The Battle of Chalons AD 451

[Patrick Waterson]

The Empire is Dead thread, one of our most prolific ever, has mutated into a discussion of Chalons, which we may as well continue here.

[Duncan Head]

Not the Chalons thread we've already got?.

[Justin Swanton]

Whilst awaiting a final decision, does anyone notice something curious about the placement of the Alans? Jordanes describes how untrustworthy Sangiban was, ready to surrender to Attila the moment he had a chance. He is placed by Aetius in the middle of the battleline:

Now Theodorid with the Visigoths held the right wing and Aëtius with the Romans the left. They placed in the centre Sangiban (who, as said before, was in command of the Alani), thus contriving with military caution to surround by a host of faithful troops the man in whose loyalty they had little confidence. For one who has difficulties placed in the way of his flight readily submits to the necessity of fighting.

As anyone who had done a little military history knows, if a contingent decides to quit the battlefield in the middle of a battle, nothing can stop it leaving - unless it has uncommitted loyal troops behind it. This is what cost Hasdrubal Dertosa. His centre, formed of Spanish troops, decamped the moment they were in spitting distance of the Romans, and there was nothing Hasdrubal could do about it since the rest of his army was already engaged. What would stop Sangiban doing the same? The only thing I can think of is a reserve force behind him. This is implied by Jordanes saying that he was surrounded 'by a host of faithful troops'.

Who were these faithful troops? When Attila has lost the fight for the ridge and decides to assault the Alans and Visigoths, he himself leads the Hunnic force that attacks the Alans. He succeeds at least in pushing them back whilst the Visigoths stand firm. This exposes his flank. The Visigoths however, are fully engaged in beating off a Hunnic/Ostrogothic attack. So where do they find enough strength to attack the Huns with such force that they nearly kill Attila himself? Detaching men already engaged in fighting a foe to attack another foe was not attempted in this period (in fact I can't think of any period in which it was attempted). And the man to command this ad hoc redeployment - Theodoric - was already dead.

The only thing that makes sense to me is that the Visigoths had a reserve force behind the Alans, or possibly behind the main Visigothic line. This force, there to keep the Alans in the fight, saw its chance when the Huns' advance left their flank exposed, and charged in:

(209) Here King Theodored, while riding by to encourage his army, was thrown from his horse and trampled under foot by his own men, thus ending his days at a ripe old age. But others say he was slain by the spear of Andag of the host of the Ostrogoths, who were then under the sway of Attila. This was what the soothsayers had told to Attila in prophecy, though he understood it of Aëtius. (210) Then the Visigoths, separating from the Alani, fell upon the horde of the Huns and nearly slew Attila.

[Patrick Waterson]

Not the Chalons thread we've already got?.

Good point - we have this one, that one and the Battle Day Chalons thread.  Post here for now and we shall see about transferring it.

[Patrick Waterson]

A thought about the following:

Adgrediamur igitur hostem alacres: audaciores sunt semper, qui inferunt bellum. Adunatas dispicite dissonas gentes: indicium pavoris est societate defendi. En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant. Nota vobis sunt quam sint levia Romanorum arma: primo etiam non dico vulnere, sed ipso pulvere gravantur, dum in ordine coeunt et acies testudineque conectunt. - Jordanes, Getica XXXIX/204

( Let us then attack the foe eagerly; for they are ever the bolder who make the attack. Despise this union of discordant races! To defend oneself by alliance is proof of cowardice. See, even before our attack they are smitten with terror. They seek the heights, they seize the hills and, repenting too late, clamor for protection against battle in the open fields. You know how slight a matter the Roman attack is. While they are still gathering in order and forming in one line with locked shields, they are checked, I will not say by the first wound, but even by the dust of battle.) - Mierow translation

Does anyone know if Jordanes was even aware of the Latin subjunctive?  I think what he is trying to convey in et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant is that if the Romans were to come down into the plains/on to the level ground they would soon repent of it and demand 'monitiones' - literally as written, this means 'warnings', but is universally and perhaps correctly assumed to be a Jordanic slip for 'munitiones', supports or fortifications.  In other words, the Romans are on the heights, but should they change their minds and come down onto the plain they would soon regret it.

