Zama 202 B.C.

[Mark G]

Zama,

The end of Hannibal.

We have had a battle day on this, and three big articles over the last 6 years in slingshot - and there is a good thread on it in discussion too.

I will post both Polybios and Livy as separate entries, to make the comparisons easier.

First, I have summarised the pre-battle campaign stuff (from Polybios)

Book 14 and the earlier chapters of book 15.

to summarise that very briefly.

Scipio has landed in Africa and gone into winter quarters there. 

The Cathaginians raise a fleet and Scipio responds and continues to woo Syphax to his side.

The Carthaginians lose a large battle -- including 10 000 Celtiberian mercenaries

Scipio advances to and then retreats back from Tunis to protect his fleet - which is prepared for a siege, not a naval battle, and the Carthaginians capture the Roman transports and supplies.

Carthage rejects another peace treaty and determines to rely upon Hannibal who has just returned with his army from Italy.

There is an incident with the Roman ambassadors, and hostilities resume.

Hannibal, in need of cavalry, recruits Tychaeus - who reportedly has the best cavalry in Africa.

Scipio reinforces Massanissa to allow him to overthrow Syphax.

Scipio then advances, sacking towns as he goes.

Hannibal is begged to meet Scipio without delay - he refuses as he is not ready, but moves near enough to send spies out (Livy has this advance involving force marches).

The spies are caught, given a guided tour of the camp, and sent back to Hannibal.  Hannibal is asks to meet him.

The next day, Massanissa arrives in the Roman camp having overthrown Syphax - Scipio moves camp, and agrees to meet Hannibal.

Hannibal moves camp closer to facilitate the meeting, but the site is far from water and his men suffer as a consequence.(but which is uphill of Scipio and affording a full view of the area)

The generals meet.

[Mark G]

POLYBIOS 15

(From Laecus Curtius / Penelope)

9
1 After this conversation, which held out no hopes of reconciliation, the two generals parted from each other.
2 On the following morning at daybreak they led out their armies and opened the battle, the Carthaginians fighting for their own safety and the dominion of Africa, and the Romans for the empire of the world.
...
6 Scipio drew up his army in the following fashion.
7 In front he placed the hastati with certain intervals between the maniples and behind them the principes, not placing their maniples, as is the usual Roman custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the enemy's elephants.
8 Last of all he placed the triarii. On his left wing he posted Gaius Laelius with the Italian horse, and on the right wing Massanissa with the whole of his Numidians.
9 The intervals of the first maniples he filled up with the cohorts of velites, ordering them to open the action,
10 and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants to retire, those who had time to do so by the straight passages as far as the rear of the whole army, and those who were overtaken to right or left along the intervals between the lines.

10
1 Having made these preparations he rode along the lines and addressed his troops in a few words suitable to the occasion. ...

11
1 Such was the substance of Scipio's harangue.
Hannibal placed in front of his whole force his elephants, of which he had over eighty, and behind them the mercenaries numbering about twelve thousand. They were composed of Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors.
2 Behind these he placed the native Libyans and Carthaginians, and last of all the troops he had brought over from Italy at a distance of more than a stade from the front lines.
3 He secured his wings by cavalry, placing the Numidian allies on the left and the Carthaginian horse on the right.
4 He ordered each commanding officer of the mercenaries to address his own men, bidding them be sure of victory as they could rely on his own presence and that of the forces that he had brought back with him.
5 As for the Carthaginians, he ordered their commanders to set before their eyes all the sufferings that would befall their wives and children if the result of the battle were adverse. They did as they were ordered,
6 and Hannibal himself went the round of his own troops, begging and imploring them to remember their comradeship of seventeen years and the number of the battles they had previously fought against the Romans.
...

13
Such was the substance of the harangues of the two generals.

12
1 When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy.
2 When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed.
3 The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman velites in the space between the two main armies,
4 both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field.
5 It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry
6 and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa.
7 In the meanwhile both phalanxes slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other, except the troops which Hannibal had brought back from Italy, who remained in their original position.
8 When the phalanxes were close to each other, Romans fell upon their foes, raising their war-cry and clashing their shields with their spears as is their practice,
9 while there was a strange confusion of shouts raised by the Carthaginian mercenaries, for, as Homer says, their voice was not one, but

Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound, Their names all various,
1 as appears from the list of them I gave above.

