Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Erpingham]

On the other hand I'm sure I've read somewhere that William the Bastard used the time waiting for the winds to change to drill his men before the invasion of England (if only to stop them getting bored) so the level of drill between his men and Philip's might not have been all that great.


Jim

I think we need to separate drilled from skilled, or even practised.  Norman knights probably did practice, conroi v. conroi.  Whether anything bigger formed up is another question.  Based on 12th century tournament evidence, we might expect in a well-established force that a conroi might fall in in a particular order and they may have a game plan but precision drill, or even the ability to operate with other conrois in their own battle less less so.

Justin has proposed the Macedonians used high precision drills.  We know Macedonian cavalry could form wedges, which must have taken a bit of planning and practice, but Justin's drills take it to another level. Presumably the preparation and training period is attested in the pre-Chaeronea run-up, even if the specific details are not covered?

[Jim Webster]

I'm not sure we have anything more on cavalry drills than Xenophon to be honest.

We know there were mounted exercises of sorts, but much was centered on improving the individual skills of the individual soldier, not on unit drill.

When you read your Livy or Polybius you begin to realise that we're talking about people who felt that the calibre of the individual, their personal 'quality' which was to an extent based on their breeding and background, was considered far more important that how much time they'd spent riding in lines. Think of them as gentleman amateurs who probably practiced a bit when they had time.

Jim

[Justin Swanton]

Agreed - mediaeval parallels are misleading as a yardstick of what could and would be done in classical times.  Hastings is an especially unsatisfactory comparison for several reasons, not least because the Bayeux Tapestry shows some Norman cavalry still using their spears overarm, presumably for hurling.  Furthermore, the Norman cavalry spear itself does not seem to have been a particularly lengthy implement and does not compare with the Macedonian xyston.

Wasn't overarm a particular way of using a spear? the cavalryman would point the spear at his target's head or throat. On contact the spearpoint would wedge into the target - the cavalryman would then swivel the shaft upwards as he passed and yank the spearpoint out. That kind of trauma would normally be enough to kill the infantryman and leave the horseman with the spear ready to insert into his next victim.

The technique would fine for taking out loose order infantry, especially if they were running, but not so much for oot massed in a shieldwall - they had spears whose reach matched his.

[Justin Swanton]

Justin has proposed the Macedonians used high precision drills.  We know Macedonian cavalry could form wedges, which must have taken a bit of planning and practice, but Justin's drills take it to another level. Presumably the preparation and training period is attested in the pre-Chaeronea run-up, even if the specific details are not covered?

Strictly-speaking the drill required was not that complicated. The Companions had to form a wedge made up of columns, fairly easy as it is natural for horses to follow each other. The leading man of each file had to be able to direct his horse at the correct point in the infantry line. Moving at a trot or perhaps canter it is quite doable for an experienced rider. Then each rider simply had to target a hoplite: either his head or the approximate centre of his shield if it has been raised. Again not overly difficult.

The big difference between Companions and mediaeval knights is the file system. If I'm not mistaken knights by and large just formed up any old how into a line, then charged. You couldn't get more out of that than a crude frontal smash designed to panic an infantry line into rout. Same thing as cataphracts, which would explain why knights gradually turned into cataphracts as time wore on.

[aligern]

You might care to read this Justin:-))

http://web.archive.org/web/20110805101324/http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/bennett1.htm

Roy

[Erpingham]

The big difference between Companions and mediaeval knights is the file system. If I'm not mistaken knights by and large just formed up any old how into a line, then charged. You couldn't get more out of that than a crude frontal smash designed to panic an infantry line into rout.

It isn't an unreasonable generalisation.  However, you could same similar things about post medieval cavalry too.  Granted they had a structure which placed men and officers in set places, but all they used was "a crude frontal smash" as you put it.  Modern reconstructors of the medieval cavalry charge, like Matt Bennett or JF Verbruggen, note the technical similarity between what we know of how medieval men-at-arms charged and how it was done in the 18th to 20th centuries.  The key trick was to arrive en masse and not as individuals.