This would mean that the reference to " ... they sought refuge for their lives, whom but a little while before no earthen walls could withstand." refers to the siege at Orleans, noting that in quibus paulo ante nullus poterat muralis agger obsistere agger muralis, a 'rampart of walls', is the subject of the sentence).  A more accurate translation might be that it took a 'mural rampart' (i.e. walls) to withstand the Huns, hence:

"... they sought refuge for their lives, [these men] whom but a little while before needed walls in order to withstand them [or could only be withstood from behind walls]."

This, if interpreted correctly, would mean that no field defences were actually erected on the battlefield but that (if 'monitiones' meant fortifications rather than supports) Attila and his men were happy to agree that the Romans would want them if they were to come down onto the level ground.


Justin raises an interesting point when he suggests that:

the Visigoths had a reserve force behind the Alans, or possibly behind the main Visigothic line. This force, there to keep the Alans in the fight, saw its chance when the Huns' advance left their flank exposed, and charged in:

"Then the Visigoths, separating from the Alani [dividentes se ab Alanis], fell upon the horde of the Huns and nearly slew Attila. But he prudently took flight and straightway shut himself and his companions within the barriers of the camp, which he had fortified with wagons." - Getica XL/210

'Fortified with wagons' is plaustris vallatum habebat, he had a fence of wagons.

We seem to have perhaps three contingents of Visigoths on the field: Thorismond on the left with Aetius, Theoderic on the right facing the Ostrogoths and this group deployed with the Alans which could 'separate from' the latter to deliver what seems to have been the decisive stroke of the battle.

[Justin Swanton]

The 'efflagitant' is in the indicative, which would, on the face of it, give the sense of the Romans here and now clamouring for fortifications on the level ground, 'clamouring' in the sense of frantically making them, which Attila interprets for his men as fear on the part of the Roman infantry.

It's the weekend, and I'm in a creative mood, so here is my suggested recreation of the battle. Anyone is welcome to shoot it down in flames (with reference to primary sources and archaeology of course  .... ).

1. Deployment.




2. Attila orders the Huns facing the Romans along with the Gepids to take the heights. They fail and are beaten back by the Romans and Auxilia under Aetius, and the Visigoths under Thorismud.




3. Whilst Attila harangues his men, the Roman infantry on the flat ground dig ramparts to blunt the anticipated Hunnic cavalry charge. The Alans and Visigoths move up to support the Romans.




4. Attila attacks the Alans and Visigoths under Theodoric. The Visigoths hold firm but the Huns drive the Alans back. The Visigothic reserve behind the Alans keeps step with their retreat, preventing them from breaking and running. The Roman fieldworks are outflanked the the Romans forced to give way. The Hunnic right wing moves up to pin the Romans, Auxilia and Visigoths, but does not engage them.




5. As the Alans continue to fall back, the commander of the Visigothic reserve realises he has a golden opportunity. He parts company with the Alans, gallops around to the exposed flank of the Hunnic centre and charges in, nearly killing Attila who is not far from that exposed flank. Attila retreats and game....I mean, battle, over.

[Patrick Waterson]

The 'efflagitant' is in the indicative, which would, on the face of it, give the sense of the Romans here and now clamouring for fortifications on the level ground, 'clamouring' in the sense of frantically making them, which Attila interprets for his men as fear on the part of the Roman infantry.

I had a look at the Getica entry in Wikipedia (for want of a better commentary) and it mentions there that Jordanes did use the indicative for the subjunctive, whether always or only on occasion not being clear:

Syntax. Case variability and loss of agreement in prepositional phrases (inter Danubium Margumque fluminibus), change of participial tense (egressi .. et transeuntes), loss of subjunctive in favor of indicative, loss of distinction between principal and subordinate clauses, confusion of subordinating conjunctions.

This would mean that at the time of Attila's speech the Romans were still on the ridge, but could descend whenever it suited them.  Assuming 'monitiones' indicates fortifications, we may still observe that Attila expected Aetius' troops to want to create defences, and hence to be accustomed to and capable of doing so.

[Justin Swanton]

Interesting reference to Jordanes' Latin. Given that the subjunctive for Jordanes had gone west, this line could be understood in the sense: 'On the plains they would - far too late - clamour for field defences.'

