Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Justin Swanton]

We also have to consider the degree of 'good enough' that would be effective.  If the alignment were, say, 3-5 degrees out, would it invalidate the system?  I think not.  At Issus, Alexander's cavalry crossed the Pinarus at the gallop and still cut through the opposition with total effectiveness.  They also sliced through the Greek mercenaries from the flank, and do not seem to have needed a precise 90-degree alignment.

I suspect that to an extent they would have been able to plough their own furrow, having much the same effect if they attacked at a slight angle as if they went precisely between the files.  The reason is that in addition to the 3' per man frontal spacing an opposing infantry formation would also have 3' per man front-to-rear spacing (and for that matter a slightly over 4' per man diagonal spacing).  All that would really be needed would be to knock the skittles over in a slightly different direction.

This seems something of a revision Justin.  Previously, the horsemen had to hit the precise point mid-file where the shields touched.  Only that way could they spin the enemy out of the way, rather than collide.  Are you now conceding collisions may have been inevitable?  Your point about the Issus might lead you to pause.  Alexander in this case can't have made a precision manouever, yet was still successful.  If precision wasn't the key factor, what was?  A cavalryman like Nolan would have probably given an answer on the lines of elan, to which we could add leadership, weapon skills and horsemanship.  Our medieval man-at-arms would recognise these too.

And, once again, hoplites aren't wooden skittles.  They are armed with spears and shields and are capable of movement, which allows them both to counter attack and brace themselves.

The point is that a horse is not a go-kart. Approach an infantry line at a few degrees on either side of a right angle - making sure it still hits the point between two shields - and the animal gets the idea it is supposed to pass down the lane between files, which it proceeds to do without needing further direction from the rider, who can focus on more important things like sending the infantry to their ancestors.

Hoplites are not wooden skittles but they are ordinary men who, with or without armament, can be easily shoved to one side by a horse. Bracing won't help.

We have no evidence that anyone in the ancient world ever achieved this. Have we any evidence that it was achieved even in Napoleonic or later cavalry?

Jim

Sure, if we had evidence we wouldn't be having this discussion. It's a hypothetical exercise, examining if a wedge could operate in this way as opposed to if it did. Until someone digs up a scroll of An Introduction to Cavalry Tactics by Philip we are never going to know for certain if it was done. Napoleonic cavalry of course were differently armed and dealing with very different opponents.

[Patrick Waterson]

This seems something of a revision Justin.  Previously, the horsemen had to hit the precise point mid-file where the shields touched.  Only that way could they spin the enemy out of the way, rather than collide.  Are you now conceding collisions may have been inevitable?  Your point about the Issus might lead you to pause.  Alexander in this case can't have made a precision manouever, yet was still successful.  If precision wasn't the key factor, what was?  A cavalryman like Nolan would have probably given an answer on the lines of elan, to which we could add leadership, weapon skills and horsemanship.  Our medieval man-at-arms would recognise these too.

And, once again, hoplites aren't wooden skittles.  They are armed with spears and shields and are capable of movement, which allows them both to counter attack and brace themselves.

Not so much a revision as pointing out that there is more leeway in driving a wedge through a phalanx than a needle through a penny.  It is really beside the point whether the system was first explained with everything at utterly precise angles; if it had not been, the diagram would have been a series of blurs which, although perhaps more closely resembling real life in many ways, would not have been so clear and understandable.

We can of course attempt to get out protractors and vector diagrams and guesstimate the maximum angle of offcentredness that would still allow a wedge to cleave through its target without complications: on an individual basis this tends to be self-adjusting because the target tends to look (and face) directly towards a horseman coming in at him, so he sets up a roughly 90 degree impact even if the attacker is coming in at an angle.  Even better, because spacing between men in the hoplite phalanx is about the same all the way round, the geometry of domino effects will work at almost any angle provided the targets are facing the cavalry.

We may also remember that such anti-cavalry drill as is depicted in period representations (or at least those we have seen) was designed for use against cavalry with shorter weapons and would thus work against the hoplites when facing xyston-armed opponents.

I think Justin's point is that the Macedonian cavalry may well have trained with extreme precision.  In action, they would have required less precision than their training demanded.  This would give them an 'adaptation reserve', an over-capacity in skill, that would tend to cancel out the mini-friction elements of the battlefield and would mean they performed to the expected standard every time (except once, against the mercenaries at the Granicus, because of the unforeseen results of formation compression, or so I surmise).