I think I would doubt the ability of medieval cavalry to be able to use the precision described in Justin's wedge tactic.  It revolves getting file leaders spaced precisely to be able to hit a sweet spot less than the width of a horse in a hostile formation, with their men inch perfect behind them.  I think the level of precision could be achieved with some practice - I've seen similar stuff done in musical rides in tattoos, though with the files wider apart - but I'm still not sure anything that complex would be tried in the face of the enemy. One of the reasons why 18th-20th century cavalry formed in shallow lines was there was less chance of fouling each other (admittedly, more of an issue if you were taking missile casualties than charging something which had a reach of about six feet).

[Justin Swanton]

You might care to read this Justin:-))

http://web.archive.org/web/20110805101324/http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/bennett1.htm

Roy

Interesting, especially this part:

If you have succeeded in overthrowing the enemy's line, your own will be in disorder. The melee which ensues, soon, however, turns into a pursuit, and this affords the opportunity of destroying those who have turned; for the charge and the melee do not last long enough to inflict or sustain heavy loss in men or horses ... The pursuit must be kept up with vigour ... This is not the time to stay the slaughter, but watch over the safety of the pursuers with your cavalry reserves till the flying enemy is entirely dispersed.... Then rally.

A charge which either immediately routed the enemy, or if not, followed by a short melee, which finished the job. Hence cavalry among enemy infantry could melee at least for a short period of time.

[Erpingham]

A charge which either immediately routed the enemy, or if not, followed by a short melee, which finished the job. Hence cavalry among enemy infantry could melee at least for a short period of time.

I think there is a caveat here about whether Nolan is talking about a cavalry melee rather than an infantry one - IIRC, Nolan is one of the cavalry manuals available on line, if anyone wants to look.  However, if we look at medieval examples (which I suppose we are allowed to, if we are looking at Victorian ones), the fight seems to be in four stages.
1. The commitment to fight.  The infantry need to stand their ground.  The cavalry need to move to contact.  Infantry probably bottled it more than the cavalry - but cavalry could ride round the target shouting abuse/looking for an opening e.g. Arques 1303, Laupen 1339
2. Whether the infantry formation is penetrated - men-at-arms may approach with insufficient vigour to break into the infantry.  Bannockburn is a good example but there are others - Lunalonge 1349, the early stages of Nogent-sur-Seine 1359.  This seems to be what is happening for most of hastings too.  Cavalry may rally back and try again in these circumstances.
3. Cavalry penetrate the infantry, issue in doubt - this is when it gets really nasty.  Examples include Courtrai, where several of the French leaders die among the Flemish ranks, their horses brought down; Chataeu-Guyon at Grandson 1473 (who, like Robert of Artois at Courtrai, is killed in touching distance of the enemy standards) and Bayard at Marignano 1515 (whose horse bolts out of the enemy lines, so he survives).  It wasn't easy on the receiving end either.  The Black prince was knocked off his feet at Crecy, as was William of Julich, one of the Flemish commanders at Courtrai.
4.  The fnal act - either the cavalry succeed in breaking up the infantry and they retreat or rout, or the cavalry break off.  The infantry can pursue but probably shouldn't (see Hastings and the less well known Montenaken 1465).

Can we parallel these stages in more ancient periods, or was medieval warfare really different (in which case we can probably give up on Victorian examples)

[Edit - pressed send before writing last sentence]

[Patrick Waterson]

An interesting and useful analysis of the mediaeval charge process.  Looking at the Macedonian Companions, we really only see them in action under Alexander, and they are being handled by a master, committed at the right moment and in the right way.  There are however some observations one can make.

- There is no individual impetuosity, or at least none recorded.  Everyone seems to know his place and keep it.

- One gets the impression of much mutual support: Alexander, fighting at the Granicus with a broken xyston, calls for a new one - and (on the second try) gets one.  At Gaugamela, he and his squadron have the fight of their lives against an unusually good contingent of Indians and Persians, but prevail with the loss of about 60 Companions, Coenus, Menidas and Hephaestion being wounded - however Alexander, who would have been at the tip of the wedge, is unhurt.