It's just the context that is a problem. Jordanes has Attila telling his men what the Romans are doing that shows them to be not all that formidable:

En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant. Behold, before our attack they are already filled with fear: they seek the heights, they take the hills and, when it is too late, they clamour for defences in the fields.

This gives the impression of what the Romans are actually doing, as opposed to what they might do in different circumstances.

[aligern]

Unfortunately the simplest way of reading that the Visigoths separate from the Alans is that they are in line with them and when the Alans are pushed back the Visigoths separate from them by going forward, driving back the Ostrogoths and attacking the Huns.
If the Visigoths have a reserve placed behind the Alans we might expect it to be mentioned when we are told that the Alans are placed in the middle in case they think of deserting.

How would the passage about the Romans read if what was being said referred to the Roman forces having hid in the cities whilst Attila tramped around Gaul taking cities, none of which (supposedly) had been able to resist his army.

Roy

[Justin Swanton]

Unfortunately the simplest way of reading that the Visigoths separate from the Alans is that they are in line with them and when the Alans are pushed back the Visigoths separate from them by going forward, driving back the Ostrogoths and attacking the Huns.

This is possible. The Visigoths rout the Ostrogoths in short order, sending them packing, then turn and charge the Huns in the flank/rear who are still being held up by the Alans.

Jordanes' text is too vague to decide either way. He mentions that Theodoric is trampled by his own men whilst riding to and fro, encouraging his army:

Hic Theodoridus rex dum adhortans discurrit exercitum, equo depulsus pedibusque suorum conculcatus vitam maturae senectutis conclusit. This king Theodoric, riding to and fro encouraging his army, was thrown from his horse and trampled by the feet of his own men, ending a life in ripe old age.

If one can deduce anything from this line, it is the sense that the Visigoths were locked in combat and not immediately carrying everything before them, requiring that the king go about bolstering the resolve of his men. The desperate fighting that Jordanes describes in the previous sentences suggests that the battle was - for some time at least - an indecisive affair. Would that leave the Visigoths time to send off the Ostrogoths and then turn on the Huns before they routed the Alans?

If the Visigoths have a reserve placed behind the Alans we might expect it to be mentioned when we are told that the Alans are placed in the middle in case they think of deserting.

The point though is that nothing would have prevented the Alans from leaving the battlefield if there were no loyal troops behind them - plenty of examples of that from other battles. The text from Jordanes says that the Alans were surrounded by faithful troops:

Dextrum itaque cornum cum Vesegothis Theoderidus tenebat, sinistrum Aetius cum Romanis, conlocantes in medio Sanguibanum, quem superius rettulimus praefuisse Alanis, providentes cautioni militari, ut eum, de cuius animo minus praesumebant, fidelium turba concluderent. Now Theodorid with the Visigoths held the right wing and Aëtius with the Romans the left. They placed in the centre Sangiban (who, as said before, was in command of the Alani), thus contriving with military caution to surround by a host of faithful troops the man in whose loyalty they had little confidence.

The verb concludo means to shut up, enclose, confine, surround, encompass. The implication is that Sangiban had allied troops all around him, not just the sides but the rear too, leaving him no choice but to fight the Huns.

How would the passage about the Romans read if what was being said referred to the Roman forces having hid in the cities whilst Attila tramped around Gaul taking cities, none of which (supposedly) had been able to resist his army.

I see the bit about the Romans and their field fortifications as happening then and there on the battlefield. Jordanes gives a nice parallel later with the Huns' own field defences, behind which they shelter, having a short time previously overcome those of their adversaries. It seems to make more sense in the context of the battle rather than referring to earlier, separate events.

[aligern]

For Thoderid to be trampled by his own men would imply that he is out in front of them . If we imagine the battle as being a bit like the  scenes in LotR where the Rohirrim charge then there is a point at which, seeing the giant elephants  advancing towards them, the King of Rohan, Theoden, makes a second exhortation to his men to turn their front and attack the pachyderms. Just such a victory to the front, then pause, speech and fresh attack would fit quite nicely.

Roy

[Justin Swanton]

For Thoderid to be trampled by his own men would imply that he is out in front of them . If we imagine the battle as being a bit like the  scenes in LotR where the Rohirrim charge then there is a point at which, seeing the giant elephants  advancing towards them, the King of Rohan, Theoden, makes a second exhortation to his men to turn their front and attack the pachyderms. Just such a victory to the front, then pause, speech and fresh attack would fit quite nicely.

