The effects of missiles - how important were armour and shields?

[Erpingham]

Was it not Alencon and his retinue who were the chief culprits in firstly chaperoning the Genoese ahead before they could properly deploy and then riding them down when they showed reluctance to advance into a shower of clothyard shafts and the roar of the odd cannon? 

Yes, I think so.  I don't think it was top down command - the French were (as often the case) all over the place - but an on-the-spot response.  Alencon (or whoever commanded the lead division - it varies) is confronted with his crossbow screen disintegrating under the weight of shooting.  Time for the next phase - the cavalry engagement - but the Genoese are milling about in the way.  Nothing for it but to cut through, reform on the far side, and sweep the enemy away.

Mention of 'San Giorgio' as the probable Genoese war cry might put a new complexion on the way the French laid into them - what does a knight think when the mercenaries on his side take up the enemy's battle-cry?  A good observation, and one which perhaps deserves more examination as a possible contributor to French conduct on the day, assuming some French contingents were unfamiliar with customary Genoese war shouts.

This is one of David Nicolle's theories

One question that does arise seeing the crossbow unit at Sinalunga with pavisers fronting it is what all those back ranks of crossbowmen expected to do - did they shoot indirectly, Swedish-style, or would they each advance to the front, peer over/round the pavise, let go a shot and drop back to reload or would they stay as they were with the best shot discharging weapon after weapon and the rest reloading and passing them along?

The Sinalunga picture, splendid as it is (it is one of my favourite medieval battle images), clearly shows the crossbowmen advancing into action - note they are preceded by drummers and what appear to be mounted officers, then the pavise bearers across the front and down the flanks, then the crossbows in quite deep formation round their company banners.  It is unclear how that formation would have shaken itself out to shoot.

[Nick Harbud]

As promised in earlier posts, I have cranked a bit of the maths on plunging fire and direct shooting.  For this I have assumed archers firing a 96g arrow at an aiming point 200m away.

Taking the plungers first of all.  They shoot their arrows at 51m/s and an elevation of 45 degrees.  All the arrows land within 6m of the aiming point, as per Patrick's earlier post.  This gives a beaten zone of 12m depth of which some 68% will fall in the center 4m (assuming a normal distribution of arrow fall.)  Their target is a body of close order foot some 8 ranks or 7m deep.  As can be seen in the attached diagram, if the archers get the range right, they get a fair proportion of their arrows on the target.  However, due to the high angle of fire and relatively low velocity, it takes about 8s for the arrows to travel the distance, during which time the infantry (whose keen-eyed officers have doubtless spotted the bow release) can change the speed of charge.  Consequently, the target could be up to 40m away from where it was when the arrows left the bows (assuming a charge speed of up to 5m/s.)  Then again, if the archers anticipated the reduction in range, the target might choose to halt, also resulting in a miss.

Now compare this with the flat shot, direct fire approach.  This departs at 60m/s and an elevation of 22 degrees.  It reaches the target in not more than 3.5s, giving the latter much less opportunity to dodge.  The other sketch depicts this scenario. Note that even 22 degrees of elevation results in a fair few shot hitting rear ranks of the target.  This difference would be even more pronounced with a cavalry target.

Of course, one can make all sorts of assumptions on the probability of the target successfully dodging the bulk of arrows under both scenarios, but I would estimate that one would need to fire something like 4-6 times as many arrows on a high trajectory to obtain the same number of hits as can be achieved by direct fire.  Some archer captains might consider it more effective to deploy their units in a shallower formation of greater frontage.

One final point to note is that for a 96g arrow the minimum velocity required to achieve 80J hitting the target is 40.8m/s.  At 200m drag has a significant effect, slowing the flat shot down to 44.6m/s and the high angle shot to 39.6m/s.

[Patrick Waterson]

That is interesting, Nick.

I notice the assumption that the target moves at a charge speed in excess of five yards per second - this 10 mph dash could only apply during the last 40 yards or so of closure; before then an infantry target would be moving at closer to 1m/s, the usual slow formation-keeping advance seen on the battlefield (keen tribesmen and Pontic chaps dashing uphill at Zela could double or triple this, but dodging archery was not on their menu when fighting pre-Imperial Romans and they tended to arrive a bit winded).  Hence with an 8-yard (or metre) closure during the 8 seconds of arrow flight the target would not move substantially out of the beaten zone, just expose more of its rear-rankers to the arrow shower.