- There are never any comments in any of our sources about the Companions showing any deficiencies in training: no mishaps, no accidents, no lack of skill in anything.  I think they had a level of training perhaps unprecedented in the classical world, probably funded (insofar as this was necessary) by the Chalcidian gold mines Philip picked up part-way through his career.

Can we parallel these stages in more ancient periods, or was medieval warfare really different (in which case we can probably give up on Victorian examples)

We probably can if we are looking at cavalry in general: if examining Companions in particular the one clearly if briefly described conflict is at Issus when Alexander's Companions ride through the Persian Kardakes almost as if the latter were not there.

Arrian's description:

"... once within range of missiles, Alexander, at the head of his own troops on the right wing, rode at a gallop into the stream.  Rapidity was now all in all: a swift attack would shake the enemy, and the sooner they came to grips the less damage would be done by the Persian archers.  Alexander's judgement was not at fault: the Persian left collapsed the very moment he was on them - a brilliant local success for the troops under his command." - Arrian II.10.3-4

Here the infantry drop out of the equation at step 1, the mutual commitment evaluation phase.  However this is not the end of the battle: after almost catching Darius Alexander has to break off to rescue his phalanx from Darius' hard-fighting Greek mercenaries:

"Alexander's victorious right wing, seeing the Persians opposite them already in flight, now swung left towards the centre, hard-pressed as it was by Darius' Greeks; they forced them back from the river and then, outflanking the broken enemy left, delivered a flank attack on the mercenaries and were soon cuttting them to pieces." - ibid.II.11.2

The Greek parerrōgos indicates a bursting through the side of the mercenary formations, rather than the translator's 'outflanking the broken enemy left', which includes a 'left' not in the Greek.

In each case the Companions seem to make mincemeat of the opposition without trouble.  The fight against the mercenaries at the Granicus seems to have been similarly one-sided in outcome but here the Companions encountered difficulties, judging by the fact that Alexander had a horse killed under him - quite a rarity.  This sequence is reconstructed from clues in our sources rather than from an explicit narrative, but for the sake of comparison:

1. Commitment to fight: the Macedonians are determined to crush their opponents, who themselves know they must stand or die (or in the event stand and die).  Neither side flinches.

2. Whether the infantry is penetrated: Alexander according to Diodorus penetrates a little way into the mercenaries and then has his horse killed under him.  So yes, but not much; perhaps because with the infantry being attacked from all sides the formation was pushed in from all sides and became too dense to penetrate further.  In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the Indian (Mallian) example Robert brought to our notice the Macedonian cavalry were perfectly happy about attacking Indian infantry until the later closed up tightly, perhaps indicating that a lesson in this regard had been learned at the Granicus.

3. Issue in doubt: Alexander's horse was felled with a sword in the side.  As we have seen from the artistic examples Duncan showed, Greek hoplites seem to have preferred to attack the rider, so stabbing the horse may have been a faute-de-mieux for a hoplite who could not reach the rider for reasons of shortness of weapon and/or being constrained by crushed-together comrades.  Meanwhile the Macedonians - horse and foot - were pressing in from all sides, so the outcome was really just a matter of time.

4. The final act: the mercenaries were slaughtered by the converging Macedonian attacks before they could do really significant damage.  Our sources do however comment that the lion's share of Macedonian losses were taken in this part of the action, so it does look as if a Macedonian wedge got stuck in an inconvenient place at an inconvenient time.

One may note that the problem - a wedge caught because its target was being compressed - and the solution - the wedge rescued because its opponents were squeezed and cut down from all sides - came from the same causes and hence was self-curing after the initial embarrassment.

[Jim Webster]

I think I would doubt the ability of medieval cavalry to be able to use the precision described in Justin's wedge tactic. 