[Jim Webster]

We have no evidence that anyone in the ancient world ever achieved this. Have we any evidence that it was achieved even in Napoleonic or later cavalry?

Jim

Sure, if we had evidence we wouldn't be having this discussion. It's a hypothetical exercise, examining if a wedge could operate in this way as opposed to if it did. Until someone digs up a scroll of An Introduction to Cavalry Tactics by Philip we are never going to know for certain if it was done. Napoleonic cavalry of course were differently armed and dealing with very different opponents.

But it's a meaningless hypothetical exercise because it flies in the face of all we know that can be done with horses. It has as much validity as arguing that men can run a mile in full plate armour across a muddy field in not much more than five minutes. It's hypothetically possible but don't attempt to use the hypothesis to look at Agincourt.
As for arguing that it wasn't done, defending a theory based on there being no contrary evidence is not popular in scientific circles.
Let us simply look at the facts, if cavalry cheerfully knocked infantry out of the way like so many skittles why on earth did they bother with wedges, because in a line each horse is the point of a wedge of one, followed by another line of wedges. In a wedge, the succeeding horses add no weight, all a wedge does is delay the skittle effect.
Similarly if this 'just ride down the files' is so obviously successful why the hell did countless generations of perfectly competent horsemen who'd spent their lives in the saddle wait about whilst horsearchers (or other javelinmen) desperately tried to create a few gaps to charge in. Were they all just incomparably thick or was Philip the man who suddenly woke up in the middle of the night and woke whichever wife he was with at the time with the shout of "Of course, we've being doing it wrong all these centuries."

Jim

PS and edited to add that then you have to explain away why half way through Alexander's reign it was declared unsporting and was never done again

[Erpingham]

We can of course attempt to get out protractors and vector diagrams and guesstimate the maximum angle of offcentredness that would still allow a wedge to cleave through its target without complications: on an individual basis this tends to be self-adjusting because the target tends to look (and face) directly towards a horseman coming in at him, so he sets up a roughly 90 degree impact even if the attacker is coming in at an angle.  Even better, because spacing between men in the hoplite phalanx is about the same all the way round, the geometry of domino effects will work at almost any angle provided the targets are facing the cavalry.

I'm not the one arguing about geometry - I'm the cleaver rather than scalpel one.  Like Jim, I'm very sceptical of combat techniques which rely on the battlefield for a precision even well-trained troops would struggle with on the drill field. As hinted at in my previous post, I think elan and leadership were the key things in the success of Alexander's Companions, along with a mental shift to seeing themselves as shock cavalry, not glorified skirmishers.  Yes, the xyston plays an important role but isn't the key.  But I'm unconvinced the discovery of a magic tactic before which all men were powerless but which was forgotten after Alexander's reign plays a part.

[Justin Swanton]

But it's a meaningless hypothetical exercise because it flies in the face of all we know that can be done with horses. It has as much validity as arguing that men can run a mile in full plate armour across a muddy field in not much more than five minutes. It's hypothetically possible but don't attempt to use the hypothesis to look at Agincourt.

We're not asking if a horse can do the manifestly impossible, and the hypothesis is well within the range of what a horse can be trained to do.

As for arguing that it wasn't done, defending a theory based on there being no contrary evidence is not popular in scientific circles.

But proposing a theory to explain textual evidence that affirms cavalry did attack heavy infantry in a wedge formation is useful. If one can show that a cavalry wedge taking out a hoplite phalanx is possible, then one has a reason for accepting the passages in their obvious and most natural sense.

Let us simply look at the facts, if cavalry cheerfully knocked infantry out of the way like so many skittles why on earth did they bother with wedges, because in a line each horse is the point of a wedge of one, followed by another line of wedges. In a wedge, the succeeding horses add no weight, all a wedge does is delay the skittle effect.

I covered this point earlier. A wedge can do something a line cannot: aim at a precise point. The leading rider of the frontmost file heads for the gap between two shields; the leading riders of the files further back aim for the correct gap points further along the infantry line.