13
1 As the whole battle was a hand-to‑hand affair [the men using neither spears nor swords],
2 the mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and skill, wounding many of the Romans,
2 but the latter still continued to advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of their arms.
3 The rear ranks of the Romans followed close on their comrades, cheering them on, but the Carthaginians behaved like cowards, never coming near their mercenaries nor attempting to back them up,
4 so that finally the barbarians gave way, and thinking that they had evidently been left in the lurch by their own side, fell upon those they encountered in their retreat and began to kill them.
5 This actually compelled many of the Carthaginians to die like men; for as they were being butchered by their own mercenaries they were obliged against their will to fight both against these and against the Romans,
6 and as when at bay they showed frantic and extraordinary courage, they killed a considerable number both of their mercenaries and of the enemy.
7 In this way they even threw the cohorts of the hastati into confusion, but the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist,
8 and now the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati.
9 Hannibal did not allow the survivors in their flight to mix with his own men but, ordering the foremost ranks to level their spears against them, prevented them from being received into his force.
10 They were therefore obliged to retreat towards the wings and the open ground beyond.

14
1 The space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy.
2 For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard.
3 However, after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the principes and triarii close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead.
5 When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the hastati the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour.
6 As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination,
7 and Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment.
8 When they fell on Hannibal's army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the cavalry were close on them and the country was level.
9 More than fifteen hundred Romans fell, the Carthaginian loss amounting to twenty thousand killed and nearly the same number of prisoners.

15
1 Such was the result of the final battle between Scipio and Hannibal, the battle which decided the war in favour of Rome.
...
He (Hannibal) had done in the battle and before it all that could be done by a good general of long experience.
4 For, in the first place, he had by his conference with Scipio attempted to terminate the dispute by himself alone;
5 showing thus that while conscious of his former successes he mistrusted Fortune and was fully aware of the part that the unexpected plays in war.
6 In the next place, when he offered battle he so managed matters that it was impossible for any commander with the same arms at his disposal to make better dispositions for a contest against the Romans than Hannibal did on that occasion.
7 The order of a Roman force in battle makes it very difficult to break through, for without any change it enables every man individually and in common with his fellows to present a front in any direction, the maniples which are nearest to the danger turning themselves by a single movement to face it.
8 Their arms also give the men both protection and confidence owing to the size of the shield and owing to the sword being strong enough to endure repeated blows. So that for these reasons they are formidable antagonists very difficult to overcome.

16
1 But nevertheless to meet each of these advantages Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed.
2 For he had hastily collected that large number of elephants and had placed them in front on the day of battle in order to throw the enemy into confusion and break his ranks.
3 He had placed the mercenaries in advance with the Carthaginians behind them in order that the Romans before the final engagement might be fatigued by their exertions and that their swords might lose their edge owing to the great slaughter, and also in order to compel the Carthaginians thus hemmed in on both sides to stand fast and fight, in the words of Homer

That e'en the unwilling might be forced to fight.3

4 The most efficient and steadiest of his troops he had placed behind at a certain distance in order that, anticipating and witnessing from afar what took place, they might with undiminished strength and spirit make use of their qualities at the proper time.
5 If he, who had never as yet suffered defeat, after taking every possible step to insure victory, yet failed to do so, we must pardon him.
6 For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, "A brave man meets another braver yet," as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal.

[Mark G]

LIVY 30

(Library collection: "Everyman's Library" Rev. Canon Roberts  1905)

[30.33]
Then he drew up his men, the hastati in front, behind them the principes, the triarii closing the rear. He did not form the cohorts in line before their respective standards, but placed a considerable interval between the maniples in order that there might be space for the enemy elephants to be driven through without breaking the ranks.
Laelius, who had been one of his staff-officers and was now by special appointment of the senate acting as quaestor, was in command of the Italian cavalry on the left wing, Masinissa and his Numidians being posted on the right.
The velites, the light infantry of those days, were stationed at the head of the lanes between the columns of maniples with instructions to retire when the elephants charged and shelter themselves behind the lines of maniples, or else run to the right and left behind the standards and so allow the monsters to rush on to meet the darts from both sides.
To make his line look more menacing Hannibal posted his elephants in front. He had eighty altogether, a larger number, than he had ever brought into action before. Behind them were the auxiliaries, Ligurians and Gauls, with an admixture of Balearics and Moors.
The second line was made up of Carthaginians and Africans together with a legion of Macedonians.
A short distance behind these were posted his Italian troops in reserve. These were mainly Bruttians who had followed him from Italy more from the compulsion of necessity than of their own free will.
Like Scipio, Hannibal covered his flanks with his cavalry, the Carthaginians on the right, the Numidians on the left.

