Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Duncan Head]

Precisely the question we have been discussing earlier in this thread.    Macedonian cavalry and infantry both used a long spear-like weapon; the cavalry weapon was usually termed a xyston, and the infantry weapon a sarissa, but while we can be fairly sure that the infantry did not use the xyston, we are less sure that the cavalry xyston was not on occasion referred to as a sarissa (Plutarch uses 'sarissa' - actually 'sarisa', the Greek spelling - in his account in the Life of Pelopidas).

Well, Patrick is less sure. 

[aligern]

A tenth century Byzantine manual, from memory Ouranos, describes the use of the menaulion, a thick spear used by squads of men designed to stop cataphract charges. They are needed because the nirmal spears of the infantry are too thin and shatter ot impact with the armoured horses. That implies that until they wrre facing armoured horses the Byzantine spears had been sufficient.

The examples referred to earlier may all have involved the front rank horses at least beng protected and thus able the push into the spear ranks.
Roy

[Jim Webster]

I have to hold my hand up Patrick and say that I have always been in the "horses wont charge closely packed men with big pointy sticks" camp. Do we have any historical manuals dealing with this kind of situation?

Alas my limited knowledge does not extent to any manuals detailing such matters; there are however quite a few instances, mostly in the Middle Ages, where horses (with men on them) do charge close-packed infantry formations which are bristling with lots of long, pointy sticks - and appear to think it nothing out of the ordinary.  The problem often seems to be holding them back, not getting them to do it.

Granted, horses by themselves (without a rider) are extremely unlikely to do this kind of thing.  But if a ridden horse has been trained to do so, and nothing untoward has happened to it yet, it really has no reason not to.

Another issue may be the horse armour. Not merely that horse armour made it easier for horses to penetrate infantry formations without dying but that a lot had eye protection (or blinkers worn under the armour as part of the bridle) which may have ensured that the horse hadn't a lot of idea about what it was getting into anyway.

Jim

[Erpingham]

I have to hold my hand up Patrick and say that I have always been in the "horses wont charge closely packed men with big pointy sticks" camp. Do we have any historical manuals dealing with this kind of situation?

Alas my limited knowledge does not extent to any manuals detailing such matters; there are however quite a few instances, mostly in the Middle Ages, where horses (with men on them) do charge close-packed infantry formations which are bristling with lots of long, pointy sticks - and appear to think it nothing out of the ordinary.  The problem often seems to be holding them back, not getting them to do it.

Granted, horses by themselves (without a rider) are extremely unlikely to do this kind of thing.  But if a ridden horse has been trained to do so, and nothing untoward has happened to it yet, it really has no reason not to.

I'm with Patrick on this one - trained horses and determined men on them will tangle with lines of shouting men with pointed sticks.  It was a poor medieval man-at-arms who, when told to charge close-order infantry, gave the answer  "my horse won't do it" and I can't see it going down any better with Macedonian elite cavalry either.  Exactly what went on at impact is, of course, an interesting question.  I've recently been involved in a discussion about 16th century cavalry where one side insisted they would never charge a pike block frontally, which can be disproved easily enough, but there were follow on discussions about whether the horse was used as a battering ram to break into formation at a gallop.  Other than Polish Hussars (who make western men-at-arms appear like wimps in the self-belief stakes), evidence seemed lacking.  Contact seems to have been at a more controlled and intended to make gaps which could be exploited. 

[Patrick Waterson]

Thanks Patrick.

I guess my next question would be if the cavalry are "charging home" into formed infantry, isnt there a danger of being unseated whilst trying to engage with their xystons or is there an assumption that the mass of the horse and rider is being used? Would the xyston be held overhand ready to thrust down rather than "couched" if a full frontal impact against infantry was being employed?

Just trying to visualize it

The way I see it is yes, the xyston would be used overhand, double-handed, with most of the weapon pointing out and slightly down ahead of the horse and rider.  The net result of the moment of forces at impact would be to hold the rider more firmly in his seat.

The idea for the xyston-using cavalryman would be to put his point into the head or neck of the infantry opponent, which would both do the target serious injury and bowl him over, retaining momentum while rendering the foe instantly hors de combat.  A quick-reacting infantry target would get his shield up in time to take the blow, but this would merely smash the shield rim into his helmet or face, stunning him (or worse) and knocking him over just the same.  Hence I see a Macedonian cavalry wedge knocking down infantry opponents like skittles as long as they could keep their momentum (men on the inside of the wedge could look out for opportunities to put their points into downed but still-moving opponents).  If they were ever brought to a halt things could get sticky, as they would be reduced to thrusts at the opponent without momentum behind them.

