Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Patrick Waterson]

No, I see nothing "contrary to expectation" in the passage at all. Justin's assessment of the sequence of events is misleading. Alexander sends the archers and slingers to lure the Triballians out of the woods. When they succeed, he sends the Upper cavalry (etc) to attack - rather than "charge" - the right wing. There is then a period of distant fighting - it makes no sense for this passage, placed between the advance of the phalanx and cavalry and their closing to handstrokes, to refer back to the archers' activity three sentences earlier. That is the sequence that Arrian describes. and that's why ouk eti has an implication of time, "no longer shooting javelins", because it's set in opposition to the preceding period of time when the distant fighting was taking place.

I think this reads an unintended sequencing into Arrian's narrative.  The way I read it is:

Description of dispositions (I.2.4-6): Alexander arrays his troops, sending the missilemen to skirmish and draw out the Triballians.  This succeeding, he orders the Upper Macedonian cavalry to emballein (throw or dash against), not akontizein, the Triballian right and at the same time instructed the Amphipolitan and Bottiaean cavalry to advance against the enemy left while he himself led the main body of infantry and the rest of his cavalry parateinas, which seems to mean beside rather than preceding, against the enemy centre.

Description of outcome (I.2.7): As soon as skirmishing is replaced by close combat, the Triballians are overcome by the weight and force of the Macedonian infantry and the 'not shooting but thrusting and riding down' (ouk akontismō eti, all' autois tois hippois ōthountes allē kai allē prosepipton) of the Macedonian cavalry.

I don't see that the Macedonian cavalry pushing their horses into the Triballians, after their period of throwing javelins at them, suggests they had lances: it certainly does not prove it.

Couple of thoughts here: 1) They have not thrown javelins. 2) They are employing aggressive close combat which is consistent with using lances.  'Proof' would only be certain with explicit mention of lances, but unless they carried both weapon types like Byzantine trapezitoi, it does seem to be a case of one or the other and hence if they are not using javelins then realistically they would be using lances.

Cavalry seem to have often been prepared to close with peltasts and other non-hoplite infantry - these are Thracians, remember, not hoplites - when conditions were right. So there is no "substitution of a close-combat attack system instead"; rather, the cavalry are behaving exactly the same as we would expect Greek or even Persian cavalry, armed with javelins or the usual mixture of javelins and spears, to behave against peltasts. It's also - odd? - that if Arrian wants to describe a new tactical style involving lances, the only weapon he mentions is the javelins that Patrick and Justin reckon weren't being used.

Apart from the fact that Arrian does not mention the use of javelins (the reverse, if anything), there is a point here: it was not only Macedonian cavalry which was prepared to get its weapons dirty in close combat if conditions were right, especially against opponents less formidable than hoplites.  However Arrian's phrasing - ouk akontismō eti (yet without shooting) - indicates that something expected was replaced by outhontes and prosepipton - pushing/thrusting and falling upon (attacking as opposed to collapsing!), the implication being that this was an apparent novelty, otherwise why mention it in this way at all?

I should add that the smiley in the original post was genuine, I do not really think that the cavalry lance was introduced in 335/4 - though it does seem possible that the Upper Macedonian cavalry hadn't yet adopted it in 335, they may have been the last to do so. But it is interesting that while various ancient sources credit Philip with introducing the sarisa to the infantry, but not with any change in cavalry weaponry.

Interesting in this regard is that Arrian refers to Alexander's infantry - phalanx and hypaspist alike - as using the doru practically throughout his narrative of these anti-Thracian and Illyrian campaigns.  I do not seriously believe that Alexander un-equipped his infantry's sarissas only to re-equip them for the campaign in Asia. 

If our sources fail to credit Philip with introducing new weaponry to his cavalry, we are left with three options: 1) he did, but they failed to mention it; 2) they already used the sarissa or xyston so he changed nothing; 3) he did not, and Alexander made the change.  How would we evaluate which of these options reflected reality?

[Patrick Waterson]

What is of interest is the use made of the cavalry: two bodies attack either flank of the Triballians whilst a third body, placed in front of the phalanx, attacks the centre. It is possible to see here an allusion to one kind of cavalry used in a frontal shock role, in contrast to more lightly-armed cavalry employed in flanking actions?

I think the cavalry with the centre should be beside (parateinas) rather than in front of the phalanx, but this does suggest a shock role.

Whether the flanking cavalry were, as Duncan suggests, late rearmers, and hence had a different tactical role in this battle, is another question: I see no indication in Arrian's Greek that any of them used javelins, in fact quite the opposite.  Moving on a bit, in Arrian I.6.3 we have an interesting passage that when I first saw it, with 'phalagga' and 'embolon' in the same sentence, tempted me to jump to the conclusion that here was evidence of a phalanx in wedge and the mystery of Chaeronea was solved.  Not so - it was the army's left, specifically the 200 cavalry who had made their way unnoticed round to the Taulantian flank, which was being ordered into wedge while the Taulantians' attention was focussed on the very obvious infantry display before them.  Lack of javelin use by Macedonian cavalry is also apparent in this action, although we are not told which parts of Macedonia they came from: a general homogenity seems to be assumed at this point, which being apparently less than a fortnight after the action in I.2.6 would not have left much time or opportunity for any Macedonian cavalry to re-equip and re-train.  These are all indicators rather than clear source assertions, but the indicators seem consistent with a general lack of Macedonian mounted javelinage.