...

Whilst the commander-in-chief was thus addressing the Carthaginians, and the officers of the various nationalities were conveying his words to their own people and to the aliens mingled with them mostly through interpreters, the trumpets and horns of the Romans were sounded and such a clangor arose that the elephants, mostly those in front of the left wing, turned upon the Moors and Numidians behind them.
Masinissa had no difficulty in turning this disorder into flight and so clearing the Carthaginian left of its cavalry. A few of the animals, however, showed no fear and were urged forward upon the ranks of velites, amongst whom, in spite of the many wounds they received, they did considerable execution.
The velites, to avoid being trampled to death, sprang back to the maniples and thus allowed a path for the elephants, from both sides of which they rained their darts on the beasts.
The leading maniples also kept up a fusillade of missiles until these animals too were driven out of the Roman lines on to their own side and put the Carthaginian cavalry, who were covering the right flank, to flight.
When Laelius saw the enemy's horse in confusion he at once took advantage of it.

[30.34]
When the infantry lines closed, the Carthaginians were exposed on both flanks, owing to the flight of the cavalry, and were losing both confidence and strength.
Other circumstances, too, seemingly trivial in themselves but of considerable importance in battle, gave the Romans an advantage.
Their cheers formed one united shout and were therefore fuller and more intimidating; those of the enemy, uttered in many languages, were only dissonant cries.
The Romans kept their foothold as they fought and pressed the enemy by the sheer weight of their arms and bodies; on the other side there was much more agility and nimbleness of foot than actual fighting strength.
As a consequence, the Romans made the enemy give ground in their very first charge, then pushing them back with their shields and elbows and moving forward on to the ground from which they had dislodged them, they made a considerable advance as though meeting with no resistance.
When those in the rear became aware of the forward movement they too pressed on those in front thereby considerably increasing the weight of the thrust. This retirement on the part of the enemy's auxiliaries was not checked by the Africans and Carthaginians who formed the second line.
In fact, so far were they from supporting them that they too fell back, fearing lest the enemy, after overcoming the obstinate resistance of the first line. should reach them. On this the auxiliaries suddenly broke and turned tail; some took refuge within the second line, others, not allowed to do so, began to cut down those who refused to admit them after refusing to support them.
There were now two battles going on, the Carthaginians had to fight with the enemy, and at the same time with their own troops. Still, they would not admit these maddened fugitives within their ranks, they closed up and drove them to the wings and out beyond the fighting ground, fearing lest their fresh and unweakened lines should be demoralised by the intrusion of panic-struck and wounded men.

The ground where the auxiliaries had been stationed had become blocked with such heaps of bodies and arms that it was almost more difficult to cross it than it had been to make way through the masses of the enemy.
The hastati who formed the first line followed up the enemy, each man advancing as best he could over the heaps of bodies and arms and the slippery bloodstained ground until the standards and maniples were all in confusion.
Even the standards of the principes began to sway to and fro when they saw how irregular the line in front had become. As soon as Scipio observed this he ordered the call to be sounded for the hastati to retire, and after withdrawing the wounded to the rear he brought up the principes and triarii to the wings, in order that the hastati in the centre might be supported and protected on both flanks.
Thus the battle began entirely afresh, as the Romans had at last got to their real enemies, who were a match for them in their arms, their experience and their military reputation, and who had as much to hope for and to fear as themselves. The Romans, however, had the superiority in numbers and in confidence, since their cavalry had already routed the elephants and they were fighting with the enemy's second line after defeating his first.