Similarly if this 'just ride down the files' is so obviously successful why the hell did countless generations of perfectly competent horsemen who'd spent their lives in the saddle wait about whilst horsearchers (or other javelinmen) desperately tried to create a few gaps to charge in. Were they all just incomparably thick or was Philip the man who suddenly woke up in the middle of the night and woke whichever wife he was with at the time with the shout of "Of course, we've being doing it wrong all these centuries."

The real question is why didn't someone before Philip come up with the idea that if you give your infantry longer spears than their opponents your men can form a human hedgehog and turn anyone in front of them into a pincushion? The Macedonian phalangite made all forms of infantryman before him obsolete, but he was invented only after - what - 3000 years of organised warfare?

The truth is that good ideas can take a very long time to think up. Everyone knows that hot air rises, but it had to wait for the Montgolfier brothers before something as simple as a hot air balloon was invented. My own impression is that with the arrival of Rome all the creative thinking re military armament and tactics was exhausted. Everything afterwards until the invention of gunpowder was variations on a theme. During the era of Philip though a lot of innovation was going on.

PS and edited to add that then you have to explain away why half way through Alexander's reign it was declared unsporting and was never done again

Against the Macedonian phalanx this tactic was ineffective and once everyone had adopted the phalanx it became obsolete.

[Jim Webster]

But it's a meaningless hypothetical exercise because it flies in the face of all we know that can be done with horses. It has as much validity as arguing that men can run a mile in full plate armour across a muddy field in not much more than five minutes. It's hypothetically possible but don't attempt to use the hypothesis to look at Agincourt.

We're not asking if a horse can do the manifestly impossible, and the hypothesis is well within the range of what a horse can be trained to do.

Sorry but have you any evidence groups of thousands of horses being trained to charge unbroken close order infantry frontally?

When you look at those later knights who charged into unbroken Swiss pike blocks the one thing you notice is that they had full armour
This includes eye protection, (and probably the equivilent of blinkers worn under that if only to protect the eye from the armour) so the horse had less idea about what was going on than the rider.

To base a hypothesis on something which is not known to be possible and has never been shown to be possible is a waste of time.
Rather than worrying about geometry how about showing some evidence that the core of your hypothesis is at all possible
Note you are not "proposing a theory to explain textual evidence that affirms cavalry did attack heavy infantry in a wedge formation"
There is no textual evidence to show that Macedonian cavalry did this against Hoplites at Chaeronea, there is no textual evidence to show that Macedonian cavalry were even present at Chaeronea.
 
For the whole wedge thing, it's main advantage seems to be ease of maneuvering on the battlefield.
Then you stop to think about it, a line is merely a long string of one horse wedges.
In a line each one has enough space within the space given him to swerve a foot to either side to hit the gap and run down the files if this is actually possible, we have to get over the wargamers assumption that stuff is glued to the base.
With your wedge you actually build this ability for the following files to have this flexibility, otherwise if the lead horse gets it wrong the entire wedge stops, embarrassed and glares at the poor sap at the point who misjudged it and brought them all to a juddering halt


The reason it didn't happen before Philip is because competent horsemen knew what could and couldn't be done.
The reason Philip didn't do it is because he'd had a lifetime amongst horses and knew what they would and wouldn't do.

Jim

[Erpingham]

But proposing a theory to explain textual evidence that affirms cavalry did attack heavy infantry in a wedge formation is useful. If one can show that a cavalry wedge taking out a hoplite phalanx is possible, then one has a reason for accepting the passages in their obvious and most natural sense.

Did we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry attacked heavy infantry in wedge formation?  The wedge evidence I've seen so far is from tactical manuals that says the Macedonian cavalry used it, mainly for manoeuver advantage but also for penetration of enemy formations (type unspecified).  Patrick has a rather literal interpretation of some passages about Chaeronea as referring to a wedge but this is speculation.  There don't seem to have been any other references to wedges and infantry, just inference, so part of a case rather evidence.

[Patrick Waterson]

Did we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry attacked heavy infantry in wedge formation?  The wedge evidence I've seen so far is from tactical manuals that says the Macedonian cavalry used it, mainly for manoeuver advantage but also for penetration of enemy formations (type unspecified).  Patrick has a rather literal interpretation of some passages about Chaeronea as referring to a wedge but this is speculation.  There don't seem to have been any other references to wedges and infantry, just inference, so part of a case rather evidence.