Once a formation reaches a speed of 4-5 yards/second you are right about the difficulty of predicting where the volley should land, and this may go a long way to explaining (e.g.) the success of the Athenians at Marathon and also of chariotry in Biblical times, when 'deflection shooting' seems to have been rare.  It is however worth pointing out that few if any troops will be advancing at a rate above a walk at ranges over 120 yards, and that keen-eyed officers spotting the release and acting upon it seem to have been quite rare, eminently sensible though the tactic may be.  Halting a formation moving at speed is a procedure fraught with cohesion-destroying adjustments: the only force I know of which managed to do this was Caesar's veteran infantry at Pharsalus, when they saw their opponents were not counter-charging.  That they were able to halt after getting going seems to have surprised their opponents, who apparently did not consider it possible.

Also worth noting is that the indirect volley lands mainly on those parts not covered by a shield, whereas the direct volley is taken exactly where shield coverage is best and greatest.  Hence even if we say that a direct volley will give a greater percentage of hits (in itself a not unreasonable conclusion) it would seem that an indirect volley will deliver at least as many effective hits as its direct counterpart, and will allow more ranks of archers to participate - not necessarily much of an advantage with the comparatively small English armies of the Hundred Years' War period, but an important consideration with the vast masses of Biblical period manpower that our original sources unanimously foist upon us.

Trying to get some sort of conclusion from the above, I would suggest that massed indirect shooting at range is still going to generate a lot of hits because an infantry target will usually be moving slowly, and more of those hits will be effective against armoured/shielded troops than with direct shooting because they will arrive at angles that are not covered by the shield (Norman archery at Hastings might exemplify this).  If armour and shield are not in use, direct shooting becomes much more effective and indirect shooting only somewhat more effective.

Volley-avoidance techniques (primarily speeding up as slowing down can be problematical) could be dramatically effective but were very rarely practised: Greeks are recorded as doing them twice (Marathon and Cunaxa) and we can perhaps extrapolate that they became standard practice against Persians after 490 BC, though the Spartans at Plataea sat tight and acted as targets for some time before finally closing, and Romans seem to have used them once (under Julian during his AD 363 campaign).  These armies are obvious candidates to take advantage of a speed-up-and-avoid rule.  Other armies seem to have lacked the command, communications and general nous for thinking of and attempting such tactics, at least with their infantry.

One last thought, this time about lethality.  Does adding acceleration due to gravity make a significant difference to indirectly dropping shots' energy at impact?

[tadamson]

You do need something like a 150 lb bow/prod to get 60m/s.   So  late medieval heavy crossbows then ?

[Nick Harbud]

You do need something like a 150 lb bow/prod to get 60m/s.   So  late medieval heavy crossbows then ?

Longbows retrieved from the Mary Rose have been estimated to be up to 180lb draw weight.  A number of people have trained themselves to shoot with reconstruction longbows of around 150lb draw.  The 60 m/s is a measured speed from some of their trials.

Crossbows also work.

[Nick Harbud]

I notice the assumption that the target moves at a charge speed in excess of five yards per second - this 10 mph dash could only apply during the last 40 yards or so of closure; before then an infantry target would be moving at closer to 1m/s, the usual slow formation-keeping advance seen on the battlefield (keen tribesmen and Pontic chaps dashing uphill at Zela could double or triple this, but dodging archery was not on their menu when fighting pre-Imperial Romans and they tended to arrive a bit winded).  Hence with an 8-yard (or metre) closure during the 8 seconds of arrow flight the target would not move substantially out of the beaten zone, just expose more of its rear-rankers to the arrow shower.

Once a formation reaches a speed of 4-5 yards/second you are right about the difficulty of predicting where the volley should land, and this may go a long way to explaining (e.g.) the success of the Athenians at Marathon and also of chariotry in Biblical times, when 'deflection shooting' seems to have been rare.  It is however worth pointing out that few if any troops will be advancing at a rate above a walk at ranges over 120 yards, and that keen-eyed officers spotting the release and acting upon it seem to have been quite rare, eminently sensible though the tactic may be.  Halting a formation moving at speed is a procedure fraught with cohesion-destroying adjustments: the only force I know of which managed to do this was Caesar's veteran infantry at Pharsalus, when they saw their opponents were not counter-charging.  That they were able to halt after getting going seems to have surprised their opponents, who apparently did not consider it possible.