[30.35]
Laelius and Masinissa, who had followed up the defeated cavalry a considerable distance, now returned from the pursuit at the right moment and attacked the enemy in the rear.
This at last decided the action. The enemy were routed, many were surrounded and killed in action, those who dispersed in flight over the open country were killed by the cavalry who were in possession of every part.
Above 20,000 of the Carthaginians and their allies perished on that day and almost as many were made prisoners. 132 standards were secured and 11 elephants.
The victors lost 1500 men. Hannibal escaped in the melee with a few horsemen and fled to Hadrumetum. Before quitting the field he had done everything possible in the battle itself and in the preparation for it.
Scipio himself acknowledged and all experienced soldiers agreed that Hannibal had shown singular skill in the disposition of his troops.
He placed his elephants in front so that their irregular charge and irresistible force might make it impossible for the Romans to keep their ranks and maintain the order of their formation, in which their strength and confidence mainly lay. Then he posted the mercenaries in front of his Carthaginians, in order that this motley force drawn from all nations, held together not by a spirit of loyalty but by their pay, might not find it easy to run away.
Having to sustain the first onset they might wear down the impetuosity of the enemy, and if they did nothing else they might blunt his sword by their wounds.
Then came the Carthaginian and African troops, the mainstay of his hopes. They were equal in all respects to their adversaries and even had the advantage inasmuch as they would come fresh into action against a foe weakened by wounds and fatigue.
As to the Italian troops, he had his doubts as to whether they would turn out friends or foes and withdrew them consequently into the rearmost line.
After giving this final proof of his great abilities, Hannibal fled, as has been stated, to Hadrumetum.

[Mark G]

Incidents:

BATTLE START

P has the battle starting with the Numdians skirmishing "for some time" (which I read as inconsequentially)

P then has Hannibal sending the elephants to attack, where many are panicked by the Roman trumpets.

L has the elephants reacting to a Roman trumpet blast and panicking - an advance without orders follows.

Both report the same consequence - elephants stampede into the Numidians, and Massanissa reacts by exploiting this confusion to put the entire Carthaginian left wing cavalry into rout.


ELEPHANTS VS VELITES

both L and P have the remaining elephants doing much damage to the velites, who make use of the elephant lanes, and missile support from the hastatii to finally defeat the beasts.

Both also report the final routing elephants as breaking onto the Carthaginian right wing cavalry

L has these elephants themselves putting the Carthaginian cavalry to flight which Laelius then pursues.

P has Laelius seizing the opportunity caused by the disorder to charge and cause the cavalry rout.

In either circumstance, both cavalry wings are now departed, with the Roman side in close pursuit on each wing leaving an infantry battle


INFANTRY ADVANCE

There are clear differences here between the two reports.

P has both armies advancing mutually - all lines of fighting men with the exception of the African veterans, who remain stationed a long way behind.

P has the mercenaries gaining the upper hand in the fighting, but still being forced back by the Romans, but that the citizens do not supporting as closely as the Principes and Triarii do for the Roman side.

P then has the mercenaries abandon the fight and turn on the citizens, compelling them to fight.  The mercenaries are defeated as are the hastatii, requiring the principes to enter the line and finally defeat the citizens.

L has the mercenaries fighting in an exposed situation to their flanks, with a loss of confidence - which suggests that the hastatii were in a clear overlap situation.

L has the Romans pushing the mercenaries back much more easily than P does, pushing them back from the first charge and advancing as if not meeting resistance - and with the principes and triarii following up closely to add to the pressure.

L has the mercenaries retire unhindered from the line, passing the citizens who themselves fall back in fear, others of whom fight the mercenaries, and others who do fight the hastatii as they advance.

both report Hannibal force the routers to flee to the flanks.


THE PAUSE AND ROMAN REORGANISATION

Both report the battlefield is now littered with bloody and gore and bodies and abandoned weapons - effectively, the ground is unsuitable for fighting over.

Both report the hastatii attempt to cross this and follow up the defeated Carthaginians, L reports that this was without formation and involved the principes as well - and that even the principes were unable to maintain order as they pushed forward over the detritus.

P does not report this pursuit by the principes, but does report that the hastatii are recalled, although hints that it was only a smaller number of them.

Both then have Scipio reorganising his army and tending to the wounded.

The reorganisation places the remnant hastatii in the centre, with the principes on their flank, and the triarii outside them again.

that is, Scipio has formed a single line of battle for the Romans.