This may be the wrong kind of question: do we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry of this period attacked heavy infantry in line formation?  For that matter, do we have a specific reference to Roman soldiers throwing pila point-first?  Macedonian cavalry are on occasion specified as entering wedge (embolos), e.g. Arrian I.6.6, and it seems reasonable to surmise that this was their standard attack formation.  Our sources' sources most probably took it for granted and so did not make a point of specifying the fact.

One thing we can do is narrow possible options down to a limited range of likely choices.  In the case of Chaeronea, Alexander either led an infantry assault or a cavalry assault to break through the Theban Sacred Band.  Putting him with an infantry assault requires (at least in my judgement) uncomfortably straining our sources and our knowledge of Macedonian tactics and customs whereas putting him at the head of a cavalry assault does not (it does strain our beliefs about cavalry-infantry relationships but these are mostly founded on different cultures).  Furthermore, extrapolating back from the fact that in every major battle against a Persian army (Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela) Alexander charged hoplites at the head of his cavalry, one can see him doing the same at Chaeronea.  Same army, same tactical system, same type of opponent.

The one speculative part of the arrangement is how it would have worked.  Objecting to aspects of this is all well and good provided it is rationally done and it may be that the proposed model was not the way things actually worked.  It nevertheless seems good enough to me pending a better suggestion, given the hoplite tactics portrayed in art and the novelty of cavalry whose weapons outreached those of the hoplites, plus taking account of the quality of Macedonian cavalry.

While on the subject of asking the wrong kind of question:

Sorry but have you any evidence [of] groups of thousands of horses being trained to charge unbroken close order infantry frontally?

Well, one could go on about a stampede, natural herd instinct and so on, but the stipulation is unrealistic.  Macedonian cavalry would have trained in their basic fighting units, the c.200-man ilai.  200 men and 200 horses (trained fighting men and warhorses) would have much training and long experience of operating together as a unit.  They would also be accustomed to have the other ilai charging at their side, and they could be expected to have a very high degree of individual and collective horsemanship.

On the matter of horses, listen very carefully for I shall say this only once.   Horses do what they are trained to do.  In the late mediaeval era some were even trained to jump ranks of enemy soldiers (I am sure Anthony can give us details and caveats regarding this practice).  What an untrained horse does in the 21st century or did in any previous century is not really relevant.  What trained horses can or could do is.  (Cue debate on stunt animals ...)

There is no textual evidence to show that Macedonian cavalry did this against Hoplites at Chaeronea, there is no textual evidence to show that Macedonian cavalry were even present at Chaeronea.

There is of course no textual evidence to show that they did not.  However on the subject of Macedonian cavalry being present, might I put in a word from that Sicilian fellow Diodorus?

"So Philip failed to get the support of the Boeotians, but nevertheless decided to fight both of the allies together. He waited for the last of his laggard confederates to arrive, and then marched into Boeotia. His forces came to more than thirty thousand infantry and no less than two thousand cavalry." - Diodorus XVI.85.5

The reason it didn't happen before Philip is because competent horsemen knew what could and couldn't be done.
The reason Philip didn't do it is because he'd had a lifetime amongst horses and knew what they would and wouldn't do.

I could be cruel and put Jim to specific proof that 'it' a) could not be done and b) did not occur.  After all, if I am asked to substantiate a hypothesis it is only fair that my fellow SoA member be asked to substantiate an assertion.

[Jim Webster]

Did we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry attacked heavy infantry in wedge formation?  The wedge evidence I've seen so far is from tactical manuals that says the Macedonian cavalry used it, mainly for manoeuver advantage but also for penetration of enemy formations (type unspecified).  Patrick has a rather literal interpretation of some passages about Chaeronea as referring to a wedge but this is speculation.  There don't seem to have been any other references to wedges and infantry, just inference, so part of a case rather evidence.

This may be the wrong kind of question: do we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry of this period attacked heavy infantry in line formation?  For that matter, do we have a specific reference to Roman soldiers throwing pila point-first?  Macedonian cavalry are on occasion specified as entering wedge (embolos), e.g. Arrian I.6.6, and it seems reasonable to surmise that this was their standard attack formation.  Our sources' sources most probably took it for granted and so did not make a point of specifying the fact.