I would doubt any cavalry having that level of precision. Imagine trying to get your files absolutely lined up, making sure your wedge approaches at right angles and isn't diverted by some quirk of the ground.
A tactic that depended on that level of precision would probably be useless on the battlefield.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

I would doubt any cavalry having that level of precision. Imagine trying to get your files absolutely lined up, making sure your wedge approaches at right angles and isn't diverted by some quirk of the ground.

Getting the files lined up would not be a problem, as every man would know his place and his neighbours.  Approaching at right angles is another way of saying approaching head on, and the only man who has to line up precisely is the man leading the wedge, because once he is in position everyone else is lined up on him.

We also have to consider the degree of 'good enough' that would be effective.  If the alignment were, say, 3-5 degrees out, would it invalidate the system?  I think not.  At Issus, Alexander's cavalry crossed the Pinarus at the gallop and still cut through the opposition with total effectiveness.  They also sliced through the Greek mercenaries from the flank, and do not seem to have needed a precise 90-degree alignment.

I suspect that to an extent they would have been able to plough their own furrow, having much the same effect if they attacked at a slight angle as if they went precisely between the files.  The reason is that in addition to the 3' per man frontal spacing an opposing infantry formation would also have 3' per man front-to-rear spacing (and for that matter a slightly over 4' per man diagonal spacing).  All that would really be needed would be to knock the skittles over in a slightly different direction.

[Justin Swanton]

I would doubt any cavalry having that level of precision. Imagine trying to get your files absolutely lined up, making sure your wedge approaches at right angles and isn't diverted by some quirk of the ground.

Getting the files lined up would not be a problem, as every man would know his place and his neighbours.  Approaching at right angles is another way of saying approaching head on, and the only man who has to line up precisely is the man leading the wedge, because once he is in position everyone else is lined up on him.

We also have to consider the degree of 'good enough' that would be effective.  If the alignment were, say, 3-5 degrees out, would it invalidate the system?  I think not.  At Issus, Alexander's cavalry crossed the Pinarus at the gallop and still cut through the opposition with total effectiveness.  They also sliced through the Greek mercenaries from the flank, and do not seem to have needed a precise 90-degree alignment.

If the horses are trained to push through file gaps, all the rider has to do is get the horse to the file gap approximately head-on so it doesn't have to swerve too much and then let it do the rest whilst he gets busy with his lance.

[Mark G]

Don't forget the different saddle and the effect of stirrups.
Medieval  knights are not comparable to companions when it comes to charging home with a lance

[Erpingham]

We also have to consider the degree of 'good enough' that would be effective.  If the alignment were, say, 3-5 degrees out, would it invalidate the system?  I think not.  At Issus, Alexander's cavalry crossed the Pinarus at the gallop and still cut through the opposition with total effectiveness.  They also sliced through the Greek mercenaries from the flank, and do not seem to have needed a precise 90-degree alignment.

I suspect that to an extent they would have been able to plough their own furrow, having much the same effect if they attacked at a slight angle as if they went precisely between the files.  The reason is that in addition to the 3' per man frontal spacing an opposing infantry formation would also have 3' per man front-to-rear spacing (and for that matter a slightly over 4' per man diagonal spacing).  All that would really be needed would be to knock the skittles over in a slightly different direction.

This seems something of a revision Justin.  Previously, the horsemen had to hit the precise point mid-file where the shields touched.  Only that way could they spin the enemy out of the way, rather than collide.  Are you now conceding collisions may have been inevitable?  Your point about the Issus might lead you to pause.  Alexander in this case can't have made a precision manouever, yet was still successful.  If precision wasn't the key factor, what was?  A cavalryman like Nolan would have probably given an answer on the lines of elan, to which we could add leadership, weapon skills and horsemanship.  Our medieval man-at-arms would recognise these too.

And, once again, hoplites aren't wooden skittles.  They are armed with spears and shields and are capable of movement, which allows them both to counter attack and brace themselves.

[Jim Webster]

If the horses are trained to push through file gaps, 

If


We have no evidence that anyone in the ancient world ever achieved this. Have we any evidence that it was achieved even in Napoleonic or later cavalry?

Jim