Scipio then advances over the earlier battlefield and engages the veterans.



SECOND ENGAGEMENT

again, clear differences between the reports.

Both agree that this was a battle between two keen armies, eager for the fight.

P has the numbers as nearly equally matched.

L has the Romans with the advantage in numbers and confidence.

P has the fight as doubtful for a long time.

both report that the victory was triggered by the return of Massanissa and Laelius

P has this as in the nick of time, falling on the veterans from the rear and cutting down those who tried to flee.

L has this cavalry return as arriving at the right moment and deciding the action.



ANCIENT ANALYSIS

both report that Hannibal did all he could to win both in preparation and execution.

P reports than he managed the battle in such a way that it was impossible for a commander to make better dispositions for a contest with the Romans

P reports that the deployment of the mercenaries in the first line was designed to exhaust the Romans, and that the positioning of the citizens (between the mercenaries and the veterans) was designed to hem them in so that they must be compelled to fight.

P also has it that by retaining his veterans well to the rear they might not be swayed by the turn of events before them, and would be fully fresh when the time came

both report that the elephants were placed in the front line to make a charge which would throw the Romans into confusion and disorder their ranks.


L reports that Scipio himself acknowledged that singular skill was shown by Hannibal in the disposition of his troops.

But L reports that the mercenaries were placed behind the elephants simply to prevent them from running away, with little more expected than to blunt the Roman weapons.

L then has the Citizens as the main part of Hannibal's army, equal in all respects to the Romans.

L reports the veterans ('Italians') as a doubtful asset, liable to change sides, and hence, they were left in the rear.

[Duncan Head]

Source: Frontinus, Stratagems II.3.16:

When Hannibal was contending against Scipio in Africa, having an army of Carthaginians and auxiliaries, part of whom were not only of different nationalities, but actually consisted of Italians, he placed eighty elephants in the forefront, to throw the enemy into confusion. Behind these he stationed auxiliary Gauls, Ligurians, Balearians, and Moors, that these might be unable to run away, since the Carthaginians were standing behind them, and in order that, being placed in front, they might at least harass the enemy, if not do him damage. In the second line he placed his own countrymen and the Macedonians, to be fresh to meet the exhausted Romans; and in the rear the Italians, whose loyalty he distrusted and whose indifference he feared, inasmuch as he had dragged most of them from Italy against their will.

Against this formation Scipio drew up the flower of his legions in three successive front lines, arranged according to hastati, principes, and triarii, not making the cohorts touch, but leaving a space between the detached companies through which the elephants driven by the enemy might easily be allowed to pass without throwing the ranks into confusion. These intervals he filled with light-armed skirmishers, that the line might show no gaps, giving them instructions to withdraw to the rear or the flanks at the first onset of the elephants. The cavalry he distributed on the flanks, placing Laelius in charge of the Roman horsemen on the right, and Masinissa in charge of the Numidians on the left. This shrewd scheme of arrangement was undoubtedly the cause of his victory.

For what it may be worth, Frontinus shares Livy's view of the unreliability of Hannibal's "Italian" third line. But he may, of course,  have no independent value if he was simply following Livy.

Appian's version is at Livius, starting http://www.livius.org/ap-ark/appian/appian_punic_08.html#%A740; but it differs from the other two so greatly, and in some places so unconvincingly, that it is often simply ignored.

[Mark G]

my interpretation.


THE DEPLOYMENT

The hill top camp choice - I think this was due to the situation with Syphax and Massanissa.  I expect that the Carthaginians would have had a much better idea of the outcome of this war than Scipio would - and as such, Hannibal would know to expect Massinissa to return to aid the Romans.

Choosing a hilltop position far from water suggests that he did not expect to stay in the area for long, and that he wanted to be able to keep watch for any returning armies before committing to battle the next morning.

The numbers question is also important I think - for me, Polybios is the more believable - with the numbers of veterans being pretty much equal to the Roman infantry, which Hannibal was able to deduce this from his spies guided tour (again, the 6000 Numidian foot would not have been known, but they are not reported on the field, and I suspect they were deliberately left behind by Scipio.)

So if he knew he had parity between his veterans and the Roman infantry, and he also had these waves of 'expendable' troops in addition, he must have greatly feared Scipio refusing battle when he saw the numbers of infantry which Hannibal had.   But he also knew that he needed those numbers to defeat the Romans.