[Justin Swanton]

Lack of javelin use by Macedonian cavalry is also apparent in this action, although we are not told which parts of Macedonia they came from: a general homogenity seems to be assumed at this point, which being apparently less than a fortnight after the action in I.2.6 would not have left much time or opportunity for any Macedonian cavalry to re-equip and re-train.  These are all indicators rather than clear source assertions, but the indicators seem consistent with a general lack of Macedonian mounted javelinage.

Question though. Here are the definitions of akontizein from Perseus: LSJ, Middle Liddell, Slater and Autenreith. They all indicate throwing a javelin as the primary meaning.

[Patrick Waterson]

Quite so, though when one has 'ouk ...' preceding a word it generally means "not ..." - is there a further bout of akontizein I have somehow missed?

[Justin Swanton]

I mean, the fact that Arrian mentions javelin-throwing would tend to indicate that at least some of the Macedonian cavalry had javelins but didn't use them. Either that or he is saying that something unusual is happening - instead of throwing javelins in the traditional manner, the cavalry are charging into contact with the peltasts using another weapon. The difficulty with the latter interpretation is that a) they would already have done that at Chaeronea, hence it wasn't such a novel tactic, b) he doesn't mention them using lances, and c) Greek javelin-armed cavalry charging to contact with peltasts was not something unheard of.

I still think the context of the passage rules out an intermediary skirmishing phase by the cavalry between the shooting by the archers and slingers and the move to contact by the phalanx and cavalry. The phrase 'And indeed as long as there was only skirmishing on both sides, the Triballians did not get the worst of it' follows immediately after Alexander has given the order for the cavalry and phalanx to close in, hence it must refer to the shooting earlier in the battle. That being the case, the cavalry don't use javelins at all but just charge in. Did some or all of the cavalry charge in with lances? There just isn't enough in the text to prove it either way. One has to put this passage in the larger context of how Macedonian cavalry were fighting elsewhere.

Which leads to the question: what are the sources for javelin-armed cavalry charging formed peltasts?

[Jim Webster]

I suspect one would be the bit from Xenophon Patrick mentioned earlier with Persian cavalry following scythed chariots into Greek infantry.

Unfortunately it's a bit vague

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

I mean, the fact that Arrian mentions javelin-throwing would tend to indicate that at least some of the Macedonian cavalry had javelins but didn't use them. Either that or he is saying that something unusual is happening - instead of throwing javelins in the traditional manner, the cavalry are charging into contact with the peltasts using another weapon. The difficulty with the latter interpretation is that a) they would already have done that at Chaeronea, hence it wasn't such a novel tactic, b) he doesn't mention them using lances, and c) Greek javelin-armed cavalry charging to contact with peltasts was not something unheard of.

It would be novel to the Taulantians, whose accounts of Chaeronea would have been delivered in general terms by an excited trader rather than as a precise explanation from a military liaison officer.

Which leads to the question: what are the sources for javelin-armed cavalry charging formed peltasts?

In addition to the Hellenica instance Jim mentions, there is the battle of Cunaxa, where Xenophon (Anabasis, I.10.7-8) describes Tissaphernes' charge against Episthenes' peltasts, although these had a cunning plan which nonplussed the Persians:

"For Tissaphernes had not taken to flight in the first encounter, but had charged along the river through the Greek peltasts; he did not kill anyone in his passage, but the Greeks, after opening a gap for his men, proceeded to deal blows and throw javelins upon them as they went through. The commander of the Greek peltasts was Episthenes of Amphipolis, and it was said that he proved himself a sagacious man. [8] At any rate, after Tissaphernes had thus come off with the worst of it, he did not wheel round again, but went on to the camp of the Greeks..."

It looks as if Tissaphernes' cavalry, the only troops on that wing who did not run from the Greeks, may have charged in a column.  Their appearance is described thus:

"There were horsemen in white cuirasses [leukothorakes] on the left wing of the enemy, under the command, it was reported, of Tissaphernes ..." - Anabasis I.8.9

Formation not described, weaponry not described; but as the javelin (palta for Persians) was more or less universal cavalry armament at the time it is a fairly safe bet that these were carried.

It should however be noted that Persian cavalry tended to be more heavily armoured than their Greek counterparts, Xenophon recommending the adoption of certain items of Persian cavalry armour (the Athenians do not seem to have taken much notice).

There is one classic case of Greek cavalry not charging peltasts; this was when Iphicrates mauled a Spartan mora near Corinth - but the reason given was lack of Spartan initiative rather than that the peltasts were too tough a nut.

Greek javelin-armed cavalry charging to contact with peltasts was not something unheard of.

