The Battle of Chalons AD 451

[Patrick Waterson]

Jordanes' en implies that Attila is referring to what the Romans are doing then and there in full view of his listeners. For me it rather forces the text to have the field defences refer to a fortified camp that the Romans made the day before and were quite happy to leave in order to confront the Huns.

My point is that Attila is not referring to anything that happened on that day, the previous day or at any other time, but was saying that if the Romans leave their nice comfy hills then they will want to dig themselves in, and the ungrammatical Jordanes had no way to express this except through misapplication of the indicative.  In this understanding the 'en' (lo!) refers only to the fact that the Romans have seized the heights.  My reading of this is that Attila is trying to fool his troops into believing that the Romans are not a threat (notice that Attila's disparagement of them is not followed by an injunction to attack them) in order to encourage the Huns to get stuck into the Alans and (interestingly in view of what Jordanes says about Visigoths later separating from the Alans) Visigoths.  In theory the Visigoths should have been fronted by the Ostrogoths, so this might be evidence of Visigoths present in the sector of the Alans.

On Aetius's lack of Roman cavalry, do any of the sources mention what cavalry units were extant in the course of the 5th century? There were the Taifali and the Sarmatians. Any others?

I am not aware of any mention, so anyone's guess is as good as mine.  It is just that I would have expected Attila to put in a disparaging remark about the Roman cavalry had they been on view - then again, with the Roman infantry on a ridge the cavalry might simply have been out of sight behind them.

[Justin Swanton]

Taking another look at that line:

En ante impetum nostrum terroribus iam feruntur, excelsa quaerunt, tumulos capiunt et sera paenitudine in campos monitiones efflagitant. Behold, before our attack they are already filled with fear: they seek the heights, they take the hills and, when it is too late, they clamour for defences in the fields.

The Romans don't actually build the field defences, they just feel a sudden need for them when it is too late to make them. The sense of this is that the Roman infantry find themselves on the level ground - just where they don't want to be when confronted by Huns - and are desperate to do something about it.

How does one interpret this? I propose that once the fight for the high ground was concluded, it became necessary for the rest of the army to move up in support of the advanced Roman left flank. This left Roman infantry on the level ground next to the ridge. Attila attributes to them fear at being in a position where they are at a disadvantage against cavalry. Normally Roman foot would have dug field fortifications at deployment before the battle started and stayed behind them, as did Belisarius's men at Dara. This time, though, the advance has left them exposed, as Attila points out to his men, soft targets for a nice bit of envelopment once the Alans and Visigoths are dispatched.

[Patrick Waterson]

Which still leaves open the question of why the nice soft targets are sedulously avoided instead of being gobbled up - it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree.

[Jim Webster]

Does show a lack on initiative on the part of Attila if he let the Romans advance and dig field defences and just watched them

Jim

[Duncan Head]

... it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree.

Oh, come on - we have no really reliable information about numbers at Chalons: we don't know how many men either side had. Anything we think we know about whether Attila had enough manpower to do anything is little more than guesswork.

[Patrick Waterson]

... it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree.

Oh, come on - we have no really reliable information about numbers at Chalons: we don't know how many men either side had. Anything we think we know about whether Attila had enough manpower to do anything is little more than guesswork.

We do not know the OBs of each side beyond the names of the contingents, true, but as Aetius had already by Jordanes' account repulsed the Hunnic wing (whether composed of Huns, Gepids or others) that sought to regain the heights, we can surmise that frontages were more or less matched, especially as neither side (in Jordanes' account) expressed concerns about being outnumbered or surrounded.

We can thus reasonably conclude that neither side had a massive numerical advantage nor a significantly shorter line, although Attila does seem to have considered himself at a disadvantage.  While the absolute numbers on each side are impossible to pin down, the relative strengths seem comparable with perhaps an edge in favour of Aetius' coalition.  Hence the operational courses of action available to a force with an opponent of similar strength would seem to be open to Attila, including holding with his left and centre while attacking on the right.

[Duncan Head]

Not really. An unknown part of the Roman and Visigoth army had repulsed an unknown part of Attila's army - not necessarily a "Hunnic wing". We can't safely deduce anything from that about relative strengths.

[Justin Swanton]

Which still leaves open the question of why the nice soft targets are sedulously avoided instead of being gobbled up - it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree.

Can we assume that the Roman infantry could repulse a frontal cavalry charge by the Huns but could not withstand being flanked by them? That means that Attila had to get rid of the Visigoths and Alans first before helping himself to the unprotected Roman line. Granted the Hunnic cavalry could melee, I don't think they had the weight of cataphracts, able to attack formed heavy infantry frontally.

With the conclusion that a slope stops cavalry from charging effectively, enabling infantry to withstand them even if flanked.