And hence the decision to deploy the Veterans so far behind his citizens . 

In addition, I think there was probably a good bit of distance between the front lines of the two armies at the beginning of the day as well.

The cavalry were likely held back a bit, rather than being as far forward as possible - offering plenty of space for the light cavalry skirmishing by the thousands of Numidians on each side, and there seems to have been a great deal of space for the elephants between them and the Carthaginian lines.

With that amount of distance - a good few hundred yards between the first lines at the outset, further back again to the citizens and then the veterans another 200 years behind the back of the citizens again offers the intriguing thought that they were being kept partially hidden, to prevent their true numbers being seen

if you have something like a half a mile between the Roman lines and the veterans, then firstly, you do not frighten off the Romans from the greater numbers which the Carthaginians had, and secondly, it may have worked against their morale when the win the field - only to see another bigger army in perfect order behind that.

Thus, Hannibal planned for two battles that day.

And as, for once, he was on home ground, he only needed to win the second of these - for it would be years before another Roman army could be raised to land on Africa.


THE CAVALRY

I think Polybios is more convincing on the opening of the battle - with the Numidians skirmishing for a long period, before Hannibal starts the battle by sending in the elephants.

This leads me to think that while the numbers, thanks to Massanissa, were on the Roman side, the quality was on the Carthaginian side.

Polybios reporting that Tychaeus had the best cavalry in Africa is significant, I think, and perhaps also is the distance which Massanissa's cavalry had to ride to get to Scipio the day before the battle. 

I do not think anyone would doubt that the regular Carthaginian cavalry would more than match the regular Roman cavalry on the other flank.

For me, I think that while Hannibal recognised his cavalry were outnumbered - and this is something he probably was not expecting as Massanissa's arrival was late and unexpected - I do not think the number differential was sufficient for him to build a plan around his cavalry losing.

Rather, I think he was happy to bide his time with them a little.

Let the 'expendable' elephants, mercenaries and citizens wear out the Romans, and then fight the real battle, at which time his cavalry would be sent in.  Both Livy and Polybios also suggest this, although for different reasons.

In previous battles, Hannibal had sent his cavalry in quite early on, but this time he sends the elephants in first.

(Numidian cavalry skirmishing is not a decisive engagement - and from the subsequent reactions, is seems safe to assume that we really are talking about a small amount of the thousands of cavalry being involved, with most held back waiting for developments - in the typical manner of a light skirmishing operation.)

It is the failure of those elephants - first trumpet blasts sending those on his left wing stampeding into his Numidians, and then those beaten in battle routing into his right wing cavalry, which give the Roman cavalry wings the confidence to attack.

Of course, once the elephants have disordered the cavalry wings, the numbers on the Roman side are more than sufficient to enable each wing to be put to rout.  But the length of time it takes for the pursuers to return suggests that either there was continual cavalry fighting for quite some time (I would expect a good couple of hours) across the plains, or the quality of the Roman cavalry was so poor that it took that long to regain enough control again for them to return to the fray.

In either respect, Hannibal did not open the battle with his cavalry, which suggests that he had plans for them after he had committed the Roman infantry by opening the battle in the centre.

It does not suggest that he intended on them 'feigning' a rout to pull off the Roman cavalry, nor does it suggest that he intended on a swift cavalry victory to allow his infantry to march over the flanks to envelop the Roman infantry - for either of which his cavalry would need to have completely cleared the field well in advance, and for which he would have issued an early attack command to achieve.

Polybios 15.7 is especially telling in the context of recent suggestions that he should have attempted a flanking march once the cavalry had departed the field.


THE ELEPHANTS

Polybios also reports that the elephants were hastily collected. 

Their performance - stampeding at the sound of trumpets, also suggests that in fact many of these elephants were not fully trained.

In such a situation, it would be foolhardy to attempt to use those elephants with his cavalry, as is another common suggestion for an alternative deployment.

Additionally, we know that the elephants prefer to avoid attacking formed infantry and are much better at a looser formation type target.

I suggest that in fact, the intention with the elephants was to nullify the huge numbers of Velites which the Romans had.  Certainly they were vulnerable to missile fire from the javelinmen, both Livy and Polybios report the hastatii using missiles to help defeat the beasts - but I think that was intended by Hannibal.