True, and even Greek javelin-armed cavalry charging hoplites on occasion.  The interest of Arrian I.2.6 seems to lie in the way the charging therein was performed - without the use of javelins.

[RobertGargan]

Not withstanding what Arrian did or not say about Alexander's Companions, the problem I have with a, matter of course, successful frontal attack on hoplites is that, later, heavier knights did not repeat the tactic.  Norman knights failed to break Harold's Huscarls at Hastings until archers, feint attacks and various stratagems took their toll.
Robert Gargan

[Erpingham]

Not withstanding what Arrian did or not say about Alexander's Companions, the problem I have with a, matter of course, successful frontal attack on hoplites is that, later, heavier knights did not repeat the tactic. 
Robert Gargan

It is probably more accurate to say medieval cavalry did attack formed spearmen frontally but, if there was nothing to disrupt the enemy formation (terrain, unpreparedness, archery, tricksiness) they didn't have much success.  A few successful occassions are mentioned earlier. 

[Justin Swanton]

Not withstanding what Arrian did or not say about Alexander's Companions, the problem I have with a, matter of course, successful frontal attack on hoplites is that, later, heavier knights did not repeat the tactic.  Norman knights failed to break Harold's Huscarls at Hastings until archers, feint attacks and various stratagems took their toll.
Robert Gargan

The theoretical technique proposed for penetrating a hoplite phalanx with heavy cavalry requires precise manoeuvring which presupposes a high degree of unit training, something mediaeval knights are not noted for. The best you could expect from them was to form a line and charge home; no question of each cavalry file targeting the gap between every other infantry file. That meant that the knights would plough into the infantry rather slice through them. They obviously would not be able to kill all the infantry in the first impact, so success depended on them panicking the footmen into routing, after which they could pursue and cut them down at their leisure.

If they did not succeed in getting the line to rout, then they would have to pull back fast before the footmen could dispatch the exposed knights, reform, and charge again. Some knights would inevitably get killed in the process and the mounted commander would eventually have to weigh up who was winning the battle of attrition.

[Erpingham]

Though Justin and I don't agree on whether any suggested unsupported Macedonian cavalry success against hoplites existed, he is right that the amount of formation training that the Macedonians got was much more than that of most medieval men-at-arms.  I don't think we have evidence of formation training until Charles the Bold's army.  Medieval cavalry were often a conglomeration of smaller components who probably knew one another and may have served together but that was it.  So tactics were on the basic side, based on stringing the component bits in a line.  Wedges were rare - only the Germans seem to have used them and then they were pointed columns, not the glorious geometry of Justin's graphics.

[Patrick Waterson]

Agreed - mediaeval parallels are misleading as a yardstick of what could and would be done in classical times.  Hastings is an especially unsatisfactory comparison for several reasons, not least because the Bayeux Tapestry shows some Norman cavalry still using their spears overarm, presumably for hurling.  Furthermore, the Norman cavalry spear itself does not seem to have been a particularly lengthy implement and does not compare with the Macedonian xyston.

Interestingly enough, mediaeval knights seem for some time (specifically AD c.1100-1300) to have assumed as a matter of course that if they charged varlets on foot the latter would not be able to withstand them: English, Flemish and Swiss tended to be exceptions to the general pattern.  This seems to be one reason why Courtrai (AD 1302) caused a shock throughout knightly circles, particularly in France itself: an army of mere burghers on foot had seen off the chivalry of France.

[aligern]

Though in pretty well all the cases where medieval infantry defeat knights they have rough ground or obstacles in front of them.


Do we have examples of knights just riding down infantry earlier?/
Roy

[Jim Webster]

Just thinking about the Companions at Chaeronea

Just how well 'drilled' were they. They were wealthy men who were supported by landed estates (and perhaps some sort of salary when actually serving) and often had civic roles that they needed to keep up.
They weren't a regular cavalry regiment as we would understand one.
So their horsemanship and skill on horseback would be good but the amount of time they actually spent in mounted drill could be very limited.

Once on campaign with Alexander then they'd be 'with the colours' most of the time and doubtless drill improved but I suspect Philip (or Macedonian) couldn't have afforded to keep all the companion cavalry (as opposed to an inner bodyguard) under arms all the time.

On the other hand I'm sure I've read somewhere that William the Bastard used the time waiting for the winds to change to drill his men before the invasion of England (if only to stop them getting bored) so the level of drill between his men and Philip's might not have been all that great.


Jim

[Erpingham]

Though in pretty well all the cases where medieval infantry defeat knights they have rough ground or obstacles in front of them.


Do we have examples of knights just riding down infantry earlier?/
Roy

battle of Lewes 1264?  Navas de Tolosa 1212?  Maybe Fordham 1173 (this may have been an ambush).  Most of the ride downs seem to have been against disordered or otherwise disrupted troops.  Battles in Italy, where knights and infantry clashed often, seem to have quite a few cases where infantry held their own.  Teutonic Knights don't seem to have done brilliantly against Russian shieldwalls.