Also worth noting is that the indirect volley lands mainly on those parts not covered by a shield, whereas the direct volley is taken exactly where shield coverage is best and greatest.  Hence even if we say that a direct volley will give a greater percentage of hits (in itself a not unreasonable conclusion) it would seem that an indirect volley will deliver at least as many effective hits as its direct counterpart, and will allow more ranks of archers to participate - not necessarily much of an advantage with the comparatively small English armies of the Hundred Years' War period, but an important consideration with the vast masses of Biblical period manpower that our original sources unanimously foist upon us.

Trying to get some sort of conclusion from the above, I would suggest that massed indirect shooting at range is still going to generate a lot of hits because an infantry target will usually be moving slowly, and more of those hits will be effective against armoured/shielded troops than with direct shooting because they will arrive at angles that are not covered by the shield (Norman archery at Hastings might exemplify this).  If armour and shield are not in use, direct shooting becomes much more effective and indirect shooting only somewhat more effective.

Volley-avoidance techniques (primarily speeding up as slowing down can be problematical) could be dramatically effective but were very rarely practised: Greeks are recorded as doing them twice (Marathon and Cunaxa) and we can perhaps extrapolate that they became standard practice against Persians after 490 BC, though the Spartans at Plataea sat tight and acted as targets for some time before finally closing, and Romans seem to have used them once (under Julian during his AD 363 campaign).  These armies are obvious candidates to take advantage of a speed-up-and-avoid rule.  Other armies seem to have lacked the command, communications and general nous for thinking of and attempting such tactics, at least with their infantry.

One last thought, this time about lethality.  Does adding acceleration due to gravity make a significant difference to indirectly dropping shots' energy at impact?

The maths I use takes into account both gravity and air resistance.

Regarding infantry approach speeds, it should be noted that even a gentle 3mph stroll = 1.36 m/s and some find it perfectly possible to run at 6.77m/s for up to a mile.  Therefore, keeping up 5m/s for around an eighth of this distance does not seem beyond human capabilities.  Incidentally, the object is to illustrate the substantially greater uncertainty involved with forecasting a moving target's range when using a high trajectory.  I mean, unless anyone feels like re-enacting this type of missile dodging, we will probably never know how practical it might be to speed up or slow down an approach.

Regarding protection from armour or shields, I think plenty has been written in earlier posts.  If after reading it you still believe that 5mm of plywood or a mail shirt will stop a longbow shaft then there is probably nothing I can add that will change your mind.  The only thing that I will mention yet one more time is that modern trials indicate that an arrow or crossbow bolt will tend to bounce of a flat plate if it hits any more than 20-40 degrees from the perpendicular.  Even with the flat trajectory example, I would expect that shields might deflect a reasonable number of missiles.  (Before anyone latches on to this, be aware that it is my view that the total number of hits at this range is so small, the handful saved by their shields is not that significant, but see earlier posts for the arguments behind this.)

However, the main point of the two diagrams and narrative was to examine the relative effect of plunging fire compared with a conventional direct fire approach.  Several posters contend that the former is substantially more effective than the latter, but I do not see how this can be the case.  If anyone has any evidence of modern trials, I would really be interested in hearing it.

[Jim Webster]

It strikes me that the main effect of 'dropping fire' would be to stir an enemy force into moving. If the target stays still, once the firing unit has the range then the target quite literally has to move or die slowly through attrition.
So they could either fall back out of range, or move forward. If the latter then they'll be subject to direct fire, and perhaps can be engaged in hand to hand combat under more favorable conditions

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

I have previously mentioned Hastings as a case where direct shooting proves ineffectual but indirect shooting (same target, same shooters, not sure about same distance) proves effective.

Regarding protection from armour or shields, I think plenty has been written in earlier posts.  If after reading it you still believe that 5mm of plywood or a mail shirt will stop a longbow shaft then there is probably nothing I can add that will change your mind.  The only thing that I will mention yet one more time is that modern trials indicate that an arrow or crossbow bolt will tend to bounce off a flat plate if it hits any more than 20-40 degrees from the perpendicular.  Even with the flat trajectory example, I would expect that shields might deflect a reasonable number of missiles.  (Before anyone latches on to this, be aware that it is my view that the total number of hits at this range is so small, the handful saved by their shields is not that significant, but see earlier posts for the arguments behind this.)

Unfortunately not all shields are 5mm plywood, not all armours are mail shirts and not all missiles are longbow arrows.  Some forms of protection are good at stopping certain missiles and some are not: the missile/protection interrelationship is a graded continuum and not a single one-size-fits-all entity.  This point could benefit from further and more detailed examination.