[Patrick Waterson]

Not really. An unknown part of the Roman and Visigoth army had repulsed an unknown part of Attila's army - not necessarily a "Hunnic wing". We can't safely deduce anything from that about relative strengths.

But the lack of mention of one side being substantially outnumbered or 'outwinged' (in the charming 18th century term) deployment-wise means we can.  More probably than not, anyway, assuming that Cassiodorus' descriptive skills were up to the basics and Jordanes' paraphrasing did not include significant omissions.

Can we assume that the Roman infantry could repulse a frontal cavalry charge by the Huns but could not withstand being flanked by them?

This seems a reasonable assumption.

That means that Attila had to get rid of the Visigoths and Alans first before helping himself to the unprotected Roman line. Granted the Hunnic cavalry could melee, I don't think they had the weight of cataphracts, able to attack formed heavy infantry frontally.

Less sure about Attila having to get rid of the Alans and Visigoths first - if the Romans were on the flat and, in theory, vulnerable, the way to eat them up from the flanks would be to deprive them of their immediate cavalry supports - Aetius' mounted troops and Thorismund's contingent - rather than to launch the Hunnic army's main strength into an uncertain engagement against the Visigoths and Alans.  Hence, to me at least, simply holding the Alans and Visigoths while concentrating on the Romans' cavalry support (perhaps this is what Jordanes meant by 'monitiones'?) would be the best and fastest way to render the Roman infantry vulnerable, especially as help would be unlikely to be provided by the allied centre, consisting as it did of the apparently reluctant Alans.

With the conclusion that a slope stops cavalry from charging effectively, enabling infantry to withstand them even if flanked.

Again, eminently reasonable, as I am sure Duke William would have agreed at Hastings.  Perhaps a good reason for Aetius to stay on the ridge until the main Hunnic contingents were committed elsewhere?

[aligern]

interesting, but a huge amount of interpretation there, building assumption on assumption:-)) The account looks much more. as though Attila. was going to match Aetius all along the line and try and break through in the centre where he was matching his best troops, the Hun cavalry, against the Alans who were of uncertain motivation.
That would have enabled him to swing right and left against the Visigoths and the Roman federates.

The advantage that the allies had gained through holding the Hill, was just that, the hill itself, as rising ground would take the sting out f a cavalry charge and give infantry confidence.


That's much more the sort of limited plan with the best troops under  direct command that fits with Early Mediaeval armies.

Roy

[Duncan Head]

Not really. An unknown part of the Roman and Visigoth army had repulsed an unknown part of Attila's army - not necessarily a "Hunnic wing". We can't safely deduce anything from that about relative strengths.

But the lack of mention of one side being substantially outnumbered or 'outwinged' (in the charming 18th century term) deployment-wise means we can.  More probably than not, anyway, assuming that Cassiodorus' descriptive skills were up to the basics and Jordanes' paraphrasing did not include significant omissions.

So you've now dropped the idea that the fight for the hill tells us something about numbers, and fallen back on the narrative as a whole? OK, frontages seems to have been broadly equivalent. (But were depths, especially if the Alans needed a "reliable" second line behind them?) To go from that plausible (but, for at least the reasons you mention, hypothetical) deduction to "it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree" seems to me to be a large step too far.

[Patrick Waterson]

But why?  The Ostrogoths faced off the Visigoths, which was essentially going to happen no matter what anyone else did, and that pretty much covers the left flank.  The Alans, whose enthusiasm seems to have been suspected by everyone involved, could have been held without much effort, possibly even with a skirmish screen if need be (risky, but if playing for dominion of the known world, risks can be taken).  That the Hunnish right which was repulsed from the heights was substantial enough to deserve the apellation of a 'wing' we can adduce from Jordanes' description:

Attila suos diriget, qui cacumen montis invaderent, sed a Thorismundo et Aetio praevenitur, qui eluctati collis excelsa ut conscenderent, superiores effecti sunt, venientesque Hunnos montis benificio facile turbaverunt. - Getica XXXVIII/201

(Attila sent his men to take the summit of the mountain, but was outstripped by Thorismud and Aëtius, who in their effort to gain the top of the hill reached higher ground and through this advantage of position easily routed the Huns as they came up.)

Points to note are that a force (of 'suos', his men) was sent by Attila himself to gain the high ground, which implies a considerable force committed to an objective seen as important, and that when they were repulsed Attila felt he had to restore the fighting spirit of his troops by a speech after the battle had begun.  This points to a significant setback for a significant portion of the Hunnic army.

So you've now dropped the idea that the fight for the hill tells us something about numbers, and fallen back on the narrative as a whole?

Not sure I ever aired the idea that it did tell us about numbers, only relative strengths/capabilities.