Instead of viewing a combined elephant and mercenary attack on the hastatii which failed, I think we are looking at an elephant vs velite battle, which does seem to have defeated the velites (they are not reported after it), and I think which also used up most if not all of the ammunition from the Hastatii, but which had the disastrous effect of weakening the Carthaginian cavalry at the same time.

Scipio's elephant lanes greatly assisted this battle from the Roman point of view - but from the Carthaginian point of view, they exhausted the missile supply and committed the hastatii to battle, and seem to have seen off the huge numbers of velites from taking further part in the engagement.


THE FIRST INFANTRY BATTLE.

Again, who do you believe - Livy on the relative valuelessness of the Mercenaries and strength of the citizens, or Polybios on the mercenaries initially winning against the hastatii and the citizens behaving with cowardice.

Firstly, I touch again on the question of space - Polybios has both armies advancing together, the citizens then slowing and the mercenaries getting far enough forward that they feel they have become unsupported.

Both L and P, in fact, have the Mercenaries being forced back (P initially has them fighting at the advantage), and yet still there is the space to feel that they are unsupported - and space for them to break off and start to fight amongst the Carthaginians.

If we accept my space proposal and also that the velites are spent and the Hastatii have exhausted their missile supply on the elephants ("As the whole battle was a hand-to‑hand affair "),

then it makes sense that the mercenaries did initially win, but soon that exposed position, and their solitary fight against the combined Roman army ("those in the rear ... pressed on those in front thereby considerably increasing the weight of the thrust") began to turn the tide.

Even so, the confused melee does seem to have resulted in the hastatii being badly mauled and the principes being needed to finally see of this phase of the battle.

Here I think is the explanation for the depth of the deployment of the veterans - they are completely isolated from the first battle, possibly even obscured from Roman view.  Now, just when they think they have won a great albeit hard fought victory - the see over the carnage, a new, fresh, army still the equal to their own in numbers calmly waiting for them to do it all again.

I think it fair therefore, to view the mercenaries as quality troops an the citizens as comparatively poor troops - but that between them they are sufficient to take any edge off the differences between Hannibal's fresh veterans, and what is otherwise the entire Roman army.


THE VETERANS ENGAGE


Hannibal allows Scipio to rest and reform his men.  This is startling.

It suggests to me that he always anticipated this great fight between the Veterans and the Romans as the deciding phase of the battle.

Not only that, but he makes no attempt to advance up to the edge of the field (if anyone has ever seen a club level rugby match where one side is forced to scrum in the mud pile while the other is on dry ground, you will imaging the potential effect of forcing Scipio to fight amongst the detritus of the earlier battle ) -suggesting complete confidence in his men.

Further, he feels under no time pressure from the victorious Roman cavalry - which suggests that they must have been beyond the horizon - or if still on the edge of the field, they must have appeared to be engaged in some way or other without any clear advantage - the dust cloud was not moving in a portentous manner, at least.

For the reasons outlined above, I do not view this as supporting his having a plan to lure the Roman cavalry away - such a thing is just too risky.  Rather I think he must have been watching the cavalry movement, and at no time prior to the final engagement do he see any reason to react in anticipation of a cavalry intervention.

In any event, Hannibal and his veterans have waited, unmoving, all day - and continue to wait now for the Romans to attack.  He had no fear of them withdrawing at this point, for to do so would be to admit defeat - which was unthinkable for Scipio.  And it think it quite possible that Hannibal's plan had intended on this being the point when he truly committed his cavalry - circumstances of course prevented that from coming about. 

But Scipio needed to pull in all the men he had, even the exhausted hastatii which must have been fighting for hours by now, in order to match the Carthaginian frontage and numbers.

I also think Polybios the more believable when he reports this battle as long and doubtful.

I completely reject Livy who views the veterans a group of unreliable turncoat Italians, rather these are men who have spent years in war and in training with Hannibal, years fighting the same Roman enemy, and men who fully expected to win.

That they do not is entirely down to the Roman cavalry arriving 'providentially at the right time'.

Such a shock to the rear while engaged is only ever going to have one outcome, but the credit must therefore go to the Roman cavalry - or the elephants.