As I believe Nick's example of indirect shooting demonstrated, a volley of this nature that 'straddles' the target will obtain a reasonable percentage of hits.

As can be seen in the attached diagram, if the archers get the range right, they get a fair proportion of their arrows on the target.

Where we really appear to differ is in the estimation of speeds on the battlefield, particularly when closing at a distance.  Yes, Athenians at Marathon may well have maintained a speed in excess of 3m/s for a furlong or so while closing with the Persians: this was an innovation at the time but apparently a successful one.

And the famous Highland charge in the Jacobite risings (particularly 1745) was carried out at a very rapid pace, which disconcerted inexperienced troops (at Prestonpans) but provided excellent target practice for experienced soldiers (at Culloden).

However most armies appear to have closed comparatively slowly, not at a trot or a run.  Infantry usually tended to be concerned with keeping formation, staying level with their neighbours, carrying long, heavy standards, pikes, polearms or shields and generally trying to keep some breath in their bodies for the final charge to contact.  The Roman infantry in Ammianus advance to 'a slow anapestic rhythm', Spartans advance at a deliberate pace in time with flute music and the Cimmerians at Vercellae advanced in a huge square, allegedly with the front rank chained together.  The Helvetii at Bibracte advance slowly in close formation against Caesar's troops; conversely the allies of the Nervii at the Sambre dash into contact (for a distance of about a furlong) - and arrive breathless, to be defeated in short order.

[Erpingham]

However most armies appear to have closed comparatively slowly, not at a trot or a run.  Infantry usually tended to be concerned with keeping formation, staying level with their neighbours, carrying long, heavy standards, pikes, polearms or shields and generally trying to keep some breath in their bodies for the final charge to contact. 

Certainly true of medieval infantry, who rated cohesion and order higher than impetus.  They usually walked, not jogged,  into battle.

[aligern]

If they moved at all. Maybe it is a reason why defenders do so relatively well in mediaeval battles. Advancing a whole line of infantry several thousand strong is fraught at the best of times without the distractions of enemies shooting at you. Better to stay put with everyone in their place.
Roy

[Mark G]

perhaps, although the weapons must also have been a factor in the attack or defend decision - bowmen do tend to struggle in an infantry attack, and it takes a real sense of teamwork to get an attack with a long spear or pike.

not to mention the expectation for most of the period that the other side will charge with knights in full armour if you break formation.

[Erpingham]

If they moved at all. Maybe it is a reason why defenders do so relatively well in mediaeval battles. Advancing a whole line of infantry several thousand strong is fraught at the best of times without the distractions of enemies shooting at you. Better to stay put with everyone in their place.
Roy

As Jean le Bueil says
"A formation on foot ought not to march but should always wait for the enemy. For when they march they cannot maintain their order – it only takes a bush to break them up. A force which marches in front of another force is defeated, unless God gives them grace. So, take up the most advantageous position you can, as soon as you can."

Of course, both armies can't do this at the same time    Though some tried  (e.g. the non-battle at Tournahem in 1369, where the English and French faced each other from fortified hilltops for three weeks).

[Patrick Waterson]

All of which makes English archers so much more effective, e.g. against Scots who have taken up a solid defensive position on a hill in the best le Bueil tradition (Homildon Hill AD 1402).

[Erpingham]

All of which makes English archers so much more effective, e.g. against Scots who have taken up a solid defensive position on a hill in the best le Bueil tradition (Homildon Hill AD 1402).

Yes, it is a good question whether it was statistically correct as a predictor of victory Certainly, the English won few battles by just letting the enemy come onto them - there had to be some tactical skill in know when to manoeuver & when to counter attack and, of course, this had to develop further in the WotR.

[Patrick Waterson]

And by way of an interlude ...

Archery was a dangerous pastime, both for participants and spectators. Coroners' reports reveal 56 accidental deaths from people standing too close to the targets or those who decided on just the wrong time to go and collect the fired arrows.

There were also some bad judgement calls. Thomas Curteys of Bildeston, Suffolk, was practising archery on a fine June evening in 1556, when he took off his hat and invited another bowman called Richard Lyrence to try to hit it with an arrow. No prizes for what happened next.

Coroners even noted the depth of wounds. The unwanted record is held by a Nicholas Wyborne, who was lying down near a target when he was hit by a falling arrow, which pierced him to a depth of six inches.

From a recent BBC internet article on strange ways in which people managed to depart this mortal coil under the Tudors.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-13762313