One thing we can do is narrow possible options down to a limited range of likely choices.  In the case of Chaeronea, Alexander either led an infantry assault or a cavalry assault to break through the Theban Sacred Band.  Putting him with an infantry assault requires (at least in my judgement) uncomfortably straining our sources and our knowledge of Macedonian tactics and customs

What evidence to we have of Macedonian tactics prior to 334BC that Macedonian Kings/Crown Princes could not lead infantry?
But yes, putting an ephebe in the front rank of any combat strains everything we know of Hellenic warfare and we've no real reason to assume the Macedonians were any different

To your comment "I could be cruel and put Jim to specific proof that 'it' a) could not be done and b) did not occur.  After all, if I am asked to substantiate a hypothesis it is only fair that my fellow SoA member be asked to substantiate an assertion." I merely answer the following

I have spent a lot of time over the last few decades reading military history. I have not come across any examples of it happening therefore I assert that it probably didn't
Of course if you produce one example where it did happen,,,,

Jim


Jim

[Erpingham]

Did we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry attacked heavy infantry in wedge formation?  The wedge evidence I've seen so far is from tactical manuals that says the Macedonian cavalry used it, mainly for manoeuver advantage but also for penetration of enemy formations (type unspecified).  Patrick has a rather literal interpretation of some passages about Chaeronea as referring to a wedge but this is speculation.  There don't seem to have been any other references to wedges and infantry, just inference, so part of a case rather evidence.

This may be the wrong kind of question: do we have textual evidence that affirms cavalry of this period attacked heavy infantry in line formation?  For that matter, do we have a specific reference to Roman soldiers throwing pila point-first?  Macedonian cavalry are on occasion specified as entering wedge (embolos), e.g. Arrian I.6.6, and it seems reasonable to surmise that this was their standard attack formation.  Our sources' sources most probably took it for granted and so did not make a point of specifying the fact.

Forgive me, but I do think it is the right question.  If absence of specific evidence is positive evidence that something happened, then we are doing it wrong.  We are speculating for much of this (as Justin himself keeps reminding us) - it is about plausibility.  And it has been said before, we have different conceptions of the weight we should place on things when judging what is plausible.

[Patrick Waterson]

Forgive me, but I do think it is the right question.  If absence of specific evidence is positive evidence that something happened, then we are doing it wrong.  We are speculating for much of this (as Justin himself keeps reminding us) - it is about plausibility.  And it has been said before, we have different conceptions of the weight we should place on things when judging what is plausible.

The question seems to distil down to whether the more reasonable of a pair of alternative explanations should be discarded because there seems to be no explicit quote either in its favour or against it.  Were there an explicit quote either way this thread would not have been started: in order to get anywhere with the topic we have to sift and assemble clues and extrapolate trends.  Having done this, the Alexander-led-a-cavalry-wedge-in-a-frontal-attack explanation seems to me to be way ahead of the alternatives, and the objections to it, when not limited to unvarnished opinion, have so far tended to bring up evidence which favours this having been the case.  Discarding it for lack of explicit support when it seems well favoured with implicit support seems to me as myopic as it would be to accept it uncritically for lack of explicit opposition.

But yes, putting an ephebe in the front rank of any combat strains everything we know of Hellenic warfare and we've no real reason to assume the Macedonians were any different

We have every reason to assume that Macedonians were different.  Their culture was different (they did not have the polis as their major social and administrative unit), their language seems to have been different*, their political system was different (monarchy), their army was different (relying on cavalry with infantry as afterthoughts).  Once they got going we no longer had Hellenic warfare, but Hellenistic warfare - a rather different approach.

*There is a long-running dispute over this, with opposite parties citing on the one hand Plutarch's Alexander 51.4:

"But one of his body-guards, Aristophanes, conveyed it away before he could lay hands on it, and the rest surrounded him and begged him to desist, whereupon he sprang to his feet and called out in Macedonian speech a summons to his corps of guards (and this was a sign of great disturbance), and ordered the trumpeter to sound, and smote him with his fist because he hesitated and was unwilling to do so."

and on the other the use of Greek by Macedonian kings in their decrees.

[Jim Webster]

The question seems to distil down to whether the more reasonable of a pair of alternative explanations should be discarded because there seems to be no explicit quote either in its favour or against it. 

