The effects of missiles - how important were armour and shields?

[Mark G]

You are thinking of sphacteria, with spartans beaten py peltasts the recent osprey on it is quite good, but it is not as simple as 'shot up by psiloi'.

[Mark G]

I incline to believe that velites were there as much to acclimatise youngsters to battle (only 5-7 javs remember) as to be central to the battle plan.

[Erpingham]

I incline to believe that velites were there as much to acclimatise youngsters to battle (only 5-7 javs remember) as to be central to the battle plan.

I've always thought that velites have quite a few javelins by comparison to some others - 2 or 3 seems to be common (or is this just a convention among those who create reconstruction drawings?)

[Mark G]

I've seen the figures 5 and 7 used nist often, but nothing to support it.
The point is, not very many

[Patrick Waterson]

Regarding the effects of missile fire, the main protective factor that outweighs all others is that the shooters simply miss.  I mean there are plenty of examples in later periods when people were better at keeping detailed records of such things, including:

• During the British advance on Blenheim village a French brigade of 4,000 musketeers discharged their weapons at 30 yards, yet caused only 800 casualties.

Apparently at Blenheim many of the front-rank British troops took 2 or 3 shots each, so the hit rate may have been somewhat in excess of the kill rate.  Musketry hit rates are anyway perhaps not a good comparator for archery hit rates because of a) much shallower target formations and b) much more erratic missiles.  A classical archer or javelinman typically hit whomever he aimed at unless the target dodged or interposed a shield.  A musketeer shooting individually typically missed whomever he shot at.  If instead one looks at the hit rate for rifles against massed targets (Rorke's Drift is not a good example because a significant amount of ammunition was expended suppressing and picking off Zulu snipers on the hillside through much of the action, while the repulse of Zulu charges was by comparison brief and infrequent) one finds a disappointing lack of records being kept but one does see battlefield patterns changing (e.g. the difference in success between massed infantry attacks in the Napoleonic wars and in the Franco-Prussian War), and the point I am somewhat ramblingly trying to make is that when making such statistical evaluations one must consider the inherent accuracy of the weapon as this really matters in addition to the tactical circumstances.

In terms of wargames rules this is quite a key point.  Currently nearly all rules regard a shield as predominantly being a protection against missiles on the approach to the extent that troops lacking such protection can find it difficult even to make contact.  Of course, if one takes a view that it is has minimal value outside hand-to-hand combat then all sorts of armies start to be come more interesting.

Not to mention shieldless - but one then has to ask why so many armies, even those which dispensed with armour, felt a shield to be essential - especially in Biblical times, when the archer was the principal troop type.  Even if only one missile in 20 hits, an opponent who issues 20 missiles to each man in his force can land you in dead trouble ...

Another element to consider is the effectiveness of training of the respective troops.  At Munda (45 BC) Caesar's veteran legions attacked (uphill) against Pompey the Younger's comparatively raw troops.

"... when the javelins [pila] were thrown, vast numbers of the enemy were hit and fell in heaps."

The 'enemy' are the Pompeians.  One may surmise that Caesar's troops, after shooting, put their shields up and advanced, while their opponents, probably hurling their first volley of pila in anger, may have been watching to see how they landed, and neglected to cover themselves against the opposing volley already on the way.

[Nick Harbud]

In terms of wargames rules this is quite a key point.  Currently nearly all rules regard a shield as predominantly being a protection against missiles on the approach to the extent that troops lacking such protection can find it difficult even to make contact.  Of course, if one takes a view that it is has minimal value outside hand-to-hand combat then all sorts of armies start to be come more interesting.

Not to mention shieldless - but one then has to ask why so many armies, even those which dispensed with armour, felt a shield to be essential - especially in Biblical times, when the archer was the principal troop type.  Even if only one missile in 20 hits, an opponent who issues 20 missiles to each man in his force can land you in dead trouble ...

Another element to consider is the effectiveness of training of the respective troops.  At Munda (45 BC) Caesar's veteran legions attacked (uphill) against Pompey the Younger's comparatively raw troops.

Where possession of a shield requires additional points to be spent, then armies will be tailored in the most cost effective manner, but normally one should design the combat rules first and the points system last.  One can also look at many medieval troop types (not all of whom were clad in plate from head to foot, who dispensed with the shield.