OK, frontages seems to have been broadly equivalent. (But were depths, especially if the Alans needed a "reliable" second line behind them?) To go from that plausible (but, for at least the reasons you mention, hypothetical) deduction to "it is not as if the Huns lacked the manpower to stand off the Alans and Visigoths while having themselves a nice Roman entree" seems to me to be a large step too far.

One wonders why 'a large step' and particularly why 'too far'.  Attila's army seems to have drawn up facing the entire Romano-Alano-Gothic frontage, or as close to it as makes no odds, and do not seem to have stretched themselves in the process.  That Aetius' coalition may have drawn up in greater depth along at least part of the front is indeed likely, particularly if the Alans were 'surrounded' using a second line of reliable troops.  However this use of troops to buttress Alan fidelity would simply remove from the reckoning the surplus forces on Aetius' side without adding any corresponding offensive potential to the Alans, who would be less able to run off rather than more likely to attack (in the actual battle it would seem that the Huns took the attack to the Alans).

Hence it seems eminently reasonable to me that Attila could have committed significantly less force than he did against the Alans and not suffered for it, leaving him with more to use against the Romans.

This point originally grew from trying to interpret whether Jordanes' Attila speech was describing Romans deployed in the flat country who were clamouring for defences (or supports) or simply saying that if they came down to flat country they would be clamouring for defences/supports.  The latter seems to me much more likely, as to have failed to attack an opponent whose morale was faltering and whose situation was disadvantageous would have marked Attila down as one of history's rather less capable generals.

That apart, I think we generally agree that for as long as the Romans held the heights (as opposed to venturing into the plain), they would be pretty much proof against anything Attila could throw at them.

[rodge]

A little information (albeit in panegyric form) on what Aetius brought with him from Italy.
In essence: Aetius arrived from Italy with a force of auxiliaries expecting to meet up with the Goths.
There is no mention of legions with him (although they are mentioned as being in Italy).
[Sidonius, Carmina 7.329]

"Aetius had scarce left the Alps, leading a thin, meagre force of auxiliaries without legionaries, vainly with ill-starred confidence expecting that the Gothic host would join his camp. But tidings came that struck the leader with dismay; in their own land were the Goths awaiting the Huns, a foe they now almost despised. Perplexed, he turned over every plan, and his mind was beset with surging cares. At length in his wavering heart was formed the fixed resolve to make appeal to a man of high estate ; and before an assemblage of all the nobles he thus began to plead : 'Avitus, saviour of the world, to whom it is no new glory to be besought by Aetius, thou didst wish it, and the enemy no longer does harm; thou wishest it, and he does good. All those thousands thou dost keep within bounds by thy nod; thine influence alone is a barrier-wall to the Gothic peoples; ever hostile to us, they grant peace to thee. Go, display the victorious eagles; bring it to pass, O noble hero, that the Huns, whose flight aforetime shook us, shall by a second defeat be made to do me service.'  Thus he spake, and Avitus consenting changed his prayer into hope. Straightway he flies thence and rouses up the Gothic fury that was his willing slave. Rushing to enroll their names, the skin-clad warriors began to march behind the Roman trumpets; those barbarians feared the name of ' pay-docked soldiers,' [dirutus, 'bankrupt' or 'overthrown'] dreading the disgrace, not the loss. These men Avitus swept off to war, Avitus even thus early the world's hope, though now (or still) a plain citizen. Even so the bird of Phoebus, when bearing the cinnamon to his pyre on the Eryrthraean hill, rouses all the common multitude of birds; the obedient throng hies to him, and the air is too narrow to give their wings free play."

[Justin Swanton]

One needs to keep in mind that this is a panegyric. St Augustine, on the subject of panegyrics, said: "I lied, and was applauded by those who knew I lied." (somewhere in Confessions). In this passage, Sidonius is playing up the role of Avitus at Chalons, which consisted of persuading the Visigoths to join up with Aetius. To this effect he mentions that Aetius came from Italy with a few troops, and then conveniently omits the fact that Aetius also had the aid of Gallic Roman troops, a host of Auxilia, the Alans and other barbarians. You have to take him with a pinch of salt.

[rodge]

One needs to keep in mind that this is a panegyric. St Augustine, on the subject of panegyrics, said: "I lied, and was applauded by those who knew I lied." (somewhere in Confessions). In this passage, Sidonius is playing up the role of Avitus at Chalons, which consisted of persuading the Visigoths to join up with Aetius. To this effect he mentions that Aetius came from Italy with a few troops, and then conveniently omits the fact that Aetius also had the aid of Gallic Roman troops, a host of Auxilia, the Alans and other barbarians. You have to take him with a pinch of salt.

Yes Justin. I am aware of all that.
Whilst Sidonius is bending facts there are facts there to be bent.
Don't be too hasty to dismiss this.