I'm suggesting that it should be discarded not because there is no explicit quote, but that there is no explicit quote which allows us to state that something happened that never happened before and that appears never to have happened again in the history of mounted warfare. The 'reasonable' explanation demands that Philip discovered a technique that he used only once, that Alexander might have used once with less success and that was never used again, and was never rediscovered by tens if not hundreds of thousands of cavalry commanders in the approximately 1800 years that followed. Even through they had the same problem to deal with.

This secondary issue is explained away by saying that the Companions were uniquely professional, even through the ones who fought under Philip would not have spent as long under arms as those who fought on Alexander's campaigns or those who fought under some of the Successors and certainly didn't train and drill to anything like the extent of the men of a Roman Cavalry Ala.

And as for the fact that 'Horses do what they are trained to do', fine. Let us have an example that shows them charging into elite, ordered spear armed units from the front and riding them down.

A hypothesis which does not advance with regular underpinnings of evidence drawn from fact is void.

As for Macedonians being different, yes, fair enough, but the descriptions of the battles come from Greek authors, and when they say a General led his men to victory, Generals can do this without drawing a sword.
Given the point that
1) there was no mention of any cavalry fighting or charging infantry
2) Alexander was 17 and even Spartan kings fought with a front rank of bodyguard

I think it follows the literary evidence, with less need to spin a hypothesis which demands things to happen that never happened before and were never to happen again, that the Theban Sacred Band where defeated by Phalangites. It might be that the Phalanx was composed of an elite bodyguard given to Alexander for the day,perhaps the foot companions had been split between Philip and Alexander.
Alexander could well have been in their ranks, he might have been near the front, but probably not too near the front because there were far better fighters available and things hadn't got that desperate that the muscle, power and experience of a seventeen year old were necessary

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

I'm suggesting that it should be discarded not because there is no explicit quote, but that there is no explicit quote which allows us to state that something happened that never happened before and that appears never to have happened again in the history of mounted warfare. The 'reasonable' explanation demands that Philip discovered a technique that he used only once, that Alexander might have used once with less success and that was never used again, and was never rediscovered by tens if not hundreds of thousands of cavalry commanders in the approximately 1800 years that followed. Even through they had the same problem to deal with.

But here is the nub of the matter: they did not have the same problem to deal with.  The hoplite had effectively vanished from warfare, never to return.  Throughout the Hellenistic era, the infantry who mattered were pikemen, whose reach prevented cavalry from making effective frontal attacks.

Can anyone remember why WRG rules decided that super-heavy cataphracts (read 'cataphracts') were effective frontally against pikes?  Was this based on some form of reasoning or just taken as given for reasons unknown?

This secondary issue is explained away by saying that the Companions were uniquely professional, even through the ones who fought under Philip would not have spent as long under arms as those who fought on Alexander's campaigns or those who fought under some of the Successors and certainly didn't train and drill to anything like the extent of the men of a Roman Cavalry Ala.

Philip reigned from 359 to 336 BC; Alexander from 336 to 323.  Philip's cavalrymen had the potential for longer experience (he would have developed his cavalry following his success at the Crocus Field in 353/2 BC, giving his men up to 14 years' experience prior to Chaeronea; Alexander's reign lasted 13 years).  We should perhaps remember that the majority of Successor cavalry were cleruchs whose efforts were diverted by their landholdings, whereas Philip's cavalry, being essentially noble, could pass this boring stuff on to lesser mortals and enjoy themselves on horseback rather more.

And as for the fact that 'Horses do what they are trained to do', fine. Let us have an example that shows them charging into elite, ordered spear armed units from the front and riding them down.

Chaeronea.  Out of interest, how many elite, ordered spear-armed units where there?  Apart from the Sacred Band, presumably only Spartans qualify, which means it is a pity we do not have a detailed account of the 'battle of mice' fought near Megalopolis by Antipater against Agis (III) in 331 BC.  (Curiously enough, Diodorus records Agis as being slain by javelins after being carried wounded from the battle.)  Unless one can count Darius' mercenary Greeks as 'elite' and 'ordered' it also means this is a rather loaded and narrow request. 

As for Macedonians being different, yes, fair enough, but the descriptions of the battles come from Greek authors, and when they say a General led his men to victory, Generals can do this without drawing a sword.

But Macedonian generals did so at the head of their troops.  Greek authors would not transfer 21st century attitudes into Macedonian culture.  Whence comes this idea that Macedonian heirs were cosseted?