[Imperial Dave]

Thanks Patrick that is the way I would see it if I had to surmise. All we need to do now is get hold of a couple of hundred re-enactors to test out the theory!

[Ian61]

Having read through this strand I keep seeing in my mind that moment at the end of the film version of 'The Two Towers' where the Rohirrim cavalry charge down-slope at the upraised spears of the Uruk-hai and thinking 'How come most aren't being skewered?'. 
To go back to original question about rules and cavalry breaking through massed infantry...
It is hard to think that cavalry without heavy armour could be successful against packed infantry wielding anything like a decent set of spears/pikes etc.  In Roman engagements such as Pharsalus we see spears being used effectively against cavalry. (Caesar has his troops use their pila to thrust at Pompey's cavalry with success.) During the Macedonian wars Roman infantry units seem to have pushed between the phalanxes so as to attack their flank/rear and I have always imagined that this was Alexander's technique against the Persians.  Certainly at Gaugamela, Alexander's tactic of moving to the right to draw the Persian cavalry to the flanks is usually assumed to be part of a larger strategy to open up the Persian lines and enable a more direct attack at Darius.  It is also clear from ancient sources that the Persian cavalry was more heavily armoured than the Macedonian (...the Scythians themselves and their horses were much more completely protected with armour for guarding their bodies...1.) so the Macedonian cavalry certainly cannot be equated with the knights of the middle ages.  There is surely a great deal of psychology involved as well. I find it incredible that lightly armoured horses could be used to crash through a determined defense armed with good thrusting weapons. I suspect that many men involved in these battles were not only poorly trained but scared witless and unlikely to work as an efficient team when suddenly confronted with a large formation of horses charging towards them thus giving openings for a determined attack to be successful.  I am no expert on ancient battle rules (I am trialing several) but it was always an aspect of the Warhammer rules that I thought quite clever, that they built in ideas like fear and terror etc. into the rules for just such a purpose - these are also present in the WAB rules (p51f under heading Psychology) and could be used to tweak the characteristics of units involved for your battles to give outcomes more in line with your interpretation of the historical facts.
Ian
1.   I had to check this, the quote is from Arrian, Anabasis 3.13 1 - via Wikipedia but I would be surprised if it were incorrect

[Patrick Waterson]

Good points, Ian.

One thought about Greek hoplites is that although they were the best infantry of their time by a wide margin, they do not appear to have had any form of 'prepare to receive cavalry' technique akin to the later schiltron or even the later bayonet hedge.  Hoplite spears were (at least in artistic representation) used overarm and the technique of grounding the butt to receive cavalry appears to have been unknown or, if known, not practised.

The Macedonian xyston at c.13' was longer than the c.9' hoplite spear (a 12' hoplite weapon would close the gap but would still not let the infantryman outreach the cavalryman).  The question of reach has been discussed and short of checking by re-enactment I see no reason why a Macedonian horseman who can reach with the weapon's point of balance up to 3' ahead of his shoulder (on account of the two-handed grip) cannot outreach a hoplite who has to keep his weapon's point of balance within c.1' of his shoulder.  Furthermore, the xyston-wielder's preferred target was probably the face or neck, easy enough to reach with the point and immediately effective: having a shiny metal point arriving before one's face tends to attract all of one's attention and inhibit concentration on one's target.  In Arrian III.14 Alexander's Companions use this technique at Gaugamela ("the Macedonian horse ... vigorously pressed the assault, fighting hand to hand and thrusting at the Persians' faces with their spears")

It is also clear from ancient sources that the Persian cavalry was more heavily armoured than the Macedonian (...the Scythians themselves and their horses were much more completely protected with armour for guarding their bodies...1.) so the Macedonian cavalry certainly cannot be equated with the knights of the middle ages.

True.  The quote is indeed Arrian III.13 (III.13.4 to be precise), and the Skythian and Bactrian nobles were more heavily armoured than anyone in Alexander's army, but protection is not everything and the 'Macedonian' cavalry in this action consisted of 1) Menidas' mercenary cavalry, 2) Ariston's Paeonians, 3) the 'xenoi' (Greek) cavalry and finally an attack by Aretes' prodromoi - not a single Companion cavalryman among them.  The prodromoi attack did, however, put the Persian left to flight.  One can draw parallels with Napoleon's cavalry fights against the Mamelukes; the latter were individually better protected and better armed, but collectively inferior in discipline and technique, a difference that became more marked as larger numbers became involved.