Roy

Could be. Jordanes wasn't there on a nice high vantage point with a video camera, so it is difficult to push his text too far. In the phrase: Theodoridus rex dum adhortans discurrit exercitum the interesting word is 'discurrit'. Discurro means 'to run in different directions', 'to run to and fro', 'to run about'. In this context it carries the idea of a mobile king moving around encouraging a static army, which makes sense if he runs around in the rear. The idea then is that he exhorts his men from the back of the line. At a critical point the part of his army where he is is pushed back (cavalry warfare is very mobile) and the king falls from his horse, getting trampled by his men. In the confusion nobody notices - the Visigoths in falling back lose sight of the king's body. The Visigoths carry on fighting, eventually driving the Ostrogoths back. It seems difficult to conceive the king running around in front of his army that had already engaged the enemy. Stopping in one place and pausing to give a speech during a momentary lull, yes. Moving backwards and forwards along the ranks, mmm.....

[aligern]

The cavalry warfare of the period is quite mobile Justin. People advance and retreat. Also the Visigoths fight two actions her so there is a forward and probably flanking movement here. I doubt that he was behind his men...not the Visigothic way.
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

It's the weekend, and I'm in a creative mood, so here is my suggested recreation of the battle. Anyone is welcome to shoot it down in flames (with reference to primary sources and archaeology of course  .... ).

1. Deployment.

Rather than opening up with cannon from the six-o-clock position, a couple of thoughts about the Roman side of the deployment.

1) Should the Auxilia be a separate contingent?
2) Should the Roman line extend beyond the high ground?

1) My impression of a Late Roman deployment is that the auxilia and legiones would tend to go in front with archers and some reserve auxilia and/or legiones behind in a second line, or some variation on this theme.   Judging by Argentoratum, our most detailed Late Roman lineup (in Ammianus XVI.12) even if a century earlier, the auxilia and legiones were not deployed side by side in separate contingents but as an integrated line.

It would also make more sense (at least to my eye) for the Roman infantry to stay on the high ground until everyone was committed and then begin their ponderous swing into the thick of the fray.  Infantry tend to be left high and dry in a cavalry battle, and the Alans would be the obvious choice to handle the level ground next to the ridge.

2) The impression I get from Jordanes is that Aetius takes the high ground and Attila describes him as being there:

En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant. Behold, before our attack they are already filled with fear: they seek the heights, they take the hills and, when it is too late, they clamour for defences in the fields.

Jordanes ignorance of or indifference to the subjunctive leaves one wondering if he has altered the sense of Cassiodorus - assuming he is using Cassiodorus' description - or struggling to express in Latin a concept that might have been a challenge for Old German and perhaps also for Hunnic.

That the Romans are on the heights (tumulos capiunt, they take the heights) seems certain: Attila disingenuously attributes Aetius' motive for taking the high ground to fear, whereas in fact it makes good tactical sense and this is simply sour grapes being presented as garnish because Attila did not manage to take them.  The problem with taking Jordanes' 'in campos monitiones efflagitant' (on the plain they demand supports/defences) to mean Roman troops are on the level ground is that they cannot be in two places at the same time.

Assuming that some Romans were on the heights and some on the low ground is plausible, but that would suggest some Romans not being 'fearful' enough to take themselves off to the high ground in the first place, an inconsistency which would not be lost upon Attila's listeners.

One could hypothesise that Aetius, having taken the heights, had advanced his leading line onto level ground and that they were now clamouring for protection, though this seems strange conduct for troops that Jordanes has just referred to as being 'the flower of the Roman army'.  For what it is worth, I take Attila's remark as a disparaging reference to the Roman custom of constructing a fortified camp instead of having a proper wagon laager as real men born in the saddle (despite the gynaecological impossibility) do with the aim of getting his men to commit to the fight in the remainder of the field and ignore rather than worry about the successful Romans and the defeated Gepids.

On another peripherally related point, does anyone have the impression  that Aetius may have been short of cavalry?  Jordanes' Attila refers to the line of shields denoting the presence of the Roman army but not to Roman cavalry, and if Thorismund was on the same wing as Aetius for reasons other than providing Aetius with a conveniently-reached hostage to encourage Theodred's good behaviour then one of those reasons would probably be to bulk up the left flank mounted contingent.