Interestingly, DBM equates possession of a shield with morale/efficiency.  For example, it does not matter how fired up you might feel yourself to be as an Auxilia or Psiloi, if you do not possess a shield you are never going to be Superior or even Ordinary.

[aligern]

Interesting that Sphacteria and Carrhae are quoted as examples of skirmishing achieving high kill rates. There is also a Hellenistic battle where the battle cavalry of one wing are chased off and the phalanx is surrounded by skirmishers and surrenders.
I doubt that any of these examples says much about high kill rates by skirmishing. The surrenders occur because there is no hope of succour and the troops are being subjected to a low but constant rate of casualties. There is also the stress of constant risk because the victims have to be constantly alert to defend themselves against incoming.
That suggests to me that the effect of skirmishers in battle beyond Adrian's screening, covering and scouting is to degrade the enemy's resolve . This is unlikely to win the battle, but it hopefully gives your own close order troops an advantage when they come to handstrokes. As we generally agree, even melee does not kill that many of the enemy, but it reduces their cohesion to the point where they break and can be massacred.
Accurate representation of the moment of victory in a wargame is generally unsatisfactory. We can represent casualties rather easily by removing figures, but casualties are only a component of thenmechanism of victory. More important is what is going on in the heads of the opposing crowd , at what point do they decide that this is all so unwinnable and so risky that the danger of turning one's back is less than the risk of staying in the fight?
Generally casualties are only a component of that devision.
Roy

[valentinianvictor]

You make an interesting point Roy about what is the trigger point for when the troops collectively decide enough is enough and run off the battlef9ield.

The triggers for Late Roman troops appeared to be different to their 'barbarian' counterparts.

The barbarian tribesmen appeared to break either as a result of an unexpected threat coupled with a failure of a breakthrough of the Roman main battle line, as happened at Argentoratum, or the troops appetite to continue the fight waned the longer it went on (this may be linked to the barbarian troops not usually being paid to fight but being promised a share of any loot gathered afterwards. If the troops felt that the risk outweighed the benefits then this does seem to have triggered flight in several battles).

The Romans generally fought until dusk when they then used darkness as a cover for their flight, as happened at Ad Salices and Adrianople.

Mind you, this is straying off topic a a bit.

[Mark G]

I'm going to to challenge  sphacteria.
Its not a battle which demonstrates missile troops defeating heavy infantry.
It is a battle which is better thought of as a long siege, which culminated with troops (light troops)  scaling undefended cliffs to emerge in the rear of heavy infantry which were already engaged to the front.

Hence, its usefulness for this case, and for spartans surrendering in battle, is limited and couched in heavy caveats about singular situations

[Patrick Waterson]

One can also look at many medieval troop types (not all of whom were clad in plate from head to foot), who dispensed with the shield.

True, although unless they had decent armour their battlefield effectiveness in the presence of a strong missile force seems to have been rather muted.

What may be a valid point (in mine humble estimation) is that many mediaeval European armies began using crossbows as their primary missile weapon in the couple of centuries following the Crusades.  The traditional arrow-stopping shield seems to have been less than adequate against crossbows, and a tendency to carry polearms (requiring both hands for use) would militate against the use of shields.  For all that, if we look at mediaeval Italian armies, there was a distinct fondness for the pavisier, whose portable side-of-a-garden-shed type shield could stop crossbow bolts - and this seems to have been its principal function, because pavises were not really useful in melee combat.

Interesting that Sphacteria and Carrhae are quoted as examples of skirmishing achieving high kill rates. There is also a Hellenistic battle where the battle cavalry of one wing are chased off and the phalanx is surrounded by skirmishers and surrenders.

Ipsus?

I doubt that any of these examples says much about high kill rates by skirmishing. The surrenders occur because there is no hope of succour and the troops are being subjected to a low but constant rate of casualties. There is also the stress of constant risk because the victims have to be constantly alert to defend themselves against incoming.

While the kill rates per se are not particularly high or rapid, one should consider also the inacpacitation rates, which are somewhat higher.