I find it incredible that lightly armoured horses could be used to crash through a determined defense armed with good thrusting weapons.

As mentioned above, technique could explain much.  There was no defence more determined than the Sacred Band at Chaeronea, yet Alexander crashed through those and left them dead on the field with all their wounds in front.  We have looked at the rather minimal source evidence and attempted to conclude, or failing that to assert, that Alexander led either a cavalry wedge or an infantry formation, my own preference being the former.

One feature of the Macedonian cavalry wedge is that it does have the potential to act like a ripsaw through a defensive line.  The point-man might knock down a man in the enemy front rank, and a split-second later those on either side of him will be down, too, before they can reach anyone with their weapons.  Each man down in the front rank will be propelled back onto the second rank, who have to either step aside smartly (interfering with their own formation and target acquisition) or stagger back into the rank behind (upsetting two men's target acquisition).  Meanwhile the cavalry wedge is still pouring through, knocking down every man ahead of it, for as long as it can maintain momentum - a sort of Hellenistic game of skittles with lance points instead of balls.

Instead of going head-on at individual defending infantrymen, it would make more sense for the wedge to line up between two files of infantry so that the xyston could reach past the horse's head rather than over it, and so that the horse could shoulder aside one infantryman on each side as it passed through.  A wedge is composed of files of unequal length, so as each file leader knocks over a target and hence upsets defensive countermeasures he also is lined up to shove through between files, knocking men aside as he does so and making them easier targets for following cavalrymen.  Properly done, this kind of wedge penetration turns the target infantry formation into a loose mass of reeling men from which the riders just pick their targets as they ride through.

The problem arises when the momentum is lost and the wedge comes to a halt: once that happens, the front end (and the man at the front in particular) is vulnerable to attack from one or both sides (this seems to have happened to Alexander in the fight against the mercenaries at the Granicus).  Hence to remain effective the wedge has to keep moving and to keep moving it has to knock down infantrymen in the way with a minimum of fuss and lost energy.

You may consider this to be surmise and yes, it is.  There is no absolute proof, only a number of clues that point in this particular direction.  If my understanding of the matter is correct, it would explain why we seem to have accounts of Macedonian cavalry penetrating hoplite formations at Chaeronea and the Granicus (others interpret the source evidence differently to suppose that Alexander was leading infantry, though this itself results in anomalies e.g. if he was fighting on foot how did he get a horse killed under him at the Granicus?).  Furthermore, it would suggest that the Macedonian technique differed from both the unsubtle mediaeval charge with couched lance and from the Parthian use of the lance against the Romans (as mentioned in Plutarch's Life of Crassus and Life of Anthony).  The Macedonian technique envisaged requires precise 'marksmanship' and training together with a degree of mutual cooperation and would be possible for full-time cavalrymen like those of Philip and Alexander, but would be difficult and demanding for part-time Successor soldiery, which might explain the eventual shift away from the xyston and wedge to a more conventional javelin-and-shield based system.

I suspect that many men involved in these battles were not only poorly trained but scared witless and unlikely to work as an efficient team when suddenly confronted with a large formation of horses charging towards them thus giving openings for a determined attack to be successful.

There you have most Achameneid, especially Late Achaemenid, infantry in a nutshell.   Morale is a very important consideration, and in The Two Towers film the hosts of Mordor do seem to lose both heart and formation as the Rohirrim reach striking range, almost falling over to order.  A Macedonian charge would be carried out at something closer to a canter than a gallop (formation did matter) but at Issus they sped up as the Kardakes ahead of them were loosing their first volleys, spoiling their deflection shooting and from Arrian's "... the Persian left collapsed the moment he was on them" (II.10) dropping their morale as they found themselves faced with something outside their previous experience.

Morale would thus be a significant factor where Achaemenid infantry were concerned, but not where the opponents were Greek mercenaries or
(especially) the Sacred Band.  There the only explanation (apart from trying to get Alexander to lead infantry) would seem to be technique - which is what started me thinking about this whole business in the first place.

[Justin Swanton]

The heart of this seems to be the knocking down/aside of infantry by Companions. Patrick makes a good point in that it is better for the leading Companion rider to aim at a point between hoplite files, rather that directly at a hoplite. In the latter case you have a horse trying to shove back 8 or 16 men pressed together shield-to-back, which sounds like a losing proposition for the horse.