I think it follows the literary evidence, with less need to spin a hypothesis which demands things to happen that never happened before and were never to happen again, that the Theban Sacred Band where defeated by Phalangites. It might be that the Phalanx was composed of an elite bodyguard given to Alexander for the day,perhaps the foot companions had been split between Philip and Alexander.

Using the standards set as a hurdle for the cavalry wedge attack proposal:

1) there was no mention of any infantry fighting or charging infantry
2) Alexander was 17 and even Spartan kings fought with a front rank of bodyguard

so he could not have been 'first' through the Theban line and this idea thus contradicts our sources, i.e. there is literary evidence against it.

Furthermore, the Alex-was-in-a-phalanx hypothesis hangs on one word - sarissas - used in connection with the demise of the Sacred Band.  We note that the word does not appear in Greek prior to the rise of Macedon (if it does I could not find it), which suggests it is not a Greek word.  If it is a Macedonian word, it may be the Macedonian equivalent of the Greek doru, the generalised spear word, and hence able to refer to both cavalry's and infantry's long pointy sticks.  The existence of a Macedonian contingent named 'sarissophoroi' in any event allows us to suggest that Alexander could have led this unit against the Sacred Band, so either way there are no literary problems with the cavalry wedge.

[Jim Webster]

I'm suggesting that it should be discarded not because there is no explicit quote, but that there is no explicit quote which allows us to state that something happened that never happened before and that appears never to have happened again in the history of mounted warfare. The 'reasonable' explanation demands that Philip discovered a technique that he used only once, that Alexander might have used once with less success and that was never used again, and was never rediscovered by tens if not hundreds of thousands of cavalry commanders in the approximately 1800 years that followed. Even through they had the same problem to deal with.

But here is the nub of the matter: they did not have the same problem to deal with.  The hoplite had effectively vanished from warfare, never to return.  Throughout the Hellenistic era, the infantry who mattered were pikemen, whose reach prevented cavalry from making effective frontal attacks.

And were then replaced by Legionaries who were from the cavalry's point of view inferior hoplites with no pike to prevent cavalry just riding down the files.
But the cavalry had forgotten how to do this and never remembered again

Your second point
"Philip reigned from 359 to 336 BC; Alexander from 336 to 323.  Philip's cavalrymen had the potential for longer experience (he would have developed his cavalry following his success at the Crocus Field in 353/2 BC, giving his men up to 14 years' experience prior to Chaeronea; Alexander's reign lasted 13 years).  We should perhaps remember that the majority of Successor cavalry were cleruchs whose efforts were diverted by their landholdings, whereas Philip's cavalry, being essentially noble, could pass this boring stuff on to lesser mortals and enjoy themselves on horseback rather more."

Actually a lot of Philips men were Cleruchs, he is recorded as handing out land to support men. And since when did being a noble mean you had time to do more drill? If that was so the best drilled cavalry of all time would have been in Medieval France

Chaeronea? We have no evidence that cavalry was even involved in the fighting!

The Alexander as phalangite hypothesis hangs on three facts
1) We KNOW that phalangites were involved in the fighting
2) We have NO evidence that cavalry were involved fighting the sacred band or that Philip or Alexander fought on horseback that day
3) There is a reference, made by a greek at least three hundred years afterwards, that the wounds were made by Sarissas. As the only sarissophoroi we appear to know of were (and I think Duncan said this) light cavalry scouts, then according to you Alexander charged not at the head of the companions but at the head of a bunch of light cavalry.
If light cavalry could take down elite hoplites you can see why they rapidly disappeared from the army and the nobility who made up the companions ensured that the histories were very vaguely written :-)

Jim

[Jim Webster]

so he could not have been 'first' through the Theban line and this idea thus contradicts our sources, i.e. there is literary evidence against it.

As for Alexander being 'First' through the Theban line, I wouldn't put too much (or any) weight on this.
Legends accumulated around Alexander very quickly. Remember that Onesicritus who was apparently with the army, recorded the tale of Thalestris and Alexander. When it was told in the presence of Lycimachus the latter is said to have laughed and commented that he must have been off duty that night.

To try and re-write the history of cavalry warfare based on a throw away line about Alexander being first  through a line is nonsense. Remember that at the very least it was written by somebody looking back on Alexander the God, so of course he'd be first through the line.

Jim