" Thus many died, and the survivors also were incapacitated for fighting. And when Publius urged them to charge the enemy's mail clad horsemen, they showed him that their hands were riveted to their shields and their feet nailed through and through to the ground, so that they were helpless either for flight or for self defence. " - Plutarch, Life of Crassus, 25.6

Justin's point, however, is that had the targets declined to surrender they would have been annihilated by continuing missile shooting, just as Leonidas' bodyguard and their 700 Thespian allies were shot to death by Persian missilemen after refusing to surrender at Thermopylae.

I also suspect that Justin was referring to Iphicrates' gradual slaughter of most of a Spartan mora near Corinth in 394 BC rather than to Sphacteria.

We might note also the following episode:

"And finally, there were the slaves whom Marius had used as allies during the war and as body-guards of his tyranny. They had thus become powerful and rich, partly by the permission and under the orders of Marius, and partly through their lawless and violent treatment of their masters, whom they would slay, and then lie with their masters' wives, and outrage their masters' children. Such a state of things Sertorius felt to be unendurable, and therefore when the (ex-)slaves were all encamped together he had them shot down with javelins, and they were as many as four thousand in number." - Plutarch, Life of Sertorius, 5.5

That suggests to me that the effect of skirmishers in battle beyond Adrian's screening, covering and scouting is to degrade the enemy's resolve. This is unlikely to win the battle, but it hopefully gives your own close order troops an advantage when they come to handstrokes. As we generally agree, even melee does not kill that many of the enemy, but it reduces their cohesion to the point where they break and can be massacred.

Inclined to agree, given a normal battle where one side is not vastly superior in skirmisher types and does not have the terrain or situation to use them to advantage.  Adrian's point about different Roman and barbarian 'triggers' is also significant: the Romans seemed able to hang on as long as hope and discipline remained.  Barbarian armies were more inclined to be aggressive on the battlefield and more inclined to give up the fight if that aggression failed to produce a result - perhaps because they had only hope and not discipline, and that hope was invested in a clear victory which, when not materialising, proved rapidly discouraging.

Accurate representation of the moment of victory in a wargame is generally unsatisfactory. We can represent casualties rather easily by removing figures, but casualties are only a component of the mechanism of victory. More important is what is going on in the heads of the opposing crowd , at what point do they decide that this is all so unwinnable and so risky that the danger of turning one's back is less than the risk of staying in the fight?
Generally casualties are only a component of that decision.
Roy

As a very general observation, one might suggest that morale took a plunge when the unexpected - and adversely unexpected - occurred, or when that which was anticipated but dreaded became apparent.  Those who have studied Wars of the Roses battles will know the deadly effects of a cry of "Treason! Treason!" in the middle of fighting.  At Delium in 424 BC the Athenians were winning handily when a couple of Theban cavalry squadrons hove into view - and the Athenians jumped to the conclusion that a fresh army had arrived, panicked - and ran (and threw away their victory).

In the WRG rules, casualties were the trigger mechanism for practically everything, but post-battle recovery rules suggested that not many of the casualties were actual losses.  In essence, WRG rules used morale indicators but called them 'casualties', not least because at the time wargamers tended to be a bloodthirsty lot who loved seeing their opponents' figures removed.

How we represent this on the tabletop is tricky, because in theory the player's mind is substituting for that of the troops.  However the player is focussed on victory rather than self-preservation and will anyway make dispositions and take risks that few real-life army commanders would.

Ultimately we would seem to need a 'Real Morale Project' to study the triggers to various morale states and then how to weave these into conflict simulation rules.  Failing that, a 'Morale' thread in this forum might air some ideas ...

[Erpingham]

One can also look at many medieval troop types (not all of whom were clad in plate from head to foot), who dispensed with the shield.

True, although unless they had decent armour their battlefield effectiveness in the presence of a strong missile force seems to have been rather muted.

What may be a valid point (in mine humble estimation) is that many mediaeval European armies began using crossbows as their primary missile weapon in the couple of centuries following the Crusades.  The traditional arrow-stopping shield seems to have been less than adequate against crossbows, and a tendency to carry polearms (requiring both hands for use) would militate against the use of shields.  For all that, if we look at mediaeval Italian armies, there was a distinct fondness for the pavisier, whose portable side-of-a-garden-shed type shield could stop crossbow bolts - and this seems to have been its principal function, because pavises were not really useful in melee combat.