Attacking between files targets the weakness of a hoplite formation - there is no lateral bracing between one hoplite file and the next. A man knocked aside will tend to continue staggering in that direction, especially as the next horse in the wedge knocks him in the same direction.  Hence a wedge is designed to knock men sideways, not back. Those men push the files next to them sideways, and so on. There is plenty of room for this sideways movement since the men involved will tend to turn and face the source of the pressure. An average man has far greater breadth than depth, so men turning sideways suddenly leaves them with plenty of space to give way before the advancing wedge - until they fall and are trampled.

[Erpingham]

if he was fighting on foot how did he get a horse killed under him at the Granicus?

Didn't we have this conversation before?  If you assume that he fought dismounted at this point, it would be after an initial round of combat when his horse was killed.  Instead of wasting horses, he continues on foot.  Not that I'm saying you are wrong, just that the loss of the horse is not a decisive argument.  I'm sure someone would have provided a shield (do we still believe Alexander's cavalry were shieldless - just checking?). 

The speculation that one aimed the point of the wedge at a gap between files as a weak point is fascinating.  Does it assume though that hoplites had no drills against people breaking in between files e.g. that rank behind the first covered the file gap to the right?

[Justin Swanton]

The speculation that one aimed the point of the wedge at a gap between files as a weak point is fascinating.  Does it assume though that hoplites had no drills against people breaking in between files e.g. that rank behind the first covered the file gap to the right?

The hoplite formation worked by othismos, meaning that files had to form dead straight lines, enabling the men to push each other and hence exert irresistible force against enemy infantry. There was no way of covering the space between the files.

[Duncan Head]

Except that nobody agrees what othismos means, it has been debated endlessly without consensus; and even if it does mean a physical pushing of the man in front, othismos is clearly something that takes place only in certain phases of the battle, which are not "when receiving a cavalry charge" - it doesn't constrain behaviour all the time. So saying that hoplites can't do something because they depend on something else of uncertain meaning which they do at another time is really not a strong argument at all.

[Patrick Waterson]

I'm sure someone would have provided a shield (do we still believe Alexander's cavalry were shieldless - just checking?). 

It seems to have varied: Diodorus XVII.20.3 in his description of the Granicus has 'Spithrobates' (probably Spithridates) hurl a javelin with such force that it passes through Alexander's shield, but Arrian's account of the same battle has no such mention (and Spithridates is mentioned only as being struck down by Black Cleitus when about to strike with a kopis - a heavy blade - at Alexander).

The xyston is generally (among classical authors) considered to be a weapon wielded with two hands but in the Alexander Mosaic it is wielded in one hand and still goes right through a presumably armoured(?) opponent's body (the opponent is one of Darius' personal guard cavalry, some of whom show indications of wearing armour - Duncan is good on the fine details of this).

So were the Companions unshielded?  Almost certainly but we cannot be quite certain.  Methinks.

The speculation that one aimed the point of the wedge at a gap between files as a weak point is fascinating.  Does it assume though that hoplites had no drills against people breaking in between files e.g. that rank behind the first covered the file gap to the right?

Usually there would be no need because even at 3' per man any gaps would be covered by shields.  Whether hoplite formations fighting each other tried to line up against opposing men or against opposing gaps I have no real idea - the accounts of lines 'crashing' together and spears shivering would suggest man-against-man rather than man-against-gap.  There seems to be a natural inclination to head for a man rather than for the gap next to a man, and I think the problem simply had not arisen.  Macedonian cavalry fighting with the xyston in wedge seems to have been very new and up to Gaugamela there were usually not many people who had faced it before and then survived to have a think about what to do.

It might even be the case that Alexander devised the (putative) tactic of aiming the horse between hoplite opponents rather than at them.  He had a sharp tactical mind which was backed by a lot of thought energy and seems to have devised the tactic of aiming for opponents' faces by preference - this is tremendously distracting to the opponent and tends to put them off their stroke, quite possibly contributing to the spectacularly low Macedonian casualty rates.

Justin is as far as I can tell right about files being in straight lines and not overlapping.  Wherever one may stand on the idea that Greek hoplites lined up to push against each other (given the source references to shoving they evidently did so in some fashion on at least some occasions) the file was the basic element of manoeuvre and organisation, and as soon as one starts to fudge the file one starts to lose cohesion.  Assuming that hoplites remained in ordered files when facing cavalry (I would observe that there seems to be no evidence of specific hoplite anti-cavalry drills, perhaps because most cavalry types did not charge into melee with hoplite formations with the possible exception of a few heavy Persian types) the logical place for a charging horse to go is at the interval between two hoplites where the shields overlap: if it hits an overlapping shield from its right the associated hoplite will tend to revolve out of the way as well as stagger back and/or sideways, while if it shoulders a shield to its left the relevant hoplite will tend to go down, back and/or sideways.

