down while the rest went elsewhere, and at Gaugamela the Persian cavalry left manoeuvred as a single entity, which allowed Alexander to rout the entire 20,000-man ensemble with three 200-300-man squadrons: two (Menidas' mercenary Greeks and the Paeonians) preoccupied the mass of Persians at one end while the third (Prodromoi) charged them in the other - and broke them through sheer surprise and panic at this unexpected development.

Over the years I have had reasonable luck with Achaemenid armies on the tabletop.  I find them very flexible in all manner of terrain but vulnerable to heavy infantry in the open unless supported by mercenary hoplites in their own ranks.

That sounds about right: they are, like Assyrians, well endowed with various troop types which can function in all manner of terrain, the early armies also have good missile power, and the heavy cavalry are generally good.  Their big weakness, as historically, is their inability to stand up to Greeks - which is why, after Cyrus the Younger and the battle at Cunaxa (401 BC) Persian kings started hiring Greeks left, right and centre.

[Dave Beatty]

I must say that I agree with all you say Patrick!

The upshot is that the Greeks won at Marathon because the Persian cavalry was not present, and at Platea because it had become ineffective - either as has been said due to inability to operate as effective tactical units, or due to demoralization with the death of Mardonius.

[Patrick Waterson]

Thank you, Dave.

I think your assessment is on the money - if a substantial contingent of Persian cavalry was present and correctly handled, Greek hoplites had problems beating Persian armies.  The one case that probably illuminates this is the Battle of Ephesus (497 BC) during the Ionian revolt (499-493 BC).

"It chanced that they [the Persians] found the Ionians no longer at Sardis, but following on their tracks, they caught them at Ephesus. There the Ionians stood arrayed to meet them, but were utterly routed in the battle." - Hertodotus V.102.2

That, alas, is all the description we get.  We can be sure the Persian army included a substantial cavalry contingent, because a little earlier (in V.99) the Paphlagonians who had previously been transported to Asia were taking the opportunity to return home, escaping just ahead of a 'host of Persian horsemen' [Perseon hippos polle].  These Persian cavalry were thus free to join the main army, consisting of "the Persians of the provinces this side of the (river) Halys," i.e. the muster of western Asia Minor, before meeting the Greeks in battle.

The Persians were also successful in a battle to reconquer the Greek cities of Cyprus, which had revolted shortly after the Ionian cities of Asia Minor.  Their success in this action was mainly owing to the defection of Stesanor of Curium and his contingent in mid-battle, but it seems to have confirmed the Persians in their belief they could and would beat Greeks whenever they met them.

Hence, when the Persian force landed at Marathon, the history of Persian-Greek major land engagements to date had been Persians 2, Greeks 0 - and both sides knew it.  By Plataea the Persians were a bit less confident, but it is very apparent that such successes as they achieved in the 479 campaign were entirely due to their cavalry, for which the Greeks had a healthy respect.