I think it is fair to say that pavises were a common response to archery in the Middle Ages.  Popular in Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Bohemia and even used by the Scots at Flodden.  One where the rule writer does need to acknowledge an effect, IMO.

I would concur about the lack of armour being an issue - English writers refer to the sufferings of "naked" i.e. unarmoured men under archery bombardment.  On two handed weapons, there is a trade off between having an effective melee weapon and protection going on.  What does it tell us about the relative importance of shooting v. melee as a battle decider?

Finally, to the list of shooting victories, one should add Humbleton/Homildon 1402.  The Scots took up a strong position on a hill, unfortunately in effective range of English archers.  They were slowly worn down and the one attempt to attack was too little too late.  Eventually morale went, the English mounted their horses and massacred the fugitives.  To pick up on a point made by Patrick, many more men were probably injured than killed by missiles.  Wounded men who would have survived in victory were likely to be killed in a rout - another reason for casualty disparity.

Failing that, a 'Morale' thread in this forum might air some ideas ...

Good idea, though I suspect we've had a go at this before.

[Mark G]

I've worked out the battle where the Spartans are shot down by peltasts etc that folk are referring to above.

Its Lechaeum

But as with Sphacteria (and I would argue the retreat from Syracuse also), its not as straightforward as 'Hoplites in battle shot to pieces'.

- actually, a comparison of the three might be interesting for an article -

anyway, its not in the Peloponnesian war, which is, to my mind, the very end point of classical hoplite v hoplite battles - by then the importance of peltasts and cavalry is well known and demonstrated, and there are very few big battles, and a lot more actions which you can't do with a phalanx.

Lechaeum is a generation later, and the key thing is that it mostly demonstrates idiocy on the part of the Spartan general (such stupidity that he could almost be a Roman Consul).

he splits off his cavalry from his infatnry in the face of the enemy, and sends the infantry alone (one Mora - @600 men) right across the front of the enemy forces holding Corinth.

a long and drawn out (as you would expect) encounter ensues with Spartan charges out failing to make contact and eventually the Spartans retreating to a hilltop. 

here they are still pretty fine if quite uncomfortable, but then they see the Athenian hoplites coming up - and that is when they run for it hoping to reach a series of boats about half a mile away which have been brought up for them to escape in, and that run is when they get cut down in large numbers (overall 250 / 600 casualties).

Wikipedia also mentions something about the cavalry returning to join them on the plain but refusing to charge away from the infantry, making itself worthless to the only job it needed to do - drive the peltasts (etc) off.

The Athenian hero here is iphirates - if that spurs anyone on to a thread on what the heck he was all about.

anyway, conclusion - no evidence here necessarily that the Spartan armour and shields failed in significant numbers so long as the formation held (which is after all the point of hoplite equipment - formation), but plenty of evidence about the importance of not having idiots in charge, and the dangers of running when faced with a faster enemy able to pursue.

I'm sure Pat will post the xenopon shortly if it has anything more of interest to tease out beyond that.

[Patrick Waterson]

From Xenophon's Hellenica IV.5.13 and following.  We start with the Athenians in Corinth noticing this force of 600 Spartans wandering around in their vicinity and sallying out to attack them.

But those in the city of the Corinthians, both Callias, the son of Hipponicus, commander of the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates, leader of the peltasts, when they descried the Lacedaemonians and saw that they were not only few in number, but also unaccompanied by either peltasts or cavalry, thought that it was safe to attack them with their force of peltasts. For if they should proceed along the road, they could be attacked with javelins on their unprotected side and destroyed; and if they should undertake to pursue, they with their peltasts, the nimblest of all troops, could easily escape the hoplites.

Note that the Spartan cavalry are currently escorting the men of Amyclae past Corinth; the Amyclaeans are en route to their Hyacinthia festival.  Once the Amyclaeans are out of danger, the cavalry will return.  Meanwhile, the cat is away and the mice come out to play.

[14] Having come to this conclusion, they led forth their troops. And Callias formed his hoplites in line of battle not far from the city, while Iphicrates with his peltasts attacked the Lacedaemonian regiment. Now when the Lacedaemonians were being attacked with javelins, and several men had been wounded and several others slain, they directed the shield-bearers to take up these wounded men and carry them back to Lechaeum; and these were the only men in the regiment who were really saved. Then the polemarch ordered the first ten year-classes to drive off their assailants.