Except that nobody agrees what othismos means, it has been debated endlessly without consensus; and even if it does mean a physical pushing of the man in front, othismos is clearly something that takes place only in certain phases of the battle, which are not "when receiving a cavalry charge" - it doesn't constrain behaviour all the time. So saying that hoplites can't do something because they depend on something else of uncertain meaning which they do at another time is really not a strong argument at all.

I take this to mean that arguing that Greek hoplites having a standard drill/procedure does not mean they could not have departed from it when faced by cavalry.  Fair enough: the question then becomes what they would have resorted/reverted to, bearing in mind the apparent lack of mention of any anti-cavalry drill (unless someone can find one in the sources, and Cunaxa does not count - that was peltasts getting out of the way of Persian heavy cavalry ).  Let us assume for the sake of hypothetical argument that a well-trained hoplite formation (say the Theban Sacred Band at Chaeronea) has or improvises a drill by which every second man takes a pace to the right when faced by cavalry.  We still have the interval between men in the front rank at which a horse can be aimed, but we also have men in the even-numbered ranks whose spears are now colliding with the heads of the ranks in front.  The horse shoving aside the front-rank men to its left and right will impact directly upon the quincunxed second-rank man and send him staggering down or backwards: his own front-ranker will have inhibited use of the spear.  Such a formation would seem to have all the disadvantages of a straight set of files with none of the advantages.

if he was fighting on foot how did he get a horse killed under him at the Granicus?

Didn't we have this conversation before?  If you assume that he fought dismounted at this point, it would be after an initial round of combat when his horse was killed.  Instead of wasting horses, he continues on foot.  Not that I'm saying you are wrong, just that the loss of the horse is not a decisive argument.  I'm sure someone would have provided a shield (do we still believe Alexander's cavalry were shieldless - just checking?). 

The argument is more what he would have been doing on a horse inside an enemy formation in the first place, specifically how he got there.  For him to be mounted he would have to be leading a mounted unit (Macedonians seemed to do things that way); had he been leading a foot unit he would not have been on horseback.  Hence even if he fought on foot after being dismounted he would have had to have led a mounted charge at least partly into the enemy formation  in order to get into a situation where his horse could be killed by an opponent sticking a sword in its side, whatever may have happened after that.

[Erpingham]

Hence even if he fought on foot after being dismounted he would have had to have led a mounted charge at least partly into the enemy formation  in order to get into a situation where his horse could be killed by an opponent sticking a sword in its side, whatever may have happened after that.

Agreed, though this does weaken this as evidence of a successful cavalry attack.

On lack of hoplite cavalry drills, is the argument that cavalry had never charged hoplites before Chaeronea i.e. Alexander is innovating.  Therefore, the hoplites must improvise their defence?  I'm afraid I don't share Justin's idea that hoplites in this situation would stick in their files.  Duncan has already made the point about othismos
but , as we are in thought-experiment territory, we could speculate what happens when the file breaker hits the file gap.  He has presumably taken down the hoplite to the right with his xyston and pushes into the gap.  He is now in touching distance of the second rank - aren't they and ranks behind going to close on him, rather than remain rigidly behind their front man?  What he has done is caused chaos, dislocating therows and files in a small area,  which can be exploited by the men behind.  It is also likely he and his horse are now in bad shape - one reason why I'm with Jim that Alex and his inner guards might have formed the point but the line breaker job was no job for the king.

[Jim Webster]

Remember also it only takes one wounded and/or hamstrung horse to fall or turn at 90 degrees to the line of attack and the attack is in chaos. A horse cannot step over another horse thrashing about on the ground.

What people forget is that if we have not a charge, but a sensible walk, moving forward and stabbing the infantry, the infantry aren't glued to their bases either.
The Macedonians weren't the first people to attack Greek Hoplites from horseback, Mardonius had a body guard of a thousand cavalry at Plataea, the Greeks had been facing Persian armoured cavalry since the Ionian revolt.
If the cavalry hit too tentatively, advancing at a walk, there is nothing to stop the infantry advancing into them. They don't need to stand in their files to brace each other because there is no shock to brace against.
Hoplites were flexible enough to advance against Persian infantry, tearing down shield walls etc (try doing that with hoplons overlapping)


Jim