Then again, if the Alans were truly 'surrounded' by loyal troops, maybe this is what the Roman cavalry were doing.  Speculation, certainly, but can we come to any conclusion about how much 'Roman' cavalry Aetius may have deployed?

[Justin Swanton]

Rather than opening up with cannon from the six-o-clock position, a couple of thoughts about the Roman side of the deployment.

1) Should the Auxilia be a separate contingent?
2) Should the Roman line extend beyond the high ground?

1) My impression of a Late Roman deployment is that the auxilia and legiones would tend to go in front with archers and some reserve auxilia and/or legiones behind in a second line, or some variation on this theme.   Judging by Argentoratum, our most detailed Late Roman lineup (in Ammianus XVI.12) even if a century earlier, the auxilia and legiones were not deployed side by side in separate contingents but as an integrated line.

True. Take the Roman-Auxilia part of the deployment as merely an indication of where they were in relation to the rest of the army.  Given the size of the forces involved (if we believe the recorded numbers), one imagines that there would be deployment in depth following the command limitations in deploying too wide. Hence more than one line. One can remark that command cohesion fell apart in any case as the battle progressed.

It would also make more sense (at least to my eye) for the Roman infantry to stay on the high ground until everyone was committed and then begin their ponderous swing into the thick of the fray.  Infantry tend to be left high and dry in a cavalry battle, and the Alans would be the obvious choice to handle the level ground next to the ridge.

There doesn't seem to have been much swinging on the part of the Romans. They just advance to the ridge and then keep advancing until they reach Attila's camp, which Thorismud mistakenly enters.

Assuming that some Romans were on the heights and some on the low ground is plausible, but that would suggest some Romans not being 'fearful' enough to take themselves off to the high ground in the first place, an inconsistency which would not be lost upon Attila's listeners.

Unless Attila is affirming that the Roman infantry will face the Huns in the open only when the terrain is in their favour, but will not dare to face them on level ground without digging earthenwork defences to bolster their inability to withstand a Hunnic cavalry charge.

One could hypothesise that Aetius, having taken the heights, had advanced his leading line onto level ground and that they were now clamouring for protection, though this seems strange conduct for troops that Jordanes has just referred to as being 'the flower of the Roman army'.  For what it is worth, I take Attila's remark as a disparaging reference to the Roman custom of constructing a fortified camp instead of having a proper wagon laager as real men born in the saddle (despite the gynaecological impossibility) do with the aim of getting his men to commit to the fight in the remainder of the field and ignore rather than worry about the successful Romans and the defeated Gepids.

Jordanes' en implies that Attila is referring to what the Romans are doing then and there in full view of his listeners. For me it rather forces the text to have the field defences refer to a fortified camp that the Romans made the day before and were quite happy to leave in order to confront the Huns.

On another peripherally related point, does anyone have the impression  that Aetius may have been short of cavalry?  Jordanes' Attila refers to the line of shields denoting the presence of the Roman army but not to Roman cavalry, and if Thorismund was on the same wing as Aetius for reasons other than providing Aetius with a conveniently-reached hostage to encourage Theodred's good behaviour then one of those reasons would probably be to bulk up the left flank mounted contingent.

Yes I did notice that. In the discussion on the late Roman army in Gaul, I think it was Jim who pointed out that it costs far less to create and equip one infantryman than one cavalryman. When not on campaign infantry are quite adequate for manning forts and towns. Cavalry are needed only for the actual battles which in fact are few and far between. This would explain why Aetius, rather strapped for resources, relied on barbarian cavalry for campaign work, calling out his infantry only in a supreme crisis.[/quote]

Then again, if the Alans were truly 'surrounded' by loyal troops, maybe this is what the Roman cavalry were doing.  Speculation, certainly, but can we come to any conclusion about how much 'Roman' cavalry Aetius may have deployed?

It's possible that the troops at the rear were Roman mounted, though it seems neater to suppose they were the Visigoths who separated from the Alans and charged Attila. But we are speculating here.

On Aetius's lack of Roman cavalry, do any of the sources mention what cavalry units were extant in the course of the 5th century? There were the Taifali and the Sarmatians. Any others?