This was the usual counter, and it has always worked before - and would work again.  It did not work this time because Iphicrates had warned his men to stay at long javelin cast and to start running as soon as the Spartans moved.

[15] But when they pursued, they caught no one, since they were hoplites pursuing peltasts at the distance of a javelin's cast; for Iphicrates had given orders to the peltasts to retire before the hoplites got near them; and further, when the Lacedaemonians were retiring from the pursuit, being scattered because each man had pursued as swiftly as he could, the troops of Iphicrates turned about, and not only did those in front again hurl javelins upon the Lacedaemonians, but also others on the flank, running along to reach their unprotected side. Indeed, at the very first pursuit the peltasts shot down nine or ten of them. And as soon as this happened, they began to press the attack much more boldly.

The Spartans were in an unenviable situation: if they carried on marching, they would lose men slowly but steadily.  If they charged to drive off the peltasts, they would lose men who were individually vulnerable while returning to the formation.

[16] Then, as the Lacedaemonians continued to suffer losses, the polemarch again ordered the first fifteen year-classes to pursue. But when these fell back, even more of them were shot down than at the first retirement.

In essence, the Spartans were doomed no matter what they did.  But then the cavalry arrived - and, on account of tactical ineptitude, failed to save the day.

And now that the best men had already been killed, the horsemen joined them, and with the horsemen they again undertook a pursuit. But when the peltasts turned to flight, at that moment the horsemen managed their attack badly; for they did not chase the enemy until they had killed some of them, but both in the pursuit and in the turning backward kept an even front with the hoplites.

This left the Spartans just as badly off as before.

And what with striving and suffering in this way again and again, the Lacedaemonians themselves kept continually becoming fewer and fainter of heart, while their enemies were becoming bolder, and those who attacked them continually more numerous.

Note the steep decline of Spartan morale under the unremitting shooting.  With nothing else working, the Spartans prepared for a famous last stand.

[17] Therefore in desperation they gathered together on a small hill, distant from the sea about two stadia, and from Lechaeum about sixteen or seventeen stadia.

Rescue - or the hope of rescue - came, ironically, from the sea.

And the men in Lechaeum, upon perceiving them, embarked in small boats and coasted along until they came opposite the hill.

The state of Spartan morale at that point can be judged from the following.

Then the troops, being now desperate, because they were suffering and being slain, while unable to inflict any harm themselves, and, besides this, seeing the Athenian hoplites also coming against them, took to flight. And some of them plunged into the sea, and some few made their escape with the horsemen to Lechaeum.

Ordinarily, the Spartans would have welcomed a clash against Athenian hoplites and gone to meet them with great joy.  Here the peltasts had so shattered their morale that they simply broke.  As at Sphacteria, the Spartans suffered a steady drain of physical casualties, but the greatest effect of Athenian missiles was on their morale.

One might incidentally point out that this period (c.395-371) did see large classic hoplite battles, Haliartus, the Nemea and Coronea all being fought within two years (395-394 BC).

[andrew881runner]

I Have always wondered... how can a missile kill a heavy hoplite? I mean, his chest is entirely covered by both shield and armor, he has greaves, helmet covering almost all his head... where would the javelin go to kill or wound badly the man? in the eyes? would it be able to Pierce bronze armor? thx. Same applies for arrows or slings.
Even if as I think, javelins were thrown not frontal ly but at an angle in order to overcome the shield wall, the only place where they could do damage was the right arm if this was uncovered by armor. Because the chest even in the sides was covered by armor (bronze or lined covered by bronze segments). I have never tested a javelin but I guess that it cannot Pierce bronze, am I right?

[Duncan Head]

Well, at Lechaeum, the Spartans were probably not that heavyily armoured - remember that at Sphakteria Thucydides says that the pilos would not stop arrows? And at Lechaeum, Xenophon tells us that they were shot in the unshielded flank: "and not only did those in front again hurl javelins upon the Lacedaemonians, but also others on the flank, running along to reach their unprotected side. Indeed, at the very first pursuit the peltasts shot down nine or ten of them".